30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/1

Resolution of the European Committee of the Regions on the State of the Regions and Cities in the European Union

(2022/C 498/01)

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

HAVING REGARD TO:

—

its report EU Annual Report on the State of Regions and Cities, based on an inclusive, factual and evidence-driven approach, including the regional and local barometer echoing the views of local and regional representatives, involving multiple partners and institutions (1) and providing political decision-makers at European, national, regional and local level with evidence and key recommendations on the most pressing challenges for the year ahead;

—	the outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) and the many proposals of direct relevance to local and regional authorities, who are key in delivering solutions to the citizens’ concerns;

—	the 2022 State of the Union address given by the President of the European Commission on 14 September 2022 and the letter of intent to the Presidents of the European Parliament and of the Council;

WHEREAS:

—

the illegal and unjustified Russian war on Ukraine has caused and is causing death and destruction, forcing millions of people to leave their homes either for another settlement in Ukraine or for the European Union, and in particular its eastern Member States, with local and regional authorities being the first level for providing support;

—

adding to the impact of climate change, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and trade disruptions, the impact of the war in Ukraine is also putting under great strain many households, small and medium enterprises and local and regional governments across the EU, given the substantial additional pressure of energy and food prices and continuously rising inflation;

Stresses that the CoR EU Annual Report on the State of Regions and Cities worryingly shows a growing territorial divide across the EU as a consequence of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and accelerating climate change;

Regrets that the President of the European Commission in her State of the Union address did neither recognise the active and central role of local and regional authorities in addressing these challenges nor the need for more multi-level governance in EU policymaking and for making cohesion the overall objective of the EU, as foreseen already in the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced the principle of subsidiarity and also established the CoR;

Warns that inflation is impacting territories unequally and risks further exacerbating existing territorial, social and economic inequalities. Higher energy and transport costs are more severely impacting vulnerable groups of citizens. People in lower-income regions suffer disproportionally from price increases for basic goods and commodities, with a risk of poverty looming;

Stresses the importance of cross-border cooperation in order to further strengthen the EU socially, economically and administratively. A third of the EU’s population lives in border regions, with larger cities or economic centres often on the other side of the border. This untapped potential in the areas of healthcare, crisis management, energy supply, mobility, education and work must be better used and separately promoted;

Calls on the European Union to support cities and regions in the EU and in Ukraine to face the challenges deriving from the war. Rebuilding Ukraine is a necessity, a moral duty and an investment for the European Union. The process must follow the OECD’s ‘build back better’ principle and ensure sustainable, green and digital approaches for integrated territorial development. Rebuilding Ukraine and the repercussions of the war and the pandemic in the EU will require a clear reprioritisation in the current Multiannual Financial Framework. The EU's municipalities, regions and Member States are already in financially strained circumstances. Rebuilding Ukraine also needs to go hand in hand with promoting local democracy based on strong partnerships with local and regional authorities in the European Union. A decentralised reconstruction process would also give Ukrainian citizens a perspective to stay in their country and thereby moderate further migration flows. At the same time, the CoR rejects impediments on the immigration of Ukrainian citizens and requests a revision of Council Directive 2001/55/EC (2) on Temporary Protection as soon as possible in order to provide refugees with a residence guarantee of more than three years;

Considers that the support for Ukrainian refugees should be an incentive for achieving a reform of the EU migration and asylum system based on solidarity, incentives for fair burden-sharing and respect for fundamental rights as well as the protection of external borders. This is all the more urgent given that soaring food prices worldwide may provoke an influx of migrants to the EU’s cities and regions;

Underlines that local and regional governments are also hit by skyrocketing energy bills for public services and the effects of inflation on public procurement and salaries. Local and regional authorities need to be considered active partners in energy saving campaigns, in new renewable energy generating projects, as well as in energy disruption contingency plans in order to consider local circumstances and cross-border solutions; Also points at the potential of local renewable energy production in order to diversify the EU’s energy mix and reduce our dependence on third countries and demands that EU funding schemes, public procurement and state aid rules be adapted to also keep local investment plans operational in high inflation time;

Calls on the EU institutions and Member States to deploy extraordinary measures to support local and regional authorities in their efforts to alleviate the effect of the energy crunch on households, vulnerable communities and local small and medium-sized enterprises and keep public services operational, including by allocating to them a share of the tax revenues received from the windfall profits of energy companies;

Calls on the European Commission to propose without delay an EU-wide price cap on all gas imports to the European Union and to support decoupling of the price between gas and energy, which would help to mitigate the inflationary pressure;

10.

Calls on the European Union to develop an EU health policy, respecting the principle of subsidiarity, that strengthens the EU's crisis preparedness and ability to address health threats, and supports municipalities’ and regions’ efforts to improve public health, prevent disease and reduce health risks;

11.

Understands that cities and regions must be given the opportunity to make the most of Next Generation EU and focus on long-term investments. To do so, economic governance rules need to be reassessed and the timeframe for the recovery measures should be extended until EU regions return to their pre-COVID-19 macro-economic situation;

12.

In this context, since the COVID-19 pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine are hindering our regions and cities from a strong recovery, we urge the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament to modify financial regulations, in the direction of extending REACT-EU projects’ certification deadlines, in line with the RRF calendar, to ensure an in-depth recovery in our territories by optimising the use of European financing;

13.

Welcomes against this background the announcement by the President of the European Commission to effectively implement a mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework. This mid-term review should consolidate cohesion policy despite its current implementation rate and the low financial execution, which mainly relates to the COVID-19 pandemic and competition with the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Also, this mid-term review should be an occasion to set up a new European fund to tackle, following the shared-management methodology, unexpected crises, starting with the war in Ukraine. Indeed, continuous financial transfers from cohesion policy to emergency responses hamper the capacity of cohesion policy to fulfil its role enshrined in the European Treaties;

14.

Calls for the reflections on the future of cohesion policy to be immediately initiated, with an inclusive approach involving all stakeholders and citizens. The Cohesion Alliance will act as the joint platform for discussion and exchange involving the EU institutions in a constructive dialogue with cities and regions. The CoR calls for the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle to be applied in all relevant EU policies, including by implementing systematic territorial impact assessments and addressing development gaps in territories with specific demographic and geographic challenges, and calls on the European Commission to work closely with the CoR in defining this principle;

15.

Agrees with the European Parliament to move forward an Islands Pact and an European Union Agenda for Islands, with the participation of the principal stakeholders, namely national, regional and local authorities, economic and social operators, civil society, academia and non-governmental organisations, along the lines of the Urban Pact and the future Rural Pact; and reminds the Commission of the necessity to carry out a study on the diverse situation of island territories of the European Union;

16.

Highlights that 43 % of European citizens put local and regional authorities at the core of climate action (a 10 % increase from 2019 to 2021, across COVID-19 lockdown and recovery) and that 160 cities across 21 Member States have submitted action plans on adaptation within the framework of the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy. The CoR calls on other municipalities and regions to follow these best-practice examples;

17.

Considers that adaptation and the response to the climate crisis, as well as environmental preservation and restoration, are key elements in building more resilient and sustainable societies and economies and response measures need to be designed locally, according to the specific needs and characteristics of the territories. The CoR therefore reiterates its call for easier access to EU funds to local and regional authorities implementing Green Deal policies;

18.

Calls for the common efforts to fight climate change to be reinforced at European Union and national level, with natural disasters affecting nearly 50 million people in the EU and causing on average an economic loss of EUR 12 billion per year over the last forty years. At the same time, it is more and more important to couple climate, environmental and social policies to ensure that, while speeding up the needed green transition, nobody and no place is left behind. In this regard, it underlines the need of protecting, revising and adapting regional and local infrastructures to better cope with intensified climate phenomena whose impact affects citizens, regional economies, key infrastructures and supply chains;

19.

Welcomes the announcement of the European Commission President in her State of the Union Address to double the EU's firefighting capacity;

20.

Notes the strong interest of cities to take part in the EU's Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities Mission and calls for a more inclusive approach to the digital and mobility transitions, including by stepping up measures to promote decarbonisation and modal shift in urban areas, as well as urban-rural connectivity, to avoid further exacerbating existing regional inequalities;

21.

Calls for the sub-national authorities to be fully included in the EU delegation to the UNFCCC COP27 and the UN CBD COP15 via the members of the CoR. The CoR stresses that the COP27 will be an opportunity to formally recognise the role for local and regional authorities for an increased level of ambition and accelerated action on climate mitigation, adaptation and finance and reiterates the call for the inclusion of local and regional contributions as a complement to Nationally Determined Contributions;

22.

Asks for a thorough revision of the Governance of the Energy Union Regulation to set the basis for a systematic engagement of cities and regions in the planning and implementation of national energy and climate plans. This revision should also be the opportunity to set up a comprehensive EU framework to fight against energy and mobility poverty;

23.

Stresses the importance of National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs) under the RRF in supporting the green and digital transition and in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. With cities responsible for nearly 75 % of global energy consumption, 70 % of global CO2 emissions, 70 % of climate mitigation measures and 90 % of climate adaptation measures, and with a quickly increasing number of local and regional authorities committed to act, they must become full-fledged partners in the development and implementation of Green Deal initiatives, especially in policy areas such as housing, the renovation of buildings, renewable energy, sustainable mobility or urban greening and in initiatives such as the New European Bauhaus;

24.

Reiterates in this context its call for a European Housing Strategy aimed at boosting affordable, sustainable, social and emergency housing. This Strategy, which shall be compliant with the subsidiarity principle, should in particular include in the European Semester and the National Reform Programmes a quantitative national public investment target for affordable, sustainable, social and emergency housing in all EU Member States, facilitate access to private investments by including affordable, social and emergency housing in the future EU social taxonomy;

25.

Reaffirms the need to involve local and regional authorities in the evaluation and implementation of the RRF and NRRPs in order to also ensure the consistent use of the recovery funds with European Structural and Investment Funds. Despite the instrument's legal basis in cohesion policy, this involvement has proven far too limited in many Member States, creating pitfalls for effective implementation and the risk that nationally-defined plans lack synergies with regional and local priorities and development strategies;

26.

Highlights the persisting and significant innovation divide. Of the 20 regions with the greatest research and development (R&D) spending, 19 are more developed, whereas two-thirds of the 50 regions with the lowest spending are less developed. The CoR underlines the great potential of the pilot action for Partnerships for Regional Innovation to support the development of place-based solutions and the creation of bottom-up ‘territorial missions’ as part of the New EU Innovation Agenda while reiterating the importance of the European Research Area (ERA) Hubs;

27.

Emphasises the role of digital transformation as a cross-cutting element in overcoming the divide in Europe and the need for digital cohesion. With the new ‘mission approach’ to policymaking, cohesion policy needs to continue to support long-term goals (EU objectives) into the future. Bridging digital divides through comprehensive and inclusive strategies involving all levels of government is necessary for a sustainable recovery and resilient societies;

28.

Stresses that, in 2021, the average unemployment rate for young people aged 15–29 in the EU was 13 %, a 0,9 percentage point decrease over 2020 with important regional differences, with youth unemployment rates higher in Spanish, Greek and Italian regions. Against this background, the CoR urges the European Commission to come forward with proposals to address long-term unemployment and youth unemployment, both exacerbated as a result of the crisis. Emphasises, by the same token, the urgency to address gender gaps in employment. Further warns against growing risks of poverty, including child poverty;

29.

Welcomes the call by the President of the European Commission for more inter-generational solidarity and stresses the leading role of the CoR in engaging with young people and youth organisations to shape the future of Europe, notably by developing an EU charter on youth and democracy;

30.

Takes note that in the period 2011–2020, the share of women elected to all political levels increased, from local to national level, but regrets that they still account for only a third of the total across all levels. In 2021, only 16 out of 285 regional assemblies in the EU achieved parity in the candidates elected. The CoR acknowledges that its membership is also far from being gender-balanced and expects the Member States to address this issue. The CoR therefore will launch reflections on how to increase women’s participation in its work, its leading positions and its composition, and calls on the Member States to organise initiatives aimed at empowering women in local and regional politics to overcome the discrimination in the political world and fighting the obstacles women encounter through their path, including stereotypes;

31.

Urges Member States to put in place, with the full involvement of local and regional authorities, all the necessary measures to promptly attain the goal set by the EU Directive on combatting violence against women and domestic violence; emphasises by the same token the importance of all EU Member States ratifying the Istanbul Convention, the Council of Europe treaty that seeks to create a comprehensive framework at pan-European level to protect women against all forms of violence, and prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence against women and domestic violence;

32.

Considers the role of municipalities and regions as employers and as providers and commissioners of welfare services to be crucial for social cohesion, gender equality and employment in Europe. There needs to be robust involvement by social partners, municipalities and regions in both the development and the implementation of EU initiatives in the social field, in order to ensure that the measures have an appropriate and genuine impact on the implementation of the Action Plan on the European Pillar of Social Rights. The European Semester plays a crucial role here, and the local and regional level must have ownership of the decisions and responsibility for how the common objectives are to be achieved. A territorial dimension and the Sustainable Development Goals should also be included in a reform of the European Semester;

33.

Supports the call of the European Parliament and of the President of the European Commission in the State of the Union for a Convention to revise the Treaties. The CoR should be fully involved in the Convention, to represent local and regional European elected representatives, and is fully committed to promoting the concept of active subsidiarity and engaging more with regional parliaments and associations of local and regional authorities. Multi-level governance is a must for an inclusive and effective EU decision making process, with particular attention to regions with legislative powers and their legitimate competences. The CoR welcomes in this context the European Commission's announcement to mainstream citizens’ assemblies and other practices of participatory democracy in EU policy making stressing, however, the role of democratically-elected representatives that are accountable towards their electorates, and commits to playing an active role in these processes;

34.

Intends to propose concrete measures to address the territorial dimension of European policies in the achievement of the EU's overall cohesion objective, also having regard to the CoFoE proposals and the specific needs of border regions and peripheral regions;

35.

Instructs its President to transmit the EU Annual Report on the State of Regions and Cities and the present resolution to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council, as well as to the Heads of State of the 27 EU Member States, and encourages regional and local elected representatives in Europe to disseminate the report to citizens and local media.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/Pages/State-of-Regions-and-Cities-2022.aspx?origin=spotlight

(2) Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12).

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/6

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Towards a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean

(2022/C 498/02)

Rapporteur:

Nikola DOBROSLAVIĆ (HR/EPP)

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

The contribution of macro-regional strategies to territorial cohesion, local democracy and cooperation at the external borders

considers that macro-regions play a key role in strengthening the economic, social, and territorial cohesion of the European Union and its close neighbourhood by empowering cross-border areas to address specific and shared challenges collectively, through exchange and cooperation and implementation;

stresses that this approach allows for greater coherence and complementarity between policies, actions, and funding programmes implemented by different government levels in a defined geographical area. In doing so, by promoting multilevel governance, macro-regions contribute to increased policy effectiveness and impact;

recalls that macro-regional strategies are based on the multi-level principle and that EU and non-EU regions must play a key role in their development, their construction and the definition of their common objectives alongside the EU Member States and other countries concerned;

notes that the Mediterranean area comprises several candidate and potential candidate countries as well as non-EU countries and stresses the importance of macro-regions in strengthening cooperation across EU borders. This collaboration is necessary in order to address common challenges and to also engage non-EU countries in a deeper and more enhanced cooperation with the Union;

recalls the adoption of the European Parliament resolution on 3 July 2012, entitled Developing EU macro-regional strategies: current practices and prospects for the future, in particular in the Mediterranean (1);

recalls the ARLEM report on ‘A Cohesion Strategy for the Mediterranean’ (2014), that outlines the premises of reflections for a macro-regional governance framework for the Mediterranean, based on the principles of multi-level governance and a progressive and geometry variable set-up;

recalls also that the Council of the European Union (2) has indicated that it is open to consideration of joint initiatives aimed at establishing new macro-regional strategies;

A Mediterranean macro-region, a key tool to address challenges in the Mediterranean

highlights the unique resources of the Mediterranean. With its 46 000 km of coastline and 22 riparian countries, it is home to more than 500 million people, with 1/3 of the population concentrated in coastal areas and some 150 million jobs directly linked to the Mediterranean Sea;

underlines the environmental importance of the Mediterranean Sea, which accounts for only 1 % of the world’s oceans, yet contributes 20 % of the world’s marine production (3). It is also one of the major reservoirs of marine and coastal biodiversity, with 28 % of endemic species, 7,5 % of wildlife and 18 % of global marine flora;

10.

stresses the potential of the Mediterranean basin, which is a coherent geographical area whose populations share a common historical and cultural heritage, resulting from a long tradition of collaboration and exchange of ideas, goods and people between its three shores;

11.

recognises that the Mediterranean basin faces governance, socio-economic, humanitarian, climate, security, and environmental challenges which call for joint action;

12.

stresses, as highlighted by the First Mediterranean Assessment Report on Climate and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean, released by MedECC, that all Mediterranean sub-regions are impacted by recent anthropogenic environmental changes, and that the main drivers of change include climate, population growth, pollution, unsustainable land and sea use practices, and non-indigenous species. In most areas, both ecosystems and human livelihoods are affected (4);

13.

points out that, at the current rate, global warming will reach 2,2 degrees in the Mediterranean area by 2040, while the region is warming at a rate 20 % faster than global average. The effects of climate change are already highly visible through the proliferation of extreme natural events. Thus, Mediterranean societies are suffering the most from climate change (already accounting for 50 % of the world’s water-poor population, with water scarcity affecting food security; 49 of the 51 UNESCO cultural sites are also at risk). Most of the climate change effects are amplified by other environmental challenges, such as overly intensified urbanization, agriculture, fishing, and tourism, land degradation, desertification, and pollution (air, soil, freshwater and seawater);

14.

highlights, as did the opinion Towards a sustainable use of natural resources in the Mediterranean island context, the very high vulnerability of Mediterranean islands in the context of global warming, which already has economic (fisheries, tourism, etc.) and social consequences (emigration, etc.) and recommends developing a specific approach to the impact of climate change at macro-regional level for this territory type, which will consider the particular needs of archipelagos and islands and foster closer cooperation between these territories, the Member States and the European Union in tackling environmental challenges and promoting sustainable development;

15.

highlights that, despite obvious commonalities, the Mediterranean area is characterised by wide disparities in development levels. These disparities, including weaknesses in institutional capacities, infrastructure interconnection and trade relations, affect the stability, prosperity, and security of Mediterranean societies;

16.

considers that the COVID-19 crisis is a reminder of the urgent need for a coordinated approach and strengthening of joint resilience to epidemics, economic shocks and climate change;

17.

maintains that the Mediterranean macro-region can also serve as a coordination tool for management of migratory flows which especially affect regional and local authorities on the external borders of the EU;

18.

reminds that, in view of the attack of Russia on Ukraine, the Mediterranean has a key role to play to mitigate the effects of the war, the greeting of displaced populations, while keeping its efforts to ensure progress toward peace building across its riparian territories;

19.

in the face of these challenges, affirms the need to bring together all three shores in a more integrated way in order to strengthen cohesion, increase the region’s Europe-wide and global weight and its innovation potential and contribute to human well-being and preservation of the environment;

20.

in this process, recognises the essential role of local and regional authorities, which are strongly mobilised through initiatives and networks such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), ARLEM (the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly) and the Mediterranean Cooperation Alliance (MedCoopAlliance) as well as the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR);

21.

points out that all challenges the Mediterranean area is facing (climate change, erosion, desertification, plastic pollution, migration, excess tourism, etc.) are concentrated in archipelagos and islands, and, for this reason, they represent ideal pilot territories for the implementation of integrated sustainable development policies in the Mediterranean and urges the European Commission to move forward with a basin-adjusted island strategy;

22.

agrees with the European Commission that the objectives of the European Green Deal should be reflected in close cooperation with neighbouring countries facing the same climate and environmental challenges;

23.

points out that local and regional authorities on the three shores, which play a major role in addressing climate change effects, have called for a ‘Mediterranean Green Deal’ (5);

24.

acknowledges the key role that local authorities (must) play as allies to regions and countries in the implementation of global and regional agendas;

25.

stresses also that a macro-regional strategy, promoting the strengthening of political dialogue, is essential for the implementation of the new Agenda for the Mediterranean, as set out in the European Commission’s communication of February 2021 For a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood (6);

Towards an integrated strategy for the entire Mediterranean basin

26.

welcomes the positive results and increased cooperation made possible by the commitment of stakeholders in the Mediterranean, and in particular local and regional authorities; calls these stakeholders, in particular local and regional authorities, to increase this cooperation in order to prepare the ground for the creation of a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean;

27.

appreciates the great progress made towards integration in the Mediterranean through the Adriatic-Ionian Macro-Regional Strategy (EUSAIR) and the WestMED Sea Basin Strategy;

28.

calls on the European Commission to progress further with the WestMED initiative as a matter of urgency, equipping it with resources, a solid structure and a long-term consolidation strategy, facilitating macro-regional integration in the western Mediterranean;

29.

stresses that the existing cooperation initiatives programmes and key players across the scale of multilevel governance must be better coordinated so as not to dilute their efforts and impact. It is therefore necessary for Mediterranean territories to finally have an operational instrument enabling them to develop and implement an integrated strategy, a concrete action plan, and joint projects, in response to common priorities identified in existing institutional frameworks for cooperation such as the UfM, ARLEM and initiatives as the MedCoop Alliance or BLUEMED among others;

30.

considers that the macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean will address these challenges not by replacing existing strategies but by complementing their actions and thus maximising their impact, finding answers to common challenges, such as those that arise from the fight against climate change and from the digital transition, transforming them into great opportunities for sustainable development, thus contributing to a just and inclusive green transition by taking advantage of shared opportunities, paying special attention to the human dimension and to opportunities for young people, thus unlocking the economic potential of the region for the benefit of citizens;

31.

stresses that a macro-regional strategy, to provide meaningful solutions to shared challenges, must necessarily be designed at Mediterranean basin level and cover the three sub-basins: Western, Eastern and Adriatic-Ionian. It must therefore be open to all from its inception and ultimately aim to cover the entire Mediterranean basin on the three shores;

32.

calls for the Mediterranean macro-regional strategy, like any maritime macro-regional strategy, to pay particular attention to island territories in accordance with Article 174 TFEU; calls for the specific characteristics and vulnerabilities of these territories to be effectively taken into account by establishing a stronger partnership, with concrete and coordinated actions between these territories, the Member States and the European Union;

33.

points out that this regional integration should proceed incrementally, on the basis of a voluntary approach by Mediterranean national, regional, and local authorities, given the challenges posed by certain unstable security, political, and diplomatic situations;

Key principles of multilevel governance at Mediterranean level

34.

proposes that the governance of a future macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean fully reflect the principle of multi-level governance, involving European, national, regional, and local authorities as well as their respective associations and Euroregions;

35.

considers that, in order to be operational, a Mediterranean macro-regional strategy must be based on a solid and representative governance scheme with: (i) a general assembly at political level, involving European, national and regional authorities, (ii) an executive board bringing together one national coordination member (from regional or national level)of each country represented in the strategy, and promoting inclusion of regional and local authorities in the decision-making process, as well as observers from networks of regional and local authorities, their respective associations and Euroregions, and (iii) thematic action groups to develop and implement concrete cooperation projects, which will mobilise public and private socio-economic actors, the academia and the civil society;

36.

proposes that, building from the good practice of WestMED, an annual rotating co-presidency be established, held in a duet by countries from EU and Partner countries and collaborating with the close support of representative organisations of regional and local authorities. The presidency should evolve considering past, current and future presiding countries and maintaining a balance between EU and Partner countries represented in the strategy, while the support from the representative organisation of regional and local authorities would also rotate in the same basis. These dynamics are essential to ensure that the various governance bodies of the macro-regional strategy are considered and linked to provide strategic guidance for the macro-region’s action, through annual work programmes. A technical secretariat (Mediterranean Macro-Regional Strategy Secretariat, MRSS) should coordinate and support the strategy;

37.

proposes that, in order to ensure compatibility with existing initiatives, representatives of key international and Euro-Mediterranean institutions, bodies and initiatives, such as the UfM, ARLEM and MedCoopAlliance, be involved in the implementation of the strategy, as well as representatives of the EUSAIR and WestMED; the EGTCs also provide useful prospects, as ‘laboratories’ for multi-level governance, to support the objectives of the new Agenda for the Mediterranean;

A macro-regional strategy focusing on priority challenges

38.

considers that a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean should target a limited number of shared challenges, which will be addressed gradually over time; underlines that the green and digital transformation are key challenges, which should be addressed as a matter of priority;

39.

calls, as a first step, for efforts to focus on key challenges — climate change, digital transformation, the environment and humanitarian crisis, as well as the necessary green transition. The following priorities urgently call for coordinated action at Mediterranean level: the future of archipelagos and islands, coastal and urban areas, marine pollution (especially microplastics and wastewater), biodiversity conservation, agroecology, the circular economy, management and prevention of natural hazards, and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and, climate adaptation and a response to the humanitarian crisis by ensuring fundamental human rights;

40.

proposes that, in the short term, the European Commission should support, through the Interreg Euro-MED or other relevant existing programmes (given the fact that macro-regional strategies obey the rule of the 3 ‘no’: no new legislation, no new funding, no new institution), the emergence in 2024 of a pilot project on zero marine pollution in the Mediterranean, also thematically contributing to the EU Mission Ocean (7). The aim will be to engage in joint work between countries and territories wishing to develop a Mediterranean macro-regional strategy and thus to test its key principles around a concrete objective;

41.

efforts could then be extended to include the following challenges, in connection with the new Agenda for the Mediterranean:

(a)	promoting balanced and sustainable economic development through joint projects aimed at strengthening research, innovation and the sustainable use of natural resources, as well as interconnected entrepreneurship;

(b)	integrating the blue economy;

(c)

promoting human development, including culture and heritage, tourism, education, health, employment, youth development, social inclusion of marginalized groups and aid for refugees, as well as meeting the needs arising from the presence of migratory flows, particularly in the external frontiers of the EU;

(d)	strengthening connectivity through the transport and digital infrastructure;

(e)	enhancing food and energy autonomy in the Mediterranean considering the consequences of climate change and war in Ukraine caused by Russia;

(f)	strengthen the tools and capacities of public and private institutions in order to mitigate the causes of climate change and the loss of biodiversity;

An operational action plan building on existing funding

42.

considers that a Mediterranean macro-regional strategy must necessarily be based on an operational action plan to translate priorities into concrete action at Mediterranean level. In order to ensure that the subnational dimension is properly included in the plan (helping not only to achieve a shared vision of better, cohesive and sustainable development in the Mediterranean basin, but also to involve civil society from the three sides of the Mediterranean), local and regional authorities — which are closest to the citizens — will be involved in drafting the plan;

43.

points out that a large amount of funding can be mobilised to support Mediterranean projects, including EUR 7 billion mobilised by the European Commission under the European Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). The European Territorial Cooperation programmes active in the Mediterranean (Next-MED, EUROMED, ADRION, MARITTIMO) also represent a major opportunity to facilitate projects capable of contributing to the objectives of a macro-regional strategy;

44.

points out that many programmes implemented directly by the European Commission, such as Horizon Europe, LIFE or Erasmus +, are open to the participation of third countries and are therefore an interesting source of additional funding. Further, programmes such as the Partnership for Research Innovation in the Mediterranean (PRIMA) or the bilateral instruments set up by the European Union in the neighbourhood countries directly support cooperation in the Mediterranean;

45.

points out that donors such as the World Bank or the European Investment Bank, and institutions such as the Anna Lindh Foundation, are also active in the Mediterranean and can facilitate the emergence of joint projects;

46.

points out, finally, that many countries, regions, and cities are implementing decentralised cooperation programmes which can also contribute to the implementation of larger cooperation projects in the Mediterranean;

47.

stresses, moreover, that the implementation of the 2021-2027 European territorial cooperation programmes will be accompanied by the development of governance mechanisms to facilitate coordination of European funding available in the area. The Committee believes that this can make a practical contribution to the emergence of a Mediterranean macro-regional strategy;

Conclusions

48.

welcomes the new impetus given to Mediterranean cooperation at the Mediterranean World Forum organised under the French Presidency;

49.

looks forward to the next Presidency of the European Union held by a Mediterranean country, namely Spain, in 2023, with the hope to bring the focus back on the Mediterranean governance and potentialities for its renewed governance and cooperation macro-regional framework;

50.

encourages the European Commission and the EU Member States to support the development of a macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean and other needed new macro-regional strategies;

51.

likewise, invites the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee to support the incentive towards a macro-regional Strategy for the whole Mediterranean, for a better, integrated, and cohesive Mediterranean;

52.

calls on the European Council to refer the matter to the European Commission in 2022 to draw up a Mediterranean macro-regional strategy accompanied by an action plan, with a view to approval by the Council and the European Parliament under the Spanish Presidency in the second half of 2023.

Brussels, 11 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) P7_TA (2012) 0269.

(2) 13424/20. Council conclusions on the implementation of macro-regional strategies, 2 December 2020.

(3) Randone. et al. 2017, Reviving the Economy of the Mediterranean Sea: Actions for a Sustainable Future, WWF Mediterranean Initiative.

(4) MedECC (2020) Climate and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean Basin — Current Situation and Risks for the Future. First Mediterranean Assessment Report [Cramer, W., Guiot, J., Marini, K. (eds.)], Union for the Mediterranean, Plan Bleu, UNEP/MAP, Marseille.

(5) Plenary meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM), 23 January 2020.

(6) JOIN(2021) 2 final. See also the Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new Agenda for the Mediterranean (OJ C 440, 29.10.2021, p. 19).

(7) EU Mission: Restore our Ocean and Waters.

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/12

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The role of EU cities and regions in rebuilding Ukraine

(2022/C 498/03)

Rapporteur-General:

Dario NARDELLA (PES/IT), Mayor of Florence

Reference documents:

Referral of the Czech Presidency of the Council

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Ukraine relief and reconstruction

COM(2022) 233 final

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

condemns again the unprovoked war Russia is waging on Ukraine, which represents a brutal breach of international law, a violation of democratic principles and the rule of law and an unprovoked, unjustified and unjustifiable aggression against the people of Ukraine and attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, for which the CoR reiterates its unwavering support. The CoR therefore joins the global condemnations of the so-called referendums held in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine in late September 2022, as they violate almost every conceivable democratic standard; calls on the EU Member States, the EU institutions and the EU partner countries to stay united in the support to Ukraine, which also fights for our freedom and for European values. Consistent sanctions are essential in this support and in putting pressure on the Russian aggressor;

deeply deplores that Russia’s invasion has led not only to more than 10 thousand mainly civilian casualties and many more injured, but also millions of displaced people within Ukraine and in third countries. Condemns the fact that in occupied Ukraine, Russian aggressors are targeting local and regional representatives, as well as journalists and human rights defenders, kidnapping and detaining them; the CoR joins the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe in demanding their immediate and unconditional release. Highlights the fact that the Russian invasion has led to the massive destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure and buildings, schools, hospitals, civilian housing and cultural heritage, amounting by some estimates to more than EUR 750 billion and an anticipated sharp decrease of GDP by 35 % (according to IMF forecasts). The CoR also highlights that the Ukrainian economy has lost 30 % to 50 % of its productive capacity, with losses concentrated in economically essential regions in Eastern and Southern Ukraine;

considers that Ukraine’s reconstruction is a European necessity and a moral duty, which will require both additional resources beyond the current EU's Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF), possibly by triggering article 122 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, as well as extra-budgetary fresh financing. Given the extraordinary circumstances of the war in Ukraine, the CoR supports the idea to advance to 2023 the mid-term review of the MFF;

stresses that out of the EUR 9 billion of EU’s macro-financial assistance promised to Ukraine only EUR 6 billion have been agreed so far, compared to estimated monthly needs of EUR 5-7 billion. The CoR recalls that the war circumstances impose a provisioning rate of 70 % under the EU budget, as opposed to the normal rate of 9 %, and that the EU budget for 2021-2027 has no longer sufficient margins to finance loans. The CoR therefore stresses the need for alternative ways of financing the assistance, including through the provision of further public guarantees by Member States;

stresses that the reconstruction process must follow a bottom-up approach, involving Ukrainian and EU local and regional authorities, and build on Ukraine’s decentralisation reform, which was already well advanced before 24 February 2022. The CoR points in this context to the recommendations of the study on ‘Challenges and opportunities of LRAs’ involvement in the reconstruction of Ukraine’ (1) released in September 2022; considers that decentralised reconstruction process is also the best way to give Ukrainian citizens a perspective for staying in their country and thereby moderate further immigration flows. At the same time, the CoR rejects artificial impediments on the immigration of Ukrainian citizens and asks for a revision of the Council Directive 2001/55/EC (2) on Temporary Protection to be considered soon in order to provide refugees with a residence guarantee of more than three years;

welcomes the European Council’s decision to grant candidate country status to Ukraine. The candidate status should become the driver for new efforts by the Ukrainian administration for reforms and the reconstruction should be an opportunity for further approximation to EU standards and policies. Against this background, the CoR stresses that the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU already covers approximatively 70 % of the EU acquis; expects Ukraine to continue its fight against corruption, which was identified in the European Commission opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union as one of the seven sectors for urgent reforms (3) and will be assessed by the end of 2022. The reforms should also provide guarantees for a transparent and equitable distribution of aid funds;

points out that the CoR could launch actions, including within the framework of a joint consultative committee, aimed at preparing, in particular, approximation with the EU cohesion policy acquis, and to support capacity-building and good governance through peer learning and the exchange of good practices;

General principles for the process of rebuilding Ukraine

welcomes the Lugano Declaration, which recognizes the Ukraine-led draft of the Recovery and Development Plan as an overarching framework guiding the recovery process, allowing for coordinated multi-stakeholder participation and partnerships;

calls on the international community, with the EU in the lead, to establish an effective coordination platform between the Government of Ukraine and all its bilateral as well as multilateral partners, organisations and international financial institutions and donors for the preparation and implementation of Ukraine’s Recovery and Development Plan and considers that the European Commission’s plans to establish a Ukraine Reconstruction Platform, coordinating all donor funding for the reconstruction of Ukraine, as pivotal to that effect provided that the Platform fully integrates the partnership principle and involves the Alliance of cities and regions for reconstruction of Ukraine as a fully-fledged partner at all stages of its planning and implementation phases;

10.

concurs with the view that the process of rebuilding Ukraine should be differentiated both in terms of timeline, security risk and regional exposure to the war and specific cohesion challenges (4). The first stage, probably while hostilities still last, should be the emergency response, the second stage dedicated to the restoration of critical infrastructure and services and the third stage to paving the way for long-term sustainable growth. In all these three phases of reconstruction, it is important to focus on building the capacity of municipalities to empower local authorities in Ukraine so that they can coordinate the reconstruction of their territory themselves;

11.

calls on the EU and other international donors, including individual Members States, to provide in the first stage immediate relief funding to help the Ukrainian population to get safely through the next winter. In the frontline regions this funding should target humanitarian aid (food, fuel, medicine, systems for drinking water and for treating drinking water, etc.), the provision of temporary housing (tents, pre-fabricated housing blocks, heating systems, etc.), mine clearance as well as logistical support for keeping these regions connected, and also be used to provide the necessary means of transport, such as buses, ambulances, fire engines, trucks, excavators, etc. In relatively safe regions and those fairly distant from combat, technical support should be provided to help with the delivery of services, the housing and integration of internally displace people, relocation of industrial capacity and the securing of transport corridors for humanitarian aid inwards and Ukrainian exports outwards;

12.

welcomes in this context that on 16 September the European Commission committed to provide in this first phase EUR 150 million to help internally displaced people in Ukraine and EUR 100 million for the reconstruction of schools destroyed by Russian bombings but considers these amounts to be largely insufficient against the needs for first stage rapid recovery estimated at EUR 17 billion, of which EUR 3,4 billion already in 2022;

13.

considers that the second stage of the rebuilding process should be dedicated to the restoration of critical infrastructure and services, including central heating, electricity, water and sewage, schools, hospitals and civilian housing. Public works schemes would allow people in areas with significant destruction to be employed;

14.

suggests that the third stage of the rebuilding process should lay the foundations for long-term sustainable growth based on a strategy of integrated planning at territorial level, capitalising on systemic approaches for sustainable, green, smart and inclusive territories and the OECD’s ‘build back better’ principle. This stage should in particular focus on reaching the objective set by the Ukrainian government to reduce until 2030 all greenhouse gas emissions by 65 %. Any investment in the energy sector should contribute to decarbonization and reducing Ukraine's dependence on fossil fuel, considering that 30 % of solar capacity and 90 % of wind energy facilities are destroyed or in territories occupied by Russian forces. Investments should also focus on rebuilding the central heating systems of many Ukrainian municipalities to be replaced with modern central heating systems not based on burning fossil fuels. It would also be critical at this stage to rebuild the housing stock, schools, hospitals in order to attract Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons back to their pre-war residences;

15.

urges the European Union, Member States and international financial institutions to provide grants rather than loans as Ukraine will unlikely be able to service and repay additional debts in the short run. Loans would increase the risk of a debt crisis in the future, considering that pre-war Ukraine was already carrying an external debt of approximately EUR 130 billion, corresponding to 80 % of GDP. Where institutions cannot provide grants, loans should be provided with no or very low interest rates, especially for projects aimed at assisting municipalities;

16.

considers that, in view of the launched EU accession process of Ukraine and in order to legitimize a strong coordination role for the EU in the reconstruction strategy, the European Commission should propose a substantial Ukraine Reconstruction Facility, which may be constructed on the same legal basis as the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility with repayment starting from 2027 onwards. This Facility should enable the EU to pre-finance a significant share (40 %) of the costs of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine, which were jointly estimated by the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission and the World Bank to amount to EUR 349 billion for the period between 24 February and 1 June 2022, which impacts particularly high in the housing, transport, commerce and industry sectors and destruction concentrated in the Chernihivska, Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, Kyivska, and Zaporizka regions (oblasts);

17.

welcomes against this background the willingness of the group of Ukraine’s six creditor countries, announced on 20 July, to suspend the servicing of the debt that Ukraine has contracted with its members until the end of 2023;

18.

encourages the European Union and international financial institutions to prepare the legal grounds for using Russian assets, frozen in the framework of sanctions, for Ukraine’s reconstruction process;

19.

insists that speed is critical for addressing the humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine and demands therefore that conditionalities would be reasonable and adapted to the circumstances and based on measurable, verifiable outcomes;

20.

stresses that the reconstruction process should be built on increasing social and environmental standards and to approximate them with the EU acquis and invites therefore the Ukrainian authorities to fully adapt its labour legislation to the standards indicated by the International Labour Organization;

21.

welcomes the Lugano declaration's principle for democratic participation, demanding the recovery process to be a whole-of-society effort, including displaced citizens within Ukraine and abroad, local self-governance and effective decentralization. The CoR also endorses the declaration’s support for multi-stakeholder engagement and emphasis on integrity, transparency and accountability as essential principles for the successful implementation of the National Recovery and Development Plan;

Role of cities and regions

22.

welcomes President Zelensky’s concept for Ukraine’s reconstruction and long-term development based on twinning between cities and regions in Ukraine and the EU, as well as the European Council President’s invitation to the CoR to support the Ukraine reconstruction plan anchored on a practical and grounded approach with the cooperation between local and regional authorities from the Ukraine and the EU;

23.

draws attention to the Alliance of cities and regions for the Reconstruction of Ukraine, launched on 30 June 2022, as a vehicle to map the local and regional needs in Ukraine, coordinate efforts, with European Union cities and regions ready to deploy resources to support an effective and sustainable reconstruction of Ukraine and to facilitate cooperation of its core partners with the EU institutions and within the ‘Ukraine reconstruction platform’, as well as between EU and Ukrainian local and regional authorities and associations and to showcase reconstruction projects of Ukrainian local authorities;

24.

commits to facilitating, through the Alliance, the provision of expertise through a twinning and peer-to-peer exchange programme to build capacity, promote good governance and provide technical assistance to Ukrainian cities and regions, with the aim of enabling Ukrainian cities and regions to carry out a reconstruction process which would encompass not only the sustainable rebuilding of infrastructures but also the social dimension, education, democracy and governance. The CoR stresses that while bilateral peer-to-peer programmes with cities and regions, including twinning, may be very appropriate in some capacity-building and reconstruction efforts at local level, broader investment schemes could involve a larger group of cities and regions, as well as knowledgeable stakeholders, also with a view to preparing the approximation to the governance patterns of EU regional policy;

25.

urges the European Union to recognise the key role of local and regional authorities in conjunction with all local government associations of the Ukraine and the EU that are part of the European Alliance of cities and regions for the Reconstruction of Ukraine (5) and expects dedicated support for strengthening the capacities of Ukrainian local authorities and their associations, which could be coordinated through the future platform for the reconstruction of Ukraine;

26.

underlines that Ukraine’s decentralisation and regional development reforms have contributed significantly to the consolidation of local democracy, strengthened self-governance and the overall resilience of the country’s local communities. These reforms were implemented with substantial support from the European Union's local and regional authorities and their associations, including through the ‘U-LEAD with Europe’ programme, and with targeted support from the CoR, within its Ukraine Task Force and through peer-to-peer cooperation activities. The success of these decentralisation reforms has brought Ukraine closer to the European Union and its values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law;

27.

stresses the fact the EU regions neighbouring Ukraine have demonstrated unprecedented solidarity by hosting large numbers of Ukrainians fleeing the war and therefore also need coordinated and systematic support by the European Union;

28.

suggests the development of a reinforced U-LEAD programme that becomes the key multilateral instrument to support local communities and promotes decentralization in Ukraine. This ‘U-LEAD 2.0’ would be made possible through a dedicated budget line for supporting further decentralisation in Ukraine, and for building the capacity of local and regional authorities to apply the EU cohesion policy acquis as soon as possible. It would be a peer-to-peer exchange programme and a programme for joint investment projects, which would enable the close involvement of EU and Ukrainian local and regional authorities in designing and implementing the EU-supported reconstruction efforts;

29.

recalls the large peer-to-peer experience involving CoR members made in Ukraine but also beyond and insists on the role the CoR and its partners in the Alliance — as the EU’s hub for peer-to-peer cooperation at the local and regional level — could take in mobilizing EU cities and regions in support of the reconstruction of Ukraine;

30.

Stresses the utmost importance of further empowering local self-government to take on a leadership role in the recovery and reconstruction together with Ukraine’s central government, the EU and other international partners. The CoR reiterates its plea for a continued focus on improving good local/regional governance, including transparency, fighting corruption, protecting the freedom of local media, and promoting e-government;

31.

calls for an easy engagement mechanism, the removal of bureaucratic obstacles, and sufficient resources that would enable EU institutions, European municipalities, regions, Euroregions, European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation and associations, to help their Ukrainian counterparts with their reconstruction efforts as well as for an inclusive approach, bringing together municipalities and regions, in order to preserve coherence with what has already been deployed for Ukraine’s sustainable territorial development to date (in Ukraine and in the EU);

32.

draws attention to the important role of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, in which Ukraine is involved, in assisting Ukraine in the reconstruction process; the strategy provides an integrated framework for cooperation with the participation of local and regional authorities;

33.

in this framework, welcomes the initiative taken by Eurocities of signing, on 19 August, with the competent Ukrainian authorities a ‘memorandum of understanding to support the sustainable rebuilding of Ukrainian cities’ (6), which complements the cooperation undertaken in the framework of the Alliance;

34.

welcomes the European Commission’s commitment to allow for flexibility in order to continue European Neighbourhood cross border and Interreg transnational cooperation programmes and in particular to co-finance at 100 % the cross-border programmes with Ukraine and Moldova implementing cooperation projects disrupted by the Russian military aggression against Ukraine;

35.

calls for the engagement of existing Interreg programmes involving Ukrainian regions to be part of the reconstruction process;

36.

calls for an effective system of multi-level governance based on the OECD principles of public investment across all levels of government;

37.

expects that Ukrainian local and regional authorities will be granted access to EU programmes such as Horizon Europe and EU4Culture;

38.

recalls that the Alliance is inviting institutional financial partners such as the EIB, notably in the framework of the EIB/CoR Action plan, the EBRD, the OECD and the Council of Europe Development Bank to prepare projects at the local and regional level with the support of EU local and regional expertise;

39.

stresses the key role mayors and regional leaders in Ukraine are playing in the resilience of the nation and praises their bravery to fight for our values, which is an inspiration for all Europeans and adds to the strong momentum for local democracy and local empowerment that must be a key element of the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Brussels, 11 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/studies/Pages/default.aspx?from=01/01/2022&to=01/01/2023

(3) European Commission opinion on Ukraine's application for membership of the European Union, 17 June 2022, COM(2022) 407.

(4) See Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine: https://cepr.org/publications/books-and-reports/blueprint-reconstruction-ukraine

(5) https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/Pages/European-Alliance-of-Cities-and-Regions-for-the-reconstruction-of-Ukraine.aspx

(6) https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/u-prisutnosti-prezidenta-pidpisano-memorandum-z-eurosities-s-77165

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/17

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The new Urban Mobility Framework

(2022/C 498/04)

Rapporteur:

Linda GAASCH (LU/Greens), Member of the Community Council of the City of Luxembourg

Reference documents:

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — The New EU Urban Mobility Framework

COM(2021) 811 final

SWD(2021) 470 final

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

welcomes the publication of the new Urban Mobility Framework (UMF) in the light of the need for urgent action to promote decarbonisation and modal shift in urban areas, which continue to be accountable for 23 % of all carbon emissions from transport;

underscores the need for an effective multilevel governance approach based on active subsidiarity for the delivery of the objectives of the EU’s Smart and Sustainable Mobility Strategy; calls on the EU level to reinforce direct dialogue with LRAs to this end and to reinforce the funding opportunities available under the EU budget as part of an active subsidiarity approach;

recalls that the economic growth of urban centres is directly linked to the fluidity of mobility, and that the fluidity of mobility is dependent on a strong public transport backbone; underlines that, in addition to the environmental impact, congestion costs EUR 270 billion per year (1) at EU level. Recalls the chronic underfunding of public transport infrastructure over recent decades, and emphasises the need to increase EU funding to accelerate the mobility transition and support LRAs in the investments required to meet the EU’s sustainability targets;

confirms its support for the reinforced focus on Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMPs) and the objective of a more harmonised approach across the EU; emphasises the environmental and societal benefits of active mobility such as walking and cycling, including particularly in the domain of public health, and calls for an ambitious approach in the forthcoming updated SUMP guidance; calls for an integrated approach to space allocation and spatial planning drawing on best-practices in this area and a comprehensive safety approach in urban areas; stresses particularly the importance of active involvement of citizens, and in particular women and persons with disabilities, for increased ownership of changes in allocation of space and enhancement of public transport in urban areas;

stresses that political decisions in the field of mobility impact different genders in different ways as women traditionally use public transport more than men, while men rely more on the car; calls on local and regional authorities to assess the impact future policy proposals have on different genders before putting their proposals forward;

points to the need for a supportive framework to accompany the efforts of LRAs with regard to the internalisation of external costs and implementation of the polluter pays principle, as well as increased flexibility in relation to budgetary processes. In this context, it is important to consider the situation in the Eastern European countries, especially in less developed regions. These tend to have a higher number of more polluting vehicles (cars, buses). It would be important to regulate the sale of more polluting vehicles (Euro 1-Euro 4) at EU level, as these vehicles are migrating from the Western European market to the Eastern European market. In this respect, it would also be important for poorer regions and countries to develop support schemes to help them catch up with Western European conditions. Calls for an approach to the increasing petrol prices as a result of the geopolitical context which is consistent with the Union’s transport decarbonisation objectives; points to the potential in this regard of using public subsidies to support green public transport services and encourage modal shift in urban areas, as well as to combat mobility exclusion in peri-urban and outlying rural areas;

A central role for active mobility

highlights that walking entails no costs for the pedestrian, and is healthy, and sustainable; stresses that cycling is a carbon-neutral and affordable transport alternative that can easily be combined with other transport modes; therefore encourages the Commission to promote awareness-raising measures on the benefits of active mobility over the use of private vehicles, putting particular emphasis on how active mobility can prevent diseases linked to sedentary lifestyles, such as cardiovascular diseases, obesity and diabetes;

regrets, in this regard, that, despite, these advantages, the most polluting transport modes in cities, i.e. individual petrol and diesel vehicles, occupy the largest part of public space dedicated to mobility; requests urgently that the European Commission encourage, through new financing, local authorities to give this space back to more active mobility such as walking or cycling and strong and well-structured and integrated public transport;

points out that walking and cycling are beneficial to a neighbourhood’s or community’s micro-economy as pedestrians and riders tend to frequent businesses and services located within a smaller radius from their residences; also points out that these trips are beneficial for people’s health — especially for certain diseases such as cardiovascular diseases — and therefore lead to considerable savings for the community;

10.

highlights the role micromobility can play as a flexible and affordable solution for first and last-mile journeys and beyond, underlines the importance of good accessibility conditions for active modes of transport, including secure bicycle parking facilities at public transport nodes (such as stations), and shared-use last mile solutions; and calls for the deployment of micromobility to be encouraged also in peri-urban and rural areas;

11.

underlines the relevance of incentivising the purchase of bikes, including e-bikes, by individuals for decarbonisation and decongestion; reiterates the need to encourage a gradual phase-out of private-sector measures such as company car allowances and to replace these with more sustainable mobility alternatives;

12.

requests the Commission to accelerate their work towards a European Cycling Strategy, as first discussed during the informal Council of Transport Ministers in 2015, in order to provide a European framework and guidelines for cycling policies;

13.

recommends promoting active mobility by reducing space inequalities, and improving street safety and infrastructure; further recommends increasing bicycle parking (both at the destination and point of origin), public stations with pumps, tools and charging stations, and bicycle repair facilities; points out that the cost to construct and maintain quality bicycle paths is much lower than the cost of constructing new roads and/or widening existing ones;

14.

underlines that systems such as congestion charges and ultra-low or zero-emission zones help to reduce motorised individual transport in cities, decrease air pollution from nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, improve local public health, and can also provide essential revenue for the development and improvement of public transport and active mobility infrastructure and services; by reducing motorised individual transport they also encourage greater ownership by citizens of their immediate environment and create space for social interactions and decreasing isolation, while promoting physical activity and sport;

15.

regrets that the Commission’s TEN-T proposal does not currently provide for bike-sharing/storage facilities and direct access routes into the multimodal hubs of TEN-T urban nodes;

16.

proposes an EU-wide ‘safe active mobility strategy’ to encourage a coordinated European response to the challenge of making walking and cycling as safe as possible;

17.

calls for another Euro emission standard for cars, vans, trucks and buses (Euro 7/VII) in order to reduce the emission of toxic pollutants (i.e. nitrogen oxide, ammonia, carbon monoxide and particulate matter PM 10-2,5) and to avoid tens of thousands of premature deaths each year; deeply regrets the European Commission’s decision to again delay the Euro 7/VII proposals in its 2022 Work Programme, which casts doubt over its ‘Zero Pollution Ambition’ and its commitment to the European Green Deal, and jeopardises the industry’s ability to plan engineering changes;

Accessible Mobility for All

18.

requests a public transport system accessible for all citizens, through inclusion by design, especially taking into account persons with disabilities; stresses the benefits of including users from an early stage of planning of infrastructure and transport services; confirms the importance of accessibility outlined within the framework of the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030 (EDS) and the European Accessibility Act; points out the importance of projects such as the ‘Access City Award’;

19.

calls for a more comprehensive approach to ensure accessibility throughout the journey;

20.

emphasises that the need to address mobility poverty is critical in the interests of social, economic and territorial cohesion; calls therefore for a multimodal and integrated approach to combat mobility exclusion and ensure equal access to urban centres; welcomes in this regard the Commission’s commitment set out in the new UMF to tackling ‘inequalities in accessing the public transport network, including improving access to train stations’; calls also for additional support for smaller cities, peri-urban, and dependent rural and mountainous areas, especially in less developed regions, to ensure the connectivity of these territories and equal access to the sustainable mobility transition for their citizens;

Reinforcing public transport as the backbone of urban mobility

21.

welcomes the intention signalled by the Commission to ‘work with national and local administrations and all stakeholders to ensure that [public transport] remains the backbone of urban mobility’; highlights the need to coordinate all available tools and resources to that end, including the important role of Public Service Obligations (PSOs) in ensuring connectivity with urban centres;

22.

highlights the urgent need for overall capacity increases for public transport, both in terms of geographical coverage and increased frequencies, to accommodate the expected increase in passenger volumes; recalls the chronic underinvestment over recent decades and the investment gap facing public transport operators, as highlighted by the European Court of Auditors;

23.

underlines that public transport must be complemented by alternative offers and multimodal concepts; calls in this regard for flexible and demand-driven first and last mile solutions; and equally stresses the importance of promoting active mobility, especially cycling;

24.

points out the need to provide and expand sustainable public transport infrastructure, including appropriate charging systems for electric buses that allow inter-urban travel on and in adverse terrain and climate conditions, and increased commercial speed;

25.

calls for the strengthening of multimodal hubs to provide for smooth transfers between different modes of transport, including improving accessibility for active mobility and the provision of secure parking facilities for bicycles, in order to ensure a faster and more effective transfer of people and goods;

26.

emphasises the importance of peri-urban linkages, including cross-border links, since commuting does not stop at city limits and must also be facilitated within rural areas and beyond national boundaries in border regions, such as providing park and ride facilities connected to the transport network;

27.

points to the need for measures to encourage the deployment of on-demand public transport services, especially in peripheral and outermost rural areas, and calls on the Commission to provide both support for trialling such solutions and a system for financing and subsidising this type of service;

28.

points out that the outermost regions, due to their terrain and small surface areas, suffer significant traffic congestion in their main cities, especially in coastal strips. However, projects to make transport more sustainable and clean in these areas are being developed and can serve as good practice for other EU regions and for their neighbouring countries;

29.

highlights the importance of multimodal ticketing in order to make sustainable transport modes as accessible and efficient as possible for users, while comprehensively protecting passengers’ rights associated to delays and other service shortfalls;

30.

calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of supporting joint public procurement for public transport operators or LRAs wishing to join forces in this area in order to achieve more sustainable and standardised buying processes; calls for a renewed EU funding mechanism to support the procurement of clean buses and highlights the need to ensure that EU budgetary rules are compatible with the realities of rolling stock purchases;

31.

points to the need to support the re-training and upskilling of public transport operators and LRAs in the context of increasing digitalisation of public transport services and systems;

32.

highlights the importance of the development and modernisation of rail infrastructure, especially in areas where there is evidence of significant deterioration and in this respect develop support schemes;

Vision Zero

33.

highlights the critical importance of a more ambitious approach to ensuring the protection of vulnerable road users to encourage further modal shift to active transport modes;

34.

stresses that a renewed approach to the allocation of road space in urban areas will have the most decisive impact on the safety of vulnerable road users, while also encouraging behavioural change and reducing both air and noise pollution, as well as congestion; welcomes European Commission’s intention to provide guidance on this in connection with the implementation of Directive 2008/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) on road infrastructure safety management;

35.

highlights the significant impact of introducing overall speed reductions for improving road safety in urban areas as first formulated by the Commission of the European Communities in their Communication on ‘Speed Limits in the Community’ (3); reiterates the European Parliament’s call on the European Commission to issue a recommendation for the Member States (4) for a 30 km/hour speed limit on relevant streets in urban areas and highlights the positive impact this policy change has shown in different cities by reducing road casualties and generally having a positive impact on health in cities, as also endorsed by the 3rd Global Ministerial Conference on Road Safety in February 2020 and subsequently by the General Assembly of the UN;

36.

underlines the positive impact car-free days have on cities, as they offer opportunities for citizens to explore alternative modes of transport and help citizens to re-claim ownership of public spaces; calls on the European Commission to put forward a proposal to invite cities in the EU to designate at least one harmonised day per year as a car-free day;

37.

stresses the need to design streets for low speeds and better visibility of the most vulnerable users of the public space; highlights the effectiveness of infrastructure traffic calming, as well as nudging measures;

38.

calls on the Commission to take up these recommendations in its forthcoming guidance on quality infrastructure for vulnerable road users.

Future-proof urban mobility

39.

stresses that while new technological solutions play an important role in making cities more liveable, existing technology such as electric (cargo) bikes or electric (trolley-) buses, trams and trains should be the backbone when aiming for zero-emission freight and passenger transport;

40.

emphasises the importance of accelerating progress towards integrated ticketing across all public transport modes; calls on the Commission to envisage the development of a standardised EU app, under a common rule, in order to facilitate access in cities across the EU and promote the use of public transport, positively impacting both rail tourism and commuting;

41.

calls for close and early cooperation with LRAs on the potential use of European Digital Identity Wallets, by transport operators and passengers, as signalled in the new UMF;

42.

recalls that shared mobility is a solution to reduce traffic in cities and the problems associated to congestion, and its development should be encouraged;

43.

points out that data collection is an important means for the planning of transport infrastructure and consequently all collected data should be made available for all relevant actors; while it is important to facilitate easy-to-use solutions including all-in-one mobile apps, data protection must also be ensured; a common and coordinated methodology for data collection that facilitates the exchange of good practices and the comparison of reliable mobility indicators needs to be implemented in the various regions;

44.

emphasises the need to properly take into account the gender dimension when designing sustainable mobility policies, taking into account the specific needs of women and their additional vulnerability towards mobility poverty, as well as those of other collectives;

SUMPs as a key tool for decarbonisation of urban mobility

45.

confirms the CoR’s support for the reinforced focus on Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMPs), in the context of the UMF and, as a mandatory requirement for the 400+ urban nodes defined under the proposed revision of the TEN-T Regulation. However, cities/municipalities that have already developed plans that meet the requirements for SUMPs should be able to use those plans;

46.

also supports the recommendation, that cities adopt SUMPs; however, stresses the need to draw up SUMPs that can be extended to areas with various municipalities that function as metropolitan areas or urban agglomerations;

47.

welcomes the Commission’s intention to request Member States to implement long-term SUMP support programmes in order to help build capacity and implementation of SUMPs in compliance with EU SUMP guidelines and calls for mandatory close cooperation with LRAs in that context; calls on the Commission to work towards close cooperation between the envisaged SUMP national programme managers and representatives of local and regional authorities on the ground, and to monitor this cooperation in practice;

48.

emphasises that to address the mobility transition in urban areas, it is critical for SUMPs to efficiently cover functional areas as a whole; calls on the Commission to consider ways of incentivising improved connectivity and access to mobility services in suburban, peri-urban and surrounding rural areas;

49.

welcomes the announced streamlined set of indicators and benchmarking tools scheduled to be published by the end of 2022, as well as the planned CEF Programme Support Action to support TEN-T urban nodes in this area. However, it is important to ensure that the development and monitoring of indicators does not result in an excessive workload for cities/municipalities;

50.

stresses the need for harmonised data collection in key areas (e.g. cycle lane kilometres, daily users, accidents, type of networks) in coordination with LRAs in order to better inform future decision-making and investment choices on active mobility, including in the context of SUMPs; the administrative burden for collecting, providing and maintaining data must be kept to a minimum;

51.

highlights the new UMF inclusion and accessibility objectives, and welcomes the indicator on the affordability of public transport in connection with the updated SUMP guidance; this can help mitigate potential risks stemming from mobility poverty;

52.

insists, while supporting the development of SUMPs, and in order to respect the subsidiarity principle, that the European Commission should reinforce direct consultation of European cities and their associations in its ongoing and future work on indicators for SUMPs. The CoR duly notes the involvement of some 50 cities in the recent pilot project on the development of sustainable urban mobility indicators (SUMI), and points out in parallel that many European cities have already developed quality SUMPs with operational indicators. Wider outreach and more direct information flows between the EU and LRA levels could be facilitated in future by the CoR, in order to ensure that indicators proposed by the European Commission do not create red tape or unnecessary burden for local and regional authorities;

53.

welcomes the focus in the new UMF on urban freight and the proposed integration of urban logistics into SUMPs, in particular in view of the significant increase in e-commerce and changes to freight distribution patterns triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic; emphasises the important potential of zero-emission solutions, technologies and vehicles for urban logistics; encourages the use of modern cargo bikes and bike trailers, since about half of all motorised trips for the transport of goods within European cities could be shifted to bicycles; recalls that this objective was already set out by EU transport ministers in their 2015 ‘Declaration on Cycling as a climate friendly transport mode’;

54.

calls for enabling measures to support the use of urban rail for freight transport;

55.

welcomes the intention to encourage dialogue and collaboration between all parties including local authorities, and to support data-sharing on urban logistics as the basis for monitoring progress and long-term planning; calls for the active involvement of LRAs with regard to the reporting requirements envisaged linked to the streamlined SUMI indicators;

Funding

56.

highlights that the significant modal shift towards public and active transport modes envisaged by the new UMF and the SSMS will only be possible with strengthened and coordinated support from public authorities at EU, national and local and regional levels, and notably more targeted funding;

57.

calls on the Commission to provide a more detailed overview of the funding sources available for urban mobility and on the ways in which these resources may be accessed by LRAs; underscores in parallel the critical importance of long-term strategies and long-term budgets to provide a stable framework for urban mobility planning and investment;

58.

expresses concern that the funding available for urban mobility under EU instruments is either rather limited in practice, difficult to access or unsuitable for LRAs and/or dependent on arbitrary factors such as favourable cooperation between national and subnational governance levels; calls for an increase, within the next MFF, and in line with national regulations with the same objective, in the amounts of programmes and tools accessible as direct funding for LRAs;

59.

expresses concern that certain aspects of the rules provided for in the EU system of national and regional accounts (ESA) may be difficult to reconcile in practice with significant infrastructure investments by LRAs, notably the requirement to record such expenditure in a single financial year, which creates an excessively high deficit in the corresponding regional accounts; recommends optimising the potential of available EU funding by enabling LRAs to record such expenditure in their accounts progressively over the lifecycle of the infrastructure;

60.

points to the expectations of many LRAs for the EU level to provide for stronger measures to encourage the internalisation of external costs in the transport sector and more systematic application of the polluter pays and user pays principles; points to the need for a supportive framework to accompany the efforts of LRAs in this regard;

61.

insists that revenue from the CO2 tax should be channelled into the rail or cycling network and other sustainable infrastructure projects — necessary for a transition of the transport system. Overall, an effective and sensible CO2 tax is a central component of a climate-friendly mobility policy;

Governance and exchange of best practice

62.

underscores the need for an effective multilevel governance approach based on active subsidiarity; welcomes the Commission’s intention to associate LRAs more closely in the reformed Expert Group on Urban Mobility (EGUM) alongside Member State representatives, and calls on the Commission to associate the CoR in this context; emphasises the importance of reinforcing the representation of the main active mobility actors (pedestrians and cyclists), as well as public transport users, in urban mobility planning;

63.

calls for the exchange of best practices with a focus on an adequate infrastructure that provides for safe and comfortable spaces for active mobility such as walking and cycling; in that regard highlights the importance of separated lanes for pedestrians and cyclists;

64.

with regard to road safety, calls for an exchange of experience to date and best practices to ensure an approach which is conducive to triggering behavioural change;

65.

welcomes the high level of interest expressed by EU cities in the EU Climate-neutral and Smart Cities Mission, reflecting both the strong commitment of many EU cities to delivering on the mobility transition, but also the need for additional support — financially, technically and strategically — from the EU level; calls on the Commission to maintain this momentum by providing for as active an involvement as possible of all EU cities wishing to be associated;

66.

insists, in particular, that the EU Climate-neutral and Smart Cities Mission and the ‘100 climate-neutral cities’ should not increase inequalities and divergences between the most advanced cities and the ones lagging behind; calls for close attention to be paid to the Mission’s objective of supporting all EU cities in the green transition;

67.

calls for the EU institutions to lead by example and adopt similar programmes to the ‘100 climate-neutral cities’;

68.

calls for an EU-wide exchange of best practices on the affordability of public transport; further asks the European Commission to conduct a study on the feasibility of implementing a free public transport system across the EU in order to incentivise modal shift. This study should address both social and financial aspects, incl. the current role of ticket sales in offsetting increasing running costs borne by LRAs and public transport operators.

Brussels, 11 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) ECA special report 06/2020: https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=53246

(2) Directive 2008/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on road infrastructure safety management (OJ L 319, 29.11.2008, p. 59).

(3) COM(86) 735 final

(4) European Parliament resolution on the EU road safety policy framework 2021-2030 — Recommendations on next steps towards ‘Vision Zero’ (2021/2014(INI)) (OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 45).

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/24

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The CoR’s role in boosting subnational climate diplomacy ahead of COP27 and COP28

(2022/C 498/05)

Rapporteur:

Olgierd GEBLEWICZ (PL/EPP), President of West Pomerania Region

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

stresses the importance of subnational governments in achieving climate ambition with a focus on the future implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in fulfilling the provisions of the Paris Agreement in order to achieve the goal of limiting global warming to 1,5 oC;

regrets the lack of recognition of the role of subnational authorities in the Council Conclusions of 21 February 2022 on ‘EU Climate Diplomacy: accelerating the implementation of Glasgow outcomes’, stressing the key importance of climate diplomacy and of EU outreach to third countries in order to speed up the implementation of the COP26 Glasgow Climate Pact.

urges the national governments when negotiating the terms of global climate goals and define National Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) to truly involve their local and regional governments, as they are the actors concretely delivering on their international pledges and commitments; considers therefore that NDCs not endorsed by LRAs are not likely to be successfully implemented and that UNFCCC should systematically check this step before accepting them; in this context, calls on national governments to include both regional and local delegates in their national negotiating delegations to the UNFCCC climate summit;

emphasises the fact that cities and regions are at the forefront in dealing with the consequences of climate change, such as climate-related disasters, social impacts such as energy poverty and increasing weather-related health problems, environmental problems such as the dramatic loss of biodiversity, ecosystems and their services, and existing inequalities that climate change deepens; highlights that subnational climate diplomacy is necessary to meet national climate targets, as local and regional authorities (LRAs) prepare and implement detailed adaptation and mitigation plans that accurately take into account local environmental conditions, socioeconomic requirements, energy and climate justice;

stresses that successful climate actions carried out by cities and regions can be more ambitious than national targets without impairing growth and territorial cohesion. This shows a strong ‘demonstration effect’ and provides leverage to national and sub-national political groups that aim at adopting more progressive climate policies;

believes it essential to support cities and regions’ climate networks and strengthen their subnational climate diplomacy activities in order to build up critical political resilience against national level backsliding and therefore safeguard the achievement of global climate goals;

recognises that, by engaging with relevant local and regional stakeholders, including businesses, universities and research centres, civil society organisations and citizens, cities and regions contribute to increasing awareness and public acceptance of climate actions at local, regional, national and global level, as well as enable and promote a good life for all within planetary boundaries;

recalls that climate agenda was one of the main topics raised by the citizens’ panels and Plenary of the Conference of the Future of Europe, resulting in 49 proposals complemented by detailed measures. EU citizens call for an accelerated green transition, the need to focus on education, better communication and addressing social justice (1);

reminds that climate change has a distinct gendered dimension, as globally women are more affected by the consequences of climate change; therefore, women leaders’ participation in climate negotiations is paramount for effective climate action, and subnational climate diplomacy can help bridge this gap, as proportionately more women are active in local politics;

10.

emphasises that cities host numbers of young people who are at the forefront of climate action, forming new movements and initiatives, such as the Youth Climate Strike, creating a new type of pressure on local, regional and central governments. Through collaboration with the youth organisations, cities provide young people with right tools, platforms, and shelters to express their own opinions via street gatherings or participation in the local council meetings. Ultimately cities and regions actively create leaders of tomorrow, ready to address local problems and represent their own community;

11.

points out, that the involvement of LRAs is particularly important in identifying the opportunities and risks that planned climate activities present for employment, income and economic activity of different genders, age groups, occupational groups and business areas;

12.

believes that, given the proximity with citizens, cities and regions are instruments for achieving community empowerment, self-determination, and good governance: subnational diplomacy creates a direct connection between citizens and global affairs, overcoming the democratic deficits of traditional multilateral policy-making where citizens lack participation in the decisions taken;

13.

believes that subnational climate diplomacy can contribute to overcoming specific challenges faced in state-to-state diplomacy, such as frequent deadlock situations and North/South divides;

14.

draws attention to international alliances of regions and municipalities for climate action, such as the Under2 Coalition, which make an important contribution to international climate policy at subnational level and should therefore be more closely involved in the UN negotiations; calls on the Commission to include these alliances in its climate diplomacy;

15.

points out several levels at which subnational actors move the international and EU climate agenda forward:

(a)	adopting progressive climate policies within their jurisdictions while engaging local stakeholders and representatives of various groups in order to boost implementation;

(b)	engaging other subnational actors in horizontal diplomacy to commit to ambitious climate goals, thus creating broader and stronger communities of climate ambitious territories;

(c)	through vertical diplomacy, influencing national environmental and climate policy, and providing a strong voice in the climate debate and state negotiations; limiting the potential damage in the case of adverse national policies;

(d)	promoting UNFCCC work for climate protection at the local level; contributing a distinct perspective to the UNFCCC negotiation process;

(e)	enabling citizen participation and dialogue of large number and variety of citizens, to increase climate action, commitment acceptability of further climate policies;

(f)	collaborating with the states to improve national Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV), as local and regional governments can provide more detailed and accurate information;

(g)	providing capacity-building, institutional support or technical assistance to third countries;

16.

identifies the main cooperation challenges for the future development of subnational climate diplomacy between regional and local authorities in the EU and in third countries:

(a)	the dependence on the level of decentralisation, political autonomy, and local democracy;

(b)	the limited legal framework outlining the rules on cooperation between cities and regions, as well as the uneven and insufficient cooperation between cities/regions and national governments;

(c)	insufficient funding and cooperation between cities/regions and financing institutions;

(d)	lack of technical staff and support, capacity building and encouragement in particular of smaller and less developed cities and regions;

(e)	missing data on collaboration initiatives, preventing the proper tracking of subnational climate diplomacy and the assessment of its full impact and importance;

(f)	lack of a structured regular dialogue with the subnational level in climate negotiations and during the COP meetings.

(g)	lack of involvement of local and regional governments in the preparation of Nationally Determined Contributions;

17.

calls, therefore, on the European Commission to address the gaps and limitations and to boost subnational climate diplomacy between EU cities, regions and the EU’s neighbouring and partnering countries ahead of the next Conferences of the Parties in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and beyond;

18.

recognises the importance of focusing on big cities given their economic power and significant role in both causing and potentially being key solutions to the climate crisis; however, the nature of climate change requires a response that is thoroughly integrated across the whole territory and calls therefore for emphasis to be placed also on small and intermediary cities, which suffer from more limited participation to networks, city diplomacy and have lower international recognition; moreover, existing international and local rural networks should be used to facilitate knowledge exchange;

19.

stresses that the world’s archipelagos and islands are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and calls for better exchanges of climate knowledge between EU islands and between these and islands in the rest of the world;

20.

stands ready to serve as the main coordinating institution for subnational climate diplomacy in the EU and its neighbouring countries. The CoR is ready to assume greater responsibility at COP meetings, to play a coordinating role, and to represent the positions of regional and local authorities from the EU, in partnership with the Western Balkans and Turkey as well as EU’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood;

21.

commits, to present the proposals of ARLEM and CORLEAP on climate issues to the UNFCCC, via its participation in the official EU delegation to the CoP; calls for the inclusion of LRAs in all stages of the preparation and the negotiations of the CoP;

22.

calls on the European institutions, international financial institutions and all international partners, including LRAs in the EU who will contribute to the rebuilding and reconstruction of Ukrainian cities and towns as well as industrial and energy sites destroyed by the Russian war, to gear reconstruction investment towards the key aspects of the Paris Agreement as well as towards the objectives of the EU’s Green Deal, with a view to achieving the target of net zero emissions by 2050, renewables-based energy autonomy, a carbon-free economy, sustainable agriculture, conservation and restoration of ecosystems and biodiversity;

23.

welcomes the establishment of a dedicated agenda within the UNFCCC process — the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) and the Gender Action Plan (GAP) — for addressing the lack of gender-responsive and gender-sensitive implementation of climate policies and ensuring that women’s voices are included in the global discussion and international negotiations on climate change, and specifically welcomes the appointment of national gender and climate change focal points (NGCCFP) for every party; stands ready to cooperate with UNFCCC and other relevant partners in this field;

24.

understands the role of cities in the phenomenon of global climate migration, providing jobs and shelters for those who run away from the adverse and hostile environmental conditions. LRAs are currently facing unprecedented economic and humanitarian challenges due to climate change impacts, as a recipient of climate refugees who pressure already limited resources that cities can provide. At the same time LRAs, together with local organisations and other stakeholders, can provide timely response to the issues such as social distress and ecological disaster caused by human influx into urban areas;

CoR external relations bodies’ commitment to the global climate agenda

25.

recognises that cooperation between European LRAs and their peers in third countries plays an important role in promoting subnational climate diplomacy, i.e. through alliance building and actions to promote, expand and finance existing and new initiatives that support exchanges of knowledge and best practices by European, national, regional and local networks as well as city-to-city cooperation, such as peer-reviews and mutual learning activities, site visits, green twinning, partner-to-partner mentoring and coaching;

26.

points out that all CoR external relations bodies and platforms (ARLEM, CORLEAP, working groups/joint consultative committees, peer-to-peer cooperation and the ‘Cities and regions for international partnerships’ forum) are actively engaged in delivering on global climate goals, to which they have committed in their respective action plans and work programmes;

27.

values the significant and underexplored potential of subnational climate diplomacy to boost the recognition of the role of the cities and regions in the UNFCCC framework; notes, in that respect, that the involvement of ARLEM members and partners in the Global South led to the reintroduction of ‘multilevel collaboration’ in the text of the Glasgow Climate Pact at COP26;

ARLEM

28.

recognises that climate action is central to ARLEM’s work on the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals, which has triggered further cooperation among Mediterranean local and regional authorities, i.e. subnational diplomacy, to fight against the common challenges that climate change poses to all territories;

29.

praises ARLEM’s active participation at the related Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) ministerial conferences, such as the UfM ministerial meetings on blue economy, on energy, and on the environment and climate change, where ARLEM representatives regularly highlight the role of LRAs in mitigating and adapting to the effects of climate change;

30.

while praising the longstanding climate action cooperation among Mediterranean cities, the coastal cities in particular, notes that a larger geographical engagement should be encouraged with non-coastal local and regional authorities;

CORLEAP

31.

notes that the priorities of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in relation to the climate agenda have put a visible focus on accelerating the green transition, while adopting the directions promoted by the Paris Agreement, the UN SDG agenda, and the EU Green Deal. There is a true interest in the Green Deal, which is often considered part of the wider national efforts towards adopting the national green agendas aligned with international commitments, especially through the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and the SDGs;

32.

underlines that all of the Green Deal areas of intervention can be found in the national-level strategies of the EaP countries, with energy being the dominant focus;

33.

underlines the need to support, with funding and technical assistance, those EaP countries that strive to diversify away from Russian sources of energy supply and to prioritise clean energy;

34.

draws attention to the advanced commitment to the EU green agenda by the EaP cities and regions from the trio countries (Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia) via their partnership agreements, and strongly welcomes the European Council decision to grant the status of candidate countries to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova;

35.

notes that the ‘East’ arm of the Covenant of Mayors (CoM) is a prominent climate action network in the Eastern partnership countries. CoM East has collected 361 new signatories from local governments willing to commit to reducing СО2 emissions by 30 % by 2030 and to enhancing resilience through climate change adaptation;

Enlargement peers

36.

underlines the central role of the green agenda and sustainable connectivity in the 2021 Enlargement package and supports the implementation of the Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) for the Western Balkans that can be a major contribution to the green transition in the region (2);

37.

recognises, within the Balkan area, the potential of the B40 Balkan Cities Network as an important milestone regarding city climate diplomacy in the region, with sustainable development and climate action among their top priority areas. It now includes 24 cities and aims to expand further in the region;

Multilevel governance

38.

calls for the establishment of a well-designed and multi-level governance framework outlining the rules of European, national and subnational cooperation on climate diplomacy within the EU and with potential implementation in the partnering countries. Considering the lack of support for and inclusion of municipalities and smaller and less developed regions, the framework should give such underrepresented local and regional governments special consideration, ensuring just and equal participation in the process;

39.

proposes to consider identifying LRA climate ambassadors within the CoR external relations bodies, taking into account the already existing CoR Covenant of Mayors ambassadors and Climate Pact ambassadors and creating synergies between them, thereby enabling them to internally coordinate their input to the CoR official delegation to the COPs;

40.

calls for a stronger coordination among cities and regions to issue joint statements ahead of UNFCCC COP events and 2023 Global Stocktake, in close cooperation with the global partners, including the LGMA, the ICLEI, the Regions4, the Under2 Coalition and the Global Covenant of Mayors; encourages local and regional authorities from the Member States and the partnering countries, especially from ARLEM, CORLEAP and Western Balkans to organise multilateral meetings between the LRA climate ambassadors and the representatives of the Member States;

41.

highlights the potential link between subnational climate diplomacy and EU energy policy, notably the importance of energy security within the global clean and just energy transition via external energy policy and diplomacy, in facing both the energy crisis exacerbated by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the existential threat of climate change;

42.

calls for the EU to step up its engagement around the world through dedicated partnerships involving local and regional authorities, in the field of energy security, energy transition towards an efficient and renewable model and strategic sufficiency;

43.

outlines the role of cities and regions as global climate innovation hubs, developing new policies and setting more ambitious emission reduction and climate adaptation and mitigation goals than the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs); reiterates its call for the establishment of a system of Regionally and Locally Determined Contributions as complementary to the NDCs to recognise, monitor and encourage the efforts of sub-national authorities in cutting CO2 emissions;

Innovation hub

44.

advocates for cooperation between the private sector, LRAs and the UN agenda on innovative climate ideas in order to provide unique and cross-border solutions that are able to move the global climate agenda forward; moreover, individual cities and regions can implement innovative policies which when successful, can be scaled up or replicated elsewhere; in this sense, suggests to build upon initiatives such as the Innovate4Cities within the Innovation pillar of Global Covenant of Mayors;

45.

represents the Member States’ LRAs and their partnering international initiatives during the European and global discussions on climate innovation; promotes examples of successful collaboration between the EU and its partners on innovative climate solutions;

Finance

46.

stresses that climate diplomacy and climate ambition at the local and regional level require appropriate funding and investment; highlights in this regard the importance of making direct funding available for subnational governments to deliver climate action and climate adaptation;

47.

highlights the need for synergy between public and private funding sources at the global, EU, national, regional and local levels, and calls for greater financial support, including direct funds, for the EU LRAs and their external peers, accelerating climate diplomacy and implementing the goals of the Paris Agreement;

48.

calls for the EU Climate financing provided to climate mitigation and adaptation to be specific and directed to the regional and local level. The EU mission’s focus on adaptation, and emphasis on supporting 150 regions towards adaptation pathways, is particularly welcomed, but could be extended and replicated within the EU external climate financing and aid to other regions in Africa, Latin America and Asia;

49.

notes that cities and regions globally have a varying degree of functioning ‘green’ markets or investments; supports engagement in projects and networks between peers, which allow LRAs to learn from more experienced peers about the approaches practiced elsewhere, and to inspire their own local or regional agendas. In this respect it is needed to help the Local and Regional Authorities to prepare their own climate adaptation strategies to increase protection and resilience of local communities and natural habitats;

Research

50.

recognises the need for a more structured approach to the assessment of ongoing international subnational climate diplomacy and the need for reinforced data collection in order to fully understand its scope, particularly in the Global South; calls on the coordination efforts to provide a full overview of current multilateral climate action at the local and regional level, especially from the EU LRAs and their partnering initiatives;

51.

calls for the provision of a toolkit and a platform for self-assessment and self-reporting by LRAs on climate action and international diplomacy.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) Proposal 3 / Measure 11 calls for increasing the EU’s leadership and taking stronger role and responsibility to promote ambitious climate action, a just transition and support to address loss and damages in the international framework.

(2) CDR 109/2022, Enlargement Package 2021.

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/30

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Towards a structural inclusion of Cities and Regions in UNFCCC COP 27

(2022/C 498/06)

Rapporteur:	Alison GILLILAND (IE/PES), Dublin City Councillor
Reference document:	Outlook opinion

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

Providing an urgent, large-scale response to the climate emergency by effectively coupling adaptation and mitigation measures through multilevel action

is deeply concerned about the findings of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), which highlights how climate hazards have substantially damaged ecosystems across the globe, further confirming that many of the impacts of climate change are already irreversible; takes note of the evidence included in the report, highlighting how current climate adaptation measures are often ineffective due to insufficient finance and poor planning, which could be addressed through more inclusive governance;

highlights that the IPCC reports recognise local and regional authorities (LRAs) as key actors in delivering adaptation and mitigation solutions; reiterates that LRAs are responsible for implementing 70 % of climate mitigation measures and 90 % of climate adaptation measures (1); underlines how solutions must be provided by and in cooperation with LRAs as direct responses to climate change threats which impact villages, towns, cities and their wider regions, all with their own particular climate context; highlights that more than one billion people in low-lying settlements face hazards such as sea-level rise, subsiding coasts, or flooding at high tides, while 350 million urban residents live with the threat of water scarcity globally;

refers in this regard to the COP 26 agreement to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1,5 oC above pre-industrial levels (2) and calls for swifter implementation of climate measures along with more financial support and guidance for LRAs;

reiterates its call to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to work in partnership with the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) towards a consistent framework for climate neutrality and resilience, biodiversity protection and sustainable development, avoiding overlapping strategies; welcomes the Edinburgh Declaration on the post-2020 global biodiversity framework (3), which provides an example of an inclusive ‘whole of government’ approach;

reiterates the role of the EU in showing leadership by acting on the European Green Deal to become the first climate neutral continent; stresses the importance of stepping up the EU’s efforts to effectively achieve climate neutrality by 2050 whilst systematically implementing the ‘do no harm’ principle, striving to avoid carbon lock-in and carbon leakage; welcomes the pathway set out by the European Climate Law and the Fit for 55 package and by targeted initiatives such as the EU Missions on Adaptation and on Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities; highlights the importance of considering the current geopolitical crisis and its economic consequences, strengthening support, while delivering on this pathway; underlines the importance of eradicating energy poverty and tackling the social consequences of the clean energy transition, in particular in regions that heavily depend on fossil fuels, when implementing the climate plans and providing long-term solutions for energy sufficiency;

highlights that the objective of global energy security is not to be considered an alternative to the Paris Agreement and calls on the Parties to speed up the shift to an energy system fully powered by renewable energy and promote energy sufficiency; welcomes the REPowerEU Plan’s response to the global energy market disruption caused by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, as a clear signal that climate action can and must accelerate; underlines that LRAs are best positioned to support a fair, inclusive and sustainable transition by implementing measures to support the most vulnerable groups affected by energy and mobility poverty, building partnerships to mobilize the business sector and civil society, and by developing decentralised innovative solutions, which significantly increase the security of supply while also reducing transmission losses and lowering emissions;

Enhancing the EU’s climate ambition by building on effective multilevel governance

underlines how the Glasgow Climate Pact highlights the ‘urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action (4)’ and formally ‘recognizes the important role of non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, children, local and regional governments, in contributing to progress towards the objective of the Paris Agreement (5)’; points out, therefore, that the success of the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement is dependent on effectively engaging with all levels of governance;

expresses its readiness to work with the EU institutions on a coherent operational strategy to be developed ahead of COP 27; points out the openness and desire for an effective, regular consultation and cooperation both at the preparation stage and during the negotiations;

calls upon the European Commission to raise the profile of LRAs at COP 27 by boosting the visibility of EU subnational climate action in the EU pavilion’s programme and side events, in cooperation with the CoR;

10.

recognises the importance of national governments to commit themselves to the Paris and Glasgow goals, and the role they have in supporting LRAs; calls upon the Council of the European Union to formally recognise the pivotal role of subnational governments in accelerating a just climate transition and making it socially compatible with local and regional needs in its conclusions on the preparations for COP 27; invites the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU to open a dialogue with cities and regions through the CoR;

11.

welcomes the recognition of the role of subnational governments in the European Parliament Resolution on COP 26 and encourages the European Parliament to further enhance this message in its Resolution on COP 27; highlights the importance of strong coordinated action between the European Parliament delegation and the CoR delegation to COP 27 and calls for joint preparation of the respective delegations;

12.

calls upon the European Commission, the Czech Presidency and the European Parliament to strongly support the organization of the First UNFCCC COP housing and urban development ministerial meeting on cities and climate change, welcoming the decision of the UN-Habitat Executive Board (6);

Moving from the recognition of the role of LRAs to effective implementation of multilevel action

13.

acknowledges that, whilst not succeeding in capturing the urgency and scale of the actions needed, the Glasgow Climate Pact did succeed in kicking off the second phase of the Paris Agreement, bringing to a close all outstanding items in the Paris Rulebook (7); remains nonetheless deeply concerned that the currently submitted Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) put the world on track for a 2,5 oC temperature rise;

14.

reiterates the calls set out in the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe for quicker implementation of the green transition; remains concerned about affordability of energy for consumers and business, in particular amidst the current crisis; stresses the need to safeguard the most vulnerable groups and territories, from any unwanted negative impacts of the energy transition, recalling the findings of the European Commission 2022 Foresight Report;

15.

highlights how the scale of action needed requires integrated, multilevel policies and cross-sectoral solutions; stresses therefore the need for formal recognition of the role of LRAs in tackling climate change; underlines that effective and systematic participation of LRAs, both at the preparation stage and during the negotiations, should be facilitated;

16.

emphasises the role of the CoR as the institutional representative of more than one million local and regional leaders and network of networks; underlines its unique position as a driver for the implementation of climate actions at local and its readiness to cooperate and partner with European institutions and Parties of the Paris Agreement to further multilevel cooperation on the way to COP27 and beyond;

17.

stresses the importance of the Under2 Coalition as the first global climate agreement for subnational governments, which was launched in the run-up to the Paris Agreement; highlights the updated and more ambitious Under2 Coalition targets set out in the 2021 Memorandum of Understanding, with a commitment to take action to achieve the 1,5 oC target and net zero emissions by 2050 or earlier; encourages CoR members to sign this agreement too, and past Under2 Coalition signatories to sign the more ambitious 2021 Memorandum of Understanding;

18.

highlights the crucial role of the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) Constituency in bringing together LRAs’ voices globally and in continuously reinforcing a worldwide network of subnational governments willing to fight climate change; encourages all Parties to the UNFCCC to cooperate with the LGMA Constituency and all non-state actors to contribute constructively to the process leading up to COP 27 and to establish stronger collaboration with the UNFCCC Friends of Multilevel Action;

Keeping the mitigation ambition and fostering capacity by scaling up research and innovation

19.

recalls that around 10 000 LRAs across Europe have made ambitious commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and tackle climate change by participating in initiatives such as the Covenant of Mayors, developing strategies and climate action such as Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAPs) or other local climate action plans driven by regional initiatives; highlights that 75 % of the over 11 000 Global Covenant of Mayors (GCoM) signatories have set more ambitious GHG reduction targets (8) than their respective national governments, and more than 50 % are accelerating the rate at which they aim to reduce their emissions, building up critical political resilience against national level backsliding;

20.

underlines how LRAs’ commitment and action complements and underpins efforts undertaken both in international processes and at national level, and how LRAs’ action is necessary to meet national and international targets; reiterates the need for the formal inclusion of Regionally and Locally Determined Contributions (RLDCs), to complement the NDCs and to formally acknowledge, monitor and encourage the reduction of GHG emissions by subnational governments globally;

21.

recommends the inclusion of a dedicated subnational governments section with the national inventory reports as part of the Paris Agreement transparency framework, to strengthen accountability, impact assessment, and transparency of global climate action; endorses the adoption and use of the Common Reporting Framework by the Global Covenant of Mayors as a step towards comparability (9) of local and regional efforts;

22.

considers that in the EU, the role and contributions of LRAs should be formalised by enshrining them in the provisions of the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union, and notably by making RLDCs an integral part of the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs);

23.

underlines that cities and regions are already driving forward innovation, implementing technical and financial solutions, and shaping innovative governance processes; welcomes in this regard the launch of the UNFCCC Global Innovation Hub at COP 26, the EU Missions on Adaptation and on Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities, as well as the launch of the global Mission Innovation on Urban Transitions (10), and welcomes collaboration and synergies between these;

24.

highlights the need for stronger cooperation and integration across the local, regional, national, EU and global levels in the field of data access, to provide LRAs with the necessary access for data-driven and science-based policy making;

25.

stresses the need to boost the reskilling and upskilling of the workforce, in line with the need to adapt professional practices to tackling climate change;

Boosting effective and cross-sectoral adaptation action and addressing loss and damage

26.

welcomes the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme for the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA); highlights that adaptation challenges may greatly vary within each country and region, and that LRAs are the most suitable actors to define adaptation goals, as they retain first-hand knowledge of both the resilience needs and solutions of specific localities;

27.

stresses the urgency for Parties to work with LRAs to further integrate adaptation into local, national and regional planning; therefore, asks for the formal inclusion of subnational governments adaptation contributions to complement National Action Plans (NAPs) and NDCs;

28.

highlights the importance of preventing ‘maladaptation’ and the implementation of adaptation actions that further deepen existing social inequities; underlines how the impacts of climate change affect marginalized and vulnerable communities disproportionally;

29.

recalls that LRAs are responsible for providing their communities with essential services and immediate responses and relief to the consequences of climate change, such as climate-related disasters, social impacts such as energy poverty and increasing weather-related health problems, and existing inequalities that climate change deepens; stresses the need to address capacity gaps through informed locally accountable decision-making, facilitated by access to scientific evidence, technology and local knowledge to support widespread application of adaptation solutions; emphasizes that innovative Nature Based Solutions (NBSs) are key tools supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation; and, in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact, encourages Parties to take an integrated approach to addressing biodiversity in national, regional and local policy and planning decisions;

30.

welcomes the establishment of the Glasgow Climate Dialogue on Loss and Damage; and, in the absence of financial flows, highlights the need for local and regional authorities from developed and developing countries alike to identify and deploy alternative means of addressing loss and damage;

31.

recalls the examples set by the financial pledges undertaken by Scotland and Wallonia at COP 26 (11) to address loss and damage; emphasises therefore the role and contribution that subnational climate diplomacy and cooperation among LRAs in the Global North and Global South can provide for raising ambitions across levels, ahead of COP 27 and COP28;

Ensuring adequate access to climate finance and promoting a just transition through collaboration and engagement

32.

stresses the importance of making direct funding available for LRAs to deliver climate action, as well as the need for LRAs to partner with the private sector and financial institutions to unlock sustainable investments; underlines that a direct link between access to funding and integrated development of plans and measures in cooperation with the local and regional levels should be established to facilitate cost-effective implementation;

33.

emphasises, in line with the Paris Agreement, the recognition of ‘the importance of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches (12) to enable voluntary cooperation’ as a key instrument ‘available to Parties to assist in the implementation of their NDCs in a coordinated and effective manner’; encourages public and private sector stakeholders and civil society organizations to actively engage in the research, development and implementation of non-market approaches.

34.

welcomes the COP 26 decision to strengthen the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action as a space to encourage non-state actors to take immediate climate action; welcomes the furthering of the Race to Zero and the Race to Resilience as key initiatives to support and showcase ambitious bottom-up climate action, whilst also facilitating reporting and stocktaking of commitments by non-party stakeholders;

35.

welcomes the Glasgow Work Programme on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) (13); expresses the readiness to continuing working on implementing actions under its six elements — education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and international cooperation; invites Parties to continue to support these processes;

36.

notes that vulnerable groups are the ones who suffer the most from the negative impacts of the climate-related crisis; underlines that a just transition needs to fully accommodate the social effects through designated support and funding, as also called for by the 2030 Agenda;

37.

underlines that the IPCC reports recognise that women’s capacities to adapt and fight climate change are often constrained due to their roles in their household and society, institutional barriers and social norms; encourages Parties to continue advancing gender-responsive climate policy by further implementing the Lima Work Programme on Gender and Gender Action Plan and by ensuring women’s equal representation in decision-making processes; strongly believes that women should not be seen as vulnerable beneficiaries but as effective actors mitigating and adapting to climate change;

38.

recognizes that climate action requires input from all generations; highlights the role of young people in driving social progress and inspiring political change and the need for meaningful and informed participation of young people in the formulation of climate policy; is committed to further involving CoR Young Elected Politicians (YEPs) in the preparations for COP 27, building upon the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe and the objectives of the European Year of Youth;

Enhancing cooperation and partnership with the UNFCCC

39.

encourages the UNFCCC to engage with the LGMA Constituency through its participation in the technical dialogues for the First Global Stocktake (GST); welcomes the decision of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to design the GST in the spirit of inclusive, open and year-round Talanoa Dialogues; calls upon the UNFCCC to include, recognize and monitor commitments under the Race to Resilience and Race to Zero in GST reports in order to have a measurable overview of progress at the local and regional level;

40.

welcomes the inclusion of a priority focus on sustainable cities and urbanization within the COP 27 agenda by the Egyptian Presidency; seeks cooperation opportunities with the presidency to further enhance the role of the LRA and stands ready to support the extension of UNFCCC Regional Climate Weeks to Europe, as an opportunity to reinforce the engagement of subnational authorities and civil society in the UNFCCC process;

41.

highlights the key role of the CoR as the institutional representative of European cities and regions; calls therefore on the UNFCCC Secretariat to establish a structured cooperation with the CoR to facilitate the cooperation between the two institutions;

42.

welcomes the G7 Development Ministers’ Meeting Communiqué (14), recognizing the role of cities and local governments in championing a just climate and energy transition; flags the openness to support the work of the Urban7 Group to strengthen multilevel cooperation as an underpinning principle of sustainable, effective climate action ahead of COP 27;

43.

welcomes the announced alignment between the COP 27 and COP 26 presidencies’ priorities (mitigation, adaptation, finance and collaboration), and the linkages with the announced priorities of the High-Level Champions (holistic approach, resilience, finance, regionalization, localization); looks forward to supporting the most effective synergies and complementarities among these priorities on the way towards and at COP 27;

44.

notes that social movements in cities and regions have heightened public awareness about the need for urgent, inclusive climate action; in line with the conclusions of the SBSTA and the SBI on the matters relating to the global stocktake under the Paris Agreement, encourages CoR members to organise local Talanoa Dialogues (15) or similar inclusive processes at local and regional level;

45.

commits to acting as a direct link, providing access to information and regular updates to CoR members, and LRAs in Europe on the progress of the negotiations, throughout the two weeks of COP 27; welcomes the partnership and support of other EU institutions in delivering this information regularly, bringing LRAs closer to the international negotiations.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) Resolution of the European Committee of the Regions — The Green Deal in partnership with local and regional authorities (OJ C 79, 10.3.2020, p. 1).

(2) Glasgow Climate Pact, Paragraph 15.

(3) Edinburgh Declaration on the post-2020 global biodiversity framework.

(4) Glasgow Climate Pact, Preamble, Paragraph 9.

(5) Glasgow Climate Pact, Paragraph 55.

(6) https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2022/04/hsp-eb-2022-crp2-rev.3.pdf.

(7) While the Paris Agreement has provided the framework for international action, the Paris Rulebook set this Agreement in motion by laying out the tools and processes to enable its full, fair, and effective implementation.

(8) Source: 2021 Global Covenant of Mayors (GCoM) Impact Report.

(9) https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/our-initiatives/data4cities/common-global-reporting-framework/.

(10) http://mission-innovation.net/missions/urban-transitions-mission/.

(11) GBP 2 million (USD 2,6 million) and EUR 1 million (USD 1,1 million) respectively.

(12) Paris Agreement Art.6.8 (Non-Market Approaches to Climate Finance).

(13) Glasgow Work Programme on Action for Climate Empowerment.

(14) 220519-G7-Development-Ministers-Meeting-Communique.pdf (bmz.de)

(15) Cities and regions Talanoa Dialogues were designed in 2018 to convene local and regional governments and national ministries of climate, environment and urbanization, along with host organizations and climate stakeholders to take stock of, shape and strengthen NDCs.

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/36

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Just and Sustainable Transition in the context of the coal and energy intensive regions

(2022/C 498/07)

Rapporteur general:	Sari RAUTIO (FI/EPP), Chair of board, Häme health care district
Reference document:	Referral letter from Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU from 16 June 2022

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

welcomes the mission of a climate-neutral European Union by 2050, which will require a digital and green transition in Europe’s municipalities and regions that will fundamentally affect the way people work and live;

notes that the offensive war launched by Russia in February 2022 has made the just transition more difficult and yet more urgent as Europe needs to become less reliant on external energy supplies in a short period of time. Underlines that the transition to a low-carbon society must be achieved while considering the needs of the most vulnerable citizens, by creating new jobs and equal opportunities in rural and coal dependent regions;

welcomes that 74 plans were submitted by the Member States, which are all based on the different circumstances in the respective regions; underlines that the changing world landscape led to an energy crisis, which forced some Member States to temporarily find flexible regional solutions to meet the programme’s objectives;

underlines the cumbersome procedures for the approval of the plans and stresses that some regions face problems with the timely planning and execution of projects due to the fact that the bigger part of the total available funds, coming from the RRF, has been programmed for 2021-2023, giving little opportunity for sustainable implementation of projects towards the end of the programming period; regrets that only a fraction of the programmes have been assessed and approved by the European Commission and calls on the Commission to consider extending the spending deadline for those resources for the Just Transition Funds that are financed by the Recovery and Resilience Facility;

is of the opinion — starting from this premise — that the timeframe for the implementation of the Fund should be reviewed to ensure the Fund’s success;

underlines that the Just Transition Fund should be mainstreamed within cohesion policy, so that synergies and spillover effects can be fully used;

points out that the just transition must focus on those regions where change, and the risks it poses, are greater, as Member States and regions have very different starting points. The Fund’s success depends on the largest beneficiary countries, Poland and Germany, which together account for around one third of the total Fund, i.e. almost 33 %. Romania, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria are also major beneficiaries. These five Member States together account for almost 60 % of the funds. The implementation of these Member States’ plans on schedule (territorial just transition plan, TJTP) will be key to the success of the programme as a whole;

stresses that, in connection with the JTF, it is essential to take account of the current major energy crisis. This crisis also poses a serious threat to a just and green transition, at least in the short term. In particular, the energy sector, energy-intensive industries, the manufacturing sector and SMEs are struggling with unprecedented price pressures, which put additional pressure on the green transition; underlines that the industry’s ambitions to become carbon-neutral also depend on the availability of green electricity for hydrogen production and on alternative energy sources to replace natural gas; welcomes that the Just Transition Fund can play a role in achieving this goal;

points out that the Just Transition Fund has been designed on a smaller scale than the traditional structural funds, but some of its objectives overlap; calls on regions to use synergies between cohesion policy programmes;

10.

requests the implementation of a stronger social component in the JTF as a place-based instrument, involving strong involvement of the social partners, and advocates keeping the bottom-up place-oriented approach as the main element of the Fund as each region represents a unique socioeconomic ecosystem;

11.

notes that the basis and objectives of the Just Transition Fund are sound and that the Fund plays an important role for regions, but also industries in transition; it is therefore necessary to make the mechanism as flexible as possible regarding the eligible operations, in order to achieve the economic diversification of the territories. Recalls that the adopted Regulation supports large companies and companies under ETS, included as potential beneficiaries in the JTF Regulation as a differential element with the Structural Funds; underlines that the future Just Transition Fund should be fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation, respecting the partnership principle, and its budget should be additional to the current cohesion funding;

12.

It stresses that, due the different regional transition processes towards carbon neutrality, such changes to the Fund should include a methodology for the regional allocation of resources, consistent with a large scope of application and with criteria for geographical allocation of its resources more adapted to the territorial diversity of the EU.

13.

calls for a clear commitment to the creation of a JTF 2.0, covering a wider range of regions that face the challenge of the green transition in industry and the manufacturing sector, and for a broad discussion of the scope and size of the instrument in the context of the preparation of the next Multiannual Financial Framework;

14.

stresses the fact that combining EU budget resources from the MFF with revenue from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (from 2021 to 2023) has brought significant difficulties for regions both in terms of planning and execution of projects due to the fact that the bigger part of the total available funds, coming from RRF, has been programmed for 2021-2023, giving little opportunity for sustainable implementation of projects towards the end of the programming period;

15.

stresses the importance of actively involving all regions across the EU in reaching the 2030 and 2050 climate targets, without leaving anyone behind; calls on the private sector to update its plans, so that energy needs and long-term sustainable development are taken into account;

16.

considers that, given the current energy crisis and the uncertain geopolitical situation in the world, the question of a secure energy supply is being increasingly raised alongside the climate-friendly nature of energy production. This is particularly relevant for energy-intensive industrial sectors, but ultimately also determines the energy consumption of households;

17.

suggests that the EU should, in particular, help those regions most dependent on fossil energy sources, so as to prevent regions from drifting further apart when it comes to future investment; stresses that the available EU funds for regions must be targeted to best achieve their aims;

18.

Additional attention should be paid to the particular circumstances of islands and outermost regions facing serious socioeconomic challenges, especially regions that are isolated and highly dependent on fossil fuel;

19.

In this regard, it recalls the needy specific situation of the Outermost Regions, which, due to their small size, remoteness and isolation, are highly dependent on fossil fuels and prevented from connecting to the continental network; however, these regions were not covered by the JTF.

20.

recognises that the JTF alone will not solve the climate emergency, but it can play an important part in it; stresses that it should be used to invest in the EU’s various regions as efficiently as possible, and on the right scale, in order to ensure its full effectiveness; points out that it is difficult for local and regional government decision-makers and experts, such as those preparing JTF programme planning, to develop ties with bigger, central government-led investments or to build cooperation;

21.

notes that energy production and customer supply (industry and consumers) are often in the hands of large, even multinational, companies, which hampers cooperation from the point of view of regional and local governments;

22.

points out that the green transition in the energy sector is gradual and will show major results only in the 2030s, despite the current intense product development and experimentation with new technologies;

23.

points out, moreover, that the potentially long-lasting Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has increased the importance of security of energy supply across Europe. The importance of a secure supply must be taken into account in all energy policy solutions in the coming years, in order to achieve the long-term goal of clean, affordable and secure energy, which is written into the EU Green Deal and is to be welcomed;

24.

stresses that the JTF’s objectives also help meet the objectives of the subsequently created REPowerEU plan. REPowerEU targets should also be taken into account in the implementation of the JTF in the Member States and regions.

25.

believes that, with a view to achieving the best possible just transition, the Union’s existing financial instruments and practices should be further developed and adapted to different situations, so that synergies between the different programmes can be found;

26.

points out that the cohesion policy programmes are continuously evaluated; calls on regional and local authorities to ensure that those programmes also contribute to achieving a just transition;

27.

insists on clear guidance on the possible synergies with ESF+ and other ESIF funding; asks the European Commission to provide additional expert assistance to concerned regions in order to achieve the objectives of the Just Transition Fund;

28.

from among the cohesion policy’s tools, the ERDF and the ESF are well suited to reducing regional disparities and synergies should be used to achieve the best results using JTF funding;

29.

notes that EU cohesion policy aims to achieve a better economic, social and territorial balance in Europe. Cohesion policy must lay the foundations for long-term territorial development, helping to cope with sudden crises and supporting the economic recovery; underlines that action at local and regional level is particularly important when it comes to building crisis resilience; stresses that the long-term objectives of cohesion policy should not be put aside in the face of a crisis;

30.

points out that the JTF programme planning should be stepped up in order to mobilise funding in a timely manner. The financing of the RRF was made available within the space of one year. The European Commission and the Member States have been working on the JTF for almost three years. If the JTF programme is not up and running in 2022, there is a risk of losing the full year allocation of 25 % of the available funds;

31.

stresses that the European Commission should, in a timely manner, put forward the necessary proposals for the continuity of JTF programme planning, in line with long-term climate objectives; urges the co-legislator to properly involve regions in the future JTF programme and calls for more participatory elements in the implementation of the territorial just transition plans, so as to avoid centrally managed decisions without taking the real needs of regions into account;

32.

concludes that it is essential for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be incorporated into the implementation of all instruments. Regionally, the search for the most suitable and effective means will only succeed when regions and cities are genuinely involved in all stages of planning and implementation.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/39

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Digital Cohesion

(2022/C 498/08)

Rapporteur:

Gaetano ARMAO (IT/EPP), Vice-president and regional minister of the Region of Sicily

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

Introduction

reiterates from the outset that economic, social and territorial cohesion is one of the main objectives indicated by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 174) to precisely achieve harmonious and balanced development across the European Union (EU) and its regions;

stresses that the ‘digital cohesion’ concept calls for the recognition of the essential role that technology plays in our life, and requires the integration of the Cohesion objectives in the digital rights, principles and policies of the Union, calling for Article 175 TFEU to be reviewed accordingly;

recalls that in the 2021 EU Annual Local and Regional Barometer report, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) highlighted digital cohesion as a key anchor in creating inclusive societies in the EU: ‘digital cohesion’ is an important additional dimension of the traditional concept of economic, social and territorial cohesion defined in the EU Treaty (1). Digitalisation can help to reduce the social and territorial inequalities by reaching out to citizens who would otherwise be excluded from certain services or underserviced;

recalls that the concept of digital cohesion (2), and the input needed to concretely lead to its attainment, as outlined in a major recent European Committee of the Regions foresight study (3), entails every citizen in Europe having decent access to the internet and to digital services and that the sovereignty and resilience of the EU's digital infrastructure be enhanced;

emphasises that the EU needs to work to make the digital transformation as accessible as possible to all EU citizens and to pay particular attention to help the less developed regions as well as those suffering from permanent natural or demographic disadvantages, such as archipelagos, outermost regions, islands, cross-border and mountain regions, to speed up their digital transformation, given the unique challenges they face while maximising their assets, and the importance of peer to peer collaboration;

acknowledges that, while technology is a key tool to help us adapt to challenging situations affecting all spheres of society, the prominent role of digital technology in responding and building resilience to COVID-19 has highlighted shortcomings in digital infrastructure and literacy, and has made the digital divides in the EU even more pronounced;

Challenges to be addressed

recalls that ‘digital divide’ is a term that refers to ‘different levels of access and use of information and communication technologies and, more specifically, to the gaps in access and use of internet-based digital services’ (4); underlines that high-speed connectivity for everyone in the European Union from cities to rural and remote areas must be a service of general interest and treated accordingly;

underlines that digital forms of communication also create new challenges for democratic processes. Many people get most of their news from social media, the operators of which rarely carry out fact checks. The digital debate on social media can lead to social polarisation and fragmentation, and there is significant potential to exert influence, in particular through the use of algorithms that steer user behaviour;

stresses that digital cohesion must address the reasons behind the growing digital divide in the Union and the challenges encountered in regions which, while striving to bridge the digital divide, are nevertheless still lagging behind, even though the widening of the digital divide is not officially recognised as a threat to the cohesion of the EU;

10.

emphasises that the outermost regions, islands, cross-border and mountain regions and those that are facing demographic challenges (5) have specific geographical, economic, demographic and social characteristics, which entail unique challenges. These include limited size (surface, population, density, economy), limited local market and difficulty in achieving economies of scale, high costs of transport, poorly developed inter-industrial relations, deficits in entrepreneurial skills, infrastructure and supply of services for businesses (compared to continental ones) and reduced social and training services to citizens. Moreover, archipelagos that have double or triple insularity, face another level of burden as specified most recently by the European Parliament's report on ‘Islands and cohesion policy: current situation and future challenges’ (6);

11.

is concerned that existing digital gaps are not diminishing, but, are in fact growing around the following key components of digital transformation in the EU (7):

—

data on the level of basic digital skills is not available at local and regional level. Instead, a proxy indicator of individuals’ ability to use the internet daily has been used. While in some western EU Member States the urban-rural digital gap is being closed in terms of digital skills (DE, SE, NL, BE), it is still significant in all other Member States;

—	in the area of connectivity and digital infrastructure, rural areas are still lagging behind in terms of Next Generation Access (NGA) coverage and the total coverage of households with high capacity networks;

—	the digital transformation of businesses is measured through the number of unicorns (a start-up with a total market value of over USD 1 billion) located in the EU, showing these are largely concentrated in the continental part of Europe and in capital regions;

—	from 2019 to 2020, the gap in the digitalisation of public services increased between individuals living in cities and those in urban areas;

—

the specific situation of the outermost regions must not be overlooked, the unique and complex reality of which requires European policies to be adapted to their specific characteristics (as recognised by Article 349 TFEU), in the interest of not only the principle of economic and social cohesion, but also digital cohesion;

12.

notes that the scope of measures to take to address digital divides overlap several policy areas, making digital cohesion a horizontal endeavour. Therefore welcomes the COFE's recognition of digital cohesion as complementary to economic, social and territorial cohesion (8); considers that digital cohesion is a component of economic, social and territorial cohesion and that it has to be addressed as a public service good;

13.

highlights that the digital divide impacts services provided at the local level in the following areas:

—	Healthcare: lack of access to e-Health services; reduced awareness and more exposure to COVID-19 and any future pandemic for disconnected people.

—	Education: unequal access to educational resources; standstill in the educational process; students have difficulties in getting technological support from their family environment.

—

Other key services: increase of financial exclusion due to the trend towards a cashless society; the population that is disconnected has restricted access to public benefits due to the use of digital-only services. Socio-economic conditions: increase in the socio-economic gap between those who could work remotely through digital means and those who could not work.

—	Increase in social exclusion: the digital divide might prevent people from participating in social initiatives that take place online and exercising their democratic rights.

14.

when designing digital services, public administrations and other organisations providing digital services should cater for accessibility for people with some form of sensory disability or digital skills impairments, ensuring that these services are accessible from connections with constraints in the area of access infrastructure;

15.

finds it regrettable that the inclusion of a principle on digital cohesion to ensure that no region or person is left behind in terms of connectivity and accessibility was not formally part of the EC proposal for a ‘European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade’ (9);

16.

welcomes targeted actions such as the recent amendment to the General Block Exemption Regulation, amending provisions on granting state aid for fixed broadband networks and the ongoing revision of Broadband Guidelines. The CoR, nevertheless, asks to add more clarity on the application of state aid rules on digital infrastructure and their additional simplification (10);

17.

points out that more CO2 savings can be achieved through the targeted use of digital solutions. However, a major challenge is the growing energy consumption of data centres, terminal equipment and transmission networks. Digitalisation without a social and environmental framework would be negligent. Digitalisation itself needs to be accompanied in order to limit resource consumption and avoid rebound effects, where efficiency gains lead to increased consumption;

Achieving Digital Cohesion

18.

notes that digital skills and digital infrastructure are key for the development of all the other dimensions of the Digital Compass and thus recommends that the European Commission undertake and commit to a dedicated long-term strategy, resources and coordination mechanisms, leveraging large scale projects based on Member States cooperation, to ensure every citizen has up-to-date digital skills and infrastructures;

19.

recommends that proper digital skills should be included in all lifelong learning efforts in order to empower all the European citizens to benefit from the general right of access to the internet. In this context, education should not be understood simply as training, but should enable citizens to be active participants and to take a reflective approach to information acquisition;

20.

stresses, in this regard, that particular focus is needed on digital empowerment of the most vulnerable groups, such as older people, ensuring that they have at least some basic skills and also to support youth in less developed regions whose education performance was mostly affected by the crisis due to the digital divide and the lack of access to appropriate online education in several regions. EU policies should put more emphasis on regional differences — in particular on less developed regions — when it comes to the allocation of the education budget to respond to the educational emergency, as it was in the recent years. Digital education content should also integrate the possibilities for children of national minorities, assuring equality by this means for all social backgrounds;

21.

stresses that another indispensable part of digital literacy for all sections of the population is sufficient media literacy to assess the reliability of information, particularly in the areas of health, finance and current affairs. This is particularly true due to the increase in phenomena such as fake news and hate speech;

22.

proposes, as a follow-up to the recently issued Declaration on European Digital Rights and Principles, that the European Commission put in place a comprehensive framework, legal acts and instruments to enforce European digital rights and foster closer cooperation with European citizens to ensure that digital principles are shared and respond to societal needs. Indeed, a revision of the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights established in 2000 should be envisaged, taking into account the newly proclaimed digital rights;

23.

welcomes the recommendation put forward by the Conference on the Future of Europe, on establishing equal access to the internet as fundamental right of every European citizen. In this regard, having a reliable access to the internet and to digital services through a sovereign and resilient EU digital infrastructure is key. Measures should be taken to ensure to fair and open competition and to prevent monopolies and general abuse of market power, vendor lock-in, data concentration and dependence on third countries in relation to infrastructure and services;

24.

suggests, in line with the recommendation put forward by the Specific recommendations for National Regulatory Authorities, from the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (11) that infrastructure sharing (between telecom operators and other service providers such as electricity companies, railways etc.) to reduce costs of deploying broadband networks and remote areas be fostered;

25.

points out that many regions have positive experiences with public-private partnerships both to increase digital infrastructure and to reduce the digital divide, and stresses the role of regional digital hubs in rolling out digitalisation;

26.

strongly underlines that the European Commission and Member States should leverage the opportunities provided by decentralised working, by promoting living in rural areas, islands and mountain regions and areas with very low population density and dispersed populations, and by leveraging the advantages of living in these areas, which could result in a more environmentally, socially and economically sustainable and affordable living if, amongst other basic requirements, digital cohesion is guaranteed, thus meaning with the full availability of key digital services;

27.

points to the merits of sharing best practice examples, from across European regions, of policies allowing for sustainable decentralised working possibilities, to ensure that decentralised working is a permanent feature in the workplace in a way that maximises economic, social and environmental benefits;

28.

emphasises the role of local and regional schools, universities, research centres and local and regional ecosystems in taking part or even leading Digital Innovation Hubs, as these are often not coordinated by regional policies and thus extensive know-how and brain power is often wasted; in this context, measures to avoid brain drain must be put in place and decentralised working, under fair conditions, can be part of the solution, in particular for disadvantaged areas;

29.

stresses that concerning SMEs, more needs to be done to support them in digitalising. They lag behind larger companies with greater resources and a new skill-set needs to be developed. The administrative burden to access EU funds (not only related to digital) for SMEs and in particular micro-enterprises must be significantly reduced. The administrative requirements must be proportionate to the size of the company, while ensuring fair treatment of SME owners when receiving EU funds (12). The European Commission should carry out an SME test for the current practices and put forward proposals to reduce the administrative burden especially for micro-enterprises (e.g. audit exemptions);

30.

the allocation of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds to digital initiatives and to SMEs in particular should be closely monitored, and it should be assessed if the amount of funding allocated to SMEs is proportionate to the SMEs’ contribution to national (and regional) GDPs;

E-government, digital resilience

31.

is in favour of the European Commission promoting a more targeted awareness-raising campaign, addressing citizens, on the existing e-participation platforms at EU, national, regional and local level, through better coordination with Member States and local and regional authorities (LRAs) and an exchange of best-practices;

32.

suggests that Member States devote specific resources to the rollout of public-private partnerships, awareness raising campaigns and training to prepare citizens, especially the younger generations, businesses and the public sector to face cybercrime as a horizontal issue of digital transformation. The post-crisis support-funding programme should also include investments related to digital education, broadband connectivity, the acquisition of necessary equipment, as well as the training of teachers for such situations. Content management within digital education should be properly reconsidered as well, taking into consideration the challenges and problems that could arise from using digital, online content;

33.

suggests that the European Commission and the Member States address cross-national regulatory and interoperability barriers preventing the full implementation of the Digital Single Market and hindering the scaling-up of business and technologies in Europe. In addition, LRAs shall facilitate the outlining of a common model through, for example, the Broadband Platform;

34.

recommends that interoperability of regional and local public IT systems with those at national level should be a starting point for any digital initiative in particular where EU ICT standards, or common EU technical specifications already exist. Interoperability should always be coupled with technology neutrality of solutions and services also to avoid vendor lock-in; in addition, an SME test should be carried out for any digital public service targeted at them; representatives of LRAs should be members of relevant committees at national level and be given advisory roles in key interoperability initiatives;

35.

highlights the importance of the availability of open source software and moreover public open data for all the high-value datasets, as identified in Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13) on open data and the re-use of public sector information, should also be considered a digital right of EU citizens to ensure their empowerment; citizens science should also be fostered and in this context the key communities should be mapped at the EU level and leveraged accordingly, including but not limited to gathering ‘local’ data for monitoring digital cohesion and recommendations on how to achieve it;

36.

insists, in line with its recent CoR opinion on the Artificial Intelligence Act, that the European Commission broaden the impact assessment on the implications of AI technologies for citizens, in particular for vulnerable groups, by obligatorily involving LRAs and/or their representatives in the consultation and by defining stricter transparency and information requirements for high-risk AI technologies (14);

Monitoring and measuring the digital divides

37.

underlines that the European Commission together with the Member States, Eurostat, national statistical offices and JRC shall promote a gradual, but continuous, increase of the geographical breakdown of existing data and widen the information scope to properly include aspects of the digital economy and of the digital society. The European Committee of the Regions shall be involved as the key actor to put forward the needs of LRAs in terms of data and information and suitable tools to measure digital maturity;

38.

suggests that a robust and comprehensive system of local digital indicators measuring digital maturity be developed to serve as background for decision-making, including as criteria for determination of resources for economic, social and territorial cohesion within the meaning of the Common Provisions Regulation currently in force;

39.

proposes that the European Commission and the European Committee of the Regions shall cooperate to move toward a Digital Compass that concretely takes into account the territorial dimension. This will allow moving from the assessment of progress in terms of digitalisation and digital transformation in Europe to the evolution of digital cohesion across territories.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) EU annual regional and local Barometer, Chapter IV — The digital transition at local and regional levels, page 63.

(2) Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Digital Europe for all: delivering smart and inclusive solutions on the ground (OJ C 39, 5.2.2020, p. 83).

(3) Fontana, Susana, Fabio Bisogni (Fondazione FORMIT), Simona Cavallini, Rossella Soldi (Progress Consulting S.r.l.)., Territorial foresight study in addressing the digital divide and promoting digital cohesion, 16 May 2022 (draft).

(4) OECD (2021), Bridging Connectivity Divides, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No 315, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available online: https://doi.org/10.1787/e38f5db7-en.

(5) A total of 17,7 million people live on 362 islands with over 50 inhabitants in 15 European countries; in these regions GDP per capita is under 80 % of EU average and a significant part of them still belong to the under-developed region category. (Source: https://www.regione.sicilia.it/la-regione-informa/estimation-insularity-cost-sicily).

(6) (A9-0144 / 2022-159), https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2021/2079(INI)&l=de.

(7) Source: 2021 EU Annual Local and Regional Barometer, Chapter IV — The digital transition at local and regional levels, A. The state of the digital transformation, page 69.

(8) Conference on the Future of Europe, Report on the Final Outcome, May 2022, 12. Proposal: Enhancing the EU’s competitiveness and further deepening the Single Market, Measure 14, page 56.

(9) Declaration on European Digital Rights and Principles, 26 January 2022.

(10) See RegHuB report 21st Century Rules for 21st Century Infrastructure — Overcoming obstacles to transport, digital, and green infrastructure deployment, available at https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/Documents/RegHub/RegHub%20report%20on%2021%20century%20rules.pdf.

(11) Iclaves & Esade, Study on post-COVID measures to close the digital divide, Final Report, October 2021.

(12) Declaration of direct personnel costs for SME owners who do not receive a salary and other natural persons who do not receive a salary are based on unit costs equivalent to a salary for researchers (https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021. 2027/common/guidance/unit-cost-decision-sme-owners-natural-persons_en.pdf).

(13) Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, p. 56).

(14) Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — European approach to artificial intelligence — Artificial Intelligence Act (OJ C 97, 28.2.2022, p. 60).

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/45

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Eighth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion

(2022/C 498/09)

Rapporteur:

Nathalie SARRABEZOLLES (FR/PES), Councillor of the Finistère Departmental Council

Reference documents:

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050

COM(2022) 34 final

SWD(2022) 24 final

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

welcomes the publication of the 8th Cohesion Report, which sets out both the main developments and the territorial disparities that European regions have experienced over the last decade, and also lays the foundations for the debate on the future of cohesion after 2027;

shares the European Commission’s analysis of the historical context in the European Union: the COVID-19 pandemic and what the Cohesion Report describes as major new trends, such as climate change and digital hyperconnectivity, constitute new sources of territorial inequalities and fuel the geography of discontent in Europe;

notes that the slow resumption of the convergence process in recent years hides very different trends: several less developed and transition regions in southern and north-western Europe have shown low or negative growth. At the same time, regional growth in the east is still sometimes marked by strong differences between capital regions and other regions;

stresses the impact of Brexit on the European economy, in particular on interregional cooperation, research and training ecosystems, and the demography of many European regions;

notes the need for cohesion in Europe, accentuated by the war in Ukraine, at the borders of Europe;

therefore calls on the Commission for an open and strategic reflection on the role of cohesion policy post-2027 in the European policy mix;

Cohesion policy for long-term development

considers that the regional disparities identified in the Cohesion Report fully reinforce the legitimacy of cohesion policy as defined in the Treaties, namely the reduction of disparities in wealth and development between the regions of the European Union;

therefore welcomes the Cohesion Report’s analysis of the impact of cohesion policy for the period 2014-2020 on investment across the regions of the European Union;

notes that cohesion policy has often played a key role in maintaining a sufficient level of public investment in the face of a decline in national investments;

10.

points out that the positive impact of investments supported by cohesion policy is proven in the long term, as highlighted in Chapter 9 of the Cohesion Report;

11.

also emphasises that the programming arrangements specific to cohesion policy allow certain projects to be financed up to three years after the end of a programming period, making it impossible to compare them with other European programmes under direct management;

12.

highlights the effectiveness of cohesion policy in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, notably through the flexibility measures introduced as of April 2020 (the two Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII) packages);

13.

considers, however, that it is essential to maintain the focus of cohesion policy on strengthening territorial, economic and social cohesion in Europe;

A definition of the concept ‘do no harm to cohesion’

14.

sees the opportunities of the introduction of a new concept in the Cohesion Report aiming to extend a comprehensive approach to cohesion policy to any European public policy with territorial impact;

15.

stresses that this concept fully supports the initiative of the European Committee of the Regions to demonstrate the role of economic, social and territorial cohesion as a fundamental value of the European Union;

16.

considers that this concept could enable any European policy to take account of the diversity of the different regional realities in the European Union, while increasing its effectiveness and improving the visibility of EU action among citizens

17.

opposes, however, the extremely restrictive interpretation of this concept, according to which this principle would only apply to operational programmes and not even to the partnership agreement; reiterates to the European Commission that this principle of ‘do no harm to cohesion’ must apply to all European policies in order to reduce the anti-cohesive effect of certain European policies or programmes;

18.

particularly supports the need mentioned in the Cohesion Report for the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to support cohesion in Europe;

19.

calls on the Members States and the European Commission to ensure that the RRF and any possible successor directly incorporates the cohesion policy approach based on multilevel governance and partnership;

20.

stresses, furthermore, the need to better align and increase synergies between cohesion policy and Horizon Europe in order to strengthen innovation in all European regions and thereby develop their research and innovation capacities, which allows the EU to compete on a global scale by investing in regional excellence and can be a solution to the development trap of middle-income regions;

21.

points out, in this connection, that it is important for these regions in the middle-income development trap to have specific support, either through belonging to the category of intermediate regions or by means of easier access to territorial cooperation instruments in the field of innovation;

22.

calls for the consolidation of the approach based on smart specialisation strategies in order to boost competitiveness and the innovation ecosystem on the basis of place-based strategies and enhanced territorial cooperation;

23.

calls on the European Commission to define the concept ‘do no harm to cohesion’ and to make it a real mechanism for assessing the impact of European policies on cohesion in Europe; proposes that the rural proofing provided for in the Communication on a long-term vision for the EU's rural areas be included in this mechanism in order to take account of the specific characteristics of these areas; calls on the European Commission to develop specific guidelines on the practical implementation of this concept, including the use of legislation after consulting the European Committee of the Regions;

Cohesion policy at the heart of a long-term European strategy

24.

points out that, even though cohesion policy is at the heart of the achievement of the European Green Deal and the European Pillar of Social Rights, it is not part of a long-term European strategy as such, unlike 2014-2020 cohesion policy, which was directly linked to the achievement of the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy;

25.

therefore calls on the European Commission to draw up a new long-term European strategy for 2030 linking the imperatives of the green and digital transitions while strengthening the EU’s economic, social and territorial cohesion; stresses that this strategy should encompass all EU policies and funds supporting investment, in line with the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle introduced in the Cohesion Report;

26.

regrets the lack of mechanisms for coordinating between and linking the RRF and 2021-2027 cohesion policy and the risk of overlaps or crowding out in the absence of a real mechanism to verify the additionality of funding from the RRF;

27.

stresses the need to put European investment policies on an equal footing in order to avoid competition between the various European policies on the ground, as state aid rules currently form an obstacle to cohesion policy implementation, as compared to other policies;

28.

in this context, calls on the European Commission to carry out a thorough analysis with a view to adapting the European legislative framework on State aid so that projects supported by the various European programmes and funds are subject to the same rules;

Better integrating cohesion policy into the European Semester

29.

notes that the Cohesion Report fails to refer to the link between cohesion policy and the EU’s economic governance framework, despite the increased role of the European Semester in implementing cohesion policy for the 2021-2027 programming period;

30.

welcomes the inclusion of a new section on territorial disparities in the country reports of the spring European Semester package published in May 2022, provided that this inclusion is aimed exclusively at strengthening territorial cohesion in Europe and not at imposing structural reforms completely disconnected from the long-term objectives of cohesion policy;

31.

calls on the Commission to continue its efforts to increase the focus on territorial cohesion challenges affecting European areas and regions in the relevant country reports and country-specific recommendations;

32.

calls for a more comprehensive reflection aimed at reforming the current framework for economic policy coordination so that the various phases of the European Semester can incorporate the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle and better involve local and regional authorities;

33.

notes on the basis of the 8th Cohesion Report that the public investment deficit in the European Union constitutes a hidden debt; therefore reiterates its often-expressed call for a ‘golden co-financing rule’, whereby expenditure by Member States and local and regional authorities on co-financing under the Structural and Investment Funds is not counted as structural, public or similar expenditure as defined in the Stability and Growth Pact, in compliance with the EU co-financing limits that apply to it; stresses that public investments, such as those for sustainable ecological, digital and social transition and for maintaining European competitiveness, are important for future generations and should therefore be treated appropriately, including through a change in European accounting rules;

34.

reiterates its call from previous opinions (1) for a code of conduct for the input of local and regional authorities in the context of the European Semester. The code of conduct is necessary to make the European Semester more transparent, inclusive and democratic, but also more effective by involving local and regional authorities. This increases ownership at local and regional level, thus improving the implementation of the desired economic reforms in the Member States;

Towards a new strategic framework for the European Structural and Investment Funds …

35.

notes a certain trend towards the multiplication of investment funds at European level, some of which are under direct management, shared management (such as the European Structural and Investment Funds — ESIF) or with the State in a leading role in their implementation (the national recovery and resilience plans supported by the RRF);

36.

is concerned by the current trend to increase the transfer of ESIF funds to other policies or programmes, such as national recovery and resilience plans or directly managed programmes such as Horizon Europe; as such, strongly opposes the transfer of funds from cohesion policy and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) to the RRF; it is the RRF, based on Article 175 TFEU, that aims to complement the efforts of cohesion policy to achieve the objectives of Article 174 TFEU, and not the other way around; furthermore, points out that cohesion policy already represents a major contribution to European green investments and to the EU’s energy independence; therefore concludes that the recentralisation of EU funds via the transfer of the aforementioned funds to the RRF is not justified;

37.

notes that this trend has a twofold adverse effect, contributing, on the one hand, to reducing the effectiveness of cohesion policy as a long-term development policy and, on the other, to downgrading it to a simple budget line in the European Union’s multiannual financial framework;

38.

therefore calls on the European Commission to develop a new strategic framework for the post-2027 period focusing on partnership and multilevel governance and making general provision for all EU investment funds with a territorial dimension, i.e. the ESIF, the possible future Social Climate Fund, the EAFRD and the future RRF where appropriate;

39.

stresses in particular the need to reintegrate the EAFRD into this new strategic framework;

40.

calls also for special attention to be paid to the future of the European Social Fund (ESF) in order to incorporate a stronger territorial dimension and to enhance the role of local and regional authorities in its implementation;

… aimed at genuine simplification in the implementation of the ESIF…

41.

notes that the legislative framework for cohesion policy covering the period 2021-2027 contains significant simplification measures, such as the extension of simplified cost options, which will have to be assessed once implemented under the 2021-2027 programming;

42.

points out, however, that the proliferation of funds and of rules, deadlines and arrangements for the implementation of funds under shared management has recently led to an increased administrative burden for the managing authorities of the funds, which are often at regional level;

43.

notes that this administrative burden leads to delays in the implementation of ESIF funds for which regions are often considered responsible, which undermines the image of cohesion policy as an effective investment policy in the eyes of European citizens;

44.

emphasises the crucial role of regions in breaking up silos in the implementation of ESIF funds and linking them to a place-based approach in order to support place-based development strategies;

45.

already calls on the Commission to start a long-term reflection process involving ESIF managing authorities at regional level in order to simplify management, control and audit rules, leading to a genuine reform with a view to the next cohesion policy legislative package for the post-2027 period;

46.

reiterates the request of the European Committee of the Regions to implement a contract of trust between the European Commission and the managing authorities for cohesion policy to make the ESIF funds attractive for project developers once more and so that programmes with a very low residual error rate in the 2021-2027 programming period can benefit from simplified management, control and audit rules for the next programming period;

… and focusing on a genuine partnership of trust with local and regional authorities…

47.

notes a certain centralisation of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy and an undermining of the partnership principle and the role of regional authorities in establishing investment needs as part of operational programmes;

48.

welcomes the intention expressed in the Cohesion Report to strengthen multilevel governance and the partnership principle;

49.

supports the recent initiative for a European community of practice on partnership 2021-2027, which should lead to significant improvements in the European code of conduct on partnership;

50.

highlights the unique approach of cohesion policy, where the ESIF operational programmes are based on an analysis of territorial needs established at local level and follow a fully participatory and democratic process, contrary to the national recovery plans supported by the RRF, which were largely designed without the involvement of the regions;

51.

therefore calls on the Commission to enhance the role of the regions in the management of the Structural and Investment Funds and to strengthen the legislative provisions linked to the partnership, particularly in view of the post-2027 period

Cohesion policy as a tool for reversing demographic decline in inland, rural and mountainous areas

52.

is concerned about the increasingly ageing population, declining birth rates, and the depopulation of inland areas, especially rural and mountainous areas;

53.

notes that economic and social disruptions, most recently caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine, affect young people’s future expectations;

54.

highlights the importance of establishing an EU strategy for demography, taking into account in particular the opportunities offered by legal migration flows within the EU, while strengthening coordination on illegal immigration and providing support and protection to refugees;

A special focus on regions with permanent geographical disadvantages

55.

regrets that the Cohesion Report only superficially addresses the challenges faced by regions with permanent geographical disadvantages and the outermost regions;

56.

calls for a special focus on the regions with permanent geographical disadvantages defined in Article 174 TFEU, namely island regions, regions with very low population density, cross-border and mountain regions, and on the outermost regions in any reform project concerning the future of cohesion policy;

57.

emphasises the important work that has been carried out in the European Parliament on the issue of cohesion of islands and recognises the importance of a pact for European islands;

58.

with regard to rural areas, welcomes the fact that the Cohesion Report recognises the potentially negative impact of demographic transitions on cohesion in Europe; therefore calls on the European Commission to step up future funding and instruments under cohesion policy and CAP strategic plans, in particular through minimum thresholds taking into account the EU-wide share of population and territory of rural areas, for the regions recognised in Article 174 and cooperation between urban and rural areas, each of which has comparative and complementary advantages with a view to harmonious territorial development;

59.

at the same time highlights the positive role metropolitan areas play in ensuring cohesive development through distributing wealth and benefits in a given area and forging more efficient urban-rural links. Reiterates that the GDP per capita does not give the full picture about their level of development and recommends the use of the Social Progress Index methodology to identify the most pressing challenges that need to be financed in the metropolitan areas by Cohesion Policy funds (2);

Boosting territorial cooperation

60.

points out that the budget allocated to the territorial cooperation component of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy has been significantly reduced compared to the previous period, undermining the EU's capacity to act in order to address significant cohesion challenges in cross-border areas;

61.

welcomes the reference in the Cohesion Report to strengthening cross-border and interregional cooperation; calls for the growing need to strengthen cohesion, maintain existing cooperation mechanisms between EU regions and respond to the new cooperation challenges emerging in the current context to be fully reflected in the future cohesion policy for the post-2027 period.

62.

regrets that the regions most negatively affected by this cut are those listed in Article 174 TFEU, which, because of their natural, permanent handicaps, particularly need to strengthen their territorial, economic and social cohesion with the other regions of the European Union.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) Opinion of the Committee of the Regions — Recovery plan for Europe in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: Recovery and Resilience Facility and Technical Support Instrument (OJ C 440, 18.12.2020, p. 160).

Opinion of the Committee of the Regions — The European semester and cohesion policy: aligning structural reforms with long-term investments (OJ C 275, 14.8.2019, p. 1).

Opinion of the Committee of the Regions ‘Improving the governance of the European Semester: a Code of Conduct for the involvement of local and regional authorities’ (OJ C 306, 15.9.2017, p. 24).

(2) Opinion of the Committee of the Regions — The challenges of metropolitan regions and their position in the future Cohesion Policy post-2020 (OJ C 79, 10.3.2020, p. 8).

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/51

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on Pathways to School Success

(2022/C 498/10)

Rapporteur:

Inga BĒRZIŅA (LV/Renew E.), Member of the Municipal Council Kuldīga

Reference document:

Proposal for a Council Recommendation on Pathways to School Success

COM(2022) 316

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS

Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on Pathways to School Success

COM(2022) 316

Amendment 1

Recital 2

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(2)

On 30 September 2020, the European Commission adopted a Communication on achieving the European Education Area by 2025, considering inclusiveness as one of its six dimensions (1). On 18 February 2021, the Council adopted the Council Resolution on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training towards the European Education Area and beyond (2021 — 2030) (2).

(2)

Reason

It is proposed to add a reference to the CoR opinion adopted in relation to the European Commission Communication on Achieving the European Education Area by 2025.

Amendment 2

Recital 5

(New recital)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

In the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe, citizens also call on the EU to ensure that all European citizens can benefit from digitalisation, by empowering them with the necessary digital skills and opportunities (1) . The European Commission intends to present proposals for a recommendation on improving digital skills provision in education and training and for European Digital Skills Certification (2) .

Reason

Proposal to highlight the importance of reaping the benefits of digitalisation by providing all citizens with the necessary digital skills and opportunities.

Amendment 3

Recital 25

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(25)

The objective of reducing underachievement and early leaving from education and training and promoting school success need to be systematically addressed by education and training across the EU. At system level, consistency of policy measures, coordination with other relevant policy areas (such as health, social services, employment, housing, justice, migration and integration), and effective cooperation between different actors at all levels (national, regional, local, school) is needed for a coordinated support to children, young people and their families. In parallel, at school level whole-school approaches should be promoted, incorporating all areas of activity (teaching and learning; planning and governance; etc.) and engaging all key actors: learners, school leaders, teaching and non-teaching staff, parents and families, and local and wider communities (1).

(25)

The objective of reducing underachievement and early leaving from education and training and promoting school success need to be systematically addressed by education and training across the EU. At system level, consistency of policy measures, coordination with other relevant policy areas (such as health, social services, employment, housing, justice, migration and integration), and effective cooperation between different actors at all levels ( European, national, regional, local, school) is needed in accordance with the principles of multilevel governance for a coordinated support to children, young people and their families. In parallel, at school level whole-school approaches should be promoted, incorporating all areas of activity (teaching and learning; planning and governance; etc.) and engaging all key actors: learners, school leaders, teaching and non-teaching staff, parents and families, and local and wider communities (1).

Reason

Education and training would be improved if the principles and processes underpinning multilevel governance were applied, as described in the CoR Resolution on the Charter for Multilevel Governance in Europe (1).

Amendment 4

Point 1

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

Develop or further strengthen by 2025 an integrated and comprehensive strategy towards school success, at the appropriate level, in accordance with the structure of their education and training system, with a view to decoupling education outcomes from socioeconomic status, promoting inclusion in education (including through addressing segregation in education) and further reducing early leaving from education and training and underachievement in basic skills, as proposed in the policy framework in the Annex. Special attention should be paid to well-being at school as a key component of school success. Such a strategy should include prevention, intervention and compensation measures (including measures offered as part of the Youth Guarantee), be evidence-based and combine universal measures with targeted and/or individualised provisions for learners requiring additional attention and support in inclusive settings (such as learners with a socioeconomic disadvantaged, migrant — including refugee — or Roma background, learners with visible and non-visible disabilities, those with special educational needs or mental health issues). Such a strategy should also be based on structured cooperation between actors representing different policy areas, levels of governance and educational levels, benefit from adequate funding and be accompanied by a clear implementation and evaluation plan .

Develop or further strengthen by 2025 an integrated and comprehensive strategy towards school success, at the appropriate level, in accordance with the structure of their education and training system and also taking into account the relevant decentralisation systems , with a view to decoupling education outcomes from socioeconomic status, promoting inclusion in education (including through addressing segregation in education) and further reducing early leaving from education and training and underachievement in basic skills, as proposed in the policy framework in the Annex. Special attention should be paid to well-being and to environmental and health conditions at school and in surrounding areas as a key component of school success. Such a strategy should include planning, prevention, intervention and compensation measures (including measures offered as part of the Youth Guarantee), be evidence-based and combine universal measures with targeted and/or individualised provisions for learners requiring additional attention and support in inclusive settings (such as learners with a socioeconomic disadvantaged, migrant — including refugee — or Roma background, learners with visible and non-visible disabilities, those with special educational needs or mental health issues). Such a strategy should also be based on structured cooperation between actors representing different policy areas, levels of governance and educational levels, benefit from adequate funding and be accompanied by a clear plan for its implementation, evaluation and review .

Reason

The role of local and regional authorities is vital for making the European education area a reality, due to the direct and substantial links they have with the communities where educational policies defined at European level need to be implemented, and where they have a direct impact (2).

Amendment 5

Point 3

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

3.	In the context of an integrated and comprehensive strategy, combine prevention, intervention and compensation measures as those set out in the policy framework in the Annex to support:

3.	In the context of an integrated , inclusive and comprehensive strategy, combine prevention, intervention and compensation measures as those set out in the policy framework in the Annex to support:

Reason

Self-explanatory.

Amendment 6

Point 3.3

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

3.3.

schools in developing a ‘whole school approach’ to school success, in which all members of the school community (school leaders, teachers, trainers and other educational staff, learners, parents and families and the local community) as well as external stakeholders engage actively and in a collaborative way to promote educational success for all learners.

3.3.

schools in developing a ‘whole school approach’ to school success, in which all members of the school community (school leaders, teachers, trainers and other educational staff, learners, parents and families and the local community , including local and regional authorities ) as well as external stakeholders engage actively and in a collaborative way to promote educational success for all learners.

Reason

Local and regional authorities have responsibilities at school level and contribute to the development of a ‘whole school approach’, including through the application of the ‘quadruple helix approach’, a model of cooperation in which, together with stakeholders from the public, private and academic sectors, a strong emphasis is placed on citizens and their needs.

Amendment 7

Point 4

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

Optimise use of national and EU resources for investment in infrastructure, training, tools and resources to increase inclusion, equality and well-being in education, including EU funds and expertise for reforms and investment in infrastructure, tools, pedagogy and the creation of healthy learning environments, in particular Erasmus+, the Recovery and Resilience Facility, European Social Fund+, European Regional Development Fund, Digital Europe Programme, Horizon Europe, the Technical Support Instrument, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, etc., and make sure that the use of the funds is aligned with the overall strategy.

Optimise use of local, regional, national and EU resources for investment in infrastructure, training, tools and resources to increase inclusion, equality and well-being in education, including EU funds and expertise for reforms and investment in infrastructure, tools, pedagogy and the creation of healthy learning environments, in particular Erasmus+, the Recovery and Resilience Facility, European Social Fund+, European Regional Development Fund, Digital Europe Programme, Horizon Europe, the Technical Support Instrument, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, etc., and make sure that the use of the funds is aligned with the overall strategy.

Reason

Proposal to also include the local and regional level.

II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

The specific role of local and regional authorities

believes that education and training systems that are high-quality, inclusive and equally accessible to all, regardless of the learners’ personal characteristics, family, cultural and socioeconomic situation, create not only paths to school success, but also our common path to social cohesion and a more sustainable economy in the European Union;

highly appreciates the ‘whole school approach’ encouraged by the European Commission and including local and regional authorities, which is an important prerequisite for reforming education and training policy and achieving such key targets of European cooperation in education and training as reducing the share of low-achievers in basic skills and countering early leaving from education and training;

points out that measures targeting early leaving of education and training (3) are often implemented at local and regional level, thus enabling contextual problems to be addressed;

considers it important to reduce the educational gap between remote, rural and urban areas, and also between different educational institutions, in order to promote the well-being of pupils and staff at school. Adequate funding to promote social and territorial cohesion and the possibility to take data-based decisions are important for this purpose; in any case, the quality of the decentralised education system can only be improved through a broad (and not purely budgetary) approach;

stresses the importance of collecting and analysing data at local, regional and national level to deduce common trends affecting early school leaving, and accordingly propose solutions able to address challenges on the basis of a place-based approach. For example, in Latvia an interactive tool has been developed at national level to collect information on pupils from the moment the teacher identifies a risk of their dropping out, and offers a wide range of statistics at local and regional authority level on the causes and trends of school dropouts;

calls for the wider uptake of local and regional good practices to develop a high-performance digital education ecosystem and to facilitate a sustainable digital transition, while promoting quality and inclusive education for all and enhancing digital cohesion to reduce territorial disparities. For example, in adapting to the circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Île-de-France region in France has developed the QIOZ free language learning platform;

Impact of crises on education systems

draws attention to the fact that the number of young people leaving education early has steadily decreased over the last decade, but that the pandemic threatens to reverse this positive trend (4). This is demonstrated by the conclusions on the results of the 2021-2022 school year and their correlation with COVID-19-related restrictions. For example, in the Walloon and Brussels regions of Belgium the number of early school leavers increased by 28 %, particularly in years 7-12;

calls for account to be taken of the impact of COVID-19 on pupils’ mental and physical health as well as overall well-being. Furthermore, attention should be paid to the fact that the impact of this crisis has also reduced the learning motivation of groups of pupils who were not previously at risk of early school leaving and has at the same time disproportionately impacted pupils of vulnerable and disadvantaged backgrounds. It calls, therefore, also for innovative motivating activities for children who are successful in learning;

calls for socially inclusive and psychologically adapted education for all school-aged Ukrainian citizens residing in EU Member States due to the ongoing war. It calls also for tailored and smart language learning programmes (such as the one implemented in the Flemish region of Belgium (5)) for pupils who do not speak the language of the EU Member State concerned, in order to promote their integration and improve their chances of success;

Final conclusions

10.

shares the conclusion of the independent evaluation (6) of the Council Recommendation of 28 June 2011 on policies to reduce early school leaving (7) that cooperation at different levels of governance (European, national, regional, local) remains limited and fragmented. This is one of the areas where further efforts are needed to address early school leaving, in particular through cooperation within the innovation ecosystem;

11.

points out that local and regional authorities have a key role to play in creating and modernising educational institutions, promoting equal opportunities for all and a safe, inclusive and efficient learning environment, also paying attention to growing bullying/cyberbullying. In view of the impact on national and local budgets of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the energy crisis and rapid inflation, the Committee stresses the importance of long-term support from the EU Structural Funds for municipal projects to modernise the learning environment and ensure the quality maintenance of existing educational infrastructures;

12.

calls for a ‘whole school approach’ to respond to the current challenges, including the generational replacement of teachers, and for broader motivation programmes for teachers and school staff, as already implemented by individual local and regional authorities with measures such as scholarship programmes for final-year students, especially future STEM teachers and guidance practitioners (psychologists, social educators, etc.). At the same time, professional development, upskilling and, where appropriate, retraining programmes for teachers should continue to be promoted.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) COM(2020) 625 final

(2) OJ C 66, 26.2.2021, p. 1.

(1) COM(2020) 625 final

(2) OJ C 66, 26.2.2021, p. 1.

(3) OJ C 175, 7.6.2021, p. 6.

(1) Conference on the Future of Europe — Report on the Final Outcome, May 2022, Proposal 32 (p. 74).

(2) COM (2022) 404 final

(1) See definition in the accompanying Staff Working Document

(1) OJ C 174, 7.6.2014, p. 1

(2) Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Achieving the European Education Area by 2025 (OJ C 175, 7.5.2021, p. 6).

(3) The EU ‘early leaving from education and training’ (ELET) indicator measures the proportion of 18-24 year-olds with, at most, lower secondary educational attainment who are no longer in formal or non-formal education or training.

(4) European Commission, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, Education and training monitor 2021: executive summary, Publications Office of the European Union, 2021, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/480191.

(5) Onthaalonderwijs voor anderstalige kinderen (OKAN) [‘Reception education for non-native language children’].

(6) European Commission, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (2019), Donlevy, V., Day, L., Andriescu, M., Downes, P., Assessment of the implementation of the 2011 Council recommendation on policies to reduce early school leaving: final report, Publications Office.

(7) OJ C 191, 1.7.2011, p. 1.

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/57

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Protecting industrial and craft geographical indications in the European Union (revised)

(2022/C 498/11)

Rapporteur:

Martine Pinville (FR/PES) Member of the Regional Council of Nouvelle-Aquitaine

Reference document:

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on geographical indication protection for craft and industrial products and amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1001 and (EU) 2019/1753 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision (EU) 2019/1754

COM(2022) 174 final

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS

COM(2022) 174 final

2022/0115 (COD)

Amendment 1

Article 2

(New Article)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

Objectives

This title provides for a unitary and exclusive system of geographical indications, protecting the names of craft and industrial products whose quality, reputation or other characteristics are linked to their geographical origin, thereby guaranteeing the following:

producers acting collectively should have the necessary powers and responsibilities to manage their geographical indication, in order to meet society’s demands for authentic products with heritage value and created through sustainable production in its three dimensions consisting of economic, environmental and social value, and to operate in the market;

b)	fair competition for producers in the marketing chain;

c)	consumers should receive reliable information and a guarantee of authenticity for such products and should be able to easily identify them in the marketplace including in e-commerce;

d)	the simple and effective registration of geographical indications, ensuring the appropriate protection of intellectual property rights; and

e)	effective enforcement and marketing throughout the Union and in e-commerce, ensuring the integrity of the internal market;

f)	local economic development, which guarantees the protection of know-how and of a common heritage.

Reason

Adding this article ensures a parallel approach with the regulation for agricultural geographical indications (GIs) and emphasises that this is not simply an intellectual property tool, but is really a tool for public policy.

Amendment 2

Article 3

(New first point)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

A ‘geographical indication’ means a craft or industrial product is a name that identifies a product:

i)	that originates in a specific place, region or country;

(ii)	whose given quality, reputation or other characteristic is essentially attributable to its geographical origin; and

(iii)

for which at least one of the production steps takes place in the defined geographical area.

Reason

It is essential that a definition of industrial and craft geographical indications (IGIA) be provided and included in this article (to ensure a parallel approach with that for agricultural GIs).

Amendment 3

Article 5

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

Article 5

Requirements for a geographical indication

For the name of a craft and industrial product to qualify for ‘geographical indication’ protection, the product shall comply with the following requirements:

(a)	the product originates in a specific place, region or country;

(b)	its given quality, reputation or other characteristic is essentially attributable to its geographical origin; and

(c)	at least one of the production steps of the product takes place in the defined geographical area.

Reason

Follows on from the amendment to Article 3

Amendment 4

Article 6

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

1. Applications for the registration of geographical indications shall only be submitted by a producer group of a product (‘applicant producer group’), the name of which is proposed for registration. Regional or local public entities may help in the preparation of the application and in the related procedure.

1. Applications for the registration of geographical indications may be submitted by a producer group (‘applicant producer group’), the name of which is proposed for registration. Regional or local public entities may help in the preparation of the application and in the related procedure.

2. An authority designated by a Member State may be deemed to be an applicant producer group for the purposes of this Title, if it is not feasible for the producers concerned to form a group by reason of their number, geographical location or organisational characteristics. Where such representation takes place, the application referred to in Article 11(3) shall state these reasons for such representation.

2. An authority designated by a Member State , in particular a regional or local authority, may be deemed to be an applicant producer group for the purposes of this Title, if it is not feasible for the producers concerned to form a group by reason of their number, geographical location or organisational characteristics. Where such representation takes place, the application referred to in Article 11(3) shall state these reasons for such representation.

3. A single producer may be deemed to be an applicant producer group for the purposes of this Title, where both of the following conditions are fulfilled:

3. A sole producer may be deemed to be an applicant producer group for the purposes of this Title, where both of the following conditions are fulfilled:

(a)	the person concerned is the only producer willing to submit an application for the registration of a geographical indication;

(a)	the person concerned is the only producer willing to submit an application for the registration of a geographical indication;

( b)	the geographical area concerned is defined by natural features without reference to property boundaries and has characteristics which differ appreciably from those of neighbouring areas or the characteristics of the product are different from those produced in neighbouring areas.

(b)	access to the GI remains open to any new producer/manufacturer complying with the GI product specification.

Reason

The applicant for a GI is not necessarily a group of producers; there should be more flexibility, and local and regional authorities, which already carry out this role in certain countries, should be allowed to be considered as applicants. Furthermore, the term ‘single’ producer should be replaced by ‘sole producer’: in geographical terms, there is no such thing as a ‘single’ producer.

Amendment 5

Article 7(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

1. Craft and industrial products the names of which are registered as a geographical indication shall comply with a product specification, which shall include at least:

1. Craft and industrial products the names of which are registered as a geographical indication shall comply with a product specification, which shall include at least the following objective and non-discriminatory elements :

(a)	the name to be protected as geographical indication which may be either a geographical name of the place of production of a specific product, or a name used in trade or in common language to describe the specific product in the defined geographical area;

(a)	the name to be protected as geographical indication which may be a geographical name of the place of production of a specific product, and a name used in trade or in common language to describe the specific product in the defined geographical area;

(b)	a description of the product, including, if appropriate, the raw materials;

(b)	the type of product(s) covered by the name;

(c)	the specification of the defined geographical area creating the link referred to in point (g);

(c)	a description of the product, including, if appropriate, the raw materials;

(d)	evidence that the product originates in the defined geographical area specified in Article 5, point (c);

(d)	the specification of the defined geographical area creating the link referred to in point (g);

(e)	a description of the method of producing or obtaining the product and, where appropriate, the traditional methods and specific practices used;

(e)	evidence that the product originates in the defined geographical area specified in Article 5, point (c);

(f)

information concerning packaging, if the applicant producer group so determines and gives sufficient product-specific justification as to why the packaging must take place in the defined geographical area to safeguard quality, to ensure the origin or to ensure control, taking into account Union law, in particular that on the free movement of goods and the free movement of services;

(f)	a description of the method of producing or obtaining the product and, where appropriate, the traditional methods and specific practices used;

(g)	details establishing the link between a given quality, the reputation or other characteristic of the product and the geographical origin as referred to in Article 5, point (b);

(g)

(h)	any specific labelling rule for the product in question;

( h)	details establishing the link between a given quality, the reputation or other characteristic of the product and the geographical origin as referred to in Article 5, point (b);

(i)	other applicable requirements where provided for by Member States or by a producer group, if applicable, having regard to the fact that such requirements must be objective, non-discriminatory and compatible with Union law.

( i)	any specific labelling rule for the product in question;

(j)	the competent product inspection authority;

(k)	other applicable requirements where provided for by Member States or by a producer group, if applicable, having regard to the fact that such requirements must be objective, non-discriminatory and compatible with Union law.

Reason

—	Recognition of a new name with no link to the local heritage or to the practices of local stakeholders should be avoided: a GI is a piece of intangible heritage, whose validity can be assessed by the practices surrounding it and the uses made of it.

—	The product specification should be more detailed and should clarify the definition of the product covered, as is done for agricultural GIs: the ‘product type’ criterion forms part of this definition by specifying the product family, such as: pottery, porcelain, natural stone, etc.

Amendment 6

Article 8(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

1. The single document shall comprise:

(a)

the following main points of the product specification:

(i)

the name;

(ii)	a description of the product, including, where appropriate, specific rules concerning packaging and labelling;

(iii)

a concise definition of the geographical area.

1. The single document shall comprise:

(a)

the following main points of the product specification:

(i)

the name;

(ii)	the product type;

(iii)

a description of the product, including, where appropriate, specific rules concerning packaging and labelling and the main stages of the production process ;

(iv)	a concise definition of the geographical area;

Reason

The single document is a summary of the product specification and is the document on which the EUIPO will base its evaluation of GI applications. As such, the essential and relevant information required for the evaluation of the application at EU level must be included: the product type and the product’s manufacturing process are essential to a proper understanding of the GI application and to assessing its eligibility in terms of the set criteria.

Amendment 7

Article 22(2)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

2. Upon opposition, the name for which there has been an application for registration shall not be registered, if:

(a)	the proposed geographical indication does not comply with the requirements for protection laid down in this Regulation;

(a)	the proposed geographical indication does not comply with the requirements for protection laid down in this Regulation;

(b)	the registration of the proposed geographical indication would be contrary to Articles 37, 38 or 39;

(b)	the registration of the proposed geographical indication would be contrary to Articles 35, 37, 38 or 39;

(c)

the registration of the proposed geographical indication would jeopardise the existence of, an entirely, or partly identical name or of a trade mark, or the existence of products which have been legally on the market for at least 5 years preceding the date of the publication provided for in Article 18(3).

(c)

Reason

Adding the reference to Article 35 makes it possible, in the event of opposition, to apply all the legal bases used to protect GIs, to strengthen protection of the already recognised GI and to prevent the lodging of competing/illegitimate GIs.

Amendment 8

Article 23

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

2. The Office may decide to extend the transitional period granted under paragraph (1) up to 15 years, or to allow continued use for up to 15 years, provided it is additionally shown that:(…)

(a)	the name in the designation referred to in paragraph 1 has been in legal use consistently and fairly for at least 25 years before the application for registration of the concerned geographical indication was submitted to the Office;

(b)	the purpose of using the name in the designation referred to in paragraph (1) has not, at any time, been to profit from the reputation of the name of the product that has been registered as geographical indication; and

(c)	the consumer has not been or could not have been misled as to the true origin of the product.

5. To overcome temporary difficulties with the long-term objective of ensuring that all producers of a product designated under a geographical indication in the area concerned comply with the related product specification, a Member State may grant a transitional period for compliance, of up to 10 years, with effect from the date on which the application is lodged with the Office, provided that the operators concerned have legally marketed the products in question, using the names concerned continuously for at least 5 years preceding the lodging of the application to the authorities of that Member State and have referred to that fact in the national opposition procedure referred to in Article 13.

5. To overcome temporary difficulties with the long-term objective of ensuring that all producers of a product designated under a geographical indication in the area concerned comply with the related product specification, a Member State may grant a transitional period for compliance, of up to five years, with effect from the date on which the application is lodged with the Office, provided that the operators concerned have legally marketed the products in question, using the names concerned continuously for at least 5 years preceding the lodging of the application to the authorities of that Member State and have referred to that fact in the national opposition procedure referred to in Article 13.

Reason

Transitional periods should be limited in order not to weaken the protection of GIs or to legitimise existing unlawful commercial uses.

Amendment 9

Article 26(3)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

3. Upon the entry into force of a decision registering a protected geographical indication, the Office shall record the following data in the Union register of geographical indications for craft and industrial products:

3. Upon entry into force of a decision registering a protected geographical indication, the Office shall record the following data in the Union register of geographical indications for craft and industrial products:

(a)	the registered name of the product;

(b)	the class of the product;

(c)	the reference to the instrument registering the name;

(d)	indication of the country or countries of origin.

(a)	the registered protected geographical indication of the product;

(b)	the type of product;

(c)	the beneficiaries of the protected geographical indication ;

(d)	the reference to the instrument registering the name;

(e)	indication of the country or countries of origin.

Reason

Clarification

Amendment 10

Article 29(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

1. The Office may, own its own initiative or on a duly substantiated request by a Member State, a third country or any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest, decide to cancel the registration of a geographical indication in the following cases:

(a)	where compliance with the requirements for the product specification can no longer be ensured;

(b)	where no product has been placed on the market under the geographical indication for at least a consecutive period of 7 years.

(a)	where compliance with the requirements for the product specification can no longer be ensured;

(b)	where no product has been placed on the market under the geographical indication for at least a consecutive period of 10 years.

Reason

The deadline of seven years appears to be somewhat random. In view of the potential difficulties in terms of supply chains and of being able to dispose of stocks, a more generous deadline for phasing-out could be granted.

Amendment 11

Article 33(5)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
5. The Advisory Board shall be composed of one representative of each Member State and one representative of the Commission and their respective alternates.	5. The Advisory Board shall be composed of one representative of each Member State, and one representative of the Commission and an independent expert recognised with regard to the type of product(s) concerned, including representatives of regional or local authorities, where appropriate, and their respective alternates.

Reason

The composition of the Advisory Board should remain flexible and allow for the appointment of independent experts with potentially relevant expertise to support the EUIPO in its assessment of applications.

Amendment 12

Article 44(2)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
2. In the case of craft and industrial products originating in the Union that are marketed under a geographical indication, the Union symbol referred to in paragraph 1 may appear on the labelling and advertising material. The geographical indication shall be in the same field of vision as the Union symbol.	2. In the case of craft and industrial products originating in the Union that are marketed under a geographical indication, the Union symbol referred to in paragraph 1 shall appear on the labelling, advertising material or communication materials . The geographical indication shall be in the same field of vision as the Union symbol.

Reason

The mandatory use of a European logo is essential to ensure that consumers or customers can recognise or identify these products. As labelling is not suitable for all industrial and craft geographical indications, it would be more relevant to refer to ‘communication materials’.

Amendment 13

Article 50(2), point (b)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(b)	the delegated product certification body:

(b)	the delegated product certification body or the natural person :

(i)	is to have the expertise, equipment and infrastructure required to perform the official control tasks delegated to it ;

(ii)	is to have a sufficient number of suitably qualified and experienced staff;

(iii)

is to be impartial and free from any conflict of interest and in particular is not to be in a situation which may, directly or indirectly, affect the impartiality of its professional conduct as regards the performance of those official control tasks delegated to it ; and

(iv)	is to have sufficient powers to perform the official control tasks delegated to it ; and

(i)	is to have the expertise, equipment and infrastructure required to perform the official control tasks delegated to them , including for company accounting ;

(ii)	is to have a sufficient number of suitably qualified and experienced staff;

(iii)

is to be impartial and free from any conflict of interest and in particular is not to be in a situation which may, directly or indirectly, affect the impartiality of their professional conduct as regards the performance of those official control tasks delegated to them ; and

(iv)	is to have sufficient powers to perform the official control tasks delegated to them ;

(c)

where the official control tasks are delegated to natural persons, those natural persons:

(i)	are to have the expertise, equipment and infrastructure required to perform those official control tasks delegated to them;

(ii)	are to be suitably qualified and experienced;

(iii)

are to act impartially and are to be free from any conflict of interest as regards the exercise of those official control tasks delegated to them; and

Reason

There should be no differentiation in the requirements for bodies or individuals to whom official control tasks have been delegated

II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

welcomes the European Commission’s proposal, which responds to considerable demand from European local and regional authorities. For local and regional authorities, an industrial and craft geographical indication (ICGI) helps protect heritage, maintain added value and jobs in a region and strengthen its identity;

notes that, in its opinion of October 2021, the European Committee of the Regions called for the establishment of a sui generis system for the protection of ICGIs so that the European Union would have a comprehensive legal framework for GIs, ensuring the same level of protection regardless of the nature of the GI;

welcomes the fact that this proposal builds on the experience of GIs in agricultural and agri-food matters and that a harmonised approach between the different schemes is favoured;

reiterates its request that, in order to ensure consistency between the two schemes, a solid mechanism for coordination between the relevant European Commission and EUIPO services be put in place;

recommends that the EUIPO’s powers to verify geographical indications be clearly set out in a legal act so as to enable the EUIPO to build up, in due course, the expertise needed to assess applications and their eligibility in the light of the required criteria;

emphasises the need to set up a common register of geographical indications to facilitate access to information for consumers, producers, States and local and regional authorities;

nevertheless draws the attention of the co-legislators to the specific nature and diversity of the products and ecosystems concerned by this proposal compared to agricultural products, and calls for vigilance to ensure that this is taken into account consistently, throughout the proposal;

notes that the proposed definition of ‘craft products’ does not reflect practices in some Member States and therefore calls on the European Union to adopt a definition that covers existing manufacturing processes in the EU, whether these be entirely manual, mechanical or mixed;

highlights the importance it attaches to the issue of innovation and research, which should not be hampered by product specifications or by an overly restrictive interpretation of the terms ‘tradition’ and ‘traditional’;

10.

underlines the importance, in specific and justified cases, that a request to register a GI be granted to a regional or local authority;

11.

points out that many of these authorities already support sectors, in both the structuring and development phase of ICGIs and in implementing and promoting them;

12.

notes the inclusion of a direct registration procedure and calls for equal treatment in all procedures, whether or not they include a step for national registration;

13.

highlights the need to implement credible controls to ensure manufacturers’ compliance with product specifications and consumer safety and confidence, and reiterates that external checks should be favoured in order to guarantee reliable and independent monitoring at an acceptable cost;

14.

is therefore concerned about the control procedure based on self-declaration as proposed by the European Commission, which does not offer sufficient guarantees in terms of controls and could lead to abuses that could potentially harm the scheme’s credibility;

15.

stresses the benefit of opting for an approach similar to the successful GIs for agriculture and agri-food in order to harmonise the schemes;

16.

reiterates the need for a time-limited registration procedure and recommends in particular that the maximum duration of the decision on the national and European application be specified;

17.

emphasises the importance of ensuring that costs, in particular those related to appeals, such as the appeal fee, are non-discriminatory, so that every GI-holder can access them.

18.

underscores the need to propose, at European level, measures to support certification, the organisation of professionals and the awareness-raising and promotion of ICGIs. Such support measures will encourage the take-up of the scheme in the EU, thus making it possible to safeguard and develop non-relocatable economic activity in the regions;

19.

shares the Commission’s view that this proposal complies with the subsidiarity principle. Indeed, the proposal aims to create a well-functioning internal market for ICGIs, the protection of which the EU and its Member States are jointly responsible. Member States alone cannot achieve this aim, due to a multitude of divergent rules, which have been developed at the national level and are not mutually recognised. Maintaining purely national approaches would result in legal uncertainty for producers, prevent market transparency for consumers, affect trade within the EU and pave the way for unequal competition in the marketing of GI-protected products. The Commission’s proposal therefore represents real European added value.

Brussels, 11 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/68

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T)

(2022/C 498/12)

Rapporteur:

Isabelle BOUDINEAU (FR/PES), Member of the Regional Council of Nouvelle-Aquitaine

Reference documents:

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013

COM(2021) 812 final

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Action plan to boost long distance and cross-border passenger rail

COM(2021) 810 final

Amended proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013

COM(2022) 384 final

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS

COM(2021) 812 final

Amendment 1

Recital 4

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(4)

The realisation of the trans-European transport network creates the enabling conditions in terms of infrastructure basis allowing to make all transport modes more sustainable, affordable and inclusive, to make sustainable alternatives widely available in a multimodal transport system and to put in place the right incentives to drive the transition, notably by ensuring a fair transition, in line with the objectives presented in the Council Recommendation (EU) […] of […] on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality.

(4)

The realisation of the trans-European transport network creates the enabling conditions in terms of infrastructure basis allowing to make all transport modes more sustainable, affordable and inclusive in all of the EU’s regions , to make sustainable alternatives widely available in a multimodal transport system and to put in place the right incentives to drive the transition, notably by ensuring a fair transition, in line with the objectives presented in the Council Recommendation (EU) […] of […] on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality.

Reason

No region in the European Union should be left behind in the transition efforts.

Amendment 2

Recital 16

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(16)	The interests of regional and local authorities, as well as those of the public concerned by a project of common interest, should be appropriately taken into account in the planning and construction phase of projects.

(16)	The interests of regional and local authorities, as well as those of the public concerned by a project of common interest, must be appropriately taken into account in the planning and construction phase of projects.

Reason

It is imperative that regional and local authorities be fully involved in project planning. The use of the conditional is therefore not justified.

Amendment 3

Recital 52

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(52)

Member States should establish a national SUMP support programme aimed at promoting the uptake of SUMPs and improving coordination among regions, cities and towns. It should support regions and urban areas to develop high-quality SUMPs and reinforce monitoring and evaluation of the SUMP implementation through legislative measures, guidance, capacity building, assistance and possibly financial support.

(52)

Reason

The European Commission must support local authorities that do not have experience in developing SUMPs, in particular by facilitating the sharing of experience.

Amendment 4

Recital 66

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(66)

European Transport Corridors should help to develop the infrastructure of the trans-European transport network in such a way as to address bottlenecks, enhance cross-border connections and improve efficiency and sustainability. They should contribute to cohesion through improved territorial cooperation. They should also address wider transport policy objectives and facilitate interoperability, modal integration and multimodal operations. The corridor approach should be transparent and clear and the management of such corridors should not create additional administrative burdens or costs. It should also encourage the establishment of integrated management structures aimed at speeding up the implementation of cross-border sections, such as the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation. The European Commission and the Member States consult the regions and these stakeholders when making decisions concerning the implementation of the trans-European transport network.

Reason

Integrated management structures such as the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation have proven that they can help address the challenges encountered in the field of cross-border cooperation, particularly in implementing cross-border sections of the TEN-T network. The regulation should make reference to this.

Amendment 5

Article 3(f)

Text proposed by the European Commission

Amendment

(f)

‘urban node’ means an urban area where elements of the transport infrastructure of the trans-European transport network, such as ports including passenger terminals, airports, railway stations, bus terminals, logistic platforms and facilities and freight terminals, located in and around the urban area, are connected with other elements of that infrastructure and with the infrastructure for regional and local traffic;

(f)

‘urban node’ means a functional urban area where elements of the transport infrastructure of the trans-European transport network, such as ports including passenger terminals, airports, railway stations, bus terminals, logistic platforms and facilities and freight terminals, located in and around the urban area, are connected with other elements of that infrastructure and with the infrastructure for regional and local traffic;

Reason

A functional urban area better reflects an integrated transport system of a city and its commuting zone and plays a key role in planning urban areas and decarbonising its transport system. Adding ‘functional’ to the definition of urban nodes matches better with the logic of SUMPs in article 3(o).

Amendment 6

Article 3(l)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(l)

‘multimodal passenger hub’ means a connection point between at least two transport modes for passengers, where travel information, access to public transport and transfers between modes, including Park and Ride stations and active modes, are ensured and which act as an interface between urban nodes and longer-distance transport networks;

(l)

‘multimodal passenger hub’ means a connection point between at least two transport modes for passengers, where travel information, access to public transport and transfers between modes, including Park and Ride stations and active modes, are ensured and which act as an interface between and within urban nodes and longer-distance transport networks;

Reason

This amendment would mean multimodal passenger hub projects between and within urban nodes would receive financing.

Amendment 7

Article 3(o)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(o)	‘sustainable urban mobility plan’ (SUMP) means a document for strategic mobility planning, aiming at improving accessibility to and mobility within the functional urban area (including commuting zones) for people, businesses and goods;

(o)‘

sustainable urban mobility plan’ (SUMP) means a document for strategic mobility planning, aiming at improving accessibility to and mobility within the functional urban area (including commuting zones) for people, businesses and goods; Sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs) may be included in existing plans and/or in broader plans that also integrate land use plans for instance given the interlinkages between land use and mobility.

Reason

This amendment makes sure SUMPs may build on existing and/or broader plans on local and regional level.

Amendment 8

Article 3(z)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(z)

‘maritime port’ means an area of land and water made up of such infrastructure and equipment so as to permit, principally, the reception of waterborne vessels, their loading and unloading, the storage of goods, the receipt and delivery of those goods and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, crew and other persons and any other infrastructure necessary for transport operators within the port area;

(z)

Reason

The regulation should define maritime ports using all the roles their infrastructure plays in order to best meet the challenges they face.

Amendment 9

Article 4(2)(c)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(viii)

the adaptation of regulatory standards to territorial realities;

Reason

To provide continuity of the network and ensure that it is implemented within the deadlines set out in Article 6 of the regulation, it is essential to adapt the technical measures to the challenges their application may pose in certain regions, particularly those mentioned in recital 26 of the regulation: outermost regions and other remote, insular, peripheral and mountainous regions or in sparsely populated areas, or for isolated or partially isolated networks.

Amendment 10

Article 8(2)(b)

Text proposed by the European Commission

Amendment

(b)	be economically viable on the basis of a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis;

(b)	be economically viable on the basis of a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis and the interpretation of viability should also take into account the socioeconomic circumstances of the Member States and the projects’ wider economic impact ;

Reason

In Member States with a lower than average flow of persons and goods, rail projects appear generally unviable when strictly examined using a cost-benefit analysis only. The interpretation of viability should take into account the circumstances and the wider impact of the projects.

Amendment 11

Article 15(3)(b)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(b)

at the request of a Member State, in duly justified cases, other exemptions may be granted by the Commission by means of implementing acts in respect of the requirements referred to in paragraph 2. Any request for exemption shall be based on a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the impact on interoperability. An exemption shall comply with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council, be coordinated and agreed with the neighbouring Member State(s) where applicable.

(b)

at the request of a Member State, a regional authority or group of competent authorities, in duly justified cases, other exemptions may be granted by the Commission by means of implementing acts in respect of the requirements referred to in paragraph 2. Any request for exemption shall be based on a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the impact on interoperability and contribution to the fight against climate change . An exemption shall comply with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council, be coordinated and agreed with the neighbouring Member State(s) where applicable.

Reason

In order to ensure that the network is implemented effectively within the deadlines set forth in Article 6 of the regulation, the administrative burden should be lifted and the granting of derogations should be facilitated.

Progress in implementing the comprehensive TEN-T network is not sufficient to foresee that all requirements referred to can be met in 2050. This would require a much too significant budgetary mobilisation, as some sections are not adapted to meet certain requirements, such as electrification of all railway lines. It is therefore appropriate to promote the progress of the network and to facilitate the identification of sections where it will be more relevant to adapt the requirements of the regulation.

Amendment 12

Article 16(2)(c)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(c)	allows for a prevailing minimum line speed of 160 km/h for passenger trains on the passenger lines of the extended core network;

(c)	allows for a prevailing minimum average line speed of 160 km/h for passenger trains on the passenger lines of the extended core network;

Reason

Implementing this technical requirement, which would be much too expensive, does not bring significant added value. It would seem more appropriate to promote a more realistic and efficient approach to ensure punctual completion of the network and to provide network users with efficient and effective connections.

Amendment 13

Article 16(5)(b)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(b)

at the request of a Member State, in duly justified cases, other exemptions may be granted by the Commission by means of implementing acts in respect of the requirements referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4. Any exemption shall be based on a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the impact on interoperability. An exemption shall comply with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2016/797, be coordinated and agreed with the neighbouring Member State(s) where applicable.

(b)

at the request of a Member State, a regional authority or group of competent authorities, in duly justified cases, other exemptions may be granted by the Commission by means of implementing acts in respect of the requirements referred to in paragraph 2 to 4. Any exemption shall be based on a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the impact on interoperability and contribution to the fight against climate change . An exemption shall comply with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2016/797, be coordinated and agreed with the neighbouring Member State(s) where applicable.

Reason

Many railway sections of the core network and the extended core network are not suitable for implementing the established requirements. It will not be possible to implement them due to specific geographical constraints or significant physical constraints that prevent them from being put in place or generate additional costs which cannot be justified.

Amendment 14

Article 17(6)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

6. At the request of a Member State, in duly justified cases, exemptions may be granted by the Commission by means of implementing acts in respect of requirements referred to in paragraphs 1 to 5. Any request for exemption shall be based on a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the impact on interoperability. An exemption shall comply with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council, be coordinated and agreed with the neighbouring Member State(s) where applicable.

6. At the request of a Member State, a regional authority or group of competent authorities , in duly justified cases, other exemptions may be granted by the Commission by means of implementing acts in respect of the requirements referred to in paragraph 1 to 5. Any request for exemption shall be based on a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis and an assessment of the impact on interoperability. An exemption shall comply with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council, be coordinated and agreed with the neighbouring Member State(s) where applicable.

Reason

The ERTMS cannot be deployed on time on certain sections of the network, particularly given the scale of the investments it would require. In order to ensure that the network is implemented effectively within the deadlines set forth in Article 6 of the regulation, the administrative burden should be lifted and the granting of derogations should be facilitated, as long as they do not affect the interoperability of the network at European level.

Amendment 15

Article 19(g)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(g)	developing innovative alternative fuels technologies for railways, such as hydrogen for sections that are exempted from the electrification requirement.

(g)	developing innovative alternative rolling stock and fuels technologies for railways, such as hydrogen, biofuels or battery-powered trains for sections that are exempted from the electrification requirement.

Reason

Sections exempted from the electrification obligation should be considered spaces for developing innovative technological solutions that contribute to the fight against climate change. To this end, the European Union must adopt a technology-neutral approach to ensure that the technologies developed are more climate-efficient and economically efficient.

Amendment 16

Article 28(1)(a)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(xi)	pedestrian and cycling infrastructure;

Reason

High-quality road infrastructure for long-distance traffic needs to be accompanied by the development of infrastructure for cycling and walking, especially in urban nodes.

Amendment 17

Article 33(2)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

2. At the request of a Member State, the Commission may, in duly justified cases, grant exemptions by means of implementing acts in respect of the requirements set out in paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c) and (g). Any request for exemption shall be based on a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis or related to the specific geographic or significant physical constraints, including the non-existence of a railway system on the territory.

2. At the request of a Member State, a regional authority or group of competent authorities, the Commission may, in duly justified cases, grant exemptions by means of implementing acts in respect of the requirements set out in paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c) and (g). Any request for exemption shall be based on a socioeconomic cost-benefit analysis or related to the specific geographic or significant physical constraints, including the non-existence of a railway system on the territory.

Reason

To provide continuity of the network and ensure that it is implemented within the deadlines set forth in Article 6 of the regulation, it is essential to adapt the technical measures to the challenges their application may pose in certain regions.

Amendment 18

Article 35(3)

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendment
Member States shall consult shippers, transport and logistics operators which operate on their territory. They shall take into account the results of the consultation in their analysis.	Member States shall consult local and regional authorities of urban nodes, shippers, transport and logistics operators which operate on their territory. They shall take into account the results of the consultation in their analysis.

Reason

Local and regional authorities have a comprehensive responsibility on multimodal freight terminals and its TEN-T transport infrastructure requirements (art 37) and should therefore be consulted when Member States prepare their action plans for a multimodal freight terminal network.

Amendment 19

Article 37(5)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

5. At the request of a Member State, in duly justified cases, exemptions from the obligations under paragraphs 1 to 4 may be granted by the Commission by means of implementing acts where investment in infrastructure cannot be justified in socioeconomic cost-benefit terms, in particular when the terminal is located in a spatially restricted area.

Reason

Platforms located in urban nodes (as stated in Article 40) have to deal with very high land pressures and limited space. Their situation makes implementing certain technical requirements laid down in points 1 to 4 of this Article more complicated. In these cases, priority should therefore be given to urban logistics missions whose implementation does not require too much expansion.

Amendment 20

Article 40(b)(ii) and last paragraph

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

collection and submission to the Commission of urban mobility data per urban node covering at minimum greenhouse gas emissions, congestion, accidents and injuries, modal share and access to mobility service, as well as data on air and noise pollution. Thereafter these data shall be submitted every year;

[…]

The Commission shall adopt, no later than one year after the entry into force of this Regulation an implementing act establishing a methodology for the data to be collected by the Member States referred to under point (ii) of paragraph (b). That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 59(3).

inform the Commission of developments in the implementation of SUMPs on an annual basis;

[…]

Reason

While it is understandable that the Commission wants to put in place thorough monitoring of the implementation of SUMPs, carrying out an annual data collection operation on such a scale seems inappropriate. In addition, compiling them will lead to inflation of studies, which is far too burdensome for local and regional authorities. Care should be taken to ensure that the preparation of SUMPs and related indicators does not create unnecessary administrative burdens for achieving TEN-T objectives. It is therefore suggested to simplify the procedure for monitoring the implementation of SUMPs, while maintaining a duty to provide information on their progress.

Amendment 21

Article 40(d)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(d)	by 31 December 2040: the development of at least one multimodal freight terminal allowing for sufficient transhipment capacity within or in the vicinity of the urban node.

(d)	by 31 December 2040: the development of at least one multimodal freight terminal allowing for sufficient transhipment capacity to ensure urban logistics and the last mile within or in the vicinity of the urban node.

Reason

It seems risky to prescribe the establishment of multimodal freight terminals without taking into account the traffic dynamics at regional level and responding as well as possible to the needs of businesses while taking into account the land and technical possibilities of the territory. It is therefore suggested to emphasise the urban logistics role of these platforms.

Amendment 22

Article 44(a)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(a)	support and promote the decarbonisation of transport through transition to zero- and low-emission vehicles, vessels and aircraft and other innovative and sustainable transport and network technologies such as hyperloop;

(a)	support and promote the decarbonisation of transport through transition to zero- and low-emission vehicles, vessels , rolling stock and aircraft and other innovative and sustainable transport and network technologies such as hyperloop;

Reason

Technological innovation for all modes of transport should be encouraged in order to achieve the objectives of the European Green Deal. Innovations are also possible and desirable in the railway sector, particularly in the sections exempted from the implementation of technical standards.

Amendment 23

Article 44(a)

(new point)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
	encourage research and development of green and innovative alternatives in territories exempted from TEN-T technical measures, such as islands and outermost regions;

Reason

If the exemptions granted to certain territories under the regulation or upon request make it possible to ensure the proper implementation of the TEN-T network by adapting to territorial challenges, the emergence of alternative technological or energy solutions should be encouraged by making those territories into innovation laboratories.

Amendment 24

Article 52(2)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
2. The ‘Corridor Forum’ shall be formally established and chaired by the European Coordinator. The Member States concerned shall agree on the membership of the Corridor Forum for their part of the European Transport Corridor and ensure representation of the rail freight governance.	2. The ‘Corridor Forum’ shall be formally established and chaired by the European Coordinator. The Member States concerned shall agree on the membership of the Corridor Forum for their part of the European Transport Corridor and ensure representation of the rail freight governance as well as regional and local authorities, business and industry, and urban TEN-T nodes .

Reason

Regional authorities provide a significant share of the co-financing of TEN-T projects and have competences in terms of network planning and management of collective transport services at regional level. They are also an indispensable channel for conveying the mobility needs of the population. They should therefore be fully involved in the governance of the TEN-T corridors.

Amendment 25

Article 52(6)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

6. The European Coordinator may consult regional and local authorities, infrastructure managers, transport operators, in particular those which are members of the rail freight governance, the supply industry, transport users and representatives of civil society in relation to the work plan and its implementation. In addition, the European Coordinator responsible for ERTMS shall closely cooperate with the European Union Agency for Railways and Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and the European Coordinator for the European Maritime Space with the European Maritime Safety Agency.

6. The European Coordinator shall consult local authorities, infrastructure managers, transport operators, in particular those which are members of the rail freight governance, the supply industry, transport users and representatives of civil society in relation to the work plan and its implementation. In addition, the European Coordinator responsible for ERTMS shall closely cooperate with the European Union Agency for Railways and Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and the European Coordinator for the European Maritime Space with the European Maritime Safety Agency.

Reason

The coordinators have all put mechanisms in place for consulting all relevant actors within their scope of action. This has to be taken into account.

Amendment 26

Article 53(2)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

2. The work plan shall be prepared in close cooperation with the Member States concerned and in consultation of the Corridor Forum and rail freight governance, or consultative forum of the horizontal priorities. The work plan of the European Transport Corridors shall be approved by the Member States concerned. The Commission shall submit the work plan to the European Parliament and the Council for information.

2. The work plan shall be prepared in close cooperation with the Member States and regional authorities concerned and in consultation of the Corridor Forum and rail freight governance, or consultative forum of the horizontal priorities. The work plan of the European Transport Corridors shall be approved by the Member States concerned. The Commission shall submit the work plan to the European Parliament and the Council for information.

Reason

Given their role in implementing the work plan and its impact on their territories, regional authorities must be involved in preparing it.

Amendment 27

Article 56(1)(b)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(b)	exclude maritime ports and airports from the comprehensive network, if it is demonstrated that the average of their traffic volume over the last six years is below 85 % of the relevant threshold;

(b)

initiate a monitoring procedure before any exclusion of maritime ports and airports from the comprehensive network, if it is demonstrated that the average of their traffic volume over the last six years is below 85 % of the relevant threshold; As part of the monitoring procedure, the Commission, in close cooperation with the competent authorities, shall take into account qualitative indicators and any cyclical factors which may explain the decline in infrastructure traffic. Changes in transport volumes due to temporary or exceptional factors shall not justify exclusion from the network;

Reason

Given the investments involved in TEN-T integration and the virtuous cycles it entails, particularly in terms of greening infrastructure, it is considered preferable to avoid the exclusion of seaports or airports from the comprehensive network. However, as the traffic dynamics are constantly evolving, the network needs to remain adaptable. Therefore, rather than exclusions, it is recommended to launch a monitoring procedure allowing for a more detailed assessment of the dynamics in effect at the relevant sea port or airport in order to decide whether or not to exclude it from the network.

Amendment 28

Article 57

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

Article 57

Engagement with public and private stakeholders

National procedures regarding the involvement and consultation of regional and local authorities and civil society concerned by a project of common interest shall be complied with , where appropriate, in the planning and construction phase of a project. The Commission shall promote the exchange of good practice in this regard, notably as regards the consultation and inclusion of people in situations of vulnerability.

Article 57

Engagement with public and private stakeholders

National procedures regarding the involvement and consultation of regional and local authorities and civil society concerned by a project of common interest shall be complied with in the planning and construction phase of a project. The Commission shall promote the exchange of good practice in this regard, notably as regards the consultation and inclusion of people in situations of vulnerability.

Reason

Regional and local authorities must be involved when the development of a project of common interest is relevant to them.

Amendment 29

Annex V, point 4

Text proposed by the European Commission

Amendment

Effective functioning of TEN-T: A SUMP should duly take into account the impact of various urban measures on the traffic flows, both passenger and freight, on the trans-European transport network with the aim to ensure seamless transit, bypass, or interconnection through and around the urban nodes, including of zero-emission vehicles. It shall in particular include actions to alleviate congestion, improve road safety and remove bottlenecks affecting the traffic flows on the TEN-T.

Reason

How regional and local traffic flows for passengers and freight interact with traffic flows on the international TEN-T corridors is a two-way street where the impact of measures should be taken into account mutually to ensure a seamless traffic system with efficient first and last mile connections.

II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

supports the general nature of the Commission’s proposal; considers it essential to have a regulation to establish a strategy for planning transport infrastructure at European level. Only this can ensure a satisfactory level of cohesion, coordination and interoperability;

believes that the transnational dimension of the TEN-T network provides strong European added value. Regional and local authorities can attest to the socioeconomic benefits of cross-border projects in their territories;

notes the geopolitical consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the need to address the vulnerability of the European transport system, which is now partly disconnected from the global market, particularly the food market; supports the suspension of European investments under the TEN-T network for projects involving Russia and Belarus, but calls for the development of better rail connections with Ukraine, in particular to promote the transport of essential raw materials. To this end, the planned increase in the CEF budget is welcome;

welcomes the objectives assigned to TEN-T; stresses the importance of the regulation’s contribution to combating climate change, particularly by supporting the development of the most climate-friendly modes of transport; at the same time, stresses the need to ensure that transport infrastructure is adapted to the effects of climate change and to the emergence of new risks;

Territorial cohesion

welcomes the reaffirmation of territorial cohesion as a priority objective of the regulation for the whole core network, extended core network and comprehensive network; notes, therefore, that the TEN-T network follows the recommendation from the 8th Cohesion Report that every EU policy should contribute to European cohesion;

recommends that the Commission define the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle developed in the 8th Cohesion Report, in order to make it possible to monitor how it is applied to TEN-T and in particular to projects of common interest;

believes that the TEN-T must take into account the diversity of challenges facing EU regions. In this regard, welcomes the attention paid to rural, remote, mountainous, sparsely populated, peripheral, island and outermost regions and points out that regions not included in these categories also have to deal with a wide variety of territories and challenges arising in them;

points out that achieving the territorial cohesion objective requires the network as a whole to establish a strong and efficient connection with secondary transport networks beyond the TEN-T framework;

recognises the relevance of common and ambitious technical measures that make it possible to ensure the continuity and interoperability of the network; points out, however, that the diversity of European regions makes it difficult to maintain the timetable for implementing the technical standards laid down in the Commission proposal, in particular the minimum speed, electrification and gauge requirements for railway sections, the implementation of which would require far too much investment;

10.

points out that, alongside the large European transport axes of the core and extended networks, bridging missing links at regional level can also make a significant contribution to the development of cross-border rail connections. By connecting border regions more effectively, Europe will become more integrated in a tangible way and offer citizens the possibility of enjoying climate-friendly, cross-border mobility;

Governance

11.

stresses that regional and local authorities actively contribute to the planning and financing of transport infrastructure in their territories, some of which are part of the TEN-T network, and calls, therefore, for them to be better involved in the TEN-T governance structure, in particular by fully involving them in the corridor forum beyond the mere observer role currently assigned to them;

12.

recognises, however, that, despite these potential improvements, the European Commission’s proposal respects the principle of subsidiarity: the trans-European transport network brings undeniable European added value across the borders of the Member States by aligning the planning efforts of states, regions and cities, particularly through the increased role of urban nodes in the draft regulation;

13.

notes many examples of cross-border sections where implementation is adversely affected by a lack of political attention at national level, a lack of coordination and cumbersome uncoordinated administrative procedures;

14.

calls for the governance of the TEN-T network to be significantly strengthened in order to facilitate its implementation, in particular for missing cross-border links; welcomes, in relation to this, the Commission’s proposals to strengthen the role of coordinators and encourage the coordination of national plans with European policies;

15.

considers that the merging of the core network corridors and the rail freight corridors within the European transport corridors has significantly improved network governance and should lead to better coordination and implementation. Is surprised that the alignment effected by the Commission in its proposal does not cover seaports located on rail freight corridors;

Urban nodes

16.

points out that the sustainability of urban mobility, together with that of long-distance travel, is a key element in achieving the TEN-T objectives, and more broadly those of the European Green Deal;

17.

stresses that the third IPCC report identifies urban development policies, including urban mobility, as an opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Points out, in this regard, the importance of active mobility, the development of which requires coherent infrastructure across urban nodes;

18.

notes the need to put in place sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs). Is of the view that SUMPs help to strengthen a multilevel governance model by integrating mobility planning and spatial planning strategies at local and regional level within the TEN-T;

19.

notes that for sparsely populated and island regions, an approach that is more tailored to their characteristics should be adopted;

20.

suggests that the criteria for sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs) should emphasise flexibility so that these plans can be integrated successfully into existing plans. Urban nodes should not be burdened by large-scale data provision and related procedures. As the number of urban nodes increases, EU funding for such nodes needs to be increased accordingly;

Modes of transport

21.

points out that waterborne and rail transport are climate-friendly modes of transport, and therefore encourages their development within the framework of TEN-T;

22.

welcomes the significant improvements in the management of railway infrastructure, but stresses the efforts still to be made in terms of interoperability and continuity in order to achieve an efficient rail network for freight and passengers at European level;

23.

welcomes the strengthening of the TEN-T maritime pillar and in particular the extension of eligibility for funding to all maritime sections between TEN-T ports, which should facilitate the development of coastal trading in order to encourage a modal shift from road to sea and the connectivity of island and outermost regions;

Financing the TEN-T network

24.

points out that completing the TEN-T network on time is a priority for regional and local authorities, but stresses that the budget of the Connecting Europe Facility is still minuscule in view of the scale of the amounts that need to be mobilised, and regrets that it is impossible for many regions to use structural funds to help fill this funding gap; Furthermore, the assessment of the economic viability of projects of common interest should take into account, in addition to the benefit-cost analysis, the different socioeconomic and geographical circumstances of the Member States, such as distances and traffic volumes, as well as the projects’ wider economic impact. Consideration must also be given to the feasibility of the requirements imposed on the Member States in terms of time and financial conditions;

25.

notes that the third IPCC report recommends encouraging more climate-efficient mobility choices. Regrets, therefore, that there is no mechanism to encourage a modal shift towards the most climate-friendly modes of transport;

26.

stresses the necessity of financial support for maintaining the TEN-T network throughout the project lifecycle and the need to guarantee the long-term sustainability of funding in transport infrastructure;

Action plan to boost long-distance and cross-border passenger rail

27.

is pleased that the action plan encourages the establishment of a uniform European framework and the removal of remaining barriers to cross-border and long-distance rail services;

28.

stresses the key role of night trains in achieving the objectives of the action plan;

29.

believes that in order to promote long-distance and cross-border rail passenger transport, European incentive and funding tools must be developed and a level playing field with air transport must be ensured;

30.

stresses the interest of regional and local authorities in achieving these objectives, and will therefore pay attention to the legislative proposal planned by the Commission to facilitate the use of rail tickets by users.

Brussels, 11 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/83

Opinion of the European Committee of the regions — Energy package on gas, hydrogen and methane emissions

(2022/C 498/13)

Rapporteur:

Jakub CHEŁSTOWSKI (ECR/PL), Marshal of the Śląskie Voivodship

Reference documents:

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen

COM(2021) 803 final

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen

COM(2021) 804 final

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942

COM(2021) 805 final

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen

COM(2021) 803 final

Amendment 1

Recital 6

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
[…] all market participants to take the transitional role of fossil gas into account while planning their activities to avoid lock-in effects and ensure gradual and timely phase-out of fossil gas notably in all relevant industrial sectors and for heating purposes.	[…] all market participants to take the transitional role of fossil gas into account to ensure that newly constructed natural gas infrastructure is fit for low-carbon and renewable gases to avoid lock-in effects during its depreciation period and ensure gradual and timely phase-out of fossil gas notably in all relevant industrial sectors and for heating purposes.

Reason

In order to increase the use of decarbonised gases, it is essential that investment plans for new gas infrastructure, including pipelines, LNG terminals and gas storage facilities, take into account the design and construction of the infrastructure in such a way that it is adapted to decarbonised gases from the start of operation.

Amendment 2

Recital 9

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

[…] However, low-carbon fuels (LCFs) such as low-carbon hydrogen (LCH) may play a role in the energy transition, particularly in the short and medium term to rapidly reduce emissions of existing fuels, and support the uptake of renewable fuels such as renewable hydrogen. Another important renewable fuel for meeting climate objectives is biomethane, which is relatively easily compatible with the current natural gas infrastructure (a drop-in fuel), and the EU has great internal potential to produce it. In order to ensure the development of the biomethane market, Member States should aim in particular to implement investments in line with the principle of biomass cascading with a view to a significant increase in the production of biogas and biomethane from existing waste in dispersed form in sectors such as agriculture, forestry and municipal management. The production of plants to be used exclusively in biogas facilities and the construction of biogas facilities that depend on the continued existence of intensive livestock farming should be excluded. In order to support the transition, it is necessary to establish a threshold for greenhouse gas emission reductions for low-carbon hydrogen and synthetic gaseous fuels.

Reason

The development of the biogas and biomethane sector is important in the short term for a partial reduction of dependence on natural gas supplies from Russia, as well as for the development of local energy communities in sectors such as agriculture, forestry or municipal management, where waste can be transformed into a production substrate. However, it should be explicitly clarified that only existing biomethane may be burned. Producing plants to be used in biogas facilities and continuing intensive livestock farming solely for the purpose of obtaining biogas and biomethane to generate energy must be excluded as this would slow down the green transition.

Amendment 3

Recital 20

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

[…] Although electrification is a key element of the green transition, in the future there will still be household natural gas consumption including increasing volumes of renewable gas.

[…] Although electrification is a key element of the green transition, in the future there will still be household natural gas consumption including increasing volumes of renewable gas. In order to ensure that households are able to take up and use renewable gases, Member States, in cooperation with the European Commission, shall initiate a dialogue with market stakeholders on the technological availability of suitable appliances as well as the potential costs of their deployment.

Reason

The developed decarbonised gas market will need to take into account retail customers: households and some SMEs. Without upgrading or purchasing new heating and cooling equipment, final customers will have technical difficulties or will not be able to switch from fossil fuels to decarbonised gases.

Amendment 4

Recital 108

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

[…] supply and demand, transport infrastructure, quality of service, cross-border trade, investments, consumer prices, market liquidity.

[…] supply and demand, transport infrastructure, quality of service, cross-border trade, investments, consumer prices, market liquidity. Market transparency should also include a detailed determination of the costs of building new infrastructure for decarbonised gases in all Member States. Therefore, national regulatory authorities, in cooperation with national network operators, should make detailed economic calculations of future investment costs for the expansion of decarbonised gas infrastructure. This will make it possible to plan network development realistically, to identify the potential financing gap, and to ensure that tariff policies can be shaped to benefit both operators and consumers.

Reason

The cost of building infrastructure for decarbonised gases may vary considerably from one Member State to another. A local cost perspective should be taken into account in order to properly plan the development of the market for low-carbon and renewable gases.

Amendment 5

Article 4(3)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

[…] in the price setting for the supply of natural gas to energy poor or vulnerable household customers. Such public interventions shall be subject to the conditions set out in paragraphs 4 and 5.

[…] in the price setting for the supply of natural gas to energy poor or vulnerable household customers or protected customers as defined in Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 . Such public interventions shall be subject to the conditions set out in paragraphs 4 and 5.

In the event of a long-term significant price increase, interventions that fulfil the criteria set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 may be extended to a different customer group to avoid the negative consequences of energy poverty.

Reason

The EC proposal is too limited in the event of a sharp increase in prices. The amendment concerns the possibility to add categories of protected customers as defined in the regulation on security of gas supply (2017/1938).

Amendment 6

Article 8(11)

(New paragraph)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

11. In order to be able to demonstrate to final customers the amount of energy from renewable sources in the energy mix of a given supplier of renewable or low-carbon fuels in relation to the energy placed on the market provided to consumers on the basis of contracts, Member States shall ensure that guarantees of origin in relation to gas can be issued at the request of a producer of renewable or low-carbon fuels, in accordance with Article 19(7)(ii) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001, including biogas, biomethane, hydrogen, ammonia, methanol, and synthetic gaseous fuels; furthermore, it is essential that final customers are aware of the importance of the green transition and are informed with regard to the diversity of renewable or low-carbon fuels and their rights to request guarantees of origin.

Reason

The development of a connected European market for low-carbon and renewable fuels will require the use of instruments to provide information on the origin of gases produced and supplied to final customers.

Amendment 7

Article 10(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
[…] trading and balancing rules. In that regard, Member States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that administrative procedures do not discriminate against suppliers already registered in another Member State.	[…] trading and balancing rules and authorisations required pursuant to Article 7(2) by the regulatory authority of the Member State where the gas supply takes place. In that regard, Member States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that administrative procedures do not discriminate against suppliers already registered in another Member State.

Reason

The requirement for suppliers to meet standards in Member States ensures security of supply for customers. The remainder of the provision ensures that such standards are not discriminatory.

Amendment 8

Article 26

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

[…] the renewable and low carbon gases production facilities are connected to distribution or transmission networks.

[…] the renewable and low carbon gases production facilities are connected to distribution or transmission networks , provided that they are considered beneficial on the basis of the national network development plans under Article 51 . Member States shall ensure that the necessary mechanisms are in place to ensure fair and proportionate sharing of the costs related to the connection of new installations producing renewable and low-carbon gases.

Reason

The introduction of compensation mechanisms is intended to ensure that costs are not unfairly passed on to other network users and to ensure a level playing field in the market. Only facilities that provide clear added value should be connected to distribution and transmission networks, as the long-term focus should be on the sustainable development of renewable energy, and in particular renewable electricity generation.

Amendment 9

Article 51(2), point (b)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(b)	contain all the investments already decided and identify new investments which have to be executed in the next three years;

(b)

contain all the investments already decided and identify new investments which have to be executed in the next three years , together with a detailed economic analysis, including the costs of constructing or upgrading existing infrastructure for low-carbon and renewable gases, and an indication of the existence of a potential financing gap in relation to conventional natural gas infrastructure;

Reason

Long-term planning for the development of low-carbon and renewable gas infrastructure must include detailed cost planning. Leaving detailed economic issues under the sole responsibility of gTSOs and gDSOs may lead to difficulties in enforcing investment objectives.

Amendment 10

Article 72(4), point (f)

(New point)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(f)

to set up regulatory sandboxes to grant targeted and temporary exemptions from national, regional or local legislative frameworks for innovative investments in low-carbon and renewable gases. The establishment of such a regulatory test environment is intended to accelerate investments in low-carbon and renewable gases, in particular in Member States where those investments will not be fully compatible with the existing legal and regulatory framework, and could facilitate the subsequent adaptation of the regulatory environment to such investments.

Reason

It is recommended that regulatory sandboxes be set up which will provide a temporary exemption from national, regional or local legislative frameworks for the implementation of innovative investments for which an appropriate legal environment has not yet been developed.

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen

COM(2021) 804 final

Amendment 11

Recital 42

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

[…] While ensuring a harmonised approach on gas quality for cross-border interconnection points, Member States’ flexibility as regards the application of gas quality standards in their domestic natural gas systems should be maintained. Guarantees of origin will be necessary to ensure a highly integrated, interoperable and transparent market for low-carbon and renewable gases, the amounts of which will increase in the natural gas system. The purpose of such guarantees will be to certify the source of gas production, as well as the carbon footprint generated, in order to ensure that producers and final customers can trade in a standardised manner and to document the CO2 reductions achieved.

Reason

Without guarantees of origin it will not be possible to certify the source of production and the carbon footprint of a given gas, thus preventing the implementation of climate policies and non-financial reporting.

Amendment 12

Article 43(1), point (c)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(c)	identify investment gaps, notably with respect to cross-border capacities.

(c)	identify investment gaps, notably with respect to cross-border capacities , as well as system connections with third countries from which low-carbon and renewable gases will be imported to cover the total energy demand of the European Union.

Reason

In order to ensure production continuity in industrial sectors and the EU’s energy security in the new market for low-carbon and renewable gases, the key planning point should be to ensure that the required volumes of hydrogen are imported from outside the EU in order to sustainably and safely cover the EU’s total energy needs.

Amendment 13

Article 43(4)

(New paragraph)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

—

4. To establish a correct, realistic and feasible Union-wide ten-year network development plan, ACER, the ENTSO for Gas and the ENTSO for Electricity should start a consultation process with national regulatory authorities on the costs of building or upgrading infrastructure for low-carbon and renewable gases as soon as this Regulation enters into force. This concerns in particular the precise planning of capital and operating expenditure for new assets such as hydrogen terminals, electrolysers, and hydrogen networks.

Reason

See above.

Amendment 14

Article 60(1), point (b)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(b)	the investment contributes to decarbonisation;

(b)	the investment contributes to decarbonisation and ensures that the newly constructed natural gas infrastructure is designed to be capable of handling renewable and low-carbon gases from the start of its operational life, minimising the risk of lock-in;

Reason

See above

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942

COM(2021) 805 final

Amendment 15

Article 3

(New Article)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

—

Assessment of the long-term potential of renewable gas sources as a basis for optimising the development of the transmission and distribution system

1. Member States are responsible for assessing the production potential for biomethane at local level throughout their territory, as part of their national biogas and biomethane strategies. This assessment shall be carried out within two years of the entry into force of this Regulation. It may build on existing assessments;

2. The scope of biomass taken into account in this assessment shall include raw biomass as defined in Article 2 of Directive 2018/2001 (including Annex IX) and meeting the EU sustainability criteria;

3. At the design stage of the assessment, Member States shall consult the relevant regulatory authority and transmission and distribution system operators in order to determine:

(a)	the territorial unit within which the assessment of production potential is to be carried out,

(b)	for the scope of biomass assessed — geographical proximity to existing natural gas networks;

4. When carrying out an assessment or expanding an existing assessment, and during subsequent updates, Member States shall consult regional and local authorities as well as transmission and distribution system operators. They may consult other relevant bodies.

Reason

The assessment of the long-term production potential for biogas and biomethane is a prerequisite for cost-effective planning of grid reinforcements to accommodate increasing volumes of biomethane in gas networks.

Amendment 16

Article 3(3)

(New paragraph)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

—

3. The European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) together with the national regulatory authorities shall carry out a detailed calculation of the investment and operating expenditure related to the reduction of methane emissions in each Member State. The first calculation shall be completed by … [12 months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and shall be updated every three years. The calculation of investment and operating expenditure shall be the basis for tariff and funding policy planning.

Reason

Conducting methane leakage analyses, reporting methane emissions and implementing potential new investments leading to methane emission reductions should take into account systemic costs, which must not lead to a burden on the final customer or an increase in energy poverty regions.

Amendment 17

Article 10(4)

(New paragraph)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
	4. The Commission, in cooperation with the International Methane Emissions Observatory, shall, by means of implementing acts, establish a Union-wide methodology for the monitoring, reporting and verification of methane emissions for the implementation of the obligations set out in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this Regulation.

Reason

In order to launch a coordinated reduction effort on methane emissions, it is necessary to introduce a universal MRV methodology that is sector-wide and ensures that emitters can report transparently and in a comparable manner.

Amendment 18

Articles 12, 14, 17, 18, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

Articles 12, 14, 17, 18, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 12 by 12 months.

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 14 by 9 months.

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 17 by 9 months.

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 18 by 12 months.

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 25 by 12 months.

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 26 by 9 months.

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 27 by 9 months.

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 28 by 12 months.

Extension of the mandatory deadlines in Article 29 by 12 months.

II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

stresses the need to protect consumers from high prices and to guarantee security of energy supply for them. This is particularly important in the current geopolitical context;

To achieve the objectives of the European Green Deal, of the 8th Environmental Action Plan and in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, taking energy security issues into account the Union should phase-out fossil fuels as quickly as possible, including natural gas, and achieve a highly energy-efficient and predominantly renewable-based economy. Therefore, there is the need to quickly establish a common framework for the phasing-out of natural gas;

points out that the roll-out of a hydrogen economy directly depends on the timely construction and conversion of hydrogen infrastructure. The implementation of multifaceted projects and initiatives in a dynamic environment requires an appropriate EU legal framework to ensure the necessary planning certainty for investments;

stresses that the increasing penetration of decarbonised gases should not affect the quality of gas for final customers;

draws attention to the need to carry out an analysis of the costs of infrastructure development in order to ensure an economically predictable energy transition. Additional cost studies may be needed for the development of infrastructure for decarbonised gases, as well as studies on the impact of this transition in the outermost regions, given their specific characteristics, which are duly enshrined in Article 349 TFEU;

calls for avoiding the creation of stranded assets. In particular, newly built gas assets should be designed in such a way as to ensure that they can co-incinerate or operate with high concentrations of decarbonised gases in the future;

recommends the introduction of regulatory sandboxes to ensure the development of an integrated market for decarbonised gases in the absence of sufficient sector-specific legislation at national level;

draws attention to the possibility of introducing guarantees of origin for low-carbon and renewable gases, which will ensure transparent trade on the market;

recommends the creation of a road map for the import of decarbonised gases into the EU in order to preserve energy security and meet future demand;

10.

calls for the expansion of ENTSOG’s remit to cover the development of a low-carbon and renewable gas market instead of setting up the separate ENNOH organisation for this purpose;

11.

is critical of the proposed strict rules on the vertical and horizontal ownership unbundling of hydrogen networks. They contradict the goal of short-term and extensive investment in a hydrogen network that is built and operated efficiently from existing natural gas networks; therefore calls for the unbundling requirements established for power and gas to be maintained for hydrogen, in particular at the level of the distribution network; draws attention to the possibility of making the gTSOs responsible for the development of the hydrogen transmission network. Dividing the hydrogen transmission system operator into a separate company, independent from the gTSO, may not be beneficial in terms of the momentum of the energy transition;

12.

calls for developing a substrate base for biogas and biomethane. Securing a supply of organic fuel will be important in order to make the most of the regions’ potential for these gases; also calls for the production of plants for exclusive use in biogas facilities and the construction of biogas facilities that are dependent on the continued existence of intensive livestock farming to be excluded;

13.

calls for an assessment of the long-term potential of biogas and biomethane production at regional level, on the basis of which it will be possible to identify the regional development potential of the decarbonised gas ecosystem;

14.

recommends the establishment of a common methodology for monitoring methane emissions, which will allow the launch of coordinated efforts to reduce methane emissions in the EU;

15.

points out that methane is only to be used as a fuel for co-generation units in exceptional cases and on a transitional basis;

16.

recommends taking into account the cost of efforts to reduce methane emissions in the EU. The European Commission should take into account the necessary costs for Member States and plan aid funds that directly benefit final customers, especially in less developed regions and in regions with high heat demand;

17.

calls on EU regulation to fully recognise and support the use of biogas also in transport, to reduce emissions from a life-cycle perspective. At present the production of biogas, but not the use of it in transport, are recognised as sustainable activities in the EU Taxonomy for sustainable activities;

18.

points out that the powers of local and regional authorities vary across the European Union and that decision-making should take place at the level of government where it is most effective; considers that the legislative proposals in question comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/94

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — European Chips Act for strengthening the European semiconductor ecosystem

(2022/C 498/14)

Rapporteur:

Thomas Gottfried SCHMIDT (DE/EPP), Minister for Regional Development, Free State of Saxony

Reference documents:

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)

COM(2022) 46 final

Annex to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)

COM(2022) 46 final, Annexes 1 to 3

Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking

COM(2022) 47 final

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Chips Act for Europe

COM(2022) 45 final

Commission Recommendation on a common Union toolbox to address semiconductor shortages and an EU mechanism for monitoring the semiconductor ecosystem

COM(2022) 782 final

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)

COM(2022) 46 final

Amendment 1

Recital 1

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(1)

Semiconductors are at the core of any digital device: from smartphones and cars, through critical applications and infrastructures in health, energy, communications and automation to most other industry sectors. While semiconductors are essential to the functioning of our modern economy and society, the Union has witnessed unprecedented disruptions in their supply. The current supply shortage is a symptom of permanent and serious structural deficiencies in the Union’s semiconductor value and supply chain. The disruptions have exposed long-lasting vulnerabilities in this respect, notably a strong third-country dependency in manufacturing and design of chips.

(1)

Semiconductors are at the core of any digital device: from smartphones , electric bicycles and cars, through critical applications and infrastructures in health, energy, communications and automation to most other industry sectors. While semiconductors are essential to the functioning of our modern economy , the goal of a green transition, and society, the Union has witnessed unprecedented disruptions in their supply. The current supply shortage is a symptom of permanent and serious structural deficiencies in the Union’s semiconductor value and supply chain. The disruptions have exposed long-lasting vulnerabilities in this respect, notably a strong third-country dependency in manufacturing and design of chips.

Reason

Industries and technologies that are key to the green transition require chips. For example, modern electric bicycles and photovoltaic inverters incorporate chips in their motors, controllers and displays. There will be no green transition without chips.

Amendment 2

Recital 3

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(3)

This framework pursues two objectives. The first objective is to ensure the conditions necessary for the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the Union and to ensure the adjustment of the industry to structural changes due to fast innovation cycles and the need for sustainability. The second objective, separate and complementary to the first one, is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform Union legal framework for increasing the Union’s resilience and security of supply in the field of semiconductor technologies.

(3)

This framework pursues two objectives. The first objective is to ensure the conditions necessary for the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the Union and to ensure the adjustment of the industry to structural changes in various sectors and affected regional ecosystems, taking into account the sustainability criteria (SDGs), due to fast innovation cycles and the need for sustainability. The second objective, separate and complementary to the first one, is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform Union legal framework for increasing the Union’s resilience and security of supply in the field of semiconductor technologies.

Reason

Compliance with the SDGs is a key aspect and should be included.

Amendment 3

Recital 13

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(13)

In order to overcome the limitations of the current fragmented public and private investments efforts, facilitate integration, cross-fertilisation, and return on investment on the ongoing programmes and to pursue a common strategic Union vision on semiconductors as a means to realising the ambition of the Union and of its Member States to ensure a leading role in the digital economy, the Chips for Europe Initiative should facilitate better coordination and closer synergies between the existing funding programmes at Union and national levels, better coordination and collaboration with industry and key private sector stakeholders and additional joint investments with Member States. The implementation set up of the Initiative is built to pool resources from the Union, Member States and third countries associated with the existing Union Programmes, as well as the private sector. The success of the Initiative can therefore only be built on a collective effort by Member States, with the Union, to support both the significant capital costs and the wide availability of virtual design, testing and piloting resources and diffusion of knowledge, skills and competences. Where appropriate, in view of the specificities of the actions concerned, the objectives of the Initiative, specifically the ‘Chips Fund’ activities, should also be supported through a blending facility under the InvestEU Fund.

(13)

In order to overcome the limitations of the current fragmented public and private investments efforts, facilitate integration, cross-fertilisation, and return on investment on the ongoing programmes and to pursue a common strategic Union vision on semiconductors as a means to realising the ambition of the Union and of its Member States to ensure a leading role in the digital economy, the Chips for Europe Initiative should facilitate better coordination at and between all levels of government as well as closer synergies between the existing funding programmes at Union and national levels (including centrally managed EU programmes and EU programmes subject to joint management) , better coordination and collaboration with industry and key private sector stakeholders and additional joint investments with Member States. The implementation set up of the Initiative is built to pool resources from the Union, Member States, the regions, and third countries associated with the existing Union Programmes, as well as the private sector. The success of the Initiative can therefore only be built on a collective effort by Member States, with the Union, to support both the significant capital costs and the wide availability of virtual design, testing and piloting resources and diffusion of knowledge, skills and competences. Where appropriate, in view of the specificities of the actions concerned, the objectives of the Initiative, specifically the ‘Chips Fund’ activities, should also be supported through a blending facility under the InvestEU Fund.

Reason

To include the regional dimension.

Amendment 4

Recital 15

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(15)

The Initiative should build upon the strong knowledge base and enhance synergies with actions currently supported by the Union and Member States through programmes and actions in research and innovation in semiconductors and in developments of part of the supply chain, in particular Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe programme established by Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) with the aim by 2030, to reinforce the Union as global player in semiconductor technology and its applications, with a growing global share in manufacturing. Complementing those activities, the Initiative would closely collaborate with other relevant stakeholders, including with the Industrial Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies.

(15)

The Initiative should build upon the strong knowledge base and enhance synergies with actions currently supported by the Union , the Member States and the regions through programmes and actions in research and innovation in semiconductors and in developments of part of the supply chain, in particular Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe programme established by Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) with the aim by 2030, to reinforce the Union as global player in semiconductor technology and its applications, with a growing global share in manufacturing. Complementing those activities, the Initiative would closely collaborate with other relevant stakeholders, including with the Industrial Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies , as well as with the Smart Specialisation strategies at regional level .

Reason

To include the regional dimension.

Amendment 5

Recital 19

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(19)

Integrated Production Facilities and Open EU Foundries should provide semiconductor manufacturing capabilities that are ‘first-of-a-kind’ in the Union and contribute to the security of supply and to a resilient ecosystem in the internal market. The qualifying factor for the production of a first-of-a-kind facility could be with regard to the technology node, substrate material, such as silicon carbide and gallium nitride, and other product innovation that can offer better performance, process technology or energy and environmental performance. A facility of a comparable capability on an industrial scale should not yet substantively be present or committed to be built within the Union, excluding facilities for research and development or small-scale production sites.

(19)

Integrated Production Facilities and Open EU Foundries should provide semiconductor manufacturing capabilities that are ‘first-of-a-kind’ in the Union and contribute to the security of supply and to a resilient ecosystem in the internal market. The qualifying factor for the production of a first-of-a-kind facility could be with regard to the technology node, substrate material, such as silicon carbide and, gallium nitride, indium phosphide, silicon nitride, and other related product and material innovations that can offer better performance, process technology or energy and environmental performance. A facility of a comparable capability on an industrial scale should not yet substantively be present or committed to be built within the Union, excluding facilities for research and development or small-scale production sites

Reason

Silicon nitride (SiN) is the ideal platform for photonic integrated circuit (PIC) applications, which have a vast spectral range and ultralow-loss waveguide. This makes them highly suited to detectors, spectrometers, biosensors, and quantum computers. For consistency reasons, it is better to also include indium phosphide.

Amendment 6

Article 2(1)(10)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(10)

‘first-of-a-kind facility’ means an industrial facility capable of semiconductor manufacturing, including front-end or back-end, or both, that is not substantively already present or committed to be built within the Union, for instance with regard to the technology node, substrate material, such as silicon carbide and gallium nitride, and other product innovation that can offer better performance, process innovation or energy and environmental performance;

(10)

‘first-of-a-kind facility’ means an industrial facility capable of semiconductor manufacturing, including front-end or back-end, or both, that is not substantively already present or committed to be built within the Union, for instance with regard to the technology node, substrate material, such as silicon carbide, and gallium nitride, indium phosphide , silicon nitride and other related product and material innovations that can offer better performance, process innovation or energy and environmental performance;

Reason

Amendment 7

Article 3(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
1. The Initiative is established for the duration of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027.	1. As a first step, the Initiative is established for the duration of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027. An extension under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034 is required.

Reason

The period until the end of the current MFF in 2027 is not sufficient to achieve the objectives set out in the ECA itself. An extension should already be laid down here.

Amendment 8

Article 4(2)(b)(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(1)

strengthening technological capabilities in next generation chips production technologies, by integrating research and innovation activities and preparing the development of future technology nodes, including leading-edge nodes below two nanometres, Fully Depleted Silicon on Insulator (FD-SOI) at 10 nanometres and below, and 3D heterogeneous systems integration and advanced packaging;

(1)

Reason

The Commission’s focus on chips that are below 10 nanometres in size is too narrow and fails to meet the needs of the EU user industry.

Amendment 9

Article 8(2)(d)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(d)	facilitating the transfer of expertise and knowhow between Member States and regions encouraging exchanges of skills, knowledge and good practices and encouraging joint programmes;

(d)

facilitating the transfer of expertise and knowhow between Member States and regions encouraging exchanges of skills, knowledge and good practices, encouraging joint programmes , and improving cooperation among universities as well as between universities, businesses, and education and research institutions, for example through an EU-wide system for exchanges between researchers and laboratories, in order to train and retain teaching and professional staff ;

Reason

The European network of competence centres for semiconductor technology should also cover the issues of training and teaching.

Amendment 10

Article 8(3)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

3. Member States shall designate candidate competence centres in accordance with its national procedures, administrative and institutional structures through an open and competitive process. The Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, set the procedure for establishing competence centres, including selection criteria, and further tasks and functions of the centres with respect to the implementation of the actions under the Initiative, the procedure for establishing the network as well to adopt decisions on the selection of entities forming the network. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 33(2).

3. Member States shall designate candidate competence centres in accordance with its national procedures, administrative and institutional structures through an open and competitive process involving regional and local authorities. The aim shall be to achieve synergies with the European Digital Innovation Hubs and to support the creation of competence centres in the regions of the EU. These should be integrated into their regional industrial ecosystem, provide access to all relevant players across the EU, and enable enhanced interregional cooperation. The Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, set the procedure for establishing competence centres, including selection criteria, and further tasks and functions of the centres with respect to the implementation of the actions under the Initiative, the procedure for establishing the network as well to adopt decisions on the selection of entities forming the network. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 33(2).

Reason

All SMEs and start-ups in the EU should have access to these centres. This can be facilitated by the regional level, which supports regional industrial ecosystems.

Amendment 11

Article 9(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
1. The components listed in points (a) to (d) of Article 5 under the Initiative may be entrusted to the Chips Joint Undertaking referred to in Council Regulation XX/XX amending Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 and implemented in the work programme of the Chips Joint Undertaking.	1. The components listed in points (a) to (d) of Article 5 under the Initiative may be entrusted to the Chips Joint Undertaking referred to in Council Regulation XX/XX amending Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 and implemented in the work programme of the Chips Joint Undertaking. Member States shall be required to include relevant semiconductor regions in the Chips Joint Undertaking.

Reason

Self-explanatory.

Amendment 12

Article 10(2)

(new point (e))

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

e)	it supports industrial supply chains in the EU.

Reason

Integrated production facilities should contribute to strengthening EU industry; the semiconductor needs of industry should play a role here.

Amendment 13

Article 11(2)

(new point (e))

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

e)	it supports industrial supply chains in the EU.

Reason

Open production facilities should also contribute to strengthening EU industry; the semiconductor needs of industry should play a role here.

Amendment 14

Article 12(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

1. Any undertaking or any consortium of undertakings (‘applicant’) may submit an application to the Commission to recognise the applicant’s planned facility as an Integrated Production Facility or Open EU Foundry. This shall also apply to businesses that are indispensable for the manufacture of semiconductors or that produce novel precursors or production units. The criteria set out in Articles 11 and 12 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Reason

In order to achieve the objectives of the ECA, the manufacture of precursors, such as wafers, or of production units in the EU should also be considered eligible. The criteria should be applied mutatis mutandis.

Amendment 15

Article 15(2)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
2. Member States shall invite the main users of semiconductors and other relevant stakeholders to provide information regarding significant fluctuations in demand and known disruptions of their supply chain. To facilitate the exchange of information, Member States shall provide for a mechanism and administrative set-up for these updates.	2. Member States shall invite the main users of semiconductors and other relevant stakeholders , including those from like-minded countries, to provide information regarding significant fluctuations in demand and known disruptions of their supply chain. To facilitate the exchange of information, Member States shall provide for a mechanism and administrative set-up for these updates.

Reason

An assessment of the situation on the basis of European and US data alone is incomplete and therefore inconclusive. Businesses from like-minded countries in Asia should therefore be included.

Amendment 16

Article 19(2)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
2. The Commission may , after consulting the European Semiconductor Board, limit the measures provided for in Articles 21 and 22 to certain critical sectors the operation of which is disturbed or under threat of disturbance on account of the semiconductor crisis.	2. Based on the results of the European Semiconductor Board consultation , the Commission shall be required to limit the measures provided for in Articles 21 and 22 to those critical sectors the operation of which is disturbed or under threat of disturbance on account of the semiconductor crisis.

Reason

Any intervention measures undertaken by the Commission should always be kept to the bare minimum.

Amendment 17

Article 19(4)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

4. The use of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall be proportionate and restricted to what is necessary for addressing serious disruptions of vital societal functions or economic activities in the Union and must be in the best interest of the Union. The use of these measures shall avoid placing disproportionate administrative burden on SMEs.

Reason

The emergency toolbox poses the significant risk of hampering investment and the establishment of new businesses. The European Commission must clearly state that these measures are intended as a last resort and will be avoided as far as possible.

Amendment 18

Article 21(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
1. Where necessary and proportionate to ensure the operation of all or certain critical sectors, the Commission may oblige Integrated Production Facilities and Open EU Foundries to accept and prioritise an order of crisis-relevant products (‘priority rated order’). The obligation shall take precedence over any performance obligation under private or public law.	1. Where necessary, proportionate and technically feasible to ensure the operation of all or certain critical sectors, the Commission may oblige Integrated Production Facilities and Open EU Foundries to accept and prioritise an order of crisis-relevant products (‘priority rated order’).

Reason

It is almost impossible to adapt semiconductor production at short notice. The decisive criterion should therefore be feasibility. The article on priority contracts should also be drafted in such a way that it does not discourage potential investors from investing in the EU. In addition, there are doubts as to the extent to which this would be legally enforceable.

Amendment 19

Article 24(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
1. The European Semiconductor Board shall be composed of representatives of the Member States and shall be chaired by a representative of the Commission.	1. The European Semiconductor Board shall be composed of representatives of the Member States with the appropriate professional competence and shall be chaired by a representative of the Commission.

Reason

The Semiconductor Board should be a specialised body and not a purely political body.

Amendment 20

Article 24(2)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

2. Each national single point of contact, referred to in Article 26(3), shall appoint a high-level representative to the European Semiconductor Board. Where relevant as regards the function and expertise, a Member State may have more than one representative in relation to different tasks of the European Semiconductor Board. Each member of the European Semiconductor Board shall have an alternate.

2. Each national single point of contact, referred to in Article 26(3), shall appoint a specialist representative to the European Semiconductor Board. Where relevant as regards the function and expertise, a Member State may have more than one representative in relation to different tasks of the European Semiconductor Board. Each member of the European Semiconductor Board shall have an alternate. The Member States shall be obliged to involve regions with semiconductor ecosystems. The European Committee of the Regions shall appoint a representative to the European Semiconductor Board.

Reason

Given their role in supporting regional industrial ecosystems, including SMEs, as well as science and research, regions with relevant semiconductor ecosystems (e.g. the members of Silicon Europe) and the European Committee of the Regions should be involved in the work of the Board.

Amendment 21

Article 26(6)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
6. Member States shall ensure that national competent authorities, whenever appropriate, and in accordance with Union and national law, consult and cooperate with other relevant national authorities, as well as with relevant interested parties. The Commission shall facilitate the exchange of experience between national competent authorities.	6. Member States shall ensure that national competent authorities, whenever appropriate, and in accordance with Union and national law, consult and cooperate with other relevant national, regional and local authorities, as well as with relevant interested parties. The Commission shall facilitate the exchange of experience between national competent authorities.

Reason

To include regional and local authorities.

Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking

COM(2022) 47 final

Amendment 22

Recital 7

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(7)

The activities funded by the Chips Joint Undertaking should be covered in one single work programme, which should be adopted by the Governing Board. Before each work programme is prepared, the Public Authorities Board, taking into account the advice of the European Semiconductor Board and input from other relevant stakeholders, including as appropriate, roadmaps produced by the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies (1), should define the part of the work programme related to capacity building activities and research and innovation activities, including their corresponding expenditure estimates. For this purpose, the Public Authorities Board should include only the Commission and public authorities from Member States. Subsequently, on the basis of this definition, the Executive Director should prepare the work programme including capacity building and research and innovation activities and their corresponding expenditure estimates.

(7)

The activities funded by the Chips Joint Undertaking should be covered in one single work programme, which should be adopted by the Governing Board. Before each work programme is prepared, the Public Authorities Board, taking into account the advice of the Private Members Board and the European Semiconductor Board and input from other relevant stakeholders, including as appropriate, roadmaps produced by the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies (1), should define the part of the work programme related to capacity building activities and research and innovation activities, including their corresponding expenditure estimates. For this purpose, the Public Authorities Board should include only the Commission and public authorities from Member States. Subsequently, on the basis of this definition and the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda , the Executive Director should prepare the work programme including capacity building and research and innovation activities and their corresponding expenditure estimates. The budget for the research and innovation activities of the Chips Joint Undertaking should be at least equal to the estimated budget for the Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking. The same scope and working methods should also be adopted.

Reason

The Public Authorities Board should not determine the research and innovation agenda in advance, as this would limit the decision-making powers of the Governing Board. The Chips Joint Undertaking should maintain the same research activities, functioning and budget of the Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking.

Amendment 23

Article 1, point (7)(a)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(a)	In paragraph 1 point (b) is replaced by the following:

(a)	In paragraph 1 point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b)

Establish Union scientific excellence and innovation leadership in emerging components and systems technologies, including in activities related to lower TRLs; and promote the active involvement of SMEs, which shall represent at least one third of the total number of participants in indirect actions and at least 20 % of public funding dedicated to research and innovation actions should go to them ’;

‘(b)

shall represent at least one third of the total number of participants in indirect actions and receive at least 20 % of public funding’;

Reason

It is not realistic for SMEs to make up one third of the participants in capacity building activities, as described in the new points (g) to (j) of Article 126(1). The SME share of one third of the number of participants should therefore only apply to the portion dedicated to research and innovation actions, the same as for the 20 per cent share of public funding.

Amendment 24

Article 1, point (7)(c)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

c)	In paragraph 2 point (f) is replaced by the following:

c)	In paragraph 2 point (f) is replaced by the following:

‘(f)

establish coherence between the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda of the Chips Joint Undertaking inputs from other relevant stakeholders, including as appropriate, roadmaps produced by the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor technologies and Union policies so that electronics components and systems technologies contribute efficiently.’

‘(f)	establish coherence between the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda of the Chips Joint Undertaking and Union policies so that electronics components and systems technologies contribute efficiently.’

Reason

The Chips Joint Undertaking is not in a position to ensure the required consistency with the activities of third parties.

Amendment 25

Article 1, point (9)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
(9) In Article 129 paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:	(9) In Article 129 paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:
‘3. By way of derogation from Article 28(4), the private members shall make or arrange for their constituent and affiliated entities to make a financial contribution of at least EUR 26 331 000 for administrative costs of the Chips Joint Undertaking. The share of the total contribution on an annual basis for administrative costs of the Chips Joint Undertaking by the private members shall be 35 %.’	‘3. By way of derogation from Article 28(4), the private members shall make or arrange for their constituent and affiliated entities to make a financial contribution of up to EUR 26 331 000 for administrative costs of the Chips Joint Undertaking. The share of the total contribution on an annual basis for administrative costs of the Chips Joint Undertaking by the private members shall be a maximum of 35 %.’

Reason

The wording could lead to serious ambiguities. It is not clear which limit prevails: the lower limit of at least EUR 26 331 000 or the upper limit of a maximum of 35 %. Meanwhile, the Commission has confirmed that the words ‘at least’ in the Commission’s proposal were a clerical error. This error was corrected in the compromise text of the Council Presidency of May 25.

Amendment 26

Article 1, point (13)

Text proposed by the European Commission	CoR amendment
(13) The following Article 134a is inserted:	(13) The following Article 134a is inserted:
‘Article 134a Additional tasks of the Executive Director In addition to the tasks listed in Article 19, the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking shall prepare and, after having taken into account the definition of the Public Authorities Board referred to in Article 137(f), as well as the inputs from relevant stakeholders including as appropriate, roadmaps produced by the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor technologies , submit for adoption to the Governing Board the work programme for the joint undertaking, to implement the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda.’	‘Article 134a Additional tasks of the Executive Director In addition to the tasks listed in Article 19, the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking shall prepare and, after having taken into account the definition of the Public Authorities Board referred to in Article 137(f), submit for adoption to the Governing Board the work programme for the joint undertaking, to implement the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda.’

Reason

These contributions are already taken into account when the Public Authorities Board sets its part of the work programme and therefore do not need to be submitted again.

Amendment 27

Article 1, point (15)(a)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

a)	The following points (f) and (g) are added:

a)	The following points (f) and (g) are added:

‘(f)

before each work programme is prepared, define the part of the work programme related to capacity building activities and research and innovation activities , including the corresponding expenditure estimates, taking into account the advice of the European Semiconductor Board and input from other relevant stakeholders, including as appropriate, roadmaps produced by the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies;

(g)	select proposals corresponding to capacity building activities in accordance with Articles 12(1) and 17(2), point (u);’

‘(f)

before each work programme is prepared, define the part of the work programme related to capacity building activities, including the corresponding expenditure estimates, taking into account the advice of the Private Members Board and the European Semiconductor Board and input from other relevant stakeholders, including as appropriate, roadmaps produced by the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies;

(g)	select proposals corresponding to capacity building activities in accordance with Articles 12(1) and 17(2), point (u);’

Reason

The Public Authorities Board should not determine the research and innovation agenda in advance, as this would limit the decision-making powers of the Governing Board. However, the Public Authorities Board should take into account the advice of the Private Members Board on capacity building in order to ensure industrial policy relevance.

II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

Importance of the European Chips Act

insists that the success of the European Chips Act (ECA) is crucial for the EU as a whole, the Member States and all local and regional authorities, as securing industrial production in all regions of Europe depends on having a secure supply of semiconductors; therefore expressly advocates the EU having a clear position within global competition;

welcomes the Commission’s proposal for an ECA as a crucial step towards strengthening the EU, its industry and its security. It is important for the Chips Act to address issues of EU strategic autonomy and technological leadership. The EU must remain a global player in the field of semiconductors. The ambitious target of increasing the EU’s market share in semiconductors from the current 10 % to 20 % by 2030 is therefore the right one;

shares the objectives of reducing the main strategic dependencies in semiconductor production, supply chains, and the supply of raw materials and precursors through a process of expansion and diversification, by developing semiconductor production in Europe, and by maintaining and strengthening the EU’s leading role in research and development. At the same time calls for the production of chips that are more than 10 nanometres in size, for which there is demand from the EU user industry, to be included in the scope of Regulation COM(2022) 46 final; underlines in this respect the importance of know-how protection and patent protection, so that individual countries are not put at a disadvantaged position;

also welcomes the proposal for an ECA with a view to ensuring swift and consistent implementation of the European Green Deal: without reliable semiconductors, the EU’s ambitious environmental and climate targets, increased energy sovereignty and targets for the development of renewable energy cannot be achieved;

points out that strengthening semiconductor production must at the same time be accompanied by steps to reduce energy and resource consumption and harmful environmental impact right along the value chain, as well as steps to ensure compliance with the sustainability criteria (SDGs) and to mainstream the use of renewable energy sources and mechanisms for the efficient use of water resources in production facilities. In this regard, believes that special attention should be given to these energy and environmental effects in innovative next-generation technologies, such as integrated photonics and dedicated heterogeneous systems;

points out that, in addition to securing the supply of critical raw materials, it is necessary to fully harness the potential of the circular economy. The recovery of raw materials and materials from devices and installations is essential. This must already be taken into account when developing products using semiconductors. The appropriate skills should be developed in the regions and eligibility criteria should be designed accordingly;

Points out that the EU’s disadvantage compared to third countries in terms of natural resources, makes the EU heavily dependent on non-EU suppliers for imports of critical raw materials; encourages the European Commission to address this strategic dependency by intensifying its work and requirements on chips circularity, notably in design and re-use of material, and to further deepen the EU’s trade relations with key international partners;

in line with its opinion on the Critical Raw Materials Action Plan, welcomes new mining activities in the EU with a view to tapping into existing reserves of critical raw materials: stresses that new mining of high technology raw materials in the EU must be based on R & D plans for innovative low-impact mining;

notes that local and regional authorities (LRAs) have a strong shared interest in having a secure supply of semiconductors due to their local economies’ high, indirect dependence on them; therefore, given their proximity to semiconductor ecosystems, LRAs should be given a key role in implementing the ECA; notes, moreover, that all regions will benefit from the ECA, irrespective of whether or not they have semiconductor businesses located within them;

10.

points out, in the light of current events, the importance of the semiconductor industry having a secure energy supply; this concerns, in particular, the necessary quantities of electricity and grid stability; these are a factor in choice of location for existing installations, but above all for setting up new ones;

Europe’s strategic objectives in the field of semiconductors

11.

calls on businesses to take greater account of their semiconductor needs and the necessary supply chains in an ever-changing geostrategic environment, and to avoid one-sided dependencies, in order to spread risks; the EU needs to better highlight its benefits as a ‘safe harbour’ within the international context;

12.

calls on the Commission, in the upcoming negotiations with the Council and the European Parliament, to clearly emphasise the importance of the ECA in securing Europe’s industrial base, and to demand additional financial contributions from the Member States and the economy;

13.

suggests that the funding available through the ECA be used strategically to expand existing semiconductor clusters and semiconductor ecosystems, both small-scale and large scale, including by linking them through networks. The chances of the EU holding its ground on the global semiconductor market in the future are greatest if it draws on and builds on its existing strengths, thereby limiting itself to inter-dependence on ‘like-minded countries’ and in turn reducing unilateral dependencies on third countries;

14.

welcomes the establishment of the European Chips Fund; notes that Pillar 2 of the ECA should in principle be open to all kinds of technology and that the funding must be mobilised as soon as possible;

15.

reiterates that, as a very successful tool, the IPCEIs continue to play an important role in the ECA; points out, however, that the EU and the Member States must act more swiftly in all areas, particularly in the area of permits and support, in order to be able to support industry, including SMEs, in line with its needs;

16.

emphasises the key importance of new technologies for the further development of the EU as a major centre for semiconductors, in order to remain globally competitive in the area of technology: when implementing the ECA, it will be important to react openly and quickly to the use of new materials, such as gallium nitride, indium phosphide, silicon carbide and silicon nitride, as well as to the use of new processes, in order to enable the development and production of next generation chips; this includes, for example, photonic chips, essential for building an autonomous and sustainable network for data-, tele- and quantum communication, and for autonomous driving, and quantum chips, allowing analyses of far larger amounts of data, performing more powerful calculations in a faster way and performing detailed simulations, as well as hybrid chips and heterogeneous systems where the integration of photonic functions on electronic ICs is one of the critical issues for the future of the semiconductors industry;

17.

considers it necessary for the EU to place additional emphasis on designing semiconductors and thus to build up its own design capabilities;

Funding for the Chips Act

18.

criticises the financial envelope proposed for the ECA as being far too low; has doubts as to whether the overall package will be sufficient to enable the EU to compete on the international market for establishing new production facilities; underlines that new initiatives deserve new financial resources and regrets the re-directing of funds from successful programmes, such as Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe Programme;

19.

calls on the Commission to ensure transparency with regard to the ECA’s financial envelope and to ensure adequate funding for all three pillars; in doing so, the Commission should draw on similar initiatives worldwide;

20.

takes the view that more, new money should be deployed for the implementation of the ECA, and therefore also calls on the Council, the Parliament and the Commission to provide the relevant EU and national subsidies and amend the Multiannual Financial Framework accordingly; as the ECA’s strategic objectives extend beyond 2030, the semiconductor sector must be considered a high priority in the revision of the MFF as well as the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

21.

considers it necessary to create further incentives to ensure that, in addition to money from the EU, Member States and regions, as well as businesses, provide the necessary funding; points to the importance of the Commission facilitating support in accordance with EU law; the funding must be tied to compliance with environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria;

22.

calls on regions and businesses to involve the European Investment Bank (EIB) in financing new projects along the entire value chain; believes that the EIB can make a decisive contribution to the success of the ECA;

Funding and EU State aid rules from a regional perspective

23.

calls on the Commission, when assessing and approving in accordance with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, to interpret the ‘first of a kind in Europe’ criterion generously, as in the case of semiconductors there is no traditional competitive situation that is relevant to competition in the single market;

24.

asks the Commission to consider further forms of relief, such as the granting of tax write-offs, in addition to changes to and simplifications in State aid law and procedures, in order to make it easier to set up businesses along the entire semiconductor value chain in Europe;

25.

considers it necessary, under the ‘first of a kind’ principle, to enable support not only for production facilities, such as the Integrated Production Facilities (IPF) and the Open EU Foundries (OEF), but also for the production of precursors, such as wafers or production units, which are equally relevant when it comes to achieving the objectives;

26.

welcomes the arrangements provided for in Article 14 aimed at speeding up national planning and approval procedures in favour of integrated production facilities and open EU manufacturing facilities;

27.

points out that, in order to ensure the supply of semiconductors, not only the production facilities for semiconductors themselves, but also upstream and downstream production facilities, are relevant, with the result that these too must be included when focusing on facilitating and speeding up procedures, in order to avoid bottleneck effects;

Research and development from a regional perspective

28.

advocates giving the EU a broad approach to R & D by involving customers and users, and avoiding basing development and innovation objectives solely on the further miniaturisation of node structures;

29.

shares the concerns of the research and higher education sectors that the redeployment of funding under the Horizon Europe and Digital Europe programmes, as provided for in the Chips Act, weakens other areas, thus increasing competition for the remaining funding; therefore expects the funding redeployed from Digital Europe and Horizon Europe to be made available to the programmes again in the course of the funding period;

30.

draws attention to the fact that national and regional co-financing of projects leads to administrative problems, and calls on the Commission to ensure that this does not constitute an obstacle to participation in research projects; in particular, framework conditions should be designed in such a way as to allow flanking support for projects from national or regional programmes, in the form of co-financing;

31.

calls on the regions with relevant clusters to actively participate in the Chips Joint Undertaking as a successor to the Key Digital Technologies (KDT) and the Electronic Components and Systems for European Leadership (ECSEL) Joint Undertakings;

32.

calls on the Commission to define the term ‘pilot line’ more precisely. Access to the pilot lines must be broad and open in order to enable clusters, educational and research institutions, and businesses, particularly SMEs, to participate; SMEs’ access to the pilot lines could be achieved both through the Horizon Europe programme and in a decentralised way through national and regional bodies with experience in supporting start-ups and SMEs in their creation, growth and consolidation, such as regional development agencies;

33.

calls for existing networks, such as the Industrial Alliance for Processors and Semiconductor Technologies, to be closely integrated into the semiconductor coordination mechanism. All networks should be open to new players, as networks such as the Vanguard Initiative or the network of EU digital innovation hubs can also make an important contribution;

34.

suggests examining to what extent it is possible to ensure that know-how developed in the EU can be safeguarded, e.g. through extended patent protection, and what measures can be taken to this end; safety aspects should also play a role here;

Securing skilled workers and education and training

35.

calls on the Member States, LRAs and businesses to place much more emphasis on securing skilled workers: qualified education and training makes a significant contribution to the EU’s success as a major centre for semiconductors and is a key criterion for investment decisions; general and vocational education and training in the regions play a crucial role; more women and girls should be encouraged to pursue training in the area of semiconductor technology;

36.

believes, therefore, that securing skilled workers is one of the keys to success. A coordinated strategy is needed to train younger generations and to retain teachers at universities and research institutions; therefore encourages greater exchanges of researchers between universities, research institutions and businesses, as well as the sharing of laboratory infrastructure across the EU;

37.

highlights that local and regional authorities have strategic capacities to promote synergies between R & D, education, upskilling, reskilling and training policies that will be vital to attract and uphold a talented workforce;

38.

recommends creating a traineeship programme dedicated to the semiconductor industry, to be jointly run and financed by industry, the Member States and the EU, with a bursary system and an obligation to work in the industry in Europe for a minimum period of time; additionally, recommends that the Commission consider developing dedicated human capital programmes to attract skilled workers from third countries with an advanced semiconductor industry;

39.

recommends setting up a Knowledge and Innovation Community (KIC) on Semiconductors, and proposes creating a Semiconductor Academy, along the lines of the Battery Academy, involving industry and research institutions;

40.

notes the importance of sustaining successful start-ups for the development of semiconductor ecosystems so that they can evolve and know-how is not lost;

41.

recommends, furthermore, having specific support for the development of innovative chip designs under the Horizon Europe programme, for example within the ‘Digital, Industry and Space’ cluster, so that the EU can maintain its leadership in the design of innovative chips and next generation technologies while reducing its interdependencies with other parts of the world;

Impact of the Chips Act on cities and regions

42.

notes that, in the event of new businesses being established, considerable input will be required from LRAs and they will need a reliable framework and support from the Member States and the Commission;

43.

calls on the Commission to keep in mind the impact that the inward movement of businesses has on LRAs; the creation of a framework for the establishment of businesses and the implementation of supporting measures should be understood as regional development and co-financing from the ERDF and the ESF should be made possible;

44.

notes that this will, in particular, allow Member States with proportionally more limited national resources to achieve a relevant leverage effect. It should also be possible to support the development of existing fabs;

45.

calls for the ECA to be operationally linked to other key EU policies and projects, such as the REACH Regulation, the Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials, the New Industrial Strategy, the Circular Economy Action Plan and the AI Strategy. Regions should play an important role and be closely involved in this process;

46.

points out that technological openness and the use of certain hazardous chemicals are necessary for the production of semiconductors and that their production, import or use is regulated by EU chemicals legislation. In the risk assessment referred to in Article 16, it is important to take into account to what extent European economic operators can overcome the legal hurdles associated with chemicals and substances remain securely available on the EU market;

Resilience and Crisis Response

47.

notes that designing and producing semiconductors in the EU can also contribute to the security and resilience of critical infrastructure in LRAs (energy networks, medical care, transport, administration, public institutions);

48.

suggests that instead of an ‘emergency toolbox’, a ‘prevention toolbox’ should be set up, since intervention in semiconductor production at short notice is not possible because of its complexity in terms of combinations of different ICs in the final products and of its widespread international supply chain, and is therefore unsuitable as a crisis response. Cooperation and coordination should always take precedence over intervention. Particular attention should be paid to maintaining semiconductor production and the necessary availability of precursors and sub-products;

49.

calls on the Commission to define the crisis situation, the rights of intervention provided for and the specific action to be taken in the event of a crisis in a more precise and legally certain manner, given the many different causes that may give rise to shortages and delivery problems, and to make it clear that this can only be applied as a last and proportional resort; is concerned that the proposed crisis response mechanism could discourage investment;

50.

suggests that greater focus should be placed on securing the availability of certain types of semiconductors and the (where appropriate, joint) purchase of critical raw materials (e.g. palladium, neon, C4F6, lithium, gallium, silicon) and precursors (e.g. wafers) necessary for this purpose;

51.

calls for LRAs to be included in the ‘semiconductor coordination mechanism’, as they can make a valuable contribution to achieving the sought-after network through their local knowledge of research, industry and semiconductor clusters;

52.

calls for care to be taken, when appointing the Semiconductor Board, to ensure that it is a specialised body and not a political body. The acceptance of the Board and its work largely depends on the trust placed in its members. The industry and the CoR should therefore also be represented with appropriate expertise;

53.

supports the objective of creating an overall picture of semiconductor value chains, dependencies and requirements in the semiconductor sector; has doubts, however, as to whether the resulting amounts of data can be processed in a safe and targeted manner; draws attention to the fact that, without valid data from non-European players, it will not be possible to get a meaningful picture;

54.

recommends the swift adoption and implementation of the ECA, and calls on the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament to take into account the CoR’s recommendations, and to reach an agreement under the Czech presidency;

55.

welcomes that the Commission has executed a subsidiarity analysis for the proposal for a Chips Act and agrees that the objectives of the proposal cannot be achieved by Member States acting alone, as the problems are of a cross-border nature, and not limited to single Member States or to a subset of Member States. The CoR therefore supports the European Commission’s analysis that action at Union level can clearly best drive European actors towards a common vision and implementation strategy.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240 (OJ L 166, 11.5.2021, p. 1).

(1) The Alliance is referred to in the Communication from the Commission of 5 May 2021 on ‘Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market for Europe’s recovery’.

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/114

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Revised Schengen Area Governance

(2022/C 498/15)

Rapporteur:

Antje GROTHEER (DE/PES), Vice-President of Bremen State Parliament

Reference documents:

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum

(COM(2021) 890 final)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders

(COM(2021) 891 final)

Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Responding to state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants at the EU external border

(JOIN(2021) 32)

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS

Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders

COM(2021) 891

Amendment 1

Recital 3

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(3)

In recent years, the Schengen area has been subject to unprecedented challenges, which by their nature were not confined to the territory of any single Member State. Such challenges underscored the fact that the preservation of public order and security in the Schengen area is a shared responsibility requiring joined and coordinated action between Member States and at Union level. They also highlighted gaps in the existing rules governing the functioning of the Schengen area both at external and internal borders and the need to create a stronger and more robust framework allowing for a more effective response to challenges faced by the Schengen area.

(3)

In recent years, the Schengen area has been subject to unprecedented challenges, which by their nature were not confined to the territory of any single Member State. Such challenges underscored the fact that the preservation of public order and security in the Schengen area is a shared responsibility requiring joined and coordinated action between Member States and at Union level. They also highlighted gaps in the existing rules governing the functioning of the Schengen area , including both at external and internal borders, and the need to create a stronger and more robust framework allowing for a more effective response to challenges faced by the Schengen area.

Reason

The functioning of the Schengen area is not solely dependent on the rules regarding controls at the external and internal borders. The recital should reflect this accordingly.

Amendment 2

Recital 4

Text proposed by the European Commission

Amendment

(4)

Border control at external borders is in the interest not only of the Member State at whose external borders it is carried out but of all Member States which have abolished internal border control and the Union as a whole. Member States are required to ensure high standards in management of their external borders, including through enhanced cooperation between border guards, police, customs and other relevant authorities. The Union provides active support through the provision of financing support by the Agencies, the European Border and Coast Guard in particular and management of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism. The rules applicable to external borders need to be reinforced in order to better respond to new challenges that have recently emerged at the external borders.

(4)

Border control at external borders is in the interest not only of the Member State at whose external borders it is carried out but of all Member States which have abolished internal border control and the Union as a whole. Member States are required to ensure high standards in management of their external borders, including through enhanced cooperation between border guards, police, customs and other relevant authorities. The Union provides active support through the provision of financing support by the Agencies, the European Border and Coast Guard in particular and management of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism. The rules applicable to external borders need to be effectively and efficiently implemented in order better respond to new challenges emerging at the external borders.

Reason

The rules governing external borders, which are currently in line with international standards and offer sufficient instruments for the competent authorities to conduct efficient and protection- sensitive border controls as they are quite flexible, need to be fully implemented in order to build effectively and efficiently on their potential.

Amendment 3

Recital 8

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(8)

It is also necessary to reinforce the rules and safeguards in Union law in order to allow Member States to act swiftly to counter instances of instrumentalisation of migrants. Such instrumentalisation should be understood as referring to a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows to the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the arrival of third country nationals to the external borders of the Member States, where such actions indicate an intention to destabilise the Union as a whole or a Member State and where the nature of such actions is liable to put at risk essential State functions, including its territorial integrity , the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security.

(8)

It is also necessary to apply effectively and efficiently the rules and safeguards in Union law in order to allow Member States to act swiftly to counter instances of instrumentalisation of migrants. Such instrumentalisation should be understood as referring to a situation where a third country or an actor sponsored by it actively supports a significant number of third country nationals in attempting to enter a Union Member State irregularly en masse , aiming to destabilise the Union or a Member State, where the Member State affected is able to duly justify why the nature of such actions puts at risk essential State functions, the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security , and where the European Council has acknowledged, as a matter of urgency, that the Union or one or more of its Member States are facing a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants .

Reason

Amendment 4

Recital 9

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(9)

Instrumentalisation of migrants can refer to situations where irregular travel of third country nationals has been actively encouraged or facilitated by a third country onto its own territory to reach the external border of the Member States but can equally refer to the active encouragement or facilitation of irregular travel of third country nationals already present in that third country. Instrumentalisation of migrants may also entail the imposition of coercive measures, intended to prevent the third country nationals from leaving the border areas of the instrumentalising third country, in a direction other than through a Member State.

(9)

Instrumentalisation of migrants can refer to situations defined in point 27 of Art. 1 (1)(b), where irregular travel of third country nationals into the European Union has been actively facilitated by a third country onto its own territory to reach the external border of the Member States but can equally refer to the active facilitation of irregular travel of third country nationals already present in that third country. Instrumentalisation of migrants may also entail the imposition of coercive measures, intended to prevent the third country nationals from leaving the border areas of the instrumentalising third country, in a direction other than through a Member State. Situations in which non-state actors are involved in organised crime, in particular smuggling, should not be considered as instrumentalisation of migrants when there is no aim to destabilise the Union or a Member State. Furthermore, humanitarian aid operations should not be considered as instrumentalisation .

Reason

For the purpose of legal certainty, a reference to the provision where instrumentalisation is defined is necessary.

Amendment 5

Recital 10

Text proposed by the European Commission

Amendment

(10)

The Union should mobilise all tools from its toolbox of diplomatic, financial and operational measures to support the Member States confronted with instrumentalisation. Diplomatic efforts by the Union or the Member State concerned, should be given priority as the means of addressing the phenomenon of instrumentalisation. This may be supplemented , where appropriate, by the imposition of restrictive measures by the Union.

(10)

The Union should mobilise all tools from its toolbox of diplomatic, financial and operational measures to support the Member States confronted with instrumentalisation. Diplomatic efforts by the Union or the Member State concerned, should be given priority as the means of addressing the phenomenon of instrumentalisation. This should be supplemented by appropriate preventive measures by the Union , involving the instrumentalising third countries and the countries of origin of the instrumentalised migrants .

Reason

Prevention is crucial in all efforts to address instrumentalisation. Situational reports should be regularly drafted by EU delegations in the countries of origin of instrumentalised groups of migrants and in the instrumentalising third countries, and be submitted to the Commission as evidentiary basis for preventive measures.

Amendment 6

Recital 11

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(11)

At the same time, in addition to these measures, it is equally necessary to further reinforce the current rules in relation to external border controls and border surveillance. To further assist the Member State facing an instrumentalisation of migrants, Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX complements the rules on border control by providing for specific measures in the area of asylum and return , while respecting the fundamental rights the individuals concerned and in particular by ensuring the respect of the right to asylum and providing the necessary assistance by the UN agencies and other relevant organisations.

(11)

It is necessary to fully implement the current rules in relation to external border controls and border surveillance, while respecting the fundamental rights of the individuals seeking asylum and in particular by ensuring the respect of the right to asylum and providing the necessary assistance by the UN agencies and other relevant organisations , especially for unaccompanied minors .

Reason

The adoption of the Instrumentalisation Regulation is conditional upon adoption of the proposals for the Asylum Procedure Regulation as well as the recast of both the Reception Conditions Directive and the Return Directive under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which are subject to on-going negotiations or on hold due to an impasse. The reference to Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX in the proposed Schengen Borders Code is a reference to an act the adoption of which is uncertain, the content of which is likely to be modified in the course of the legislative process, and which is moreover conditional upon other proposals under the New Pact being adopted. Furthermore, the impact assessment accompanying the proposed Schengen Borders Code did not assess the potential impact of the proposed provisions responding to instrumentalisation. Therefore, as it stands, the reference jeopardises the adoption of the very proposal on Schengen and is contrary to legal certainty, the European Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines and the 2016 Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making. Moreover, the great numbers of unaccompanied minors in areas suffering the most migratory pressure call for and deserve guarantees for the defence of their rights, their protection, and the coordination of the necessary assistance by all the parties involved.

Amendment 7

Recital 12

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(12)

In particular, in a situation of instrumentalisation, it should, where necessary, be possible for the Member State concerned, to limit border traffic to the minimum by closing some border crossing points, while guaranteeing genuine and effective access to international protection procedures. Any such decision should take into account whether the European Council has acknowledged that the Union or one or more of its Member States are facing a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants. Furthermore, any such limitations should take full account of the rights of Union citizens, third country nationals who are beneficiaries of the right of free movement pursuant an international agreement and third-country nationals who are long-term residents under national or Union law or are holders of long-term visas, as well as their respective family members. Such limitations should also be applied in a manner that ensures respect for obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement.

(12)

In particular, in a situation of instrumentalisation , as defined in point 27 of Art. 1 (1)(b) , it should, where necessary, be possible for the Member State concerned, to limit border traffic to the minimum by closing some border crossing points, while guaranteeing genuine and effective access to international protection procedures. Any such decision should take into account whether the European Council has acknowledged that the Union or one or more of its Member States are facing a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants. Furthermore, any such limitations should not restrict the rights of Union citizens, third country nationals who are beneficiaries of the right of free movement pursuant an international agreement and third-country nationals who are long-term residents under national or Union law or are holders of long-term visas, as well as their respective family members. Such limitations should also be applied in a manner that ensures respect for obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement.

Reason

The proposed measures to limit the number of border crossings will have a negative impact on access to asylum at the EU’s external borders and risk running counter to the overall objective of the Schengen Area, that is, maintaining the absence of internal borders. They should therefore be used only as a last resort, and only in cases where instrumentalisation has been acknowledged to exist. The possibility of applying restrictive measures should not be detrimental to the exercise of the right to free movement by EU citizens and lawfully residing non-EU nationals.

Amendment 8

Recital 14

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(14)

By virtue of Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency is required to recommend to a Member State that it request the Agency to initiate, carry out or adjust the Agency’s support, in order to address identified threats and challenges at the external borders, where the conditions laid down in that provision are met. In particular, the need for Agency support may become apparent in situations where the European Border and Coast Guard Agency has carried out a dedicated vulnerability assessment in connection with the instrumentalisation of migrants. On the basis of the results of such a vulnerability assessment or where a critical impact level is attributed to one or more external border sections and taking into account the relevant elements in the Member State’s contingency plans, the Agency’s risk analysis and the analysis layer of the European situational picture, the Executive Director should recommend to the Member State concerned to request that the Agency initiate, carry out or adjust the Agency’s support in accordance with Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896. This competence of the Executive Director is without prejudice to the general support that the Agency may be providing to the Member States.

(14)

Reason

The deleted text repeats the exact text of Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) and is therefore superfluous.

Amendment 9

Recital 15

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(15)

Moreover, in the event of instrumentalisation of migrants, the Member State concerned should reinforce border control, including, as appropriate, through additional measures preventing illegal crossings and the deployment of additional resources and technical means to prevent unauthorised crossing of the border. Such technical means could include modern technologies including drones and motion sensors, as well as mobile units. The use of such technical means, in particular, any technologies capable of collecting personal data, needs to be based on and exercised in accordance with clearly defined provisions of national law.

(15)

Moreover, in the event of instrumentalisation of migrants, as defined in point 27 of Article 1(1)(b) and acknowledged as such by the European Council, the Member State concerned should reinforce border surveillance, through the deployment of additional resources and technical means , including modern technologies, to address attempts to cross the border irregularly en masse. Such technical means could include modern technologies including drones and motion sensors, as well as mobile units. The use of such technical means, in particular, any technologies capable of collecting personal data, needs to be based on and exercised in accordance with clearly defined provisions of national law and in line with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union .

Reason

The proposed measures should be used only as a last resort, and only in cases where instrumentalisation has been officially acknowledged to exist by the European Council. Moreover, the use of technical means should not run counter to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU.

Amendment 10

Recital 16

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(16)

The Commission should be empowered to specify, in delegated acts adopted under this Regulation, appropriate standards for border surveillance, concerning in particular the new technologies that Member States may use, while taking into account the type of borders (land, sea or air), the impact levels attributed to each external border section in accordance with Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and other relevant factors, as a specific response to situations of instrumentalisation of migrants.

(16)

The Commission should be empowered to specify, in delegated acts adopted under this Regulation, appropriate common standards for border surveillance, concerning in particular the new technologies that Member States may use, while taking into account the type of borders (land, sea or air), the impact levels attributed to each external border section in accordance with Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and other relevant factors, as a specific response to threats, challenges and vulnerabilities at the external borders .

Reason

As per recital 8.

Amendment 11

Recital 17

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(17)

In an area without internal border controls, persons should be able to move freely, and in security between Member States. In this regard, it should be clarified that the prohibition of controls at internal borders does not affect the competence of Member States to carry out checks on their territory, including at their internal borders, for purposes other than border control. It should, in particular, be clarified that national competent authorities, including health or law enforcement authorities, remain, in principle, free to carry out checks in the exercise of public powers provided for under national law.

(17)

In an area without internal border controls, persons should be able to move freely, and in security between Member States. In this regard, it should be clarified that the prohibition of controls at internal borders does not affect the competence of Member States to carry out checks on their territory, including at their internal borders, for purposes other than border control. It should, in particular, be clarified that nationally, regionally and locally competent authorities, including health or law enforcement authorities, remain, in principle, free to carry out checks in the exercise of public powers provided for under national law.

Reason

To take into account differences in governance structures and related competences across Member States, all levels of government should be included.

Amendment 12

Recital 18

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(18)

While the prohibition of internal border controls also extends to checks having equivalent effects, checks by competent authorities should not be considered equivalent to the exercise of border checks where they do not have border control as an objective, where they are based on general information and experience of the competent authorities regarding possible threats to public security or public policy, including where they aim to combat irregular stay or residence and cross-border crimes linked to irregular migration, where they are devised and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders, and where they are conducted at transport hubs, such as ports, train or bus stations and airports or directly on board of passenger transport services, and where they are based on risk analysis.

Reason

The current rules already allow for these measures. It should not be insinuated that more controls and security checks are possible under the proposed amendments. More controls are detrimental to regions with internal borders in particular. Security measures based on risk analysis should not be limited to these regions.

Amendment 13

Recital 20

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(20)

The combatting of illegal residence or stay and of cross-border crime linked to irregular migration such as human trafficking, migrant smuggling and document fraud and other forms of cross-border crime could in particular encompass measures allowing the verification of the identity, nationality and residence status of persons provided that such verifications are non-systematic and carried out on the basis of risk analysis.

Reason

Article 77 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union lays out the objective of ‘ensuring the absence of any controls on persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing internal borders’. Moreover, the combatting of illegal residence or stay is already regulated in Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) (‘Returns Directive’) and should not be linked to controls at internal borders. The framework for combatting cross-border crimes as well as human trafficking is similarly regulated in other legislative acts (3). Furthermore, the provision leaves space for non-compliance with the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, according to which the Schengen Borders Code must be interpreted as precluding national legislation by which a Member State obliges a person, on pain of a penalty, to present a passport or identity card on entering the territory of that Member State via an internal border, when the reintroduction of the internal border control in relation to which that obligation is imposed is contrary to that provision (Joined Cases C-368/20 and C-369/20).

Amendment 14

Recital 24

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(24)

It is necessary to ensure that checks carried out by Member States in exercise of national competences remain fully consistent with an area that is free of internal border controls. In accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice, the more extensive the indications are that checks conducted by Member States at their border areas have an equivalent effect to border control, having regard to the objective of such checks, their territorial scope and possible differences compared to checks carried out in the remainder of the territory of the Member State concerned, the greater the need for strict and detailed rules and limitations laying down the conditions for the exercise, by the Member States, of their police powers in a border area.

(24)

Reason

To achieve consistency with other parts of the proposal.

Amendment 15

Recital 25

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(25)

Measures need to be taken to address unauthorised movements of illegally staying third country nationals in an area without internal border controls. In order to strengthen the functioning of the Schengen area, Member States should be able to take additional measures to counter irregular movements between Member States, and combat illegal stays. Where national law enforcement authorities of a Member State apprehend illegally staying third country nationals at the internal borders as part of cross-border police operational cooperation it should be possible for those authorities to refuse such persons the right to enter or remain in their territory and to transfer them to the Member State from which they entered. The Member State from where the person came directly should in turn be required to receive the apprehended third country nationals.

(25)	Measures need to be taken to address unauthorised movements of illegally staying third country nationals in an area without internal border controls.

Reason

The proposed possibilities for direct transfers are not in line with international and European legal standards regarding the movement of persons in the Schengen area. Such measures would also be very difficult to align with the standards set by the Dublin system for responsibility sharing and would further contribute to uneven responsibility sharing for asylum and irregular migration, which would be contrary to the correct application of the subsidiarity principle and the objective of a common European approach. The proposed procedure would further contribute to divergent practices and risk violating fundamental rights.

Amendment 16

Recital 26

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(26)

The procedure by which a Member State may transfer apprehended illegally staying third country nationals to a Member State from where the person came directly should take place swiftly but be subject to safeguards and carried out in full respect of fundamental rights and the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, to prevent racial profiling. It should be possible for the authorities to carry out a verification of relevant information immediately available to the authorities concerning the movements of the persons concerned. Such information may include objective elements that would allow the authorities to conclude that the person had recently travelled from another Member States, such as the possession of documents, including receipts or invoices, evidencing recent travel from another Member State. Third country nationals subject to the transfer procedure should be provided with a reasoned decision in writing. While the decision should be immediately enforceable, the third country national should be afforded an effective remedy to appeal against or seek review of the transfer decision. This remedy should not have suspensive effect.

Reason

As per recital 25. Additionally, the part on legal remedies does not seem to be compatible with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Amendment 17

Recital 27

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(27)

The transfer procedure provided for under this Regulation should not affect the existing possibility for Member States to return irregular third country nationals in accordance with bilateral agreements or arrangements referred to in Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC (the ‘Return Directive’), where such persons are detected outside of the vicinity of internal borders. In order to facilitate the application of such agreements, and to complement the objective of protecting the area without internal borders, the Member States should be afforded the possibility to conclude new agreements or arrangements and update existing ones. The Commission should be notified of any such modifications or updates of new agreements or arrangements. Where a Member State has taken back a third country national under the procedure provided for in this Regulation or on the basis of a bilateral agreement or arrangement, the Member State concerned should be required to issue a return decision in accordance with the Return Directive. In order to ensure consistency between the new procedures provided for in this Regulation and existing rules on the return of third country nationals, a targeted modification of Article 6(3) of the Return Directive is therefore necessary.

Reason

As per recitals 25 and 26. Additionally, the large-scale reliance on bilateral agreements between Member States which would be necessary for the implementation of such transfers may undermine European solidarity. Furthermore, in accordance with the opinion of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union (6357/21, 19.2.2021) explaining in detail the ‘variable geometry’ between the Schengen and Dublin acquis in relation to the proposals under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, return-related provisions could be re-included in the proposal for the recast of the Return Directive (as proposed by the Commission in 2018, a proposal which is currently on the Council’s table). Alternatively, such provisions could be part of a proposal to amend the Return Directive. Including an amendment to the Return Directive through the revised Schengen Borders Code is not in line with the European Commission’s commitment to better regulation.

Amendment 18

Recital 29

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(29)

Furthermore, a serious threat to public policy or internal security can also result from large scale unauthorised movements of irregular migrants between the Member States where this creates a situation putting a strain on the overall resources and capacities of the responsible national services, where the other means provided for under this Regulation are not sufficient to address these inflows and movements. In this context, Member States should be able to rely on objective and quantified reports on unauthorised movements whenever available, in particular, when produced on a regular basis by the competent Union agencies in line with their respective mandates. It should be possible for a Member State to use the information provided by the agencies to demonstrate the exceptional character of the identified threat caused by unauthorised movement in the risk assessment, in order to justify the reintroduction of internal border controls on this ground.

Reason

A situation characterised by large-scale unauthorised movements of third-country nationals between Member States should not be included as constituting a serious threat to public policy or internal security justifying the reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders by individual Member States, as its inclusion under the general framework is incompatible with and contradictory to the proposal’s objective as well as to the proper application of the principle of subsidiarity. Movements between the Member States, which might, in fact, affect the majority of Member States, need to be addressed at the Union level as proposed under Article 28 and be subject to a Council’s implementing decision.

Amendment 19

Recital 34

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(34)

In order to ensure compliance with the principle of proportionality, the decision of the Council should be adopted for a limited period of time of up to six months that may be prolonged subject to regular review upon a proposal from the Commission, as long as the threat is found to persist . The initial decision should include an assessment of the expected impact of the measures adopted, including its adverse side-effects, with a view to determining if controls at internal borders are justified or whether less restrictive measures could be applied in their place in an effective manner. Subsequent decisions should take account of the evolution of the identified threat. The Member States should immediately notify the Commission and the Member States of the reintroduction of internal border controls in accordance with the decision of the Council.

(34)

In order to ensure compliance with the principle of proportionality, the decision of the Council should be adopted for a limited period of time of up to six months that may be prolonged to up to a total of 24 months if the threat is found to persist, subject to regular review upon a proposal from the Commission. The initial decision should include an assessment of the expected impact of the measures adopted, including its adverse side-effects, with a view to determining if controls at internal borders are justified or whether less restrictive measures could be applied in their place in an effective manner. Subsequent decisions should take account of the evolution of the identified threat. The Member States should immediately notify the Commission and the Member States of the reintroduction of internal border controls in accordance with the decision of the Council.

Reason

The controls at internal borders conducted since 2015 show that a fixed upper limit is necessary in order to avoid quasi-permanent controls at internal borders based on the same threat. The initial period of six months and the proposed maximum period of 24 months for such controls are based on the overall aim to look for European rather than national solutions in such situations. In this context, it is worth mentioning that, if a threat of a new nature occurs, the existing rules would allow for the reintroduction of controls at internal borders (CJEU Judgment of 26 April 2022, Joined Cases C-368/20 and C-369/20).

Amendment 20

Recital 35

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(35)

Reintroduction of internal border controls should also remain possible where serious deficiencies in the management of the external borders persist, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control. Periods where the border controls were introduced by Member States because the urgency of the situation required it or where the Council takes a decision to recommend the reintroduction because a threat affects a significant number of Member States, should not be included in the two years’ period applicable to reintroductions based on serious deficiencies at the external borders.

(35)

Reintroduction of internal border controls should also remain possible where serious deficiencies in the management of the external borders persist, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control. Periods where the border controls were introduced by Member States because the urgency of the situation required it or where the Council takes a decision to recommend the reintroduction because a threat affects a significant number of Member States, should be included in the two years’ period applicable to reintroductions based on serious deficiencies at the external borders.

Reason

A maximum time limit of two years should remain in force, in order to allow and call for coordinated European measures to address the serious deficiencies in the management of the external borders as soon as possible.

Amendment 21

Recital 38

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(38)

In order to limit harmful consequences resulting from the reintroduction of internal border controls, any decision to reintroduce internal border controls should be accompanied by mitigating measures if needed. Such measures should include measures to assure a smooth operation of transit of goods and transport personnel and seafarers by the establishment of ‘green lanes’. In addition, and to take account of the need to ensure the movement of persons whose activities may be essential for preserving the supply chain or the provision of essential services, Member States should also apply the existing guidelines on cross-border workers45. Against this background, the rules for the reintroduction of border controls at internal borders should take account of the guidelines and recommendations adopted throughout the COVID-19 pandemic as a solid safety net for the Single Market, for the purpose of assuring that they are applied by the Member States, where appropriate, as mitigating measures during reintroduced internal border controls. Measures should in particular be identified with a view to ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the Single Market and safeguarding the interests of cross-border regions and of ‘twin cities’ including for instance authorisations or derogations for the inhabitants of cross-border regions.

(38)

In order to limit harmful consequences resulting from the reintroduction of internal border controls, any decision to reintroduce internal border controls should be accompanied by mitigating measures if needed. Such measures should include measures to assure a smooth operation of transit of goods and transport personnel and seafarers by the establishment of ‘green lanes’. In addition, and to take account of the need to ensure the movement of persons whose activities may be essential for preserving the supply chain or the provision of essential services, Member States should also apply the existing guidelines on cross-border workers45. Against this background, the rules for the reintroduction of border controls at internal borders should take account of the guidelines and recommendations adopted throughout the COVID-19 pandemic as a solid safety net for the Single Market, for the purpose of assuring that they are applied by the Member States, where appropriate, as mitigating measures during reintroduced internal border controls. Measures should in particular be identified, taking into account the position of local and regional authorities in cross-border regions, with a view to ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the Single Market and safeguarding the interests of cross-border regions and of ‘twin cities’ including for instance authorisations or derogations for the inhabitants of cross-border regions.

Reason

To ensure that mitigating measures are proposed in cooperation and coordination with the competent authorities in the cross-border regions that will be affected by them.

Amendment 22

Recital 45

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(45)

In order to enable the post factum analysis of the decision on the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders, Member States should remain obliged to submit a report on the reintroduction of border control at internal borders to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission once they lift the controls. Where the controls are kept in place for prolonged periods of time, such a report should also be submitted after 12 months, and every year thereafter if exceptionally controls are maintained and for as long as the controls are maintained . The report should outline, in particular, the initial and follow-up assessment of the necessity of internal border controls and the respect of the criteria for reintroduction of border controls at internal borders. The Commission should adopt in an implementing act a template and make it available online.

(45)

In order to enable both the ongoing and the post factum analysis of the decision on the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders, Member States should remain obliged to submit regular report s on the reintroduction of border control at internal borders to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission while such controls are conducted and a final report once they lift the controls. Where the controls are kept in place for prolonged periods of time, ongoing assessment report s should be submitted every six months and a final post factum report has to be submitted once internal border controls are lifted . The report s should outline, in particular, the initial and follow-up assessment of the necessity of internal border controls and the respect of the criteria for reintroduction of border controls at internal borders. The Commission should adopt in an implementing act template s and make these available online.

Reason

The assessment should be ongoing. As internal border controls should be limited to a maximum of 24 months, it is not necessary to foresee more than one post factum assessment report in case these controls are prolonged for more than 12 months. However, ongoing assessment reports should take place at the end of each 6-month period and a final post factum report should be issued upon the termination of internal border controls.

Amendment 23

Article 1, point (1)(b)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

b)	the following points 27 to 30 are added:

b)	the following points 27 to 30 are added:

‘27.

“instrumentalisation of migrants” refers to a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders, onto or from within its territory and then onwards to those external borders, where such actions are indicative of an intention of a third country to destabilise the Union or a Member State, where the nature of such actions is liable to put at risk essential State functions , including its territorial integrity , the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security;

‘27.

“instrumentalisation of migrants” refers to a situation where a third country or an actor sponsored by it actively supports a significant number of third country nationals in attempting to enter a Union Member State irregularly en masse, aiming to destabilise the Union or a Member State, where the Member State affected is able to duly justify why the nature of such actions puts at risk essential State functions, the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security , and where the European Council has acknowledged, as a matter of urgency, that the Union or one or more of its Member States are facing a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants ;

28.	“essential travel” means travel in connection with an essential function or need, taking into account any applicable international obligations of the Union and of the Member States and listed in Annex XI;

28.	“essential travel” means travel in connection with an essential function or need, taking into account any applicable international obligations of the Union and of the Member States and listed in Annex XI;

29.	“non-essential travel” means travel for purposes other than essential travel;

29.	“non-essential travel” means travel for purposes other than essential travel;

30.	“transport hubs” means airports, sea or river ports, train or bus stations.’

30.	“transport hubs” means airports, sea or river ports, train or bus stations.’

Reason

The proposed definition of instrumentalisation is overly broad and lacks clarity, with the risk of many dissimilar situations being deemed compatible with this definition. It is also contrary to the Better Regulation Guidelines as the accompanying Impact Assessment (SWD(2021) 462 final) admits it ‘does not look into the instrumentalisation of irregular migration’. Recital 12 of the proposal requires that any operational decision by a concerned Member State’ should take into account whether the European Council has acknowledged that the Union or one or more of its Member States are facing a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants’. According to recital 10 of the proposal, ‘The Union should mobilise all tools from its toolbox of diplomatic, financial and operational measures to support the Member States confronted with instrumentalisation. Diplomatic efforts by the Union or the Member State concerned, should be given priority as the means of addressing the phenomenon of instrumentalisation’. A political consensus at EU level on whether a situation constitutes instrumentalisation is therefore necessary. Given the gravity of the resulting restrictive measures imposed on the individuals and given that the Commission’s proposal responds to a European Council request (EUCO 17/21), affirmative position of the European Council, meeting swiftly in order to allow for prompt action by the Member State(s) concerned, needs to be factored into the definition. As for the restrictive measures available to the Member States for a variety of other situations, the current legal framework of Directives 2013/32/EU (4) and 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) already provides them with operational flexibility in order to specify the locations where asylum applications should be lodged, extend registration deadlines and adjust material reception conditions.

Amendment 24

Article 1, point (2)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(2)	In Article 5, a new paragraph 4 is added:

(2)	In Article 5, a new paragraph 4 is added:

‘4. In a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants, Member States may limit the number of border crossing points as notified pursuant to paragraph 1 or their opening hours where the circumstances so require .

‘4. In a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants , as defined in point 27 of Article 1(1)(b) , Member States may limit the number of border crossing points as notified pursuant to paragraph 1 in strictly limited and well-defined circumstances.

Any limitations adopted pursuant to the first subparagraph shall be implemented in a manner that is proportionate and that takes full account of the rights of:

(a)	the persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law;

(a)	the persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law;

(b)	third-country nationals who are long-term residents under Council Directive 2003/109/EC56, persons deriving their right to reside from other instruments of Union or national law or who hold national long-term visas, as well as their respective family members;

(b)	third-country nationals who are long-term residents under Council Directive 2003/109/EC56, persons deriving their right to reside from other instruments of Union or national law or who hold national long-term visas, as well as their respective family members;

(c)	third-country nationals seeking international protection.’

(c)

third-country nationals seeking international protection. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a sufficient number of registration points, including crossing points, are open and accessible to applicants for international protection in order to guarantee effective protection against refoulement, including the right to make an application for international protection, and that appropriate safeguards for the treatment of vulnerable people are in place.’

Reason

The proposed measures to limit the number of border crossings will have a negative impact on the right to make an application for international protection and may lead to unlawful refoulement at the EU’s external borders and risk running counter to the overall objective of the Schengen Area, that is, maintaining the absence of controls at internal borders. They should therefore be used only as a last resort. Lowering EU standards in asylum law will not solve a geopolitical crisis. Instead, it will weaken the EU’s image in the world as a community of values.

Amendment 25

Article 1, point (3)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(3)	Article 13 is replaced by the following:

(3)	Article 13 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 13

Border surveillance

1. The main purpose of border surveillance shall be to detect and prevent unauthorised border crossings, to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally. A person who has crossed a border illegally and who has no right to stay on the territory of the Member State concerned shall be apprehended and made subject to procedures respecting Directive 2008/115/EC.

2. The border guards shall use stationary or mobile units to carry out border surveillance. That surveillance shall be carried out in such a way as to prevent and discourage persons from unauthorised border crossings between border crossing points and from circumventing the checks at border crossing points.

3. Surveillance between border crossing points shall be carried out by border guards whose numbers and methods shall be adapted to existing or foreseen risks and threats. It shall involve frequent and sudden changes to surveillance periods and other methods or techniques, so that unauthorised border crossings are effectively detected or prevented.

4. Surveillance shall be carried out by stationary or mobile units which perform their duties by patrolling or stationing themselves at places known or perceived to be sensitive, the aim of such surveillance being to prevent unauthorised border crossings or apprehend individuals crossing the border illegally. Surveillance may also be carried out by technical means, including electronic means, equipment and surveillance systems.

5. In a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants, the Member State concerned shall intensify border surveillance as necessary in order to address the increased threat . In particular , the Member State shall enhance , as appropriate, the resources and technical means to prevent an unauthorised crossing of the border .

5. In a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants, as defined in point 27 of Article 1(1)(b) and acknowledged as such by the European Council, the Member State concerned shall intensify border surveillance when necessary in order to address increased attempts to cross the border irregularly en masse. To this effect , the Member State shall reinforce , as appropriate, the resources and technical means to enhance border surveillance .

Those technical means may include modern technologies including drones and motion sensors, as well as mobile units to prevent unauthorised border crossings into the Union.

6. Without prejudice to the support that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency may provide to the Member States, in the event of a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants, the Agency may carry out a vulnerability assessment as provided for in Articles 10(1), point (c), and Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and Council57, with a view to providing the necessary support to the Member State concerned. On the basis of the results of that assessment or any other relevant vulnerability assessment or the attribution of a critical impact level to the border section concerned within the meaning of Article 35(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency shall make recommendations, in accordance with Article 41(1) of that Regulation to any Member State concerned.

6 . The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 concerning additional measures governing surveillance, including the development of standards for border surveillance, in particular the use of surveillance and monitoring technologies at the external borders, taking into account the type of borders, the impact levels attributed to each external border section in accordance with Article 34 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and other relevant factors.’

7. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 concerning additional measures governing surveillance, including the development of standards for border surveillance, in particular the use of surveillance and monitoring technologies at the external borders, taking into account the type of borders, the impact levels attributed to each external border section in accordance with Article 34 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and other relevant factors.’

Reason

The proposed measures to intensify border surveillance should be used only as a last resort, and only in cases where instrumentalisation has been officially acknowledged to exist by the European Council. The deleted text referring to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency repeats the exact text of Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and is therefore superfluous.

Amendment 26

Article 1, point (5)

Text proposed by the European Commission

Amendment

(5)	Article 23 is replaced by the following:

(5)	Article 23 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 23

Exercise of public powers

The absence of border control at internal borders shall not affect:

a)	the exercise of police or other public powers by the competent authorities of the Member States in their territory, including in their internal border areas, as conferred on them under national law, insofar as the exercise of those powers does not have an effect equivalent to border checks.

a)	the exercise of police or other public powers by the competent authorities of the Member States in their territory, including in their internal border areas, as conferred on them under national law, insofar as the exercise of those powers does not have an effect equivalent to border checks.

The exercise by competent authorities of their powers may not, in particular, be considered equivalent to the exercise of border checks when the measures:

i)	do not have border control as an objective;

ii)	are based on general information and experience of the competent authorities regarding possible threats to public security or public policy and aim, in particular, to:

i)	do not have border control as an objective;

ii)	are based on general information and experience of the competent authorities regarding possible threats to public security or public policy and aim, in particular, to:

—	combat cross-border crime;

—	combat irregular residence or stay, linked to irregular migration; or

—	combat cross-border crime;

—	combat irregular residence or stay, linked to irregular migration , provided that verifications of identity, nationality and residence status are non-systematic and carried out on the basis of a continuous risk analysis ; or

—	contain the spread of an infectious disease with epidemic potential as detected by the European Centre for Disease Control;

—	contain the spread of an infectious disease with epidemic potential as detected by the European Centre for Disease Control;

iii)	are devised and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders, including where they are conducted at transport hubs or directly on board of passenger services and when they are based on risk analysis;

iv)	are carried out, where appropriate, on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory, for the purposes of addressing threats to public security or public policy as set out under ii);

iii)	are devised and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders, including where they are conducted at transport hubs or directly on board of passenger services and when they are based on risk analysis;

iv)	are carried out, where appropriate, on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory, for the purposes of addressing threats to public security or public policy as set out under ii);

the possibility for a Member State to carry out security checks on persons carried out at transport hubs by the competent authorities under the law of each Member State, by their competent authorities or by carriers, provided that such checks are also carried out on persons travelling within a Member State;

c)	the possibility for a Member State to provide by law for an obligation to hold or carry papers and documents;

c)	the possibility for a Member State to provide by law for an obligation to hold or carry papers and documents;

the possibility for a Member State to provide by law for an obligation on third-country nationals to report their presence on its territory pursuant to the provisions of Article 22 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (“the Schengen Convention”);

e)	checks for security purposes of passenger data against relevant databases on persons traveling in the area without controls at internal borders which can be carried out by the competent authorities under the applicable law.’

e)	checks for security purposes of passenger data against relevant databases on persons traveling in the area without controls at internal borders which can be carried out by the competent authorities under the applicable law.’

Reason

Alignment of the text to the wording of recital 20. Checks to combat irregular migration across borders are per se checks that aim at achieving the result of border controls and may therefore not be exempted from being regarded as controls at internal borders. The insertion is an unwarranted extension of Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code currently in force. Achieving an area in which the free movement of persons across internal borders is ensured is one of the main achievements of the Union. Given the impact that such measures of last resort may have on all persons having the right to move within the area without internal border controls, the conditions and procedures for reintroducing such measures should be provided for, in order to ensure that they are exceptional and justified, and that the principle of proportionality is respected.

Amendment 27

Article 1, point (6)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(6)	The following Article 23a is inserted:

‘Article 23a

Procedure for transferring persons apprehended at the internal borders

1. This Article applies to the apprehension of a third-country national in the vicinity of internal borders, in circumstances where all of the following conditions are fulfilled:

a)	the third country national concerned does not or no longer fulfils the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1);

b)	the third country national is not covered by the derogation laid down in Article 6(5) point (a);

c)	the third country national is apprehended as part of cross-border police operational cooperation, in particular, during joint police patrols;

there are clear indications that the third country national has arrived directly from another Member State, on the basis of information immediately available to the apprehending authorities, including statements from the person concerned, identity, travel or other documents found on that person or the results of searches carried out in relevant national and Union databases.

2. The competent authorities of the Member State may, based on a finding that the third country national concerned has no right to stay on its territory, decide to immediately transfer the person to the Member State from which the person entered or sought to enter, in accordance with the procedure set out in Annex XII.

3. Where a Member State applies the procedure referred to in paragraph 2, the receiving Member State shall be required to take all measures necessary to receive the third country national concerned in accordance with the procedures set out in Annex XII.

4. From [one year following the entry into force of the Regulation] and annually thereafter, Member States shall submit to the Commission the data recorded in accordance with point 3 of Annex XII, regarding the application of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.’

Reason

As per recitals 25 to 27.

Amendment 28

Article 1, point (8)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(8)	Article 25 is replaced by the following:

(8)	Article 25 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 25

General framework for the temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. Where, in the area without internal border controls, there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State, that Member State may exceptionally reintroduce border controls at all or specific parts of its internal borders.

A serious threat to public policy or internal security may be considered to arise from, in particular:

(a)	activities relating to terrorism or organised crime;

(a)	activities relating to terrorism or organised crime;

(b)	large scale public health emergencies;

(b)	large scale public health emergencies;

(c)	a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third-country nationals between the Member States, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control;

(c)	large scale or high profile international events such as sporting, trade or political events.

(d)	large scale or high profile international events such as sporting, trade or political events.

2. Border controls may only be introduced pursuant to Articles 25a and 28 where a Member State has established that such a measure is necessary and proportionate, taking into account the criteria referred to in Article 26(1), and, in case such controls are prolonged, also the criteria referred to in Article 26(2). Border controls may also be reintroduced in accordance with Article 29, taking into account the criteria referred to in Article 30.

In all cases, border controls at internal borders shall be reintroduced as a measure of last resort. The scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat identified.

3. Where the same threat continues to persist, border controls at internal borders may be prolonged in accordance with Articles 25a, 28 or 29.

The same threat shall be considered to exist where the justification advanced by the Member State for prolonging border controls is based on the determination of the continuation of the same threat that had justified the initial reintroduction of the border controls. ’

Reason

The introduction of letter c) goes against the rationale of the specific mechanism proposed under Article 28 and against the principle of subsidiarity. A situation characterised by large-scale unauthorised movements of third-country nationals between Member States should not be included as constituting a serious threat to public policy or internal security justifying the reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders by that individual Member State, as its inclusion under the general framework is incompatible and contradictory to the proposal’s objective as well as to the proper application of the principle of subsidiarity. To quote the proposal COM(2021) 891 itself:

‘Action in the area of freedom, security and justice falls within an area of competence shared between the EU and the Member States in accordance with Article 4(2) TFEU. Therefore, the subsidiarity principle is applicable by virtue of Article 5(3) TEU, according to which the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.

The objectives of this proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting alone, and can be better achieved at the level of the Union. This is because they concern checks on persons at the external borders which are a precondition of the area without controls at internal borders. Furthermore, the integrity of the Schengen area and the need to ensure uniform conditions for exercising the right to free movement require a coherent approach across the entire Schengen area to confidence-building measures at the external borders, including on restrictions for non-essential travel to the EU and response to instrumentalisation of migrants by the authorities of third countries.

The absence of any controls at internal borders is guaranteed by the Treaty in Article 77(2)(e) TFEU. While Member States retain the right to take actions in order to respond to internal security and public policy, and thus to exercise the right guaranteed in Article 72 TFEU even if this means reintroducing internal border controls, the rules for such temporary reintroductions have been set out in the Schengen Borders Code in order to ensure that they are applied only under strict conditions. Therefore, any changes concerning these conditions for reintroduction of border controls at internal borders require EU legislation.

The objective of establishing a contingency planning for Schengen, including specific measures at internal borders to address a threat affecting a majority of Member States at the same time and to mitigate the negative impacts of border controls where they have become inevitable, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting alone, and can be better achieved at the level of the Union.’

Given that a situation under the proposed Article 25(1)(c) refers to movements between the Member States, which might, in fact, affect the majority of Member States, in order to comply with the principle of subsidiarity, it needs to be addressed at the Union level as proposed under Article 28 and be subject to the Council’s implementing decision.

Deletion of subparagraph 3 as per recitals 34, 35 and 45.

Amendment 29

Article 1, point (9)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(9)	A new Article 25a is inserted after Article 25:

(9)	A new Article 25a is inserted after Article 25:

‘Article 25a

Procedure for cases requiring action due to unforeseeable or foreseeable events

1. Where a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State is unforeseeable and requires immediate action, the Member State may, on an exceptional basis, immediately reintroduce border control at internal borders.

2. The Member State shall, at the same time as reintroducing border control under paragraph 1, notify the Commission and the other Member States of the reintroduction of border controls, in accordance with Article 27(1).

3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, border control at internal borders may be immediately reintroduced for a limited period of up to one month. If the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond that period, the Member State may prolong the border control at internal borders for further periods, leading to a maximum duration not exceeding three months.

4. Where a serious threat to public policy or internal security is foreseeable in a Member State, the Member State shall notify the Commission and the other Member States and the Commission in accordance with Article 27(1), at the latest four weeks before the planned reintroduction of border controls, or within a shorter period where the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce border controls at internal borders become known less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction.

5. For the purposes of paragraph 4, and without prejudice to Article 27a(4), border control at internal borders may be reintroduced for a period of up to six months. Where the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond that period, the Member State may prolong the border control at internal borders for renewable periods of up to six months.

5. For the purposes of paragraph 4, border control at internal borders may be reintroduced for a period of up to six months. Where a threat of a new nature to public policy or internal security occurs beyond that period, the Member State may prolong the border control at internal borders for renewable periods of up to six months.

Any prolongation shall be notified to the Commission and the other Member States in accordance with Article 27 and within the time limits referred to in paragraph 4. Subject to Article 27a(5), the maximum duration of border control at internal borders shall not exceed two years.

Any prolongation shall be notified to the Commission and the other Member States in accordance with Article 27 and within the time limits referred to in paragraph 4. The maximum duration of border control at internal borders shall not exceed two years.

6. The period referred to in paragraph 5 shall not include periods referred to in paragraph 3.’

6. The period referred to in paragraph 5 shall include periods referred to in paragraph 3.’

Reason

Controls at internal borders should not exceed 24 months in total. According to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Joined Cases C-368/20 and C-369/20), the Schengen Borders Code must be interpreted as precluding border controls at internal borders from being temporarily reintroduced by a Member State on the basis of Articles 25 and 27 of that Code where the duration of its reintroduction exceeds the maximum total duration of six months, and no threat of a new nature occurs that would justify applying afresh the periods provided for in Article 25.

Amendment 30

Article 1, point (10)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(10)	Article 26 is replaced by the following:

(10)	Article 26 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 26

Criteria for the temporary reintroduction and prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. To establish whether the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is necessary and proportionate in accordance with Article 25, a Member State shall in particular consider:

(a)

the appropriateness of the measure of reintroducing border controls at internal border, having regard to the nature of the serious threat identified and in particular, whether the reintroduction of border controls at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat to public policy or internal security;

(a)	the use of alternative measures such as proportionate checks carried out in the context of the lawful exercise of powers as referred to in Article 23 point (a);

(b)	the likely impact of such a measure on:

(b)

—	movement of persons within the area without internal border control and

—	the functioning of the cross-border regions, taking into account the strong social and economic ties between them.

(c)	the likely impact of such a measure on:

—	movement of persons within the area without internal border control and

—	the functioning of the cross-border regions, taking into account the strong social and economic ties between them.

2. Where a Member State decides to prolong the border control at internal borders pursuant to Article 25a(5), it shall also assess in detail whether the objectives pursued by such prolongation could be attained by:

a)	the use of alternative measures such as proportionate checks carried out in the context of the lawful exercise of powers as referred to in Article 23 point (a);

a)	the use of alternative measures such as proportionate checks carried out in the context of the lawful exercise of powers as referred to in Article 23 point (a);

b)	the use of the procedure as referred to in Article 23a;

b )	forms of police cooperation as provided for under Union law, including on matters such as joint patrols, joint operations, joint investigation teams, cross-border hot pursuits, or cross-border surveillance.

c)	forms of police cooperation as provided for under Union law, including on matters such as joint patrols, joint operations, joint investigation teams, cross-border hot pursuits, or cross-border surveillance.

3. Where border controls at internal borders have been reintroduced or prolonged, the Member States concerned shall, where necessary, ensure that they are accompanied by appropriate measures that mitigate the impacts resulting from the reintroduction of border controls on persons and the transport of goods, giving particular consideration to the cross-border regions.’

Reason

To achieve the objectives of the proposal, it is essential that alternative measures are already considered at a stage prior to reintroducing border controls, not only at the stage of prolongation.

Article 23a is suggested to be deleted and therefore has to be deleted from Article 26 as well.

Amendment 31

Article 1, point (11)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(11)	Article 27 is replaced by the following:

(11)	Article 27 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 27

Notification of temporary reintroduction of internal border controls and risk assessment

1. Notifications by Member States of the reintroduction or prolongation of internal border controls shall contain the following information:

(a)	the reasons for the reintroduction or prolongation, including all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat to its public policy or internal security;

(a)	the reasons for the reintroduction or prolongation, including all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat to its public policy or internal security , and reasons as to why alternative measures were not appropriate ;

(b)	the scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control is to be reintroduced, or prolonged;

(b)	the scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control is to be reintroduced, or prolonged;

(c)	the names of the authorised crossing-points;

(c)	the names of the authorised crossing-points;

(d)	the date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation;

(d)	the date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation;

(e)	the considerations as to the necessity and proportionality referred to in Article 26(1) and, in the case of a prolongation, in Article 26(2);

(e)	the considerations as to the necessity and proportionality referred to in Article 26(1) and, in the case of a prolongation, in Article 26(2);

(f)	where appropriate, the measures to be taken by the other Member States.

(f)	where appropriate, the measures to be taken by the other Member States.

A notification may be submitted jointly by two or more Member States.

The notification shall be provided in accordance with a template to be established by the Commission by an implementing act and to be made available online. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 38(2)."

The notification shall be provided in accordance with a template to be established by the Commission by an implementing act and to be made available online. The template should include the position of the authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h). That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 38(2).

2. Where border controls have been in place for six months in accordance with Article 25a(4), any subsequent notification for the prolongation of such controls shall include a risk assessment. The risk assessment shall present the scale and anticipated evolution of the identified serious threat, in particular how long the identified serious threat is expected to persist and which sections of the internal borders may be affected, as well as information regarding coordination measures with the other Member States impacted or likely to be impacted by such measures.

2. Where border controls have been in place for six months in accordance with Article 25a(4), any subsequent notification for the prolongation of such controls shall include a risk assessment. The risk assessment shall present the scale and anticipated evolution of the identified serious threat, in particular how long the identified serious threat is expected to persist and which sections of the internal borders may be affected, as well as information regarding coordination measures with the other Member States and cross-border regions impacted or likely to be impacted by such measures.

3. Where the reintroduction of border controls or its prolongation refers to large scale unauthorised movements referred to in Article 25(1) point (b), the risk assessment shall also provide information on the scale and trends of such unauthorised movements, including any information obtained from the relevant EU agencies in line with their respective mandates and data analysis from relevant information systems.

4. The Member State concerned shall upon request by the Commission, provide any further information, including on the coordination measures with the Member States affected by the planned prolongation of border control at internal borders as well as further information needed to assess the possible use of measures referred to in Article 23 and 23a.

5. Member States submitting a notification under paragraphs 1 or 2 may, where necessary and in accordance with national law, decide to classify all or parts of the notified information.

Such classification shall not preclude access to information, through appropriate and secure police cooperation channels, by the other Member States affected by the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders.’

Reason

Alignment with the preceding amendment.

Amendment 32

Article 1, point (12)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(12)	The following Article 27a is inserted:

(12)	The following Article 27a is inserted:

‘Article 27a

Consultation with the Member States and opinion of the Commission

1. Following receipt of notifications, submitted under Article 27(1), the Commission may establish a consultation process, where appropriate, including joint meetings between the Member State that is planning to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders, and the other Member States, especially those directly affected by such measures and the relevant Union agencies.

1. Following receipt of notifications, submitted under Article 27(1), the Commission shall establish a consultation process, where appropriate, including joint meetings between the Member State that is planning to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders, and the other Member States, especially those directly affected by such measures, the European Parliament, the European Committee of the Regions and the relevant Union agencies.

The consultation shall concern in particular the identified threat to public policy or internal security, the relevance of the intended reintroduction of border controls taking into account the appropriateness of alternative measures, as well as the ways of ensuring implementation of the mutual cooperation between the Member States in relation to the reintroduced border controls.

The Member State planning to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders shall take utmost account of the results of such consultation when carrying out border control at the internal border.

2. Following the receipt of notifications, submitted in relation to the reintroduction or prolongation of border controls at internal borders, the Commission or any other Member State may, without prejudice to Article 72 TFEU, issue an opinion, if, based on the information contained in the notification and risk assessment, where appropriate, or any additional information, they have concerns as regards the necessity or proportionality of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders.

3. Following receipt of notifications submitted in relation to a prolongation of border control at the internal border under Article 25a(4) which leads to the continuation of border controls at internal borders for 12 months in total, the Commission shall issue an opinion on necessity and proportionality of such internal border controls. This opinion should also be informed by the position of the affected authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1) point (h) included in the notification.

4. Where an opinion referred to in paragraphs 2 or 3 is issued, the Commission may establish a consultation process in order to discuss the opinion with the Member States. Where the Commission or a Member State issues an opinion expressing concerns on the necessity or proportionality of reintroduced internal border controls the Commission shall launch such a process.

4. Where an opinion referred to in paragraphs 2 or 3 is issued, the Commission shall establish a consultation process in order to discuss the opinion with the Member States. Where the Commission or a Member State issues an opinion expressing concerns on the necessity or proportionality of reintroduced internal border controls the Commission shall launch such a process.

5. Where a Member State considers that there are exceptional situations justifying the continued need for internal border controls in excess of the maximum period referred to in Article 25(5), it shall notify the Commission in accordance with Article 27(2). The new notification from the Member State shall substantiate the continued threat to public policy or internal security, taking into account the opinion of the Commission given pursuant to paragraph 3. The Commission shall issue a follow up opinion.’

5. Where a Member State considers that there are exceptional situations justifying the continued need for internal border controls in excess of the maximum period referred to in Article 25 a (5), it shall notify the Commission in accordance with Article 27(2). The new notification from the Member State shall substantiate the continued threat to public policy or internal security, taking into account the opinion of the Commission given pursuant to paragraph 3. The Commission shall issue a follow up opinion.’

Reason

It is essential that the European Commission assesses swiftly the necessity and proportionality of prolonged internal border controls and that its recommendations are informed by the position of the affected authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h). In the process, the European Parliament and the European Committee of the Regions should be consulted. Furthermore, reference to the prolongation of border controls at internal borders is covered in Article 25a(5)and this needs to be corrected.

Amendment 33

Article 1, point (13)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(13)	Article 28 is replaced by the following:

(13)	Article 28 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 28

Specific mechanism where the serious threat to public policy or internal security puts at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border controls

1. Where the Commission, establishes that the same serious threat to internal security or public policy affects a majority of Member States, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border, it may, make a proposal to the Council to adopt an implementing decision authorising the reintroduction of border controls by Member States where the available measures referred to in Article s 23 and 23a are not sufficient to address the threat.

2. The decision shall cover a period of up to six months and may be renewed, upon proposal from the Commission, for further periods of up to six months as long as the threat persists , taking into account the review referred to in paragraph 5.

2. The decision shall cover a period of up to six months and may be renewed, if the threat persists, upon proposal from the Commission, for further periods of up to six months and a total of 24 months , taking into account the review referred to in paragraph 5.

3. Where Member States reintroduce or prolong border controls because of the threat referred to in paragraph 1, those controls shall, as of the entry into force of the Council decision, be based on that decision.

4. The decision of the Council referred to in paragraph 1 shall also refer to any appropriate mitigating measures that shall be established at national and Union level in order to minimise the impacts caused by the reintroduction of border controls.

5. The Commission shall review the evolution of the identified threat as well as the impact of the measures adopted in accordance with the Council decision referred to in paragraph 1, with a view to assess whether the measures remain justified.

6. Member States shall immediately notify the Commission and the other Member States in the Council of a reintroduction of border controls in accordance with the decision referred to in paragraph 1.

7. The Commission may issue a recommendation indicating other measures as referred to in Articl es 23 and 23a that could complement internal border controls or be more suitable to address the identified threat to internal security or public policy as referred to in paragraph 1.’

7. The Commission may issue a recommendation indicating other measures as referred to in Article 23 that could complement internal border controls or be more suitable to address the identified threat to internal security or public policy as referred to in paragraph 1. Such recommendation should also be informed by the position of the affected authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h) .’

Reason

To ensure consideration of the positions of the local and regional authorities in the cross-border regions and compliance with the provisions set out in the proposal, the uniform format of the report ought to include a section on the position of the affected authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h). Moreover, a fixed upper limit is necessary in order to avoid quasi-permanent controls at internal borders.

Amendment 34

Article 1, point (14)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(14)	Article 31 is amended as follows:

(14)	Article 31 is amended as follows:

a)	Article 31 becomes paragraph 1;

a)	Article 31 becomes paragraph 1;

b)	the following paragraph 2 is added:

b)	the following paragraph 2 is added:

‘2. Where a Member State notifies the Commission and the other Member States of the reintroduction of border controls in accordance with Article 27(1), it shall at the same time inform the European Parliament and the Council of the following:

a)	the details of the internal borders where border control is to be reintroduced;

b)	the reasons for the proposed reintroduction;

c)	the names of the authorised crossing-points;

d)	the date and duration of the planned reintroduction;

e)	where appropriate, the measures to be taken by the other Member State.

a)	the details of the internal borders where border control is to be reintroduced;

b)	the reasons for the proposed reintroduction;

c)	the names of the authorised crossing-points;

d)	the date and duration of the planned reintroduction;

e)	where appropriate, the measures to be taken by the other Member State.

3. The provision of information may be subject to classification of information by Member States pursuant to Article 27(4).

Member States shall not be required to provide all the information referred to in the paragraph 2 in cases justified on public security grounds.

Member States shall not be required to provide all the information referred to in the paragraph 2 in exceptional cases justified on severe public security grounds.

The classification of information shall not preclude information from being made available by the Commission to the European Parliament. The transmission and handling of information and documents transmitted to the European Parliament under this Article shall comply with rules concerning the forwarding and handling of classified information which are applicable between the European Parliament and the Commission.’

Reason

Exceptions to transparency should be very limited in scope.

Amendment 35

Article 1, point (15)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(15)	Article 33 is replaced by the following:

(15)	Article 33 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 33

Report on the reintroduction of border control at internal borders

Reports on the reintroduction of border control at internal borders

1. Within four weeks of the lifting of border control at internal borders, Member States which have carried out border controls at internal borders shall present a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the reintroduction and, where applicable, the prolongation of border control at internal borders.

1. Every four weeks while border controls are conducted at internal borders and within four weeks of the lifting of border control at internal borders, Member States which are carrying out border controls at internal borders shall present reports to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the reintroduction and, where applicable, the prolongation of border control at internal borders.

2. Without prejudice to the first paragraph 1, where border controls are prolonged as referred to in Article 25a(5), the Member State concerned shall submit a report at the expiry of 12 months and every 12 months thereafter if border control is exceptionally maintained.

3. The report shall outline, in particular, the initial and follow-up assessment of the necessity of border controls and the respect of the criteria referred to in Articles 26, the operation of the checks, the practical cooperation with neighbouring Member States, the resulting impact on the movement of persons in particular in the cross-border regions, the effectiveness of the reintroduction of border control at internal borders, including an ex-post assessment of the proportionality of the reintroduction of border control.

3. The reports shall outline, in particular, the initial and follow-up assessment of the necessity of border controls and the respect of the criteria referred to in Articles 26, the operation of the checks, the practical cooperation with neighbouring Member States, the resulting impact on the movement of persons in particular in the cross-border regions, the effectiveness of the reintroduction of border control at internal borders, including an ongoing assessment of the proportionality of the reintroduction of border control.

4. The Commission shall adopt a uniform format for such report and make it available online.

4. The Commission shall adopt a uniform format for such reports and make it available online. The report shall include a section on the position of the affected authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h).

5. The Commission may issue an opinion on that ex-post assessment of the temporary reintroduction of border control at one or more internal borders or at parts thereof.

5. The Commission shall issue an opinion on that ongoing assessment of the temporary reintroduction of border control at one or more internal borders or at parts thereof.

6. The Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council, at least annually, a report on the functioning of the area without internal border control entitled (“State of Schengen report”). The report shall include a list of all decisions to reintroduce border control at internal borders taken during the relevant year. It shall also include information on the trends within the Schengen area as regards the unauthorised movements of third country nationals, taking into account available information from the relevant Union agencies, data analysis from relevant information systems and an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the reintroductions of border controls in the period covered by that report.’

Reason

To ensure consideration of the positions of local and regional authorities in cross-border regions and compliance with the provisions set out in the proposal, the uniform format of the report ought to include a section on the position of the affected authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h).

The necessity and proportionality of reintroduced border controls at internal borders shall be carried out on a regular basis and be subject to a mandatory assessment by the Commission during and after the controls.

As controls at internal borders should only be conducted under exceptional circumstances and be a measure of last resort, close monitoring and evaluation should be done from the beginning of such measures. The four week timespan proposed here is in alignment with the timespan foreseen for post factum reporting.

Amendment 36

Article 1, point (19)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(19)	A new ANNEX XII is added: ‘ANNEX XII PART A Procedure for transferring persons apprehended at the internal borders [1. — 7.] PART B Standard form for transferring persons apprehended at the internal borders […]’

Reason

As a result of the suggested deletion of Article 23a, Annex XII also needs to be deleted.

Amendment 37

Article 2(1)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

1. Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC is replaced by the following:

‘3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is taken back by another Member State in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 23a of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council (*1) or under bilateral agreements or arrangements.

The Member State which has taken back the third-country national concerned in accordance with the first subparagraph shall issue a return decision in accordance with paragraph 1. In such cases, the derogation laid down in the first subparagraph shall not apply.

Member States shall without delay notify any existing, amended or new bilateral agreements or arrangements to the Commission.’

Reason

As a result of the suggested deletion of Article 23a, the amendments proposed to Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC also need to be deleted. The reasoning for the proposed deletion of recitals 25 and 26 applies. Additionally, the large-scale reliance on bilateral agreements between Member States which would be necessary for the implementation of such transfers may undermine European solidarity. Furthermore, in accordance with the opinion of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union (6357/21, 19.2.2021) explaining in detail the ‘variable geometry’ between the Schengen and Dublin acquis in relation to the proposals under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, return-related provisions could be re-included in the proposal for the recast of the Return Directive (as proposed by the Commission in 2018, a proposal which is currently still on the Council’s table). Alternatively, such provisions could be part of a proposal to amend the Return Directive. Including an amendment to the Return Directive through the revised Schengen Borders Code is not in line with the European Commission’s commitment to better regulation.

II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

welcomes the Commission’s proposal for amendment of the Schengen Borders Code, both regarding the proposed uniformly applicable measures aimed at the protection of external borders, as well as the redefined criteria and procedural safeguards for the reintroduction and prolongation of internal border controls, in particular as they recognise the importance of cross-border cooperation;

welcomes the Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Responding to state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants at the EU external border, adopted on 23 November 2021, which, together with the Renewed EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2021-2025) (6), addresses the phenomenon of instrumentalisation for the first time;

agrees with the need for a better functioning Schengen area framework and with external border control being in the interest of all Member States; recognises that the effective control of the EU’s external borders is an important integral part of a comprehensive EU policy on migration;

underlines that as it stands, the proposed definition of the concept of instrumentalisation in the Schengen Borders Code is overly broad and unclear, leaving room for misinterpretations, thus potentially leading to insufficiently justified derogations from minimum standards guaranteed by the common rules on international protection. Points out by the same token that the impact assessment accompanying the proposal ‘does not look into the instrumentalisation of irregular migration, which has manifested in the summer at the land borders with Belarus, i.e. after the work on this document has been completed’ (7). Therefore, the accompanying impact assessment is incomplete and does not contribute sufficiently in a manner that ensures that the resulting proposal fulfils the intended objective of Better Regulation Guidelines, that is, the delivery of ‘the full benefits of policies at minimum cost, while upholding the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’ (8);

stresses that complementary and preventive policy measures should also be directed at the countries of origin of instrumentalised migrants as well as the third-country governments responsible for instrumentalisation in order to avoid merely penalising people who become victims of such actions. While the humanitarian needs of instrumentalised migrants should remain a priority, sanctions and other restrictive measures should target those involved in or contributing to activities of the instrumentalising regime that facilitate the illegal crossings of the external borders of the Union, as well as those of migrants’ smugglers abusing human rights, or those otherwise involved in trafficking in human beings;

points out that the instrumentalisation regulation raises concerns with regard to compliance with the principle of proportionality under Article 5(4) TEU, according to which the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. The proposal risks allowing for derogations from uniform EU asylum law and exceeding what is necessary to achieve the EU foreign and security policy objective of stopping a third country from instrumentalising migrants;

calls on the European Commission to thoroughly rework the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum (Instrumentalisation Regulation) (9), in line with its Better Regulation Guidelines and good law-making principles, and to revise its proposal of the revised Schengen Borders Code accordingly, in line with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality under Article 5 TEU. Given that the proposed Instrumentalisation Regulation is conditional upon adoption of other proposals under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum and furthermore, that it was not accompanied by an impact assessment, the Committee refrains from suggesting any legislative amendments to the aforementioned proposal for a regulation;

points out that, by allowing derogations from the uniform application of EU asylum law for individual Member States, the instrumentalisation regulation risks undermining the very objective of the proposed New Pact on Migration and Asylum, that is, achieving a coherent, uniform and integrated Common European Asylum System, which can only be sufficiently achieved at the level of the Union. In particular, the Committee is highly sceptical of the proposed provisional measures because they fall short of the protection granted by the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, which guarantees protection against refoulement, effective access to a status determination procedure, the right to asylum, the right to liberty, the right to effective judicial protection and the right to dignity;

points to its opinion on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (10) and its opposition to the unnecessary prolongation of the asylum border procedures, which would be extended even further under the proposed instrumentalisation regulation together with other restrictions making the right to claim asylum even more difficult to exercise;

10.

cautions therefore against the extensive possibilities to apply an accelerated border procedure without consideration of personal circumstances other than particular health issues; warns to this effect against the excessively lengthy period granted to Member States for registering an asylum application and granting access to their territory, which is likely to result in large-scale deprivation of liberty, amounting to unlawful de facto detention at the external borders;

11.

deplores by the same token the fact that withholding the automatic suspensive effect of appeals in the ‘emergency migration and asylum management procedure’ and lowering reception standards to the bare minimum, which itself is not further defined in the proposal, risks failing to address particular needs of asylum seekers;

12.

emphasises the fact that the proposal for a Council Decision on provisional emergency measures for the benefit of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which the proposed instrumentalisation regulation mirrors, has not progressed in the Council negotiations either; points out that flexibility already exists for Member States under the current legal framework to deal with changing events at their border;

13.

points out that the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 and the subsequent exodus of Ukrainians and people residing in the country demonstrated the importance of effective and humane management of the EU’s external borders. Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary faced a major challenge related, on the one hand, to maintaining security at the border and on the other hand, to managing the migration of hundreds of thousands of people having left Ukraine and seeking refuge in EU Member States. The armed conflict in Ukraine also highlighted the great importance of intra-EU and extra-EU cross-border cooperation, particularly in the context of providing humanitarian assistance.

14.

applauds the Member States for staying united and activating the Temporary Protection Directive for the benefit of all Ukrainian refugees, and not derogating from asylum law standards, which would be the case should the instrumentalisation regulation apply; stresses that the complexity of the situation demands a coordinated approach which respects human rights and the right to asylum and is based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility with the Member States and the regions that are most affected by this situation; is proud that the current response has been solidarity by governments and citizens alike;

15.

agrees that internal border controls should always be a measure of last resort and emphasises the fact that the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders severely jeopardises the ability of neighbouring regions to cooperate with each other, and has severe impacts on regional economies;

16.

stresses that cross-border cooperation is at the very heart of the European integration project and one of the biggest successes of the European Union. It is at the borders that the real benefits of European integration are being experienced by citizens. Cross-border cooperation fosters contacts between regions’ residents, stimulates development and directly improves the quality of life of local communities;

17.

points out that the COVID-19 pandemic has been one of the biggest setbacks for cross-border cooperation in the past decades, but even before the pandemic, many border regions were already struggling with a multitude of unique regional obstacles, such as cross-border transport and connectivity as well as bureaucratic hurdles for citizens and businesses as the biggest obstacles faced in their territories;

18.

welcomes the confirmation that the absence of border control at internal borders shall not affect the exercise of police or other public powers by the competent authorities, in so far as they do not have an effect equivalent to border checks;

19.

welcomes the stricter criteria for the temporary reintroduction and prolongation of border control at internal borders, and in particular the requirement to consider their likely impact on the functioning of the cross-border regions, taking into account the strong social and economic ties between them;

20.

considers, however, that the use of alternative measures should also be included under the criteria for reintroduction of border controls, and not only for their prolongation;

21.

recommends that controls at internal borders should strictly be limited to a maximum of 24 months in total;

22.

recommends that a notification by a Member State of temporary reintroduction of internal border controls ought to include reasons as to why alternative measures are not appropriate and the position of the authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1)(h);

23.

welcomes the requirement for mitigating measures to accompany the reintroduction or prolongation of border controls with a particular consideration for the cross-border regions; such consideration should be based on consultation with the authority or authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1)(h);

24.

welcomes the references to ‘competent authorities’ as a recognition of public powers of administrative units at regional and local level;

25.

calls for extensive consultations by the European Commission with the relevant actors, including at the local and regional level, before proposing delegated acts under the new Schengen framework;

26.

cautions against the discretionary use of border checks which would, in substance, amount to internal border controls;

27.

agrees that the subsidiarity principle is applicable by virtue of Article 5(3) TEU, and the Union shall act as the objectives of the proposed action — the integrity of the Schengen area and the need to ensure uniform conditions for exercising the right to free movement — cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level;

28.

agrees that, while irregular migratory flows should not, per se, be considered as a threat to public policy or internal security, they may require additional measures to ensure the functioning of the Schengen area;

29.

disagrees, however, that a situation characterised by large-scale unauthorised movements of third-country nationals between the Member States should be included as a possible justification for the reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders by an individual Member State, as this contradicts the objective of the proposal and the proper application of the principle of subsidiarity. Given that such a situation refers to movements between the Member States, in order to comply with the principle of subsidiarity, it needs to be addressed at the Union level as proposed under Article 28;

30.

recommends that the reintroduction of border controls in a situation characterised by large-scale unauthorised movements of third-country nationals between the Member States should fall solely under the specific mechanism proposed under Article 28 and be subject to the Council’s implementing decision;

31.

recommends that monitoring and reporting should start in due course when controls at internal borders are introduced and not be limited to post factum analysis and reporting;

32.

welcomes the consultation process introduced under Article 27a and asks for authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1)(h) to be able to submit observations to the Member State notifications which directly concern their administrative unit;

33.

points out that a risk assessment to be submitted by a Member State in case of prolongation of border controls ought to include the results of consultations with authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h);

34.

asks the Commission to base its opinion on the necessity and proportionality of border controls also on consultation with the authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h);

35.

similarly, asks the Commission, when issuing a recommendation indicating other measures as referred to in Article 23 that could complement internal border controls or be more suitable to address the identified threat to internal security or public policy, to base its recommendation also on consultations with the authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h);

36.

asks, in order to ensure that the views of the cross-border regions are taken into consideration at all stages, for the post factum analysis presented by a Member State as a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to include the position of the authorities governing the local administrative areas considered as the cross-border regions under Article 39(1), point (h);

37.

finally, supports the envisaged enlargement of the Schengen area to include Croatia as of 1 January 2023. Furthermore, the CoR calls for the enlargement of the Schengen area to include Bulgaria and Romania, provided that they effectively implement the Schengen acquis. The Committee shares the conviction of the European Commission expressed in its Communication ‘A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area’ that ‘all three countries joining Schengen in full will increase security in the EU as a whole, as these countries will then be able to fully exploit the tools available [… and] their accession is finally crucial for a reinforced mutual trust in the Schengen area’ (11).

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1).

(2) Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98).

(3) Overview provided in the European Commission Communication on the EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2021-2025, COM(2021) 171 final.

(4) Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 60).

(5) Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 96).

(6) COM(2021) 591 final.

(7) SWD(2021) 463 final.

(8) SWD(2021) 305 final.

(9) COM(2021) 890 final.

(10) COR-2020-04843

(11) COM(2021) 277 final.

30.12.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 498/154

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Industrial Emissions Directive

(2022/C 498/16)

Rapporteur:

Jean-Noël VERFAILLIE (FR/RE), Mayor of Marly

Reference documents:

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste

COM(2022) 156

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on reporting of environmental data from industrial installations and establishing an Industrial Emissions Portal

COM(2022) 157

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS

COM(2022) 156

Amendment 1

Recital 16

Text proposed by the European Commission

Amendment

(16)

The contribution of Directive 2010/75/EU to resource and energy efficiency and circular economy in the Union should be made more effective, taking into consideration the ‘Energy Efficiency First’ as a guiding principle of the Union energy policy. Therefore, the permits should establish , where possible, mandatory environmental performance limit values on consumption and resource efficiency levels, including on the use of water, energy and recycled materials, based on the environmental performance levels associated with the best available techniques (BAT AEPLs) set out in decisions on BAT conclusions.

(16)

The contribution of Directive 2010/75/EU to resource and energy efficiency and circular economy in the Union should be made more effective, taking into consideration the ‘Energy Efficiency First’ as a guiding principle of the Union energy policy. Therefore, the competent authorities are considering establishing , where possible, mandatory environmental performance limit values on consumption and resource efficiency levels, including on the use of water, energy and recycled materials, based on the environmental performance levels associated with the best available techniques (BAT AEPLs) set out in decisions on BAT conclusions.

Reason

Technical amendment to align recital with the changes proposed to the relevant article.

Amendment 2

Recital 25

Text proposed by the European Commission

Amendment

(25)

Achieving Union objectives regarding a clean, circular and climate neutral economy by 2050 calls for a deep transformation of the Union economy. Consistently with the 8th Environmental Action Programme, operators of installations covered by Directive 2010/75/EU should therefore be required to include transformation plans in their environmental management systems. Such transformation plans will also complement the Corporate Sustainability Reporting requirements under Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) by providing a means for concrete implementation of these requirements at installation level. The first priority is the transformation of energy-intensive activities listed in Annex I. Therefore, the operators of energy-intensive installations should produce transformation plans by 30 June 2030. Operators of installations carrying out other activities listed in Annex I should be required to produce transformation plans as part of the permit reconsideration and update following the publication of decisions on BAT conclusions published after 1 January 2030 . Whilst the transformation plans should remain indicative documents prepared under the responsibility of the operators, the audit organisation contracted by the operators as part of their environmental management systems should check that they contain the minimum information to be set by the European Commission in an implementing act, and the operators should make the transformation plans public .

(25)

Achieving Union objectives regarding a clean, circular and climate neutral economy by 2050 calls for a deep transformation of the Union economy. Consistently with the 8th Environmental Action Programme, operators of installations covered by Directive 2010/75/EU should therefore be required to include transformation plans in their environmental management systems. Such transformation plans will also complement the Corporate Sustainability Reporting requirements under Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) by providing a means for concrete implementation of these requirements at installation level. The first priority is the transformation of energy-intensive activities listed in Annex I. Therefore, the operators of energy-intensive installations should produce indicative transformation plans by 30 June 2030. Operators of installations carrying out other activities listed in Annex I should be required to produce indicative transformation plans as part of the permit reconsideration and update following the publication of decisions on BAT conclusions published after 1 January 2030.

Reason

Technical amendment to align the recital to the proposed changes to the relevant amendment.

Amendment 3

Article 1, point (5)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(5)	In Article 5, the following paragraph (4) is added:

(5)	In Article 5, the following paragraph (4) is added:

‘4. Member States shall ensure that permits granted pursuant to this Article are made available on the internet, free of charge and without restricting access to registered users. In addition, a summary of each permit shall be made available to the public under the same conditions. That summary shall include at least the following:

(a)	an overview of the main permit conditions;

(a)	an overview of the main permit conditions;

(b)	the emission limit values and environmental performance limits values;

(b)	the emission limit values and environmental performance limits values;

(c)	any derogations granted in accordance with Article 15(4);

(c)	any derogations granted in accordance with Article 15(4);

(d)	the applicable BAT conclusions;

(d)	the applicable BAT conclusions;

(e)	the provisions for reconsideration and updating of the permit.

(e)	the provisions for reconsideration and updating of the permit.

(f)	the name of the specific authority or body responsible for information requests and complaints.

The Commission shall adopt an implementing act to establish the format to be used for the summary referred to in the second subparagraph. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 75(2).’

Reason

The public should be informed of the specific level responsible for enquiries and complaints in order to avoid contact being made with the wrong body or authority, which would create an administrative burden for the public administration and make it more difficult to receive information.

Amendment 4

Article 1, point (12)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(12)	Article 15 is replaced by the following:

(12)	Article 15 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 15

Emission limit values, environmental performance limit values, equivalent parameters and technical measures

[…]

3a. The competent authority shall set environmental performance limit values that ensure that, under normal operating conditions, such performance limits values do not exceed the environmental performance levels associated with BATs as laid down in the decisions on BAT conclusions referred to in Article 13(5).

3a. The competent authority may set environmental performance limit values that ensure that, under normal operating conditions, such performance limits values do not exceed the environmental performance levels associated with BATs as laid down in the decisions on BAT conclusions referred to in Article 13(5).

[…]’

Reason

The obligation to set binding performance values would lead to inconsistent rules and undermine the industrial transformation. This requirement should be left to the discretion of the competent authorities after it has been demonstrated by means of a careful assessment that such a requirement would not lead to inconsistency between the permit conditions set elsewhere.

Amendment 5

Article 1, point (18a)

(New point)

Article 25(3) of Directive 2010/75/EU

CoR amendment

(18a)

Article 25(3) is replaced by the following:

3. What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be determined by Member States, consistently with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice.

To this end, the interest of any non-governmental organisation promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of paragraph 1(a).

To this end, the interest of any sub-national public authority whose territory or population could be adversely affected and compliance with any requirement of national law shall be considered sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 1(a).

Such organisations shall also be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for the purpose of paragraph 1(b).

Such organisations or authorities shall also be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for the purpose of paragraph 1(b).

Reason

The CoR supports public participation and access to justice for local authorities and welcomes the revisions made to this aspect, while suggesting that efforts be made to ensure that LRAs also have access to justice in all Member States and calling for full and timely information and public participation in all procedures.

Amendment 6

Article 1, point (22)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(22)	The following Articles 27a to 27d are inserted:

(22)	The following Articles 27a to 27d are inserted:

‘[…]

Article 27d

Transformation towards a clean, circular and climate neutral industry

1. Member States shall require that by 30 June 2030 the operator includes in its environmental management system referred to in Article 14a a transformation plan for each installation carrying out any activity listed in points 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.1 a, and 6.1 b of Annex I. The transformation plan shall contain information on how the installation will transform itself during the 2030-2050 period in order to contribute to the emergence of a sustainable, clean, circular and climate-neutral economy by 2050, using the format referred to in paragraph 4.

Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that by 31 December 2031, the audit organisation contracted by the operator as part of its environmental management system assesses the conformity of the transformation plans referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 with the requirements set out in the implementing act referred to in paragraph 4.

1. Member States shall require that, by 30 June 2030 and as part of the review of the permit conditions pursuant to Article 21(3) following the publication of decisions on BAT conclusions after 1 January 2030, the operator include an indicative transformation plan for each installation carrying out any activity listed in Annex I. The indicative transformation plan shall contain information on how the installation will transform itself during the 2030-2050 period in order to contribute to the emergence of a sustainable, clean, circular and climate-neutral economy by 2050, using the format referred to in paragraph 4.

2. Member States shall require that, as part of the review of the permit conditions pursuant to Article 21(3) following the publication of decisions on BAT conclusions after 1 January 2030, the operator includes in its environmental management system referred to in Article 14a a transformation plan for each installation carrying out any activity listed in Annex I that is not referred to in paragraph 1. The transformation plan shall contain information on how the installation will transform itself during the 2030-2050 period in order to contribute to the emergence of a sustainable, clean, circular and climate-neutral economy by 2050, using the format referred to in paragraph 4.

Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the audit organisation contracted by the operator as part of its environmental management system assesses the conformity of the transformation plans referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 with the requirements set out in the implementing act referred to in paragraph 4.

2. The operator shall make the summary of its indicative transformation plan public.

3 . The operator shall make its transformation plan as well as the results of the assessment referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 public , as part of the publication of its environmental management system .

3. The Commission shall by 30 June 2028, adopt an implementing act establishing the format for the transformation plans. This implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 75(2).’.

4 . The Commission shall by 30 June 2028, adopt an implementing act establishing the format for the transformation plans. This implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 75(2).’.

Reason

The indicative nature of the transformation plan seems appropriate since the objectives pursued are forward-looking and depend on externalities (e.g. the availability of renewable and low-energy vectors) and in order to prevent permit procedures becoming more complicated.

Amendment 7

Article 1, point (31)

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR amendment

(31)	Article 79 is replaced by the following:

(31)	Article 79 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 79

Penalties

1. Without prejudice to the obligations of Member States under Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, Member States shall lay down rules on penalties applicable to violations of national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are applied. The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall without delay notify the Commission of those rules and of those provisions, and shall notify without delay any subsequent amendment affecting them.

2. The penalties referred to in paragraph 1 shall include fines proportionate to the turnover of the legal person or to the income of the natural person having committed the infringement. The level of the fines shall be calculated in such a way as to make sure that they effectively deprive the person responsible for the violation of the economic benefits derived from that violation. The level of the fines shall be gradually increased for repeated infringements. In the case of a violation committed by a legal person, the maximum amount of such fines shall be at least 8 % of the operator’s annual turnover in the Member State concerned .

3. Member States shall ensure that the penalties referred to in paragraph 1 give due regard to the following, as applicable:

(a)	the nature, gravity, and extent of the violation;

(b)	the intentional or negligent character of the violation;

(c)	the population or the environment affected by the violation, bearing in mind the impact of the infringement on the objective of achieving a high level of protection of human health and the environment.’.

(a)	the nature, gravity, and extent of the violation;

(b)	the intentional or negligent character of the violation;

(c)	the population or the environment affected by the violation, bearing in mind the impact of the infringement on the objective of achieving a high level of protection of human health and the environment.

4. Member States shall ensure that funding from penalties is used, as a matter of priority, in order to repair or compensate for damage caused to local authorities.

Where the application of the Directive entails resizing or closing down economic activities, the social consequences for local authorities must be taken into account when determining the penalties and Member States must ensure that the funds stemming from penalties are used to compensate local authorities for social and economic losses, in consultation with local and regional authorities. ’.

Reason

The impact of pollution on local authorities can cause environmental, health, social and economic damage that could be extremely problematic, especially for small and/or poor communities. Penalties must take this into account.

II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

General comments

reiterates its commitment to accelerating a fair and clean transition towards a climate-neutral and circular economy by 2050 that favours the regions of the European Union and leaves no people and no territory behind across the European Union; to this end, supports the revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED), intended not only to help prevent and control pollution in order to better protect the environment and human health, but also to stimulate innovation, reward frontrunners and help level the playing field in the EU market;

considers that the IED is an effective legislative framework that has already proven to be effective in reducing industrial emissions of pollutants and that, as such, remains fit for the transformation that European industry requires in order to meet the objectives of the European Green Deal; stresses that the synergies between the prevention approach of the IED and the market-based approach of the Emission Trading System (ETS) can lead to a ‘win-win-win’ situation for the operators, climate and environment;

supports a science-based approach, particularly for assessing the real impact of industrial activities on overall pollution;

points out that one of the current residual shortcomings is the lack of consistency in the application of the IED in the Member States;

draws attention to the context in which the proposed revision of the IED is taking place (energy prices, rampant inflation, disruption of supply chains), and warns of the negative impact that a poorly calibrated reform of the IED would have on Europe’s industrial competitiveness;

takes note, in this connection, of the reservations expressed by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board in its report on the impact assessment on the revision of the IED (1), in particular the lack of clarity in this text with respect to certain impacts of the revision on industrial competitiveness (risk of relocation and substitution with products from third countries that apply less stringent rules, particularly those on newly included activities) as well as the impact of the inclusion of livestock on rural areas and prices for consumers;

calls on the co-legislators to make the implementation of the IED more consistent and to take into account the costs and challenges of the transition in the context of EU trade policy, in order to avoid unfair competition from third countries;

points out, in this connection, that industrial sites subject to the IED are also largely covered by decarbonisation rules and schemes; calls, therefore, for the IED not to encroach on these particularly effective tools, which are already being applied at industrial level, in order to avoid inconsistencies and promote decarbonisation efforts in the most cost-effective way;

Ensuring the effectiveness of the IED

believes that the general principle of informing the public and the need to not restrict the dissemination of relevant information must be in line with the security and safety of locations, trade secrets and the prevention of acts of malice;

10.

points out that maintaining the IED’s key principles and integrated approach contributes to the success of the industrial transformation;

11.

is therefore in favour of maintaining the ‘best available techniques’ (BAT) definitions and the Seville Process (under which the Best Available Technique Reference Documents or ‘BREF’ are drawn up);

12.

has reservations about the current wording of Article 15(3), namely on setting emission limit values (ELVs) at the strictest levels, as mentioned in the BAT conclusions;

13.

questions the wording of Article 15(3a) on environmental performance levels linked to the BAT. This requirement should be left to the discretion of the competent authorities after it has been demonstrated by means of a careful assessment that such a requirement would not lead to inconsistency between the permit conditions set elsewhere;

14.

strongly supports the ‘polluter pays’ principle, agrees with the European Court of Auditors that the ‘polluter pays’ principle should be clearly defined, and endorses strengthening the provisions concerning penalties and compensation; considers that penalties need to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and that they need to take into account the full ownership structure of companies to ensure that they are imposed on the responsible parties;

15.

stresses that local and regional authorities have to deal with the environmental, health, social and economic impacts of pollution. Money from penalties and compensatory payments should also be used to help local and regional authorities cope with the consequences of these impacts;

16.

supports the creation of the Industrial Emissions Portal; calls, however, for efforts to limit the additional administrative burden on local and regional authorities;

Scope

17.

is of the opinion that any extension to new sectors needs to be carefully analysed, including through a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account, among other things, the measures and policy frameworks in place to address them;

18.

supports the extension of the IED to other sectors such as the beef sector; is concerned, however, by the administrative burden and costs and suggests considering measures providing financial support for businesses and local and regional authorities in this transition, taking into account in particular the social impact on small installations; calls on the co-legislators not to confine themselves to the livestock rearing threshold criterion alone;

19.

calls for a more in-depth assessment of the potential for including aquaculture in the Directive, taking into account environmental and climate costs and benefits, assessing the administrative burden and costs for businesses and taking into account in particular the social impact in local communities where aquaculture is a significant part of the local economy;

20.

warns that an excessive extension via Article 74, which allows for the scope to be broadened by delegated act, could jeopardise the entire process of in-depth data collection, affect the functioning of the Seville Process, and slow down the issuing of permits;

Support for innovation

21.

shares the ambition to stimulate research and innovation on more environmentally efficient technologies in order to meet the ambitions of the Green Deal;

22.

welcomes the establishment of the Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions (INCITE), which could become an asset for EU innovation; calls, however, for INCITE not to reproduce the BREF review process;

23.

points out that innovation also occurs at local and regional level and that local and regional authorities should be included among the public institutions involved in the activities of the new innovation centre;

24.

notes the willingness to combine performance levels with emerging techniques; considers that there is a risk of holding back the effective implementation of these emerging techniques if the ELVs included in the permits are not achievable with 100 % certainty;

25.

welcomes the long-term transformation plans; draws attention, however, to the fact that these plans should be indicative and produced at company level, not at the level of the operating site, and that disclosing them must not undermine industrial secrets.

26.

acknowledges that the proposed actions as they stand do not appear to raise any issue regarding their compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, due to the transboundary nature of pollution from agro-industrial installations and to the need of a level playing field in the single market. The proposed actions do not appear to raise any general issue regarding their compliance with the principle of proportionality due to the urgency of the environment and climate crises.

Brussels, 12 October 2022.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

(1) Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19).

(1) SEC(2022) 169

		ISSN 1977-091X
Official Journal of the European Union		C 498

English edition	Information and Notices	Volume 65 30 December 2022

Contents		page
	I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions
	RESOLUTIONS
	Committee of the Regions
	151st CoR plenary session, 11.10.2022–12.10.2022
2022/C 498/01	Resolution of the European Committee of the Regions on the State of the Regions and Cities in the European Union	1
	OPINIONS
	Committee of the Regions
	151st CoR plenary session, 11.10.2022–12.10.2022
2022/C 498/02	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Towards a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean	6
2022/C 498/03	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The role of EU cities and regions in rebuilding Ukraine	12
2022/C 498/04	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The new Urban Mobility Framework	17
2022/C 498/05	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The CoR’s role in boosting subnational climate diplomacy ahead of COP27 and COP28	24
2022/C 498/06	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Towards a structural inclusion of Cities and Regions in UNFCCC COP 27	30
2022/C 498/07	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Just and Sustainable Transition in the context of the coal and energy intensive regions	36
2022/C 498/08	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Digital Cohesion	39
2022/C 498/09	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Eighth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion	45
2022/C 498/10	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on Pathways to School Success	51

	III Preparatory acts
	Committee of the Regions
	151st CoR plenary session, 11.10.2022–12.10.2022
2022/C 498/11	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Protecting industrial and craft geographical indications in the European Union (revised)	57
2022/C 498/12	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T)	68
2022/C 498/13	Opinion of the European Committee of the regions — Energy package on gas, hydrogen and methane emissions	83
2022/C 498/14	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — European Chips Act for strengthening the European semiconductor ecosystem	94
2022/C 498/15	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Revised Schengen Area Governance	114
2022/C 498/16	Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Industrial Emissions Directive	154