1.

Must Articles 3(4) and 18 of Directive 2009/28 (1) be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, which, for the purposes of compliance with biofuel incorporation targets, provides that economic operators may, alternatively, evidence compliance with the same criteria by i) physically incorporating biofuels into fossil fuel, or ii) purchasing biofuel certificates from other operators with surplus biofuels?

2.

Must Articles 3(4) and 18 of Directive 2009/28 be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, under which the option of physically incorporating biofuel is confined to producers operating tax warehouses for processing, that option being denied to entities under an obligation to incorporate which import fuel as registered consignees, which have the option of purchasing biofuel certificates, failure to do so triggering a requirement to pay compensation (materially equivalent to a fine)?

3.

Does it make any difference to the answer to the previous question if, at the material time, there were no biofuel certificates available for purchase on the market, meaning that a small operator could not buy any (or could do so only with great difficulty), and if the Direção-Geral de Energia e Geologia (Directorate General for Energy and Geology; ‘the DGEG’) had not organised the corresponding auctions, leaving the small operator with no option but to pay compensation (materially equivalent to a fine)?

4.

Must Article 18(3) of Directive 2009/28 be interpreted as meaning that it requires independent audits (in the case of the national legislation, independent verifications) to be carried out as a precondition for the application of the sustainability scheme?

5.

Does Article 18(3) of Directive 2009/28 preclude a national system for the verification of compliance with sustainability criteria which, despite providing that verifying entities must be accredited to carry out independent verifications of compliance with the sustainability criteria (in accordance with Article 18(3) of that directive), did not in practice allow such entities to be selected because no calls for tender were issued, and, at the same time, requires economic operators to demonstrate their compliance with those criteria, without subjecting that compliance to any independent audit?

6.

If the previous questions are answered in the negative, must Article 34 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, interpreted in the manner described in the previous questions?

1.

Must transactions involving (i) an offer for the cash purchase of debentures, (ii) the issue of debentures and (iii) a public offer for subscription of shares be considered ‘overall transactions’ within the meaning of the case-law of the Court of Justice resulting from the judgments in Isabele Gielen (C-299/13) (1) and Air Berlin (C-573/16)? (2)

2.

Must the expression ‘formalities relating thereto’, used in Article 5(2)(b) of Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008, (3) be interpreted as covering the purchase of financial intermediation services that are ancillary to transactions involving (i) an offer for the cash purchase of debentures, (ii) the issue of debentures and (iii) a public offer for subscription of shares?

3.

Can Article 5(2)(b) of Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008 be interpreted as precluding the levying of stamp duty on fees charged for financial intermediation services provided by a bank in relation to (i) the repurchase of debt securities, (ii) the issue and placing on the market of negotiable securities and (iii) the increase of capital through a public subscription of the shares issued, where such services include the obligation to identify and contact investors in order to distribute transferrable securities, receive subscription or purchase orders and, in some cases, purchase the transferrable securities to which the offer relates?

4.

Must the above questions be answered differently depending on whether the provision of financial services is required by law or optional?

1.

In light of the objective of the directive and Article 2(d) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on energy statistics, and in light of the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) in conjunction with Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of Council Directive 2009/119/EC (2) of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which persons who have made intra-Community acquisitions of petroleum coke for production purposes in accordance with point 3.4.23 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 may be required to build up emergency stocks?

2.

Must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which restricts the types of products in respect of which emergency stocks must be built up and held to some of the types of products in Article 2(i) of the directive in conjunction with Chapter 3.4 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008?

3.

Must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which the realisation by a person of intra-Community acquisitions or imports of a type of product referred to in Article 2(i) of the directive, read in conjunction with Chapter 3.4 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 entails an obligation on that person to build up and hold emergency stocks of another, different type of product?

4.

Must the 33rd recital in the preamble, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which a person is obliged to build up and hold stocks of a product that they do not use in the course of their economic activity and that is unrelated to that activity and where that obligation also entails a significant financial burden (leading, in practice, to compliance being impossible) because the person is neither in possession of the product nor are they its importer and/or holder?

5.

In the event that one of the above questions is answered in the negative: Having regard to the aim of the directive and in light of the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) in conjunction with Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products be interpreted as meaning that the importer of a particular type of product can only be required to build up and hold emergency stocks of the same type of product as the product that was imported?

1.

In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, does a basis with a direct legal effect flow from Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (1) of 18 December 1995, read in conjunction with Article 56(1) and Article 54(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 and with Article 35(6) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014 (3) of 11 March 2014, for the recovery of fraudulently obtained aid financed by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) from the representatives of a beneficiary legal person who intentionally made false declarations with a view to fraudulently obtaining the aid?

2.

In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in which aid to be financed by the EAFRD was, as a result of fraud, set and paid to a limited liability company (Osaühing), can the representatives of the beneficiary company who carried out the fraud and who, at the time when the aid was fraudulently obtained, were simultaneously the beneficial owners of that company, also be regarded as beneficiaries within the meaning of Article 54(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 and Article 35(6) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014 of 11 March 2014?

1.

Must the phrase ‘legal effect [of an electronic signature] as evidence’ in Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC be interpreted as meaning that that provision requires the courts of the Member States to presume that, where the requirements of [points] 10, 11 and 12 of Article 3 of that regulation are met or are not in dispute, the existence and claimed authorship of such a signature must be presumed a priori to be established beyond doubt or dispute, and must that phrase be interpreted as meaning that, where the requirements of those provisions are met, the courts of the Member States are required to recognise that the qualified electronic signature has the evidential value/force equivalent to that of a handwritten signature only to the extent that the relevant national legal regime prescribes in respect of such a handwritten signature?

2.

Must the phrase ‘shall not be denied … in legal proceedings’ in Article 25(1) of that regulation be interpreted as imposing on the national courts of the Member States an absolute prohibition on using the procedural possibilities provided for in their legal systems to deny evidential value to the legal effect of the electronic signature provided for in that regulation, or must it be interpreted as meaning that that provision does not preclude the possibility to refute the requirements of [points] 10, 11 and 12 of Article 3 of that regulation as being met, through the use, by the national courts of the Member States, of the instruments applicable under their procedural laws, thereby enabling the parties to a dispute before the courts to refute an electronic signature’s evidential force and value, as provided for?

1.

Is a compensation regime based on strict liability, such as that described above (paragraphs 16 to 18 of this request for a preliminary ruling) which is in force in Finland, to be regarded as compatible with Article 9(7) of the Enforcement Directive? (1)

2.

If the first question is answered in the negative, what then is the nature of the liability for compensation on which the liability under Article 9(7) of the Enforcement Directive is based? Is that liability to be regarded as a form of liability based on fault, an abuse of rights, or some other ground?

3.

In relation to the second question, what circumstances must be taken into account in assessing the existence of liability?

4.

In particular, as regards the third question, must the assessment be made solely on the basis of the circumstances known at the time when the provisional measure was obtained, or is it permissible to take into account, for example, the fact that the intellectual property right on whose alleged infringement the provisional measure was based was subsequently, after that measure was obtained, found to be invalid ab initio and, if so, what significance is to be attached to that circumstance?

1.

First, should the concept of unforeseeable circumstances giving rise to losses under duty suspension arrangements, within the meaning of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/118/EC, (1) be understood, in the same way as force majeure, as abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances extraneous to the authorised warehousekeeper, which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, were objectively outside the warehousekeeper’s control?

2.

Furthermore, to exclude liability in the event of unforeseeable circumstances, is the care exercised in taking the necessary precautions to avoid the harmful act relevant, and if so, to what extent?

3.

Subject to the first two questions, is a provision such as Article 4(1) of decreto legislativo 26 ottobre 1995 n. 504 (Legislative Decree No 504 of 26 October 1995), which equates ordinary negligence (by the same person or by third parties) with unforeseeable circumstances and force majeure, compatible with the provisions of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/118/EC, which mentions no other conditions, particularly as regards the ‘fault’ of the perpetrator or active participant?

4.

Lastly, can the expression ‘or as a consequence of authorisation by the competent authorities of the Member State’, also contained in Article 7(4), be understood as the possibility for the Member State to identify another general category (slight negligence) that might have a bearing on the definition of release for consumption in the event of destruction or loss of the product, or does that expression preclude a clause of that type, it having to be understood, rather, as referring to specific cases that are individually authorised or otherwise identified by precedents in which the objective elements are defined?

1.

Must Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, (1) in conjunction with Article 7(3) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that a passenger who has paid for a flight partly in frequent flyer miles may claim from the operating air carrier, which is not his or her contracting partner, reimbursement (only) in frequent flyer miles in that respect?

2.

In the event that the Court answers the first question in the affirmative:

Does Regulation No 261/2004 preclude national legislation under which, in the event of failure to provide reimbursement in the form of frequent flyer miles, contrary to the corresponding obligation under Article 8(1)(a) of that regulation, compensation in lieu of performance may be claimed from the operating air carrier, or is the passenger bound by his or her original request for reimbursement in frequent flyer miles?

3.

In the event that the Court answers the first question in the negative:

In the event that the passenger may also claim reimbursement in money or is reimbursed in money, must Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004, in conjunction with Article 7(3) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that, as reimbursement of the cost of the ticket (…) at the price at which it was bought, the passenger is reimbursed by the operating air carrier the amount in money which would enable, or would have enabled, him or her to purchase, without using frequent flyer miles, re-routing, under comparable transport conditions, to his or her final destination at the earliest opportunity or at a later date at his or her convenience, subject to availability of seats?

—

annul the judgment of the General Court of 1 June 2022, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL — Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL) v Single Resolution Board (T-481/17, EU: T:2022:311), in so far as the General Court found the action for annulment at first instance to be admissible;

—

declare the action for annulment brought in case T-481/17 at first instance inadmissible, and, consequently, dismiss it in its entirety; and

—

order Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL, Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL) (applicants at first instance) to pay the costs incurred by the Commission both in the proceedings before the General Court and in the present proceedings.

—

error in the interpretation of Article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU and article 18, paragraph 7, of the Regulation on the Single Resolution Mechanism, (1) in so far as it treats the resolution scheme as a challengeable act (first ground of appeal),

—

error in the interpretation of article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU and infringement of the rights of the defence of the Commission, as regards the omission to address the action for annulment against the author of the legally binding final act (second ground of appeal), and,

—

contradictory reasoning in the judgment under appeal, resulting from the decision, by the General Court, to find the action for annulment against the contested resolution scheme to be admissible, while the General Court concludes that said resolution scheme only enters into force and produces binding legal effects through the Commission’s decision (third ground of appeal).

—

declare that the applicant correctly fulfilled her contractual obligations and is fully entitled to payment of claimed costs of the SANAD Project and set aside Debit Note No 3242113938 as infringing applicable laws by declaring the rejected costs as ineligible; and

—

order the REA to pay the costs of the proceedings before this Court, or, in the event that the orders sought in the present action are not granted, refrain from ordering the applicant to pay the costs in view of the complexity of the present case.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the ‘Final Audit Report’ bearing on applicant’s secondees allowances granted for knowledge sharing and inter-sectoral mobility should be deemed as falling outside the scope of the Agreement (GA) for having been engaged by REA as exceptional in view of a flat-rate financing proper to output and results based research and thus not subject to ex-post verification but also for having been conducted as visibly inquisitorial in suspecting systematic errors which however are deemed of no systematic nature, thus drawing from terms proper to different types of procedure.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that in the alternative, if such control were to be deemed as falling within the scope of the GA, it should have been undertaken as ex ante verification by the authorising officer as based on evidence drawn from electronic inspection mechanisms established at the hosting organisation (KU), specifically entrusted in collecting secondment data in own premises, and monitored by the Defendant. In omitting to do so, the latter infringed the terms of the GA in correctly assessing under applicable laws.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that even if the audit were to be deemed within the scope of the contract and the burden of proof incumbent, as a matter of principle, on the applicant, the rejection of the secondment costs, during an ex post verification for systematic errors improper to such verification as referring to flat rate financing, was reached in infringement of the principle of good faith not only in applying the Financial Regulation 2018/1046 (1), in force at the time of the audit (article 181 (2)), but also in performing under contract in general: by an unlawful discretion, the auditing entity denied the sufficiency of a performance audit for flat rate financing so as to assess it upon certified and auditable historical data of the beneficiary, and, instead, she privileged types of evidence referring to generating events of the activities covered by flat rate financing. Such inversion in the order of proofs deprived the applicant of the right to interpret its contractual obligations to its benefit in a legal context of vagueness of terms as created by the then applicable Financial Regulation (966/2012) (2) as well as by the contradictory behaviour of the defendant in monitoring the implementation of the GA.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that on properly considering the variety of concurring evidence, internal as external, but also the misleading orientations before and during implementation, mismatches and lacunae detected in evidence should be disregarded or, at least, brought to their appropriate dimension but not lead to full rejection for being systematic, in particular where they should be ignored as immaterial or negligible in effect according to the general principle of proportionality.

—

declare void pursuant to Art. 264 TFEU the SRB’s No Resolution-decision dated 1 March 2022 with respect to the applicant;

—

order the SRB to bear the applicant's costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the SRB exceeded its competence by adopting a decision with respect to the applicant instead of simply refraining from any action in accordance with its finding that the conditions of Article 18 of the ‘SRMR’ (1) were not met.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to grant the applicant a right to be heard.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the SRB did not provide a sufficient statement of reasons.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to consider appropriately the requirements pursuant to Article 18(1)(b) SRMR.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the SRB and the ECB failed to consider the suspension of the applicant’s liabilities.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the principle of proportionality by failing to consider a number of obvious and less burdensome alternatives, including the transfer of the applicant to another shareholder.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to follow the resolution plan without providing any plausible explanation for this.

—

annul Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/692 of 16 February 2022 amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (‘the contested Regulation’), (1) insofar as it introduces a harmonised classification and labelling for three substances, namely N-carboxymethyliminobis (ethylenenitrilo)tetra(acetic acid) and its pentasodium and pentapotassium salts (together referred to as ‘DTPA’ or ‘the substance’), i.e. Recitals 2 and 3, Articles 1 and 2 and the Annex to the contested Regulation, insofar as they concern DTPA and, in particular, the entries introduced by the Annex to the contested Regulation in Part 3 of Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (‘the CLP Regulation’), (2) for the individual substances:

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the classification criteria established in Article 36(1) and Section 3.7.2.2.1 of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, in that DTPA does not have the ‘intrinsic, specific property to produce an adverse effect on reproduction’. If some developmental effects were observed in animals exposed to very high doses of DTPA, such effects are ‘non-specific secondary developmental effects’ that do not justify a classification as toxic for reproduction.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of Section 3.7.2.2.2 of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, as the EU authorities failed to properly evaluate and take into account the possible influence of maternal toxicity" when classifying DTPA. DTPA produces zinc deficiency, disrupting the maternal homeostasis in rats, and it is that maternal toxicity which triggers the observed nonspecific secondary developmental effects. This cannot support the classification of DTPA as toxic for reproduction in line with the requirements of the CLP Regulation.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of Section 3.7.2.1.1 and Table 3.7.1(a) of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, since the available evidence does not constitute the ‘strong presumption’ that DTPA can produce reproductive effects in humans, nor was there ‘clear evidence’ that DTPA can produce developmental effects in the absence of other toxic effects (i.e., maternal toxicity). Again, without such elements, the classification of DTPA as toxic for reproduction, category 1B, is not justified.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the Commission’s duty pursuant to Article 37(5) of the CLP Regulation to establish that the proposed harmonised classification is ‘appropriate’. The Commission endorsed the Committee for Risk Assessment (‘RAC’) opinions without verifying whether they are consistent, reliable and capable of sustaining the proposed classification. If the Commission had taken into account all the relevant information on the properties of DTPA, as it was repeatedly invited do to by the dossier submitter (‘DS’) between 2018 and 2022, it would not have classified DTPA as toxic for reproduction, category 1B.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the procedural requirement of Article 37(4) of the CLP Regulation to consult on the RAC opinions themselves, instead of only on the proposal for a harmonised classification and labelling made by the DS.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that, in adopting the contested Regulation without the prior conduct and documentation of an impact assessment, the Commission breached its commitments under the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making and the principle of sound administration.

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annul European Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/908 of 8 June 2022 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), notified under document C(2022) 3543 final and published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 10 June 2022, L 157, p. 15, in so far as it excludes from Union financing the expenditure incurred by the Republic of Austria and declared under the EAGF set out in the annex to that decision under budget item 6200, lines 1 to 8, less the amounts listed under budget item 08020601, thus totalling EUR 68 146 449,98;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law

The defendant infringed Article 52(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (1) in so far as it imposed a financial correction by means of the contested implementing decision even though the applicant had applied the reduction coefficient in respect of the allocation of payment entitlements to farmers of alpine pastures in accordance with Article 24(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013. (2) The related financial correction was therefore wrongly made.

2.

Second plea in law

The defendant infringed Article 52(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in so far as it imposed a financial correction even though the use of the national reserve for the remedial action taken in respect of farmers of pasture land (Hutweide) and the linear reduction made in order to avoid exceeding the national ceiling were in compliance with EU law. The applicant submits that it was entitled to rely on Article 30(7)(b) or Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 to take those actions. The related financial correction was therefore wrongly made.

3.

Third plea in law

The defendant infringed Article 52(4)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in so far as it also refused financing for such EAGF expenditure effected prior to 26 November 2016 — and thus more than 24 months before the date on which the defendant notified the results of its verifications by letter of 27 November 2018.

4.

Fourth plea in law

The defendant infringed the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU in so far it completely failed to address the applicant’s arguments concerning the classification of alpine pastures based on the alpine pasture laws of the provinces and thus failed to provide sufficient and appropriate reasons for the allegation that the applicant infringed the principle of objectivity and equal treatment in applying the exception provided for in Article 24(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013.

—

partly annul the contested decision;

—

alter the contested decision;

—

order Pitk Pelotas, SL to pay the costs incurred by CrossFit, LLC in the present action, in the proceedings before the Board of Appeals and in the proceedings before the Opposition Division.

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the First Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion with the earlier CROSSFIT trade marks;

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the First Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion with the earlier CROSS trade mark;

—

Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that the applicant had failed to prove the reputation of its earlier CROSSFIT trademark in the EU, in connection to the services in Class 41.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

declare inapplicable the order that the applicant bear the costs incurred by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal;

—

order EUIPO and the intervening party to pay all the costs of the dispute before the General Court, including those relating to the procedure before the Board of Appeal.

—

Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 109 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision and refer the case back to EUIPO for reconsideration, or,

—

alter the contested decision, stating that there are relative grounds for the refusal of registration of trade mark application No 18 174 721 for all goods and services in class 5, 35 and 44 and that the trade mark shall not be registered;

—

award the costs in the applicant’s favour.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of the principle of trademarks similarity assessment;

—

Infringement of the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and of legal certainty.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 47(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1),

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annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2) (the ‘Contested Acts’) in so far as they apply to the applicant, and

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order the Council to bear its own costs and pay the costs incurred on behalf of the applicant in bringing this action.

1.

First plea in law, alleging violation of the rights of the defence. Firstly, it is alleged that the reasons have been stated inadequately. By failing to set out with sufficient clarity how the Council concluded that the alternative criteria in Articles 3(1)(b) and 4(1)(b) of Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (3) apply to the applicant, the Contested Acts violate Article 296, 2nd paragraph, TFEU. Secondly, violation of the principle of personal responsibility is alleged on the grounds that by failing to identify the benefit received from, or support provided to, the Belarusian regime by the applicant, the Contested Acts infringe the applicant’s fundamental rights in violation of the principle of personal responsibility.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment. Firstly, it is alleged that there has been failure to substantiate benefit from or support for the Lukashenka regime. The Contested Acts are vitiated by a manifest error of assessment as they were adopted in the absence of sufficient evidential support. Secondly, it is alleged that there has been failure to substantiate temporally relevant conduct. The Contested Acts are punitive only, and therefore unlawful, in that the evidence in support discloses historic circumstances only.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging disproportionate interference with the applicant’s fundamental rights. The objective of the Contested Acts has been achieved by other legislative measures; they therefore constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s fundamental rights.

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annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1), insofar as it concerns the applicant (Annex A.2);

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annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2) insofar as it concerns the applicant (Annex A.3);

—

order the Council pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of legality.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of non-discrimination.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging disproportionate infringement of the property rights.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging the violation of the obligation to state reasons.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of respect for the rights of defence.

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Annul, firstly, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/883 of 3 June 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (1) (‘Amended Decision’) to the extent it concerns the applicant, and, secondly, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (2) (‘Amended Regulation’), to the extent it concerns the applicant;

—

Order the Council to pay all costs of the present proceeding.

1.

First plea in law alleging breaches Article 2 of the Amended Decision and Article 3 of the Amended Regulation on the grounds that the Council erred in law in incorrectly applying Criterion (g) of Article 2(1) of the Amended Decision and Article 3(1) of the Amended Regulation to the applicant, without thoroughly examining the facts and providing sufficient reasons to adopt restrictive measures against a person.

2.

Second plea in law alleging breaches Article 296 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), Article 41 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘The Charter’) and Article 2 and 4 of the Amended Decision on the grounds that the Council has not provided sufficiently specific and concrete reasons to justify the decision to take restrictive measures against the applicant, according to Article 4 of the Decision and Article 3 of the Regulation; it has committed manifest errors in conducting its analysis and failing to establish why the applicant would fall under one of the criteria stipulated in the Amended Decision, without thoroughly examining the facts and providing sufficient reasons to adopt restrictive measures against a person.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breaches of Article 41 and 48 of the Charter on the grounds that the Council did not provide the Evidence File to the Applicant with sufficient time to defend its rights; that the Council imposed a 14-day limit to present its observations and that it only presented the Evidence File one day before the deadline; that the applicant did not have any time to examine the Evidence File and present its observations, when the Council should have provided sufficient time to the applicant to examine the Evidence File and present its observations and ensured that all rights of defence were adhered to.

4.

Fourth plea in law alleging, breaches of Article 296 TFEU, Article 16 and 45 of the Charter on the grounds that the Council took disproportionate restrictive measures against the applicant based on non-corroborated factual allegations which can in any case no longer be justified.

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annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant;

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annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2), insofar as it concerns the applicant (together, the ‘Contested Acts’); and

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order the Council pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of legality.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of non-discrimination.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of proportionality.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging the violation of the obligation to state reasons.

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declare the present action admissible and well founded;

as a consequence,

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annul the decision of 28 September 2021 for the recovery of an amount of EUR 61 186,61 and the decision of 20 May 2022 dismissing the appeal through official channels by the applicant;

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order the EIB to reimburse the amounts recovered, which amounts must be increased with default interest at the rate set by the European Central Bank plus two points;

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order the EIB to pay all the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging a flaw due to the lack of competence of the author of the act.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the infringement of the five-year limitation period under Article 16.3 of the administrative provisions applicable to EIB Staff (‘the Staff Rules’).

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the infringement of Article 16 of the Staff Rules whereby, as well as the five-year limitation period, the conditions for recovery are not fulfilled.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging the infringement of Articles 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 of the Staff Rules and manifest error of assessment.

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annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1), insofar as it concerns the applicant;

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annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2), insofar as it concerns the applicant (together, the ‘Contested Acts’); and

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order the Council to bear the full costs and expenses of the proceedings, including those incurred by the applicant for its defence.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Contested Acts violate the principle of legality.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging violation of the right to effective judicial protection and the obligation to state reasons.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.

4.

Fourth plea in law, violation of the principle of proportionality.