1.

In the case of a supply of services by a taxable person established in one Member State to another taxable person acting as such, whose business is established outside the European Union, where those persons are separate and legally independent entities but form part of the same group, where the service provider contractually undertakes to use its equipment and its staff exclusively for the production of products for the recipient of the services and where those products are then sold by that recipient, giving rise to taxable supplies of goods for which the service provider renders logistical assistance and which take place in the Member State in question; are Article 44 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 (1) and Article 11 of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/[2011] of 15 March 2011 (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the taxable person established outside the European Union must be deemed to have a fixed establishment in that Member State?

2.

Are Article 44 of Directive 2006/112/EC and Article 11 of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/[2011] of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax to be interpreted as meaning that a taxable person may have a fixed establishment where the required human and technical resources are those of its service provider, which is legally independent but forms part of the same group, and which contractually undertakes to use them exclusively for the benefit of that taxable person?

3.

Are Article 44 of Directive 2006/112/EC and Article 11 of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/[2011] of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax to be interpreted as meaning that a taxable person has a fixed establishment in the Member State of its service provider if the latter supplies it, pursuant to an exclusive contractual undertaking, with a series of services which are ancillary or additional to tolling in the strict sense, thus contributing to the completion of sales concluded by that taxable person from its place of business outside the European Union but giving rise to taxable supplies of goods which, under the VAT legislation, take place in the territory of that Member State?

1.

Do legislative measures which relate to granting public authorities access to traffic and location data (including identification data) in connection with the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences fall within the scope of Directive 2002/58/EC (1) if they concern the granting of access to data which are not retained on the grounds of legislative measures within the meaning of Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, but which are retained by the provider on some other ground?

2.

3.

Can granting public authorities access to traffic and location data (other than mere identification data) for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences be permissible under Directive 2002/58/EC if no serious criminal offences or serious crime are involved, that is to say, if in the specific case the granting of access to such data — in so far as may be assumed — causes only a minor interference with, in particular, the right to the protection of the private life of the user as referred to in Article 2(b) of Directive 2002/58/EC?

1.

Must Article 1(2) and (3) and Articles 3 and 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (1) be interpreted as meaning that they do not permit the executing judicial authority to refuse or in any case defer the surrender of a mother who has minor children living with her?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are Article 1(2) and (3) and Articles 3 and 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA compatible with Articles 7 and 24(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, also considering the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to Article 8 of the [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, in so far as they require the surrender of the mother, thus severing ties with minor children living with her without considering the best interest of the child?

1.

Must Article 5 of Directive 93/13/EEC, (1) which provides that the ‘terms offered to the consumer … must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language’, in the light of the twentieth recital of that directive, be interpreted as meaning that consumers must always have an opportunity to become acquainted with all the terms?

2.

Must Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC, according to which terms relating to the main subject matter of the contract are subject to assessment unless ‘these terms are in plain intelligible language’, be interpreted as meaning that it requires consumers always to have an opportunity to become acquainted with those terms?

3.

In the context of national legislation which allows the courts to review the unfairness of terms that have not been individually negotiated relating to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract: (i) in relation to a contributory group insurance contract, does Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, in conjunction with point (i) in the indicative list referred to in Article 3(3), preclude the insurer from relying against the insured on a term excluding or limiting the insured risk, where that term has not been notified to the insured and with which, as a result, the insured has not had an opportunity to become acquainted; (ii) does the foregoing apply even where, at the same time, if the duties to notify and provide information about the terms have not been discharged, under the national legislation the policy holder is liable to pay compensation for damage caused to the insured where that compensation does not, however, restore the insured to the position in which he or she would have been had the insurance cover been effective?

1.

Irrespective of the provisions of national law according to which, under certain circumstances, foreign nationals can be allowed to stay on account of their state of health, and which where necessary protect them from an expulsion order, must Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that where a sick Palestinian refugee, after actually availing himself of UNRWA protection or assistance, leaves the State or territory in the area of operations of that agency in which he had his habitual residence because he cannot have sufficient access there to the care and treatment required by his state of health and because that failure to provide care and treatment presents a genuine risk to his life or physical integrity, there is reason to consider that his personal safety is at serious risk and that he is in a situation in which it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that his living conditions will be commensurate with the mission entrusted to it?

2.

If the answer is in the affirmative, what are the criteria for identifying such a situation, concerning for example the seriousness of the illness or the nature of the care needed?

1.

2.

If the answer to question 1(a) is yes, can a competent authority for the purposes of development consent grant development consent for a project that may affect the water body prior to it being categorised and classified?

3.

If the answer to question 1(a) is no, what are the obligations on a competent authority when deciding upon an application for development consent that potentially affects a water body not characterised and/or classified?

1.

Is point 6.4(a) of Annex I to Directive 2010/75/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) to be interpreted as meaning that ‘carcass production’ covers the slaughter process, which begins when the animal is removed from lairage, stunned and killed and ends when the large standard cuts are produced, so that the weight of the slaughter animal is to be calculated before the neck and head as well as the organs and entrails are removed, or does ‘carcass production’ mean the production of pig carcasses after the organs and entrails as well as the neck and head have been removed, and after exsanguination and chilling, so that the weight of the slaughter animal should only be calculated at this point in time?

2.

Is point 6.4(a) of Annex I to Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) to be interpreted as meaning that when determining the number of production days included in the capacity ‘per day’, this should take into account only the days when stunning, killing and immediate cutting up of the slaughter pig are carried out, or should this take into account the days when the operations for dressing the slaughter pigs are carried out, which includes preparing the animal for slaughter, chilling the slaughtered animal and removing the animal’s head and neck?

3.

Is point 6.4(a) of Annex I to Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) to be interpreted as meaning that the ‘capacity’ of a slaughterhouse is to be calculated as the maximum production per day within 24 hours, subject to the physical, technical or legal constraints actually complied with by the slaughterhouse, but not lower than its achieved production, or can the slaughterhouse’s ‘capacity’ be lower than its achieved production, for example, where the production achieved by a slaughterhouse has been carried out in disregard of the physical, technical or legal constraints on production that are assumed when calculating the slaughterhouse’s ‘capacity’?

1.

In general, does the system of sources of European Union law and, specifically, the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU preclude the disapplication by a national court, in a dispute between private individuals, of a provision of national law that is contrary to a clear, precise and unconditional provision of a directive that has not been transposed or has been incorrectly transposed, thereby imposing an additional obligation on an individual, where that constitutes, according to the national legal system (Article 14(4) of Legislative Decree No 504/1995), a prerequisite for the latter to be able to assert against the State the rights conferred on him or her by that directive?

2.

Does the principle of effectiveness preclude national legislation (Article 14(4) of Legislative Decree No 504/1995) that does not allow a final consumer to seek reimbursement of undue tax directly from the State, but grants him or her only the option of bringing a civil action for recovery against the taxable person, who alone is entitled to obtain reimbursement from the tax authority, where the sole ground for the unlawfulness of the tax — namely the fact that it is contrary to a [Union] directive — can be relied on only in the relationship between the person liable to pay and the tax authority, but not in the relationship between the person liable to pay and the final consumer, thus effectively preventing the application of the reimbursement or, in order to ensure compliance with that principle, should the final consumer be recognised as having direct standing in such a case to bring an action against the Treasury, as a case where it is impossible or excessively difficult to obtain from the supplier a refund of the tax unduly paid?

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Canon Inc. to bear its own costs as well as those incurred by the European Commission;

3.

Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs.

1.

Upholds the Czech Republic’s action in so far as it concerns the repayment by the European Commission of the sum of 17 828 399,66 Czech koruny (CZK) paid in respect of the European Union’s own resources;

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.

Orders the parties to bear their own costs.

1.

The operation of Decision C(2021) 3339 final, relating to the recovery of a debt in the amount of EUR 4 241 507,00 payable by HB under the contract with reference TACIS/2006/101-510, and Commission Decision C(2021) 3340 final of 5 May 2021 relating to the recovery of a debt in the amount of EUR 1 197 055,86 payable by the applicant under the contract with reference CARDS/2008/166-429, is suspended.

2.

Costs are reserved.

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

—

declare that the cited measures of the Commission DH (Directorate-General for Research and Innovation — Directorate H — Common Implementation Centre — H.2. Common Audit Service) and of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs — in particular the LOC (Letter of Conclusion Ref. Ares (2021)7900224 — 21/12/2021 of the European Commission ref. CAIA389007), the FAR (Final Audit Report annexed to the LOC), the letter requesting repayment (Confirmation Letter of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs of 15 March 2022) and the debit note (note of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs No 3242203436 of 15 March 2022), are null and void, unlawful, annulled or in any event ineffective;

—

declare that the excluded costs are eligible costs for the purposes of the Dante Grant Agreement and, accordingly, that Engineering is entitled to have those costs taken into account for the purpose of determining the total amount of the subsidy provided for in that agreement and, in any event, that the Commission is not entitled to recover those sums;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging misapplication by the European Commission — European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs of the provisions of the Dante Grant Agreement.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging breach of the applicant’s legitimate expectations.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging misinterpretation of the ‘Dante’ Grant Agreement and of the contractual provision in question, eligible costs having been excluded on the basis of the wording of that agreement, for the reasons set out in relation to the first plea in law.

—

find that the defendants incurred non-contractual liability and order the SRB and the Commission to compensate the applicants for the harm suffered as a result of the resolution decision relating to the BPE (Banco Popular Español S.A. and its subsidiaries);

—

order the SRB and the Commission to pay the costs of the present proceedings;

—

order that all the sums awarded to the applicants accrue compensatory interest as from 23 May 2017 (or, in the alternative, as from 7 June 2017) up to the date of the judgment and, in addition, default interest as from the date of the judgment, except for the costs of the present proceedings, which will accrue only default interest as from the date of the judgment, and

—

award to the applicants any additional remedy that it considers appropriate in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the declarations and information disclosed constituted a sufficiently serious breach of the duty of confidentiality, the principles of due diligence and of sound administration and the nemo auditur propiam turpitudinem allegans principle.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a sufficiently serious breach of the principles of due diligence, sound administration, the duty to state reasons and the principle of non-discrimination and prohibition of arbitrariness in the decision-making process.

In that regard, it is stated that the conditions to put the BPE in resolution were not satisfied, that a fair, prudent and realistic independent valuation was not guaranteed and the resolution measure is discriminatory and arbitrary.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging sufficiently serious breach of the right to private property and the principle of proportionality.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court;

—

order Apcoa Parking Holdings to pay the costs of the proceedings before the EUIPO.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision in its entirety;

—

order EUIPO and interested party to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in relation to the present action of annulment.

—

Infringement of Article 46(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council in connection with Article 103(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

declare the present application for annulment admissible and well founded;

—

partially annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/397 (1) of 9 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures with regard to actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as it concerns Mr Alexander Vinokurov;

—

partially annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 (2) of 9 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine in so far as it concerns Mr Alexander Vinokurov;

—

order the Council of the European Union to pay all the costs and expenses of the proceedings;

—

reserve to the applicant all other rights, remedies and actions.

1.

First plea in law, alleging lack of sufficiently precise and specific reasons in support of the act complained of. In support of that plea, the applicant submits, inter alia, that the Council’s reasons refer to sectors of activity, whereas the criteria referred to in Decision CFSP 2022/397 refer only to specific persons. The applicant also alleges that the criterion relating to the provision of substantial revenue is not specified and that the use of the grounds does not correspond to any relevant criteria raised by the Council. Finally, the applicant considers that the ground relating to the support or implementation of actions or policies differs from the relevant criterion, which is ‘material or financial’ support for the Government of the Russian Federation.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Council committed a manifest error of assessment with regard to the relevant criteria used by it, namely, material or financial support for Russian decision-makers, taking advantage of the Government of the Russian Federation or providing a substantial source of income to that Government.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, on the grounds that the extension of the inclusion criteria now makes it possible to penalise persons with no connection with the situation in Ukraine. Thus, it is argued that the Council refers to the provision of substantial sources of income by certain sectors of activity but does not consider either the applicant’s market share in those sectors or the applicant’s capital holding in the companies mentioned.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging violation of the applicant’s rights of defence and effective judicial protection.

—

annul the contested decision in so far as it confirms the declaration of partial invalidity of EU trade mark No 17 880 952 made by the Cancellation Division of EUIPO by decision of 19 April 2021, Cancellation No 38283 C;

—

annul the contested decision in so far as it orders the applicant to bear the costs incurred by Marco Viti Farmaceutici in the appeal proceedings before EUIPO;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Articles 60 and 8 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

Annul the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/429 of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427 of 15 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (2) (‘Contested Acts’) so far as they include the applicant in the list of persons and entities made subject to the restrictive measures;

—

Order the Council to bear the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons, of Article 296 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and of Article 41 (2) (c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as breach of the right to effective judicial protection and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment, failure to discharge the burden of proof, breach of the listing criteria set forth in Article 1 (1) (a) and (e) and 2 (1) (a) and (g) of Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 and in Article 3 (1) (a) and (g) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014, both concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality and the breach of the applicant’s fundamental rights to property and freedom to conduct business (Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the fundamental principle of non-discrimination.

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (1) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/351 of 1 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (2); and

—

order the defendant to bear the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging Article 29 of the TEU and Article 215 of the TFUE do not provide a lawful basis for the contested decision and the contested regulation, respectively, and/or the defendant acted outside its competence as enshrined the Treaties, in particular Title V of the TEU.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the contested regulation and the contested decision violate Article 11 and Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the contested regulation and the contested decision violate Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and constitute an infringement of rules of law relating to the application of the Treaties, more specifically the general principles of good administration.

—

Annul, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/429 of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions under-mining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (1) as well as of the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427 of 15 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (2) (‘Contested Acts’) — in so far as those acts concern the applicant; and

—

order the Council to pay the costs pursuant to Article 134 of the Rules of Procedure.

—

the Council’s reasons for listing the applicant are materially flawed;

—

the Council fails to identify the individual, specific and concrete reasons why restrictive measures were imposed on the applicant, and the reasons relied on are not sufficiently detailed, contrary to the Council’s obligations;

—

the evidence provided is insufficient to support the listing of the applicant by the way of the Contested Acts.

—

set aside the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to bear the costs, including those incurred by the applicant before the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

—

Infringement of Article 67(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

—

annul the decision of the European Commission contained in the letter of 16 May 2022, relating to the offsetting of the amounts receivable by way of the daily penalty payments imposed by the order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 20 September 2021 (Czech Republic v Poland, C-121/21 R, EU:C:2021:752) with regard to the period from 18 January 2022 to 3 February 2022;

—

order the European Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging lack of competence on the part of the Commission and infringement of Articles 101 and 102 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (1) read in conjunction with Article 98 thereof, as a result of the application of the procedure for recovering the amounts receivable by offsetting, despite the fact that those amounts had ceased to exist. The applicant submits that the Commission had no legal basis on which to adopt the contested decision given that, as a result of the settlement agreement concluded between the Polish and Czech Governments, the waiver by both parties of any claims, and the removal of Case C-121/21 (2) from the register of the Court of Justice, the effects of the order of 20 September 2021 had retroactively ceased to exist.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 296 TFEU, as well as of Article 41(2)(c) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as a result of an insufficient statement of reasons in the contested decisions. The applicant submits that, in adopting the contested decisions, the Commission failed to provide a statement of reasons, as required by the Treaty and the case-law of the Court of Justice, with regard to the legal basis for the procedure for recovering the amounts receivable conducted by means of that decision.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

reject Marmara Import-Export GmbH’s application of 17 June 2020 for a declaration of invalidity in respect of EU trade mark No 44 583 C;

in the alternative: refer the case back to EUIPO for a further hearing and decision;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those incurred in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of the right to be heard.

—

annul the Commission’s decision not to promote the applicant to grade AD 11 in the 2021 promotion procedure, which resulted from his failure to appear on the list of promoted officials;

—

annul the Commission’s decision to promote to grade AD 11 the officials appearing on the list of promoted officials in the 2021 promotion procedure;

—

annul the Commission’s decision of 1 April 2022 rejecting complaint No. R/620/21 lodged by the applicant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union;

—

annul all preliminary, consequential or connected acts or measures;

—

or, in the alternative, make provision for compensation for the damage resulting from the Commission’s unlawful measures.

1.

First plea in law, alleging misuse of powers and claiming that the applicant’s merits were assessed with clear and unjustified bias as compared with those of other officials who were less deserving of promotion.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that although the Commission is not obliged to provide reasons for its decisions vis-à-vis candidates who are not promoted, it does, however, have an obligation to provide reasons for a decision by which it rejects complaints lodged, within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, by a candidate who has not been promoted, and the reasoning in that decision must coincide with the reasoning of the decision against which the claim was lodged. That obligation was not met in the present case.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision in its entirety;

—

order, pursuant to Article 134 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in the present proceedings.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/397 (1) of 9 March 2022 in so far as it includes the applicant’s name on the list in Annex I to Council Decision (CFSP) 2014/145 of 17 March 2014;

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 (2) of 9 March 2022 in so far as it includes the applicant’s name on the list in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 2014/269 of 17 March 2014;

—

order the Council to pay EUR 500 000 on a provisional basis in respect of the non-material damage suffered by the applicant;

—

order the Council to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and the obligation to state reasons. The applicant submits, first of all, that the Council has not set out individual, specific and concrete reasons that would provide him with a sufficient indication of the validity of the restrictive measures taken against him. He considers that the contested decisions do not have a sufficiently solid factual basis and are based on grounds that are unsubstantiated and the cogency of which is only abstract. The applicant considers, next, that the Council has placed the burden on him to provide proof that the general facts alleged against him are not true, thus reversing the burden of proof, which is contrary to the most fundamental rights of the defence. Lastly, the applicant claims that the alleged grounds are insufficient and that there is no credible and substantive evidence in support of those grounds, and submits that that prevents an adequate judicial review of the lawfulness of the inclusion and maintenance of his name on the lists of persons subject to the restrictive measures in question.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment, on the ground that the applicant does not exercise, and has not exercised, decisive influence over the company PJSC SIBUR Holding. Furthermore, the company PJSC SIBUR Holding is not a significant source of revenue for the Russian government and does not have close ties to it.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and of equal treatment. The applicant submits that the grounds which allegedly justify the restrictive measures against him are discriminatory and disproportionate to the objective pursued by the Council.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights, namely the right to respect for property, the right to respect for his private and family life, the right of freedom to conduct a business and the right to the presumption of innocence.

—

annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/429 (1) of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as it concerns the applicant;

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427 (2) of 15 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of the actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine in so far as it concerns the applicant;

—

order the Council to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging lack of legal basis for the criterion of ‘leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine’, on the grounds that no sufficient ties have been established between the category of individuals covered by this criterion and the Russian Federation.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the criterion of ‘leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine’ is unlawful due to two breaches of the principle of proportionality. The applicant is of the view, first, that the criterion relied by the Council is manifestly inappropriate in the light of the objective pursued and secondly that there was a possibility of having recourse to less restrictive measures.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging an error of assessment. The applicant claims that, first, none of the evidence relied on by the Council meets the requirements of EU case-law regarding the standard and quality of evidence and secondly, that none of the assertions of the Council’s reasoning are established and therefore cannot be characterised by the criteria under (d) and (g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP in the version then in force.