Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2022/C 244/01)

Last publication

OJ C 237, 20.6.2022

Past publications

OJ C 222, 7.6.2022

OJ C 213, 30.5.2022

OJ C 207, 23.5.2022

OJ C 198, 16.5.2022

OJ C 191, 10.5.2022

OJ C 171, 25.4.2022

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

Conduct of judicial activity between 1 and 15 September 2022

(2022/C 244/02)

At its Plenary Meeting of 1 June 2022, the General Court took note of the fact that the taking of the oath before the Court of Justice by the new Judges of the General Court will take place on 15 September 2022 and, consequently, confirms that, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 5 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, until the new Judges of the General Court take up their duties:

—	the President of the General Court will be Mr van der Woude,

—	the Vice-President of the General Court will be Mr Papasavvas,

—	the Presidents of the Chambers of five and three Judges will be Mr Kanninen, Ms Tomljenović, Mr Gervasoni, Mr Spielmann, Ms Marcoulli, Mr da Silva Passos, Mr Svenningsen, Ms Costeira, Mr Kornezov, Mr De Baere,

—

the decision on the formation of Chambers of 30 September 2019, as most recently amended by the decision of 13 January 2022 (OJ C 52, 2022, p. 1), the decision of 4 October 2019 on the assignment of Judges to Chambers, as most recently amended by the decision of 13 January 2022 (OJ C 52, 2022, p. 1), the decision of 10 April 2019 on the composition of the Grand Chamber (OJ C 172, 2019, p. 2), the decision of 10 July 2019 on the method of designation of a Judge replacing a Judge prevented from acting (OJ C 263, 2019, p. 2) and the decision of 4 October 2019 on the criteria for assigning cases to Chambers (OJ C 372, 2019, p. 2) will continue to apply.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 5 May 2022 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha — Spain) — Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo v XU (C-451/19), QP (C-532/19)

(Joined Cases C-451/19 and C-532/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 20 TFEU - Union citizenship - Union citizen who has never exercised his or her right of freedom of movement - Application for a residence card for his or her family member who is a third-country national - Refusal - Obligation for the Union citizen to have sufficient resources - Obligation for spouses to live together - Minor child who is a Union citizen - National legislation and practice - Genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred on EU nationals - Deprivation)

(2022/C 244/03)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo

Defendants: XU (C-451/19), QP (C-532/19)

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 20 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from refusing an application for family reunification made for the benefit of a third-country national who is family member of a Union citizen, the latter being a national of that Member State and who has never exercised his or her right of freedom of movement, on the sole ground that that Union citizen does not have, for himself or herself and for that family member, sufficient resources so as not to become a burden on the national social assistance system, without there having been an examination of whether there exists, between that Union citizen and that member of his or her family, a relationship of dependency of such a nature that, in the event of a refusal to grant a derived right of residence to that family member, that Union citizen would be forced to leave the territory of the European Union as a whole and would thereby be deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by his or her status as a Union citizen;

2.

Article 20 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning, first, that a relationship of dependency capable of justifying the grant of a derived right of residence under that article does not exist on the sole ground that a national of a Member State who is an adult and has never exercised his or her right of freedom of movement, and his or her spouse, who is an adult and a third-country national, are required to live together under the obligations arising from marriage according to the law of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national and in which the marriage was entered into and, second, that, where the Union citizen is a minor, the assessment of the existence of a relationship of dependency capable of justifying the grant of a derived right of residence under that article to that child’s parent, who is a third-country national, must be based on the taking into account, in the child’s best interests, of all of the circumstances of the case. Where that parent lives on a stable basis with the other parent, who is a Union citizen, of that minor, there is a rebuttable presumption of such a relationship of dependency;

3.

Article 20 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a relationship of dependency capable of justifying the grant of a derived right of residence under that article to a minor child, who is a third-country national, of the spouse, who himself or herself is a third-country national, of a Union citizen who has never exercised his or her right of freedom of movement exists where the marriage between that Union citizen and his or her spouse produces a child who is a Union citizen and who has never exercised his or her right of freedom of movement, and where that child would be forced to leave the territory of the European Union as a whole if the minor child who is a third-country national were forced to leave the territory of the Member State concerned.

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(1)  OJ C 432, 23.12.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 5 May 2022 — European Commission v Stefano Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others

(Case C-54/20 P) (1)

(Appeal - Civil service - Non-contractual liability of the European Union based on a failure of an institution to fulfil its duty to ensure the protection of its officials - Delegation of the European Commission in Morocco - Murdered official - Non-material damage suffered by the official’s brother and sister - Remedy - Articles 270, 268 and 340 TFEU - Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union - Articles 40, 42b, 55a, 73, 90 and 91 - Concept of a ‘person to whom the Staff Regulations apply’ - Statement of reasons)

(2022/C 244/04)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: B. Schima, T.S. Bohr and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Stefano Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, Maria Letizia Missir Mamachi di Lusignano (represented by: F. Di Gianni, G. Coppo and A. Scalini, avvocati), Anne Jeanne Cécile Magdalena Maria Sintobin, Carlo Amadeo Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, Giustina Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, Tommaso Missir Mamachi di Lusignano, Filiberto Missir Mamachi di Lusignano

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Mr Stefano Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Ms Maria Letizia Missir Mamachi di Lusignano.

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(1)  OJ C 209, 22.6.2020.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 5 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo — Portugal) — BPC Lux 2 Sàrl and Others v Banco de Portugal, Banco Espírito Santo SA, Novo Banco SA

(Case C-83/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2014/59/EU - Banking union - Recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms - Articles 36, 73 and 74 - Protection of shareholders and creditors - Partial implementation before expiry of the period for transposition - Transposition in stages - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Article 17(1) - Right to property)

(2022/C 244/05)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: BPC Lux 2 Sàrl, BPC UKI LP, Bennett Offshore Restructuring Fund Inc., Bennett Restructuring Fund LP, Queen Street Limited, BTG Pactual Global Emerging Markets and Macro Master Fund LP, BTG Pactual Absolute Return II Master Fund LP, CSS LLC, Beltway Strategic Opportunities Fund LP, EJF Debt Opportunities Master Fund LP, TP Lux HoldCo Sàrl, VR Global Partners LP, CenturyLink Inc. Defined Benefit Master Trust, City of New York Group Trust, Dignity Health, GoldenTree Asset Management Lux Sàrl, GoldenTree High Yield Value Fund Offshore 110 Two Ltd, San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association, EJF DO Fund (Cayman) LP, Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group SA

Defendants: Banco de Portugal, Banco Espírito Santo SA, Novo Banco SA

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, applicable in the context of a resolution action, which, in principle, ensures the economic neutrality of that action and consists in the formation of a bridge institution and an asset separation tool, and which does not expressly provide: — for a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution under resolution to be carried out before the resolution action is adopted; — for potential compensation based on the valuation referred to in the previous indent to be paid to the institution under resolution or, where appropriate, to the holders of shares or other titles of ownership; — that shareholders of the institution under resolution are entitled to receive an amount not less than the amount it is calculated they would have received if the institution had been completely wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, such a safeguard mechanism being provided only for creditors whose claims have not been transferred; and — for a separate valuation from that referred to in the first indent to be carried out in order to determine whether shareholders and creditors would have received more favourable treatment if the institution under resolution had entered into normal insolvency proceedings.

2.

The transposition by a Member State in part, in national legislation relating to the resolution of credit institutions, of certain provisions of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC and Directives 2001/24/EC 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, before the expiry of the period prescribed for transposition of that directive is not, as a matter of principle, liable seriously to compromise the result prescribed by that directive, within the meaning of the judgment of 18 December 1997, Inter-Environment Wallonie (C-129/96, EU:C:1997:628).

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(1)  OJ C 247, 27.7.2020.

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 5 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van beroep te Antwerpen — Belgium) — FN v Universiteit Antwerpen and Others

(Case C-265/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Part-time work - Directive 97/81/EC - Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC - Clause 4.1 - Principle of non-discrimination - Part-time academic staff - Automatic permanent appointments reserved for academic staff members holding a full-time teaching post - Calculation of the percentage of a full-time workload to which a part-time workload corresponds - No requirements)

(2022/C 244/06)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hof van beroep te Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FN

Defendant: Universiteit Antwerpen, Vlaamse Autonome Hogeschool Hogere Zeevaartschool, PB, ZK, NG, ZN, UM

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Clause 4.1 of the Framework Agreement on part-time work, concluded on 6 June 1997, annexed to Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, as amended by Council Directive 98/23/EC of 7 April 1998, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation and practice under which an academic staff member holding a full-time teaching post is to be automatically appointed on a permanent basis, without any objective reason other than the fact that that position is held on a full-time basis, whereas an academic staff member holding a part-time teaching post is to be either appointed on a permanent basis or employed on a temporary basis;

2.

The Framework Agreement on part-time work, concluded on 6 June 1997, annexed to Council Directive 97/81, as amended by Directive 98/23, must be interpreted as meaning that it does not lay down any requirements for an employer hiring a part-time worker as to the method of calculating the full-time workload to which a part-time workload corresponds.

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(1)  OJ C 313, 21.9.2020.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 5 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — EB, JS, DP v Versicherungsanstalt öffentlich Bediensteter, Eisenbahnen und Bergbau (BVAEB)

(Case C-405/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Article 157 TFEU - Protocol (No 33) - Equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation - Directive 2006/54/EC - Article 5(c) and Article 12 - Prohibition of indirect discrimination on grounds of sex - Occupational social security scheme applicable after the date referred to in that protocol and that article 12 - Retirement pensions of civil servants - National legislation providing for an annual adjustment of retirement pensions - Adjustment on a reducing scale depending on the amount of the retirement pension, with no adjustment at all above a certain amount - Justifications)

(2022/C 244/07)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: EB, JS, DP

Defendant: Versicherungsanstalt öffentlich Bediensteter, Eisenbahnen und Bergbau (BVAEB)

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Protocol (No 33) concerning Article 157 TFEU, annexed to the FEU Treaty, and Article 12 of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation must be interpreted as meaning that the temporal limitation of the effects of the principle of equal treatment of men and women provided for in those provisions does not apply to national legislation which provides for an annual adjustment of the retirement pensions paid under an occupational social security scheme applicable after the date referred to in those provisions;

2.

Article 157 TFEU and Article 5(c) of Directive 2006/54 must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation providing for an annual adjustment on a reducing scale of the amount of retirement pensions of national civil servants, depending on that amount, with no adjustment at all above a certain pension amount, if that legislation adversely affects a significantly greater proportion of male beneficiaries than female beneficiaries, provided that that legislation pursues, in a consistent and systematic manner, the objectives of ensuring the long-term funding of retirement pensions and of narrowing the gap between State-funded pension levels, without going beyond what is necessary to attain those objectives.

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(1)  OJ C 378, 9.11.2020.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 5 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña — Spain) — Banco Santander, SA v J.A.C., M.C.P.R

(Case C-410/20) (1)

(Request for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2014/59/EU - Resolution of credit institutions and investment firms - General principles - Article 34(1) - Bail-in - Effects - Article 53(1) and (3) - Write-down of capital instruments - Article 60(2), first subparagraph, (b) and (c) - Articles 73 to 75 - Protection of shareholders’ and creditors’ rights - Directive 2003/71/EC - Prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading - Article 6 - Incorrect information in the prospectus - Action for damages brought after a resolution decision - Action for a declaration of nullity of a share purchase contract brought against the universal successor of the credit institution subject to the resolution decision)

(2022/C 244/08)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Banco Santander, SA

Defendants: J.A.C., M.C.P.R

Operative part of the judgment

The combined provisions of Article 34(1)(a), Article 53(1) and (3), and Article 60(2), first subparagraph, (b) and (c) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, must be interpreted as precluding, following a total write-down of shares in the capital stock of a credit institution or investment firm subject to a resolution procedure, persons having acquired shares, in the context of a public offer to subscribe issued by that institution or firm, before the opening of such a resolution procedure, from bringing, against that institution or firm or its successor entity, an action for damages on the basis of the information provided in the prospectus, as provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/11/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008, or an action for a declaration of nullity of the purchase contract for such shares, which, given its retroactive effect, results in the restitution of the value of said shares, plus interest from the date of conclusion of the contract.

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(1)  OJ C 423, 7.12.2020.

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Úřad pro přístup k dopravní infrastruktuře — Czech Republic) — CityRail a.s. v Správa železnic, státní organizace

(Case C-453/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 267 TFUE - Concept of ‘court or tribunal’ - Criteria relating to the constitution and function of that body - Exercise of judicial or administrative functions - Directive 2012/34/EU - Articles 55 and 56 - Single national regulatory body for the railway sector - Independent regulatory authority for the sector - Entitlement to act on an ex officio basis - Power to impose penalties - Decisions that are open to challenge before the courts - Inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling)

(2022/C 244/09)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Úřad pro přístup k dopravní infrastruktuře

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CityRail a.s.

Defendant: Správa železnic, státní organizace

Intervening party: ČD Cargo a.s.

Operative part of the judgment

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Úřad pro přístup k dopravní infrastruktuře (Transport infrastructure access authority, Czech Republic) is inadmissible.

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(1)  OJ C 62, 22.2.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 5 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d'État — France) — Association France Nature Environnement v Premier ministre, Ministre de la Transition écologique et solidaire

(Case C-525/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Directive 2000/60/EC - Framework for European Union action in the field of water policy - Article 4(1)(a) - Environmental objectives relating to surface water - Obligation of the Member States not to authorise a programme or a project that may cause a deterioration of the status of a body of surface water - Concept of ‘deterioration’ of the status of a body of surface water - Article 4(6) and (7) - Derogations from the prohibition of deterioration - Conditions - Programme or project with temporary, short-term impacts which are without lasting consequences on the status of a body of surface water)

(2022/C 244/10)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d'État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Association France Nature Environnement

Defendants: Premier ministre, Ministre de la Transition écologique et solidaire

Operative part of the judgment

Article 4 of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy must be interpreted as precluding Member States, when they assess the compatibility of a particular programme or project with the objective of preventing the deterioration of water quality, from taking into account the temporary, short-term impacts which are without lasting consequences, unless it is clear that such impacts have, by their nature, little effect on the status of the bodies of water concerned and cannot lead to a ‘deterioration’ of that status, within the meaning of that provision. Where, as part of the authorisation procedure for a programme or project, the competent national authorities determine that that programme or project could lead to such a deterioration, that programme or project may be authorised only if the conditions set out in Article 4(7) of that directive are met, even if the deterioration is temporary in nature.

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(1)  OJ C 35, 1.2.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 12 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Venezia — Italy) — U.I. Srl v Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli — Ufficio delle dogane di Venezia

(Case C-714/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Customs Union - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 201 - Persons liable for payment of VAT - Import VAT - Union Customs Code - Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 - Article 77(3) - Joint and several liability of the indirect customs representative and the importing company - Customs duties)

(2022/C 244/11)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Commissione tributaria provinciale di Venezia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: U.I. Srl

Defendant: Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli — Ufficio delle dogane di Venezia

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 77(3) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that, according to only that provision, an indirect customs representative is liable solely for the customs duties payable in respect of goods which he or she has declared for customs purposes, but not also for the import value added tax in respect of the same goods;

2.

Article 201 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that an indirect customs representative cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the importer for the payment of import value added tax where there are no national provisions explicitly and unequivocally designating or acknowledging that indirect customs representative as being liable for that tax.

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(1)  Date lodged: 24/12/2020.

Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Okresný súd Prešov — Slovakia) — Rozhlas a televízia Slovenska v CI

(Case C-638/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court - Unfair terms in consumer contracts - Directive 93/13/EEC - Scope - Legal relationship between a national radio broadcaster and a natural person who is subject to the radio fee - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2022/C 244/12)

Language of the case: Slovak.

Referring court

Okresný súd Prešov

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Rozhlas a televízia Slovenska

Defendant: CI

Operative part of the order

The request for a preliminary ruling lodged by the Okresný súd Prešov (District Court, Prešov, Slovakia), by decision of 8 September 2021, is manifestly inadmissible.

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(1)  Lodged on: 19.10.2021.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción No 2 — León (Spain) lodged on 22 October 2021 — ACNC v Unicaja Banco, SA

(Case C-652/21)

(2022/C 244/13)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción No 2 — León

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ACNC

Defendant: Unicaja Banco, SA

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts be interpreted as meaning that the repayment only of the amounts unduly paid pursuant to an unfair term fulfils the obligation to make repayment in full? Alternatively, must that obligation be considered to be fulfilled by the addition to those amounts of the statutory interest accruing thereon from the date of each undue payment, as provided for by national law?

2.

If the answer is that repayment in full does include statutory interest: 2.1. Do Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts preclude the national civil procedural law principles of the delimitation of the subject matter of an action by the parties and of the correlation between the claims put forward in the action and the rulings contained in the operative part where the action is not seeking repayment in full of the statutory interest accrued on the amounts to be repaid? 2.2. Do Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts preclude national courts from upholding a claim that is not seeking the entirety of the statutory interest due on the amounts to be repaid? 2.3. Does the principle of effectiveness laid down in Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts preclude national courts from declining to award part of the interest accrued on the amounts to be repaid where the applicant has not claimed that interest? 2.4. Do the principles of effectiveness and of repayment in full laid down in Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts permit or require national courts to decide to increase the amount of the claim to cover amounts not claimed in the application in order to achieve repayment in full, including the part of the statutory interest that was not claimed in the application, where this is done for the consumer’s benefit?

3.

If the answer to question 2.4. is in the negative, does Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 preclude the national civil procedural law principles of res judicata and of time-barring in respect of facts for the purposes of reserving to a subsequent action a claim for the accrued statutory interest not claimed in the application?

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(1)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

Appeal brought on 1 February 2022 by Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 1 December 2021 in Case T-467/20, Inditex v EUIPO — Ffauf Italia (ZARA)

(Case C-65/22 P)

(2022/C 244/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex) (represented by: C. Duch Fonoll and S. Sáenz de Ormijana Rico, abogadas)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Ffauf Italia SpA

By order of 6 May 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex) should bear its own costs.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 17 February 2022 — DX, Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) v Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social

(Case C-113/22)

(2022/C 244/15)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: DX, Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS)

Defendant: Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social

Questions referred

1.

Must the administrative authority’s practice, set out in administrative position 1/2020 of the INSS’ Subdirectorate-General for Planning and Legal Services of 31 January 2020, of systematically refusing to grant the supplement at issue to men and requiring them to pursue their claims through the courts, as has happened to the applicant in the present case, be regarded, in accordance with Council Directive 79/7/EEC (1) of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, as an administrative breach of that directive, which is different from the legislative breach found to have been committed in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 December 2019 in WA (C-450/18), (2) so that, considered in itself, that administrative breach constitutes discrimination on grounds of sex, in view of the fact that, according to Article 4 of that directive, the principle of equal treatment means that there is to be no discrimination whatsoever on ground of sex, either directly, or indirectly, and that, according to Article 5 of that directive, Member States are to take the measures necessary to ensure that any legislative or administrative provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment are abolished?

2.

In the light of the answer to the previous question, and having regard to Directive 79/7 (in particular Article 6 thereof and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness in relation to the legal consequences of non-compliance with EU law), must the effective date of the judicial recognition of the supplement be the date of the application (backdated by three months), or must the effective date be backdated to the date on which the judgment of the Court of Justice in WA was delivered or published, or to the date of the operative event for the permanent incapacity benefit to which the supplement at issue relates?

3.

In the light of the answer to the previous questions, and having regard to the applicable directive (in particular Article 6 thereof and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness in relation to the legal consequences of non-compliance with EU law), is it appropriate to award compensation by way of reparation for the loss sustained and exemplary damages, on the ground that that loss is not addressed by the determination of the effective date of the judicial recognition of the supplement, and in any event, must the compensation cover the court fees and costs of legal representation before the Juzgado de lo Social (Social Court) and the Sala de lo Social (Social Chamber) of the referring court?

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(1)  OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24.

(2)  EU:C:2019:1075.

Appeal brought on 21 February 2022 by Zoï Apostolopoulou and Anastasia Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki against the judgment delivered on 21 December 2021 in Joined Cases T-721/18 and T-81/19, Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v European Commission

(Case C-124/22 P)

(2022/C 244/16)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellants: Zoï Apostolopoulou and Anastasia Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki (represented by: D. Gkouskos, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants submit that the Court of Justice should:

—	set aside the judgment of the General Court of 21 December 2021 in Joined Cases T-721/18 and T-81/19; (1)

—	uphold the actions in Joined Cases T-721/18 and T-81/19 in their entirety;

—	order the other party to the proceedings to pay the costs incurred by the appellants at first and second instance.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of their appeal, the appellants rely on five grounds of appeal.

1.    First ground of appeal: contradictory and incorrect reasoning regarding the breach of the principle of sound administration on the part of the Commission

In the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed as inadmissible the applicants’ plea alleging breach of the principle of sound administration, holding that the applications in the joined cases fail to set out the facts and law on which that plea is based, that is to say, the General Court based its finding on an incorrect and contradictory reasoning, in that (1) the General Court itself ruled that the subject matter of the applications was clear, precise and complete, and rejected the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Commission on the basis of the imprecise nature of those applications (paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal); (2) the General Court itself held (paragraph 124 of the judgment under appeal) that the Commission had indeed set out in its written pleadings, with regard to the applicants, the false allegations which the applicants regard as constituting conduct contrary to the principle of sound administration. In other words, not only were the necessary facts and law set out (as is apparent, moreover, from a mere reading of the pleadings in the two applications), but the General Court itself had already ruled on them; (3) the General Court’s finding that the Commission made false assertions concerning the applicants in judicial proceedings seeking to recover sums of money which were NOT awarded against the applicants in itself demonstrates a clear breach of the principle of sound administration on the part of the Commission. If that were not the case, it would have to be accepted that the false claims made by an EU institution before the national court to the detriment EU citizens is a practice consistent with the rules of sound administration.

2.    Second plea in law: Defective statement of reasons based on arguments which were not raised and failure to adjudicate on the claims for compensation in respect of non-material damage resulting from specific false and offensive allegations made by the Commission

Rather than examining the specific false and offensive allegations made with regard to the applicants and the passages set out in the Commission’s pleadings, which formed the background and the subject matter of the two actions, in order to determine whether those allegations constitute an infringement of the applicants’ personality and whether they form the basis of a claim for compensation for non-material damage, as the applicants claim in their two applications, the General Court held that the Commission had not accused the applicants of fraud and, on the basis of that finding, dismissed the applications in the joined cases. However, that finding is unrelated to the subject matter of those actions, since the applicants do not, by their actions, seek financial compensation because the Commission accused them of alleged acts of fraud. By that finding, the General Court has adjudicated on a plea that was not raised by the applicants, with the result that that assessment does not constitute a lawful statement of reasons. Thus, the General Court failed, first, to adjudicate on the joined actions and, second, to base its judgment on a lawful statement of reasons.

3.    Third plea in law: Distortion of the applicants’ arguments and contradictory assessments of the breach of the principle of due process and of the right to a fair hearing

Quite contradictorily, the General Court, while correctly stating that the applicants claim that the conduct complained of against the Commission in Case T-81/19 is contrary to both the duty of truthfulness and fairness of the parties to the proceedings, which is a principle common to the Member States, and the fundamental general principle of the sound administration of justice (right to a fair trial), then held that the applicants had not relied on any infringement of a rule of EU law. Yet it is clear from a simple reading of the claims made in their applications that they do so. In so doing, the General Court dismissed that part of the action in Case T-81/19 and based its judgment on a contradictory and defective statement of reasons.

4.    Fourth plea in law: Distortion of the subject matter of the actions and misinterpretation and misapplication of Articles 299, 268 and 340 TFEU

The General Court wrongly considered that (1) the subject matter of the dispute was the conduct of the Commission’s representatives (as legal representatives), whereas the Commission itself is a party to the dispute and liable to pay compensation on the basis of its non-contractual liability; (2) the breach of the Commission’s duty of truthfulness and the infringement of the applicants’ right to a fair trial fall within the scope of the review of whether enforcement is being carried out in an irregular manner, which is a matter for the national courts, whereas the infringements committed by the Commission referred to in the actions constitute infringements of the fundamental rights of EU citizens by an EU institution which give rise to a right to compensation on the basis of non-contractual liability, the General Court alone having jurisdiction under Articles 268 and 340 TFEU; and (3) the applicants rely on an infringement of national procedural rules, when they rely on the infringement of legal principles common to all Member States, of a general principle of EU law and of individual fundamental rights protected by EU law, as is apparent from a simple readings of the application and as the General Court itself accepted in other parts of its judgment.

5.    Fifth plea in law: Misinterpretation and misapplication of Articles 299, 317 and 325 TFEU

While fully accepting the allegation criticising the Commission for ‘false reports’ to the detriment of the applicants, the General Court arbitrarily extends the Commission’s right to accelerate the enforcement of its claim, disregarding in a paradoxical manner unprecedented in legal thinking, on account of the fact that the Commission cannot falsely exercise that inalienable right and in breach of the applicants’ fundamental individual rights, which constitute the minimum democratic threshold for any unlawful conduct on the part of EU institutions.

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(1)  ECLI: ECLI:EU:T:2021:933

Appeal brought on 3 March 2022 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 21 December 2021 in Case T-795/19, HB v European Commission

(Case C-160/22 P)

(2022/C 244/17)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: J. Baquero Cruz, J. Estrada de Solà and B. Araujo Arce, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: HB

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

—

Set aside the judgment delivered by the General Court on 21 December 2021 (T-795/19), in so far as it dismisses as inadmissible the action for annulment against Commission Decision C(2019) 7319 final of 15 October 2019 (point 1 of the operative part), and orders the Commission to pay the costs, including those relating to the interim proceedings (point 3 of the operative part);

—	Refer the case back to the General Court for a decision on the substance;

—	Order HB to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the Commission puts forward three grounds of appeal.

The first ground of appeal alleges an error of legal characterisation, in that the General Court overlooked and rendered ineffective the provisions of the Decision adopted by the Commission in the exercise of its public powers within a contractual framework, by characterising those measures as contractual and subject to adjudication by the courts with jurisdiction to hear contractual disputes. That incorrect legal characterisation concerns paragraphs 67 to 90 of the judgment under appeal.

The second ground of appeal alleges an incorrect legal characterisation of Article 1 of the Decision (paragraphs 67 to 78 of the judgment) and a distortion of the facts. In its characterisation of Article 1 of the Decision, which establishes HB’s liability for an irregularity in the contract award procedure, the General Court distorted the facts and incorrectly characterised Article 1 as contractual in nature.

The third ground of appeal alleges an incorrect legal characterisation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Decision (paragraphs 79 to 86 of the judgment). In applying the reduction of the price of the contract to EUR 0 and recovering the amounts already paid, the Commission did not act within a contractual framework, but exercised its public powers. The General Court erred in treating those provisions in the same way as if they were the consequences of a contractual annulment on grounds of fraud or vitiated consent.

Appeal brought on 3 March 2022 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 21 December 2021 in Case T-796/19, HB v European Commission

(Case C-161/22 P)

(2022/C 244/18)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: J. Baquero Cruz, J. Estrada de Solà and B. Araujo Arce, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: HB

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

—

Set aside the judgment delivered by the General Court on 21 December 2021 (T-796/19), in so far as it dismisses as inadmissible the action for annulment against Commission Decision C(2019) 7318 final of 15 October 2019 (point 1 of the operative part), and orders the Commission to pay the costs, including those relating to the interim proceedings (point 3 of the operative part);

—	Refer the case back to the General Court for a decision on the substance;

—	Order HB to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the Commission puts forward three grounds of appeal.

The first ground of appeal alleges an error of legal characterisation, in that the General Court overlooked and rendered ineffective the provisions of the Decision adopted by the Commission using its public powers within a contractual framework, by characterising those measures as contractual and subject to adjudication by the courts with jurisdiction to hear contractual disputes. That incorrect legal characterisation concerns paragraphs 62 to 87 of the judgment under appeal.

The second ground of appeal alleges an incorrect legal characterisation of Article 1 of the Decision (paragraphs 62 to 73 of the judgment) and a distortion of the facts. In its characterisation of Article 1 of the Decision, which establishes HB’s liability for an irregularity in the contract award procedure, the General Court distorted the facts and incorrectly characterised Article 1 as contractual in nature.

The third ground of appeal alleges an incorrect legal characterisation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Decision (paragraphs 74 to 83 of the judgment). In applying the reduction of the price of the contract to EUR 0 and recovering the amounts already paid, the Commission did not act within a contractual framework, but exercised its public powers. The General Court erred in treating those provisions in the same way as if they were the consequences of a contractual annulment on grounds of fraud or vitiated consent.

Appeal brought on 3 March 2022 by MG against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 21 December 2021 in Case T-573/20, MG v European Investment Bank

(Case C-173/22 P)

(2022/C 244/19)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: MG (represented by: L. Levi, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Investment Bank

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

—	Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 21 December 2021 in Case T-573/20;

—

In consequence thereof, grant the appellant the relief sought at first instance and, accordingly: — Annul the EIB decision of 11 October 2018 by which the appellant was denied family allowances (including inter alia day care and CPE costs unduly deducted by the EIB from the appellant’s salary until November 2019) and derived financial rights (including inter alia tax reliefs and reimbursement of the medical expenses of the appellant’s dependent children); — If necessary, annul the letter/decision of 7 January 2019 rejecting all of the appellant’s requests; — If necessary, annul the EIB decision dated 30 July 2020 noting the absence of conciliation and confirming the decision of 11 October 2018; — Provide compensation for the material and non-material harm suffered by the appellant.

—	Order the respondent to pay the entire costs of both proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant puts forward the following grounds of appeal:

—	The judgment under appeal misconstrued the concept of the right to a fair hearing;

—	The judgment under appeal infringed the applicable regulatory framework relating to the obligation to state reasons;

—	The judgment under appeal distorted the file and misconstrued the concept of a manifest error of assessment. It also infringed the principles of equal treatment and proportionality by rejecting the plea of illegality raised in respect of the administrative provisions relating to family allowances;

—	The judgment under appeal infringed the applicable legislative framework (Article 3(4) of Regulation No 260/68 (1));

—

The judgment under appeal distorted the file in rejecting the fifth plea in law, infringed Article 85 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and erred in its classification of the facts. The General Court did not respond to all of the complaints raised and failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons.

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(1)  Regulation (EEC, Euratom ECSC) No 260/68 of the Council of 29 February 1968 laying down the conditions and the procedure for applying the tax for the benefit of the European Communities (OJ 1968 L 56, p. 8).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca do Porto — Juízo Local Cível da Maia (Portugal) lodged on 15 March 2022 — WH, NX v TAP — Transportes Aéreos Portugueses, SGPS, SA

(Case C-202/22)

(2022/C 244/20)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Judicial da Comarca do Porto — Juízo Local Cível da Maia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: WH, NX

Defendant: TAP — Transportes Aéreos Portugueses, SGPS, SA

Questions referred

1.

In the light of Articles 5(1)(c), 6(1), 7(1) and 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 261/2004, (1) must compensation be paid in the same way as it is for flight delays where transport to the final destination by bus, which is provided by an operating air carrier to passengers who missed a flight connection, is very late?

2.

In the light of recital 14 and Article 7(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, does the breakdown of that bus and the need to replace it on the journey to the final destination constitute an extraordinary circumstance which exempts the air carrier from the obligation to pay compensation to passengers where the bus arrives at the final destination much later than its scheduled or expected arrival time?

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(1)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 23 March 2022 — Research Consorzio Stabile Scarl, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa) and Others v Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa and Others

(Case C-215/22)

(2022/C 244/21)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Research Consorzio Stabile Scarl, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa); C.I.S.A. SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa); Debar Costruzioni SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association to be constituted with Consorzio Stabile COM Scarl, C.N. Costruzioni Generali SpA and Edil.Co. Srl; Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa

Defendants: Invitalia — Agenzia Nazionale per l’Attrazione degli Investimenti e lo Sviluppo di Impresa; Debar Costruzioni SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association to be constituted with Consorzio Stabile COM Scarl, C.N. Costruzioni Generali SpA and Edil.Co. Srl; Consorzio Stabile Scarl, acting on its own account and as agent of the association of undertakings to be constituted (Research-Cisa); C.I.S.A. SpA, acting on its own account and as agent of the association to be constituted (Research-Cisa)

Question referred

Do Articles 63 and 71 of Directive 2014/24 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) together with the principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services laid down in Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (FEU Treaty), preclude an interpretation of national Italian law on necessary subcontracting under which a tenderer which does not have the mandatory qualification in one or more secondary sub-categories cannot satisfy the non-fulfilled requirement by having recourse to several subcontracting undertakings or by aggregating the amounts for which those undertakings are qualified?

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(1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen (Germany) lodged on 23 March 2022 — A.A. v Bundesrepublik Deutschland

(Case C-216/22)

(2022/C 244/22)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A.A.

Defendant: Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Questions referred

1.

a. Is a national provision which considers a subsequent application admissible only if the factual or legal position on which the original rejection decision was based has subsequently changed in favour of the applicant compatible with Article 33(2)(d) and Article 40(2) of Directive 2013/32/EU? (1) b. Do Article 33(2)(d) and Article 40(2) of Directive 2013/32/EU preclude a national provision that does not treat a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (here: in preliminary ruling proceedings under Article 267 TFEU) as a ‘new element’ or ‘new circumstance’ or ‘new finding’ if the decision does not establish the incompatibility of a national provision with EU law but is limited to the interpretation of EU law? What conditions, if any, apply in order for a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union which merely interprets EU law to be taken into account as a ‘new element’ or ‘new circumstance’ or ‘new finding’?

2.

If Questions 1a and 1b are answered in the affirmative: must Article 33(2)(d) and Article 40(2) of Directive 2013/32/EU be interpreted as meaning that a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union which has ruled that there is a strong presumption that a refusal to do military service under the conditions set out in Article 9(2)(e) of Directive 2011/95/EU (2) is linked to one of the five grounds listed in Article 10 of that directive must be taken into account as a ‘new element’ or ‘new circumstance’ or ‘new finding’?

3.

a. Must Article 46(1)(a)(ii) of Directive 2013/32/EU be interpreted as meaning that the judicial remedy against an inadmissibility decision taken by the determining authority within the meaning of Article 33(2)(d) and Article 40(5) of Directive 2013/32/EU is limited to examining whether the determining authority has correctly concluded that the conditions for the subsequent application for asylum to be considered inadmissible under Article 33(2)(d) and Article 40(2) and (5) of Directive 2013/32/EU have been met? b. If Question 3a is answered in the negative: must Article 46(1)(a)(ii) of Directive 2013/32/EU be interpreted as meaning that the judicial remedy against an inadmissibility decision also covers the examination of whether the conditions for the grant of international protection within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU have been met if the court finds, after conducting its own examination, that the conditions for the rejection of the subsequent application for asylum as inadmissible are not met? c. If Question 3b is answered in the affirmative: does such a decision by the court require that the applicant has first been granted the special procedural guarantees under the third sentence of Article 40(3) in conjunction with the rules in Chapter II of Directive 2013/32/EU? May the court conduct that procedure itself or must it delegate it to the determining authority, where necessary after suspending the court proceedings? Can the applicant waive compliance with those procedural guarantees?

---

(1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).

(2)  Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 29 March 2022 — Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl

(Case C-222/22)

(2022/C 244/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl

Interested party: JF

Question referred

Must Article 5(3) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), (1) be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which a foreign national who files a subsequent application is not normally to be granted asylum status if the risk of persecution is based on circumstances which the foreign national has created by his or her own decision since leaving his or her country of origin, unless the activities in question are permitted in Austria and it is established that those activities constitute the expression and continuation of convictions held in the country of origin?

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(1)  OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 6 April 2022 — NQ v Mara-Tóni Bt.

(Case C-244/22)

(2022/C 244/24)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: NQ

Defendant: Mara-Tóni Bt.

Intervening parties: Foudre Kft., Tasavill Bt.

Questions referred

1.	Does an undertaking that employs, without State authorisation, workers who actually work for a client thereof, to which those workers are assigned, fall within the scope of Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 2008/104/EC? (1)

2.

Do workers who have an employment relationship with an undertaking which, in the context of a work contract, assigns them to another undertaking in order to work, with the company that puts them to work providing them with the equipment, tools and instructions necessary to carry out the work, fall within the scope of Article 3(1)(c) of Directive [2008/104]?

3.

In so far as, having regard to the foregoing, the applicant and the electricians should be classified as temporary agency workers, should it be considered that they form an economic unit, a specific group of workers who engage continuously in an economic activity for successive undertakings belonging to the same circle of persons, even though those undertakings lack State authorisation to engage lawfully, either as transferor or transferee, in the temporary transfer of workers as temporary-work agencies and also taking into account the fact that, in the case of temporary agency work, there is, in principle, no transfer of assets?

4.	In so far as those workers are to be classified as an economic unit, as a specific group of workers, do they fall within the scope of Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC (2) although they are workers assigned by a temporary-work agency?

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(1)  Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 9).

(2)  Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16).

Appeal brought on 18 April 2022 by QI, QJ, QL, QM, QN, QP, QQ, QT, QU, QW, QX against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 9 February 2022 in Case T-868/16, QI and Others v Commission and ECB

(Case C-262/22 P)

(2022/C 244/25)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: QI, QJ, QL, QM, QN, QP, QQ, QT, QU, QW, QX (represented by: S. Pappas, A. Pappas, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, European Central Bank, Council of the European Union, European Council, QK, QO, QR, QS, QV

Form of order sought

The Appellants claim that the Court should:

—	set aside the judgment under appeal;

—	refer the case back to the General Court;

—	order the defendants to pay their own costs and the costs of the Appellants in the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

With the present appeal, the Appellants respectfully request the Court of Justice to review and set aside the appealed judgment, on the basis of two grounds:

First, that the General Court performed an inadequate examination of the third plea of illegality of the application, alleging a sufficiently serious breach of the right to property guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Charter. In turn, this improper examination resulted in the misapplication and infringement of the Appellants’ right to property.

Second, that the General Court infringed the principle of proportionality.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Upravni sud u Zagrebu (Croatia) lodged on 22 April 2022 — ANTERA d.o.o. v Hrvatska agencija za nadzor financijskih usluga

(Case C-278/22)

(2022/C 244/26)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Upravni sud u Zagrebu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ANTERA d.o.o.

Defendant: Hrvatska agencija za nadzor financijskih usluga

Questions referred

1.

Do operating leasing and/or long-term car rental services fall within the scope of Directive 2006/123/EC (the Services Directive), (1) as indicated in the Handbook on implementation of the Services Directive of 13 March 2008 issued by the Directorate-General for the Internal Market and Services? Should an entity that engages in operating leasing (but not financial leasing) and/or long-term car rental be considered a financial institution within the meaning of Article 4(1)(26) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013? (2)

2.

If the answer to the first question above is in the affirmative and the answer to the second question is in the negative, is granting the Hrvatska agencija za nadzor financijskih usluga (Croatian Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services) (HANFA) the power to supervise the provision of operating leasing and/or long-term car rental services pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Leasing Law, and to impose additional requirements and restrictions on undertakings that engage in such activities, compatible with Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, read in conjunction with Articles 9 to 13 of Directive 2006/123/EC?

3.

Must Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 9 to 13 of Directive 2006/123/EC, in circumstances such as those at issue in the present dispute, in which a parent company from one Member State wishes to provide in another Member State, through a subsidiary, services of the same type as those which it provides in the original Member State, be interpreted as permitting a national law (the Leasing Law) to impose additional requirements and restrictions on the subsidiary and thereby hinder or render less attractive engaging in the activity in question?

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(1)  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).

(2)  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 22 April 2022 — CH v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Case C-279/22)

(2022/C 244/27)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CH

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

Questions referred

1.	Is Article 2 of Directive 2013/34/EU (1) to be interpreted as meaning that that provision does not cover taxable persons who are private individuals, but instead applies only to commercial companies and other types of undertaking listed in Annexes I and II to that directive?

2.

If the answer is in the affirmative, does this mean that in the present case, the provisions of Directive 2013/34/EC which lay down obligations are consequently not applicable to private individuals, that is to say, that the obligations imposed on undertakings covered by that directive are not enforceable against taxable persons who are private individuals and cannot be used against them when examining their tax obligations?

3.

If the preceding question is answered in the affirmative, is an action of the tax authority of a Member State, which consists in determining a tax difference owed by a taxable person who is a private individual, on the basis of the provisions referred to in the Law on Accounting, solely because the taxable person has not been able to make available to the tax authority all of the accounting documents of a commercial company which is independent of the taxable person, in order to prove that he or she has, in the interests of that company, used, in his or her capacity as employer, the cash amounts which he or she has handled in the course of his or her work in accordance with instructions or orders and, consequently, the tax authority relies on the absence of certain documents which the taxable person was unlikely to have or could not have had for objective reasons, where those documents are publicly accessible as a result of the obligation of companies to publish their annual financial statements, in conformity with the basic accounting principles and with the objective and function of the publication requirement laid down in Articles 4, 30 and 33 of Directive 2013/34/EU as well as the right to a fair trial enshrined as a principle of law in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and with the fundamental principles of legal certainty and proportionality?

4.

Are the provisions of Directive 2013/34/EC — in particular the recitals and Articles 4, 6, 30 and 33 thereof — to be interpreted as meaning that fulfilment of the obligations laid down in those articles gives rise to a legal presumption that the information in the annual financial statements complies with basic accounting principles, in particular the principle of accuracy and the principle of justification?

5.

Is an action whereby the tax authority, without rebutting the legal presumption linked to compliance with the provisions of Directive 2013/34/EU and without examining the content of the tax return, does not accept the annual financial statements published by the company as evidence of the information contained in that tax return, stating that those financial statements are in themselves insufficient to provide reliable proof of any such information, in particular that the taxable person repaid to the commercial company the amounts which he or she had taken, but rather that the company’s entire accounting records are required for that purpose, in conformity with Articles 4, 6, 30 and 33 of Directive 2013/34/EU, as well as the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of legal certainty?

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(1)  Directive 2013/34.EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ 2013 L 182, p. 19).

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan v Commission

(Case T-242/19) (1)

(Dumping - Imports of cycles, with pedal assistance, with an auxiliary electric motor, originating in China - Definitive anti-dumping duties - Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/73 - Determination of injury - Article 3(2), (3) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 - Price undercutting calculation - Causal link)

(2022/C 244/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan Co. Ltd (Kunshan, China) (represented by: P. De Baere and J. Redelbach, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Luengo and T. Maxian Rusche, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/73 of 17 January 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2019 L 16, p. 108, and corrigendum OJ 2019 L 16 I, p. 1) in so far as it concerns the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Annuls Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/73 of 17 January 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China in so far as it concerns Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan Co. Ltd;

2.	Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan.

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(1)  OJ C 206, 17.6.2019.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan v Commission

(Case T-243/19) (1)

(Subsidies - Imports of cycles, with pedal assistance, with an auxiliary electric motor, originating in China - Definitive countervailing duties - Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 - Determination of injury - Article 8(1), (2) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 - Price undercutting calculation - Causal link)

(2022/C 244/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan Co. Ltd (Kunshan, China) (represented by: P. De Baere and J. Redelbach, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Luengo and T. Maxian Rusche, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 of 17 January 2019 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2019 L 16, p. 5) in so far as it concerns the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 of 17 January 2019 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China in so far as it concerns the applicant;

2.	Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan.

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(1)  OJ C 206, 17.6.2019.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Sieć Badawcza Łukasiewicz — Port Polski Ośrodek Rozwoju Technologii v Commission

(Case T-4/20) (1)

(Arbitration clause - Grant agreement concluded in the context of the Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) - Eligible costs - Request for reimbursement - Financial audit - OLAF investigation - Conflict of interest on account of family or emotional ties - Principle of good faith - Principle of non-discrimination on grounds of marital status - Legitimate expectations - Action for annulment - Debit notes - Acts inseparable from the contract - Act not open to challenge - Right to effective judicial review - Inadmissibility)

(2022/C 244/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Sieć Badawcza Łukasiewicz — Port Polski Ośrodek Rozwoju Technologii (Wrocław, Poland) (represented by: Ł. Stępkowski, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Araujo Arce and J. Estrada de Solà, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action, the applicant seeks, primarily, on the basis of Article 272 TFEU, a declaration that the contractual claim of the European Commission set out in six debit notes issued on 13 November 2019 for an aggregate amount of EUR 180 893,90, comprising a principal amount of EUR 164 449 and damages of EUR 16 444,90, is non-existent, and an order that the Commission repay the amounts contained in those debit notes, and, in the alternative, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, annulment of the Commission’s letter of 12 November 2019, which was addressed to the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Sieć Badawcza Łukasiewicz — Port Polski Ośrodek Rozwoju Technologii to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 87, 16.3.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Group Nivelles v EUIPO — Easy Sanitary Solutions (Shower drainage channel)

(Case T-327/20) (1)

(Community design - Invalidity proceedings - Registered Community design representing a shower drainage channel - Earlier design produced after the filing of the application for a declaration of invalidity - Article 28(1)(b)(v) of Regulation (EC) No 2245/2002 - Discretion of the Board of Appeal - Scope - Article 63(2) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 - Oral proceedings and measures of inquiry - Articles 64 and 65 of Regulation No 6/2002 - Ground for invalidity - Individual character - Article 6 and Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002 - Identification of the earlier design - Earlier whole design - Determination of the features of the contested design - Global comparison)

(2022/C 244/31)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Applicant: Group Nivelles NV (Gingelom, Belgium) (represented by: J. Jonkhout, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral and G. Predonzani, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Easy Sanitary Solutions BV (Oldenzaal, Netherlands) (represented by: F. Eijsvogels, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 17 March 2020 (Case R 2664/2017-3), relating to invalidity proceedings between Group Nivelles and Easy Sanitary Solutions.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Group Nivelles NV to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 240, 20.7.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 6 April 2022 — Mandelay v EUIPO — Qx World (QUEST 9)

(Case T-516/20) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU word mark QUEST 9 - Earlier EU word mark QUEX - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Articles 95 and 97 of Regulation 2017/1001)

(2022/C 244/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Mandelay Magyarország Kereskedelmi Kft. (Mandelay Kft.) (Szigetszentmiklós, Hungary) (represented by: V. Luszcz, C. Sár and É. Ulviczki, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Qx World Kft. (Budapest, Hungary) (represented by: Á. László and B. Mező, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 3 June 2020 (Case R 1900/2019-2), relating to opposition proceedings between QX WORLD and Mandelay.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mandelay Magyarország Kereskedelmi Kft. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by QX WORLD Kft.

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(1)  OJ C 339, 12.10.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 6 April 2022 — MF v eu-LISA

(Case T-568/20) (1)

(Civil service - Members of the temporary staff - Post occupied requiring security clearance - Clearance refused by the national security authority - Termination of the contract - No request for a hearing - Right to be heard within the meaning of Article 11(5)(b) of Decision 2015/444)

(2022/C 244/33)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: MF (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (represented by: M. Chiodi, acting as Agent, and by A. Duron and D. Waelbroeck, lawyers)

Re:

By his action under Article 270 TFEU, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 4 September 2020, the applicant seeks annulment, first, of the decision of the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) of 29 October 2019 terminating his employment contract and, second, to the extent necessary, of the decision of eu-LISA of 26 May 2020 rejecting his complaint of 29 January 2020.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders MF to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 399, 23.11.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 6 April 2022 — Planistat Europe and Charlot v Commission

(Case T-735/20) (1)

(Non-contractual liability - ‘Eurostat’ case - External investigation by OLAF - Forwarding to the national judicial authorities of information concerning matters liable to result in criminal proceedings before the conclusion of the investigation - Filing of a complaint by the Commission before the conclusion of the investigation - National criminal proceedings - Ruling that there is no need to adjudicate which has become final - No sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals)

(2022/C 244/34)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Planistat Europe (Paris, France), Hervé-Patrick Charlot (Paris) (represented by: F. Martin Laprade, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Baquero Cruz and F. Blanc, acting as Agents)

Re:

By their action based on Article 268 TFEU, the applicants seek compensation, first, for the non-material damage that Mr Charlot allegedly suffered as a result of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) having forwarded to the national authorities information relating to matters liable to be characterised as criminal, as well as of the complaint filed by the Commission with those authorities, and, secondly, for the material damage that they allegedly suffered as a result of the termination of contracts concluded between Planistat and the Commission.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Planistat Europe and Mr Hervé-Patrick Charlot to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 53, 15.2.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 6 April 2022 — Hungary v Commission

(Case T-57/21) (1)

(EAGF and EAFRD - Expenditure excluded from financing - Obligation to increase on-the-spot checks - Article 35 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 809/2014 - Legal value of the working documents of the Commission - Calculation of the increase in the rate of on-the-spot checks)

(2022/C 244/35)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: Hungary (represented by: M. Fehér and G. Koós, acting as Agents)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Aquilina, A. Sauka and Z. Teleki, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1734 of 18 November 2020 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2020 L 390, p. 10), only in so far as the European Commission excluded the sum of EUR 4 334 068,02 from the amount of financial aid granted to it by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) for the financial year 2018 on account of an insufficient number of on-the-spot checks.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Annuls Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1734 of 18 November 2020 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), only in so far as that the European Commission excluded the sum of EUR 4 334 068,02 from the amount of financial aid granted to Hungary by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) for the financial year 2018 on account of an insufficient number of on-the-spot checks;

2.	Orders the Commission to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 88, 15.3.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Boshab v Council

(Case T-103/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures adopted in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territory of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/36)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Évariste Boshab (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Lejeune, acting as Agent)

Re:

By his action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5) in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Évariste Boshab to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Kande Mupompa v Council

(Case T-104/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/37)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Alex Kande Mupompa (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Lejeune, acting as Agent)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Alex Kande Mupompa to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Kanyama v Council

(Case T-105/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/38)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Célestin Kanyama (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M.-C. Cadilhac and H. Marcos Fraile, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Célestin Kanyama to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Kazembe Musonda v Council

(Case T-106/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/39)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda (Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Lejeune, acting as Agent)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Amisi Kumba v Council

(Case T-107/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/40)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Gabriel Amisi Kumba (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: B. Driessen and H. Marcos Fraile, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Gabriel Amisi Kumba to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Ilunga Luyoyo v Council

(Case T-108/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/41)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M.-C. Cadilhac and H. Marcos Fraile, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in so far as those acts concern Mr Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo;

2.	Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Mutondo v Council

(Case T-109/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/42)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Kalev Mutondo (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck. P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: B. Driessen and H. Marcos Fraile, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Kalev Mutondo to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Kampete v Council

(Case T-110/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/43)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Ilunga Kampete (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De. Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: B. Driessen and H. Marcos Fraile, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Ilunga Kampete to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Numbi v Council

(Case T-112/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/44)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: John Numbi (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M.-C. Cadilhac and H. Marcos Fraile, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr John Numbi to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Ramazazni Shadary v Council

(Case T-119/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/45)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Emmanuel Ramazazni Shadary (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Lejeune, acting as Agent)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Emmanuel Ramazani to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Ruhorimbere v Council

(Case T-120/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/46)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Éric Ruhorimbere (Mbuji-Mayi, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M.-C. Cadilhac, acting as Agent)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Éric Ruhorimbere to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — LG Electronics v EUIPO — Anferlux-Electrodomésticos (SmartThinQ)

(Case T-181/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark SmartThinQ - Earlier national figurative mark SMARTTHING - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Translation of the list of goods covered by the earlier mark into the language of the proceedings - Genuine use of the earlier mark)

(2022/C 244/47)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: LG Electronics, Inc. (Seoul, South Korea) (represented by: M. Graf, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Capostagno, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Anferlux-Electrodomésticos, Lda (Vila Nova de Monsarros, Portugal)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 3 February 2021 (Case R 1657/2020-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Anferlux-Electrodomésticos and LG Electronics.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders LG Electronics, Inc., to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

---

(1)  OJ C 217, 7.6.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists v EUIPO — R. Lopez de Heredia Viña Tondonia (LOPEZ DE HARO)

(Case T-210/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark LOPEZ DE HARO - Earlier EU word mark LOPEZ DE HEREDIA - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 244/48)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists SLU (Logroño, Spain) (represented by: L. Broschat García and L. Polo Flores, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: S. Palmero Cabezas, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: R. Lopez de Heredia Viña Tondonia SA (Haro, Spain) (represented by: A. Sanz Cerralbo, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 February 2021 (Case R 1741/2020-5), relating to opposition proceedings between R. Lopez de Heredia Viña Tondonia and Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Vintae Luxury Wine Specialists SLU to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 228, 14.6.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 6 April 2022 — Saure v Commission

(Case T-506/21) (1)

(Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Contracts concluded by the Commission on behalf of the Member States for the delivery of COVID-19 vaccines - Invitation emails to meetings of the Steering Committee - Partial refusal to grant access - Exception relating to the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual - The transmission of personal data is not necessary for a specific purpose in the public interest - Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725)

(2022/C 244/49)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Hans-Wilhelm Saure (Berlin, Germany) (represented by: C. Partsch, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Herrmann, G. Gattinara and A. Spina, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 9 June 2021 partially refusing to grant him access to certain documents.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Hans-Wilhelm Saure to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 412, 11.10.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 6 April 2022 — Funline International v EUIPO (AMSTERDAM POPPERS)

(Case T-680/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark AMSTERDAM POPPERS - Absolute ground for refusal - Trade mark contrary to public policy - Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Distinctive character acquired through use - Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001)

(2022/C 244/50)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Funline International (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: Y. Echevarría García, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment and modification of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 20 August 2021 (Case R 439/2021-2).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Funline International to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 502, 13.12.2021.

Action brought on 11 April 2022 — Deutsche Bank and Others v ECB

(Case T-182/22)

(2022/C 244/51)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Deutsche Bank AG (Frankfurt am Main, Germany), BHW Bausparkasse AG (Hameln, Germany), norisbank GmbH (Bonn, Germany) (represented by: H. Berger and M. Weber, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

—	partially annul the decision of the ECB of 2 February 2022, including Annexes I and II, with regard to the requirements imposed on the applicants pursuant to paragraph 1.3 of the decision; and

—	order the ECB to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on three pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant has infringed Union law by exceeding the powers conferred on it in Article 4 and Article 16 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (1) and breaching basic principles of Union law, as there is no provision in Union law permitting paragraph 1.3 of the contested decision concerning the prudential treatment of irrevocable payment commitments (‘IPC Requirement’), the ECB failed to carry out an individual and methodologically correct examination of the applicants’ situation and the IPC Requirement is based on inaccurate facts and several manifest errors of assessment.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant has breached the principle of proportionality by requiring a deduction of the full amount of irrevocable payment commitments from the applicants’ Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) on a consolidated and/or individual level, without taking into account the individual situation of the applicants and setting a deduction appropriate to the applicants’ individual risk profile and level of liquidity, and without properly appreciating mitigating factors.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant has infringed the principle of good administration and legal certainty and erred in applying Article 4(1)(f) and Article 16(1)(c) and (2)(d) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 by imposing the IPC Requirement on the first and third applicants on an individual level. The first and third applicants have been granted waivers according to Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (2) and are, therefore, exempt from a prudential capital requirement on an individual level.

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63).

(2)  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1).

Action brought on 15 April 2022 — Naass and Sea Watch v Frontex

(Case T-205/22)

(2022/C 244/52)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Marie Naass (Berlin, Germany), Sea Watch eV (Berlin) (represented by: I. Van Damme and Q. Declève, lawyers)

Defendant: European Border and Coast Guard Agency

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

—	annul Frontex Decision DGSC/TO/PAD-2021-00350 of 7 February 2022;

—	order Frontex to bear the costs of the applicants.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that, in its Decision DGSC/TO/PAD-2021-00350 of 7 February 2022, Frontex did not appropriately state the reasons for its refusal to disclose certain documents pertaining to a specific event that took place in the Mediterranean sea on 30 July 2021, on the basis of the public security exception under Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. (1)

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that Decision DGSC/TO/PAD-2021-00350 of 7 February 2022 violates Article 4(6) of Regulation 1049/2001 by refusing partial access to the requested documents.

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).

Action brought on 27 April 2022 — Cylus Cyber Security v EUIPO — Cylance (CYLUS)

(Case T-227/22)

(2022/C 244/53)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Cylus Cyber Security Ltd (Tel Aviv, Israel) (represented by: S. Bailey, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Cylance, Inc. (Irvine, California, United States)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark CYLUS — Application for registration No 17 801 952

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 February 2022 in Case R 692/2022-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

—	Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 2 May 2022 — Lacapelle v Parliament

(Case T-240/22)

(2022/C 244/54)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Jean-Lin Lacapelle (Paris, France) (represented by: F.-P. Vos, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul decision D-301937 of the Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group of 3 March 2022 excluding Mr Jean-Lin Lacapelle from taking part in election observation delegations of the European Parliament until the end of his parliamentary mandate (2019-2024);

—	order the European Parliament to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 3 000, on the basis of Articles 87 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law which are, essentially, identical or similar to those relied upon in Case T-196/22, Mariani v Parliament.

Action brought on 2 May 2022 — Juvin v Parliament

(Case T-241/22)

(2022/C 244/55)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Hervé Juvin (Paris, France) (represented by: F.-P. Vos, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul decision D-301936 of the Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group of 3 March 2022 excluding Mr Hervé Juvin from taking part in election observation delegations of the European Parliament until the end of his parliamentary mandate (2019-2024);

—	order the European Parliament to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 3 000, on the basis of Articles 87 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law which are, essentially, identical or similar to those relied upon in Case T-196/22, Mariani v Parliament.

Action brought on 3 May 2022 — Pšonka v Council

(Case T-243/22)

(2022/C 244/56)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Applicant: Artem Viktorovyč Pšonka (Kramatorsk, Ukraine) (represented by: M. Mleziva, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/376 of 3 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/375 of 3 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, to the extent to which they relate to the applicant;

—	order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to sound administration. — The applicant claims in support of his action, inter alia, that the Council of the European Union did not act with due care and attention in the adoption of the contested decision, since before the adoption of the contested decision it did not address the applicant’s arguments and the evidence he had adduced, which supports his case, and it primarily based its decision on information provided by the Ukrainian institutions and did not request any supplementary information on the course of the investigations in the Ukraine.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s right to property. — The applicant claims in this connection that the restrictions adopted against him are disproportionate, go beyond what is necessary and amount to an infringement of guarantees under international law of protection of the applicant’s right to property.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights guaranteed under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. — The applicant claims in this connection that in the adoption of the restrictive measures against him, his right to a fair trial and to the presumption of innocence were infringed, as were his rights of the defence and his right to the protection of private property.

Action brought on 3 May 2022 — Pšonka v Council

(Case T-244/22)

(2022/C 244/57)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Applicant: Viktor Pavlovyč Pšonka (Kiev, Ukraine) (represented by: M. Mleziva, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/376 of 3 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/375 of 3 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, to the extent to which they relate to the applicant;

—	order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to sound administration. — The applicant claims in support of his action, inter alia, that the Council of the European Union did not act with due care and attention in the adoption of the contested decision, since before the adoption of the contested decision it did not address the applicant’s arguments and the evidence he had adduced, which supports his case, and it primarily based its decision on information provided by the Ukrainian institutions and did not request any supplementary information on the course of the investigations in the Ukraine.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s right to property. — The applicant claims in this connection that the restrictions adopted against him are disproportionate, go beyond what is necessary and amount to an infringement of guarantees under international law of protection of the applicant’s right to property.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights guaranteed under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. — The applicant claims in this connection that in the adoption of the restrictive measures against him, his right to a fair trial and to the presumption of innocence were infringed, as were his rights of the defence and his right to the protection of private property.

Action brought on 6 May 2022 — Mordashov v Council

(Case T-248/22)

(2022/C 244/58)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Alexey Mordashov (Cherepovets, Russia) (represented by: T. Bontinck, A. Guillerme and L. Burguin, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/337/CFSP of 28 February 2022 (1) in so far as it lists the applicant under No 695 of the annex to that decision;

—	annul Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 of 28 February 2022 (2) in so far as it lists the applicant under No 695 of the annex to that regulation;

—	order the Council to pay the costs.

—	In addition, the applicant reserves the right to seek compensation for material and non-material damage suffered as a result of the illegality of the contested acts.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and of the obligation to state reasons.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights.

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/337 of 28 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 59, p. 1).

(2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 of 28 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 58, p. 1).

Action brought on 6 May 2022 — Ponomarenko v Council

(Case T-249/22)

(2022/C 244/59)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Alexander Ponomarenko (Moscow, Russia) (represented by: M. Komuczky, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

annul, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/337 of 28 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 59, p. 1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 of 28 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 58, p. 1), in so far as they relate to the applicant;

—	order, pursuant to Article 134 the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging procedural error. — The Council failed to comply with its verification obligation, as the reason provided for inclusion on the list in the documents is inconsistent with the statement of reasons. — In addition, the evidence submitted is irrelevant rationae temporis and could not be examined to the required standard in the short time available. — Furthermore, the facts accepted by the Council, even if they were true, are not such as to support the adoption of the contested acts.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment. — The facts accepted by the Council are inaccurate. The applicant is a successful businessman and is not in any way involved in the matters cited by the Council. — They are also too old to justify the reason for inclusion on the list, formulated in the present tense, on which the Council relies. — The evidence submitted by the Council is based solely on unreliable sources which did not verify their statements. They also contradict each other and do not correspond to the reality of the facts. Moreover, they are too old to be of any relevance.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality. The measures adopted by the Council, in so far as they concern the applicant, are disproportionate, since they are not capable of achieving the objectives pursued by the Council.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the fundamental right to property. The applicant’s fundamental right to property has been infringed by the contested legal acts. The infringement is also not justified.

5.	Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment. Since the applicant was included on the list, whereas many other businessmen in comparable positions were not, the Council infringed the principle of equal treatment by the contested acts.

Action brought on 6 May 2022 — Indetec v Commission and Others

(Case T-250/22)

(2022/C 244/60)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Ingeniería para el Desarrollo Tecnológico, SL (Indetec) (Valencia, Spain) (represented by: J. Navas Marqués, lawyer)

Defendants: European Commission, European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA), European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency (EISMEA)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the decision of 10 March 2022, reference number Ares (2022) 1775149, of the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) (now EASME), which is an executive agency of the European Commission;

—

declare that, on the basis of Article 272 TFEU, the applicant correctly applied Article II.9.1 of the General Conditions of the LIFE Programme (1) Grant Agreement, signed on 10 June 2016 between EASME and, inter alia, the applicant, who was duly represented for the purposes of that signature by the coordinating beneficiary INNOTECNO;

—

order the European Commission, through its agency EASME, to pay the applicant, the total amount of EUR 335 900,00 required to fulfill its contractual obligations under the LIFE Programme Grant Agreement signed on 10 June 2016 between EASME and, inter alia, the applicant, who was duly represented for the purposes of that signature by the coordinating beneficiary INNOTECNO;

—	expressly order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, more specifically Article 298 thereof, and of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on the right to good administration.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 202(4) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046. (2)

3.	Third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of defence.

5.	Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article II.9.1 of the General Conditions of the Grant Agreement.

---

(1)  European Union Programme for the Environment and Climate Action.

(2)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ 2018 L 193, p. 1).

Action brought on 9 May 2022 — Timchenko v Council

(Case T-252/22)

(2022/C 244/61)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko (Geneva, Switzerland) (represented by: T. Bontinck, A. Guillerme, L. Burguin, S. Bonifassi and E. Fedorova, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/337/CFSP (1) of 28 February 2022 in so far as it lists the applicant under No 694 of the annex to that decision;

—	annul Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 (2) of 28 February 2022 in so far as it lists the applicant under No 694 of the annex to that regulation;

—	order the Council to pay EUR 1 000 000, on a provisional basis, in respect of the non-material damage suffered by the applicant;

—	order the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and of the obligation to state reasons.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality and of fundamental rights.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment, in particular as regards the ground based on the relationship between the applicant and President Putin, of the applicant’s status as shareholder in the Volga Group, and of his status as shareholder in Bank Rossiya.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment.

5.	Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaties, in particular, of the principle of the free movement of citizens of the European Union and of the rules relating to the applicable legal basis.

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/337 of 28 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 59, p. 1).

(2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/336 of 28 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 58, p. 1).

Action brought on 10 May 2022 — ‘ANITA’ Grzegorz Mordalski v EUIPO — Anita Food (ANITA)

(Case T-254/22)

(2022/C 244/62)

Language in which the application was lodged: Polish

Parties

Applicant:‘ANITA’ Grzegorz Mordalski (Działoszyn, Poland) (represented by: A. Korbela, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Anita Food, SA (Lima, Peru)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark ‘ANITA’ — EU trade mark No 8 291 056

Proceedings before EUIPO: Invalidity proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 3 March 2022 in Case R 1616/2021-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 3 March 2022, delivered in Case R 1616/2021-4;

—	annul the decision (preceding the aforementioned decision) of the Cancellation Division of EUIPO of 26 July 2021, delivered in Case No 000 047 106 C; and

—	remit to EUIPO the application of 1 November 2020 seeking a declaration that the EU trade mark ANITA 008 291 056, registered in the name of Anita Food SA, Carretera Central No 869, Santa Anita, Lima 43, PERU, filed on 11 May 2009 and protected until 11 May 2019, is invalid.

Plea in law

—	Incorrect interpretation of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, resulting in the declaration that the invalidation of EU trade marks that have already expired is inadmissible.

Action brought on 12 May 2022 — Freixas Montpelt and Others v Committee of the Regions

(Case T-260/22)

(2022/C 244/63)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: David Freixas Montpelt (Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, Belgium), Gustavo Lopez Cutillas (Woluwé Saint Pierre, Belgium), Valeria Schirru (Brussels, Belgium), Svetlozar Andreev (Brussels) (represented by: L. Levi and P. Baudoux, lawyers)

Defendant: Committee of the Regions

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the General Court should:

—	declare the present action admissible and well founded;

—	accordingly, annul the list of officials eligible for promotion in the 2021 promotion exercise, in so far as that list does not include the names of Mr Freixas Montpelt at grade AST5, Mr Lopez Cutillas at grade AD6, Ms Schirru at grade SC2 and Mr Andreev Svetlozar at grade AD10;

—	in so far as necessary, annul the defendant’s decision of 11 February 2022 rejecting the applicants’ complaints;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs in their entirety.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging that the decision of 16 June 2021 is unlawful in that it infringes Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that the decision of 16 June 2021 is unlawful in that it infringes the principle of non-discrimination.

Action brought on 13 May 2022 — Suicha v EUIPO — Michael Kors (Switzerland) International (MK MARKTOMI MARKTOMI)

(Case T-264/22)

(2022/C 244/64)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Lin Suicha (Zhejiang, China) (represented by: J. Donoso Romero, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Michael Kors (Switzerland) International GmbH (Manno, Switzerland)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark MK MARKTOMI MARKTOMI — European Union trade mark No 17 946 599

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 March 2022 in Case R 1899/2021-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision in all its pronouncements;

—	reject the application for a declaration of invalidity in its entirety;

—	order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.

Plea in law

—	Infringement of article 60(1)(a) in conjunction with article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.