24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/2

P9_TA(2021)0404

The role of development policy in the response to biodiversity loss in developing countries, in the context of the achievement of the 2030 Agenda

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the role of development policy in the response to biodiversity loss in developing countries, in the context of the achievement of the 2030 Agenda (2020/2274(INI))

(2022/C 132/01)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the International Union for Conservation of Nature,

—	having regard to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of 1992, and the upcoming 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties thereto (COP15),

—	having regard to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,

—	having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007,

—	having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 2018,

—	having regard to the special report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on climate change and land of 2019,

—	having regard to the IPCC special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate of 2019,

—	having regard to the global assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) on biodiversity and ecosystem services of 2019,

—	having regard to the IPBES Workshop Report on Biodiversity and Pandemics of 29 October 2020,

—	having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2016,

—	having regard to Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on indigenous and tribal peoples of 1989,

—	having regard to Global Biodiversity Outlook 5 of the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity of 15 September 2020,

—	having regard to the UN Summit on Biodiversity of 30 September 2020,

—	having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

—	having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

—	having regard to the Cancun Statement on Promoting Sustainable Pastoralism and Livestock Production for the Conservation of Biodiversity in Grasslands and Rangelands of the CBD COP 13 of 14 December 2016,

—	having regard to the report by the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, of July 2019, entitled ‘Agroecological and other innovative approaches for sustainable agriculture and food systems that enhance food security and nutrition’,

—	having regard to the FAO report on the State of knowledge of soil biodiversity — Status, challenges and potentialities, published in 2020,

—	having regard to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS),

—	having regard to Front Line Defenders’ global analysis 2020,

—	having regard to the Streamlining European Biodiversity Indicators (SEBI) 2020, issued by the European Environment Agency,

—	having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 March 2020 entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa’ (JOIN(2020)0004),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe — the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy — for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 25 May 2020 entitled ‘EU biodiversity strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

—	having regard to Commission recommendation 2013/396/EU of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law (1),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 23 July 2019 on stepping up EU action to protect and restore the world’s forests (COM(2019)0352) and to the subsequent Council conclusions,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 15 May 2017 on indigenous peoples,

—	having regard to the new European Consensus on Development of 2017,

—	having regard to the EU Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade Action Plan adopted in November 2003,

—	having regard to the in-depth analysis on Trade and Biodiversity, published by its Directorate-General for External Policies in June 2020 (2),

—	having regard to the mid-term review of the EU Biodiversity Strategy (3),

—	having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘The link between biodiversity loss and the increasing spread of zoonotic diseases’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies in December 2020 (4),

—	having regard to its resolution of 3 July 2018 on violation of the rights of indigenous peoples in the world, including land grabbing (5),

—	having regard to the study entitled ‘Indigenous peoples, extractive industries and human rights’, published by its Directorate-General for External Policies in September 2014 (6),

—	having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘Challenges for environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights in the Amazon region’, published by its Directorate-General for External Policies in June 2020 (7),

—	having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation (8),

—	having regard to the European Green Deal,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A9-0258/2021),

A.	whereas around 70 % of the world’s poor directly depend on biological diversity for their livelihoods;

B.	whereas the majority of biodiversity loss takes place in developing countries;

C.	whereas biodiversity continues to remain a critical source for the development of medicines;

D.	whereas the most comprehensive global estimate suggests that ecosystem services provide benefits of USD 125-140 trillion per year, i.e. more than one-and-a-half times the size of global GDP (9);

E.	whereas biodiversity is both affected by climate change and makes an important contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation through the ecosystems services it supports;

F.	whereas biodiversity and ecosystem services are projected to decline over the coming decades, while the supply of and demand for materials derived from natural resources with current market value (food, feed, timber and bioenergy) are projected to increase;

G.	whereas key pressures on terrestrial, marine and other aquatic biodiversity include habitat loss and fragmentation (particularly from agricultural expansion and intensification), over-exploitation of natural resources (e.g. fish), pollution, invasive alien species and climate change;

H.	whereas according to the IPBES 2019 global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services, most of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets for 2020 have been missed;

I.	whereas the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2020 identified environmental risks as the greatest systemic risks to our global economy;

whereas the OECD estimates at USD 500 billion per year the financial flows potentially harmful to biodiversity (based on fossil fuel and agricultural subsidies), an order of magnitude ten times higher than global finance flows for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, and whereas the costs of inaction on biodiversity loss are high and are anticipated to increase (10);

K.	whereas IPBES reports that land use change, agricultural expansion and urbanisation are responsible for more than 30 % of emerging disease events;

whereas recent studies show that between 1,65 and 1,87 billion indigenous peoples, local communities, and Afro-descendants live in the world’s important biodiversity conservation areas; whereas another finding shows that 56 % of the people living in important biodiversity conservation areas are in low-income and low-middle income countries; whereas only 9 % live in high-income countries; whereas this underscores the disproportionate impact of conservation on the Global South, according to the Rights and Resources Initiative;

M.	whereas there is scientific evidence of a complex link between biodiversity loss and the increasing risk of zoonotic diseases such as COVID-19;

whereas indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLC) are heavily reliant on land, natural resources and ecosystems for their basic needs and livelihoods, taking into account the fact that their low standard of living and exclusion from political and economic life may imply crucial conflicts concerning the use of natural resources and land rights;

O.	whereas traditional indigenous territories encompass around 22 % of the world’s land surface and coincide with areas that hold 80 % of the planet’s biodiversity;

P.	whereas protected areas have the potential to safeguard biodiversity for the benefit of all humanity, but have also been associated, in some cases, with large-scale human rights violations against IPLC;

Q.	whereas indigenous people remain among the poorest of the poor, and whereas one of the major difficulties that indigenous peoples face globally is in obtaining legal recognition of collective ownership over their ancestral lands, especially when these were declared protected territories;

R.	whereas it is estimated that 50 % of protected areas worldwide have been established on lands traditionally occupied and used by indigenous peoples, and that this proportion is highest in the Americas, where it may exceed 90 % in Central America;

S.	whereas the lack of recognition of indigenous peoples’ and communities’ customary land rights generates risks of land grabbing, thereby jeopardising their livelihoods and their ability to respond to climate change or biodiversity loss;

T.	whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples has identified the extractive industries as a main source of conflict and violence on indigenous peoples’ territories;

U.	whereas according to Front Line Defenders’ Global Analysis 2020, at least 331 human rights defenders were murdered in 2020, of whom 69 % were environmental defenders and 26 % worked specifically on indigenous populations’ rights;

V.	whereas the EU aims to push for a target of at least 30 % biodiversity protection under the CBD;

whereas a growing body of research shows that IPLC possess crucial knowledge and play a vital role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity, as well as in improving rural livelihoods and enhancing the resilience of local populations and communities; whereas global biodiversity targets cannot be achieved without recognition of and respect for the rights of IPLC;

whereas the EU has put forward strong ecological commitments and targets with the European Green Deal, but the total ecological footprint of the EU remains high, which has negative consequences for the environment in developing countries; whereas the EU Biodiversity Strategy aims to achieve a situation in which all of the world’s ecosystems have been restored, resilient and adequately protected by 2050, in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and expresses commitment to the objective of ending human-induced extinction of species by 2050, guided by intergenerational responsibility and the principle of equality, including respect for the rights, and the full and effective participation of IPLC; whereas the strategy of the EU and its Member States in support of developing countries should be designed to anticipate the effects of climate change and biodiversity loss;

whereas biodiversity is crucial for food security, human well-being and development worldwide; whereas the benefits that humans derive from ecosystems include, among other things, the purification of water and air, pest and disease control, crop pollination, soil fertility, genetic diversity, fresh water provisioning, flood protection, carbon sequestration and resilience to climate change; whereas forests harbour more than 75 % of the world’s terrestrial biodiversity and more than 25 % of the world’s population rely on forest resources for their livelihoods; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted areas of inequality across agri-food systems and the necessity of adapting and improving smallholder production sustainably in developing countries, of transforming agri-food systems and of reorienting agriculture towards climate sustainability;

Z.	whereas the IPCC special report on climate change and land of 8 August 2019 demonstrates that indigenous peoples have a long record of adapting to climate variability, drawing on their traditional knowledge, which enhances their resilience;

AA.	whereas the IPCC special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate of 24 September 2019 equally gives evidence of the benefits of combining scientific with local and indigenous knowledge to ensure resilience;

AB.

whereas Article 8(j) of the CBD commits States parties to respect and maintain the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities, which are relevant for conservation and the sustainable use of biological diversity; whereas the CBD, however, fails to contain explicit recognition of the human rights of indigenous peoples;

AC.	whereas the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that about 75 % of genetic diversity in plants has been lost worldwide, while 75 % of the world’s food is now generated from only 12 plants and five animal species, which poses a serious risk to global food security;

AD.

whereas the loss of genetic diversity, especially the replacement of local, well-adapted breeds, increases vulnerability to pests, diseases and environmental changes, including climate change; whereas the market globalisation of agriculture has been a reinforcing driver of such agricultural biodiversity erosion, which means less capacity to innovate and adapt to climate change;

AE.	whereas it is estimated that globally, 30 % of threats to species are due to international trade;

AF.	whereas illegal wildlife trade and illegal trade in timber and raw materials can accelerate the degradation and destruction of biodiversity in countries with weak institutions and environmental regulations;

AG.

whereas oceans are huge reservoirs of biodiversity and the primary regulator of the global climate; whereas their conservation is critical to sustainable development and to poverty eradication, providing sustainable livelihoods and food security for billions of people; whereas the pollution of marine ecosystems with plastics is both a global and a local problem with potentially severe consequences for wildlife, economic activities and human health in developing countries; whereas the scale of this pollution has been greatly underestimated and knowledge gaps persist, in particular of impacts on coastal lands and communities; whereas according to the recent UN Environment Programme report ‘Neglected: Environmental Justice Impacts of Marine Litter and Plastic Pollution’, such litter and pollution disproportionally impact vulnerable people, threaten the full and effective enjoyment of human rights and pose substantial obstacles to the achievement of the SDGs;

AH.	whereas the EU Biodiversity Strategy is committed to a fair and equitable sharing of the benefits from the use of genetic resources linked to biodiversity and to fostering an enabling framework, making use of research, innovation and technology tools;

AI.	whereas environmental crimes, whose value has been estimated by the UN Environment Programme and Interpol to be up to twice the global aid budget, accelerates biodiversity loss and climate change, notably through forestry crimes;

AJ.	whereas there are overlaps between biodiversity hotspots and areas suffering from poverty, as most conservation hotspots are located in countries with a high prevalence of poverty and food insecurity;

AK.	whereas the Republic of Maldives called, in its statement of 3 December 2019, for the amendment of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in order to recognise criminal acts that would amount to ecocide;

AL.	whereas IPBES reports that the international legal wildlife trade has increased 500 % in value since 2005, and 2 000 % since the 1980s (11);

AM.	whereas the EU is one of the largest importers of wildlife and wildlife-related products globally;

AN.	whereas global wildlife trafficking is one of the most profitable forms of organised cross-border criminal activity;

AO.

whereas in a business as usual scenario, climate change is expected to reduce fish biomass by 30 to 40 % in some tropical regions by 2100 and has a strong impact on marine biodiversity; whereas countries in these zones are highly dependent on fisheries, but lack social and financial resources to adapt and prepare for the future;

AP.	whereas the International Union for the Conservation of Nature advocates the transformation of at least 30 % of all marine habitats by 2020 into a network of highly protected marine protected areas;

AQ.	whereas illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing threatens the sustainability of global marine resources by contributing to their overexploitation;

Is alarmed by the fact that the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services is undermining progress in approximately 80 % of the assessed targets for the SDGs; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to reduce its biodiversity footprint worldwide and to bring it into line with planetary boundaries;

Points out that nearly half of the human population is directly dependent on natural resources for their livelihood, and many of the most vulnerable and poorest people depend directly on biodiversity to fulfil their daily subsistence needs; stresses, therefore, that the loss of biodiversity risks accentuating inequality and the marginalisation of the most vulnerable people, by decreasing their access to a healthy life and by reducing their freedom of choice and actions; recalls that biodiversity is threatened by climate change, which aggravates the vulnerability of these people and undermines their fundamental rights and dignity; takes the view that developing countries must be supported to develop and implement effective climate mitigation and adaptation policies;

Calls for the EU to comprehensively address the root causes of biodiversity loss and to mainstream obligations on conservation, the sustainable use of resources and the restoration of ecosystems into its external development cooperation policy and partnerships, in line with the principle of policy coherence for development in order to reduce the pressure on biodiversity worldwide;

Recalls that sustainable development requires striking a good balance between the economic, social and environmental dimensions; recalls also that the conservation, sustainable use and restoration of biodiversity is vital to achieve many development policy objectives, including human health, climate change mitigation and adaptation, early warning, disaster risk reduction, water, food and nutrition security, rural development and job creation, sustainable use of forests, agriculture ecosystems and the creation or preservation of resilient food systems; recalls that the harmful effects of ecosystem degradation are being borne disproportionately by the poor, in particular women and young people, as well as by indigenous people and other natural resource-dependent communities;

Highlights that the EU is also responsible for global biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity; stresses that EU biodiversity objectives and targets should build on sound scientific knowledge and be fully integrated into the EU’s external action, notably in the remit of partnership strategies and agreements, including fisheries agreements with developing countries; insists that preservation and restoration efforts in such countries, in particular at regional level, should be intensified;

Recalls the responsibility of the EU and third developed countries for biodiversity loss at global level; calls for the EU to step up financial and technical support to developing countries across the world to achieve the new global targets, fight environmental crime and tackle the drivers of biodiversity loss;

Emphasises the duty of states to protect and sustainably manage natural and biodiversity-rich ecosystems and safeguard the human and land rights of IPLC and Afro-descendants who depend on these ecosystems for their survival;

Calls for the EU and its Member States to add recognition of the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to support the global recognition of this right as a human right and to support enshrining the comprehensive protection and defence of nature, biodiversity and ecosystems as a basis for life, recognising the interdependence and right of all people, including future generations, to nature, in particular by enforcing strict standards on transparency, public participation and access to justice in accordance with the Aarhus Convention and international law; in this context, and given that the most serious damage to ecosystems is done in developing countries, considers it necessary to combat all forms of environmental damage to ecosystems, including in all third countries the EU cooperates with, and in environments on which the world’s poor depend and to examine, where appropriate, the relevance of and interest in granting rights to nature;

Is deeply concerned by the major gap in the data, indicators and finance needed to halt biodiversity loss, and inconsistencies in biodiversity finance reporting and tracking; recalls that establishing specific, measurable and quantitative targets and indicators for the post-2020 framework is essential to improving the ability to monitor progress;

10.

Welcomes the African initiative on the ‘Great Green Wall’ and calls on the Commission to support this project;

11.

Calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to better assess and value biodiversity and ecosystem services and to integrate these values into decision-making;

12.

Welcomes the fact that the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe will contribute to the overall multiannual financial framework (MFF) biodiversity target; underlines that planning, scrutinising and monitoring of the NDICI-Global Europe are key to the pursuit of the EU’s global biodiversity goals; recalls that the NDICI-Global Europe should contribute to the ambition of providing 7,5 % of annual spending under the MFF to biodiversity objectives in the year 2024 and 10 % of annual spending under the MFF to biodiversity objectives from 2026 onwards; calls for the effective application of the ‘do no significant harm’ principle across EU spending and programmes; calls for the enhancement of the reporting and monitoring framework of EU external biodiversity policy, inter alia through detailed provisions on biodiversity objectives and indicators; calls, more broadly, for the EU and its Member States to promote research and innovation on biodiversity conservation and protection, and agro-ecological solutions for delivering key development benefits, thereby helping to implement the SDGs;

13.

Regrets the fact that the EU external budget for supporting biodiversity policy remains considerably low in comparison with that earmarked for climate change policies; calls for an effective increase in funds for biodiversity protection, in line with the MFF agreement, and for technical assistance for the development of further resource mobilisation tools in order to respond to global commitments on biodiversity; stresses the need to track, report and phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, and to channel them towards biodiversity-friendly activities, in line with Agenda 2030 and the relevant international Conventions and obligations; calls for a significant share of EU official development assistance dedicated to climate action to be directed towards supporting biodiversity conservation co-benefits in climate mitigation and adaptation;

14.

Calls for the EU to pass a mandatory due diligence law to make companies and their financiers directly responsible for ensuring that their imports are not tainted by human rights abuses, such as land grabs and environmental degradation (including deforestation and biodiversity loss); more broadly, calls for the EU to require business and financial institutions to scale up their commitment to biodiversity, for example through robust and mandatory provisions on impact assessment, risk management, disclosure and external reporting requirements; invites the OECD to develop a set of practical actions on due diligence and biodiversity to support efforts by business;

15.

Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to develop a legislative proposal on mandatory human rights and environmental corporate due diligence for companies throughout their supply chains; recommends that this legislative proposal should support and facilitate the development of common methodologies for measuring the environmental and climate change impacts; stresses the importance of effective, meaningful and informed consultation of all affected or potentially affected stakeholders, such as human rights and environmental defenders, civil society, trade unions and IPLC; regrets the serious shortcomings in the implementation of the UN ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ framework and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights with regard to both indigenous peoples’ rights and land rights; calls once again for the EU to engage constructively in the work of the UN Human Rights Council on an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, which should include specific standards for the protection of indigenous people;

16.

Reiterates its request that the Commission urgently present a proposal for an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation and forest degradation, which imposes on companies a requirement to conduct due diligence in order to ensure that the products placed on the EU market are not associated with deforestation, the conversion of natural ecosystems and violations of IPLC rights;

Policy coherence for development

17.

Recalls that the effectiveness of EU external biodiversity policy depends on policy coherence between biodiversity and other key EU external policies, such as trade and investment agreements;

18.

Notes that the IPBES 2019 global assessment report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services shows the limits of the approach of the protection of biodiversity through the spatial extent of terrestrial and marine protected areas, which account for some of the few Aichi Biodiversity Targets partially achieved;

19.

Highlights the fact that biodiversity is at the centre of many economic activities, particularly those related to crop and livestock agriculture, forestry, fisheries and many forms of tourism directly based on nature and healthy ecosystems; urges the EU to mainstream biodiversity and ecosystem services into all related policy areas, notably agriculture, fisheries, forestry, energy, mining, trade, tourism and climate change, as well as into development and poverty reduction policies and actions, and to promote innovative and implementable solutions to tackle biodiversity loss while ensuring healthy, safe, accessible and affordable food to all;

20.

Notes with deep concern that EU consumption accounts for around 10 % of the global share of deforestation, in particular through dependency on imports of agricultural commodities such as palm oil, meat, soy, cocoa, coffee, maize, timber and rubber; reiterates its call on the Commission to submit a proposal in 2021 for an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation, by ensuring that EU markets and consumption patterns do not detrimentally affect forests and biodiversity in developing countries, taking account of the knock-on effects of this on their populations; calls for the EU to support such countries in implementing the sustainability of food systems, through the creation of short supply chains, the development of agro-ecology, support for small farmers, while ensuring land rights and the rights of local communities;

21.

Calls for the EU to promote sustainable agricultural practices to protect and restore the world’s forests in its international development action, with particular attention to sustainable water resource management, the restoration of degraded land and the protection and restoration of biodiverse areas with high ecosystem services and climate mitigation potential; calls for the EU to step up the implementation of its Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and, in particular, the Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), so as to reduce the demand for illegal timber and the associated trade, and to strengthen the rights of IPLC affected by logging;

22.

Recalls that the EU’s growing demand for wood for use in materials, energy and the bioeconomy is exceeding the limits of its supply, which increases the risk of import-embodied deforestation, land grabbing, forced displacement and violations of IPLC rights; reiterates that EU bioenergy policy should respond to strict environmental and social criteria;

23.

Underlines that EU-supported investment in agriculture, forestry or fisheries, or in undertakings that impact soil, grasslands, forests, water or sea, needs to be in line, inter alia, with the FAO/Committee on World Food Security (CFS) Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGTs) and the FAO/CFS Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems in order to protect ecosystems and prevent biodiversity loss;

24.

Calls for the protection and restoration of forests and the defence of biodiversity to be prioritised in the upcoming NDICI; emphasises that forests can only develop their full functions for the climate and the environment if they are managed sustainably;

25.

Underlines that protecting biodiversity and mitigating climate change are not automatically mutually supportive; calls for the revision of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) to make it consistent with the EU’s international commitments on Agenda 2030, the Paris Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, which entails, among other things, introducing social sustainability criteria, taking into account the risks of land grabbing; stresses, to this end, that RED II should comply with international tenure rights standards, i.e. ILO Convention No 169 and the FAO/CFS Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure and Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems;

Agriculture and fisheries

26.

Recalls that agri-food systems and smallholder farmers both depend and have significant impacts on biodiversity; highlights that the effective mainstreaming of biodiversity in agriculture requires ensuring the provision of financial incentives and voluntary and regulatory actions promoting uptake and delivery of biodiversity and environmental benefits by farmers through training, technology use and innovation, as well as good sustainable agricultural practices, which implies, among other things, restoring limited water resources and addressing land degradation and desertification; highlights that in accordance with the principle of policy coherence for development, environmentally harmful subsidies should be identified and phased out in line with the decisions taken at EU level; calls for mandatory ex ante and ex post Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) of related EU-supported investment; calls, to this end, for the EU to step up its financial and technical support to developing countries;

27.

Recalls that agro-ecology’s unique capacity to reconcile the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainability has been recognised by landmark reports from the IPCC and IPBES and by the World Bank and FAO-led global agricultural assessment (IAASTD); insists that EU external funding for agriculture should be in line with the transformative nature of the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN CBD; considers that investment in locally adapted and resource-efficient crops, agro-ecology, agroforestry and crop diversification should be prioritised accordingly;

28.

Recalls that the use of genetically modified seeds are covered by patents which undermines small-scale farmers’ and indigenous peoples’ rights to save, use, exchange and sell their seeds, which is enshrined in international agreements such as the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (UNDROP); recalls that genetically modified crops are often associated with major use of herbicides; urges the Commission and the Member States to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements and to ensure that development aid is not used to promote genetic modification (GM) technologies in developing countries;

29.

Recalls that enhancing seed and crop diversity by switching to resistant varieties is vital in building the resilience of agriculture, adapting to changing conditions such as climate change, biodiversity loss, new zoonotic diseases, pests, drought or flood, taking into account food demand and food security in developing countries; calls for the Commission, within the remit of its development aid and trade and investment policies, to support farming that is in line with the provisions of the ITPGRFA, which safeguards the rights of small-scale farmers to maintain, control, protect and develop their own seeds and traditional knowledge (including financially, technically, in establishing seed banks in order to conserve and exchange traditional seeds, as well as within free trade agreements (FTAs)); underlines that the Union for Protection of New Varieties of Plants system (UPOV system) does not suit developing countries’ interests where farmer-managed seed systems (the informal seed sector) and the practises of saving, using, exchanging and selling seeds are prevalent; urges the EU to promote the informal seed system and to reform the UPOV system in such a way as to allow smallholder farmers to use saved seeds and by introducing a fair benefit sharing mechanism; recalls the Commission’s commitment to prioritise the effective implementation of the CBD in trade and investment agreements, and urges the EU to support the development of locally adapted seed varieties and farmer-saved seeds, which safeguard the rights of farmers to maintain genetic resources for the purposes of food security and climate change adaption;

30.

Calls for the EU to support intellectual property rights regimes that enhance the development of locally adapted seed varieties and farmer-saved seeds;

31.

Recalls that unsustainable practices in agriculture and forestry, such as excessive water withdrawal and pollution by hazardous chemicals, cause substantial environmental degradation and biodiversity loss; calls for the EU to support developing countries in their efforts to strengthen pesticide risk regulation, to evaluate and align their pesticide registrations with the FAO/WHO International Code of Conduct on Pesticide Management, including via South-South cooperation, to strengthen research and education in alternatives to pesticides and to increase their investments in agro-ecological and organic practices and production, including in sustainable irrigation and water management practises; in addition, calls for the EU to stop all exports of crop protection products banned in the EU, in line with the EU’s commitments towards policy coherence for development, the Green Deal, the ‘do no harm’ principle and the Rotterdam Convention of 1998; calls on the Commission to take action to prohibit the export from the EU of hazardous substances banned in the EU; calls on the Commission to ensure that exported products meet the same standards as those required of European producers, avoiding hazardous substances that are not allowed in the EU and allowing for a level playing field worldwide;

32.

Notes that gene drive technologies, as in the case with GM mosquitoes for the control of vector-borne diseases, pose serious and novel threats for the environment and nature, including irreversible changes to food chains and ecosystems, and losses of biodiversity, on which the world’s poorest depend for their livelihoods; reiterates its concern about the new legal, environmental, biosafety and governance challenges that might arise from the release of genetically engineered gene drive organisms into the environment, including for nature conservation purposes; reiterates that the free, prior and informed consent of IPLC must be sought and obtained prior to the release of any technologies which may impact on their traditional knowledge, innovation, practices, livelihoods and use of land, resources and water; stresses that this must be done in a participatory manner involving all potentially affected communities prior to any deployment; given that gene drive technologies raise concerns about the difficulties of predicting their behaviour, and that gene drive organisms could become invasive species in themselves, considers that no releases of genetically engineered gene drive organisms should be permitted, including for nature conservation purposes, in line with the precautionary principle;

33.

Recalls that the conservation, restoration and sustainable management of marine ecosystems is crucial for climate mitigation strategies, while ensuring that the rights and livelihoods of small-scale fishers and coastal communities are respected; emphasises that the IPCC special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate gives evidence of the benefits of combining scientific with local and indigenous knowledge to enforce resilience; urges the EU to develop a human rights-based approach towards ocean governance;

34.

Highlights that approximately 3 billion people around the world rely on fisheries products as a primary source of protein; underlines that the excessive fishing capacity within the framework of international fish trade, as in the case of yellowfin tuna in Seychelles waters, is threatening the food security of coastal communities and marine ecosystems in developing countries; recalls the EU’s commitment to the principle of policy coherence for development and good governance; takes the view that Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements should be enhanced in order for them to become truly sustainable, be in line with the best available scientific advice, and take into account the cumulative effects of the various fisheries agreements in force; calls for the EU to support sustainable fisheries activities in developing countries, with a view to restoring and protecting marine and coastal ecosystems; stresses the importance of continuing and stepping up the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, by increasing penalties for associated criminal practices and by dedicating financial resources to this end;

35.

Calls on the Commission to support the establishment of a global capacity building programme for the use and management of soil biodiversity and of the Global Soil Biodiversity Observatory; calls on the Commission to support ongoing efforts in the FAO’s Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture for a Global Plan of Action to address the decline of biodiversity for food and agriculture and promote its sustainable management;

36.

Highlights the fact that small-scale fishers are directly dependent on coastal and marine biodiversity for their livelihoods; emphasises that the world’s oceans and coasts are highly threatened by, for example, unsustainable fishing practices, rapid climate change, land-based pollution reaching the seas and oceans, marine pollution, ocean degradation, eutrophication and acidification; urges the EU and its Member States to take all necessary measures to address holistically the root causes of marine pollution and fish depletion by means of a comprehensive and integrated approach which takes into account the external impact of all EU sectoral policies, including marine pollution resulting from its agricultural policy, so as to respond effectively to its international commitments on biodiversity and climate change;

37.

Draws attention to the importance of marine resources for meeting basic human needs in developing countries; calls for recognition of the ocean as a global common resource with a view to contributing to the fulfilment of the SDGs in developing countries and ensuring its effective protection; calls on the Commission, accordingly, to champion in international multilateral fora, such as the regional fisheries management organisations, an ambitious governance model on marine biodiversity and marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdictions; stresses, in addition, the need to implement an integrated and ecosystem-based approach to all sectors of the Blue Economy, based on science; emphasises, accordingly, the duty of states to refrain from taking measures, including large-scale development projects, which may adversely affect the livelihoods, territories or access rights of inland and marine small-scale fisherfolk, unless their free, prior and informed consent is obtained, and ensure that courts protect such rights; emphasises that ex ante assessments of extractive industry projects should be conducted, in particular in order to evaluate the possible negative human rights impacts on local fishing communities;

Trade

38.

Highlights the EU’s responsibility to reduce the indirect drivers of biodiversity loss, by systematically including biodiversity and safeguards against land grabs in trade negotiations and dialogues with developing countries;

39.

Calls on the Commission to carefully assess the impacts of trade agreements on deforestation, biodiversity loss and human rights in the Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs), based on comprehensive, solid scientific data and evaluation methodologies;

40.

Points out that according to the FAO approximately a third of global food is lost or wasted, with approximately a third of harvested food being lost in either food transport or the transformation chain; urges the EU and its Member States to promote practices that reduce food loss and waste globally and to safeguard the rights of developing countries to food sovereignty as a means to achieve nutritional security, poverty reduction, and inclusive, sustainable and fair global supply chains and local and regional markets, devoting particular attention to family farming, with the aim of securing the supply of affordable and accessible food; calls, in line with this, for the prioritisation of local production and consumption that support small-scale farming, benefit women and young people in particular, ensure local job creation, guarantee fair prices for producers and consumers, and reduce countries’ dependence on imports and the vulnerability in particular of developing countries to international price fluctuations;

41.

Notes that the trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters of EU free trade agreements (FTAs) are not effectively enforceable; asks the Commission to reinforce TSD chapters in the context of EU FTAs, in particular as regards biodiversity-related provisions; stresses that in order to be effectively enforceable, biodiversity-related provisions and the environmental objectives of the EU’s FTAs must be clear and concrete and their implementation verifiable; calls on the Commission to consider, within the upcoming review of the 15-point action plan, further action and resource allocation to allow for the effective implementation of TSD chapters, applying the principle of policy coherence for sustainable development;

42.

Points out that the EU already includes biodiversity-related non-trade provisions in trade agreements, while noting that implementable, measurable and realistic guarantees can be considered;

43.

Highlights that the biodiversity of cultivated crops and farmed animals has fallen as a result of international trade; calls for a full assessment of the direct and indirect impact of EU FTAs on biodiversity;

44.

Calls on the Commission to carefully review its trade policy, especially its Economic Partnership Agreements, to ensure that it is not in contradiction with the principles of policy coherence for development, the Paris Agreement and the Green Deal; asks the Commission and the Council not to conclude new FTAs that could contribute to increasing world deforestation and biodiversity loss;

Public health

45.

Stresses that the deterioration of biodiversity and ecosystems have both direct and indirect impacts on public health;

46.

Notes that diverse diets combined with global convergence to moderate levels of calorie and meat consumption would improve health and food security in many areas and also substantially reduce the impacts on biodiversity;

47.

Stresses the link between biodiversity loss and the rise of zoonotic pathogens; recalls that the risk of pandemics is heightened by anthropogenic changes bringing wildlife, livestock and people into closer contact, such as land-use change, deforestation, agricultural expansion and intensification, and legal and illegal wildlife trade and consumption, as well as demographic pressure; recalls that ecological restoration is critical for the implementation of the ‘One Health’ approach; stresses, more broadly, that the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the importance of recognising the intrinsic connection between human health, animal health and biodiversity; stresses, accordingly, the significance of the ‘One Health’ approach and the subsequent need to place a stronger focus on healthcare, disease prevention and access to medicines in developing countries, by ensuring the coherence of trade, health, research and innovation policies with the objectives of development policy; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, to reinforce EU action against pandemics and other health threats, taking into account the links between zoonotic pandemics and biodiversity loss, in line with the new Commission proposal on serious cross-border threats to health, while building upon cooperation with EU partner countries to reduce the risk of future zoonotic pandemics and support the development of an international treaty on pandemics under the WHO;

48.

Recalls that the majority of drugs used for healthcare and the prevention of diseases are derived from biodiversity, notably plants all around the world, while many important therapeutics are derived from indigenous knowledge and traditional medicine;

49.

Stresses the challenges raised in developing countries by intellectual property rights over genetic resources and traditional knowledge in terms of access to medicine, the production of generic drugs and farmers’ access to seeds;

50.

Stresses the need to ensure that the benefits of nature’s genetic resources are shared fairly and equitably and highlights the need for consistency between international agreements in this regard; underlines that regulations adopted to protect genetic resources and the associated traditional knowledge must comply with international commitments on the promotion of and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples, as enshrined in the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989; stresses the need to disclose the origin of genetic resources during patent proceedings, when known, in line with Directive 98/44/EC (12); calls on the Commission to push for making WTO rules consistent with the Nagoya Protocol to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, in order to prevent biopiracy effectively;

Indigenous peoples and local communities

51.

Underlines the fact that the IPBES global assessment demonstrated the importance of IPLC to global biodiversity conservation and ecosystem management; regrets that, in spite of its great potential, indigenous knowledge has not been effectively used, while explicit recognition of indigenous and tribal peoples, and of their rights, remains absent from the legal, policy and institutional frameworks of many countries, and its implementation remains a major issue;

52.

Underlines that pastoralists and other nature-based land users on rangelands and natural grasslands contribute to conservation and the sustainable use of natural and domestic biodiversity;

53.

Highlights the numerous allegations of large-scale violations of the rights of indigenous peoples reported by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, resulting for example from increased mineral extraction, the development of renewable energy projects, agribusiness expansion, mega-infrastructure development and conservation measures;

54.

Calls for the EU and its Member States to enhance the scrutiny of EU-funded projects and trade agreements in order to prevent and detect human rights abuses and allow for action against such abuses, paying particular attention to those projects and agreements that may affect the lands, territories or natural assets of indigenous peoples and local communities, including where the creation of a protected area, or the expansion of any existing such area, is involved; stresses that the Sustainable Development Mechanism should aim to finance projects that benefit those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and biodiversity loss and should undergo a human rights impact assessment, with only projects having a positive impact being eligible for registration; insists that all activities in developing countries by EU financial institutions, notably the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, must be consistent with the EU’s climate commitments and follow a rights-based approach; calls for the reinforcement and deepening of the respective banks’ complaint mechanisms for individuals or groups whose rights may have been violated by such activities and who could be eligible for remedies;

55.

Recalls the duty of states under international law to recognise and protect the rights of indigenous people to own, develop, control and use their communal lands and to participate in the management and conservation of their natural resources; urges the EU to ensure that a rights-based approach is applied to all projects funded through official development assistance, with particular regard to the rights of pastoralists and IPLC, including recognition of their right to self-determination and access to land rights as enshrined in human rights treaties, notably UNDRIP; stresses the need for compliance with the principle of free, prior and informed consent as set out in ILO Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989, including in relation to all decision-making regarding protected areas, and the establishment of accountability, complaint and redress mechanisms for infringements of indigenous rights, not least in the context of conservation activities; calls on those EU Member States that have not yet ratified ILO Convention No 169 to do so; underlines that ILO Convention No 169 obliges all ratifying states to develop coordinated action to protect indigenous peoples’ rights;

56.

Highlights the numerous allegations of large-scale violations also of the rights of environmental defenders, as reported by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, who denounced the growing number of attacks, death threats and murders perpetrated against them; recalls the obligation on states to protect environmental defenders and their families against harassment, intimidation and violence, as enshrined in international human rights law, as well as to guarantee their fundamental freedoms; calls for the EU to further invest in and strengthen specific protection mechanisms and programmes for environmental human rights defenders, as well as for indigenous populations, and local communities, including ensuring the continuation of ProtectDefenders.eu projects; stresses the need to recognise their rights, knowledge and experience in the fight against biodiversity loss and environmental degradation;

57.

Urges the EU to ensure that the NaturAfrica Initiative protects wildlife and its related ecosystems in compliance with a rights-based approach to conservation, which requires the free, prior and informed consent of the IPLC concerned, together with the civil society groups who support them; asks the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to this effect;

58.

Encourages the EU and its Member States to support the African Governance Architecture, and in particular the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in order to implement the African Union Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa and, more broadly, to recognise pastoralists’ and indigenous peoples’ rights;

59.

Stresses that securing tenure rights is a prerequisite for effective biodiversity mainstreaming; notes, however, that the lack of collective land rights for indigenous peoples is a primary obstacle to ensuring that rights-based conservation becomes effective;

60.

Recalls that the transition to a green and digital economy has huge implications for the mining sector and that there are growing concerns that mining will spread into sensitive forest landscapes, contributing to deforestation and forest degradation; recalls that 80 % of forests worldwide lie within the traditional lands and territories of indigenous people; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to foster responsible and sustainable mining practices, while accelerating their transition towards a circular economy; calls, in particular, for the EU to develop a region-wide framework for extractive industries which would sanction companies violating human rights and provide legal redress to indigenous peoples whose rights have been violated; stresses the need to ban mineral exploration and exploitation in all protected areas, including national parks and World Heritage Sites;

Environmental criminality

61.

Underlines the fact that environmental crime poses a global threat to nature conservation, sustainable development, stability and security;

62.

Stresses that wildlife trafficking should be classified as a serious crime in accordance with the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in an effort to facilitate international cooperation, notably in a context where the trade in and consumption of wildlife represent a significant risk of future pandemics;

63.

Calls on the Commission to revise the EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking to crack down on the illegal wildlife trade; welcomes the draft measures published by the Commission aimed at effectively banning the EU trade in ivory; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this regard, to drive international action to stop the demand for elephant ivory and to address the root causes of the elephant poaching crisis, by stepping up their cooperation with and assistance of African countries; calls for the revision of the Environmental Crime Directive (13) by expanding its scope and introducing specific provisions for sanctions to ensure that environmental crimes, including illegal fishing, wildlife crime and forest crime, are recognised as serious crimes and adequately penalised, especially in the context of organised crime, thereby creating strong deterrents;

64.

Urges supply, transit and demand countries in the illegal wildlife trade to deepen their levels of cooperation in order to combat this trade along the entire chain; urges, in particular, the governments of supply countries to: i) improve the rule of law and create effective deterrents by strengthening criminal investigation, prosecution and sentencing; ii) enact stronger laws that treat illicit wildlife trafficking as a ‘serious crime’ deserving the same level of attention as other forms of transnational organised crime; iii) allocate more resources to combating wildlife crime, particularly to strengthen wildlife law enforcement, trade controls, monitoring, and customs detection and seizure; iv) commit to a zero-tolerance policy on corruption;

65.

Notes that environmental crime threatens human security by damaging resources that are essential for livelihoods, generating violence and conflicts, fuelling corruption and causing other harm; urges the EU to make the fight against environmental crime an overriding strategic political priority in international judicial cooperation and in multilateral fora, notably by promoting compliance with multilateral environmental agreements through the adoption of sanctions and exchanges of best practices and by promoting the enlargement of the scope of the International Criminal Court to cover criminal acts that amount to ecocide; calls on the Commission and the Member States to allocate appropriate financial and human resources to preventing, investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes;

66.

Underlines that international law has evolved to embrace new concepts such as the common heritage of humanity, sustainable development and future generations, but stresses that there is no permanent international mechanism to monitor and address environmental damage and destruction that alters the global commons or ecosystem services; calls for the EU and the Member States, to this end, to support a paradigm shift to include ecocide and the right of future generations in international environmental law;

o o

67.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 201, 26.7.2013, p. 60.

(2) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603494/EXPO_IDA (2020)603494_EN.pdf

(3) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-annex-eu-biodiversity- strategy-2030_en.pdf and https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2016-0034_EN.html

(4) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/658217/IPOL_IDA (2020)658217_EN.pdf

(5) OJ C 118, 8.4.2020, p. 15.

(6) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/534980/EXPO_STU (2014)534980_EN.pdf

(7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603488/EXPO_IDA (2020)603488_EN.pdf

(8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0285.

(9) Biodiversity: Finance and the Economic and Business Case for Action. Executive Summary and Synthesis, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), May 2019, p. 7.

(10) Biodiversity: Finance and the Economic and Business Case for Action. Executive Summary and Synthesis, OECD, May 2019.

(11) IPBES Workshop on Biodiversity and Pandemics, Workshop Report, 2020, p. 23.

(12) Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (OJ L 213, 30.7.1998, p. 13).

(13) Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law (OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 28).

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/17

P9_TA(2021)0405

Artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters (2020/2016(INI))

(2022/C 132/02)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 2 and 6 thereof, and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 16 thereof,

—	having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), in particular Articles 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 24 and 47 thereof,

—	having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

—	having regard to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS 108), and its amending protocol (Convention 108+),

—	having regard to the European Ethical Charter on the use of artificial intelligence in judicial systems and their environment of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) of the Council of Europe,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 8 April 2019 entitled ‘Building Trust in Human-Centric Artificial Intelligence’ (COM(2019)0168),

—	having regard to the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI published by the Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence on 8 April 2019,

—	having regard to the Commission white paper of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘Artificial Intelligence — A European approach to excellence and trust’ (COM(2020)0065),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘A European strategy for data’ (COM(2020)0066),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (1),

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (2),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (3),

—	having regard to Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (4),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (5),

—	having regard to its resolution of 19 June 2020 on the anti-racism protests following the death of George Floyd (6),

—	having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2017 on fundamental rights implications of big data: privacy, data protection, non-discrimination, security and law-enforcement (7),

—	having regard to the hearing in the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on 20 February 2020 on artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters,

—	having regard to the report of the LIBE mission to the United States in February 2020,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the opinions of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection and the Committee on Legal Affairs,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0232/2021),

whereas digital technologies in general and the proliferation of data processing and analytics enabled by artificial intelligence (AI) in particular, bring with them extraordinary promises and risks; whereas AI development has made a big leap forward in recent years, making it one of the strategic technologies of the 21st century, with the potential to generate substantial benefits in efficiency, accuracy, and convenience, and thus bringing positive change to the European economy and society, but also great risks for fundamental rights and democracies based on the rule of law; whereas AI should not be seen as an end in itself, but as a tool for serving people, with the ultimate aim of increasing human well-being, human capabilities and safety;

whereas despite continuing advances in computer processing speed and memory capacity, there are as yet no programs that can match human flexibility over wider domains or in tasks requiring understanding of context or critical analysis; whereas, some AI applications have attained the performance levels of human experts and professionals in performing certain specific tasks (e.g. legal tech), and can provide results at a drastically higher speed and wider scale;

whereas some countries, including several Member States, make more use of AI applications, or embedded AI systems, in law enforcement and the judiciary than others, which is partly due to a lack of regulation and regulatory differences which enable or prohibit AI use for certain purposes; whereas the increasing use of AI in the criminal law field is based in particular on the promises that it would reduce certain types of crime and lead to more objective decisions; whereas these promises, however, do not always hold true;

D.	whereas fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter should be guaranteed throughout the life cycle of AI and related technologies, notably during their design, development, deployment and use, and should apply to the enforcement of the law in all circumstances;

E.	whereas AI technology should be developed in such a way as to put people at its centre, be worthy of public trust and always work in the service of humans; whereas AI systems should have the ultimate guarantee of being designed so that they can always be shut down by a human operator;

whereas AI systems need to be designed for the protection and benefit of all members of society (including consideration of vulnerable, marginalised populations in their design), be non-discriminatory, safe, their decisions be explainable and transparent, and respect human autonomy and fundamental rights, in order to be trustworthy, as described in the Ethics Guidelines of the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence;

whereas the Union together with the Member States bears a critical responsibility for ensuring that decisions surrounding the life cycle and use of AI applications in the field of the judiciary and law enforcement are made in a transparent manner, fully safeguard fundamental rights, and in particular do not perpetuate discrimination, biases or prejudices where they exist; whereas the relevant policy choices should respect the principles of necessity and proportionality in order to guarantee constitutionality and a fair and humane justice system;

whereas AI applications may offer great opportunities in the field of law enforcement, in particular in improving the working methods of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities, and combating certain types of crime more efficiently, in particular financial crime, money laundering and terrorist financing, online sexual abuse and exploitation of children as well as certain types of cybercrime, thereby contributing to the safety and security of EU citizens, while at the same time they may entail significant risks for the fundamental rights of people; whereas any blanket application of AI for the purpose of mass surveillance would be disproportionate;

whereas the development and operation of AI systems for police and judicial authorities involves the contribution of multiple individuals, organisations, machine components, software algorithms, and human users in often complex and challenging environments; whereas the applications of AI in law enforcement and the judiciary are in different stages of development, ranging from conceptualisation through prototyping or evaluation to post-approval use; whereas new possibilities for use may arise in the future as technologies become more mature owing to ongoing scientific research worldwide;

whereas a clear model for assigning legal responsibility for the potential harmful effects of AI systems in the field of criminal law is imperative; whereas regulatory provisions in this field should always maintain human accountability and must aim, first and foremost, to avoid causing any harmful effects to begin with;

K.	whereas it is ultimately the responsibility of the Member States to guarantee the full respect of fundamental rights when AI systems are used in the field of law enforcement and the judiciary;

whereas the relationship between protecting fundamental rights and effective policing must always be an essential element in the discussions on whether and how AI should be used by the law enforcement sector, where decisions may have long-lasting consequences on the life and freedom of individuals; whereas this is particularly important as AI has the potential to be a permanent part of our criminal justice ecosystem providing investigative analysis and assistance;

whereas AI is in use by law enforcement in applications such as facial recognition technologies, e.g. to search suspect databases and identify victims of human trafficking or child sexual exploitation and abuse, automated number plate recognition, speaker identification, speech identification, lip-reading technologies, aural surveillance (i.e. gunshot detection algorithms), autonomous research and analysis of identified databases, forecasting (predictive policing and crime hotspot analytics), behaviour detection tools, advanced virtual autopsy tools to help determine cause of death, autonomous tools to identify financial fraud and terrorist financing, social media monitoring (scraping and data harvesting for mining connections), and automated surveillance systems incorporating different detection capabilities (such as heartbeat detection and thermal cameras); whereas the aforementioned applications, alongside other potential or future applications of AI technology in law enforcement, can have vastly varying degrees of reliability and accuracy and impact on the protection of fundamental rights and on the dynamics of criminal justice systems; whereas many of these tools are used in non-EU countries but would be illegal under the Union data protection aquis and case law; whereas the routine deployment of algorithms, even with a small false positive rate, can result in false alerts outnumbering correct alerts by far;

whereas AI tools and applications are also used by the judiciary in several countries worldwide, including to support decisions on pre-trial detention, in sentencing, calculating probabilities for reoffending and in determining probation, online dispute resolution, case law management and the provision of facilitated access to the law; whereas this has led to distorted and diminished chances for people of colour and other minorities; whereas at present in the EU, with the exception of some Member States, their use is limited mainly to civil matters;

whereas the use of AI in law enforcement entails a number of potentially high, and in some cases unacceptable, risks for the protection of fundamental rights of individuals, such as opaque decision-making, different types of discrimination and errors inherent in the underlying algorithm which can be reinforced by feedback loops, as well as risks to the protection of privacy and personal data, the protection of freedom of expression and information, the presumption of innocence, the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial, as well as risks for the freedom and security of individuals;

whereas AI systems used by law enforcement and the judiciary are also vulnerable to AI-empowered attacks against information systems or data poisoning, whereby a wrong data set is included on purpose in order to produce biased results; whereas in these situations the resulting damage is potentially even more significant, and can result in exponentially greater levels of harm to both individuals and groups;

whereas, the deployment of AI in the field of law enforcement and the judiciary should not be seen as a mere technical feasibility, but rather a political decision concerning the design and the objectives of law enforcement and of criminal justice systems; whereas modern criminal law is based on the idea that authorities react to an offence after it has been committed, without assuming that all people are dangerous and need to be constantly monitored in order to prevent potential wrongdoing; whereas AI-based surveillance techniques deeply challenge this approach and render it urgent that legislators worldwide thoroughly assess the consequences of allowing the deployment of technologies that diminish the role of human beings in law enforcement and adjudication;

Reiterates that, as processing large quantities of personal data is at the heart of AI, the right to the protection of private life and the right to the protection of personal data apply to all areas of AI, and that the Union legal framework for data protection and privacy must be fully complied with; recalls, therefore that the EU has already established data protection standards for law enforcement, which form the foundation for any future regulation in AI for the use of law enforcement and the judiciary; recalls that processing of personal data should be lawful and fair, the purposes of processing should be specified, explicit and legitimate, processing should be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which is it processed, it should be accurate, kept up to date and inaccurate data should, unless restrictions apply, be corrected or erased, data should not be kept longer than is necessary, clear and appropriate time limits should be established for erasure or for periodic review of the need for storage of such data, and it should be processed in a secure manner; underlines also that possible identification of individuals by an AI application using data that was previously anonymised, should be prevented;

Reaffirms that all AI solutions for law enforcement and the judiciary also need to fully respect the principles of human dignity, non-discrimination, freedom of movement, the presumption of innocence and right of defence, including the right to silence, freedom of expression and information, freedom of assembly and of association, equality before the law, the principle of equality of arms and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial, in accordance with the Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights; stresses that use of AI applications must be prohibited when incompatible with fundamental rights;

Acknowledges that the speed at which AI applications are being developed around the world does not allow for an exhaustive listing of applications and thus necessitates a clear and coherent governance model guaranteeing both the fundamental rights of individuals and legal clarity for developers, considering the continuous evolution of technology; considers, however, given the role and responsibility of police and judicial authorities, and the impact of decisions they take for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, that the use of AI applications has to be categorised as high-risk in instances where there is the potential to significantly affect the lives of individuals;

Considers, in this regard, that any AI tools either developed or used by law enforcement or the judiciary should, as a minimum, be safe, robust, secure and fit for purpose, respect the principles of fairness, data minimisation, accountability, transparency, non-discrimination and explainability, and that their development, deployment and use should be subject to risk assessment and strict necessity and proportionality testing, where safeguards need to be proportionate to the identified risks; highlights that trust among citizens in the use of AI developed, deployed and used in the EU is conditional upon the full fulfilment of these criteria;

Acknowledges the positive contribution of certain types of AI applications to the work of law enforcement and judicial authorities across the Union; highlights, as an example, the enhanced case law management achieved by tools allowing for additional search options; believes that there is a range of other potential uses for AI for law enforcement and the judiciary which could be explored while taking into consideration the five principles of the Ethical Charter on the use of artificial intelligence in judicial systems and their environment, adopted by the CEPEJ, and paying particular attention to the ‘uses to be considered with the most extreme reservation’, identified by the CEPEJ;

Underlines that any technology can be repurposed and therefore calls for strict democratic control and independent oversight of any AI-enabled technology in use by law enforcement and judicial authorities, especially those that can be repurposed for mass surveillance or mass profiling; notes, thus, with great concern the potential of certain AI technologies used in the law enforcement sector for mass surveillance purposes; highlights the legal requirement to prevent mass surveillance by means of AI technologies, which by definition does not fulfil the principles of necessity and proportionality, and to ban the use of applications that could result in it;

Emphasises that the approach taken in some non-EU countries regarding the development, deployment and use of mass surveillance technologies disproportionately interferes with fundamental rights and thus is not to be followed by the EU; stresses therefore that safeguards against the misuse of AI technologies by law enforcement and judicial authorities also need to be regulated uniformly across the Union;

Stresses the potential for bias and discrimination arising from the use of AI applications such as machine learning, including the algorithms on which such applications are based; notes that biases can be inherent in underlying datasets, especially when historical data is being used, introduced by the developers of the algorithms, or generated when the systems are implemented in real world settings; points out that the results provided by AI applications are necessarily influenced by the quality of the data used, and that such inherent biases are inclined to gradually increase and thereby perpetuate and amplify existing discrimination, in particular for persons belonging to certain ethnic groups or racialised communities;

Underlines the fact that many algorithmically driven identification technologies currently in use disproportionately misidentify and misclassify and therefore cause harm to racialised people, individuals belonging to certain ethnic communities, LGBTI people, children and the elderly, as well as women; recalls that individuals not only have the right to be correctly identified, but they also have the right not to be identified at all, unless it is required by law for compelling and legitimate public interests; stresses that AI predictions based on characteristics of a specific group of persons end up amplifying and reproducing existing forms of discrimination; considers that strong efforts should be made to avoid automated discrimination and bias; calls for robust additional safeguards where AI systems in law enforcement or the judiciary are used on or in relation to minors;

10.

Highlights the power asymmetry between those who employ AI technologies and those who are subject to them; stresses that it is imperative that use of AI tools by law enforcement and judicial authorities does not become a factor of inequality, social fracture or exclusion; underlines the impact of the use of AI tools on the defence rights of suspects, the difficulty in obtaining meaningful information on their functioning and the consequent difficulty in challenging their results in court, in particular by individuals under investigation;

11.

Takes note of the risks related in particular to data leaks, data security breaches and unauthorised access to personal data and other information related to, for example. criminal investigations or court cases that is processed by AI systems; underlines that security and safety aspects of AI systems used in law enforcement and by the judiciary need to be considered carefully and be sufficiently robust and resilient to prevent the potentially catastrophic consequences of malicious attacks on AI systems; stresses the importance of security by design, as well as specific human oversight before operating certain critical applications and therefore calls for law enforcement and judicial authorities only to use AI applications that adhere to the privacy and data protection by design principle in order to avoid function creep;

12.

Stresses that no AI system used by law enforcement or the judiciary should be enabled to harm the physical integrity of human beings, nor to distribute rights or impose legal obligations on individuals;

13.

Recognises the challenges to the correct location of legal responsibility and liability for potential harm, given the complexity of development and operation of AI systems; considers it necessary to create a clear and fair regime for assigning legal responsibility and liability for the potential adverse consequences produced by these advanced digital technologies; underlines, however, that the aim must, first and foremost, be to prevent any such consequences materialising to begin with; calls, therefore, for the application of the precautionary principle in all applications of AI in the context of law enforcement; underlines that legal responsibility and liability must always rest with a natural or legal person, who must always be identified for decisions taken with the support of AI; emphasises, therefore, the need to ensure the transparency of the corporate structures that produce and manage AI systems;

14.

Considers it essential, both for the effectiveness of the exercise of defence rights and for the transparency of national criminal justice systems, that a specific, clear and precise legal framework regulates the conditions, modalities and consequences of the use of AI tools in the field of law enforcement and the judiciary, as well as the rights of targeted persons, and effective and easily available complaint and redress procedures, including judicial redress; underlines the right of the parties to a criminal proceeding to have access to the data collection process and the related assessments made by or obtained through the use of AI applications; underlines the need for executing authorities involved in judicial cooperation, when deciding on a request for extradition (or surrender) to another Member State or non-EU country, to assess whether the use of AI tools in the requesting country might manifestly compromise the fundamental right to a fair trial; calls on the Commission to issue guidelines on how to conduct such an assessment in the context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters; insists that Member States, in accordance with applicable laws, should ensure that individuals are informed when they are subject to the use of AI applications by law enforcement authorities or the judiciary;

15.

Points out that if humans only rely on the data, profiles and recommendations generated by machines, they will not be able to conduct an independent assessment; highlights the potentially grave adverse consequences, specifically in the area of law enforcement and justice, when individuals overly trust in the seemingly objective and scientific nature of AI tools and fail to consider the possibility of their results being incorrect, incomplete, irrelevant or discriminatory; emphasises that over-reliance on the results provided by AI systems should be avoided, and stresses the need for authorities to build confidence and knowledge to question or override an algorithmic recommendation; considers it important to have realistic expectations on such technological solutions and not to promise perfect law enforcement solutions and detection of all offences committed;

16.

Underlines that in judicial and law enforcement contexts, the decision giving legal or similar effect always needs to be taken by a human, who can be held accountable for the decisions made; considers that those subject to AI-powered systems must have recourse to remedy; recalls that, under EU law, a person has the right not to be subjected to a decision which produces legal effects concerning them or significantly affects them and is based solely on automated data processing; underlines further that automated individual decision-making must not be based on special categories of personal data, unless suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in place; stresses that EU law prohibits profiling that results in discrimination against natural persons on the basis of special categories of personal data; highlights that decisions in the field of law enforcement are almost always decisions that have a legal effect on the person concerned, owing to the executive nature of law enforcement authorities and their actions; notes that the use of AI may influence human decisions and have an impact on all phases of criminal procedures; takes the view, therefore, that authorities making use of AI systems need to uphold extremely high legal standards and ensure human intervention, especially when analysing data deriving from such systems; requires therefore the sovereign discretion of judges and decision-making on a case-by-case basis to be upheld; calls for a ban on the use of AI and related technologies for proposing judicial decisions;

17.

Calls for algorithmic explainability, transparency, traceability and verification as a necessary part of oversight, in order to ensure that the development, deployment and use of AI systems for the judiciary and law enforcement comply with fundamental rights, and are trusted by citizens, as well as in order to ensure that results generated by AI algorithms can be rendered intelligible to users and to those subject to these systems, and that there is transparency on the source data and how the system arrived at a certain conclusion; points out that in order to ensure technical transparency, robustness, and accuracy, only such tools and systems should be allowed to be purchased by law enforcement or judiciary authorities in the Union whose algorithms and logic is auditable and accessible at least to the police and the judiciary as well as the independent auditors, to allow for their evaluation, auditing and vetting, and that they must not be closed or labelled as proprietary by the vendors; points out, furthermore, that documentation should be provided in clear, intelligible language about the nature of the service, the tools developed, the performance and conditions under which they can be expected to function and the risks that they might cause; calls therefore on judicial and law enforcement authorities to provide for proactive and full transparency on private companies providing them with AI systems for the purposes of law enforcement and the judiciary; recommends therefore the use of open source software where possible;

18.

Encourages law enforcement and judicial authorities to identify and assess the areas where some tailor-made AI solutions might be beneficial and to exchange best practices on AI deployment; calls for the adoption by Member States and EU agencies of appropriate public procurement processes for AI systems when used in a law enforcement or judicial context, so as to ensure their compliance with fundamental rights and applicable legislation, including ensuring that software documentation and algorithms are available and accessible to the competent and supervisory authorities for review; calls, in particular, for binding rules requiring public disclosure on public-private partnerships, contracts and acquisitions and the purpose for which they are procured; stresses the need to provide the authorities with the necessary funding, as well as to equip them with the necessary expertise to guarantee full compliance with the ethical, legal and technical requirements attached to any AI deployment;

19.

Calls for traceability of AI systems and the decision-making process that outlines their functions, defines the capabilities and limitations of the systems, and keeps track of where the defining attributes for a decision originate, through compulsory documentation; underlines the importance of keeping full documentation of training data, its context, purpose, accuracy and side effects, as well as its processing by the builders and developers of the algorithms and its compliance with fundamental rights; highlights that it must always be possible to reduce the computations of an AI system to a form that is comprehensible to humans;

20.

Calls for a compulsory fundamental rights impact assessment to be conducted prior to the implementation or deployment of any AI systems for law enforcement or the judiciary, in order to assess any potential risks to fundamental rights; recalls that the prior data protection impact assessment is mandatory for any type of processing, in particular, using new technologies, that is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons and is of the opinion that this is the case for most AI technologies in the area of law enforcement and judiciary; underlines the expertise of data protection authorities and fundamental rights agencies in assessing these systems; stresses that these fundamental rights impact assessments should be conducted as openly as possible and with the active engagement of civil society; demands that the impact assessments also clearly define the safeguards necessary to address the identified risks and that they be made, to the greatest extent possible, publicly available before the deployment of any AI system;

21.

Stresses that only robust European AI governance with independent evaluation can enable the necessary operationalisation of fundamental rights principles; calls for periodic mandatory auditing of all AI systems used by law enforcement and the judiciary where there is the potential to significantly affect the lives of individuals, by an independent authority, to test and evaluate algorithmic systems, their context, purpose, accuracy, performance and scale, and, once they are in operation, in order to detect, investigate, diagnose and rectify any unwanted and adverse effects and to ensure the AI systems are performing as intended; calls therefore for a clear institutional framework for this purpose, including proper regulatory and supervisory oversight, to ensure full implementation and to guarantee a fully informed democratic debate on the necessity and proportionality of AI in the field of criminal justice; underlines that the results of these audits should be made available in public registers so that citizens know the AI systems being deployed and which measures are taken to remedy any violation of fundamental rights;

22.

Stresses that the datasets and algorithmic systems used when making classifications, assessments and predictions at the different stages of data processing in the development of AI and related technologies may also result in differential treatment and both direct and indirect discrimination of groups of people, especially as data used to train predictive policing algorithms reflects ongoing surveillance priorities and consequently may end up reproducing and amplifying current biases; emphasises therefore that AI technologies, especially when deployed for the use of law enforcement and the judiciary, require inter-disciplinary research and input, including from the fields of science and technology studies, critical race studies, disability studies, and other disciplines attuned to social context, including how difference is constructed, the work of classification, and its consequences; stresses the need therefore to systematically invest in integrating these disciplines into AI study and research at all levels; stresses also the importance for the teams that design, develop, test, maintain, deploy and procure these AI systems for law enforcement and judiciary of reflecting, where possible, the diversity of society in general as a non-technical means to reduce the risks of discrimination;

23.

Highlights further that adequate accountability, responsibility, and liability require significant specialised training with regard to the ethical provisions, potential dangers, limitations, and proper use of AI technology, especially for police and judiciary personnel; emphasises that suitable professional training and qualifications should ensure that decision-makers are trained about the potential for bias, as the data sets may be based on discriminatory and prejudiced data; supports the establishment of awareness-raising and educational initiatives to ensure that individuals working in law enforcement and the judiciary are aware of and understand the limitations, capabilities and risks that the use of AI systems entails, including the risk of automation bias; recalls that the inclusion in AI training data sets of instances of racism by police forces in fulfilling their duties will inevitably lead to racist bias in AI-generated findings, scores, and recommendations; reiterates its call on Member States, therefore, to promote anti-discrimination policies and to develop national action plans against racism in the field of policing and the justice system;

24.

Notes that predictive policing is among the AI applications used in the area of law enforcement, but warns that while predictive policing can analyse the given data sets for the identification of patterns and correlations, it cannot answer the question of causality and cannot make reliable predictions on individual behaviour, and therefore cannot constitute the sole basis for an intervention; points out that several cities in the United States have ended their use of predictive policing systems after audits; recalls that during the LIBE Committee’s mission to the United States in February 2020, Members were informed by the police departments of New York City and Cambridge, Massachusetts, that they had phased out their predictive policing programmes due to a lack of effectiveness, discriminatory impact and practical failure, and had turned instead to community policing; notes that this has led to a decline in crime rates; opposes, therefore, the use of AI by law enforcement authorities to make behavioural predictions on individuals or groups on the basis of historical data and past behaviour, group membership, location, or any other such characteristics, thereby attempting to identify people likely to commit a crime;

25.

Notes the different types of use of facial recognition, such as, but not limited to, verification/authentication (i.e. matching a live face to a photo in an ID document, e.g. smart borders), identification (i.e. matching a photo against a set database of photos) and detection (i.e. detecting faces in real time from sources such as CCTV footage, and matching them to databases, e.g. real-time surveillance), each of which carry different implications for the protection of fundamental rights; strongly believes that the deployment of facial recognition systems by law enforcement should be limited to clearly warranted purposes in full respect of the principles of proportionality and necessity and the applicable law; reaffirms that as a minimum, the use of facial recognition technology must comply with the requirements of data minimisation, data accuracy, storage limitation, data security and accountability, as well as being lawful, fair and transparent, and following a specific, explicit and legitimate purpose that is clearly defined in Member State or Union law; is of the opinion verification and authentication systems can only continue to be deployed and used successfully if their adverse effects can be mitigated and the above criteria fulfilled;

26.

Calls, furthermore, for the permanent prohibition of the use of automated analysis and/or recognition in publicly accessible spaces of other human features, such as gait, fingerprints, DNA, voice, and other biometric and behavioural signals;

27.

Calls, however, for a moratorium on the deployment of facial recognition systems for law enforcement purposes that have the function of identification, unless strictly used for the purpose of identification of victims of crime, until the technical standards can be considered fully fundamental rights compliant, results derived are non-biased and non-discriminatory, the legal framework provides strict safeguards against misuse and strict democratic control and oversight, and there is empirical evidence of the necessity and proportionality for the deployment of such technologies; notes that where the above criteria are not fulfilled, the systems should not be used or deployed;

28.

Expresses its great concern over the use of private facial recognition databases by law enforcement actors and intelligence services, such as Clearview AI, a database of more than three billion pictures that have been collected illegally from social networks and other parts of the internet, including from EU citizens; calls on Member States to oblige law enforcement actors to disclose whether they are using Clearview AI technology, or equivalent technologies from other providers; recalls the opinion of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) that the use of a service such as Clearview AI by law enforcement authorities in the European Union would ‘likely not be consistent with the EU data protection regime’; calls for a ban on the use of private facial recognition databases in law enforcement;

29.

Takes note of the Commission’s feasibility study on possible changes to the Prüm Decision (8), including regarding facial images; takes note of earlier research that no potential new identifiers, e.g. iris or facial recognition, would be as reliable in a forensic context as DNA or fingerprints; reminds the Commission that any legislative proposal must be evidence based and respect the principle of proportionality; urges the Commission not to extend the Prüm Decision framework unless there is solid scientific evidence of the reliability of facial recognition in a forensic context compared to DNA or fingerprints, after it has conducted a full impact assessment, and taking into account the recommendations of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and EDPB;

30.

Stresses that the use of biometric data relates more broadly to the principle of the right to human dignity forming the basis of all fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter; considers that the use and collection of any biometric data for remote identification purposes, for example by conducting facial recognition in public places, as well as at automatic border control gates used for border checks at airports, may pose specific risks to fundamental rights, the implications of which could vary considerably depending on the purpose, context and scope of use; further highlights the contested scientific validity of affect recognition technology, such as cameras detecting eye movements and changes in pupil size, in a law enforcement context; is of the view that the use of biometric identification in the context of law enforcement and the judiciary should always be considered ‘high risk’ and therefore be subjected to additional requirements, as per the recommendations of the Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on AI;

31.

Expresses strong concern over research projects financed under Horizon 2020 that deploy artificial intelligence on external borders, such as the iBorderCtrl project, a ‘smart lie-detection system’ profiling travellers on the basis of a computer-automated interview taken by the traveller’s webcam before the trip, and an artificial intelligence-based analysis of 38 microgestures, tested in Hungary, Latvia and Greece; calls on the Commission, therefore, to implement, through legislative and non-legislative means, and if necessary through infringement proceedings, a ban on any processing of biometric data, including facial images, for law enforcement purposes that leads to mass surveillance in publicly accessible spaces; calls further on the Commission to stop funding biometric research or deployment or programmes that are likely to result in indiscriminate mass surveillance in public spaces; highlights, in this context, that special attention should be paid, and a strict framework applied, to the use of drones in police operations;

32.

Supports the recommendations of the Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on AI advocating for a ban on AI-enabled mass scale scoring of individuals; considers that any form of normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities, in particular within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary, leads to the loss of autonomy, endangers the principle of non-discrimination and cannot be considered in line with fundamental rights, in particular human dignity, as codified in EU law;

33.

Calls for greater overall transparency in order to form a comprehensive understanding regarding the use of AI applications in the Union; requests that Member States provide comprehensive information on the tools used by their law enforcement and judicial authorities, the types of tools in use, the purposes for which they are used, the types of crime they are applied to, and the names of the companies or organisations that developed those tools; calls on law enforcement and judicial authorities also to inform the public and provide sufficient transparency as to their use of AI and related technologies when implementing their powers, including disclosure of false positive and false negative rates of the technology in question; requests that the Commission compile and update the information in a single place; calls on the Commission to also publish and update information concerning the use of AI by the Union agencies charged with law enforcement and judicial tasks; calls on the EDPB to assess the legality of these AI technologies and applications in use by law enforcement authorities and the judiciary;

34.

Recalls that AI applications, including those used in the context of law enforcement and the judiciary, are being developed globally at a rapid pace; urges all European stakeholders, including the Member States and the Commission, to ensure, through international cooperation, the engagement of partners outside the EU in order to raise standards at international level and to find a common and complementary legal and ethical framework for the use of AI, in particular for law enforcement and the judiciary, that fully respects the Charter, the European data protection acquis and human rights more widely;

35.

Calls for the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, in collaboration with the EDPB and the EDPS, to draft comprehensive guidelines, recommendations and best practices in order to further specify the criteria and conditions for the development, use and deployment of AI applications and solutions for use by law enforcement and judicial authorities; undertakes to conduct a study on the implementation of the Law Enforcement Directive (9) in order to identify how the protection of personal data has been ensured in processing activities by law enforcement and judicial authorities, particularly when developing or deploying new technologies; calls on the Commission, furthermore, to consider whether specific legislative action on further specifying the criteria and conditions for the development, use and deployment of AI applications and solutions by law enforcement and judicial authorities is needed;

36.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89.

(3) OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39.

(4) OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37.

(5) OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53.

(6) OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 63.

(7) OJ C 263, 25.7.2018, p. 82.

(8) Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

(9) Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89).

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/27

P9_TA(2021)0406

The impact of intimate partner violence and custody rights on women and children

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the impact of intimate partner violence and custody rights on women and children (2019/2166(INI))

(2022/C 132/03)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to Articles 2 and 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and Articles 6, 8, and 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—	having regard to Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime (the Victims’ Rights Directive) (1),

—	having regard to Articles 21, 23, 24, and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’),

—	having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), which entered into force on 1 August 2014,

—	having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,

—	having regard to General Comment No 13 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child of 18 April 2011 on the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence,

—	having regard to the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,

—	having regard to the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption,

—	having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings (2),

—	having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women adopted on 18 December 1979, and General Recommendation No 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating General Recommendation No 19 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on violence against women,

—	having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights and in particular Principle 2 thereof,

—	having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which entered into force on 1 January 2016, and in particular to Sustainable Development Goals 5 on gender equality and 16.2 on ending abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children,

—	having regard to the Commission proposal of 4 March 2016 for a Council decision on the conclusion, by the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (COM(2016)0109),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152), in particular its first target on freeing women and girls from violence and stereotypes,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0698),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 24 June 2020 entitled ‘EU Strategy on victims’ rights (2020-2025)’ (COM(2020)0258),

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document of 6 March 2019 entitled ‘2019 report on equality between women and men in the EU’ (SWD(2019)0101),

—	having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2017 on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, by the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (3),

—	having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and other measures to combat gender-based violence (4),

—	having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the need for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality (5),

—	having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period (6),

—	having regards to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality (7),

—	having regard to Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the European protection order (8),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) No 606/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters (9),

—	having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (the Brussels IIa Regulation) (10),

—	having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) 2020 Gender Equality Index,

—	having regard to the EIGE study of 12 June 2019 entitled ‘Understanding intimate partner violence in the EU: the role of data’,

—	having regard to the EIGE study of 18 November 2019 entitled ‘A guide to risk assessment and risk management of intimate partner violence against women for police’,

—	having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’,

—	having regard to the Platform of Independent Expert Mechanisms on Discrimination and Violence against Women (EDVAW Platform), and its statement of 31 May 2019 entitled ‘Intimate partner violence against women is an essential factor in the determination of child custody’,

—

having regard to the statement of 24 March 2020 by the President of the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Marceline Naudi, entitled ‘For many women and children, the home is not a safe place’, on the need to uphold the standards of the Istanbul Convention in times of a pandemic,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0254/2021),

whereas gender equality is a fundamental value and a core objective of the EU, and should be reflected in all EU policies; whereas the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties (11) and the Charter (12) and should be fully respected; whereas gender-based violence in all its forms constitutes an extreme form of discrimination against women and a violation of human rights entrenched in gender inequality, which it helps to perpetuate and reinforce; whereas this kind of violence originates from and maintains gender stereotypes about the roles and capabilities of women and men and from unequal power relations in societies; whereas it remains widespread and affects women at all levels of society, regardless of age, education, income, social position or country of origin or residence, and whereas it is one of the most serious obstacles to achieving gender equality; whereas women and children across the EU are not equally protected against gender-based violence due to differing policies and legislation across the Member States;

whereas, in spite of numerous instances of formal recognition and progress having been made on gender equality, women are still discriminated against and disadvantaged, and social, economic and cultural inequalities persist; whereas according to the EIGE 2020 Gender Equality Index, no Member State has fully achieved equality between women and men yet; whereas the EU’s progress on gender equality is still slow, with the index score improving on average by one point every two years; whereas at this rate, it will take almost 70 years for the EU to reach gender equality; whereas this Parliament has already called for the establishment of a new Council configuration of ministers and secretaries of state in charge of gender equality;

whereas different forms of oppression do not exist separately but overlap and affect individuals simultaneously, triggering intersectional forms of discrimination; whereas discrimination on the basis of gender often intersects with discrimination on other grounds, such as race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinions, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age and sexual orientation;

D.	whereas the present decade is witnessing a visible and organised offensive at global and EU level against gender equality and women’s rights, including in the EU;

E.	whereas gender equality is an essential condition for an innovative, competitive and prosperous EU economy, leading to the creation of new jobs and increased productivity, especially in the context of digitalisation and the transition to a green economy;

whereas intimate partner violence refers to any act of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occurs between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared a residence with the victim; whereas intimate partner violence is one of the most prevalent forms of gender-based violence, with an estimated 22 % of women having experienced physical and/or sexual violence, and 43 % having experienced psychological violence by their partner (13); whereas women and children are disproportionately affected by this type of violence; whereas domestic violence refers to ‘all acts of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occur within the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim’ (14); whereas domestic violence is a serious and often long-term and hidden social problem that causes systematic physical and/or psychological trauma with serious consequences for the victims and with a severe impact on the emotional, economic and social well-being of the whole family, as the perpetrator is a person the victim should be able to trust; whereas between 70 % and 85 % of children who are victims of violence know their abuser and whereas the vast majority of these children are victims of people they trust (15); whereas victims are often subjected to coercive control from their abuser, characterised by intimidation, control, isolation and abuse;

whereas the rates of intimate partner violence in rural and remote communities are even greater than those in urban areas; whereas women in rural and remote areas experience higher rates of intimate partner violence and greater frequency and severity of physical, psychological and economical abuse, which is intensified by the fact that they reside farther away from available resources and services where they would be able to seek assistance; whereas poor understanding of domestic violence by health, social and legal services in rural and remote regions can be identified as a significant problem for survivors of intimate partner violence;

whereas at EU level, the majority of single-parent households are headed by single mothers who are particularly vulnerable economically, especially those in the low-wage categories, and more likely to leave the labour market early when they become parents, thus putting them at a disadvantage when they try to re-enter the labour market; whereas in the EU, 40,3 % of single-parent households were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2019 (16);

whereas 30 % of women who have been sexually victimised by a former or current partner also experienced sexual violence in childhood, and whereas 73 % of mothers who have been victims of physical and/or sexual violence by a partner indicate that at least one of their children has become aware of such violence taking place (17);

whereas in many Member States, the lockdown and social distancing measures during the COVID-19 pandemic have been associated with an exponential increase in the prevalence and intensity of cases of intimate partner violence, psychological violence and coercive control and cyber violence, and with a 60 % increase in emergency calls reported by victims of domestic violence (18); whereas requirement to stay at home and the alarming upsurge in the ‘shadow pandemic’ made it difficult for women and children to access effective protection, support services and justice and revealed that support resources and structures were insufficient and that victims had limited access to support services, leaving many of them without adequate and timely protection; whereas best practices in specific measures to provide timely and accessible assistance to victims, including setting up emergency texting systems or creating contact points to seek help in pharmacies and supermarkets should be shared among the Member States; whereas in spite of the prevalence of the phenomenon, intimate partner violence against women remains under-reported in the EU by the victims, their families, friends, acquaintances and neighbours, for various reasons, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, and whereas there is a significant lack of comprehensive, comparable and gender-disaggregated data, making it difficult to fully assess the impact of the crisis; whereas the survey by FRA on violence against women indicates that victims report their most serious incidents of partner violence to the police in only 14 % of cases, and that two thirds of female victims systematically do not report to the authorities, either out of fear or a lack of information about victims’ rights, or due to a general belief that intimate partner violence is a private matter, which should not be publicised (19);

K.	whereas domestic and gender-based violence has increased as a result of the lockdown measures put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic and whereas according to the latest Europol Report (20), online child sexual abuse in the EU has dramatically increased;

L.	whereas during the lockdowns, a significant rise in domestic violence against LGBTI+ people, especially young people, was reported;

whereas economic violence against women in the form of property damage, restricting access to financial resources, education or the labour market, or not complying with economic responsibilities such as the payment of maintenance allowance, deserves due attention, as hampering the financial independence and the family wealth go hand in hand with other forms of violence, and result in an additional trap for victims; whereas victims who are not financially independent are often forced to continue living with their perpetrator to avoid financial insecurity, homelessness or poverty and whereas this tendency was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas fair remuneration and economic independence are essential for enabling women to leave abusive and violent relationships; whereas in some Member States, the enforcement of court decisions related to financial compensation can require the victim to stay in contact with her abuser, putting her at risk of further physical and emotional abuse;

whereas children may also suffer what is called ‘witnessed violence (21)’ in the home and family environment, through experiencing any form of ill treatment carried out through acts of physical, verbal, psychological, sexual and economic violence against reference figures or other affectively significant figures; whereas such violence has very serious consequences for the psychological and emotional development of the child, and whereas it is therefore essential to pay due attention to this type of violence in separations and parental custody arrangements, ensuring that the best interests of the child are the primary consideration, in particular in order to determine custody and visitation rights in separation cases; whereas witnessed violence is not always easily recognisable and whereas women victims of domestic violence live in a state of tension and emotional difficulty; whereas in cases involving both domestic violence and child protective issues, courts should refer to experts with the knowledge and tools to avoid decisions against the mother that do not properly take all circumstances into account;

whereas education plays a fundamental role in building children’s and young people’s skills to help them to form healthy relationships, notably by teaching them about gender norms, gender equality, power dynamics in relationships, consent and respect for boundaries, and helps to combat gender-based violence; whereas according to UNESCO’s International Technical Guidance on Sexuality Education, curriculum-based programmes on comprehensive sexuality education enable children and young people to develop knowledge, positive attitudes and skills in this area, including respect for human rights, gender equality, consent and diversity and whereas it empowers children and young people;

whereas in order to address the issue of the eradication of gender-based violence, it is necessary to rely on consistent and comparable administrative data, based on a robust and coordinated framework for data collection; whereas the current available data collected by the Member States’ law enforcement and justice authorities fail to reflect the full extent of intimate partner violence and its impact and long-term effects on both women and children, as most Member States neither collect gender-segregated comparable data on violence nor do they recognise intimate partner violence as a specific offence, which results in a grey zone reflecting the fact that the real prevalence and incidence of intimate partner violence is significantly unquantified and unmapped; whereas data are also lacking on the heightened risks and prevalence of domestic and intimate partner violence for specific groups, such as for disadvantaged or discriminated groups of women;

whereas in some Member States, intimate partner violence against women is often neglected and the default rule of shared custody or parental authority appears to prevail in cases of child custody, access, contact and visitation arrangements and decisions; whereas disregarding such violence leads to dire consequences for women and children, which may escalate into femicide and/or infanticide; whereas victims of intimate partner violence need special protection measures; whereas the victims’ situation considerably worsens if they are economically or socially dependent on the perpetrator; whereas it is therefore essential to fully take into account this type of violence when deciding on separation and custody arrangements and to address allegations of violence before custody and visitation issues; whereas the courts of the Member States should ensure a comprehensive assessment is carried out under the ‘best interests of the child’ principle to determine custody and visitation rights, which includes hearing the child, involving all relevant services, providing psychological support and taking into account the expertise of all professionals involved;

R.	whereas law enforcement risk assessments in most Member States do not systematically include information provided by children about their experiences of intimate partner violence;

whereas the best interests of the child should always be the primary consideration in all decisions concerning children, including family disputes and whereas the right of every child to maintain contact with both parents, implied in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 9 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, should therefore be restricted if necessary in the best interests of the child;

whereas according to Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and Articles 4 and 16 of Directive (EU) 2016/800, children have the right to express their views in all matters affecting them, including in judicial and administrative proceedings, in a child-friendly manner and whereas these views have to always be given primary consideration according to the age and maturity of the child;

whereas two of the most prestigious institutions on mental health, the World Health Organization and the American Psychological Association, reject the use of the so-called parental alienation syndrome and similar concepts and terms, since they can be used as a strategy against victims of violence by putting into question the victims’ parental skills, dismissing their word and disregarding the violence to which children are exposed; whereas according to the EDVAW Platform recommendation, accusations of parental alienation by abusive fathers against mothers must be considered as a continuation of power and control by state agencies and actors, including those deciding on child custody (22);

V.	whereas anonymous complaints and complaints later retracted by victims may hamper further investigation by the authorities and present an obstacle to the prevention of further violence;

whereas criminal proceedings arising from a complaint about domestic violence are often dealt with completely separately from separation and custody proceedings; whereas this can mean that shared custody of the children is ordered and/or visitation rights imposed that endanger the rights and safety of the victim and the children; whereas this can have irreversible consequences for children’s mental and emotional development, actually affecting their best interests; whereas there is therefore a need for Member States to ensure that victims, according to their needs, have access to confidential victim support services, free of charge, acting in the interests of the victims before, during and for an appropriate time after criminal proceedings, including through a system of psychosocial support — particularly during and after questioning procedures — which takes into account the emotional tensions associated with the circumstances;

X.	whereas according to Article 67 TFEU, ‘the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights’, to which non-discriminatory access to justice for all is instrumental;

whereas it is necessary to ensure that the safety and protection of victims is given primary consideration in family law cases and whereas alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation, should not be used in cases where violence against women and children is present, either before or during the judicial proceedings, in order to avoid further harm to the victims;

whereas the Istanbul Convention requires the Parties to adopt legislative or other necessary measures to ensure that incidents of domestic violence are taken into account when determining custody and visitation rights in relation to children, and that the exercise of any visitation or custody rights does not jeopardise the rights and safety of the victim or their children (23); whereas eight years since its entry into the force, the Istanbul Convention has not yet been ratified by six EU Member States or by the EU; whereas the Istanbul Convention is the most important existing international framework to prevent and combat gender-based violence;

AA.

whereas shared custody in situations of intimate partner violence exposes women to a continuum of preventable violence, by forcing them to stay in geographical proximity to their abusers, and subjecting them to further exposure to physical and psychological violence, as well as emotional abuse, which can have a direct or indirect impact on their children; whereas in cases of intimate partner violence, the right of women and children to be protected and live a life free of physical and psychological violence should take precedence over the preference for shared custody; whereas ill treatment of children by perpetrators of intimate partner violence can be used to exercise power over and commit acts of violence against the mother, which is a type of indirect gender-based violence known in some Member States as vicarious violence;

AB.	whereas helplines are a critical channel for obtaining support but whereas only 13 Member States have implemented the EU 116 006 helpline for all victims of crimes, and only few Member States have specialist helplines for victims of intimate partner violence;

AC.

whereas intimate partner violence is inherently interlinked with violence against children and child abuse; whereas exposing children to domestic violence is to be considered as violence against children; whereas children who are exposed to domestic violence suffer negative mental and/or physical health consequences that could be acute and chronic in nature; whereas child victimisation in situations of violence against women may continue and escalate in the context of parental disputes over custody and care; whereas the mental health and well-being of children has deteriorated due to containment measures put in place to tackle COVID-19; whereas the number of mental health services for children differs significantly between Member States and in many is not sufficient;

AD.

whereas growing up in a violent domestic environment has very negative implications for the child’s physical, emotional and social development and subsequent behaviour as an adult; whereas exposure to violence as a child, either through experiencing maltreatment and/or witnessing partner violence, constitutes a risk factor for becoming vulnerable to victimisation, committing violence as an adult or experiencing behavioural, physical or mental health problems;

AE.

whereas despite progress, recent reports show that victims of crime are still unable to fully exercise their rights in the EU; whereas access to support services is critical to women exposed to intimate partner violence; whereas there remain insufficient numbers of specialised and generalist support services for victims of intimate partner violence, and whereas victims often face difficulties in obtaining justice due to lack of information and insufficient support and protection; whereas victims often face secondary victimisation in criminal proceedings and when claiming compensation; whereas there are several cases in which law enforcement officials and judicial systems are not able to provide sufficient support to women and child victims of domestic violence, and whereas victims of gender-based violence have even been subjected to neglectful behaviour or inappropriate comments when reporting the violence; whereas civil society and public organisations, in particular those working with and for children and victims of domestic and gender-based violence, are important players in preventing and dealing with domestic and intimate partner violence; whereas such organisations can also provide valuable contributions to policies and legislation given their grassroots experience; whereas EU funding programmes such as the Justice Programme and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme can be used to support activities for the protection and support of victims of domestic and gender-based violence, including to ensure access to justice and the financing of organisations working with victims;

AF.

whereas cross-border separation divorce and custody proceedings are more complex in nature and generally take longer; whereas increased mobility within the EU has led to a growing number of cross-border disputes concerning parental responsibility and child custody; whereas the automatic recognition of rulings on proceedings linked to custody rights where gender-based violence is involved are problematic since legislation on gender-based violence differ in each Member State and not all Member States recognise intimate partner violence as a criminal offence and a form of gender-based violence; whereas the Commission must step up its efforts to promote in all Member States the consistent and concrete implementation of the principles and objectives set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been ratified by all EU Member States; whereas the Member States, as parties to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, must make the best interests of the child a primary consideration in all public action, including when dealing with cross-border family disputes; whereas Article 83(1) TFEU provides for the possibility to ‘establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis’; whereas Article 83(2) TFEU provides for the possibility to ‘establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions’, in order to ‘ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures’;

AG.

whereas Article 82(2) TFEU provides for the possibility of establishing minimum rules applicable in the Member States in order ‘to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension’, in particular as regards the rights of victims of crime;

General Remarks

Condemns in the strongest possible terms all forms of gender-based violence, domestic violence, and violence against women and deplores the fact that in particular women and children, in all their diversity, continue to be exposed to intimate partner violence, which constitutes a serious violation of their human rights and dignity, and also has an impact on women’s economic empowerment, this phenomenon having been exacerbated during the COVID-19 crisis;

Recalls that the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women has noted that the COVID-19 crisis has illustrated the lack of proper implementation of international conventions to protect and prevent gender-based violence; calls on the Member States to urgently address the increase in intimate partner violence during the COVID-19 pandemic and encourages them to exchange national innovations, guidelines, best practices and protocols that have proven to be effective in addressing intimate partner violence and in supporting victims, especially during emergencies; calls on the Commission to promote those practices; calls on the Members States and local authorities to measure the extent of gender-based violence and to support victims of gender-based and domestic violence by guaranteeing them safety and economic independence through access to specific housing and essential public services such as health, transport and professional psychological support; calls on the Commission to develop a European Union protocol on violence against women in times of crisis and emergency to prevent violence against women and to support victims during emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, to establish a safe and flexible emergency warning system and to consider protection services for victims, such as helplines, safe accommodation and health services, to be ‘essential services’ in the Member States; underlines, in this context, the need for specific measures to address the existing disparities in laws, policies and services between Member States and the increase in domestic and gender-based violence during the COVID-19 pandemic;

Highlights that perpetrators often use litigation to extend their power and control, and to continue to intimidate and incite fear in their victims; stresses in this regard that the child and the request for shared custody are often manipulated by the violent parent to continue reaching the mother after the separation; stresses that perpetrators often abuse, or threaten to harm or to take the children, in order to harm their partners and ex-partners, which has a serious impact on the harmonious development of the child; recalls that this is also a form of gender-based violence; notes that the withholding of maintenance allowance can be used by perpetrators as a threat and a form of abuse against their victims; highlights that this practice can cause great psychological harm to the victims, and create or aggravate financial difficulties; calls on the Member States to take measures to ensure maintenance allowance is paid to victims from victim funds in order to avoid financial abuse and the risk of causing further harm to them;

Welcomes the Commission’s commitment in the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 to fight gender-based violence and stresses the importance of fully and swiftly implementing its key objectives in this regard; points out the alarming figures on gender-based violence, which reveal that patriarchal behaviours need to be reshaped as a matter of urgency; recalls that common action is essential in order to upwardly converge and harmonise women’s rights in Europe; calls, therefore, for the creation of a council configuration on gender equality within the European Council so that Member State representatives can regularly meet, legislate and exchange best practices; stresses that measures to combat gender-based and domestic violence need to incorporate an intersectional approach with the aim of being as inclusive as possible and in order to prevent any type of discrimination;

Points out that the Istanbul Convention is a pivotal instrument tackling gender-based violence against women and domestic violence; deplores the fact that the convention has not been ratified by the European Union yet, and that to date only 21 EU Member States have ratified it; calls for its swift ratification and implementation at national and EU level; urges Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia to ratify the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of the recent decision by the Polish Minister of Justice to officially start Poland’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, which would be a serious setback with regard to gender equality, women’s rights and the fight against gender-based violence; calls on the Commission to continue developing a comprehensive framework of policies, programmes and other initiatives to tackle violence against women and domestic violence, and to allocate sufficient and appropriate resources to actions related to the implementation of the Istanbul Convention through its funding programmes safeguarded in the provisions of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework and through the Daphne strand; commends all campaigns advocating the ratification and implementation of the Istanbul Convention; supports the Commission’s plan to continue pushing for its EU-wide ratification; strongly condemns all attempts to discredit the Istanbul Convention and condemns the attempts to set back the progress made in the fight against gender-based violence, including domestic violence, that are taking place in some Member States; notes with great concern that the effective implementation of the convention is still patchy across the EU; calls on the Member States that have ratified the convention to ensure its full, effective and practical implementation, paying special attention to Article 31 of the Istanbul Convention, and to take all the necessary measures to ensure that incidents of intimate partner violence are taken into account when custody and visitation rights of children are determined and that the exercise of any visitation or custody rights does not jeopardise the rights and safety of the victim or children;

Calls on the Commission and on the Council to add gender-based violence to the list of areas of crime in Article 83(1) TFEU, taking into account the particular need to combat this crime on a common basis; calls on the Commission to use this as a legal basis to propose binding measures and a holistic EU framework directive to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence, including the impact of intimate partner violence on women and children, that contains uniform standards and a due diligence obligation to collect data, to prevent and investigate violence, to protect victims and witnesses, and to prosecute and punish perpetrators; recalls that such new legislative measures should in any case be in line with the rights, obligations and objectives of the Istanbul Convention and should be complementary to its ratification; recommends that the Istanbul Convention should be seen as a minimum standard and aspire to make further progress to eradicate gender-based and domestic violence;

Calls on the Member States and the Commission to adopt specific measures to eradicate cyber violence, including online harassment, cyberbullying and misogynistic hate speech, which disproportionally affects children and especially girls, and to specifically address the increase in these forms of gender-based violence during the COVID-19 pandemic; calls on the Commission to put forward relevant regulations and any other possible actions to eradicate hate speech and online harassment;

Deplores the underfunding by the Commission and the Member States of the fight against domestic violence given the scale of the phenomenon; notes that the Member States which have significantly increased these funds have obtained results, in particular in terms of reducing femicides; calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the funds dedicated to the fight against domestic violence; is concerned about the fragmentation of funding, short-term funding and administrative burden, which can reduce the access of associations to funding and therefore have an impact on the quality of support for victims of domestic violence and their children; calls on the Commission and the Member States to favour stable and long-term financing;

Protection, safety and support for victims of gender-based violence — addressing intimate partner violence in custody rights and visitation decisions

Recalls that in all actions concerning children, their best interests must be the primary concern; recalls the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests; notes that, in principle, shared custody and unsupervised visits are desirable in order to ensure that parents enjoy equal rights and responsibilities, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests; stresses that it is contrary to those interests if the law automatically gives parental responsibilities to either or both parents; recalls that according to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, assessing the child’s best interests is a unique activity that should be undertaken in each individual case, taking the specific circumstances of each child into account; underlines that intimate partner violence is clearly incompatible with the best interests of the child and with shared custody and care, owing to its severe consequences for women and children, including the risk of post-separation violence and the extreme acts of femicide and infanticide; stresses that when establishing the arrangements for custody allocation, access and visitation rights, the protection of women and children from violence and the best interests of the child must be paramount and should take precedence over other criteria; underlines, therefore, that the rights or claims of perpetrators or alleged perpetrators during and after judicial proceedings, including with respect to property, privacy, child custody, access, contact and visitation, should be determined in the light of women’s and children’s human rights to life and physical, sexual and psychological integrity, and guided by the principle of the best interests of the child (24); stresses, therefore, that the withdrawal of the custody and visitation rights of the violent partner and the awarding of exclusive custody to the mother, if she is a victim of violence, can represent the only way to prevent further violence and the secondary victimisation of the victims; stresses that awarding all parental responsibilities to the one parent must be accompanied by relevant compensation mechanisms, such as social benefits and priority access to collective and individual care arrangements;

10.

Stresses that failing to address intimate partner violence in custody rights and visitation decisions is a violation by neglect of the human rights to life, to a life without violence, and to the healthy development of women and children; strongly urges any form of violence, including witnessing violence against a parent or close person, to be considered in law and in practice as a violation of human rights and as an act against the best interests of the child; is deeply concerned about the alarming number of femicides in Europe, which is the most extreme form of violence against women; is concerned about the inadequacy of the protection granted to women, as evidenced by the number of femicides and infanticides which take place after the woman has reported gender-based violence; stresses that in the best interests of the child, the parental authority of the accused parent should be systematically suspended in cases of femicide for the entire duration of the proceedings; further emphasises that descendants should be exempted from maintenance obligations towards a parent who has been condemned for femicide; urges the Members States to ensure that access to justice and victim support is accessible, adequate and free for all women victims of intimate partner violence in all their diversity and status, and to provide interpreting services where needed; calls on the Member States to ensure that services take into consideration the intersecting forms of discrimination suffered by women and children; calls on the Member States to strengthen care, monitoring and protection of women who report gender-based violence; calls on the Member States to ensure that support services take a coordinated approach to identifying women at risk, to ensure that all these measures are available and accessible to all women and girls within their jurisdiction; stresses that when a perpetrator is arrested in flagrante delicto, the victim should be taken to a safe place and the protection of the children from the aggressor should be compulsory and also stresses that, if the legal conditions for arrest are not met, the alleged abuser should nonetheless be immediately removed from the victim’s house and kept away from the victim’s workplace to prevent the risk of further violence;

11.

Invites the Member States to develop systems to allow third persons and associations to handle the children’s visits to the violent ex-partner, to reduce the exposure of mothers who are victims of domestic violence if their former partner has retained a right of visit, accommodation or shared custody rights; considers that these mechanisms must be accessible to women as soon as they report domestic violence; considers that this task requires specific skills and that the people in charge of handling the children must receive adequate training; considers that these mechanisms should be carried by specialised associations and institutions;

12.

Is concerned about significant disparities between Member States when it comes to tackling gender-based violence; is worried about the situation of women victims of gender-based violence who live in areas where there is a lack of support structures and access to justice, public and legal services to defend their rights is difficult; is worried that specialist support services are not provided equally within each Member State and calls on them to ensure the adequate geographical distribution of immediate, short- and long-term specialist support services for victims, irrespective of the women’s residence status and their ability or willingness to cooperate in proceedings against the alleged perpetrator; calls on the Member States to provide universal access to legal services and tailored services and responses to specific contexts in which the intimate partner violence occurs in rural areas; highlights the need to create networks between different services and programmes in order to successfully combat cases of gender-based violence against women in rural and remote regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to examine the possibility of dedicating EU funds to this issue, in particular funds dedicated to regional development;

13.

Welcomes the EU Strategy on victims’ rights (2020-2025), which addresses the specific needs of victims of gender-based violence, in particular the specific approach to psychological violence against women and the impact on their mental health on the long run; calls on the Commission, in its evaluation of the Victims’ Rights Directive, to address the current gaps in the EU legislation, to examine whether the gender aspect of victimisation is properly and effectively taken into account, particularly with regard to international standards on violence against women such as those set in the Istanbul Convention, and to adequately enhance the legislation on victims’ rights and the protection and compensation of victims; calls for the continued promotion of victims’ rights, including through existing instruments such as the European protection order; urges the Commission to ensure that all Member States translate the Victims’ Rights Directive into national legislation and calls for its full and accurate implementation, so that victims of intimate partner violence get full access to a range of support services, including through specialist and generic services such as the 116 006 helpline for victims of crime;

14.

Recommends that Member States provide alternative mechanisms for victims who do not file a complaint so that they can exercise the recognised rights of victims of intimate partner violence, such as social and labour rights, for example through expert reports drawn up by specialised public services accrediting the status of victim of gender-based violence;

Protection and support: access to legal protection, emergency accommodation and to victim funds

15.

Highlights the key role of economic support for victims in helping them to achieve financial independence from their violent partner; stresses that the majority of women become poorer during separation and divorce procedures, and that some women give up asking for their fair share and what they are entitled to for fear of losing custody; calls therefore on the Member States to pay particular attention to the risk of the situation of victims of domestic violence becoming more precarious during the separation and divorce process; stresses the need to eliminate any economic barriers that might induce a woman not to report the violence she has suffered; points out that an adequate income and economic independence are key factors in enabling women to leave abusive and violent relationships; calls on the Member States to implement specific measures to tackle economic violence, to protect the capital and income of victims of gender-based violence and to set up a framework which provides rapid and effective decisions on maintenance allowance for children, aiming to ensure empowerment, financial safety and economic independence for victims of gender-based violence, allowing them to take control over their lives, including through the support of women entrepreneurs and workers; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote and support such independence; welcomes the proposal for a directive on adequate minimum wages (25) and the proposal for binding pay transparency measures (26); stresses the importance of the implementation of Work-Life Balance Directive (27), as it is particularly crucial for lone parents, helping them to cope with their specific employment situation and with caring duties -such as by making sure accessible and adequate care facilities are available; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate financial support and compensation mechanisms for victims and to set up a mechanism to coordinate, monitor and regularly assess the implementation and effectiveness of the measures to prevent economic violence against women;

16.

Calls on the Member States to promote and guarantee full access to adequate legal protection, effective hearings and restraining orders, shelters and counselling, as well as victim funds and financial empowerment programmes for women victims of intimate partner violence; calls on the Member States to guarantee support for mothers and their children who are victims of domestic violence by means of community, educational and financial support, such as victim funds for women victims of domestic violence, in order to ensure these mothers have the necessary means to care for their children and to prevent them from losing custody; calls on the Member States to apply particular procedures based on common minimum standards and to give support to victims of domestic violence, in order to prevent them from becoming victims again as a result of shared custody or from completely losing custody of their children; calls on the Member States to ensure that the legal costs of victims of domestic violence are covered when they do not have sufficient resources and to guarantee them proper defence by lawyers specialised in situations of domestic violence; calls on the Commission to assess the establishment of minimum standards for protection orders across the EU; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of intimate partner violence have access to psychological support and counselling at every stage of their legal procedures;

17.

Deplores the lack of appropriate emergency and temporary accommodation solutions for victims of intimate partner violence and their children; calls on Member States to open emergency accommodation spaces specific to situations of intimate partner violence and to make them available at all times, in order to increase, improve and ensure adequate reception and protection services for women who are victims of domestic violence and any children affected; calls on the Commission and the Member States to allocate adequate funds to relevant authorities, including through projects, and calls for funding for the establishment and expansion of shelters, as well as other appropriate measures enabling women who are victims of violence to benefit, with confidentiality, from a safe and local environment;

18.

Regrets that women can find themselves without appropriate social, health, and psychological support; calls on the Member States to ensure the provision of effective, accessible, universal and quality medical and psychological support for victims of gender-based violence, including the provision of sexual and reproductive health services (SRHR), especially in times of crisis where such support must be deemed essential, for example by investing in telemedicine to guarantee healthcare services can continue to be provided;

19.

Invites the Member States to create patient-centred medical care that would allow early detection of domestic abuse, organise professional therapeutic treatment and set up housing programmes and legal services for victims which could significantly help to reduce the consequences of and prevent intimate partner violence;

20.

Calls on the Member States to explore virtual options for helping victims of violence, including mental health and counselling options, paying attention to existing inequalities in access to information technology services;

21.

Encourages good practices that already exist in some Member States to prevent further violence, such as the recording of victims' telephone numbers in special lists related to stalking and intimate partner violence, in order to give absolute priority to possible future calls during emergencies and facilitate effective law enforcement interventions;

Protection and support for children

22.

Stresses the importance of establishing common legal definitions and minimum standards at the EU level for combating gender-based violence and for the protection of children of victims of gender-based violence, as intimate partner violence, witnessed and vicarious violence are not recognised in many legal systems; points out that children witnessing violence in their family environment are not recognised as victims of gender-based violence, which has a direct impact on data collection in the police and judicial sectors, and on cross-border cooperation; stresses the need to assign the status of victim of gender-based violence in criminal and investigation proceedings to children who are witnesses to intimate partner violence or suffer vicarious violence in order for them to benefit from better legal protection and appropriate assistance; therefore recommends establishing systematic procedures for monitoring, including psychological monitoring, of children who are victims of and witnesses to domestic violence, in order to respond to the troubles this causes in their lives and to prevent them from repeating such violence as adults; also calls on the Member States to introduce special measures concerning so-called witnessed violence, including provisions for specific aggravating circumstances;

23.

Calls on the Member States to set up an annual campaign to inform children and raise awareness of children’s rights; calls on the Member States to set up specific centres to attend to child victims of violence, with paediatricians and therapists specialised in gender-based violence; calls on the Member States to set up contact points for children that are easily accessible, including by telephone, email, online chat etc., where they can talk about and ask questions as well as report violence against themselves, a parent or a sibling and where they can get information, advice or be referred to another organisation for more help;

24.

Emphasises that the child must in particular be provided with the opportunity to be heard, which is essential for establishing what is in the best interests of the child when examining custody and foster care cases, according to the age and maturity of the child; points out that in every case, but crucially in cases where intimate partner violence is suspected, such hearings must be conducted in a child-friendly environment by trained professionals, such as doctors or psychologists, including professionals qualified in child neuropsychiatry, in order to analyse the effect of trust in others on the harmonious development of the child and to avoid deepening their trauma and victimisation; calls for minimum EU standards on how such hearings should be conducted; highlights the importance of ensuring a proper long-term level of psychological and psychiatric care and social counselling for the victims and their children throughout the process of recovery after the time of abuse;

25.

Highlights the need for special attention and specific procedures and standards for cases in which the victim or the child involved is a person with disabilities or belongs to a particularly vulnerable group;

26.

Welcomes the Commission’s presentation of a comprehensive strategy to protect vulnerable children and foster child-friendly justice; underlines the need to protect the rights of the most vulnerable children, with particular attention paid to children with disabilities, the prevention of and fight against violence and the promotion of child-friendly justice; calls for a full and swift implementation of the strategy by all Member States; urges the Commission and the Member States to take concrete measures to combat child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation by investing in preventive measures and treatment programmes aimed at preventing perpetrators from reoffending, with more effective support for victims, and by enhancing cooperation between law enforcement authorities and civil society organisations; stresses that in suspected cases of child abuse, prompt action needs to be taken to ensure the safety of the child and to stop and prevent further or potential violence, while ensuring the right of the child to be heard throughout the process; believes that such action should include immediate risk assessment and protection comprising a wide range of effective measures such as interim measures or protection or restraining orders while the facts are investigated; recalls that in all proceedings involving child victims of violence, the principle of celerity must be applied; stresses that courts dealing with child abuse should also be specialised in gender-based violence;

27.

Urges the Commission and the Member States to take concrete measures to end child sexual abuse by investing in preventive measures and identifying specific programmes for potential offenders and more effective support for victims; calls on the Member States to enhance cooperation between law enforcement authorities and civil society organisations to combat child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation;

28.

Stresses that violence against children can also be linked with gender-based violence, either because they are witnesses of violence perpetrated against their mothers or because they are victims of ill treatment themselves, when it is used in an indirect way to exercise power and psychological violence against their mothers; notes that programmes which support children who are exposed to domestic violence are crucial in minimising long-term harm; calls on the Member States to continue to run innovative programmes in order to address the needs of these children, for example through training providers who work with children to detect early warning signs, provide appropriate responses and support, and provide effective psychological support to children during criminal and civil proceedings in which they are involved; strongly recommends that the Member States put in place systematic procedures for monitoring children who are victims of and witnesses to domestic violence, including psychological support, in order to respond to the trouble this causes in their lives and to prevent them from repeating such violence as adults;

Prevention: training of professionals

29.

Calls for recurrent, effective capacity-building and mandatory targeted training for professionals dealing with cases of gender-based violence, child abuse and, in general, all forms of domestic violence and its mechanisms, including manipulation, psychological violence and coercive control; stresses that this targeted training should therefore be intended for the judiciary, law enforcement officers, specialised legal practitioners, forensic medical personnel, healthcare professionals, social workers, teachers and child carers, as well as public servants working in these fields; calls for this training to also emphasise the relevance of intimate partner violence to children’s rights and to their protection and well-being; calls for this training to improve these professionals’ knowledge and understanding of current protection measures, as well as of safety, the impact of the crime, the needs of the victim and how to address those needs, and to provide them with adequate skills in order to better communicate with and support victims; calls for this training to also enable them to assess the situation using reliable risk assessment tools and to detect signs of abuse; stresses the need to evaluate the mechanisms for detecting these signs used by the professionals involved; calls for this training to be conducted by focusing on the needs and concerns of victims as a priority and by recognising that violence against women and domestic violence must be addressed through a specific, gender-sensitive and human rights approach upholding national, regional and international standards and measures; calls on the EU and its Member States to develop and finance such training; recalls the importance of European Judicial Training Network in this respect; stresses that civil society and public organisations working with and for children and victims of domestic and gender-based violence should be asked to provide or at least be involved in providing these training courses so as to share the knowledge and expertise they gained from real-life experiences; calls on the Commission to facilitate and coordinate this type of training, focusing especially on cross-border cases;

30.

Calls on the Member States to ensure that their police and justice services are adequately financed, equipped and trained to handle complaints of domestic violence and responsive in doing so; regrets that the underfunding and budgetary cuts in these services can result in procedural defects, a lack of information for complainants on the progress of the procedure and excessive delays which are not compatible with the imperative of protection of victims and their recovery; stresses the important role of social and psychological workers in police departments to facilitate concrete and human support for victims of domestic violence; calls on the Member States to provide all associations with the necessary means to help women victims and their children; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance their cooperation in order to take measures to improve the identification of victims of domestic and intimate partner violence, as well as to empower the victims and the witnesses to come forward and report the crime, as in many cases the intimate partner violence remains unreported;

31.

Calls on the Commission and the European Judicial Training Network to set up an EU platform for mutual learning and the sharing of best practices between legal practitioners and policymakers from different Member States working in all relevant fields;

32.

Strongly recommends that the Member States establish specialised courts or sections, as well as appropriate laws, training, procedures and guidelines for all professionals dealing with victims of intimate partner violence, including raising awareness of gender-based violence and gender stereotypes, in order to avoid discrepancies between judicial decisions and discrimination or secondary victimisation during judicial, medical and police, child protection and guardianship proceedings, ensuring that children and women are duly heard and that priority is given to their protection and seeking reparation for them; emphasises the need to strengthen dedicated courts or sections and child- and women-victim-friendly justice, to set up comprehensive assessment units dealing with gender-based violence composed of forensic doctors, psychologists and social workers who will work in coordination with the public services specialised in gender-based violence in charge of assisting victims; stresses the importance of legal protective measures being fully applied to protect women and children from violence, and of such measures not being limited or restricted by parental rights; urges decisions on shared custody to be postponed until intimate partner violence has been adequately investigated and a risk assessment conducted;

33.

Stresses the need to recognise the interconnectedness of criminal, civil and other legal proceedings in order to coordinate the judicial and other legal responses to intimate partner violence and suggests, therefore, that the Member States adopt measures to link the criminal and civil case of one family, so that discrepancies between judicial and other legal decisions that are harmful to children and victims can be effectively avoided; deplores the lack of provisional measures to protect victims and the lack of temporary mechanisms to suspend the parental authority of the violent parent during legal proceedings, which usually lasts for several years; calls on Member States to experiment with and develop such protective measures; calls to this end on the Member States to organise training for all professionals, as well as volunteer workers involved in such proceedings, and to associate civil society organisations working with and for children and victims with these training courses; calls on the competent national authorities to improve coordination between courts by fostering contacts between prosecutors’ offices so as to enable issues of parental responsibility to be resolved urgently, and to ensure that family courts are able to consider all issues relating to gender-based violence against women when determining custody and visitation rights;

34.

Calls on the Member States to set up a platform for the regular exchange of best practices between civil and criminal courts, legal practitioners dealing with cases of domestic and gender-based violence, child abuse and separation and custody cases, and all other relevant stakeholders;

35.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to involve relevant civil society organisations, in particular those working with and for children as well as victims of domestic and gender-based violence, in the development, implementation and evaluation of policies and legislation; calls for structural support to be provided at EU, national and local level for these civil society organisations, including financial support, to increase their capacity to react and advocate as well as to ensure adequate access for all people to their services, including counselling and support activities;

36.

Reiterates its full support for the strengthening of the capacity of service providers across sectors (justice, law enforcement, health and social services) to record and maintain updated databases; calls on the Member States to establish national guidelines and good practices as well as to provide intimate partner violence awareness training for staff at all levels in each front line sector, it being essential to provide a sensitive response to women seeking protection; calls on the Member States to monitor services for sectors and set the necessary budgets in line with the needs;

37.

Recommends that national authorities take action, in particular to draft and circulate a set of guidelines for professionals involved in cases relating to intimate partner violence and custody rights, taking risk factors (relating to children or family members, environmental or social concerns, or potential repetition of violent offences) into consideration to enable intimate partner violence to be assessed, in support of children’s and women’s rights;

38.

Notes that such guidelines and guidance should support health professionals in raising public awareness in their professional environment of the significant impact of violence against women, including intimate partner violence, on their mental health;

39.

Stresses the importance in these procedures of the role of all relevant forensic experts and professionals, such as doctors, forensic clinical psychologists and social workers, providing forensic and psychological expertise in caring not only for women victims of domestic abuse or violence, but also for the children affected, in particular when the environment in which they live is not suitable to protect their health, dignity, emotional balance and quality of life; recalls, therefore, the need for the forensic practitioners and professionals involved to be able to benefit, inter alia, from guidelines drawn from a set of data, practice and best practices at EU level; notes that, for legal purposes, the specific technical and medical knowledge of forensic doctors make them suitable professionals for assisting specialists (such as paediatricians, gynaecologists and psychologists) in their work, with them having the appropriate training and technical expertise to be able to recognise signs of violence and, where there are grounds to do so, to comply with reporting obligations and liaise with judicial authorities;

40.

Recalls the provisions of the Victims’ Rights Directive; highlights that women victims of gender-based violence and their children often require special support and protection because of the high risk of secondary and repeat victimisation, of intimidation and of retaliation connected with such violence; calls, therefore, for attention to be paid to the victim-blaming attitudes in society, including among professionals in the criminal justice system; calls for institutional violence to be recognised and addressed, which includes all actions and omissions of the authorities and public servants aimed at delaying, obstructing or preventing access to relevant public services or the exercise of the rights of victims, with appropriate sanctions and measures put in place to ensure the victims are protected and compensated; underlines the paramount importance of establishing training, procedures and guidelines for all professionals dealing with victims in order to help them to identify signs of intimate partner violence even when victims do not make explicit complaints; suggests that such guidelines and guidance should include measures to promote safe, respectful and non-guilt-inducing patient treatment programmes for women who have suffered violence, including intimate partner violence, and to disseminate the best treatments for them and for their children; calls on the Commission and the Member States to tackle the issue of anonymous complaints and retracted complaints by guaranteeing effective and rapid procedures to protect victims as well as by ensuring the accountability of violent partners; encourages the creation of law enforcement databases that keep record of all details pertaining to intimate partner violence statements made by the victim or a third party in order to monitor and prevent further episodes of violence; calls for more community education and awareness raising as well as training and education on intimate partner violence for police and social services in rural and remote areas stressing the importance of education in informing and supporting children as well as programmes for conflict resolution, positive role models and cooperative play;

Prevention: addressing gender stereotypes and biases — education and awareness raising

41.

Expresses its concern about the impact of gender stereotypes and bias leading to inadequate responses to gender-based violence against women and to a lack of trust in women, in particular concerning presumed false allegations of child abuse and of domestic violence; is also concerned about the lack of specific training for judges, prosecutors and law professionals; stresses the importance of measures aimed at combating gender stereotypes and patriarchal biases through education and awareness-raising campaigns; calls on the Member States to monitor and fight the culture of denigration of women’s voices; condemns the use, assertion and acceptance of non-scientific theories and concepts in custody cases which punish mothers who attempt to report cases of child abuse or gender-based violence by preventing them from obtaining custody or by restricting their parental rights; stresses that so-called parental alienation syndrome and similar concepts and terms, which are generally based on gender stereotypes, can work to the detriment of women victims of intimate partner violence by blaming mothers for their children’s ‘alienation’ from their father, calling into question victims’ parental skills, disregarding the children’s testimony and the risks of violence to which their children are exposed, and jeopardising the rights and safety of the mother and children; calls on the Member States not to recognise parental alienation syndrome in their judicial practice and law and to discourage or even to prohibit its use in court proceedings, particularly during investigations to determine the existence of violence;

42.

Highlights the importance of awareness-raising campaigns that enable witnesses (particularly neighbours and co-workers) in spotting the signs of intimate partner violence (in particular non-physical violence), and providing guidance on how to support and assist victims; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote awareness raising, information and advocacy campaigns tackling gender bias and stereotypes as well as domestic and gender-based violence in all its forms, such as physical violence, sexual harassment, cyber-violence, psychological violence and sexual exploitation, particularly in relation to newly created prevention measures and flexible emergency warning systems, and to encourage reporting on coordination and cooperation with recognised and specialised women’s organisations; stresses the importance of actively involving all public structures when carrying out awareness-raising campaigns;

43.

Emphasises that the effective punishment of abusers is essential to both deter further violence and reinforce trust in public authorities, especially by the victims; points out, however, that imprisonment by itself is not enough to prevent future violence and that specific rehabilitation and re-education programmes are necessary; calls on the Member States, as laid down in Article 16 of the Istanbul Convention, to take the necessary legislative or other measures to set up or support programmes aimed at teaching perpetrators of domestic violence to adopt non-violent behaviour in interpersonal relationships with a view to preventing further violence and changing violent behavioural patterns; highlights that in doing so, Member States must ensure that the safety of, support for and the human rights of victims are of primary concern and that, where appropriate, these programmes are set up and implemented in close cooperation with specialist support services for victims; points out that education is pivotal to eradicating gender-based violence, and intimate partner violence in particular; calls on the Member States to implement preventive programmes, including through education on issues such as equality between women and men, mutual respect, non-violent conflict resolution in interpersonal relationships, gender-based violence against women and the right to personal integrity, and age-appropriate sexuality education adapted to the evolving capacity of learners, in formal curricula and at all levels of education, in line with the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025; stresses that age-appropriate comprehensive relationship and sexuality education is key to protecting children from violence and giving them the skills they need to build safe relationships free from sexual, gender-based and intimate partner violence; calls on the Commission to support programmes that aim to prevent gender-based violence, including through the Daphne strand of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme in order to ensure effective prevention measures;

44.

Calls on the Member States to encourage moves to eliminate the ingrained preconceptions still underlying the gender care gap;

45.

Highlights that strategies to prevent intimate partner violence should include actions to reduce exposure to violence during childhood, teaching skills necessary to create safe and healthy relationships and challenging social norms that promote supremacy and authoritarian behaviour of men over women, or other forms of sexist behaviour;

46.

Calls on the Commission to promote EU-wide public awareness and educational campaigns and the exchange of best practices as a necessary measure for the prevention of domestic violence and gender-based violence and for the creation of a climate of zero tolerance towards violence and a safer environment for victims; highlights the strategic role of the media in this regard; stresses, however, that in some Member States, femicide and cases of gender-based violence are still presented in terms which absolve the violent partner of their responsibility; highlights that the media and advertising must not spread misogynist and sexist messages, including by trying to excuse, legitimise or minimise violence and the responsibilities of violent partners; considers that domestic violence also originates from a gender-stereotyped approach to parenthood; calls on the Commission and the Member States, therefore, to fight gender stereotypes and to promote gender equality in parental responsibilities, where parental burden is fairly distributed, ensuring women are not assigned a subordinate status; calls on the Commission to facilitate the exchange of best practices at EU level on prevention, protection and prosecution measures and measures to combat violence, as well as on their practical implementation; calls on the Member States to complement this EU campaign by disseminating information about where victims and witnesses can report this kind of violence, including after the end of the campaign, taking into account the specificity of the COVID-19 crisis to also focus on the impact on children; calls on the Commission to support activities in schools and other settings which raise the awareness of crime and trauma issues, where to find help, how to report issues, and how to build resilience among children and those working with children;

Cooperation between the Member States, including in cross-border cases

47.

Underlines the importance of the exchange of information between courts, the central authorities of Member States and police bodies, especially in relation to cross-border custody cases; hopes that the revised rules under Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (28) will enhance the cooperation between judicial systems to effectively determine the best interests of the child, irrespective of their parents’ marital status or family composition, and the interests of victims of intimate partner violence; stresses that it is important for forensic doctors, or any other professionals involved, to provide the relevant national authority with information relating to intimate partner violence when they believe that this violence puts the life of the adult victim or child in danger, and that the victim is unable to protect themselves because of the moral or economic coercion resulting from the hold exercised by the perpetrator, seeking to obtain the adult victim’s consent; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure enforcement and the effective implementation of the Brussels IIa Regulation; regrets in this regard that its latest revision failed to extend the scope to registered partnerships and unmarried couples; is of the opinion that this leads to discrimination and potentially dangerous situations for victims and children of registered partnerships and unmarried couples; recalls that the scope and objectives of the Brussels IIa Regulation are based on ‘the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality between citizens of the Union’ and on the principle of mutual trust between the Member States’ legal systems; asks the Commission to report back to Parliament on the implementation and impact of these regulations, including in the context of intimate partner violence and custody rights, at the latest by August 2024;

48.

Points out that, while all family disputes have a profound emotional impact, cross-border cases are even more sensitive and legally complex; stresses the need for a high degree of public awareness regarding complex issues such as cross-border custody arrangements and maintenance obligations, including the need to ensure clarity regarding the rights and obligations of parents and children in each country; points out that Member States could contribute to the swifter resolution of such cross-border family law cases by instituting a system of specialist sections within national courts, including units focused on gender-based violence composed of forensic medical personnel, psychologists, and other relevant professionals, and to work in coordination with public services specialised in gender-based violence and in charge of assisting victims; calls for specific attention to be paid to the situation of single-parent households and the cross-border collection of maintenance allowance, since the practicalities of the enforcement of the current provisions in place — namely Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations and the UN Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance — setting down legal obligations relating to the cross-border collection of maintenance allowance, remains challenging; stresses that the legal tools for the cross-border collection of maintenance allowance need to be enforced together with public awareness raising regarding their availability; calls therefore on the Commission to work closely with the Member States to identify practical problems linked with the collection of maintenance allowance in cross-border situations and to assist them in developing effective tools to enforce payment obligations; stresses the importance of the issue and its consequences for single-parent families and the risk of poverty;

49.

Urges the Member States to continue analysing data on and tendencies in the prevalence of and reporting on all forms of gender-based and domestic violence, as well as the consequences for children, while confinement measures are in place and during the period immediately afterwards;

50.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance their cooperation in order to take measures that empower victims of intimate partner violence to come forward and report the crime, as in many cases intimate partner violence remains unreported; notes the Commission’s commitment to carry out a new EU survey on gender-based violence, with the results to be presented in 2023; calls on the Commission and the Member States to cooperate closely in order to establish a permanent mechanism to provide on a regular basis harmonised, accurate, reliable, comparable, high-quality and gender-segregated EU-wide data on the prevalence, causes and consequences for women and children and the management of intimate partner violence and custody rights, making full use of the capacity and expertise of EIGE and Eurostat; recalls that providing national statistics on gender-based violence is an action eligible for funding under the Single Market Programme for 2021-2027; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that data are disaggregated by age, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex characteristics, race and ethnicity and disability status, among others, to ensure that the experiences of women in all their diversity are captured; notes that this will contribute to a better understanding of the scale and causes of the problem, mainly the socioeconomic categories where gender-based violence is more prevalent and other influencing factors, as well as of different legal frameworks and policies across countries, which can be explored closely through detailed country comparisons to identify policy frameworks that might influence the occurrence of violence; also insists on the importance of Member States collecting statistical data on administrative and judicial proceedings concerning child custody involving intimate partner violence, and particularly on the outcome of the judgments and the grounds they give for their decisions on custody and visitation rights;

51.

Calls on the Commission to promote EU-wide public awareness campaigns as a necessary measure in the prevention of domestic violence and the creation of a climate of zero tolerance towards violence;

o o

52.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57.

(2) OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, p. 1.

(3) OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 167.

(4) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 48.

(5) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0379.

(6) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0024.

(7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0025.

(8) OJ L 338, 21.12.2011, p. 2.

(9) OJ L 181, 29.6.2013, p. 4.

(10) OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1.

(11) Articles 2 and 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 8, 10, 19 and 157 TFEU.

(12) Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter.

(13) FRA report of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’.

(14) The Istanbul Convention.

(15) Council of Europe, ‘Human Rights Channel: Stop Child Sexual Abuse in Sport’, accessed on 21 July 2021.

(16) Eurostat, ‘Children at risk of poverty or social exclusion’, data extracted in October 2020.

(17) FRA report of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: An EU Wide Survey’.

(18) Statement to the press by Dr Hans Henri P. Kluge, World Health Organization Regional Director for Europe of 7 May 2020 entitled ‘During COVID-19 pandemic, violence remains preventable, not inevitable’.

(19) FRA report of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’.

(20) Europol report of 19 June 2020 entitled ‘Exploiting isolation: offenders and victims of online child sexual abuse during the COVID-19 pandemic’.

(21) Council of Europe explanatory report of 11 May 2011 to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.

(22) Statement by the EDVAW Platform of 31 May 2019 entitled ‘Intimate partner violence against women is an essential factor in the determination of child custody’.

(23) Article 31 of the Istanbul Convention.

(24) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women general recommendation No 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No 19.

(25) Commission proposal of 28 October 2020 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adequate minimum wages in the European Union (COM(2020)0682).

(26) Commission proposal of 4 March 2021 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms (COM(2021)0093).

(27) Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers (OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79).

(28) OJ L 178, 2.7.2019, p. 1.

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/45

P9_TA(2021)0407

EU Road Safety Policy Framework 2021-2030 — Recommendations on next steps towards ‘Vision Zero’

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the EU Road Safety Policy Framework 2021-2030 — Recommendations on next steps towards ‘Vision Zero’ (2021/2014(INI))

(2022/C 132/04)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document of 19 June 2019 entitled ‘EU Road Safety Policy Framework 2021-2030 — Next steps towards “Vision Zero”’ (SWD(2019)0283),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2020 entitled ‘Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy — putting European transport on track for the future’ (COM(2020)0789),

—	having regard to Directive (EU) 2015/413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 facilitating cross-border exchange of information on road-safety-related traffic offences (1) (Cross-Border Enforcement Directive),

—	having regard to Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (2) (Driving Licence Directive),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on type-approval requirements for motor vehicles and their trailers, and systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, as regards their general safety and the protection of vehicle occupants and vulnerable road users (3) (General Safety Regulation),

—	having regard to its resolution of 27 April 2021 on the implementation report on the road safety aspects of the Roadworthiness Package (4),

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 8 June 2017 entitled ‘road safety — endorsing the Valletta Declaration of March 2017’,

—	having regard to the Stockholm Declaration of 19-20 February 2020 made during the Third Global Ministerial Conference on Road Safety,

—	having regard to the Council declaration of 7 October 2015 on cycling as a climate friendly transport mode, signed by EU transport ministers at an informal meeting in Luxembourg,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A9-0211/2021),

whereas every year around 22 700 people still lose their lives on EU roads and around 120 000 are seriously injured; whereas more than 11 800 children and youngsters up to the age of 17 have been killed in road traffic collisions in the EU over the last 10 years; whereas progress in reducing EU fatality rates has stagnated in recent years and, as a result, the target to halve the number of road deaths between 2010 and 2020 was missed; whereas the above figures represent an unacceptable human and social price for EU citizens and whereas the external cost of road crashes in the EU represents around 2 % of its annual GDP;

whereas the EU is being confronted with new trends and challenges in automation that could have a huge impact on road safety; whereas the growing phenomenon of distraction by mobile devices needs to be addressed; whereas in the near future, the presence of both vehicles with a wide range of automated/connected features and traditional vehicles in mixed traffic will pose a new risk, especially for vulnerable road users such as motorcyclists, cyclists and pedestrians;

whereas technological advances, connectivity, automation and the sharing economy provide new opportunities for road safety and for tackling congestion, especially in urban areas; whereas developing the synergies between safety and sustainability measures and pursuing the modal shift towards public transport modes and active mobility could lead to lower CO2 emissions, improve air quality and help develop more active and healthy lifestyles;

D.	whereas passengers in cars rated five stars in the latest tests for the European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) had a 68 % lower risk of fatal injury and a 23 % lower risk of serious injury than passengers in two-star-rated cars;

whereas the share of road deaths of vulnerable road users is increasing, as car users have been the main beneficiaries of improved vehicle safety and other road safety measures; whereas the weight, power and top speed of new cars sold in the EU is increasing, posing greater risks to road safety; whereas the safety of motorcyclists, cyclists and pedestrians must be urgently addressed;

whereas although they only account for 2 % of the total number of kilometres travelled, powered two-wheeled vehicles are responsible for 17 % of the total number of road fatalities; whereas there are significant disparities between countries; whereas the EU should give priority to taking further action to improve the safety of these vehicles over the next decade;

G.	whereas according to a Commission study, only 8 % of fatalities occur on motorways, while 37 % occur in urban areas and 54 % on rural roads; whereas new investment and proper maintenance of existing infrastructure throughout its life cycle are key to road safety;

H.	whereas not all accident victims are reported, which distorts the statistics available; whereas effective testing methods need to be developed to determine the actual number of road accident victims;

whereas ensuring and enforcing the safe behaviour of road users, such as travelling at the right speed, using protective equipment like seatbelts and crash helmets, not driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and driving, riding and walking without distractions, is key to preventing and mitigating fatal road crashes;

J.	whereas there are gender, age and social inequalities at play in mobility and road safety;

whereas achieving the new EU road safety targets requires more intensive cooperative efforts to develop strong European road safety policies with stakeholders, research and innovation support in order to prepare policy-based solutions based on solid data and impact analysis, as well as more and better targeted national enforcement measures and effective cross-border cooperation on the enforcement of penalties;

L.	whereas 40 to 60 % of all work-related fatalities are road accidents that occur during work or while commuting to work; whereas driver fatigue is common on EU roads;

M.	whereas the implementation of the national road safety plans and the new EU road safety policy framework requires stable and sufficient financial resources both from the Member States and the EU budget;

EU road safety policy framework 2021-2030 — next steps towards Vision Zero

Welcomes the fact that the EU has reaffirmed in the 2021-2030 EU road safety policy framework its long-term strategic goal to get close to zero deaths and zero serious injuries on EU roads by 2050 (Vision Zero), and its medium-term goal to reduce deaths and serious injuries by 50 % by 2030 in line with the Valletta Declaration; highlights that these EU goals and targets relating to road safety should be underpinned by a coordinated, well-planned, systematic and well-financed road safety approach at EU, national, regional and local level;

Welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the safe system approach at EU level, based on a performance framework and timed targets for the reduction of casualties and serious injuries; welcomes the setting up of key performance indicators (KPIs) established in cooperation with the Member States to enable a more focused and targeted analysis of the Member States’ performances and to identify shortcomings; calls on the Commission to set outcome targets by 2023; underlines the importance of the ongoing cooperation between the EU and the Members States in this regard and urges all Member States to fully commit to this exercise and agree on a harmonised methodology for KPIs that will allow Member States to compare data; calls for a detailed roadmap for EU action against which performance can be measured and delivery made accountable to specific bodies;

Believes, however, that there is room for improvement on the above-mentioned KPIs and urges the Commission to consider extending these indicators and updating them in its EU strategic action plan on road safety; believes that the KPI for protective equipment should be complemented by a KPI that collects exposure data according to travelling distance and time for all road users, broken down by modal share and road type in order to better understand the different risk ratios and dangers involved; calls on the Commission to continue working closely with the Member States to define a KPI for road infrastructure, indicating the safety quality of a road network independent of road user behaviour or vehicle technology, based on an agreed common rating methodology; regrets the fact that KPIs for vehicle safety disregard the safety of powered two-wheeled vehicles; calls on the Commission to draw up a vehicle safety index for L-category vehicles and underlines the need to include therein all KPIs for L-category vehicles;

Highlights that EU funding is crucial for investing in sustainable and smart road safety solutions and accelerating the delivery of road safety results across the EU; calls on the Commission to safeguard and increase EU investment in road safety across all the relevant EU financing programmes, including in research and innovation; calls on all Member States, furthermore, to earmark a suitable amount of their national budgets which, coupled with EU funding, should make it possible to implement their national road safety programmes and the new EU road safety policy framework for 2021-2030; calls on the Member States to create national road safety funds as mechanisms for collecting fines under their traffic codes and redistributing the money raised for road safety; calls on the Commission to extend to all Member States the EU Road Safety Exchange programme, which is designed to improve road safety performance but currently focuses on just six Member States;

Encourages the Member States to establish national observatories for road safety to collect, process and maintain national road safety databases; asks the Member States to align their national road safety strategies with the objectives of the EU road safety policy framework for 2021-2030 and to address the related shortcomings as soon as possible;

Safe infrastructure

Calls on the Member States and the Commission to prioritise investments that deliver the greatest benefits in terms of road safety, devoting particular focus to zones with the highest number of accidents, including investments in maintaining existing infrastructure as a priority and in the construction of new infrastructure, where necessary; welcomes the fact that the Connecting Europe Facility for 2021-2027 provides for financing in safe and secure infrastructure and mobility projects, including road safety; calls on the Commission to further promote EU funding opportunities through the Connecting Europe Facility, regional and cohesion funds, InvestEU and the Safer Transport Platform launched by the European Investment Bank (EIB), especially in Member States with a relatively poor road safety performance; stresses the importance of making the eligibility criteria for those instruments clearer for road safety actions; calls on the Commission to support and encourage Member States to invest in a safer, more sustainable, resilient and multimodal transport network through their national recovery and resilience plans; calls on the Commission to set out in the revision of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) Regulation (5) the bases for future road safety investment decisions, including the implementation of a core network monitoring plan on maintenance at EU level;

Highlights that a proactive assessment of the EU road network will be a useful tool for assessing the inbuilt safety of roads and for targeting investment; welcomes, in this regard, the risk mapping and safety rating of motorways and primary roads introduced in the recently revised EU infrastructure safety rules (6) and calls on the Member States to designate as many primary roads in their territory as possible to increase the road safety potential of the new directive; calls on the Member States, in accordance with the directive, to establish national systems for voluntary reporting, which should be accessible online and available to all road users, in order to facilitate the collection of data of occurrences transmitted by road users and vehicles and any other safety-related information perceived by the reporter as an actual or potential hazard to road infrastructure safety, with a view to ensuring that EU citizens make a transparent, immediate and direct contribution to safety; calls on the Commission and the Member States to agree as soon as possible on a methodology to carry out systematic network-wide road assessments as mandated by the revision of the above-mentioned act, including any aspects that are important for the safety of active road users;

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to expedite work on EU specifications for the performance of road signs and markings in order to prepare the ground for greater vehicle automation; recalls the importance of the performance of road signs and markings, including their placing, visibility and retro-reflectivity, in particular for the effectiveness of driver assistance systems such as intelligent speed assistance and lane keeping systems; highlights the importance of using infrastructure to build self-explaining, self-enforcing and ‘forgiving’ roads for the safety of all road traffic participants, in particular in dangerous areas or areas with a significant number of vulnerable road users;

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to devise quality requirements for walking and cycling infrastructure in order to address the insufficient level of safety for active road users; calls on the Commission to draw up common EU curricula for road infrastructure auditors and inspectors, including specific training on the needs of vulnerable road users, as part of its new forum of European road safety auditors;

10.

Notes that road users with reduced mobility and other disabilities have special needs that should be taken into account when planning and constructing new road infrastructure; calls on the Member States to underpin investments in projects aimed at making road infrastructure inclusive and accessible for everyone;

11.

Notes that in accordance with the last revision of EU infrastructure safety rules, the Commission is obliged to consider revising Directive 2004/54/EC on minimum safety requirements for tunnels (7) by 2021 and to consider adopting a new legislative proposal on minimum safety requirements for bridges; calls on the Commission to further improve the safe use of tunnels by, inter alia, organising awareness-raising campaigns and carrying out the relevant studies;

12.

Encourages the Commission and the Member States to establish an expert group for drawing up a road classification framework that better matches speed limit to road design and layout, in line with the safe system approach;

13.

Calls for measures to further strengthen road safety in urban nodes and suburban and rural areas and to improve operational safety throughout the life cycle of critical infrastructure such as tunnels and bridges, while also considering the use of new monitoring technologies for vulnerable infrastructure, and to define specific safety objectives and quality requirements in the forthcoming revision of the TEN-T Regulation;

14.

Calls on the Member States to acknowledge the importance of a modal shift towards active modes such as walking and cycling and of sustainable public transport modes as important tools to reduce danger on roads, and to allocate adequate investments to this end; welcomes, in this regard, the launch of the Safer Transport Platform initiative, which explicitly calls for better facilities for sustainable transport, including for cyclists and pedestrians, and for accident mitigation projects; calls on the Commission and the EIB to launch awareness-raising and information campaigns in order to ensure that all interested parties are well informed about the conditions and consider its use;

15.

Calls for increased synergies between the European cycle route network EuroVelo and the TEN-T to make cycling infrastructure safer and better connected; stresses the importance of ensuring continuous walking and cycling paths in TEN-T projects where feasible; calls on the Commission to encourage the reconversion of disused railway lines and to actively support bike-train projects and intermodality; notes that new forms of infrastructure such as advanced stop lines, bike boxes, cycle streets or cycle highways offer new possibilities for safe active mobility; highlights the need to work to harmonise and enforce the rules on road signs and signals in order to avoid confusion and increase safety and ease of use;

16.

Believes that the Commission should do its utmost to ensure that the cycling and walking infrastructure deployed by the Member States as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic remains in place and is expanded in order to further promote safe active travel;

17.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work closely with regions and cities to complete any missing last-mile infrastructure and intermodal and cross-border connections throughout the TEN-T, thereby ensuring a more seamless and efficient use of infrastructure and services and improving road safety;

Safe vehicles

18.

Welcomes the recent revision of the General Safety Regulation, which will make new advanced safety features in vehicles such as intelligent speed assistance and emergency lane keeping systems mandatory in the EU as from 2022, with the potential to save around 7 300 lives and avoid 38 900 serious injuries by 2030; calls on the Commission to adopt ambitious and timely secondary legislation, which should also require high-performing intelligent speed assistance systems to be fitted in all new vehicles; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to consider the practical application of making it compulsory to equip motorcycles with these systems and the feasibility, acceptability and possible implications for road safety of next-generation intelligent speed assistance for cars, vans, trucks and buses;

19.

Recalls the importance of innovation in vehicle technology, which can help to both mitigate the severity of crashes and reduce the likelihood of crashes through active and passive safety features; calls on the Commission to review future passenger vehicle standards in the light of new technological developments and to take into account factors which may affect road safety such as mass, power, speed and frontal area size;

20.

Calls on the Commission to make it obligatory to fit motorcycles with anti-lock braking systems in the upcoming revision of the type approval of L-category vehicles; calls on the Commission to extend the categories of vehicles for which installation of eCall is mandatory, with particular regard to powered two-wheeled vehicles;

21.

Invites the Commission to further develop the vehicle type approval crashworthiness requirements and include them in future legislative revisions, which should also incorporate the latest criteria of Euro NCAP crash tests that monitor the impact of a collision on other vehicles and vulnerable road users, with the aim of achieving harmonisation of minimum standards and equalising passenger safety;

22.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support cities in setting up speed limit databases in order to promote the deployment of intelligent speed assistance technology, as required by the General Safety Regulation;

23.

Stresses that the danger and frequency of accidents between trucks and vulnerable road users could be significantly reduced through the widespread use of turning assistants; highlights that turning assistants will become mandatory for new types of trucks in 2022 and for all new trucks in 2024; calls on the Commission to set up a European action programme on turning assistants to promote the benefits of this technology and encourage stakeholders to voluntarily equip new and existing vehicles with turning assistants as soon as possible; commends initiatives that support the voluntary introduction of mandatory turning assistants; calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide financial support for the installation of turning assistants in new and existing vehicles;

24.

Underlines that manipulation and fraud involving electronic safety features such as advanced driving assistance systems pose considerable safety risks and should therefore be addressed by specific training for inspectors on checking software integrity;

25.

Calls on the Commission to develop crash test dummy standards that are more representative of a variety of aspects such as age, gender, size and stature for users both within and outside vehicles;

26.

Calls on the Member States to provide tax incentives and calls on private insurers to offer attractive motor insurance schemes for the purchase and use of vehicles with the highest safety standards; calls on the Commission to revise the legislation on car labelling in order to include additional information at the point of sale and digitally on the safety rating of new vehicles;

27.

Welcomes the requirement for seatbelt reminders for all seats to be made mandatory under the revised General Safety Regulation and calls on the Commission to draw up standards for information requirements on the safety parameters of child restraint systems; calls on the Member States to launch awareness-raising campaigns for parents and guardians on child safety in road transport in order to continue to promote awareness on the need to use seat belts, including in back seats, in view of the safety risks posed to vehicle occupants in many of the vehicles currently in use — and which will remain in use for years to come — that do not have such seat belt reminder technology in place;

28.

Urges the Commission, in line with Parliament’s resolution of 27 April 2021 on the implementation report on the road safety aspects of the Roadworthiness Package, to take due account of the technical progress in vehicle safety features provided for in the new General Safety Regulation and to include advanced safety systems in the scope of the next revision of the Roadworthiness Package to ensure they are checked during periodical technical inspections; calls on the competent authorities, in this regard, to ensure additional training, upskilling and reskilling for the inspectors that carry out the periodical technical inspections; calls for more stringent vehicle self-diagnosis requirements in order to prevent malfunctioning advanced driving assistance systems, which are designed to enhance safety, from eventually becoming a hazard;

29.

Regrets the fact that the provisions in the Roadworthiness Package relating to the inspection of cargo securing are not mandatory; calls on the Commission to propose strengthening these provisions during the next revision of the package;

30.

Stresses that greater efforts are needed to prevent odometer fraud and thus ensure the quality and safety of second-hand vehicles; invites the Member States, therefore, to make use of the odometer reading exchange system developed by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE), the EU MOVEHUB platform and its ODOCAR module as a result of the pilot project proposed by Parliament on a European system for limiting odometer fraud (OREL);

31.

Calls on the Commission to propose a new harmonised regulatory framework for automated cars in order to ensure, by means of comprehensive tests, including real driving conditions, that automated cars will operate in an absolutely safe manner for their drivers and other road users, in particular concerning their interaction with conventional vehicles and vulnerable road users;

32.

Requests that the Commission assess, meanwhile, the risks to road safety of the assisted driving systems currently available, such as driver overreliance and distraction; calls on the Commission to consider introducing a requirement to equip drivers’ mobile and electronic devices with a ‘safe driving mode’ and the standard installation of other technological tools to reduce distractions while driving;

33.

Highlights the fact that, as the Commission’s EU strategic action plan on road safety points out, public procurement presents an interesting opportunity to positively influence road safety; calls on the Commission to take explicit account of the fact that the most economically advantageous tenders in the public procurement of road public passenger transport services should be assessed on the basis of the best price-quality ratio, which should also include vehicle safety, innovation, quality, sustainability and social issues; urges the Member States and contracting authorities to consider safety aspects as one of the main criteria when awarding public contracts for road transport services;

34.

Notes that new personal mobility devices also raise a number of serious concerns related not only to the safety of the devices themselves, but also to their safe use in traffic; regrets that only a few Member States have introduced legislation on this issue and that the lack of harmonisation in the EU can create confusion and make it difficult for visitors to abide by local rules; calls on the Commission to consider a type approval framework for these new mobility devices and to issue guidelines for Member States on managing safety aspects, including traffic rules for the safe use of such devices; reminds the Commission and the Member States of the need to implement EU and national awareness-raising and education campaigns on the safe use of micromobility devices, with a particular focus on vulnerable road users such as children, older people or persons with reduced mobility; calls on the Commission and the Member States to exchange best practices on how to improve the safe use of micromobility devices;

35.

Calls on the Commission to update the requirements of the EU road accidents database (CARE) and to incorporate the identification of collisions of micromobility devices such as e-scooters and other electrically-assisted bicycles; calls on the Member States to implement concrete preventive safety measures at national, regional or local level on the basis of the information in the CARE database;

Safe road use

36.

Notes that according to a Commission study, alcohol is estimated to be involved in around 25 % of all road fatalities, while drugs are involved in 15 % of road fatalities (8); notes that the EU recommendation on permitted blood alcohol content dates from 2001; calls on the Commission to update its recommendations and include a zero-tolerance drink-driving limit framework therein, and to introduce an EU recommendation for zero tolerance regarding illicit psychoactive drugs and standards on roadside drug-driving enforcement; points out that harmonising the permitted blood alcohol levels in the EU for all categories of vehicle will facilitate comparisons under the KPIs relating to sobriety on the roads; calls on the Commission to draw up guidelines on the labelling of medication which affects people’s ability to drive a vehicle and to launch information campaigns to raise awareness of medical services, including family doctors, in this area; calls on the Commission to also include in the revised recommendations guidance on the fitting of alcohol interlock devices, with a special focus on repeat offenders, high-level first-time offenders and all professional drivers;

37.

Notes that speeding is a key factor in around 30 % of fatal road crashes and an aggravating factor in most crashes; calls on the Commission to come up with a recommendation to apply safe speed limits, in line with the safe system approach for all road types, such as maximum default speeds of 30km/h in residential areas and areas where there are high numbers of cyclists and pedestrians, with the possibility for higher limits in main arterial roads with appropriate protection for vulnerable road users; calls on the Member States to prioritise investing in speed enforcement and high-quality communication on the centrality of speed and speed management; calls on the Member States to apply penalties to deter speeding, including penalty point systems, and to consider introducing speed awareness courses to rehabilitate repeat offenders;

38.

Notes that according to Commission estimates (9), 10 million major road traffic offences in the EU related to speeding, driving through red lights and drink-driving committed by non-residents are detected each year; acknowledges the progress made in setting up a framework for the cross-border enforcement of traffic offences since 2015, yet regrets that the existing framework on cross-border enforcement of traffic offences laid down in the Cross-Border Enforcement Directive does not adequately ensure investigation in order to enforce penalties or recognition of decisions on penalties; believes that better cross-border enforcement of road traffic rules would increase compliance with such rules and act as a deterrent, thereby reducing dangerous behaviour and improving road safety; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to address the above-mentioned issues in the next review of the directive, to assess the issue of mutual recognition of driving disqualifications and penalty points, and to revise the scope of the directive to include toll enforcement in order to prevent dangerous driving and maintain the quality of infrastructure;

39.

Recalls that the Driving Licence Directive established a harmonised EU licence model and introduced minimum requirements for obtaining licences; notes that the directive will need to be kept up-to-date regarding new technological developments in vehicle and infrastructure technology and vehicle automation and in training curricula, especially for professional drivers; calls on the Commission to develop minimum standards for driver training and traffic safety education, while gradually aligning the form, content and outcomes of driving courses across the EU, and to consider including in the upcoming revision of the directive the Goals for Driver Education matrix, which has three categories: knowledge and skills, risk-increasing aspects and self-assessment; calls, in addition, for the introduction of a graduated licencing system that encourages novice drivers to gain more experience in higher-order skills such as traffic in sight, self-assessment and hazard perception and to limit certain high-risk activities such as driving at night and with passengers, while taking into account the mobility needs of people living in remote areas and limited access to public transport; calls on the Commission, moreover, to further harmonise the minimum standards for driving and riding trainers, including periodic training, hazard perception training, stricter minimum education and communication skills; notes with concern that irregular issuances of driving licences have been reported in several Member States and calls on the Commission to monitor this issue;

40.

Calls on the Commission to assess making theoretical and practical training and tests mandatory to obtaining a driving licence for all categories of powered two-wheeled vehicles;

41.

Calls on the Commission to develop KPIs on the provision of traffic safety and mobility education in the Member States, and to develop EU tools to design, implement and evaluate traffic safety and mobility education; encourages all the Member States to ensure the provision of high-quality road safety education, which should begin at school and form part of continued lifelong learning;

42.

Notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has led to the expansion of the home delivery sector and specifically the use of vans and powered two-wheeled vehicles such as mopeds and bicycles, boosting the emergence of new types of platform work and business models; calls on the Commission to ensure that professional van drivers undergo appropriate training and to address the issue of van drivers’ fatigue and speeding, particularly as a result of the large increase in the number of home deliveries; further calls on the Commission to consider tightening the roadworthiness test regime and introducing the obligation of additional checks for vans used by parcel delivery service providers once a specific mileage has been reached, and to consider extending this obligation to other vehicles in these categories used for further commercial purposes as part of the revision of the Roadworthiness Package; calls on the Commission to come up with a recommendation on the safety of delivery personnel, including requirements for employers and companies to ensure the provision and use of safety equipment and safe vehicles, as well as training in the digital tools they might have to use, such as applications and interactive platforms;

43.

Expresses deep concern over driver fatigue in commercial freight and passenger transport as a cause for road accidents; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that Council Directive 89/391/EEC on the health and safety of workers (10) is implemented properly with regard to road safety aspects; calls on the Commission to introduce a KPI for driver fatigue in commercial freight and passenger transport; asks the Commission and the Member States to increase the number of secure parking areas in the TEN-T and ensure they are adapted to drivers’ needs, and to provide information on their availability through an updated and user-friendly website; calls on the Commission to assess whether the installation of air conditioners or equivalent air conditioning systems for cabins in heavy goods vehicles could have a positive impact on driver fatigue and road safety, given that these systems can run independently from the main engine;

44.

Highlights that effective and complete post-crash response includes, in addition to medical care and rehabilitation, the provision of mental and social support, recognition for the victims, and a thorough investigation to identify the causes of crashes and measures to prevent them for reoccurring in the future, as well as criminal and civil proceedings where appropriate; calls on the Member States to establish closer collaboration between their road safety authorities and the health sector to enforce the correct use of emergency corridors to speed up rescue operations; calls on the Commission and the Member States, furthermore, to provide sufficient financing for efficient emergency infrastructure, including air medical services, in particular in remote, mountainous and insular regions; calls on the Commission to make first aid training compulsory in the future revision of the Driving Licence Directive; calls on the Member States to enshrine the concept of emergency corridors in their national highway codes and to launch further awareness-raising campaigns; recalls the importance of effective follow-up victim support;

45.

Calls on the Member States to develop their principal trauma networks and to adopt guidelines for mutual cooperation in order to enable emergency care services to deliver patients swiftly, including across borders;

46.

Stresses that poor enforcement of road traffic rules undermines efforts to achieve Vision Zero; encourages the Member States to set annual targets for enforcement and compliance in their road safety plans and to ensure their adequate funding, as well as to undertake and publish an annual follow-up analysing the targets achieved and results obtained; underlines that only well-explained, well-publicised and consistent enforcement activities and education by enforcement can have a long-lasting effect on driving behaviour; notes that efficiency is further enhanced if the handling of fines for detected violations is largely automated;

47.

Notes that using a mobile phone or other electronic devices while driving or riding significantly impairs driving ability and plays a role in 10-30 % of road collisions; calls on the Member States to introduce effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for mobile phone use, including non-financial penalties, to raise awareness of the risks involved and to improve enforcement;

A framework fit for the future

48.

Highlights that external factors and emerging societal trends present unprecedented challenges to road safety under the EU strategy to 2030 and beyond; notes that the EU should pave the way for connected and automated vehicles to be rolled out in due time and should assess the possible risks of combining such vehicles with traditional vehicles in mixed traffic and vulnerable road users; calls on the Commission to fully assess the impact on traffic in urban areas and on the environment of the greater number of automated vehicles; highlights that it may be necessary to upgrade infrastructure to guarantee that automated and semi-automated vehicles operate safely, while also improving safety for conventional vehicles and thus benefit all road users;

49.

Calls on the Member States to set up vehicle scrappage schemes under green conditions in order to incentivise the purchase and use of safer, clean and energy-efficient vehicles and the renewal of public and private vehicle fleets; asks the Commission and the Member States to work with the EIB to study new funding schemes to facilitate investment in safe and sustainable transport services and safe and sustainable vehicle fleets;

50.

Points out that data will play a key role in improving road safety; recalls that in-vehicle data is extremely valuable for traffic management, roadworthiness tests and crash analysis; calls on the Commission to set up a framework to access in-vehicle data beyond the repair market in compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (11), solely for the purpose of accident research and roadworthiness tests; stresses, in this regard, the importance of the digital data stored in event data recorders (EDR) for undertaking thorough crash analyses to improve road safety; calls on the Commission to ensure that all data elements relevant to in-depth crash analysis and road safety research (including location, date and time) are required to be recorded and stored by the EDR;

51.

Recalls that although road safety is a shared responsibility among all the relevant actors and authorities at EU, national and local level, the EU should exercise strong leadership to ensure that road safety remains a priority in road transport to help close the road safety gap between Member States and ensure that the EU remains a global leader in this domain; stresses the EU’s responsibility to promote cooperation and the exchange of best practices with third countries, such as the United Kingdom, in order to implement the Stockholm Declaration on Road Safety; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that EU road safety policy objectives apply to all the relevant external programming and to develop an effective system for exchanging information on traffic offences with neighbouring non-EU countries to improve enforcement, while ensuring that any sharing of information should be subject to strict safeguards, audits and oversight conditions, in full compliance with the applicable EU rules;

52.

Calls on the Commission, in view of the upcoming revision of the Urban Mobility Package, to promote synergies between safety and sustainability measures in urban areas; calls, in this regard, for the reprioritisation of transport infrastructure in urban areas, including the repurposing of public spaces, away from individual motorised transport towards sustainable, safer and healthier transport modes such as public transport, walking and cycling, while taking into consideration the special needs of vulnerable road users, such as children, persons with disabilities and older people; encourages greater investments and co-financing via EU funding instruments for parking and other mobility connectivity zones in the entry of urban areas, providing for easy access to different modes of public transport, in view of the need to reduce urban congestion and CO2 emissions; welcomes the EIB’s intention to support ambitious investment programmes to help public authorities foster sustainable mobility at local and regional level, such as sustainable urban mobility plans and public transport projects; calls on the Commission to better integrate the EU road safety targets and actions into the guidelines on the sustainable urban mobility plans by monitoring and promoting best practices, including establishing an indicator on using EU funding for improve urban road safety effectively;

53.

Notes that rural areas account for approximately 83 % of the EU’s territory and are home to 30,6 % of its population; points out that rural areas and sparsely populated areas in particular lack quality transport infrastructure and regular collective public transport services, which has a direct impact on road safety; further notes that 54 % of road deaths in the EU occur on rural roads; highlights that improving accessibility, connectivity and road safety for rural areas should be a part of the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy; calls on the Commission to take account of the latter in its upcoming communication on a long-term vision for rural areas;

54.

Highlights the need to promote an integrated approach to accomplish the goals of Vision Zero and to foster intersectoral collaboration, including engagement with NGOs, civil society, and businesses and industry at regional, national and EU level; calls on companies and SMEs, in line with the Stockholm Declaration, to pursue the attainment of road safety by applying safe system principles throughout their value chains, including internal practices in procurement, production and distribution processes, and to include reporting on safety performance in their sustainability reports and on their official websites; further calls on companies and SMEs, where applicable, to offer dedicated road safety training to their drivers, and to consider incorporating the role of a ‘mobility manager’ to coordinate and optimise their company’s mobility needs for the transportation of goods and workers throughout the entire logistics chain;

55.

Calls on the Commission to cooperate with the Member States, civil society and other key stakeholders on developing a Europe-wide road safety culture; welcomes the launch of the EU Urban Road Safety Award as part of European Mobility Week and the revamping of the European Road Safety Charter — the largest civil society platform on road safety; calls on the Commission to organise a European Year of Road Safety initiative in the coming years as part of the EU road safety policy framework for 2021-2030; advocates, moreover, in the context of the European Year of Greener Cities in 2022, the establishment, funding and monitoring of a ‘safer city’ label, which should be based on criteria on the highest road safety standards for all users and more liveable public spaces, including better air quality and reduced CO2 emissions;

56.

Acknowledges the World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims, which is held on the third Sunday of November every year to remember the many millions who have been killed or seriously injured on the world’s roads, to thank the emergency services for their work, and to reflect on the tremendous burden and cost to families, communities and countries of this day-to-day, continuing disaster; formally recognises this day and calls on the European Council and the Commission to do the same by holding an annual event supported by the three institutions;

57.

Is of the view that in order to properly implement the next steps in the EU road safety policy under the overarching Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy, some new capacities are needed in the field of road safety, in particular with respect to the coordination, monitoring and evaluation functions and technical support for the overall strategy; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to consider establishing a European road transport agency to support sustainable, safe and smart road transport or — if not feasible — to entrust an existing agency with this task;

o o

58.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 68, 13.3.2015, p. 9.

(2) OJ L 403, 30.12.2006, p. 18.

(3) OJ L 325, 16.12.2019, p. 1.

(4) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0122.

(5) OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 1.

(6) Directive (EU) 2019/1936 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 amending Directive 2008/96/EC on road infrastructure safety management (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 1).

(7) OJ L 167, 30.4.2004, p. 39.

(8) Commission study of 18 February 2014 on the prevention of drink-driving by the use of alcohol interlock devices.

(9) Commission Inception Impact Assessment of 15 March 2019 on the revision of the Cross-Border Enforcement Directive.

(10) OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, p. 1.

(11) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1.

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/56

P9_TA(2021)0408

Rebuilding fish stocks in the Mediterranean

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on rebuilding fish stocks in the Mediterranean: assessment and next steps (2019/2178(INI))

(2022/C 132/05)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and to Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (1),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381),

—

having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, set out in the Commission Communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), in particular, to its point 2.2.6 on ‘Restoring the good environmental status of marine ecosystems’, ‘including through providing financial incentives through the future financial instruments for fisheries and maritime policy for marine protected areas (including Natura 2000 areas and those established by international or regional agreements)’,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 16 June 2020 entitled ‘Towards more sustainable fishing in the EU: state of play and orientations for 2021’ (COM(2020)0248),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 17 September 2020 entitled ‘Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021’ (COM(2020)0575),

—	having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 of 21 December 2006 concerning management measures for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea (2),

—	having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) (3),

—	having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (4),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy (5),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (6) and the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2018)0390),

—

having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2017/159 of 19 December 2016 implementing the Agreement concerning the implementation of the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 of the International Labour Organisation, concluded on 21 May 2012 between the General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union (Cogeca), the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF) and the Association of National Organisations of Fishing Enterprises in the European Union (Europêche) (7),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 on the establishment of a Union framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the common fisheries policy (8),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/2107 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention area of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) (9),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1022 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 establishing a multiannual plan for the fisheries exploiting demersal stocks in the western Mediterranean Sea (10),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/982 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1343/2011 on certain provisions for fishing in the GFCM (General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean) Agreement area (11),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 508/2014 and (EU) No 1379/2013 as regards specific measures to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak in the fishery and aquaculture sector (12),

—	having regard to the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 25 June 2020 on the implementation of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (Directive 2008/56/EC) (COM(2020)0259),

—	having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report 26/2020 of 26 November 2020 entitled ‘Marine environment: EU protection is wide but not deep’,

—	having regard to the Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ (JOIN(2021)0002),

—	having regard to Articles 38 and 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—	having regard to the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),

—	having regard the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

—	having regard to the mid-term strategy (2017-2020) of the GFCM towards the sustainability of Mediterranean and Black Sea fisheries,

—	having regard to the GFCM’s 2018 report on the state of Mediterranean and Black Sea fisheries,

—	having regard to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14, ‘Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development’, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2015,

—	having regard to the 2020 report of the Commission’s Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) on monitoring the performance of the common fisheries policy (STECF-Adhoc-20-01),

—	having regard to the Commission’s retrospective evaluation study of the Mediterranean Sea Regulation of May 2016,

—	having regard to the European Environment Agency report No 17/2019 entitled ‘Marine messages II — Navigating the course towards clean, healthy and productive seas through implementation of an ecosystem-based approach’,

—	having regard to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention) and the related EU protocols and decisions,

—	having regard to the MedFish4Ever Ministerial Declaration of the Mediterranean coastal states, adopted in Valletta, Malta, on 30 March 2017,

—	having regard to the Sofia Ministerial Declaration of 7 June 2018,

—	having regard to the Ministerial Declaration of 26 September 2018 aimed at implementing a Regional Plan of Action for Small-Scale and Sustainable Fisheries in the Mediterranean and Black Sea,

—	having regard to the 2019 global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES),

—	having regard to the 2019 special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate,

—	having regard to Part II, Section 2 of the UNCLOS entitled ‘Limits of the territorial sea’,

—	having regard to the First Mediterranean Assessment Report (MAR1) by the independent network of Mediterranean Experts on Climate and environmental Change (MedECC),

—	having regard to the report of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the GFCM entitled ‘The State of Mediterranean and Black Sea Fisheries 2020’,

—	having regard to the report of its Committee on Fisheries on the consequences of rising seawater temperatures for fish stocks and fisheries (2019/2163(INI)),

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Fisheries for the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on a Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally friendly food system (2020/2260(INI)) PECH_AD(2021)662054,

—

having regard to its legislative resolution of 17 April 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak in the fishery and aquaculture sector (COM(2020)0142 — C9-0093/2020 — 2020/0059(COD)) (13),

—	having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 entitled ‘More fish in the seas? Measures to promote stock recovery above the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), including fish recovery areas and marine protected areas’ (14),

—	having regard to the present and long-term negative socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sector, including retailers and the small-scale fresh food trade,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0225/2021),

whereas the Mediterranean Sea is one of the areas with the greatest biodiversity in the world in addition to being a basin that is home to coastal communities that depend largely on fishing, and particularly small-scale fishing; whereas its current worrying environmental status, partly as a result of overfishing, is seriously endangering not only biodiversity but also the survival of a sector whose loss of profitability may have extremely negative socioeconomic repercussions on fishing communities, the industry and its ancillary sectors;

B.	whereas fish stocks do not have unlimited reproductive capacity, and whereas demand for and consumption of fish is constantly increasing;

whereas the Mediterranean — especially the western Mediterranean where new measures are being implemented, although it is too early to fully assess them since more initiatives are needed — and the Black Sea have remained broadly unchanged since data collection began in 2003, although there may have been a slight increase in biomass since 2012;

whereas according to the 2020 GFCM report on the state of Mediterranean and Black Sea fisheries, in the Mediterranean the proportion of overfished stocks decreased from 88 % in 2014 to 75 % in 2018, clearly showing that much work remains to be done, but reflecting gradually improving results owed to the commitment of fishers across the region; whereas the situation of many stocks remains critical as more than 80 % of scientifically assessed stocks are exploited above maximum sustainable yield (MSY) levels, according to the STECF;

E.	whereas the Regulation establishing a multiannual plan for the management of demersal fisheries in the western Mediterranean was adopted in 2019, and whereas we need to wait and see what the effects of the measures adopted therein will be;

F.	whereas the significant socioeconomic impact of restrictions on fishing activities undermines the profitability of thousands of companies to the point of endangering their very survival, with a potentially devastating impact on employment and social cohesion in coastal areas;

G.	whereas stock depletion and marine biodiversity erosion is threatening food security of coastal communities, jobs and incomes throughout the artisanal fisheries value chain;

H.	whereas the unequal levels of compliance with the restrictions on fishing activities precludes fulfilment of the stated aims, putting those who comply with them at a clear disadvantage;

I.	whereas the European Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund should be used both to mitigate negative socioeconomic effects and to diversify the sector;

whereas the majority of the Mediterranean fishing fleet consists of small-scale artisanal fishing vessels, accounting for some 84 % of the fishing fleet and 60 % of jobs in the Mediterranean basin, and whereas although some fleets have decreased significantly, albeit to varying degrees across the EU and non-European countries with major impacts on local economies, the trends on the numbers of the vessels have remained relatively stable;

K.	whereas for most coastal and island areas, small-scale fishing is a traditional form of fishing which is part of a lifestyle and provides a significant livelihood which calls for specific measures and support to allow it to grow and develop;

L.	whereas healthy levels of fish stocks need to be reached to prevent the loss of jobs and to sustain important economic sectors that depend on fisheries;

M.	whereas, in addition to fishing, the factors exerting pressure on Mediterranean fish stocks and marine biodiversity include human-induced problems such as plastic pollution, fuel dispersion, habitat loss, maritime traffic, and climate change, and the proliferation of invasive alien species;

N.	whereas the statistics show a steady increase in consumption of fish products together with a relative increase in imports;

O.	whereas there is room for improvement in the labelling of European products with a view to enhancing the value of Mediterranean fisheries and improving traceability while combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing;

P.	whereas there has been a steady decline in production and measures are needed in order to restore the sustainability of resources;

Q.	whereas fishing and aquaculture are among the sectors hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, as demand has seen a sudden decline;

R.	whereas the Commission has proposed a range of temporary and targeted measures to address the challenges faced by the seafood community due to COVID-19;

S.	whereas the political instability and unrest in Libya are posing a tangible threat to EU fishers active in the southern Mediterranean, jeopardising their personal freedom and the safety of fishing operations;

T.	whereas while EU fishers are required to comply with rules for the conservation of fish stocks, those from other Mediterranean countries are not required to comply with the same rules, thereby undermining efforts to rebuild stocks while competing unfairly with EU fisheries;

U.	whereas the Mediterranean Sea is warming up to 20 percent faster than the rest of the world; whereas climate change could lead to the local extinction of up to 50 % of commercial fish and marine invertebrates by 2050, according to MedECC;

Improving legislative aspects

Calls on the Commission, after consulting the Advisory Council for the Mediterranean (MED-AC), to identify the obstacles to the process of rebuilding fish stocks, including an analysis of the implementation of the 2017-2020 GFCM strategy, with a view to including its findings in the 2021-2030 strategy, ensuring that practical steps are taken to rebuild fish stocks, including considering, if needed and found appropriate, both legislative and non-legislative actions;

Welcomes the Commission’s proposal, in its 2030 biodiversity strategy, to have at least 30 % of the sea area in the EU protected, including through establishing fish stock recovery areas, as provided for under the common fisheries policy (CFP);

Considers it necessary to ensure the effective consolidation and development of existing marine protected areas and the involvement of fishers in the preparation and management phase;

Emphasises the need to include the evaluation of the designation and success of such areas in the upcoming report on the functioning of the common fisheries policy (CFP); calls on the GFCM to draw on the successful example of the Jabuka/Pomo Pit fish stock recovery area;

Calls on the Commission to ensure a level playing field for all economic sectors in the implementation of effectively managed and connected marine protected areas (MPAs);

Urges the Commission to address the needs of Mediterranean countries by providing scientific and technical support for those countries to utilise regional and international funding mechanisms, and for developing sustainable development projects;

Calls on the Commission to assess whether new stock management plans are required to achieve the principles of social, economic and environmental sustainability set out in the CFP;

Recalls the objective of the CFP to achieve the maximum sustainable yield exploitation rate at the latest by 2020 for all stocks;

Notes with concern that there remain a great many stocks of unknown status; calls for a redoubling of efforts to improve data collection with a view to improving arrangements for devising the necessary management measures;

10.

Recalls the objective of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive to achieve or maintain Good Environmental Status in the marine environment by the year 2020 at the latest;

11.

Calls on the Commission to draw on the successful example of bluefin tuna by studying the introduction of total allowable catches (TACs) in the long term for some species including hake and to come forward with a proposal during the evaluation of the multiannual plan in 2024;

12.

Recalls that the success of MPAs and other protected areas lies in them being embraced by fishers, coastal communities and other stakeholders; calls on the Commission to consider the need to facilitate the active participation of the fisheries sector, including its artisanal component, the local communities and all relevant stakeholders in the design, management and monitoring of MPAs;

13.

Calls on the EU and its Member States to act to end ‘paper parks’ in the Mediterranean Sea and to establish MPAs as part of a coherent network of effectively managed and connected areas, including offshore and deep-sea areas; recalls the requirement to cease fishing with bottom-contacting gear below 400 m in areas where vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) are known to exist or are likely to occur;

14.

Invites the EU and its Member States to expand the network of fish stock recovery areas under the CFP and under the GFCM, especially where there is clear evidence of heavy concentrations of fish below minimum conservation reference size or of spawning grounds; emphasises the need to include the evaluation of the designation and success of such areas in the upcoming report on the functioning of the CFP; calls on the GFCM to draw on the successful example of the Jabuka/Pomo Pit fish stock recovery area;

15.

Calls on the GFCM to propose an ambitious and holistic new common strategy for fisheries and aquaculture in the Mediterranean and Black Seas for 2021-2025, which must include effective and sustainable management measures at regional and national level, following the MSY approach; calls on the GFCM to tackle issues such as global warming and IUU and recreational fishing, and to establish new fish stock recovery areas;

16.

Regrets the lack of scientific data on recreational fisheries; calls on the EU Member States and the GFCM to fully assess the impacts and contribution of recreational fisheries on the management of fisheries resources and to include them in their management plans;

17.

Stresses the importance of monitoring and control and effective regional cooperation on the management of marine biological resources;

18.

Calls on the Commission to promote the objectives of the European Green Deal at the GFCM level and to support sustainable ocean governance and fish stock management through adequate funding;

19.

Calls on the Commission to ensure that every legislative proposal aimed at increasing fish stocks which restricts fishing activities is preceded by a wide-ranging impact assessment to quantify its possible socioeconomic and environmental impact on coastal communities and on the productivity and competitiveness of EU fisheries undertakings and the production chain, and is supported by the best available scientific data shared with stakeholders related to the fisheries sector;

20.

Calls, further, given the development of the European Green Deal and the Biodiversity and Farm to Fork Strategies that underpin it, and the major impact it will have on fishing activity in general and in the Mediterranean in particular, for a prior impact assessment of these measures and their implementation on the fishing and aquaculture sectors, in view of the Mediterranean’s particular status as a sea shared with non-EU countries with different regulations;

21.

Underlines the lack of precise quantification of the consequences for fish stocks of all possible impacts above and beyond fishing activities, such as pollution, global warming, alien species, exploitation of hydrocarbons, dredging and maritime transport; stresses that this lack of information does not allow for sufficiently adequate and effective decision-making to ensure the conservation of fish stocks and marine ecosystems;

22.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all legislative and non-legislative proposals are shared with fishers’ associations, including guilds (cofradías), under a co-management model;

23.

Stresses that any future legislative measures to promote the recovery of fish stocks in the Mediterranean Sea that have an impact on the fishing activity of the European fisheries sector should be implemented gradually and in proportion to the sector’s capacity for action; stresses, in addition, the importance of ensuring that any future legislative proposal does not impose an excessive bureaucratic and financial burden on the European fisheries sector, particularly on small-scale fisheries;

24.

Emphasises that any legislative initiative aimed at protecting and rebuilding stocks in the Mediterranean Sea should not be limited solely to measures restricting fishing activities, but should take a holistic approach to the problem and jointly address all the threats to stock depletion;

25.

Stresses the need to legislate on the basis of an eco-system approach which can be used to identify and analyse all interactions that have an impact on fish stocks, taking into account not only fishing activities, but also other factors weighing in the balance and the presence of new invasive species;

26.

Highlights the positive impact that the renewal of the very elderly fishing fleets operating in the Mediterranean, as regards both vessels and engine, would bring, as it would reduce their impact on the environment, foster fuel efficiency and decarbonisation of the vessels and improve safety and working conditions on board; recalls that the agreement on the European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) facilitates support in this regard;

27.

Calls on the Commission to safeguard the competitiveness and sustainable development of the entire fisheries sector and its production chain, enhancing the value of fisheries products and improving labelling and traceability and placing particular emphasis on measures to ensure that imported products comply with European standards;

28.

Calls on the Council and the Commission to positively assess Parliament’s position in the ongoing revision of Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (15) (IUU Regulation), and especially in relation to the proposal from Parliament to introduce safeguard measures, subject to certain conditions, under which preferential tariffs for fishery and aquaculture products are temporarily suspended from non-EU states that do not properly cooperate in combatting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing;

29.

Requests that the Commission and the Member States improve the labelling and traceability of all seafood products in order to provide consumers with clearer information regarding the origin of the product, species and information on other aspects such as production methods and the standards applied in respect of capture and processing including from non-EU imports;

30.

Calls on the Commissioner responsible for fisheries and maritime affairs to establish a consultation body with the involvement of non-EU countries of the Mediterranean area with a view to reducing unfair competition and to securing a level playing field for European fishers and women working in the sector;

31.

Calls on the Member States to fight IUU fishing by increasing transparency of fishing operations, and of monitoring and control efforts;

32.

Calls on the Member States to enhance capacity for fisheries control and to facilitate the exchange of best practices and targets between Member States on a short-term tactical level, assisted by the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA);

33.

Urges the Mediterranean Member States to establish additional number of GFCM fisheries restricted areas with immediate effect, for the sake of protecting overexploited marine ecosystems, taking into account the Jabuka/Pomo Pit fisheries restricted area as an example of best practice;

34.

Calls on the Commission to consider integrating fisheries into the EU Neighbourhood Policy, as a tool for invigorating regional cooperation;

35.

Insists that the proper, mandatory implementation of the CFP should have as its objective achieving the right balance between environmental, economic and social sustainability;

36.

Calls on the Commission to carry out an analysis of environmental and socioeconomic data concerning the local communities and the Mediterranean fisheries sector in order to assess the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the industry as well as on fish stocks, and for this assessment to be taken into account in future decision-making;

37.

Calls on the Commission to use that analysis when developing policies, facilitating research collaboration and cooperating with all actors around the entire Mediterranean, including both EU and non-EU riparian countries, to assess and avoid potential disputes among fleets targeting the same marine biological resources, located in sensitive areas of international waters;

38.

Calls on the Commission to analyse the social, economic and environmental impact, as well as the effects on fish stocks in the recreational fishing sector, with a view to incorporating this analysis into any measures that may be adopted;

39.

Urges the Member States to make correct use of EMFAF resources to compensate small-scale fisheries that have to temporarily suspend their activity due to conservation measures, in line with the rules and provisions of the EMFAF;

40.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to foster the opportunities offered by co-management and ecosystem, adaptive and precautionary management with the ultimate aim of achieving sustainable management of fisheries resources, based on monitoring fishing efforts and ensuring selectivity in extractive fishing activity in the Mediterranean;

Tackling the impacts of other economic activities and pressures on fish stock recovery

41.

Welcomes the work carried out at GFCM level since 2017 to develop and adopt strategies to cope with the potential effects of climate change on fisheries;

42.

Calls on the Member States to adopt rules to put a ban on anchoring and mooring of large private vessels within 300 metres of the coastline and in protected habitats, on this 300 metre limit and in roadsteads, given their strong impacts on fragile ecosystems such as posidonia oceanica meadows;

43.

Calls on the Commission to publish a study on the impact of the diverse human activities and sources of pollution, both terrestrial and marine, on fish stocks and on marine ecosystems;

44.

Highlights the lack of resources to conduct scientific research and stock assessments in the Mediterranean Sea, especially human resources;

45.

Calls on the Member States to finance the training of new scientific experts;

Reinforcing data collection and research

46.

Stresses the need to promote small-scale coastal fisheries and low-impact fishing techniques in the Mediterranean, including making it mandatory for Member States to allocate to these fisheries a bigger share of the fishing opportunities for the two fisheries where TACs have been introduced, in line with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013;

Giving operators a greater role in decision-making and data collection

47.

Calls on the Commission to carry out an economic analysis of the social and employment effects of the decline in fishery resources in the Mediterranean, with a view to identifying appropriate support measures to guarantee a fair and equitable transition to low impact fisheries;

48.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that both the analysis of the data and any measures that may arise from it can make use of EMFAF funds to support sustainability and innovation in and the diversification of the sector;

49.

Calls for local and regional authorities and scientific institutes, as well as local operators to be more closely involved in the collection of data on selective fishing, in close cooperation with the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF);

50.

Calls for the exchange of good practices and innovation regarding the development of more selective fishing gear and marine waste collection methods, recognising the role of fishers as ‘guardians of the sea’, in order to contribute to a healthier and cleaner marine environment;

51.

Stresses that the full achievement of any objective relative to stock recovery in the Mediterranean and a proper implementation of the rules adopted by the European legislators is dependent on the effective participation of the fishing sector;

52.

Calls on the Commission to improve and strengthen cooperation and dialogue with the advisory councils, fishers and professionals in the coastal community sector, taking due account of their views and acknowledging the importance of fishers, women working in the sector and relevant professional organisations and civil society organisations in the formulation of rules to be implemented and decision-making processes;

53.

Urges the Member States to allow the establishment of co-management models for fisheries at local level based on participation, consultation and joint decision-making between relevant stakeholders; notes that such management plans require comprehensive monitoring of catches to ensure sustainable resource exploitation, as well as to ensure a fair balance of socioeconomic conditions within the fisheries sector with a view to offsetting differences between segments of the fleet;

54.

Stresses that co-management models are based on the maintenance of ecosystem services and on conserving exploited ecosystems by safeguarding them, which means applying an ecosystem approach to fisheries and adaptive management, with the establishment of a permanent information, analysis and action system with ongoing learning and constant feedback and agile decision-making;

55.

Welcomes the adoption of the 2018 Plan of Action to ensure a sustainable future for small-scale fisheries and the marine environment in the region as well as the launch of the ‘Friends of Small-Scale Fisheries’ platform;

56.

Stresses that any protection goals should be based on the best available scientific advice;

Upholding the rule of law

57.

Condemns the ongoing violations of the law of the sea in the Mediterranean, including kidnappings, requisitions of vessels, illegal imprisonment, intimidation, controls, harassment, assaults and unfair trials against EU fishers for carrying out their work, in clear violation of international human rights obligations;

58.

Calls on the Commission to analyse the situation in the Mediterranean and look into the possibility of setting up some form of operative arrangements to protect European seafarers and vessels;

59.

Calls on the Commission to engage in a dialogue with those North African countries that do not comply with the UNCLOS and GFCM policies and decisions, ensuring safety and a level playing field for all EU fishers;

60.

Calls on the Commission to encourage joint efforts with neighbouring countries to facilitate compliance with agreements concluded by regional fisheries management organisations and participation in the good management and recovery of fish stocks;

61.

Calls on the Commission, through its agencies, to step up its efforts to monitor EU territorial waters in order to identify non-EU vessels illegally fishing in EU territorial waters and marine protected areas and make the conditions in which EU fishers work safer; stresses that it is essential to provide these agencies with adequate funding and manpower to this end;

62.

Calls on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to step up the Union’s efforts to uphold international law, security and the rule of law in the southern Mediterranean;

o o

63.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0005.

(2) OJ L 409, 30.12.2006, p. 11.

(3) OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19.

(4) OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1.

(5) OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 22.

(6) OJ L 149, 20.5.2014, p. 1.

(7) OJ L 25, 31.1.2017, p. 12.

(8) OJ L 157, 20.6.2017, p. 1.

(9) OJ L 315, 30.11.2017, p. 1.

(10) OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, p. 1.

(11) OJ L 164, 20.6.2019, p. 1.

(12) OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 11.

(13) OJ C 316, 6.8.2021, p. 28.

(14) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0017.

(15) Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999 (OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1).

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/65

P9_TA(2021)0409

Active substances, including chlorotoluron and difenoconazole

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1449 of 3 September 2021 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances 2-phenylphenol (including its salts such as the sodium salt), 8-hydroxyquinoline, amidosulfuron, bifenox, chlormequat, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflufenican, dimethachlor, etofenprox, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, paraffin oils, paraffin oil, penconazole, picloram, propaquizafop, prosulfocarb, quizalofop-P-ethyl, quizalofop-P-tefuryl, sulphur, tetraconazole, tri-allate, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron (2021/2869(RSP))

(2022/C 132/06)

The European Parliament,

—

having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1449 of 3 September 2021 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances 2-phenylphenol (including its salts such as the sodium salt), 8-hydroxyquinoline, amidosulfuron, bifenox, chlormequat, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflufenican, dimethachlor, etofenprox, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, paraffin oils, paraffin oil, penconazole, picloram, propaquizafop, prosulfocarb, quizalofop-P-ethyl, quizalofop-P-tefuryl, sulphur, tetraconazole, tri-allate, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron (1),

—

having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (2), and in particular Article 17, first paragraph, and Article 21 thereof,

—

having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/408 of 11 March 2015 on implementing Article 80(7) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and establishing a list of candidates for substitution (3),

—	having regard to Articles 11 and 13 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (4),

—	having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2018 on the implementation of the Plant Protection Products Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 (5),

—	having regard to its resolutions of 10 October 2019 and of 26 November 2020 objecting to the previous extensions of the approval period of the active substance chlorotoluron (6),

—	having regard to Rule 112(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

A.	whereas chlorotoluron was included in Annex I to Council Directive 91/414/EEC (7) on 1 March 2006 by Commission Directive 2005/53/EC (8) and has been deemed to be approved under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009;

B.	whereas a procedure to renew the approval of chlorotoluron under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 844/2012 (9) has been ongoing since 2013;

whereas the approval period for the active substance chlorotoluron has already been extended by one year by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 533/2013 (10), and subsequently by one year every year since 2017 by Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2017/1511 (11), (EU) 2018/1262 (12), (EU) 2019/1589 (13), (EU) 2020/1511 (14) and now again by one year by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1449, which extends the approval period until 31 October 2022;

whereas the Commission has failed to explain the reasons for the extension other than saying: ‘Due to the fact that the assessment of those substances has been delayed for reasons beyond the control of the applicants, the approvals of those active substances are likely to expire before a decision has been taken on their renewal’;

whereas Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 aims to ensure a high level of protection of both human and animal health and the environment, and at the same time to safeguard the competitiveness of Union agriculture; whereas particular attention should be paid to the protection of vulnerable groups of the population, including pregnant women, infants and children;

whereas the precautionary principle should apply, and whereas Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 specifies that substances should only be included in plant protection products where it has been demonstrated that they present a clear benefit for plant production and that they are not expected to have any harmful effect on human or animal health or any unacceptable effects on the environment;

whereas Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 indicates that in the interest of safety the approval period for active substances should be limited in time; whereas the approval period should be proportionate to the possible risks inherent in the use of such substances, but in this case it is clear that no such proportionality exists;

H.	whereas in the 15 years since its approval as an active substance, chlorotoluron has been identified as a probable endocrine disruptor, and yet during this time its approval has not been reviewed or withdrawn;

whereas the Commission and Member States have the possibility and responsibility to act according to the precautionary principle when the possibility of harmful effects on health have been identified but scientific uncertainty persists, by adopting provisional risk management measures that are necessary to ensure a high level of protection of human health;

whereas, more specifically, Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 provides that the Commission may review the approval of an active substance at any time, especially where, in the light of new scientific and technical knowledge, it considers that there are indications that the substance no longer satisfies the approval criteria provided for in Article 4 of that Regulation, and whereas this review may lead to the withdrawal or amendment of the approval of the substance;

Endocrine-disrupting properties

whereas, according to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (15), chlorotoluron has a harmonised classification of very toxic to aquatic life, very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects, suspected of causing cancer (Carc. 2), and suspected of damaging the unborn child (Repr. 2);

L.	whereas chlorotoluron has been associated with endocrine-disrupting properties in scientific publications (16);

whereas in 2015 chlorotoluron was placed on the ‘list of candidates for substitution’ by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/408 because it is considered to have endocrine-disrupting properties that may cause adverse effects in humans, and because it meets the criteria for it to be considered a persistent and toxic substance;

whereas, according to point 3.6.5 of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, an active substance cannot be approved when it is considered to have endocrine-disrupting properties that may cause adverse effect in humans, unless the exposure of humans to that active substance in a plant protection product, under realistic proposed conditions of use, is negligible, that is, the product is used in closed systems or in other conditions excluding contact with humans and where residues of the active substance concerned on food and feed do not exceed the default value set in accordance with Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council (17);

O.	whereas it is unacceptable for a substance which is likely to meet the cut-off criteria for active substances that have endocrine-disrupting properties to continue to be allowed for use in the Union, thereby putting public and environmental health at risk;

whereas applicants can take advantage of the automatic system built into Commission working methods which immediately extends the approval periods of active substances if the risk reassessment has not been finalised, by prolonging the reassessment process on purpose by providing incomplete data and asking for more derogations and special conditions, which leads to unacceptable risks for the environment and human health since during this time exposure to the hazardous substance continues;

whereas in its resolution of 13 September 2018 Parliament called on the Commission and Member States ‘to ensure that the procedural extension of the approval period for the duration of the procedure, pursuant to Article 17 of the Regulation, will not be used for active substances that are mutagenic, carcinogenic, toxic for reproduction and therefore in category 1A or 1B, or active substances that have endocrine disrupting characteristics and are damaging to humans or animals, as is currently the case for substances such as flumioxazine, thiacloprid, chlorotoluron and dimoxystrobin’;

R.	whereas Parliament has already objected to the previous extensions of the approval period of chlorotoluron in its resolutions of 10 October 2019 and of 26 November 2020;

whereas the Commission in its responses (18) to the previous objections to the extensions of the approval period of chlorotoluron only refers to the ‘study underpinning the impact assessment conducted prior to the adoption of Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/605’ (19) in which ‘chlorotoluron was not identified as a potential endocrine disruptor’, but fails to acknowledge that that study did not lead to the removal of chlorotoluron from the list of candidates for substitution;

whereas after the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2100 (20) and Regulation (EU) 2018/605, the Commission tasked the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) with developing harmonised guidance to ensure that the endocrine disruptor criteria adopted by the Union are applied consistently for the assessment of biocides and pesticides in the Union; whereas this guidance which incorporates new OECD tests was published in June 2018 (21), but has not been used to assess the endocrine-disrupting properties of chlorotoluron;

U.	whereas therefore, chlorotoluron has not been properly assessed to allow for it to be no longer considered as an endocrine disrupter;

V.	whereas the draft renewal assessment report in relation to chlorotoluron has not yet been assessed by EFSA;

whereas following the previous extension in 2020 of several active substances, including chlorotoluron, under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1511, only one of the 27 substances covered by that Implementing Regulation has been non-renewed, while under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1449, the approval periods of as many as 39 substances will be extended again, many of them for a third or fourth time;

X.	whereas difenoconazole used on its own, as well as in combination with different azoles, such as penconazole, is suspected of inducing triazole-resistance in the fungal strain Aspergillus fumigatus (22);

Y.	whereas triazole resistance in Aspergillus fumigatus is a growing public health concern (23); whereas data from several studies (24) strongly suggest that agricultural azoles are responsible for medical treatment failure in azole-naïve patients in clinical settings;

whereas one in four patients admitted to intensive care due to COVID-19-related health problems have been found to be infected with Aspergillus fumigatus, of which 15 % of them are diagnosed with a resistant variant of Aspergillus fumigatus; whereas those patients become almost untreatable and their survival rate is estimated at just 20 % (25);

AA.	whereas extending the approval periods of substances which lead to resistance to fungal medicines is unacceptable from a health point of view;

Considers that Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1449 exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009;

Considers that Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1449 is not consistent with Union law in that it does not respect the precautionary principle;

Strongly denounces the serious delays in the reauthorisation process and in the identification of endocrine-disrupting substances;

Considers that the decision to extend the approval periods for chlorotoluron and difenoconazole is not in line with the safety criteria laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, and is based neither on evidence that those substances can be used safely, nor on a proven urgent need for those substances in food production in the Union;

Calls on the Commission to repeal Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1449 and to submit a new draft to the committee, which takes into account the scientific evidence on the harmful properties of all the substances concerned, especially of chlorotoluron and difenoconazole;

Calls on the Commission only to present draft implementing regulations to extend the approval periods of substances for which the current state of science is not expected to lead to a Commission proposal for non-renewal of the approval of the active substance concerned;

Calls on the Commission to withdraw the approvals for substances if proof or reasonable doubt exists that they will not meet the safety criteria laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009;

Calls on the Member States to ensure the proper and timely reassessment of the approvals for the active substances for which they are the reporting Member States, and to ensure that current delays are solved effectively and as soon as possible;

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 313, 6.9.2021, p. 20.

(2) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 67, 12.3.2015, p. 18.

(4) OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13.

(5) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0356.

(6) European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on the draft Commission implementing regulation amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances amidosulfuron, beta-cyfluthrin, bifenox, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflubenzuron, diflufenican, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, picloram, prosulfocarb, pyriproxyfen, thiophanate-methyl, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron (OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 7); European Parliament resolution of 26 November 2020 on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1511 of 16 October 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances amidosulfuron, bifenox, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflufenican, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, paraffin oils, picloram, prosulfocarb, sulphur, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0325).

(7) Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ L 230, 19.8.1991, p. 1).

(8) Commission Directive 2005/53/EC of 16 September 2005 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC to include chlorothalonil, chlorotoluron, cypermethrin, daminozide and thiophanate-methyl as active substances (OJ L 241, 17.9.2005, p. 51).

(9) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 844/2012 of 18 September 2012 setting out the provisions necessary for the implementation of the renewal procedure for active substances, as provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ L 252, 19.9.2012, p. 26).

(10) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 533/2013 of 10 June 2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances 1-methyl-cyclopropene, chlorothalonil, chlorotoluron, cypermethrin, daminozide, forchlorfenuron, indoxacarb, thiophanate-methyl and tribenuron (OJ L 159, 11.6.2013, p. 9).

(11) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1511 of 30 August 2017 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances 1-methylcyclopropene, beta-cyfluthrin, chlorothalonil, chlorotoluron, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dimethenamid-p, flufenacet, flurtamone, forchlorfenuron, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, iprodione, MCPA, MCPB, silthiofam, thiophanate-methyl and tribenuron (OJ L 224, 31.8.2017, p. 115).

(12) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1262 of 20 September 2018 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances 1-methylcyclopropene, beta-cyfluthrin, chlorothalonil, chlorotoluron, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dimethenamid-p, diuron, fludioxonil, flufenacet, flurtamone, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, MCPA, MCPB, prosulfocarb, thiophanate-methyl and tribenuron (OJ L 238, 21.9.2018, p. 62).

(13) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1589 of 26 September 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances amidosulfuron, beta-cyfluthrin, bifenox, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflubenzuron, diflufenican, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, picloram, prosulfocarb, pyriproxyfen, thiophanate-methyl, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron (OJ L 248, 27.9.2019, p. 24).

(14) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1511 of 16 October 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances amidosulfuron, bifenox, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflufenican, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, paraffin oils, picloram, prosulfocarb, sulphur, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron (OJ L 344, 19.10.2020, p. 18).

(15) Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, p. 1).

(16) See inter alia: Hong, M., Ping, Z., Jian, X., ‘Testicular toxicity and mechanisms of chlorotoluron compounds in the mouse’, Toxicology Mechanisms and Methods 2007; 17(8):483-8.

(17) Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin and amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC (OJ L 70, 16.3.2005, p. 1).

(18) Commission follow up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on the draft Commission implementing regulation amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances amidosulfuron, beta-cyfluthrin, bifenox, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflubenzuron, diflufenican, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, picloram, prosulfocarb, pyriproxyfen, thiophanate-methyl, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron, SP(2019)669, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2019/2826(RSP)&l=en;

Commission follow up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1511 of 16 October 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances amidosulfuron, bifenox, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflufenican, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, paraffin oils, picloram, prosulfocarb, sulphur, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron, SP(2021)129, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2020/2853(RSP)&l=en

(19) Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/605 of 19 April 2018 amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 by setting out scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine disrupting properties (OJ L 101, 20.4.2018, p. 33).

(20) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2100 of 4 September 2017 setting out scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine-disrupting properties pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and Council (OJ L 301, 17.11.2017, p. 1).

(21) EFSA and ECHA Guidance for the identification of endocrine disruptors in the context of Regulations (EU) No 528/2012 and (EC) No 1107/2009, EFSA Journal 2018, 16(6):5311, http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/5311.

(22) Verweij, P.E., Lucas, J.A., Arendrup, M.C., Bowyer, P., Brinkmann, A.J.F., Denning, D.W., Dyer, P.S., Fisher, M.C., Geenen, P.L., Gisi, U., Hermann, D., Hoogendijk, A., Kiers, E., Lagrou, K., Melchers, W.J.G., Rhodes, J., Rietveld, A.G., Schoustra, S.E., Stenzel, K., Zwaan, B.J., and Fraaije, B.A., ‘The one health problem of azole resistance in Aspergillus fumigatus: current insights and future research agenda’, Fungal Biology Reviews, Volume 34, Issue 4, 2020, pp. 202-214, https://www.sciencedirect.com/ science/article/pii/S1749461320300415

(23) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349087541_Prevalence_of_Azole-Resistant_Aspergillus_fumigatus_is_Highly_Associated_with_Azole_Fungicide_Residues_in_the_Fields

(24) Cao, D., Wang, F., Yu, S., Dong, S., Wu, R., Cui, N., Ren, J., Xu, T., Wang, S., Wang, M., Fang, H., and Yu, Y., ‘Prevalence of Azole-Resistant Aspergillus fumigatus is Highly Associated with Azole Fungicide Residues in the Fields’, Environmental Science & Technology, 2021, 55(5), 3041-3049, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/articles/PMC5461301/

(25) https://huisarts.bsl.nl/levensbedreigende-schimmel-ontdekt-bij-kwart-coronapatienten-op-ic/

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/70

P9_TA(2021)0410

The future of EU-US relations

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the future of EU-US relations (2021/2038(INI))

(2022/C 132/07)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2 December 2020 on a new EU-US agenda for global change (JOIN(2020)0022),

—	having regard to the joint statement of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue of 24 August 2020 on EU-US relations,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions on EU-US relations of 7 December 2020,

—	having regard to the testimony of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 19 January 2021,

—	having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021 on security and defence,

—	having regard to the joint press statement by President von der Leyen and US Secretary of State Blinken of 24 March 2021,

—	having regard to the joint statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 March 2021,

—	having regard to the statement by the US State Department of 26 April 2021 entitled ‘US Commitment to the Western Balkans’,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 on the Global Strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy, entitled ‘Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe’,

—	having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on 8 July 2016 by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of NATO,

—	having regard to the exchange of views with the NATO Secretary-General during the joint meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Subcommittee on Security and Defence and the Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, held on 15 March 2021,

—	having regard to the participation of the VP/HR in the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers of 17 and 18 February 2021, and in the meeting of the NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers of 23 and 24 March 2021,

—	having regard to the Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels of 14 June 2021,

—	having regard to the EU-US Summit Statement entitled ‘Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership’, issued on 15 June 2021,

—	having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on EU-NATO relations (1),

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on transatlantic relations, in particular its resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections (2), its resolution of 13 June 2013 on the role of the EU in promoting a broader Transatlantic Partnership (3) and its resolution of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU-US relations (4),

—	having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — annual report 2020 (5),

—	having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020 (6),

—	having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on the ruling of the CJEU of 16 July 2020 — Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems (‘Schrems II’) — Case C-311/18 (7),

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0250/2021),

whereas for 75 years the transatlantic partnership has stood for freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, for trade and economic cooperation and for security; whereas the US remains the EU’s closest and most important strategic partner; whereas this partnership is based on strong political, cultural, economic and historic links and shared values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and has a great potential of dialogue, cooperation and delivery on issues, objectives and priorities of common interest or concern across the policy spectrum;

whereas the EU and the US share common values and a fundamental common interest in shaping a rules-based international environment that strengthens multilateralism and democratic values, defends human rights, upholds international law and promotes a rules-based international order, and equally promotes peaceful conflict resolution and sustainable development around the world;

whereas the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States and Kamala Harris as Vice-President has created new opportunities to further pursue and reinvigorate this essential transatlantic partnership, to restart work and innovation on all levels of this long-established cooperation and to better cooperate on multilateral issues, such as climate change, digital and green transition, democracy and international security; whereas both the EU and the US should take this renewed opportunity for close dialogue and cooperation to fulfil their standing obligations to the international organisations to which they both belong and to ensure greater coordination and burden sharing across a wide spectrum of geopolitical issues moving forward; whereas cooperation with the United States is a permanent objective of the EU, irrespective of the administration in office;

whereas the Biden administration has declared its intention to strengthen relations with the EU and other democratic allies; whereas President Biden’s first overseas visit was to Europe, during which he took part in the NATO Summit and the EU-US Summit in Brussels on 14-15 June 2021; whereas this confirms the US’s deep commitment to strengthening its relationships with the European Union and its Member States and to the future of common security and defence within the North Atlantic Alliance and with the European Union; whereas President Biden has proposed to organise a Summit for Democracy, which will seek joint commitments with the EU and other democracies in strengthening our democracies and fostering enhanced cooperation between democratic states, while fighting authoritarianism and human rights violations around the world;

whereas constant, constructive and balanced dialogue based on shared objectives is needed to build a strong and ambitious transatlantic agenda and to address any areas where there are transatlantic differences, through deeper cooperation, including in such areas as relations with China and Russia, defence commitments and capabilities, conflicts in the Middle East and other security and stability issues, and to identify common approaches where possible; whereas it is clear that the transatlantic alliance cannot be taken for granted and must be reinvigorated and constantly strengthened;

whereas, in pursuing and deepening transatlantic cooperation, the EU should strive for partnership in leadership with the US, focused on the pursuit of shared interests; whereas the EU should also foster its strategic autonomy in defence and economic relations as a means to pursue its own legitimate diplomatic, security and economic interests while strengthening the transatlantic bond and to increase the joint leverage of the EU and the US on the world scene, but also with a view to increasing its ability to take greater responsibility for addressing key global and regional challenges and decide and act autonomously, if needed, in foreign affairs and security and defence matters;

G.	whereas the EU and the US have the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship and enjoy the most integrated economic relationship in the world;

whereas both the EU and the US share a number of new common challenges such as the malign influence of authoritarian regimes, which undermine multilateral institutions, the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, the promotion of global health, climate change and the need to advance on climate mitigation measures, the pushback against a global wave of authoritarianism, the fight against global criminal networks and terrorism, making gender equality and anti-discrimination a reality, addressing the increasing division between metropolitan and rural areas and pursuing the digital and green transformations as a means of sustainable modernisation, the advance of technology, such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, tax avoidance, and broader challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy;

I.	whereas a renewed impetus in the transatlantic relationship would create a favourable political context to tackle the common challenges in a constructive manner and to address the issues where our positions diverge;

whereas in December 2020, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) presented a new EU cybersecurity strategy, which aims for ‘the EU to step up leadership on international norms and standards in cyberspace, and to strengthen cooperation with partners around the world to promote a global, open, stable and secure cyberspace, grounded in the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic values’ (8);

K.	whereas there is strong bipartisan support in the United States to work with democratic allies to increase the resilience of the transatlantic community against hybrid threats from authoritarian regimes;

L.	whereas the rules-based international order and democratic values are challenged by the rise of the assertive authoritarianism and the decline of democracy in third countries, as well as from within the EU and US through the rise of anti-democratic populist and far-right movements;

M.	whereas the departure of the UK from the EU might lead to a further fragmentation of the strategic landscape, not only in terms of EU-US relations but also in the UN Security Council, G7, G20 and other multilateral formats;

N.	whereas Latin America is a region that shares many key values, interests, historical links and economic and human ties with the EU and the US;

Welcomes the adoption of the new proposal of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for an EU-US agenda for global change in December 2020 as a blueprint for a renewed and strengthened transatlantic partnership;

Reconfirms its support for the strong EU-US transatlantic cooperation, partnership and friendship, which over the past 70 years has contributed to Europe’s development, prosperity and successful integration and is the basis for its stability and security since the end of the Second World War; underlines that the EU’s relationship with the US is built on common values; recalls that the political systems of both the US and the EU are founded on democratic principles, rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms; is convinced that through transatlantic cooperation we can best contribute to a peaceful, sustainable and constructive solution to existing global and regional challenges, including through focusing on a sustainable and environmentally friendly reconstruction of the economy, including carbon neutrality by 2050, and overcoming regional, social, race and gender injustice; insists that the renewed transatlantic partnership should be based on equality of partners; stresses in parallel that the EU’s strategic autonomy cannot be pursued without a qualitative improvement in the implementation of EU foreign and defence policy priorities and principles, and the EU’s ability to act autonomously, when needed, in pursuit of its legitimate interests, including an ambitious partnership and cooperation with the Union’s closest allies, such as the United States;

Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to reassert the continued relevance of the strategic transatlantic relationship for the rebuilding and reinvigoration of the multilateral rules-based international order, with the UN system and international law at its centre, the global strengthening of democracy and democratic values and the promotion of human rights, for addressing the malign influence and disinformation of authoritarian regimes, and for shaping the rules of the digital and technological future according to shared values, sustainable economic development and inclusive economic growth and jobs worldwide, a coordinated position vis-à-vis Russia and China and a common offer of investing in global infrastructure initiatives in line with the EU’s connectivity strategy; underlines the relevance of the EU’s connectivity strategy and calls for enhanced EU-US cooperation in the core field of connectivity; supports transatlantic efforts to avoid energy dependence by promoting energy diversification and, more broadly, connectivity through all possible mechanisms, as also reflected in the G7 communiqué entitled ‘Our shared agenda for global action to build back better’;

Notes and supports also the new transatlantic resolve on support to democracy across the globe through, in particular, the defence of media freedom, support to civil society and the protection and defence of journalists; welcomes the clear commitment of the US to strengthen and further expand the scope of transatlantic relations by the decision of the US President to travel to Europe during his first overseas trip and to participate in the EU-US Summit in June 2021; supports the operational conclusions of the Summit as detailed in the EU-US Summit Statement ‘Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership’, issued on 15 June 2021 and attesting to a strong commitment by both parties to pursue synergies and deepen transatlantic dialogue and cooperation; notes in particular the transatlantic resolve to address humanitarian needs and stand up for international humanitarian law as well as expand the resource base for humanitarian action; notes also and supports the intention to enhance transatlantic cooperation on the use of sanctions to pursue shared foreign policy and security objectives;

Calls for a new transatlantic agenda that pursues common interests and leverages collective strength, and promotes multilateral cooperation for a more equitable and healthier world, the fight against climate change and the peaceful and sustainable resolution of conflicts, including regional conflicts, based on the principles of international law, arms control, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament; stresses that this agenda should put our shared strategic goals at its centre, such as bolstering our supply chain for medicines and reforming the WHO, ensuring adequate access to vaccines for vulnerable countries, lowering our dependency on external energy reserves, increasing investment in advanced technologies, fighting inequalities, promoting ecological transformation, and cooperating together and with relevant third countries with, at the centre, the security and stability of the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, the Western Balkans and the African continent;

Underlines the need to deepen legislative cooperation and establish stronger structures for legislative cooperation and an inclusive transatlantic dialogue based on both the EU and US legislative branches, such as a transatlantic legislators assembly; notes that raising the awareness of structures such as the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue and organising more regular meetings and visits of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee with their US counterparts, for example on the occasion of regular annual visits of the respective committees, would restore confidence in and the durability and efficiency of transatlantic cooperation; urges the US Congress to enhance the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue by authorising it as a formal body with permanent membership devoted to furthering United States-European Union relations and as the natural counterpart of the European Parliament interparliamentary delegation for relations with the US Congress; welcomes the relaunch of the European Union Caucus in the US Congress and underlines the importance of close cooperation and association with the activities of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue; reaffirms the importance of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue’s steering committee in ensuring coordination of all activities relating to transatlantic cooperation on legislative efforts in the European Parliament, with a view to strengthening parliamentary oversight;

Welcomes the rich transatlantic dialogue at civil society level and calls on the EU and the US to further valorise such dialogue and to involve all social and economic stakeholders in the debate on the future of transatlantic relations; takes the view that a regular transatlantic civil society dialogue could be established for this purpose; stresses that EU-US citizen-to-citizen contacts contribute to the development of common values, trust and a mutual understanding between transatlantic partners; calls, therefore, for increased support for the promotion and facilitation of mobility and exchange programmes, such as Erasmus+, and internship exchanges between the Congress and the European Parliament; underlines the importance of enhancing people-to-people contacts in science, research and education;

Calls for strengthened interparliamentary cooperation between Members of the European Parliament, Members of Congress, members of the national parliaments of the EU Member States and members of the various State legislatures of the 50 US Federal States, in different thematic areas that could enable the exchange of best practices, including subnational dialogues such as the ‘Under2 Coalition’, and enhanced coordination on global, but also on shared, domestic challenges, such as addressing economic and social inequality, protection of human rights and democratic standards in the face of growing anti-democratic threats, both internal and external, the defence of international law and the safeguarding of legally binding agreements, the promotion of common strategic interests, universal health coverage, legislative convergence on human-centric AI in all its forms, support for cooperation between US and EU companies, innovation and other cutting-edge technologies such as 5G and 6G and biotechnologies, research, development and innovation, the taxation of technology companies, the responsibility and accountability of online platforms, including through providing the needed oversight to make sure that the policies of online platforms are in line with core democratic values, the fight against climate change, including as a security threat, and the objective of a just transition towards climate neutrality, protecting a free and independent media landscape and protecting our democratic elections from foreign interference; reiterates the importance of EU-US space cooperation and the EU-US Space Dialogue; welcomes the announced commitment to strengthen transatlantic cooperation on space by building on the Galileo-GPS Agreement; believes that EU-US cooperation on space could help promote space safety standards and best practices across the international community;

Urges the EU and the US to work together on global tax challenges, building on the work of the OECD, such as a reform of the international corporate tax system, with a view to eliminating the possibility for economic operators to use base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) strategies to avoid paying corporate taxes; supports, in this regard, the work of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS; underlines that reform efforts must include the elimination of tax havens; highlights that such measures can serve to reduce economic inequalities; affirms the EU’s commitment to fair taxation in the digital economy, as called for in the new EU-US agenda for global change;

10.

Emphasises the importance of visa reciprocity between the EU and the US and encourages both sides to find a mutually acceptable solution through active diplomatic engagement that would enable a visa-free regime for all EU Member States; welcomes the inclusion of Poland in the US Visa Waiver Program and the confirmation that Croatia also meets all the requirements for inclusion; calls on the US to speed up the process of the accession of Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania to the Visa Waiver Program;

Restoring multilateralism

11.

Welcomes the recommitment of the US to rules-based multilateralism and to the alliances with its partners, and emphasises that this provides an important opportunity to re-engage with the US in rebuilding, consolidating and further expanding the transatlantic relationship, including in areas such as multilateralism and human rights, and strengthening together, as equal partners, the global rules-based order in the spirit of our shared liberal democratic values; underlines the importance of close cooperation with the US and other like-minded states for the modernisation of multilateral organisations in order to make them fit for purpose and improve the promotion of global peace and security, fundamental rights, universal values and international law; emphasises also the need to include countries from the Global South in these efforts; stresses the need to closely cooperate and coordinate within the UN system, its agencies, organisations and missions, including with regard to staffing of leading positions;

12.

Reiterates its commitment to international cooperation within the UN as an indispensable forum for multilateral solutions for global challenges and for policy outreach, policy dialogue and consensus-building across the international community;

13.

Calls for increased EU-US joint funding of cutting-edge projects based on frontier technologies, increased joint investments in research and development, increased people-to-people academic exchanges in STEM, and increased joint support for technology start-ups and SMEs;

14.

Welcomes the decision of the Biden administration to rejoin the Paris Agreement and the appointment of a Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, John Kerry; welcomes the announcement on establishing an EU-US High-Level Climate Action Group; urges the EU and the US to move forward concrete proposals to address climate change and greening trade, and to promote the operationalisation of green technology, including hydrogen, sustainable finance and biodiversity;

15.

Stresses the importance of global cooperation on the transnational challenges of fostering education, science, youth and cultural diversity and dialogue; calls on the US to return to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO);

16.

Welcomes the US’s decision to rejoin the World Health Organization; calls for transatlantic leadership on health diplomacy to coordinate the approach to stop COVID-19 at global level, as well as possible future health crises, and to strengthen global health security, notably the reform of the World Health Organization and the joint transatlantic effort to deliver equitable global access to and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines, tests and treatments, in particular in lower-income countries; insists on fostering cooperation to establish better procedures for preparing for future pandemics, including through a coherent and consistent clinical and regulatory approach complementary to global supply chains to ensure flexibility and resilience; calls for an impartial independent investigation into the source and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as its handling by the WHO at its onset;

17.

Underlines the need for enhanced public vaccine diplomacy in which the EU and the US can play a leading role, as global vaccination is the only way to end the pandemic; welcomes the financial contributions of the EU and the US to the COVAX Facility and the promotion of international cooperation to improve the accessibility of vaccines worldwide, by taking a coordinated approach when addressing the proposal to ease intellectual property protection rules for vaccines; urges, in this sense, the transatlantic partners to work together to allow the rapid production and delivery of vaccines wherever needed; encourages an exchange of best practices between the US and the EU on vaccine rollout to ensure better preparedness and resilience for the future;

18.

Calls for a concerted EU-US approach in the UN, including on the UN reform to strengthen its effectiveness as a multilateral organisation, bring more transparency to the institution and enhance its credibility; calls for coordinated efforts to achieve ambitious commitments at the UN summits on climate change and biodiversity in 2021 (COPS 26); calls for the EU and the US to play a leading role within the United Nations Framework on Climate Change and in other fora such as the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization; emphasises in this regard that cooperation in clean energy and research, development and innovation, and in low-carbon technologies and products is crucial, as well as cooperation on other pressing issues such as non-proliferation, conflict resolution and countering violent radicalisation and terrorism; expresses concern at the fact that over the past three decades China has tripled its carbon emissions and is now emitting 27 % of the world’s greenhouse gases, making EU and US efforts to address greenhouse gas emissions largely insufficient without a clear commitment and implementation by China;

19.

Calls for the international law of the sea to be defended and, in this respect, reiterates its request to the US to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls on the US to join in the EU’s efforts to encourage the adoption of an international treaty on marine litter and plastic pollution in the sea at the next UN Environment Assembly; urges the US and the EU to strengthen their cooperation in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fisheries around the world;

20.

Notes that President Biden has announced a new decarbonisation target of between 50 % and 52 % by 2030 compared with 2005 levels; notes also that President Biden held a virtual Leaders Summit on Climate to galvanise efforts of major economies on climate action;

21.

Recognises the significant improvement of air quality within the US over the past few decades, largely driven by technological improvement and innovation in the energy sector;

22.

Believes that the EU should reaffirm together with the US the centrality of the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as a framework for effective multilateral cooperation, involving also China whenever possible, provided there is a genuine commitment by China to pursue dialogue and cooperation in a non-adversarial fashion and with an agenda which reinforces the core structures and objectives of the 2030 agenda;

23.

Calls for enhanced coordination on the use of restrictive measures, including human rights sanctions, and urges the Council to adopt a corruption component as part of the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime; calls on the EU and the US to coordinate their sanctions policies whenever possible and useful;

24.

Welcomes the Biden administration’s announced commitment to re-engage with the UN Human Rights Council, signalling the US’s renewed intention to promote human rights globally in the hope to strengthen efforts towards upholding human rights globally and to prevent the authoritarian redefinition of human rights as a state-centred concept; calls on the EU and the US, together with like-minded allies, to work to reform the Human Rights Council and in particular set clear criteria for its membership;

25.

Calls for strengthening the EU-US commitment towards the promotion and protection of human rights globally, and towards combating the rise of authoritarianism and illiberal regimes; encourages the establishment of a comprehensive EU-US joint toolbox for tackling human rights abuses; calls on the EU institutions to work closely with fellow democracies to defend and promote fundamental human rights and democratic values at international level through a reinforced close collaboration with international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE; takes the view that Parliament and Congress could cooperate together on instances of human rights defenders and civil society representatives being persecuted and incarcerated without cause or to repress their actions;

26.

Welcomes the lifting of the US sanctions on top officials of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Biden administration; encourages the US to join the Rome Statute establishing the ICC and to engage constructively with the Court in its ongoing investigations and legal proceedings;

27.

Reiterates its appeal to the US to abolish the death penalty and to reform its criminal justice system;

28.

Urges dialogue and exchange of best practices between the EU and US on promoting racial and gender equality; calls on the EU and the US to take decisive steps to address systemic racism, as reflected in police violence that disproportionately targets ethnic and racial minorities, and entrenched inequalities that fuel legitimate peaceful protests;

29.

Takes the view that the EU and the US together can advance equality and the respect for human rights and ensure that these are duly reflected and supported in the decision-making of multilateral fora; suggests, therefore, exploring a permanent platform for dialogue between the EU and the US to take concrete steps to combat racism, hate speech and discrimination, including discrimination against LGTBQI people, and calls for closer multilateral cooperation in this regard with international organisations such as the OSCE, the UN, the African Union, the OAS and the CoE; calls on the EU and the US to organise together a Global Anti-Racism Summit on combating global racism and discrimination;

30.

Is deeply concerned by the Texas Legislature’s adoption of the Texas Heartbeat Act, de facto banning abortion, as a serious attack on women’s sexual and reproductive rights; regrets that by split decision the US Supreme Court declined to rule on the adoption of this unprecedented law;

31.

Insists that increased efforts are needed on improving gender equality and women’s rights, including on gender-based violence and sexual and reproductive health and rights, among others;

32.

Calls on the EU and the Member States to strengthen their cooperation with the US in promoting the freedom of religion or belief across the world; calls on the EU and the US to mutually protect and preserve Europe’s and the US’s cultural and historical heritage in the US and in the EU;

33.

Encourages the Biden administration to swiftly carry out its announced plans to close the Guantanamo detention facility; regrets the fact that almost 20 years after the establishment of the facility, 40 prisoners remain detained, including five who were cleared for release under the Obama administration; calls on the EU and its Member States to offer their assistance to facilitate the process;

34.

Encourages the US to guarantee fair and open access to essential services such as the healthcare system and social protection schemes to a larger share of the population; encourages the newly appointed Biden administration to take concrete actions to regulate possession of weapons among US citizens;

35.

Highlights that the transatlantic community is faced with a broad array of unprecedented common challenges, ranging from the fight against terrorism to hybrid threats, climate change, disinformation, cyberattacks, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) and a shifting global power balance, as well as the resulting challenge to the international rules-based order;

Enhanced cooperation on international trade and investments

36.

Stresses the need to work together with the US, building on positive momentum, on strengthening the multilateral trading system and reforming the World Trade Organization; welcomes the outcome of the EU-US summit of 15 June 2021‘Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership’ as a sign of a revived and constructive engagement; welcomes the Understanding on a Cooperative Framework for Large Civil Aircraft; takes note of the recognition in the EU-US summit statement that the US’s application of tariffs on imports from the EU under US Section 232 have led to tensions in the transatlantic relationship and salutes the explicit commitment in the same statement to resolve existing differences on steel and aluminium overcapacity before the end of the year; considers the establishment of several platforms for permanent discussion, such as the Trade & Technology Council and the EU-US Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue, essential as they will further enable transatlantic commerce, and urges the Commission to set up an efficient and inclusive structure on the EU side for the Trade & Technology Council as soon as possible; welcomes the establishment of a Joint EU-US COVID Manufacturing and Supply Chain Taskforce;

37.

Stresses that the Trade & Technology Council is part of the positive transatlantic trade agenda, with its ultimate aim being to enshrine democratic values and ethics in new technologies in order to become a transparent institutional structure and lead the global digital transformation; welcomes in this regard the fact that the inaugural meeting has taken place as planned despite tensions which need to be discussed in an open and frank manner; points out that it would be possible to obtain some quick gains which would enhance bilateral trade, and therefore urges both sides to focus on concrete tangible outcomes; welcomes in this regard the outcomes of the first Trade & Technology Council meeting held on 29 September in Pittsburgh which adopted concrete themes for each of the 10 working groups; supports, among commitments, the commitment to cooperate on avoiding new and unnecessary barriers to trade in new and emerging technologies, on investment screening and the export of dual-use goods, as well as the commitment to improve the effectiveness of policies that address non-market and trade-distorting policies and practices; welcomes the identification of specific themes such as addressing the challenges posed by non-market economies, and cooperating on labour rights and trade-related climate policies in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group; underlines the importance of cooperation on international technology standard-setting; calls for the establishment of a Sub-Committee on Trade & Technology within the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue to complement the executive’s role in the Trade & Technology Council and in order to exercise democratic scrutiny over this Council; stresses that the Trade & Technology Council is not a forum for the negotiation of an EU-US trade agreement, without prejudice to future initiatives to do so;

38.

Underlines that the European Union and the United States have the most integrated economic relationship in the world, which is also the largest and deepest bilateral trade and investment relationship, with trade in goods and services accounting for more than EUR 1 trillion per year; recalls that the EU and the US economies together account for more than 40 % of global GDP and for nearly a third of world trade flows;

39.

Emphasises the importance of reinvigorating our Transatlantic trade relationship as historical allies and trading partners, not least given the current COVID-19 crisis, with the aim of promoting multilateralism, fostering an open, rules-based trading system and finding common solutions to pressing global challenges, including global health;

40.

Takes note of the indications already provided by US counterparts and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s statements at the hearing on the Biden administration’s 2021 trade agenda;

41.

Reiterates, in this context, its support for the EU’s new trade strategy, which aims, also through the Union’s transatlantic agenda, at synergies between domestic and external policy objectives in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals;

42.

Identifies trade policy as a strategic geopolitical tool for the transatlantic agenda; emphasises that the US is a crucial trading partner and therefore welcomes the positive signals from the Biden administration of its plans to strengthen bilateral relations with the EU, and calls for renewed cooperation that should bring lasting and concrete results in the years to come, taking into account that our economic relations are also impacted by security interests in the context of open strategic autonomy;

43.

Highlights the need to identify joint actions based on shared interests and values as well as on shared risks and threats in order to contribute to a global sustainable and inclusive economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic;

44.

Emphasises the need to reform the global trading system, so that it ensures a global level playing field and to work together to develop new rules, in particular with regard to unfair trade practices, as unfair competition is heavily affecting our companies and workers;

45.

Supports the approach of partnership in leadership with the US, including a coordinated stance vis-à-vis Russia and China, focused on the pursuit of shared interests in the green and digital transformations of our economies, as well as common initiatives as regards the provisions of global public goods; stresses that ‘workers and wages’, as well as more resilient, sustainable and responsible supply chains, are included in this agenda; in this regard, encourages both sides to coordinate their approach on forced labour and exploitative labour conditions and to cooperate on improving respect for workers’ rights and environmental standards in trade agreements, as well as at the multilateral level, including by building on each other’s experience to enforce these provisions more efficiently;

46.

Underscores the need to demonstrate that improved trade relations between the EU and the US will benefit citizens, especially those left behind by globalisation, and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic; in that context, calls for the EU and the US to work together and align their strategies to create investment synergies, in particular to achieve sustainable and inclusive digital and green transitions of their economies;

47.

Notes that EU-US common challenges are increasingly non-military in nature and lie within our economic partnership; calls, therefore, for a continued and enhanced transatlantic parliamentary dialogue on trade between the European Parliament and the US Congress via committee-to-committee interaction between the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade on the EU side and the Ways & Means Committee, its subcommittee on trade and the Senate Finance Committee on the US Side, as well as within the framework of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue;

48.

Strongly welcomes the US support for the new Director-General of the WTO, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, and the US’s return to the Paris Agreement; welcomes the four-month temporary suspension of Airbus-Boeing tariffs, which had a disproportionate negative effect on EU agri-food products, as a positive step towards finding a lasting solution for civil aircraft subsidies; notes that the suspension of these tariffs will end in July 2021, and urges that a solution that leads to a permanent lifting of these tariffs be found;

49.

Welcomes the US’s willingness to open discussions to address the global steel and aluminium excess capacity; notes the decision by the Commission to suspend the increase of tariffs against US imports counterbalancing US measures;

50.

Also welcomes the swift conclusion of the WTO tariff rate quota agreement, which was the first agreement with the US under the new Biden administration and demonstrates the willingness of this new administration to seek agreements with the EU in the WTO framework;

51.

Recognises at the same time that some diverging interests remain; in this regard, urges both sides to resolve bilateral disputes; urges the US to remove unilateral trade measures and threats for additional measures on digital service taxes, to refrain from taking further ones, and to rather focus on what brings us together; attaches a lot of importance to the EU-US Summit in June 2021 as a stepping stone to continue mending our trade relationship and discuss untapped areas for greater cooperation;

52.

Urges the US, despite the ongoing talks, to remove immediately section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium as European companies cannot be considered a national security threat by the US and emphasises the need to jointly address the concerns related to the steel and aluminium excess capacity from third countries; reiterates, inter alia, the EU’s ambition to eliminate tariffs for industrial goods between the EU and the US;

53.

While deploring the conclusion of the 301 investigations on digital taxes, welcomes the suspension of the six months of trade retaliation on economic sectors such as footwear in Member States that have implemented a digital services tax while negotiations are ongoing in the OECD framework; expresses concerns at the US Trade Representative’s preliminary list of retaliatory tariffs arising from the 301 investigations on the different EU digital services taxes, which include particularly sensitive manufacturing sectors such as footwear and leather industries, which could potentially end up being excluded from the US market if additional tariffs are adopted; urges the Commission and the Member States to speed up and conclude as soon as possible the negotiations in the framework of the OECD proposal on digital taxation and pursue all possible ways to avoid further economic damage to EU companies, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in the context of the COVID-19 recovery strategies; considers that given the exclusive competence of the EU in the field of the common commercial policy and the US threats of retaliation with regard to digital taxation laws, a common EU approach is preferable to individual ones at national level, particularly in order to avoid further transatlantic tariff cross-escalation;

54.

Recognises that unexploited opportunities to remove significant red tape and strengthen the transatlantic economic partnership remain; in the context of the ongoing technological race, stresses the importance of a close transatlantic regulatory space for our businesses, especially for emerging digital, energy and climate-related technologies; expects both sides to address in a dialogue the EU’s concerns regarding the US Buy American Act and the Jones Act, including public procurement and access to markets for services;

55.

Advocates a joint approach on tackling the COVID-19 crisis by, among other measures, increasing the availability and affordability of vaccines; calls for the EU and the US to work together and lead efforts to address the issue of vaccine shortages to ensure that vaccines are delivered worldwide and to the greatest number as fast as possible; welcomes the announcement of the EU-US partnership to further the global COVID-19 vaccination effort by vaccinating 70 % of the world by next year’s UN General Assembly; recalls that the world is facing a global scarcity of vaccines; therefore, in order to achieve vaccine equity, calls for the EU and the US to work with manufacturers to increase global manufacturing capacity for vaccines and their components; calls for both sides to refrain from any export restricting measures, to ensure the proper functioning of supply chains, to secure the required technology transfers and to improve preparedness for future global health emergencies; encourages both sides to increase regulatory cooperation to facilitate essential access to medicines;

56.

Calls on the Commission and the Biden administration to actively support the new WTO DG’s initiatives concerning, in particular, health; points, in this context, to Parliament’s position on a potential waiver on the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) expressed in its resolution of 10 June 2021 (9);

57.

Considers, while recognising the importance of protecting European intellectual property rights to maintain businesses’ capacity to innovate, that it is relevant to examine all applicable flexibilities within the TRIPS agreement with the aim of increasing global manufacturing capacity of vaccines and vaccine components; stresses that finding solutions on intellectual property rights can only be one part of the common global response;

58.

Underlines that the WTO remains the cornerstone of a rules-based, multilateral system for trade; calls for enhanced cooperation on WTO reform, including the reform of its three core functions, which entails reforming and reinstating as a matter of urgency the appellate body and reinforcing the monitoring and deliberative functions of the WTO, by, among other means, promoting open plurilateral agreements;

59.

Urges both sides to cooperate on regulating trade in health products, developing rules for digital trade and setting an ambitious climate and environmental agenda, among other activities, by relaunching the negotiations on the Environmental Goods Agreement, and to work on common proposals, inter alia, on disciplines on subsidies and the phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies;

60.

Expects both sides to agree on concrete deliverables for the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) to make the WTO ready for the green and digital transitions, including an agreement on fisheries, a declaration on trade and health, a work programme for reform of the dispute settlement system, a work programme on industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises, and substantial progress on e-commerce negotiations;

61.

Encourages both sides to work jointly to update WTO rules on state-owned enterprises, industrial subsidies, overcapacity and technology transfer in order to efficiently make the organisation fit for the challenges of the 21st century; in this regard also supports expanding the trilateral initiative with Japan and calls for the EU and the US to lead a coalition of like-minded countries at the WTO with a view to agreeing on new rules, while also developing an autonomous instrument against unfair foreign subsidies; expects both sides to promote and strive for multilateral agreements; calls on the US to renew its commitments to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement;

62.

Notes the result of the first high-level meeting of the EU-US dialogue on China, where the two sides reiterated that their trade relations with China are multifaceted and comprise elements of cooperation, competition and systemic rivalry; advocates, wherever possible, for a joint strategic approach towards China, as well as cooperation within multilateral frameworks on common challenges such as climate change, unfair trade practices that lead to market distortions and a lack of a level playing field;

63.

Draws attention to the importance of having a coordinated position to tackle distortive industrial subsidies — in particular as regards state-owned enterprises and overcapacity in critical sectors –, forced technology transfers, theft of intellectual property, compulsory joint ventures, market barriers and the banning of forced labour by including a discussion on the US’s Phase One agreement with China and the EU’s Comprehensive Agreement on Investments;

64.

Notes that such issues cannot be solved unilaterally or bilaterally and require a coalition of like-minded partners at international level within the framework of the WTO;

65.

Stresses the importance of including in the EU-US joint strategy and within the WTO respect for human rights, including in the operation of international businesses; points out in this regard the need for binding due diligence legislation and calls for the US to join and support this approach throughout the supply chain;

66.

Believes that the EU and the US should strengthen transatlantic cooperation on rules-based and sustainable connectivity as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and hopes for future cooperation with particular regard to upholding high quality standards;

67.

Calls on the Commission, while promoting dialogue and common action, to assertively promote the EU’s interests and its open strategic autonomy and respond to unwarranted US duties, the exterritorial application of sanctions, which is contrary to international law, and market barriers; emphasises the need to strengthen the EU’s autonomous trade measures;

68.

Asks, in particular, the US to ensure that its public procurement procedures are transparent, open and predictable based on the principle of equal treatment;

69.

Calls on the Commission to draft its proposal on an instrument to deter and counteract coercive actions by third countries and legislation to support European companies targeted by these sanctions and that are operating in compliance with international law;

70.

Encourages both sides to engage in an ambitious dialogue and find a framework for joint action and to look for selective trade and investment agreements via the relaunch of a high level strategic dialogue;

71.

Calls for a stronger regulatory, green, sustainable and digital partnership through the Trade & Technology Council; calls for an agreement on conformity assessment, which will particularly benefit SMEs, a coordinated approach to setting international standards for critical and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, and regulatory cooperation for big tech companies as well as digital and global taxes; calls for the EU and the US to exchange information and cooperate on foreign investment screening in strategic sectors, including on potential hostile takeovers;

72.

Encourages both sides to exchange best regulatory practices; urges the EU and the US to pursue their negotiations on conformity assessment to remove financially burdensome non-tariff barriers; stresses the importance for both sides to align and lead a coalition of like-minded partners to enhance the use of transatlantic standards by international standards organisations;

73.

Calls on both sides to use trade as a means to fight climate change and achieve upward convergence; in this regard urges both sides to cooperate on pricing carbon and in particular to coordinate on the development of a carbon border adjustment mechanism, and on effective measures against illicit arms trade and enhancing the transparency and accountability of arms trade, including US and EU Member States’ arms exports;

74.

Calls for the US and the EU to work together on a global corporate tax in the framework of the OECD, welcoming in particular the deal reached by the G7 countries on global tax reform and highlighting the agreement on a minimum global corporate tax rate of at least 15 %, and to cooperate in fighting fraudulent and harmful trade practices;

75.

Underlines that stronger trade and economic partners make for stronger alliances; welcomes efforts being made by both sides to make their supply chains more resilient, especially with regard to critical raw materials;

76.

Calls for enhanced EU-US cooperation in the Arctic, considering the opening up of new navigation routes and the possible availability of natural resources due to climate change and taking into account the growing economic interest in the Arctic by other countries, such as China; calls on the Commission to also address these possibilities and challenges in its upcoming Arctic Strategy;

77.

Urges the Commission, as common practice, to be transparent in its cooperation with the United States by, inter alia, publishing all proposals sent to the US and by guaranteeing the involvement of Parliament and civil society in the development of these proposals so as to enhance consumers’ and citizens’ trust;

Facing security and defence challenges together

78.

Underlines that the transatlantic alliance remains fundamental for the security and the stability of the European continent, as NATO is the foundation of Europe’s collective defence and is a key pillar of European security; reaffirms further that NATO allies and partners as well as the European Union collectively must do more to meet fair expectations as credible and equal transatlantic partners that are able and willing to defend themselves and to manage crises in their own neighbourhoods, while taking the lead when necessary, but in close coordination with the United States; supports a rebalancing of the responsibilities in the transatlantic security relationship by fostering greater self-reliance for EU Member States in matters of defence as a way to lessen the burden on the US and in a way that will create synergies between NATO membership and EU defence capabilities; stresses that EU-NATO cooperation is based on 74 commonly agreed actions in specific areas; recalls that both organisations have different tasks and priorities, with NATO being in charge of collective territorial defence of its members, and the EU aiming for military crisis management abroad, with a potential for further dialogue and cooperation on security challenges and strategic partnership built on common support for the core values of democracy, freedom and the promotion of peace; stresses that more in-depth cooperation, pooling and sharing and an efficient and transparent European defence sector also strengthens the capabilities available for NATO; underlines that creating a strong EU industrial base and stronger military capabilities at EU level and investing in military mobility and interoperability will not only strengthen the EU but would also simultaneously reinforce the transatlantic alliance and be synergic with the role and relevance of the EU and its Member States in NATO; expresses, therefore, its full commitment to the European defence initiatives, in particular the EDF, PESCO and the EPF, among others; underlines that the transatlantic partnership can only be successful if all Member States fulfil their commitments, including defence investment pledges, and engage in mutual support and pursue a more balanced burden-sharing; underlines the need for all the NATO allies to invest financially in developing, acquiring and maintaining the capabilities that NATO needs to defend its citizens; points also to the ongoing drafting process of the EU Strategic Compass, which will be a milestone for stronger European defence and security cooperation, and underlines that the Strategic Compass should be closely linked with the drafting of NATO’s Strategic Concept, and expresses its conviction that these parallel processes offer a unique opportunity to significantly advance and update the transatlantic political and security partnership and make it fit to address the current global challenges that both the EU and the US are faced with; stresses that the ambition of European strategic autonomy by no means undermines NATO but is complementary to it; calls for the conclusion of an administrative arrangement between the European Defence Agency and the United States and welcomes the commitment by the EU and the US, as reflected in the statement issued at the end of the EU-US summit on 15 June 2021, to begin discussions as soon as possible; promotes the setting up of foreign policy and security and defence policy coordination processes between the US, the EU and the UK;

79.

Welcomes the positive decision by the Council of 6 May 2021 authorising the coordinator of the Military Mobility project, the Netherlands, to invite the US, Canada and Norway, following their respective requests, to participate in the PESCO project on military mobility; stresses that this participation will enhance the coherence of EU and NATO capabilities and the interoperability, preparedness and resilience of transatlantic forces;

80.

Calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU, US and NATO with our eastern neighbours, in particular, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, in security and defence-related matters, including through support for these countries’ territorial integrity, and to strengthen their resilience against cyber, informational, espionage and other threats directed at them;

81.

Welcomes the US decision to reverse the withdrawal of US forces from the EU and to step up its military presence in EU Member States as a sign of commitment to transatlantic security cooperation; expresses its gratitude to the many US service personnel who helped protect the security and safety of Europe and its citizens in past decades;

82.

Urges the EU and the US to foster close cooperation not only on traditional security threats, but also on emerging ones such as hostile foreign technological dominance, hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns and malign interference in electoral processes; urges the EU and the US to develop close cooperation in the field of cybersecurity; urges the EU to develop more efficient cyber capabilities to bolster its ability to defend itself against cyber threats; welcomes the Commission’s new Cybersecurity Strategy as a basis for the setting of international norms and standards in cyberspace; calls for the necessary capabilities to be developed, acquired and maintained, also within NATO, including in terms of intelligence sharing, and for stronger coordination between EU agencies, such as the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), and their American counterparts; recognises that, to a certain degree, cyber defence is more effective if it includes some offensive means and measures as well, provided their use is compliant with international law; stresses the need for a common approach as regards banning lethal autonomous weapons without meaningful human control, regulating autonomy of weapons systems at global level, and restricting the export and proliferation of cyber tools and mass surveillance technology; underlines that global arms control needs to be updated to be able to face cyber and AI challenges; calls on the transatlantic partners to support and actively contribute to the UN Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire;

83.

Takes the view that the protection of democratic and electoral processes is a matter of global security; suggests in this regard the joint development of a structured framework for responses to interferences in electoral processes, based on a Transatlantic Code of Practices for Free and Resilient Democratic Processes, which seeks structural and comprehensive measures to respond to the hybrid nature of interferences, collaborating closely with international organisations such as the OSCE; calls on the EU and the US to promote closer and more ambitious international cooperation on election observation, jointly with all relevant partners, especially with the endorsing organisations of the ‘Declaration of Principles for international election observation’, in order to counter growing public security threats to electoral processes; stresses the need to jointly counter the growing phenomenon of fake domestic election observation, which undermines public trust in election observation overall, and to assess in depth the opportunities, challenges and risks involved in the growing use of new electoral information and communication technologies; insists on the need to reinforce the necessary cooperation with relevant domestic election observation organisations at all levels, as well as their protection within the framework of their activities;

84.

Underlines the importance of achieving quantum computing capabilities, and stresses the need to enhance EU-US cooperation in this area to ensure that quantum computing is first realised among partners with close relations and who share supporting objectives;

85.

Stresses the strategic importance of the submarine telecommunications cables in the North Atlantic that provide over 95 % of international telecommunications; reiterates the importance of strengthened transatlantic cooperation in protecting and ensuring respect for the international instruments that govern submarine cables, including the UNCLOS;

86.

Supports the creation of the EU-US Security and Defence Dialogue and calls on the VP/HR to launch it as soon as possible; points to the importance of also including NATO representatives in this dialogue in order to promote synergies with the ongoing cooperation in the EU-NATO framework and avoid any duplications of policy responses; underlines that the EU-US Security and Defence Dialogue should include cooperation on security and defence initiatives, crisis management, military operations and bilateral security matters, as noted in the EU-US agenda for global change; highlights that information-sharing would form an important part of this dialogue;

87.

Stresses the common need for our societies to engage in an introspective process on our common democratic values, and on respect for the other and for the diversity of opinions, in order to reinvigorate and defend global democracy against rising authoritarianism, as promoted by both Russia and China, but also within the transatlantic community, inter alia by strengthening the accountability and resilience of our democratic systems, by countering extremist views and racism that provide a fertile ground for anti-democratic movements to thrive, by standing up with one united voice against the malign influence of authoritarian actors geopolitically and by engaging in transatlantic dialogue and fostering inclusive social and economic policies that address the root causes of inequalities; underlines the value of transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on policies supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law and combating disinformation and foreign interference; underlines the need on both sides to address the drivers of declining public trust in policy and institutions; stresses that efforts in this direction should include building trust in science and facts, expanding a safety net of non-discrimination policies, and rejecting and addressing racial and religious discrimination;

88.

Further calls upon the EU and the US to jointly provide economic, political and operational support to existing regional organisations based in Africa, such as the African Union, the G5 Sahel Force and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);

89.

Underlines that the EU and the US must synergise their efforts to combat terrorism and radicalisation and ensure that the efforts made are supported by the necessary resources and commensurate with the threats posed; takes the view that both partners should strive to improve current practices of intelligence-sharing among Member States, with particular emphasis on achieving better, common situational awareness in key areas, including emerging safe havens and terrorists’ use of EDTs, as well as hybrid tactics;

90.

Encourages strong EU-US collaboration in deradicalisation and counterterrorism efforts, including establishing joint training activities, shared counterterrorism courses, exchange programmes for officers, tactical drills and education initiatives;

91.

Underlines the fundamental importance of democratic principles, which are the basis of our social and economic progress and our free societies; supports the proposal of President Biden to hold a Summit for Democracy to promote universal values; calls on the US to draw on the experience of the EU’s Conference on the Future of Europe, and calls on the Commission and the Council to support the initiative of the Summit both politically and practically; takes the view that the proposed Summit for Democracy should aim at promoting value-based multilateralism and solidarity between democracies when they are under pressure, strengthening democracy internally and globally, in particular increasing citizens’ participation in democratic governance, voicing concerns and seeking peaceful solutions to ongoing crackdowns on democratic movements and protecting the human rights defenders, including environmental defenders, around the globe, in addition to addressing the growing influence of authoritarian regimes; emphasises in this regard that such an effort could help chart a clear course forward to counter populism and authoritarianism and to protect fundamental democratic and human rights values; proposes that the EU establish, together with the US, a transatlantic alliance to defend democracy globally and devise a democracy defence toolkit, which should include joint actions on sanctions, anti-money laundering policies, rules on the conditionality of economic and financial assistance, international investigations, and support for human rights activists and defenders of democracy; calls for better communication with and between citizens on both sides on the enduring importance of the transatlantic bond and its relevance today; reaffirms in this regard the value of exchanges between legislators, businesses and civil society;

Closer foreign policy coordination

92.

Believes that the EU should engage more with the US and renew the strategic partnership in relation to countries of the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans in order to build resilient, prosperous, democratic multi-ethnic societies there, capable of resisting the disruptive influence of both local and external authoritarian forces; recalls that the stability of the Western Balkans and countries of the Eastern Partnership is a matter of peace and security for the region, as well as for the EU; welcomes the highly increased coordination of the US with the EU in supporting the countries of the Western Balkans on their path to European integration and EU membership; takes the view that regular, institutionalised coordination between the Foreign Affairs Council and the US Secretary of State on this and on other foreign policy matters would enhance transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on foreign policy matters of common concern and foster further convergence of policy stances at transatlantic level; recalls its suggestion to create a Transatlantic Political Council (TPC) for systematic consultation and coordination on foreign and security policy, which would be led by the VP/HR and the US Secretary of State and underpinned by regular contact with political directors; calls for strong EU leadership and effective coordination with the US in order to push back against initiatives aiming at redrawing borders, and similar sub-national initiatives to deepen ethnic divide and segregation, as well as the issue of Chinese investment and financing across the region and its impact on democratic governance and the environment; stresses the importance of close EU-US cooperation and coordination on fighting state capture, corruption, organised crime, foreign interference and attacks on media freedom, and promoting the rule of law, in-depth reforms, good neighbourly relations and reconciliation, and the objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; underlines the EU’s leading role in the process of normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo;

93.

Stresses the common interest in supporting long-term sustainable peace, stability, security, resilience, democracy and respect for human rights in the South Caucasus; welcomes the US engagement in the region, in cooperation with the EU, including through mechanisms such as the OSCE Minsk Group;

94.

Calls on the EU and US to collaboratively address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage, including cultural smuggling, especially in conflict zones; urges the embracing of a strategy that includes robust public awareness campaigns, universal condemnation of trafficking in unprovenanced antiquities, the establishment of a single code of conduct on the protection of cultural sites, fostering of greater cooperation among different law-enforcement agencies that includes immediate information-sharing among national intelligence agencies, and increased cooperation between law enforcement and the art and archaeological communities;

95.

Notes that China’s economic influence, geopolitical power and various forms of Chinese power projection, as well as military strength, have brought its system of authoritarian governance into conflict with Western systems of governance that are based on liberal democratic values; recalls China’s increased presence on the international stage and in Europe through its Belt and Road Initiative, and its activities in cyberspace, in the Arctic regions and in Africa; stresses in this regard that China has become a systemic rival and competitor, but that it should also be an important partner in tackling many global problems; is convinced that a joint transatlantic approach to engage with China is the best way to ensure a peaceful, sustainable and mutual beneficial long-term relationship with China; welcomes in this context the recent relaunch of a comprehensive EU-US high-level strategic dialogue on China and takes the view that this should provide a key mechanism for advancing our interests and managing our differences and explore possibilities for EU-US engagement with the People’s Republic of China in multilateral frameworks on common and global challenges, such as climate change, health-related risks, respect for human rights, cyberspace, arms control, non-proliferation and emerging disruptive technologies; emphasises the need for a strong parliamentary dimension for this dialogue; calls for the development of a broad range of policy instruments and, where possible, a search for transatlantic synergies for dealing with China; emphasises in this regard that the EU and the US share very serious concerns over systematic human rights violations in China, with particular regard to the Uyghur community; strongly believes that relations with the PRC, both bilateral and otherwise, must always include the safeguarding and the promotion of shared democratic values and that any multilateral agenda must have at its core the notion of full compliance with international law and the protection of human rights;

96.

Underscores the need to explore areas of convergence, possible cooperation and better coordination and consultation between the US and EU on China, in order to avoid transatlantic tensions, such as those that followed the adoption of the trilateral US-UK-Australia security deal known as AUKUS, without consultation of EU allies, notably regarding the protection of human and minority rights and de-escalation of tensions in the South and East China Seas, Hong Kong and across the Taiwan Strait; emphasises the relevance of UNCLOS as a legal basis for resolving conflicts; reiterates its support for shared connectivity initiatives, also within the framework of the EU’s newly announced ‘Global Gateway’ strategy;

97.

Welcomes the recent progress on the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy; calls for its swift and comprehensive implementation as it is in the EU’s interests and would promote its values, and highlights the relevance of this geo-strategic region, which is home to common transatlantic democratic friends and partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Taiwan, and calls for an enhanced EU-US partnership and coordination on the Indo-Pacific region; recalls the importance of fostering strategic ties with the ASEAN members and with the Pacific Island Forum (PIF);

98.

Highlights that non-democratic regimes such as China increasingly use technology to control and repress their citizens, restricting the exercise of fundamental, social and political rights; calls for increased EU-US cooperation in developing human-centric technology that respects privacy and reduces biases and discrimination;

99.

Recognises that China’s acquisitions of intellectual property and technological advances by leading research centres are often used to propel its military aims, and stresses, therefore, that the EU should work to develop a long-term strategy to counter China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy in Europe;

100.

Recognises that the EU and the US should coordinate on issues where China’s actions are contrary to Euro-Atlantic security interests; stresses that priority should be given to challenges in the cyber, hybrid, EDT, space, arms control and non-proliferation areas;

101.

Is concerned by China’s economic coercion against Member States and third countries; supports the idea of collective economic defence via collaboration with like-minded democracies against China’s economic coercion;

102.

Is concerned about the close ties between the Chinese Communist Party and industry in China, particularly security companies; recommends that Member States undertake an internal audit of procurement practices to ensure that products integrated into their national networks and defence institutions are free of technologies coming from companies in China;

103.

Calls for close cooperation to work towards a common plan of engagement with the Russian Federation and, in parallel, to jointly address the range of threats emanating from the Russian Federation, such as the continued destabilisation of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, support for Lukashenka’s illegitimate rule in Belarus, Russia’s role and influence in the Western Balkans and in the Black Sea, the deplorable interference in democratic processes in the EU and the US, including elections, the financing of extremist political parties and the revisionist policies, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, while at the same pursuing selective cooperation in the areas of shared transatlantic interest, notably in the area of arms control architecture, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, as well as climate diplomacy, the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the stabilisation of Afghanistan; welcomes the decision taken by the current US administration to extend the new START arms control treaty; emphasises the need to revitalise the arms control talks between the key global players, such as the US and Russia, that have a direct impact on European security, as well as to include China in future arms control negotiations; stress the need for urgent rebuilding of the conventional arms control architecture, to limit the scope for arms races and unforeseen incidents; welcomes the readiness of the Biden administration to re-establish dialogue and negotiations with Russia and supports the plan by the EU and the US to establish an EU-US high-level dialogue on Russia; takes the view that the EU and its Member States should actively support the search for ways to further dialogue and should contribute to the rebuilding of mutual trust; stresses the importance, in parallel, of dialogue with civil society and support for civil society organisations in Russia that seek to advance dialogue on political pluralism, agency and the legitimate democratic aspirations of the Russian people;

104.

Considers that the EU and the US must coordinate their dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue with Russia within the parameters agreed at the Wales and Warsaw Summits;

105.

Calls on the EU and the US to act in a timely manner and with resolve against disruptive actions of Russian intelligence services on the territory of the EU; recommends that Member States enhance counter-intelligence services cooperation and information sharing;

106.

Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to devise a new strategic approach for the EU’s relations with Russia, which must better support civil society, strengthen people-to-people contacts with the citizens of Russia, draw clear red lines for cooperation with Russian state actors, use technological standards and the open internet to support free spaces and restrict oppressive technologies, and demonstrate solidarity with the EU’s Eastern Partners, including on security issues and peaceful conflict resolution; underlines that any dialogue between the EU and US with Russia must be based on respect for international law and human rights;

107.

Underlines the importance of and calls for US-EU cooperation and coordination vis-à-vis the African continent, its different regions and countries with a view to ensuring sustainable development and promoting security, stability and prosperity; stresses the urgent need for a strong and fair partnership between the US, the EU and Africa, taking into account the challenges of climate change and its demographic implications, the collapse of biodiversity, China’s exploitation of Africa’s natural resources, sustainable socio-economic development education, digitalisation, the rule of law, democracy promotion and the strengthening of human rights, civil society and gender equality; believes that any security assistance should be based on the human security approach and needs of local populations, fully comply with international law and include strong accountability and democratic and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; welcomes the Biden administration’s commitment to strengthen cooperation with the International Coalition for the Sahel; urges the US and the EU to work together to tackle the increase in violent extremism, terrorism by ISIS and al-Qaeda offshoots, and the humanitarian, economic and governance challenges in the Sahel and in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region in general; calls for enhanced dialogue and coordination regarding the positioning of transatlantic partners vis-à-vis the challenges faced by countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Libya;

108.

Calls for better cooperation in the Arctic, taking into account the growing interest in the Arctic by other countries such as China and the activities and military build-up by Russia in the Arctic; welcomes the decision by the EU and the US, as attested by the statement issued after the EU-US Summit on 15 June 2021, to work together to retain the Arctic as a region of peace and stability and collaborate through the Arctic Council;

109.

Highlights the need to maintain and, where applicable, deepen structural strategic relations between the EU, the US and the UK, capitalising on our shared values, interests and challenges, including in regard to security matters, while ensuring the autonomy of EU decision-making;

110.

Deplores the violent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban following the withdrawal of US and European forces, and the ensuing widespread violations of human rights, particularly of girls, women, and ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the country; reiterates its position that the transatlantic community must redouble its efforts to work for long-term peace, stability and progress in Afghanistan by supporting Afghan civil society, human rights defenders, particularly women’s rights defenders, political activists, journalists, academics, artists and other groups and persons at risk; calls for robust transatlantic coordination and consultation in order to gain, preserve and share intelligence concerning the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan, notably from ISIS, Al-Qaeda and their affiliates; calls for a concerted transatlantic approach combining the need for operational engagement with the Taliban for humanitarian and counter-terrorism purposes with clear conditions for engagement with the Taliban-led government in the future, which should include commitment to respecting human rights and fighting terrorism; calls for deep transatlantic reflection on the lessons from the mission in Afghanistan, with the aim of drawing the necessary conclusions for future efforts to promote stability, security and good governance in the world; calls on transatlantic partners, further, to engage with all of Afghanistan’s neighbours, bearing in mind the plight of the Afghan people who have sought refuge there and the need to help them;

111.

Welcomes the US’s renewed engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with the Eastern Mediterranean Act of 2019, which authorises new security assistance for Cyprus and Greece, and strengthens energy cooperation among regional actors; welcomes the decision by the EU and the US, as attested by the Statement issued after the EU-US Summit on 15 June 2021, to work hand in hand for sustainable de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, where differences should be settled through dialogue in good faith and in accordance with international law; supports the statement by the EU and the US that they intend to aim for a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with a democratic Turkey;

112.

Supports closer cooperation with the US and Latin American countries in promoting multilateralism, democratic values, sustainable development, human rights and international law standards, economic growth, the fight against inequalities, the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime, biodiversity and the fight against climate change; underlines the need for the EU and the US to engage more actively with Latin America and the Caribbean region as vital allies in international fora and as strategic partners in the defence of multilateralism; calls for an EU-US-Latin America ‘Atlantic Triangle Alliance’ that allows both regions to jointly further progress in areas such as democracy, security and drug trafficking, the fight against inequalities and development cooperation; highlights, in this regard, the importance of ensuring that this cooperation with the US and the Latin American countries is reflected in joint efforts to support the opponents and dissidents facing retribution in various countries for defending the values of democracy and protection of human rights; calls, in this regard, on the US and the EU to cooperate with one another and with other countries to restore human rights and democracy in Venezuela through elections that are truly free, credible, inclusive, transparent and entirely democratic, and through support for the legitimate political forces recognised by the European Parliament; further reiterates its commitment to promote democracy and human rights in all Latin American countries; calls for greater EU-US coordination on sanctions; reiterates its suggestion that the US and the EU should engage in regular exchanges of views regarding their respective summits with Latin American countries, namely the EU-CELAC summits and the Summit of the Americas held by the Organization of American States;

113.

Points to the importance of the MENA region for European, and hence also transatlantic, security and stability; calls, therefore, for enhanced dialogue and coordination regarding the positioning of transatlantic partners vis-à-vis the MENA region, including by taking action against severe violations of human rights and international law that have been occurring in the region; urges the US to rejoin the JCPOA as a cornerstone of a global non-proliferation regime and a foundation for de-escalation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region; supports the US’s call for a ‘longer and stronger’ nuclear agreement with Iran and urges transatlantic collaboration in this matter as the next step; welcomes the decision by the US to renew its financing for UNRWA; calls for renewed transatlantic efforts to meaningfully revive and bring to a successful conclusion the Middle East Peace Process, leading to a viable two-state solution; welcomes the signing and implementation of the Abraham Accords and encourages transatlantic cooperation on deepening those ties;

o o

114.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, for information, to the US Department of State and the US Congress.

(1) OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 49.

(2) OJ C 117 E, 6.5.2010, p. 198.

(3) OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 120.

(4) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 89.

(5) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0012.

(6) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0013.

(7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0256.

(8) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2391

(9) European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on meeting the global COVID-19 challenge: effects of the waiver of the WTO TRIPS Agreement on COVID-19 vaccines, treatment, equipment and increasing production and manufacturing capacity in developing countries (Text adopted, P9_TA(2021)0283).

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/88

P9_TA(2021)0411

Implementation report on the EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the implementation report on the EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (2020/2045(INI))

(2022/C 132/08)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to Articles 208, 210, 214 and 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—	having regard to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,

—	having regard to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,

—	having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020 (1),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (2),

—	having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (3),

—	having regard to the general budgets of the European Union for the financial years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 18 November 2011 on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) (COM(2011)0743),

—	having regard to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, both adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2018,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 7 June 2016 on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration (COM(2016)0385),

—	having regard to the Action Plan of the Valletta Summit of November 2015,

—	having regard to the EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016,

—	having regard to the new European Consensus on Development ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’ published on 30 June 2017,

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 April 2014 entitled ‘Tool-box — A rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights for EU development cooperation’ (SWD(2014)0152),

—	having regard to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid of 30 January 2008,

—	having regard to the original constitutive agreements of the Bêkou EU Trust Fund (EUTF), the Madad EUTF, the Africa EUTF and the Colombia EUTF, and their revised constitutive agreements of December 2020,

—

having regard to Commission Decision C(2015)9500 of 24 November 2015 on the coordination of the actions of the Union and of the Member States through a coordination mechanism — the Refugee Facility for Turkey (4), as amended by Commission Decisions C(2016)0855 of 10 February 2016 (5), C(2017)2293 of 18 April 2017 (6), C(2018)1500 of 14 March 2018 (7), and C(2018)4959 of 24 July 2018 (8),

—	having regard to the Commission’s Fourth Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey of 30 April 2020 (COM(2020)0162), as well as to its previous reports,

—	having regard to the 7th Results Report on the Madad EUTF,

—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors special reports entitled ‘The Bêkou EU trust fund for the Central African Republic: a hopeful beginning despite some shortcomings’ (No 11/2017); ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey: helpful support, but improvements needed to deliver more value for money’ (No 27/2018); and the ‘European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Flexible but lacking focus’ (No 32/2018),

—	having regard to the Commission’s decisions to extend the EUTFs until December 2021 in line with Article 234 of the Financial Regulation, and to Parliament’s positions on the draft extension decisions,

—	having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2018 on the implementation of the EU external financing instruments: mid-term review 2017 and the future post-2020 architecture (9),

—	having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2018 on the implementation of the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Humanitarian Aid Instrument and the European Development Fund (10),

—	having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2016 on the EU Trust Fund for Africa: the implications for development and humanitarian aid (11),

—	having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development,

—

having regard to its resolutions of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — annual report 2020 (12), of 18 May 2017 on the EU strategy on Syria (13), of 6 October 2016 on Syria (14), of 24 November 2016 on the situation in Syria (15), and of 6 July 2016 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No. 2/2016 of the European Union for the financial year 2016: Entering the surplus of the financial year 2015 (16),

—

having regard to its resolutions of 13 March 2019 on the 2018 Commission Report on Turkey (17), of 12 December 2018 on the Council position on the second draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2019 (18), and of 4 July 2018 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No. 3/2018 of the European Union for the financial year 2018, Section III — Commission: Extension of the Facility for refugees in Turkey (19),

—	having regard to Draft amending budget No. 5/2020 (20) and the accompanying decision on Mobilisation of the Contingency Margin in 2020: continuation of humanitarian support to refugees in Turkey (21),

—	having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on the 2019-2020 Commission Reports on Turkey (22),

—	having regard to the Commission’s decisions in 2019 and 2020 to extend the Madad EUTF until 14 December 2021 in line with Article 234 of the Financial Regulation,

—	having regard to the commitments to addressing the Syrian crisis and supporting its people, made by the EU and its Member States at the London and Brussels conferences held between 2016 and 2021,

—	having regard to Commission’s mid-term evaluation 2018 and regular results reporting on the Madad EUTF,

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (23), the proposal of 14 June 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe) 2021-2027 (COM(2018)0460), and the proposal of 14 June 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA III) 2021–2027 (COM(2018)0465),

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

—	having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development and the Committee on Budgets under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and of the Committee on Budgetary Control,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development and the Committee on Budgets (A9-0255/2021),

whereas four EUTFs have been established since 2014 to respond to the need for flexible and quick instruments to provide a coherent and reinforced aid response to crises: the Bêkou EUTF, established on 15 July 2014, with the objective of supporting all aspects of the Central African Republic’s exit from crisis and its reconstruction efforts; the Madad EUTF, a European Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis to allow for the pooling and tailoring of resources and response at a regional level, established on 15 December 2014; the Africa EUTF, a European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, established on 12 November 2015; and the Colombia EUTF, established on 12 December 2016 to support the implementation of the peace agreement in the early recovery and stabilisation post-conflict;

whereas the revision of the Financial Regulation in 2018 introduced provisions strengthening, to a certain extent, Parliament’s scrutiny powers when new EUTFs are established or the current ones are extended; whereas the provisions remain too limited to ensure full democratic scrutiny by Parliament as well as complete Parliamentary scrutiny as the budgetary authority, as enshrined in the treaties;

whereas Parliament issued mainly positive opinions in 2020 on the requests to extend the EUTFs until the end of 2021, while expressing concerns about the lack of transparency over the implementation of projects, with specific regard to the ones related to border and migration management, and under the condition, in the case of the Africa EUTF, of providing mandatory guarantees on respect for fundamental human rights in all funded projects;

whereas the establishment of both the EUTFs and the Facility for refugees in Turkey (FRT) have been justified by the need for a flexible, ad hoc and swift reaction not possible under the classical institutional framework and the limited resources and flexibility available in the EU budget; whereas the EU’s new external financial framework (Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) — Global Europe) should overcome the constraints that have led to the need to launch trust funds to respond in a more flexible and rapid manner to specific crises; whereas the extra-budgetary instruments such as the EUTFs, as well as extraordinary tools such as the FRT, jeopardise the principles of democratic accountability, transparency and sound financial management, undermining the role of the European Parliament and also the integrity and unity of the EU budget; whereas Parliament was not consulted on the establishment of the extra-budgetary instruments; whereas the European Development Fund (EDF) contributed to the Africa and Bêkou EUTFs, and therefore Parliament was not involved at all in setting-up of these two EUTFs; whereas Parliament’s possible involvement was limited to an objection to the draft implementing decisions on the constitutive agreements on the Madad and Colombia EUTFs;

whereas when setting up an EUTF, the Commission has to justify its added value, visibility, complementarity with other EU financing instrument and alignment with policy objectives, and whereas it is essential to guarantee continuous monitoring and evaluation of the use of funds to ensure that their effects are always in line with EU law, fundamental values and objectives;

whereas, according to the Financial Regulation, the EUTFs should be subject to an annual external and independent audit and the Commission has the power to suspend the financing agreement if the partner country breaches an obligation relating to respect for human rights, democratic principles or the rule of law and in serious cases of corruption; whereas European Court of Auditors recommended in its special reports on the EUTFs that the Commission improve donor coordination (Bêkou), remove weaknesses in implementation, increase efficiency and focused actions (Africa) and deliver better value for money (FRT);

G.	whereas according to the Commission’s estimations, there are substantial refugee-related humanitarian needs beyond those covered by the Facility for Refugees in Turkey;

whereas Parliament, while acknowledging their value-added, has repeatedly voiced the need for enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of the EUTFs and the FRT and for stronger involvement in the preparation and negotiation of future EUTFs and of the extension of existing EUTFs and other financial instruments in the domain of EU external action; whereas Parliament has called on the Commission to improve its communication on the EUTFs and noted that regular, figure-based information on the implementation of the EUTFs is essential to allow Parliament to exercise its democratic oversight and scrutiny role;

whereas the biggest share of contributions to the EUTFs now comes from the EU budget itself, while contributions from Member States represent a very limited share of their total budgets; whereas, the Member States’ contributions to the FRT are not voluntary, but based on the GNI contribution key and are directly included in the Union budget as external assigned revenue pursuant to Article 21(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation; whereas in the case of the EUTFs, Member States’ contributions are not integrated into the Union budget pursuant to Article 187(6) of the Financial Regulation;

J.	whereas the EU-Turkey statement of March 2016 and the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement give special regard to the prevention of new sea or land routes for illegal migration, dismantling of smuggling networks, control of Turkey’s borders and acceptance of returns, in a non-discriminatory manner;

whereas the primary objective of the Union’s development cooperation policy is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty as enshrined in Article 208 TFEU; whereas the new European Consensus on Development remains the doctrinal framework for EU development policy, and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid reaffirms the fundamental principles of humanitarian aid; whereas the EU and its partners in the humanitarian field must be able to ensure assistance and protection based on needs and on respect for the principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence of humanitarian action; whereas funds from official development assistance (ODA) sources must be devoted to economic, human and social development, particularly to securing access to quality education, local resilience building, including related to climate change, and peacekeeping operations for delivering development and/or humanitarian assistance, with a particular focus on the development challenges identified in the Trust Fund decision;

whereas the constitutive agreement on the EU Trust Fund for Africa clearly put border management projects in Libya within the scope of the mandate of the EUTF, as well as the regulation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); whereas since July 2017, almost EUR 90 million have been allocated through the Africa EUTF to train, equip and support the capacity of the Libyan coastguard and EUR 49 million have been allocated to address the conditions in which returnees are detained; whereas the constitutive agreement on the EUTF clearly states that the Trust Fund will finance activities that contribute to improving migration management in all its aspects in line with the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, including containing and preventing irregular migration and fighting against trafficking of human beings; whereas, nevertheless, there have been allegations of cases of human rights violations in the context of the activities of the Libyan coastguard;

whereas in 2020, Parliament considered that in order to proceed with the extension of the EUTF for Africa, mandatory guarantees on respect for human rights should be provided in all projects that received funding, with particular attention to migration management and also ensuring that these guarantees be established in case of a need for a duly justified new trust fund in the future;

whereas the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Trust Fund) has mobilised EUR 2,3 billion, including voluntary contributions from 21 EU Member States, Turkey and the United Kingdom; whereas its programmes focus on education, livelihoods, health, protection and water, benefiting refugees, internally displaced persons and local communities and supporting more than 7 million beneficiaries; whereas as the Syrian civil war became protracted, the Madad Trust Fund response evolved further along a humanitarian development nexus, with a greater focus on strengthening systems to support the host countries’ efforts and capacities to respond to this protracted crisis, notably through the provision of public services in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon;

whereas according to its evaluation, the Madad Trust Fund is comparatively faster for launching projects than the standard procedures under the European Neighbourhood Instrument and Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance; whereas the Madad Trust Fund has also managed to achieve an economy of scale, with large-scale projects of an average volume of EUR 20 million and an average implementation period of around 30 months;

P.	whereas the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRT) differs from the EUTFs, mainly because it remains embedded within the Union budget;

Q.	whereas according to the Commission, the FRT is designed to coordinate existing EU financing instruments so they are mobilised in a consistent and joined-up manner to address the needs of refugees;

I. General considerations

Budgetary aspects

Notes that, by 31 December 2020, the total pledges to all of the EUTFs amounted to EUR 7 691 million, with the EU budget contribution amounting to EUR 3 170 million, of which EUR 3 534 million originated from the European Development Fund (EDF), and with EUR 988 million originating from Member States and other donors’ pledges; notes further that, by the same date, EUR 7 141 million had been contracted and EUR 4 869 million had been paid by the EUTFs; also notes that, by 31 December 2020, the implementation rate of commitment appropriations for all the EUTFs was 98 % (the EUTF Madad had committed over 95 %, the EUTF Bêkou 99 %, the EUTF Africa 99 % and the EUTF Colombia 94 % of the commitment appropriations available), while the overall implementation rate of payment appropriations was 63 % (with the EUTF Africa at 62 %, the EUTF Bêkou at 66 %, the EUTF Colombia at 52 % and the EUTF Madad at 64 %);

Recalls that the Turkey Facility is made up of two tranches of EUR 3 billion each; regrets the fact that, unlike in the first tranche 2016-2017, where the EU budget contributed EUR 1 billion and Member States EUR 2 billion, in the second tranche 2018-2019 the ratio of contributions was reversed, to the detriment of existing Union projects;

Recalls that while for the first tranche of the FRT, IPA II contributions represented 52,4 %, humanitarian aid 46,6 %, the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace 0,7 % and the Development Cooperation Instrument 0,3 %, for the second tranche, IPA II contributions represented 64,5 % and humanitarian aid 35,5 %;

Notes that by the end of 2020, 36,6 % of the FRT first tranche allocation had been implemented through direct management and 63,4 % through indirect management (of which over four fifths by international organisations); further notes that for the second tranche, direct management represented 32,1 % (100 % by the European Commission) and indirect management 67,9 % (with three quarters by international organisations);

Further notes that international organisations have been the biggest implementing actors of the EUTFs (36,8 %), ahead of the European Commission (35,7 %), Member States agencies (24,2 %) and public service bodies (3,4 %);

Parliament’s involvement in the decision-making and results-monitoring frameworks and in reporting and/or evaluation

Notes that Committee Chairs and relevant Members have been granted observer status in meetings of the Strategic Boards of the Trust Funds and in the FRT Steering Committee; regrets that this status has not been formally reflected in the Constitutive Agreements of the Trust Funds; strongly urges that invitations to board meetings take into account Parliament’s official calendar and that all relevant information and documents to be discussed at the board meetings be provided well ahead of the meetings in order to enable the active participation of Members and staff of the Secretariat;

Regrets the limited role of Parliament in the decision-making, supervision and scrutiny of the Union contributions to the EUTFs and reiterates that existing legal, regulatory and budgetary solutions should have been used to their full extent before creating and/or extending the EUTFs, which should remain a last resort instrument; recalls its earlier unanswered requests and reiterates that Parliament should be represented at the meetings of, and able to monitor the activities of, the Operational Committees, and calls on the Commission to provide in good time detailed information on the decisions taken in those Committees; believes that Parliament must make full use of its powers of scrutiny of implementation and budgetary control and ensure that EU funding decisions and related allocations comply with the Union’s principles of legality and sound financial management, thus providing the EU action with democratic legitimacy and accountability;

Notes the Commission’s efforts to closely monitor and evaluate interventions, and to generate knowledge about the activities of the EUTFs and of the FRT, through a dedicated set of reports; asks for these efforts to achieve greater transparency to be strengthened by publishing relevant data, including specific details of projects funded and results achieved vis-a-vis the stated objectives, on the web pages of the EUTFs and the FRT; stresses that the availability, level of details, completeness and factual consistency of such reports are essential for the support of Parliament as budgetary authority in order to adequately assess the implementation;

Notes that information on the involvement of civil society organisations (CSOs) was made available in the Annual Reports of 2019 and 2020 of the EUTF for Africa; regrets that this information is not openly available due to the low transparency of subcontracting; notes that, where possible, such information should be broken down at project level having regard to the duly justified requirements of confidentiality and security;

10.

Regrets the late notice from the Commission on its intention to extend the duration of the EUTFs and the late evaluations of some of the Trust Funds, which did not allow Parliament to arrive at full and precise conclusions in a timely manner in the case of the Trust Fund for Africa, thus limiting democratic oversight and accountability;

11.

Reiterates its insistence that the extensions of the EUTFs until December 2021 to which it has agreed must be mainly technical to allow for a smooth transition into the new MFF and efficient contracting and use of the funds already committed; highlights the Commission’s assurances that the extensions sought to ensure a continued legal basis for payments of commitments made under the previous MFF 2014-2020, and that no new commitments to the EUTFs will be made under NDICI or IPA III;

12.

Underlines that in its reports the Commission should illustrate the complementarity of different financial instruments dedicated to the areas covered by the EUTFs and the FRT, including the EU External Investment Plan, as well as generated added value;

II. Assessment per EU Trust Fund / FRT

Bêkou

13.

Considers that the Bêkou Trust Fund has partially contributed as one of the tools to address the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as to the nexus approach of development and humanitarian needs in the CAR;

14.

Further refers to the conclusions of its Committee on Development’s delegation to the Central African Republic in February 2018, which note that the Bêkou Trust Fund is visible and seems well perceived in the country, with projects adequately addressing needs transiting between rehabilitation, livelihood provision and longer-term development, at least at local level and on smaller scales;

15.

Highlights the conclusions by the European Court of Auditors, published in its 2017 special report, that the Bêkou Trust Fund has had positive achievements overall and has attracted aid, but few additional donors, and that most of its projects have delivered their expected outputs and provided enhanced visibility to the EU; indicates, however, that the report recommended a better definition of the intervention scope, improved donor coordination, project selection procedures, monitoring and performance measurement, as well as optimisation of costs and increased transparency in the selection of implementing organisations; notes that in the Operational Committee Member States are represented by their own national development agencies, which are also selected as projects implementers, and is concerned that this could lead to a potential conflict of interests in the projects selection procedure of the Operational Committee;

16.

Notes that due to the humanitarian crisis, poverty and the new security challenges ongoing in the CAR, further EU support will require well-targeted programmes and, where relevant, flexible EU funding under the NDICI-Global Europe to enhance humanitarian response, peace and security, democratisation and strengthening of democratic institutions and the respect for human rights in the CAR;

17.

Considers that despite the intervention of the EU and other donors, the situation in the country remains unstable due to the emergence of new conflicts and severe food insecurity;

Madad

18.

Considers that the Madad EUTF has proven its added value in response to the crisis and for the EU in terms of higher external visibility and clout, increased control, coordination and leverage of funds from various sources, as compared to national level or other international channels; notes that its spending was aligned with the legal bases or the Union instruments used and with their objectives; recalls, therefore, that projects funded under the Madad Trust Fund must promote and protect dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and promote social and economic inclusion, in particular of minorities and vulnerable groups; regrets that the conflict in Syria is still continuing, and stresses that the needs of the Syrian refugees, unable to return to their home country in the foreseeable future, and the needs of their host communities in terms of longer-term integration and employment, still require EU and international long-term assistance to secure capacity for longer-term integration and employment in a cohesive way with the host communities; points out that the conflict-prone areas in Syria do not permit long-term reconstruction to take place at present;

19.

Notes that the Mid-Term Strategic Evaluation report from October 2018 concluded that the Madad Trust Fund has been ‘large and cost-effective, reaching a large number of beneficiaries at a comparatively low cost’, and that it has ‘allowed the EU to operate flexibly’;

20.

Welcomes the rapid and flexible reaction of the Trust Fund in support of partner countries and communities during the coronavirus outbreak, showing active engagement in the realignment and refocusing of activities, not only in the domain of health, but also in other areas, such as livelihoods, protection, education or social cohesion in Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan;

21.

Emphasises the importance of continuous support for refugees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable host communities, including in the wider region, affected by the continued conflict, by means of a mix of longer-term, predictable, fully transparent and rapidly deployable funding under instruments established for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) and potential contributions from the Member States as external assigned revenue, taking into account all financial instruments provided under the Financial Regulation;

22.

Recalls the vulnerability of the Palestine refugee communities in Syria and the region, and calls for continuous support and for their inclusion in the EU’s humanitarian plans and responses regarding the Syria crisis;

Africa

23.

Notes that the Trust Fund for Africa was created as an emergency trust fund to help address the crises in three regions in Africa, with the aim of achieving long-term stability and development goals; considers that the EUTF for Africa represents a swift and flexible tool to help address common, global challenges, such as migration and forced displacement, the impact of climate change and economic crises; highlights that the unprecedented situation caused in the context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic required all necessary flexibility and rapidity; stresses, however, that flexibility must always be combined with full transparency and accountability; believes that there could be room for improvement, with more focused steered action across the three windows and support for the measuring and reporting of results;

24.

Takes note that 78 projects contributed to greater economic and employment opportunities, 97 projects were undertaken to strengthen resilience, 75 projects were dedicated to migration management, and 75 projects contributed to improving governance and conflict prevention; notes with concern that, due to specific circumstances, migration management has become the focus of EU response in some projects; reiterates, however, that the original objectives of improving resilience and tackling the root causes of migration should be maintained;

25.

Welcomes the fact that the EUTF for Africa has in some cases contributed to the triple humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach, which was not possible with the EU financial instruments under the previous MFF; recalls that funding of the EUTF must be implemented and evaluated on the basis of ODA criteria and that all expenses falling outside this requirement have to be funded from different sources that are pooled in the Trust Fund, and condemns any use of ODA funds that contradicts development objectives; recalls that as a fundamental principle, humanitarian assistance must be independent;

26.

Regrets the fact that as much as 37 % of the EUTF for Africa is allocated to measures intended to restrict and reduce migration, while less than 9 % is allocated to addressing the drivers of migration and forced displacement; notes that less than 1,5 % of the EUTF for Africa was allocated to regular migration channels; acknowledges that security is essential for the stability of African partner countries and that the EU must support partner countries in tackling the root causes of irregular migration flows, smuggling and human trafficking;

27.

Notes the reports on continuing human rights violations taking place in Libya in the context of actions by the Libyan coast guard; stresses that many of the people rescued or intercepted by the coast guard are returned to arbitrary detention in horrendous conditions in Libya; underlines that the return of refugees to countries in which they are not safe is in violation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; notes that in the context of the Emergency Transit Mechanism there are concerns about the respect for human rights in the implementation of projects; notes the failure to respect the principle of non-refoulement in Libya; recalls, however, that any intervention should ensure full protection of human lives, dignity and human rights; calls in this regard on the Commission and the Member States to review and conduct a specific risk assessment, in consultation with CSOs, of the cooperation activities with the competent authorities in maritime and border surveillance and management, funded under the EUTF for Africa, to ensure an objective assessment of the respect for human rights;

28.

Underlines the importance of cooperation and dialogue with local partners; hails the consultations and studies carried out to identify priority needs; strongly calls on the Commission to properly involve local authorities and CSOs in projects supported by the EUTF for Africa;

29.

Notes that one of the key objectives of the EUTF for Africa, as determined in its Constitutive Agreement, is addressing the root causes of migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and addressing human rights abuses; calls for greater emphasis on long-term development goals such as employment, education, food security and improving the living conditions of the local population;

30.

Notes that Special report No 32/2018 of the European Court of Auditors pointed out various shortcomings, including the failure to apply EU public procurement law and opaque management, recommended an improved project selection procedure, higher implementation speed and a more systematic performance monitoring process, covering the full range of projects, and noted that due to the fund’s broad scope, it often lacked efficiency due to an absence of adequate quantification of the needs and means through which measured impact could have been achieved; calls for simplification and better communication regarding applications for procurement procedures in order to facilitate access to EU funding for smaller and local NGOs;

31.

Notes that the EUTF for Africa made a contribution to strengthening resilience and implementing the humanitarian-development nexus in fragile contexts; notes further that it also fostered cooperation between different stakeholders, and allowed contributions from non-EU donors, which in the post-Brexit context have acquired particular importance, and increased the visibility of the issue of migration and forced displacement and the EU’s response to it; regrets at the same time that the monitoring of the implementation of this fund has not been adequate and requests that SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely) objectives be included in the project logframes, and that quantifiable targets be established for evaluating projects;

32.

Welcomes the proposal by the Commission to decommit funds originating from the EUTF for Africa that were initially allocated to Eritrea, in particular for the procurement for road renovation that used forced labour;

Colombia

33.

Considers that the Trust Fund for Colombia has proven its value and represents, under the current circumstances, an important tool to support the implementation of the peace agreement between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); points out that the extension of the Colombia EUTF has further reaffirmed the EU’s commitment and provided much-needed support to the Colombian peace process; recalls that the EUTF for Colombia is established under the Development Cooperation Instrument, and must be aligned to the primary objective of the development policy of the European Union: the ‘Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty’ and ‘the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries’;

34.

Underlines its important role in supporting Colombia in the area of comprehensive rural development and economic growth; calls for the implementation of the Colombian peace process to continue to prioritise long- and medium-term, fully transparent funding programmes and monitoring, and for these programmes to benefit from the appropriate democratic scrutiny and involvement of the European Parliament and appropriate, transparent and inclusive stakeholder consultations, notably of the local civil society;

35.

Congratulates Colombia on its efforts, despite its own challenges with the implementation of the peace agreement, to provide support for over 1,7 million Venezuelan migrants who have fled to Colombia, in particular by granting them a 10-year temporary protection status;

36.

Welcomes the involvement of the Republic of Chile as a donor in the Trust Fund; notes that the participation of regional partners is of high value added, and has increased both local recognition and the legitimation of the EU’s engagement and cooperation;

Facility for Refugees in Turkey

37.

Points out that Turkey hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with almost 4 million registered refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; recalls the important role played by the FRT in welcoming refugees from Syria; calls for a thorough human rights impact assessment of the EU-Turkey Statement and underlines the importance of both parties’ compliance with fundamental rights as part of its implementation; takes the view that the EU should continue to give the necessary support to Syrian and other refugees and host communities in Turkey, ensuring that the Turkish Government is not directly involved in the management and allocation of funds, which should primarily be given directly to the refugees and host communities and should be managed by organisations that guarantee accountability and transparency;

38.

Considers that the EU FRT has proven its value as an innovative pooling tool and important coordinating mechanism for assisting Turkey in swiftly responding to the immediate humanitarian and development needs of refugees and their host communities, and stresses the need to ensure sustainability of these activities; notes therefore that the majority of projects needed to be extended to achieve the expected outcome; expresses its support to Turkish civil society and recalls the laudable efforts played by international organisations in implementing these projects; underlines the added value generated by involving local organisations, experts and NGOs, as well as those from across Member States, in the implementation of the FRT;

39.

Welcomes the success of the first tranche of the FRT, in particular the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) — the biggest humanitarian project managed by the Commission; welcomes the progress of the second tranche, which is facilitating a gradual shift from humanitarian to development assistance;

40.

Acknowledges the role played by FRT in providing some 1,8 million refugees with basic needs support, 668 900 refugee children with educational support, and millions of refugees with healthcare and protection services; stresses, however, that Special report No 27/2018 of the European Court of Auditors indicated inconsistency in the financing of health and education activities, with a parallel use of different management structures to fund similar projects; furthermore, the report highlighted that greater value could have been achieved in cash-assistance projects and called on the Commission to improve the programming for municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support, enable the operating environment for NGOs and improve the reporting on the Facility; notes in particular the impact of COVID-19 on the refugees and points out that the FRT was established despite the existence of serious concerns about the human rights situation of refugees in Turkey from the perspective of international asylum law; recalls that in 2020 the Commission requested the mobilisation of an additional EUR 481,6 million under the EU Budget Contingency Margin, which goes beyond the initially planned allocation for the FRT, in order to finance the activities under the Emergency Social Safety Net programme and the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education programme;

41.

Reiterates its deep regret that Parliament was not formally consulted or asked to give its approval to the creation or extension of this Facility and was only involved as one arm of the budgetary authority, thereby undermining the democratic accountability of the FRT; insists that it should not be confronted with this situation again;

42.

Underlines that the European Court of Auditors Special report No 27/2018 (24) raises questions on the efficiency of the humanitarian projects financed by the Facility, since they did not consistently and comprehensively assess the reasonableness of the budgeted costs; notes that the report also raises concerns about the fact that it is not possible to monitor all the humanitarian projects during the audit; in this respect, stresses that the refusal by the Turkish authorities to grant access to beneficiary data for the two cash-assistance projects could raise questions as regards the soundness of financial management under the Facility, particularly taking into account Turkey’s rapid backsliding on the rule of law and fundamental rights; recalls the need for scrutiny of the funds implemented by the Turkish Government and the local authorities; reiterates that the funds have to be exclusively used for accommodating all physical and psychological needs of refugees, including housing, food, education and guaranteeing a decent standard of living; calls on the Commission to improve monitoring and obtain the data on beneficiaries of all FRT programmes and projects; stresses that in order to achieve full accountability and to avoid double funding, the Commission should make the resources available on the basis of targets achieved by implementing partners on the ground and after the implementation assessment has been carried out in accordance with the Financial Regulation rules; calls, therefore, on the Commission to ensure that the objectives and the implementation of the FRT are consistent with the EU’s general principles, policies and objectives, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and expresses its concern over the degradation of these principles in Turkey;

43.

Stresses the importance of transition from humanitarian relief to development cooperation, and calls on the Commission to develop and implement a transition strategy, focused on helping to create livelihood opportunities for refugees so as to improve their self-reliance and social inclusion in their host communities; recalls the EU’s long-term objective of a gradual takeover of EU-funded activities by the Turkish authorities in full respect of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; calls on all parties involved in the upcoming Multilateral Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean to address this in a comprehensive way, along with humanitarian and development issues;

44.

Reiterates its request that Turkey respect the principle of non-refoulement, in particular on the Syrian border, ensuring that the human rights of refugees and their status as guaranteed by the 1951 Refugee Convention are fully respected, and that it does not instrumentalise the migratory flows and use them as a source of blackmail against the EU for political purposes; expects Turkey to implement in full and in a non-discriminatory manner the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 and the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement; urges the Commission to ensure close monitoring of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, including in relation to the human rights situation of asylum seekers and migrants returned to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Statement, and to report back to Parliament thereon; calls on the Turkish authorities to grant the UNHCR full access to the removal centres at the Turkish-Syrian border to be able to monitor the respect for the principle of non-refoulement; stresses that the financial support to Turkey in the management of refugee flows must respect full budgetary transparency, as well as unrestricted involvement of civil society organisations; calls on the Commission to call upon the Turkish authorities to improve the working environment for international NGOs; calls on the Commission to build upon its experience in special third-party verification systems to strengthen the oversight of spending;

45.

Calls on Turkey to refrain from keeping refugees in detention centres with the purpose of making them sign voluntary return forms, and to guarantee their access to health care services regardless of their place of registration within the country;

46.

Notes that the FRT supports only registered refugees; expresses its concerns that many refugees have been left without assistance since registration was made difficult in some provinces and cities;

47.

Welcomes the Council’s invitation to the Commission to present a proposal to the Council for the continuation of financing for Syrian refugees in Turkey, as well as in Jordan, Lebanon and other parts of the region;

III. Future outlook and recommendations

48.

Underlines the necessity of better addressing the funding needs in situations of protracted crisis and with a view to the coordination and transition between humanitarian relief, reconstruction and development in a flexible and interconnected manner, in a way that is in line with international development policy targets, including the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Union’s development policy principles, such as supporting poverty eradication and the reduction of inequalities, and in the event of humanitarian intervention, fully respecting the humanitarian assistance principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, with full protection of human lives, dignity and human rights; insists on the need for efficiency and effectiveness of the EU assistance, so that it has genuine effects on the ground;

49.

Stresses the need to take on board the lessons learned in the establishment, management and implementation of the Trust Funds and the FRT in order to apply them to the new generation of external financial instruments, as well as to enhance synergies and coherence of the EU external assistance and parliamentary scrutiny; urges the Commission to present the final comprehensive review on the implementation of the EUTFs, evaluating its alignment with the EU’s development, human rights and humanitarian objectives; insists further that, should the need for any new EUTF or ad hoc instrument arise in the future, the contribution mechanism from the Union budget must be clearly defined and negotiated from the outset with the full involvement of Parliament; believes also that the impact and visibility of EU external assistance should be further increased, highlighting the EU’s and its Member States’ role as the biggest donors of global development financing;

50.

Calls on the Commission to ensure a transparent impact assessment, carried out by independent EU bodies and experts, on the impact of EU-funded projects on the human rights of migrants and refugees, as well as on the wider population in the country concerned; calls for the establishment of an effective and independent monitoring mechanism to fully monitor and evaluate the final destination of these funds and protocols for action in the event of violations of fundamental rights; deems it necessary to fully involve regional and local authorities and civil society actors in their design and implementation; calls on the Commission and Member States to establish a complete and clear overview of the funds used to finance cooperation with third countries in the field of migration management across all financial instruments, and their implementation; underlines the importance of sharing the audit data with the EU financial scrutiny framework, including the ECA, OLAF and EPPO;

51.

Points out the need to better address challenges related to intra-African migration, which makes up almost 90 % of migration flows in Africa, in close cooperation with the African Union and in line with its Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action 2018-2030; in the long run, insists, nevertheless, on the need for an approach that avoids creating dependencies on external intervention; in this respect, insists on empowerment through education and the importance of quality education in creating stronger support for development cooperation;

52.

Notes that gender equality and social inclusion are two of the main spending targets of the NDICI-Global Europe programming; reiterates the EU’s commitment to empowering women and girls, and calls on the Commission to integrate gender equality, along with resilience building and climate change adaptation, into planning and implementation of the Trust Funds and the FRT; recommends that a gender-sensitive analysis and consideration of the involvement of women in designing supported projects should be regularly carried out in the implementation of projects under both the EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey;

53.

Calls on the Commission to withhold or review the cooperation with third countries that do not fully respect fundamental rights, including suspending specific funding and projects which endanger or undermine human rights;

54.

While noting that the Financial Regulation allows for the creation of Trust Funds for external action, reiterates further Parliament’s long-standing insistence that external assistance be financed in full from the Union budget and be implemented in a coherent way, following a streamlined set of rules, based on co-legislated instruments and in full respect of Parliament’s legislative, budgetary and monitoring prerogatives, and of the principles of the EU’s budgetary unity, accountability, transparency, effectiveness and sound budgetary management; highlights that the adoption of extraordinary tools increases the complexity of financing governance and puts financial pressure on existing foreign policy instruments, thereby possibly affecting their efficiency; believes that EU Trust Funds should only be used to react to a sudden major crisis and to situations where multiple donor responses need to be coordinated and where the external policy objective cannot be fully achieved by the existing external financing instruments, and on the condition that they abide by the principle of sound financial management, and that the Union trust fund does not duplicate other existing funding channels or similar instruments without providing any additionality, and that the objectives of the trust fund are aligned with the objectives of the Union instrument or budgetary item from which it is funded; calls on the Commission to guarantee more efficient communication on the ground, highlighting the EU’s role as the biggest donor of global development financing;

55.

Points out that pooling resources from the EDF, the Union budget and other donors in trust funds should not alter the ability of existing EU policies and programmes to pursue their original objectives, such as the eradication of poverty and the promotion of fundamental rights;

56.

Recalls that EUTFs and the FRT should be seen as exceptional or truly emergency-led instruments whose added value and effects on the ground should be very well justified and carefully monitored; expects the Commission to fully make use of the possibilities afforded by the programme-based approach under the geographic pillar of the NDICI-Global Europe and IPA III — which may no longer be used to finance pre-accession assistance to Turkey except for support to Turkish civil society organisations through the financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights –, complemented by global thematic programming, rapid response funding and the large unprogrammed reserve under the NDICI-Global Europe;

57.

Recalls that the funds from the Emerging challenges and priorities cushion under the NDICI-Global Europe are expected to top up funding from the geographic and thematic programmes and rapid response actions; underlines that the Commission has committed to discussing the use of these funds as part of the geopolitical dialogue with Parliament, and to providing detailed information before their mobilisation, while fully taking into consideration Parliament’s remarks on the nature, objectives and financial amounts envisaged;

58.

Welcomes the new EU external financing instrument, NDICI-Global Europe, as it envisages increasing possibilities within the EU budget to respond to new emergencies; is confident that the NDICI-Global Europe will allow for more efficient allocation of resources, as well as sufficient flexibility and responsiveness, while learning from past experiences and assessments of the existing Trust Funds by the NDICI-Global Europe Instrument;

59.

Underlines that NDICI-Global Europe should be used to its full potential, and where necessary improved, while the recourse to extraordinary financing tools should be limited to unforeseen emergencies, thereby safeguarding the unity and democratic accountability of the Union budget; underlines in this respect that an ordinary decision-making governance framework confers more legitimacy to the EU’s external action, both within the EU and in the destination countries;

60.

Requests that the funding of any successor to the current FRT not be done at the expense of the newly adopted financing instruments, especially IPA III and NDICI-Global Europe, including its emerging challenges and priorities cushion, as the FRT successor does not respond to a genuinely new challenge or crisis; strongly advocates the funding of any such initiative through fresh appropriations, reinforced, if necessary, by contributions from the Member States; reiterates that Parliament must be fully and from the outset involved in the discussions on the FRT successor, including its funding and governance structures, which must reflect the origins of the funding and the role of the budgetary authority;

61.

In the event of greater needs in the MFF 2021-2027, advocates that the first and main solution to be explored should be through the co-legislated instruments, namely by increasing the NDICI-Global Europe envelope through a revision of the MFF and the NDICI-Global Europe regulations, or, as a secondary option, and under the condition that Parliament is fully involved in the decision-making process and endowed with the proper scrutiny power, a strengthening of the relevant NDICI-Global Europe budget lines with contributions in the form of external assigned revenue; expects, in this respect, that the upcoming revision of the Financial Regulation will ensure appropriate involvement of the budgetary authority in the governance of external assigned revenue; stresses that, should a need for a duly justified new Trust Fund nevertheless arise, following the outbreak of a major crisis, a sudden change in international relations requiring a major EU financial response, or the need to pool resources with third countries, which would not be feasible under the co-legislated instruments, Parliament must be fully involved from the very outset; considers, in this respect, that the Financial Regulation should be revised to guarantee the appropriate role of Parliament in the setting up and scrutiny of any new trust fund, including in the drawing up of the constitutive agreement and the mobilisation of the Union’s contribution, the implementation, continuation and possible liquidation;

62.

Calls on the Commission to prioritise the nexus approach in the implementation of the NDICI-Global Europe, and calls for the cooperation between EU humanitarian and development actors, notably in post-crisis settings and in protracted crises, to be increased in order to better adapt to local needs and deliver more efficient results;

63.

Notes that the possibilities of mainstreaming migration policy in EU external policy are significantly broadened by the inclusion of migration in the thematic, geographical and rapid response component of NDICI; notes with concern, however, that through the ‘rapid response’ component, cooperation with third countries on migration management can be funded without the need for the Commission to publish any programming documents or consult civil society actors, and without the involvement of Parliament, including in the framework of the ‘Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint’, which lacks mechanisms to assess the possible adverse impact of such interventions; insists in this regard on the need to ensure that the 2021-2027 MFF is accompanied by a robust human rights framework for the identification, implementation and monitoring of future migration cooperation programmes;

64.

Notes that NDICI-Global Europe envisages mid-term and final evaluations and detailed annual reporting by the Commission to Parliament and the Council on the ongoing activities, results delivered, effectiveness, and progress towards the thematic targets and objectives of the Regulation; calls on the Commission to develop and implement a precise methodology for tracking the 10 % expenditure earmarked for migration and forced displacement to effectively ensure proper transparency and accountability regarding this expenditure, as required by the Regulation;

65.

Welcomes the close-to-ground decision-making procedure and adaptation to the local realities and the possibility to implement cross-border and multi-year funded projects in the EUTFs and the FRT, as these are of high added value; calls for such aspects to be mainstreamed in the future programming exercises linked to budgetary instruments for EU external policy;

66.

Acknowledges that cooperation with representatives of local communities and stakeholders, including local government bodies, civil society organisations, social partners and religious leaders, in settings affected by conflict is crucial to foster reconciliation, dialogue and peace; emphasises that local churches and faith-based organisations play an active role in development cooperation and in delivering humanitarian assistance to the people most in need, and calls on the Commission to engage with them, notably regarding the delivery of direct support to hard-to-reach communities in developing countries;

67.

Stresses the importance of allocating a substantial share of future EU funding in the field of migration to civil society groups in third countries for providing assistance and for the protection and monitoring of the rights of migrants, and of ensuring that a significant part of EU funding is earmarked for the improvement of human rights, international protection and the future perspective of refugees;

68.

Calls on the Commission to adapt the programming methods to the local realities and emerging local challenges and to support local ownership in the implementation of the new EU development instruments; calls further on the Commission to carry out a needs assessment and adapt the EU’s response to local needs;

69.

Calls on the Commission to examine the possibilities of involving third country partners in joint initiatives and financing to address common challenges such as migration, forced displacement, climate change, empowerment of women and protection of vulnerable groups;

70.

Calls on the Commission to prioritise investments in education and job creation to provide possibilities for people in partner countries to engage in local income-generating activities;

71.

Expects the Commission to address ongoing or future crises and potential reconstruction needs in a more efficient and targeted manner by using the existing ways and other means possible under the current Financial Regulation in close and coordinated cooperation with Member States and other EU institutions as part of the ‘Team Europe’ approach, and with like-minded international partners and donors;

o o

72.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the Council.

(1) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 884.

(2) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.

(3) OJ L 163, 2.7.1996, p. 1.

(4) OJ C 407, 8.12.2015, p. 8.

(5) OJ C 60, 16.2.2016, p. 3.

(6) OJ C 122, 19.4.2017, p. 4.

(7) OJ C 106, 21.3.2018, p. 4.

(8) OJ C 278, 8.8.2018, p. 3.

(9) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 76.

(10) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 33.

(11) OJ C 204, 13.6.2018, p. 68.

(12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0012.

(13) OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 117.

(14) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 44.

(15) OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 88.

(16) OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 179.

(17) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 58.

(18) OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 326.

(19) OJ C 118, 8.4.2020, p. 264.

(20) Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2020/1157 of Amending budget No 5 of the European Union for the financial year 2020 (OJ L 299, 11.09.2020, p. 1).

(21) Decision (EU) 2020/1268 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 on the mobilisation of the Contingency Margin in 2020 to provide continued humanitarian support to refugees in Turkey (OJ L 298, 11.9.2020, p. 21).

(22) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0243.

(23) OJ L 163, 2.7.1996, p. 1.

(24) Special report No 27/2018 of the European Court of Auditors, ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey: helpful support, but improvements needed to deliver more value for money’, p. 6 and p. 40.

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/102

P9_TA(2021)0412

State of EU cyber defence capabilities

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (2020/2256(INI))

(2022/C 132/09)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to the document entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016,

—	having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 December 2013, 26 June 2015, 15 December 2016, 9 March 2017, 22 June 2017, 20 November 2017 and 15 December 2017,

—	having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (1),

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 June 2017 on a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities (‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’),

—	having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 September 2017 entitled ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ (JOIN(2017)0450),

—	having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation signed in July 2018,

—	having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2019 on complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats,

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification (Cybersecurity Act) (2),

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 June 2020 on EU External Action on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism,

—	having regard to the Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact,

—	having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1127 of 30 July 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (3),

—	having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1537 of 22 October 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (4),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605),

—	having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

—	having regard to the Commission’s proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of 16 December 2020 (COM(2020)0823),

—	having regard to the Commission’s proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities of 16 December 2020 (COM(2020)0829),

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 9 March 2021 on the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade,

—	having regard to the statement of the European Council of 25 March 2021,

—	having regard to the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) report of 10 March 2021,

—	having regard to the UN Agenda for Disarmament — ‘Securing our Common Future’,

—	having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and in particular SDG 16 aiming at the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,

—	having regard to European Court of Auditors Review No 09/2019 on European defence,

—	having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on cyber defence (5),

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0234/2021),

whereas the EU and its Member States must further develop a cyber-security strategy which sets realistic, precise and ambitious objectives and defines policies in a clear manner in both the military and the civilian domain, and also where both sectors overlap; whereas all EU institutions and EU Member States have to work more cooperatively at all levels to build that strategy, whose main objective should be to further strengthen resilience, and as a consequence, develop common, but also better, national, robust civilian and military cyber capabilities and cooperation in order to respond to lasting security challenges;

whereas the EU is committed to the application of existing international law in cyberspace, in particular the UN Charter which calls on states to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

whereas in recent years, we have seen continuous growth in malicious cyber operations against the EU and its Member States, conducted by state and non-state actors, which have revealed vulnerabilities in networks essential to European security; whereas offensive cyber actors are growing in diversity, sophistication and number; whereas these attacks make it a matter of priority to step up defence capacity and develop European cyber capabilities; whereas damaging cyberattacks can take place at any moment and actors at both EU and national level should be encouraged to take the necessary measures to maintain effective cyber defence capabilities constantly during peacetime;

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and the increase in cyber insecurity have demonstrated that international agreements are necessary; whereas cyberattacks have significantly increased during the COVID-19 pandemic and whereas the EU and its Member States have observed cyber threats and malicious cyber activities targeting essential operators, including attacks to disrupt critical infrastructure such as energy, transportation and healthcare, as well as considerable cyber-enabled foreign interference, which have blurred the line between peace and hostility; whereas the Recovery Plan for Europe envisages additional investments in cybersecurity;

whereas cyberspace is now recognised as a domain of operation; whereas cyber threats are capable of compromising all traditional military domains and whereas traditional domains depend on cyber space functionality and not vice versa; whereas conflicts can take place in all physical (land, air, sea and space) and virtual (cyber) domains, may be amplified through elements of hybrid warfare, such as cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns, proxy wars, offensive and defensive use of cyber capabilities and strategic attacks on digital service providers to disrupt critical infrastructure, as well as our democratic institutions, and cause considerable financial losses;

whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA) should support Member States in coordinating and stepping up their efforts to deliver cyber defence capabilities and technologies, addressing all aspects of capability development, including doctrine, leadership, organisation, personnel, training, industry, technology, infrastructure, logistics, interoperability and resources;

G.	whereas during the development of the Requirements Catalogue 2017, which is used to identify the full range of common security and defence policy (CSDP) military requirements across a number of illustrative scenarios, the need for cyber defence capabilities emerged as a high priority;

H.	whereas the successful execution of EU missions and operations is increasingly dependent on uninterrupted access to a secure cyberspace, and thus requires resilient cyber-operational capabilities;

I.	whereas the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF) updated in 2018 identified priorities such as the development of cyber defence capabilities and the protection of the CSDP’s communication and information networks;

J.	whereas in her 2021 State of the Union speech, the Commission President underlined the need for an EU cyber defence policy;

whereas the increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into defence forces’ cyber capabilities (cyber-physical systems, including the communication and data links between vehicles in a networked system) may lead to vulnerabilities to electronic warfare attacks such as jamming, spoofing or hacking;

whereas raising the EU’s level of cyber security and cyber defence is a necessary corollary to the success of Europe’s digital and geopolitical ambitions and would create greater resilience, keeping pace with the growing sophistication and threat of cyberattacks; whereas an EU with a strong cybersecurity culture and strong cybersecurity technology, including the capacity to identify and attribute malicious actions in a timely and effective manner and to respond adequately, would be able to protect its citizens, as well as the security of its Member States;

M.	whereas international terrorist organisations have increased their expertise in and use of cyber warfare, and cyber-attackers are using state-of-the-art technology to investigate vulnerabilities in systems and devices and to engage in large- and mega-scale cyberattacks;

whereas the defence and space industries are facing unprecedented global competition and major technological changes with the emergence of advanced cyber technologies; whereas the European Court of Auditors has pointed to capability gaps in the area of ICT technologies, cyber warfare and AI; whereas the EU is a net importer of cyber security products and services, which increases the risk of technological dependence on and vulnerability to non-EU operators; whereas a set of common EU AI capabilities should bridge technical gaps and ensure that Member States lacking the relevant technology-industry expertise or the ability to implement AI systems in their defence ministries are not left behind;

whereas the Pegasus spyware scandal showed that large numbers of journalists, human rights activists, elected representatives and other EU citizens have been spied on; whereas various state actors like Russia, China and North Korea have been involved in malicious cyber activities in pursuit of political, economic and security objectives that include attacks on critical infrastructure, cyber espionage on and mass surveillance of EU citizens, aiding disinformation campaigns, distributing malware, and limiting access to the internet and the functioning of IT systems; whereas such activities disregard and violate international law, human rights and EU fundamental rights while jeopardising democracy, security, public order and the strategic autonomy of the EU, and therefore warrant a joint EU response, such as through the framework for a joint EU diplomatic response, including the use of restrictive measures envisaged for the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox;

whereas the Council decided for the first time on 30 July 2020 to impose restrictive measures against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for or involved in various cyberattacks in order to better prevent, discourage, deter and respond to malicious behaviour in cyberspace; whereas the legal framework for the EU cyber sanctions regime was adopted in May 2019;

Q.	whereas attribution forms are a central component in cyber diplomacy and deterrence strategies;

R.	whereas in recent years, EU-NATO cooperation has increased across multiple fields, including cyber security and defence, in line with the 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration;

whereas the 2010, 2013 and 2015 consensus reports of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), endorsed by the UN General Assembly, constitute a universal normative framework for cyber stability, consisting of the acknowledgment that existing international law, including the UN Charter in its entirety, applies in cyberspace, as do the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour, as well as confidence-building measures and capacity building;

State of EU cyber defence capabilities

Underlines that a common cyber defence policy and substantial EU level cooperation on generating common, and also better, cyber defence capabilities are core elements for the development of a deepened and enhanced European Defence Union and require a complex mix of technical, strategic and operational abilities; states that cyber defence refers to actions, instruments and processes which are proportionate and in line with international law, which include both military and civilian elements, and which aim to protect, inter alia, CSDP communication and information networks, and CSDP missions and operations, and to assist Member States; stresses the urgent need to develop and strengthen both common and Member State military cyber defence capabilities;

Recalls that the borderless nature of cyber space, as well as the substantial number and increasing complexity of cyberattacks, require a coordinated Union-level response, including common Member State support capabilities and Member State support for measures in the EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox, as well as intensified EU-NATO cooperation based on information sharing between cyber crisis response teams, the exchange of best practices, enhanced training, research and exercises;

Welcomes the CDPF as a tool to support the development of Member States’ cyber defence capabilities; stresses that the review of the CDPF should first of all highlight the existing gaps and vulnerabilities as regards EU and national military structures; stresses the need to enhance coordination between EU institutions, agencies and bodies, between and with Member States, and with the European Parliament, in order to ensure the updated CDPF achieves the EU’s cyber defence objectives;

Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to further develop, in cooperation with the Member States, a comprehensive set of measures and a coherent IT security policy to strengthen resilience, but also military cyber defence coordination; urges the strengthening of cooperation with the EU’s civilian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) to protect networks used by all EU institutions, bodies and agencies, in close cooperation with CIOs in the respective entities, and of EU institutions’, bodies’ and agencies’ communication with Member States; calls for Parliament to ensure its participation in CERT-EU results to ensure a level of IT security that will allow it to receive all the necessary classified and non-classified information to carry out its responsibilities under the Treaties, including as a result of the current process to replace the 2002 Inter-Institutional Agreement on access to information in the area of security and defence; calls on the EEAS to ensure adequate levels of cybersecurity for its assets, premises and activities, including its headquarters, EU delegations and CSDP missions and operations;

Notes the 2018 CDPF’s objective to setup an EU Military CERT-Network; calls on Member States to significantly increase classified information sharing capacities in order to facilitate information sharing where needed and useful, and to develop a European rapid and secure network to detect, asses and counter cyberattacks;

Recalls that the 2018 EU Capability Development Priorities established in the framework of the Capability Development Plan (CDP) reflected on the need to develop full-spectrum capabilities and made cyber defence a key priority; recalls that the CDP underlined that cyber situational awareness technologies and defensive cyber technologies are essential in countering security threats; welcomes the EDA’s support for Member States in developing their capabilities to improve cyber resilience, such as the ability to detect, withstand and recover from any cyberattack; takes note of the different activities undertaken by Member States in the framework of the EDA, including the EDA’s ‘Cyber Defence Requirements Engineering’ (CyDRE) project, which should develop an enterprise architecture for cyberspace operations, including scope, functionalities and requirements, based upon national and EU legislation;

Calls on Member States to define a common communication standard that could be used for classified and non-classified information, in order to enhance rapid action and ensure a secure network to counter cyberattacks;

Welcomes the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) — the first fully fledged defence review at EU level — which is one of the key tools that support overall coherence in Member States’ defence spending, defence planning and defence cooperation, and should contribute to promoting investment in developing cyber defence capabilities;

Welcomes the progress already made under the European Defence Industrial Development Programme in the form of several relevant projects on intelligence, secured communication and cyber-defence; welcomes, in particular, the call for an easily deployable and interconnected cyber toolbox for defence and the fact that the EDF will also help to strengthen resilience and improve preparedness, responsiveness and cooperation in the cyber domain, provided that such a priority is decided upon when negotiating relevant EDF work programmes; stresses that the EU’s capacity to develop cyber defence projects depends on the control of technologies, equipment, services, data and data processing and is dependent on a trusted sectoral stakeholder base, while calling for the full implementation and enforcement of the Defence Procurement Directive (6); calls on the Member States to take advantage of the EDF to jointly develop cyber defence capabilities;

10.

Welcomes the increased cooperation among Member States in the domain of cyber defence and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and the progress achieved in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), including through the implementation of concrete projects such as the Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cybersecurity project; recalls that the EDF and PESCO offer excellent means to develop cyber defence capabilities and speed up cyber security initiatives, such as through the Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform and the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre; calls on all Member States to ensure coherence and focus on cyber capability, developing a strategic common approach to priorities; calls for the fostering of research and innovation and the exchange of expertise in order to harness the full potential of PESCO and the EDF; welcomes the Council’s decision of 5 November 2020 allowing third countries to join individual PESCO projects in some specific cases, given that they can add value and provide technical expertise and additional capabilities and provided that they meet an agreed set of political, substantive and legal conditions; underlines that it might be in the strategic interest of the EU on an exceptional case-by-case basis for Member States and non-Member States to participate in cyber-related PESCO projects in order to meet more ambitious commitments, on the basis of effective reciprocity;

11.

Stresses that cyber defence is considered an operational task for all CSDP missions, and that cyber resilience and related capabilities must be established, tested and deployed prior to the start of CSDP planning processes; recalls that the successful execution of EU missions and operations is increasingly dependent on uninterrupted access to a secure cyberspace, and thus requires robust and resilient cyber operational capabilities, as well as adequate responses to attacks against military installations, missions and operations; emphasises that in line with the Civilian CSDP Compact, civilian CSDP missions must be cyber resilient and support host countries where appropriate, including through monitoring, mentoring and advice; recommends that options be explored to foster the cyber capability-building of our partners, such as extending the mandate of EU training missions to cover aspects of cyber defence or launching civilian cyber missions;

12.

Welcomes the Council’s decision of 14 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the Union or its Member States, which allows for targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyberattacks that constitute a threat to the EU or its Member States, including cyberattacks against third countries or international organisations; welcomes the imposition of such restrictive measures in July 2020 and October 2020 as a credible step in implementing the EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox, including restrictive measures, and in strengthening the EU’s cyber deterrence posture; calls for further development and strict enforcement of a system of proportionate restrictive measures to contain cyberattacks, while respecting the European vision for the internet, which is one of a single, open, neutral, free, secure and unfragmented network;

13.

Recalls that given the dual nature of cybertechnologies, secured civilian products and services are key to the military and thus contribute to better cyber defence; welcomes therefore the work led by ENISA involving the Member States and interested stakeholders to provide the EU with certification schemes for ICT products, services and processes in order to raise the overall level of cybersecurity within the digital single market; stresses the EU’s pivotal pioneering role in developing standards that shape the cybersecurity landscape, contribute to fair competition within the EU and on the global stage, and react to extraterritorial measures and security risks from third countries; also acknowledges the important role of ENISA in supporting research initiatives and other forms of cooperation aimed at enhancing cybersecurity; underlines the importance of investments in cyber-defence and cybersecurity capabilities with the aim of enhancing the EU’s and Member States’ resilience and strategic capacities; highlights in this regard the importance of the Digital Europe Programme and Horizon Europe, especially its ‘Civil security for society’ cluster; notes the significance of the relevant financial instruments available under the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), as well as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

14.

Welcomes the progress made by some Member States in establishing cyber commands within their military;

Strategic vision — achieving cyber defence resilience

15.

Notes that the Strategic Compass will enhance and guide the implementation of the EU’s level of ambition in security and defence, and translate that ambition into capability needs, including in cyber defence as a priority, thereby increasing the ability of the EU and Member States to detect, attribute, prevent, discourage, deter, respond to and recover from malicious cyber activities by strengthening its posture, situational awareness, legal and ethical framework, tools, procedures and partnerships;

16.

Insists that the Strategic Compass should deepen the strategic culture in the cyber domain and remove any duplication of capabilities and mandates; stresses that it is essential to overcome the current fragmentation and complexity of the overall cyber architecture within the EU and to develop a common vision of how to achieve security and stability in cyberspace;

17.

Stresses that fragmentation is accompanied by serious concerns over the lack of resources and staff at EU level, which hinders the ambition of creating the most secure digital environment, and therefore stresses the need to increase both; urges the VP/HR and/or the Member States to increase financial and cyber defence personnel resources, in particular cyber intelligence analysts and experts in cyber forensics, and their training in the areas of decision and policy making, policy implementation, cyber incident response and investigations, including the development of cyber skills to strengthen the EU’s ability to characterise and attribute cyberattacks and hence provide an adequate political, civilian and military response within a short time frame; calls for further funding for CERT-EU and the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and support for Member States in establishing and strengthening security operation centres (SOCs) in order to build a network of SOCs across the EU which could enhance civil-military cooperation so as to provide timely warnings of cybersecurity incidents;

18.

Notes that streamlined EU military training and education in the cyber domain would significantly improve the level of trust among Member States, increasing standard operating procedures, establishing clearer rules, and improving enforcement; notes in this regard the important training work undertaken by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in the cyber defence field, and welcomes in this respect the establishment of the Cyber Education, Training, Evaluation and Exercise (ETEE) Platform, aimed at addressing cyber security and defence training among civilian and military personnel, as well as establishing the necessary harmonisation and standardisation in cyber-related training; stresses that the ESDC should benefit more from structural Union funding so as to be able to enhance its contribution to fostering EU cyber defence skills, especially given the increased need for top-level cyber experts; calls on Member States to promote partnerships with academia aimed at fostering cybersecurity R&D programmes in order to develop new common technologies, tools and skills applicable in both the civilian and the defence sectors; stresses the importance of education to raise public awareness and improve the skills of citizens so that they may defend themselves against cyberattacks;

19.

Underlines the need for EU cyber defence policies to incorporate gender considerations and to be ambitious in closing the gender gap among cyber defence professionals, notably through active gender-inclusive policies and tailored training programmes for women;

20.

Recalls that cyber defence has both military and civilian dimensions and thus requires stronger cooperation, synergies and coherence among instruments; stresses the need to first analyse and discuss problems of cooperation and coordination, but then also of gaps as regards human and technical resources at both national and EU level; notes that successful integration of both military and civilian resources can only be ensured through training and exercises with all relevant stakeholders; highlights in this regard NATO’s Locked Shields exercise as one of the best examples of testing and improving cyber defence capabilities, both civilian and military; calls on the VP/HR and Commission, therefore, to develop an integrated policy approach and promote synergies and close cooperation between the Military CERT-Network, CERT-EU and the CSIRT Network;

21.

Welcomes the joint communication by the VP/HR and the Commission entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’, which aims to enhance synergies and cooperation between civilian, defence and space cyber work; considers the strategy a milestone for strengthening the EU’s and Member States’ cyber resilience, thereby strengthening the EU’s digital leadership and its strategic capacities;

22.

Recommends the establishment of a Joint Cyber Unit to increase cooperation with a view to responding to the lack of information sharing among EU institutions, bodies and agencies, thereby guaranteeing a secure and rapid information network, and to enabling the full use of existing structures, resources and capabilities; notes the important role the Joint Cyber Unit could play in protecting the EU from grave cross-border cyberattacks, on the basis of the concept of cross-sector information-sharing; underlines the importance of coordination in order to avoid the duplication of structures and responsibilities during its development; welcomes in this regard the Commission recommendation of 23 June 2021, which provides that specific interfaces with the Joint Cyber Unit should be built to enable information sharing with the cyber defence community, notably through EEAS representation; stresses also that representatives of relevant PESCO projects should support the Joint Cyber Unit, especially in relation to situational awareness and preparedness;

23.

Recalls that, given their often dual-use nature, improving cyber defence capabilities also requires civilian network and information security expertise; stresses that the proliferation of dual-use, off-the-shelf systems may present challenges in terms of systems being exploited by an increasing number of state and non-state hostile actors; calls on the Commission and the Member States to activate several key levers, such as certification and the supervision of the responsibility of private actors; underlines that technological innovation is mainly driven by private companies, and therefore that cooperation with the private sector and civilian stakeholders, including industries and entities involved in the management of critical infrastructures, as well as SMEs, civil society, organisations and academia, is crucial and should be reinforced; takes note of the proposed revision of the Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) and of the proposal for a directive on the resilience of critical entities, seeking to protect critical infrastructures and enhance supply chain security and the inclusion of regulated actors in the digital ecosystem; recalls that each Member State should have a dedicated policy towards cybersecurity supply chain risk management addressing, in particular, the question of trusted vendors; recalls also that the NIS Directive should respect Member States’ competencies and refers to the relevant Subcommittee on Security and Defence opinions on both proposals;

24.

Welcomes the launch of the Cyber Crises Liaison Organisation Network (CyCLONe) on 29 September 2020, which further improved timely information sharing and situational awareness by closing the gap between the EU’s technical and political levels; notes that an effective cyber defence capability requires a change from a ‘need-to-know’ to a ‘need-to-share’ culture of information sharing;

25.

Welcomes the Commission’s Action Plan on Synergies between civil, defence and space industries and recalls the close interdependence of these three sectors in cyber defence; notes that, differently from other military domains, the infrastructure used to ‘create’ cyberspace is mainly operated by commercial entities based mostly outside the EU, which leads to industrial and technological dependencies on third parties; strongly believes that the EU needs to increase its technological sovereignty and boost innovation, investing in the ethical use of new technologies in security and defence such as AI and quantum computing; strongly encourages the development of an AI-focused agenda for R&D within Member States; stresses, however, that the military use of AI must respect international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and that the EU must take the lead in promoting a global AI regulatory framework rooted in democratic values and a human-in-the-loop approach;

26.

Notes the important work conducted by EU SatCen and underlines that the Union must have adequate resources in the fields of space imagery and intelligence gathering; asks the agency to analyse and provide a report regarding the safety and/or vulnerability of EU and Member State satellites to space debris and cyberattack; stresses that EU SatCen should benefit from more structural Union funding to be able to maintain its contributions to the Union’s actions; stresses that cyber defence capabilities are crucial for ensuring secured and resilient information exchange with SatCen in both security from space and in space, in order to preserve and enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy as regards situational awareness; underlines the need for the EU to strive to prevent the weaponisation of space;

27.

Welcomes the Council’s decision on the establishment of the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre in Bucharest, which will channel cybersecurity-related funding from Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe Programme, and encourages seamless cooperation with its network of national coordination centres; stresses the importance of the centre in implementing relevant cybersecurity projects and initiatives that will help to create the new capacities essential to underpinning Union resilience and stepping up coordination between the civilian and defence cybersecurity sectors; underlines that the Cybersecurity Competence Centre must bring together the main European stakeholders, including industry, academic and research organisations and other relevant civil society associations, to enhance and spread cybersecurity expertise across the EU;

28.

Underlines the importance of encryption and legal access to encrypted data; recalls that data encryption and the enhancement and widest possible use of such capabilities can make a significant contribution to the cyber security of states, societies and industry; encourages a ‘European digital sovereignty’ programme in order to foster and enhance the current capabilities in terms of cyber and encryption tools inspired by fundamental European rights and values such as privacy, freedom of expression and democracy, with the aim of enhancing European competitiveness in the cybersecurity market and boosting internal demand;

29.

Welcomes the upcoming ‘Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations’ which will define cyberspace as a domain of operations for EU CSDP; calls for continuous assessment of the vulnerabilities of CSDP mission information infrastructures, and for the implementation of common harmonised standards in cyber defence education, training and exercises (ETE) in support of CSDP missions;

30.

Deplores the fact that current limitations in the classified systems of the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) are hampering its capabilities; calls on the EEAS, therefore, to swiftly provide the MPCC with a state-of-the-art autonomous and secure Communications and Information System (CIS) able to handle classified EU data for its CSDP missions and operations, with an adequate level of protection and resilience and a deployed Force Headquarters;

31.

Calls for further integration of cybersecurity into EU crisis response mechanisms and for the existing initiatives, structures and procedures across various cyber communities to be linked with a view to enhanced mutual assistance and operational cooperation between Member States, in particular in the event of major cyberattacks, in order to increase interoperability and develop a common understanding of cyber defence; strongly emphasises the importance of further exercises, but at a higher frequency, and scenario-based policy discussions on crisis management, including on the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) in a hypothetical grave cyberattack scenario, potentially considered an armed attack; calls for such initiatives to strengthen common understanding of the implementation procedures for mutual assistance and/or solidarity in line with Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU, including with a specific objective of operationalising these procedures for cyberattacks on the Member States; welcomes the NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué of 14 June 2021, reaffirming NATO’s engagement in employing the full range of capabilities at all times to actively deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats, including the decision to invoke Article 5 ‘on a case-by-case basis’; welcomes further discussions on the articulation between the EU cybersecurity crisis management framework and the cyber diplomacy toolbox;

32.

Notes that the EU is increasingly involved in hybrid conflicts with geopolitical adversaries; underlines that these acts are of a particularly destabilising and dangerous nature as they blur the lines between war and peace, destabilise democracies and sow doubt in the minds of target populations; recalls that these attacks are by themselves often not serious enough to trigger Article 5 of the NATO Treaty or Article 42(7) TEU, though they have a cumulative strategic effect and cannot be effectively tackled through retorsions by the injured Member State; believes that the EU should therefore strive to find a solution to fill this legal vacuum by reinterpreting Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU in such a way that would reserve the right for collective defence below the collective defence threshold and allow for collective countermeasures by EU Member States on a voluntary basis, and should work internationally with allies towards a similar solution at international level; underlines that this is the only effective means to counter the paralysis in reacting to hybrid threats and is an instrument to increase the costs for our adversaries;

33.

Reiterates that common strong attribution capabilities are one of the key tools for strengthening EU and Member State capabilities and are an essential component of effective cyber defence and cyber deterrence; stresses that the improvement of information sharing as regards technical information, analysis and threat intelligence between Member States at EU level could enable collective attribution at EU level; recognises that, to a certain degree, cyber defence is more effective if it also contains some offensive means and measures, provided that their use is compliant with international law; underlines that explicit attribution of cyberattacks is a useful instrument of deterrence; invites consideration of joint public attribution of malicious cyber activities, including the option to create cyber-behaviour reports under the auspices of the EEAS for specific actors to summarise state-sponsored malicious cyber activities against Member States at EU level;

34.

Considers that EU-NATO cyber cooperation is crucial, as it could enable and strengthen formal collective attribution of cyber malicious incidents and consequently the imposition of restrictive sanctions and measures; notes that functioning resilience and effective deterrence would be achieved if perpetrators are aware of the catalogue of possible countermeasures, their proportionality and appropriateness, and their compliance with international law, in particular the UN Charter (based on the severity, scale and target of the cyberattacks;

35.

Welcomes the VP/HR’s proposal to encourage and facilitate the establishment of a Member States’ EU cyber intelligence working group residing within INTCEN to advance strategic intelligence cooperation on cyber threats and activities, in order to further support EU situational awareness and decision-making as regards a joint diplomatic response; encourages further progress in the common set of proposals, particularly the ongoing interaction with the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and NATO’s Hybrid Analysis Cell in sharing situational awareness and analysis, and in tactical and operational cooperation;

Strengthening partnerships and enhancing the EU’s role in the international context

36.

Considers that cyber defence cooperation with NATO plays an important role in preventing, deterring and responding to cyberattacks affecting Member States’ collective security; calls on Member States to fully share evidence and intelligence in order to feed into the establishment of cyber sanction lists; calls for increased coordination with NATO in this matter through participation in cyber exercises and joint training, such as the parallel and coordinated exercises (PACE);

37.

Recognises that the EU and NATO should coordinate on issues where hostile actors are threatening Euro-Atlantic security interests; expresses concern about the systemic aggressive behaviour demonstrated notably by China, Russia and North Korea in cyberspace, including numerous cyberattacks against government institutions and private companies; believes that EU-NATO cooperation should focus on challenges in the cyber, hybrid, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT), space, arms control and non-proliferation areas; urges EU-NATO cooperation ensuring resilient, affordable and secure high-speed networks complying with EU and national security standards that secure national and international information networks capable of encrypting sensitive data and communications;

38.

Welcomes the arrangement between the CERT-EU and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), to ensure the ability to respond to threats in real time by improving cyber incident prevention, detection and response both in the EU and in NATO; stresses also the importance of increasing cyber defence training capabilities in IT and cyber systems in cooperation with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) and the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Academy;

39.

Calls for further EU-NATO cooperation, notably on cyber defence interoperability requirements, by looking for possible complementarities and mutually beneficial strengthening of capacities, pursuing the affiliation of relevant CSDP structures to NATO’s Federated Mission Networking, avoiding duplication and acknowledging their respective responsibilities; urges the reinforcement of the EU’s PESCO, as well as NATO’s Smart Defence, Connected Forces Initiative and Defence Investment Pledge, and the promotion of pooling and sharing, seeking to better forge synergies and efficiencies in the relationship between suppliers and end-users; welcomes the progress made in EU-NATO cooperation in the cyber defence field, notably in the exchange of concepts and doctrines, cross-participation in cyber exercises and cross-briefings, notably on the cyber dimension of crisis management; suggests the creation of a joint EU-NATO cyber threat information hub, as well as a joint task force for cyber security;

40.

Calls for closer coordination on cyber defence between Member States, the EU institutions, NATO Allies, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); encourages, in this regard, the further promotion of the OSCE confidence-building measures for cyberspace and underlines the need to develop effective international cooperation tools to support the strengthening of partners’ cyber capacity building, as well as to develop and promote confidence-building measures and inclusive cooperation with civil society and stakeholders; welcomes the importance attributed to a global, open, free, stable and secure cyber space by the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of 19 April 2021; calls for the active development of closer ties with likeminded democracies in the Indo-Pacific region, such as the US, South Korea, Japan, India, Australia and Taiwan, in order to share knowledge and experience and exchange information on countering cyber threats; underlines also the importance of cooperation with other countries, particularly in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, to help build their capacity to defend against cybersecurity threats; commends the Commission’s support for cybersecurity programmes in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries; stresses the urgent need to respect international law, including the UN Charter in its entirety, and adhere to the widely recognised international normative framework for responsible state behaviour, and to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the modalities of application of international law in cyberspace within the UN context;

41.

Underlines the importance of having a strong partnership in the cyber domain with the UK, which is a leading nation in terms of its cyber defence arsenal; calls on the Commission to investigate the possibility of relaunching a process aiming to conclude a formal and structured framework for cooperation in this field in the future;

42.

Emphasises the need to ensure peace and stability in cyberspace; calls on all Member States and the EU to show leadership during discussions and initiatives under the auspices of the UN, including by proposing a programme of action, to take a proactive approach to the establishment of an internationally shared regulatory framework and to help truly advance accountability, adherence to emerging norms and prevention of the misuse of digital technologies and promote responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, building on the consensus reports of the UN GGE endorsed by the UN General Assembly; welcomes the recommendations of the OEWG final report, notably on the establishment of a programme of action; encourages the UN to foster dialogue among states, researchers, academics, civil society organisations, humanitarian actors and the private sector so as to ensure inclusive policymaking processes for new international provisions; calls for all existing multilateral efforts to be accelerated so that normative and regulatory frameworks are not outpaced by technological development and new methods of warfare; calls for the modernisation of arms control architecture, in order to avoid the emergence of a digital grey zone; calls for UN peacekeeping missions to be reinforced with cyber defence capacities in line with the effective implementation of their mandates;

43.

Recalls its position on a ban on the development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons enabling strikes to be carried out without meaningful human intervention; calls on the VP/HR, the Member States and the European Council to adopt a common position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control over the critical functions of such weapons systems; demands that international negotiations be launched on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit fully autonomous weapons;

44.

Underlines the importance of cooperation with national parliaments in order to exchange best practices in the area of cyber defence;

o o

45.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU agencies involved in defence and cyber security, the Secretary-General of NATO, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 15.

(3) OJ L 246, 30.7.2020, p. 12.

(4) OJ L 351 I, 22.10.2020, p. 5.

(5) OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 57.

(6) Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security (OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76).

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/113

P9_TA(2021)0413

The Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges (2020/2112(INI))

(2022/C 132/10)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, notably Articles 21, 22, 34, and 36 , as well as to Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—

having regard to its resolutions of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance (1), of 20 January 2011 on a sustainable EU policy for the High North (2), of 12 March 2014 on the EU strategy for the Arctic (3), of 16 March 2017 on an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic (4), of 3 July 2018 on climate diplomacy (5), and of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency (6),

—	having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 December 2007,

—	having regard to its resolution of 3 July 2018 on violation of the rights of indigenous peoples in the world, including land grabbing (7),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 November 2008 entitled ‘The European Union and the Arctic region’ (COM(2008)0763), and to the joint communications of 26 June 2012 entitled ‘Developing a European Union policy towards the Arctic region: progress since 2008 and next steps’ (JOIN(2012)0019) and of 27 April 2016 entitled ‘An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic’ (JOIN(2016)0021),

—	having regard to the relevant recommendations of the Delegation for Northern cooperation and for relations with Switzerland and Norway and to the EU-Iceland Joint Parliamentary Committee and the European Economic Area (EEA) Joint Parliamentary Committee (DEEA),

—	having regard to the Summary of the results of the public consultation on the EU Arctic policy of January 2021,

—	having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 (8) and the Commission communication of 11. December 2019 (COM(2019)0640) on the European Green Deal,

—	having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),

—	having regard to the agreement adopted in Paris on 12 December 2015 at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (the Paris Agreement),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 8 December 2009 on Arctic issues, of 12 May 2014 on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region, of 20 June 2016 on the Arctic, of 21 November 2019 on space solutions for a sustainable Arctic and of 9 December 2019 on the EU Arctic policy,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 15 May 2017 on indigenous peoples and the joint staff working document of 17 October 2016 on implementing EU external policy on indigenous peoples (SWD(2016)0340),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 20 November 2008 on the European Union and the Arctic region (COM(2008)0763),

—	having regard to the Ilulissat Declaration between the five Arctic coastal states (the US, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark), which was announced on 28 May 2008 and reaffirmed in May 2018,

—	having regard to the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States(CBSS) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC),

—	having regard to Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other,

—	having regard to the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016,

—	having regard to the national Arctic strategies, in particular those of Arctic states, namely the Kingdom of Denmark, Sweden and Finland, as well as those of other EU and EEA Member States,

—	having regard to the European Union Maritime Security Strategy,

—	having regard to the Space Strategy for Europe, published by the Commission on 26 October 2016 (COM(2016)0705),

—	having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded on 10 December 1982 and in force since 16 November 1994,

—	having regard to the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 16 November 1972,

—	having regard to International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples,

—	having regard to the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean of 3 October 2018 (CAO Fisheries Agreement),

—	having regard to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR),

—	having regard to the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) of the International Maritime Organization,

—

having regard to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 1974, the international Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) of 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 and by the Protocol of 1997, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) of 1978, as amended in 1995 and 2010, the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) of 1972, the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL) of 1965, and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) of 1979,

—	having regard to the Svalbard Treaty (previously the Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen) of 9 February 1920,

—	having regard to the Ottawa Declaration of 19 September 1996 establishing the Arctic Council,

—	having regard to the statements adopted at the Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum in Bodø, Norway, in November 2019, in Brussels in November 2017, in Reykjavik, Iceland, in May 2015, in Archangelsk, Russia, in November 2013, in Tromsø, Norway, in February 2011 and in Brussels in September 2009,

—

having regard to the three legally binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, namely the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic of 2011, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic of 2013, and the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation of 2017,

—	having regard to the statement from the 14th Conference of the Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region held on 13 and 14 April 2021,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 3 September 2020 entitled ‘Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability’ (COM(2020)0474),

—	having regard to the EU Arctic Forum held in Umeå, Sweden, in 2019,

—	having regard to the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), particularly its Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate and Special Report on Global Warming of 1,5 oC,

—	having regard to the summary report of the Arctic Stakeholder Forum consultation to identify key investment priorities in the Arctic and ways to better streamline future EU funding programmes for the region, published on 21 December 2017,

—	having regard to the strategic note of the European Political Strategy Centre of July 2019 entitled ‘Walking on Thin Ice: A Balanced Arctic Strategy for the EU’,

—

having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw of 8 and 9 July 2016, and the analysis and recommendations of the reflection group appointed by the NATO Secretary General entitled ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era’,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0239/2021),

whereas, over the past decades, the Arctic has been a region of peace, low tensions and constructive international cooperation between the eight Arctic states (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Canada and the US); whereas the Arctic states and the international community should therefore keep it as such and continue to display political will to cooperate and resolve contentious issues in accordance with international law;

whereas the region’s geopolitical importance is growing, and the future of the Arctic and the global challenges the Arctic region is facing, which go beyond those of the littoral Arctic states, therefore require multi-level governance, with a need to pursue regional cooperation and international solutions; whereas there is a direct link between the geopolitics and security of the Arctic and its environmental situation, which is in turn strongly influenced by the consequences of human activity in other areas of the planet;

C.	whereas the comprehensive governance model of the Arctic, with international law at its core, has proven to be effective and robust; whereas cooperation has proven to be the most useful way of establishing relations between the Arctic states;

whereas the current Arctic governance framework, centred on the Arctic Council, has for the last 25 years made a significant contribution to the stability of the region; whereas the Arctic Council is the primary forum for Arctic cooperation and its working groups serve as an arena for positive and constructive international cooperation;

whereas the work of the Arctic Council has been vital in securing peaceful and constructive cooperation between the Arctic states, leading to several binding agreements between them; whereas in the past the Arctic region has been relatively unaffected by global geopolitical conflicts, but its military importance and geopolitical strategic role are increasing; whereas Arctic security and politics have become ever more linked to global issues, with developments outside the Arctic likely to have consequences for Arctic states and vice versa, which makes avoiding any spill-over effect on the Arctic from geopolitical tensions and conflicts in other regions even more important;

whereas the Arctic Council’s commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, the sustainable development of the region and the protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of ecosystems, maintenance and restoration of biodiversity, conservation and the sustainable management of natural resources, is fully supported by the EU;

whereas the EU has been a long-time advocate for close cooperation in the Arctic region and has been engaged in the Arctic for decades through its involvement in the Northern Dimension policy with Russia, Norway and Iceland, its participation in the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), its cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, particularly in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional Council, its strategic partnerships with Canada and the US, and its participation as an active de facto observer in the Arctic Council; whereas the EU has contributed over EUR 1 billion to regional development and cross-border cooperation in the European Arctic;

whereas international law forms the basis of international engagement and cooperation in the Arctic; whereas, in particular, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which provide a framework for international cooperation and action on issues related to the Arctic Ocean, should be reaffirmed and reinforced; whereas the UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out, grants economic rights to coastal states over their exclusive economic zones, as well as over their continental shelves, and stipulates that the high seas are not subject to any state sovereignty; whereas all Arctic coastal states have confirmed in the Ilulissat Declaration that they will follow international law, most notably the UNCLOS, in governing the Arctic Ocean; whereas the IMO sets out global regulatory standards for the safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping;

whereas the Arctic has been particularly and increasingly affected by the dramatic impact of climate change and biodiversity degradation, including rising temperatures, changing ice conditions, wild fires, rising sea levels, changing weather patterns, invasive alien species, severe biodiversity losses and the thawing of permafrost, which are affecting the entire planet, but also represent a risk to the local infrastructure; whereas local adaptation strategies and the protection of the Arctic ecosystem cannot be addressed independently from the global framework of climate action, and the implementation of the Paris Agreement is at the heart of such cooperation;

J.	whereas some parts of the Arctic have the highest concentration of plastic litter in the world, which is already affecting Arctic animal species and posing a risk of contaminating the food web, and will eventually affect humans;

K.	whereas the alarming pace of the melting ice caps in the Arctic is due to climate change and factors that mainly originated outside the Arctic; whereas climate change should be viewed as a threat multiplier, which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability;

whereas the melting Arctic ice cap and the resulting rise in sea levels would have serious global environmental, economic and human security implications; whereas the melting of the Greenland ice cap could cause a rise in sea levels across the world of up to 7,2 metres, submerging many regions across the planet; whereas some Arctic populations are already experiencing the consequences of the melting ice caps, which has generated migratory flows; whereas Greenland’s melting ice is also altering biodiversity;

whereas among the various threats that the Arctic is exposed to as a result of human activity, one of particular concern is the thawing of permafrost; whereas permafrost covers around 24 % of the northern hemisphere soil, particularly large areas of the north of Russia; whereas permafrost contains large proportions of dangerous methane and CO2 and as it thaws greenhouse gases are released into the atmosphere, contributing to global warming; whereas the melting of permafrost can change ecosystems and affect security in unexpected ways;

whereas while the challenges to the Arctic are predominantly caused by global climate change and activities outside the Arctic region, the effects of climate change are particularly visible in the Arctic, since the Arctic is heating three times faster than the global average and Arctic sea ice is melting at an unprecedented speed, with rising sea levels creating a dire social, environmental and economic impact not only in the region itself but also worldwide; whereas these effects are changing the regional ecosystem, geography and economy by potentially opening new transport routes, enhancing trade, enabling access to rare natural resources, and intensifying research activities, fishing and tourism; whereas some of these changes offer enormous potential for technologically advanced, environmentally friendly and sustainable economic development; whereas the challenges affecting the Arctic are the responsibility of the whole world, especially climate change; whereas the EU should act on these challenges both through its own commitments and by providing assistance to others;

whereas man-made environmental disasters in the Arctic, particularly when extracting oil and other Arctic resources, are difficult to contain and manage, and eliminating the damage caused can have high costs; whereas the largest oil spill in the Arctic took place in Siberia in May 2020, when more than 20 000 tons of diesel fuel poured into the surrounding terrain and waterways near the Russian city of Norilsk, and the clean-up work is still ongoing;

whereas the mostly extraneous effects of climate change in the Arctic and the re-emergence of geopolitical competition in the region constitute complicating factors for sustainable development and the preservation of traditional livelihoods in the fragile environment of the Arctic and may affect the security and sustainable economic development of the region;

whereas the region’s geo-economic importance is quickly growing owing to the increasing interest in its rich and abundant natural resources, including critical raw materials, its emerging maritime routes and its potential for maritime transportation; whereas Arctic countries, while having the right to use resources on their own territories, also have a duty to do so in a responsible manner; whereas the exploration and exploitation of Arctic resources entail substantial risks for the vulnerable ecosystems and local populations in the region; whereas in 2019 the EU and the UK imported a large share of Arctic states’ exports of energy, metals, minerals and fish;

whereas the North West Passage, the Northern Sea Route and the future Transpolar Sea Route are opening up as a consequence of the ice melting; whereas the natural resources of the Arctic region fall largely within the national jurisdiction of the Arctic states, and the ownership of these resources is undisputed; whereas the need to develop and find sustainable solutions for energy production and transportation has increased the global demand for rare-earth elements, which has shifted the focus to the Arctic’s largely unexploited natural resources; whereas the Arctic region has a vast reserve of rare-earth minerals; whereas 90 % of global rare-earth production currently stems from China;

whereas the primary responsibility for the sustainable development of the Arctic lies with the Arctic states, but the significant impact of external factors cannot be denied and the international community therefore has an obligation to do all it can to protect the Arctic region and ensure its stability and safety;

whereas the circumpolar Arctic is home to over four million people, including over 40 different indigenous peoples and local communities and half a million EU citizens; whereas the EU’s only recognised indigenous people, the Sami people, live in the Arctic regions of Finland and Sweden, as well as Norway and Russia; whereas indigenous peoples and local communities play a vital role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; whereas demography is important to regional development;

U.	whereas cooperation in the field of scientific research is now, more than ever, crucial to overcome the challenges brought about by severe environmental degradation and climate change;

V.	whereas the EU has contributed over EUR 200 million to Arctic research through the Horizon 2020 programme;

W.	whereas the EU is committed to working towards an open and secure global maritime domain, in accordance with the EU Global Strategy and the EU Maritime Security Strategy;

whereas the EU’s engagement with the Arctic is based on history, geography, economy and research; whereas the importance of sustainable development, cohesion policy and cross-border cooperation for easing geopolitical tensions should be emphasised; whereas the EU, as a global actor, has consistently demonstrated its commitment towards a peaceful, environmentally clean, cooperative, sustainable and prosperous Arctic, and aims to secure a sustainable future for people living in the Arctic; whereas the EU has clearly indicated its readiness to play an even more prominent role;

Y.	whereas the EU has the ability to contribute in various ways to solving potential emerging challenges and prevent conflicts in the Arctic;

whereas the EU’s application to become a full observer to the Arctic Council, of which the Arctic Council members acknowledged receipt in 2013, is currently pending; whereas the final decision has been deferred as a result of resistance from some Arctic Council members; whereas Parliament has previously shown support for that application; whereas the EU actively participates in the work of the relevant groups, taskforces and expert groups of the Arctic Council; whereas the EU’s broad spectrum of regional competences, expert knowledge and existing initiatives can serve as a framework for joint projects;

AA.

whereas France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Italy — observers to the Arctic Council — show a substantial involvement in the Arctic and a strong interest in future dialogue and cooperation with the Arctic Council; whereas Estonia and Ireland have applied to become observers to the Arctic Council;

AB.	whereas Iceland and Norway, as engaged and reliable partners, are associated with the EU through the EEA and Schengen Agreements;

AC.

whereas the stability of the Arctic has long been relatively well preserved, but it is increasingly affected by the growing international interest in the region and the changing security landscape, including the progressive re-militarisation of the Russian Federation in the region; whereas the Russian Federation’s economic and military investments in the Arctic far exceed those of the rest of the Arctic states; whereas the Russian Federation has established new and modernised old military bases in the northern regions and boosted the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability restricting navigation rights in the strategic Northern Sea Route, which it falsely claims as an internal waterway; whereas Russia has upgraded its Northern Fleet to the status of a military district and has scaled up different branches of its armed forces, equipped inter alia with new submarines, nuclear- and conventionally powered icebreakers, combat-ready radars and missile systems; whereas Russia has revived the bastion defence concept aimed at protecting its strategic capabilities from the Barents Sea to the Bering Straits; whereas Russia has also increased its naval and air patrols, submarine activity and electronic warfare tactics, which is a very worrying development; whereas such geopolitical developments have led to an increase in exercises, deployments, patrols and capability investments in the Arctic; whereas the militarisation of the area runs counter to the spirit of cooperation that has guided the relationship between states in the Arctic so far;

AD.	whereas the Barents Sea region has been the main testbed for both ballistic and cruise missile systems, while the area east of Noveya Zemlya has been the main area for nuclear tests;

AE.	whereas Russia has violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its peaceful neighbours, blocking freedom of navigation in the Azov, Black and Baltic Seas, all of which cannot be disregarded when assessing the future scenarios for maintaining current peaceful coexistence in the Arctic;

AF.

whereas China’s far-reaching projects and initiatives are a cause of great concern; whereas China released its first White Paper on Arctic Policy in January 2018 and engaged in a long-term effort to enhance its position in the Arctic, declaring itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, with the ambition of becoming a ‘polar power’, and is enhancing collaboration with Russia in the Arctic; whereas China has created a Polar Silk Road for commerce through the Arctic region, as an extension to its Belt and Road Initiative, and has organised regional scientific exploration missions, establishing research centres in the Arctic and developing 24 polar observation satellites; whereas China participates actively in the Arctic Council and has engaged in bilateral cooperation with individual Arctic states and other stakeholders in order to earn support for its initiatives;

AG.	whereas most Arctic players have updated their strategies, taking into account the rapidly changing situation in the Arctic and the growing economic and geostrategic significance of the region;

International cooperation as the bedrock of a safe, stable, prosperous, accessible and peaceful Arctic

Reaffirms that the Arctic is of strategic and political importance to the EU, as an Arctic stakeholder and global actor, and underlines the EU’s commitment to being a responsible actor, seeking the long-term sustainable and peaceful development of the region by fully cooperating with international partners; considers it crucial that all stakeholders, including the EU and its Member States, act to maintain peaceful and intense international and regional cooperation, scientific research, prosperity and low tensions in the Arctic, as well as to respond to the very alarming effects and consequences of climate change in the region; considers that the Arctic plays a crucial role in maintaining the environmental balance of the planet, is satisfied that the region has long been a place of peace and fruitful international cooperation, and congratulates the Arctic Council on its 25th anniversary as the primary forum for Arctic cooperation, which has proven its ability to maintain a constructive and positive spirit of cooperation;

Supports the validity of the three founding pillars of the integrated EU policy for the Arctic, namely responding ambitiously to climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment, promoting sustainable development and strengthening international cooperation; stresses the importance of a balanced EU Arctic policy and is of the opinion that the EU is uniquely well-placed to help coordinate and complement Member States’ Arctic policies, and therefore stresses the need for more coherence between the EU’s internal and external policies as regards Arctic matters; urges the EU to include an Arctic dimension wherever appropriate in its sectoral policies;

Underlines the important role of Arctic Council observers, which have considerable experience and have long been engaged in scientific and political cooperation in the Arctic; welcomes, in this regard, the ongoing dialogue between the observers and the Arctic Council Presidency; supports the EU’s application to become a full observer in the Arctic Council and encourages the members of the Arctic Council to respond positively to the EU’s request; underlines, however, that the EU is already a de facto observer of the Arctic Council, with the possibility to participate and contribute on the same terms as other observer members;

Stresses that the EU must contribute to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance, promote the sustainable use of resources, and protect and preserve the Arctic in unison with its population; calls for the EU to continue to contribute to the Arctic Council through expertise and financing by increasing its engagement in the Arctic Council working groups and its various projects; believes that the northern region should be viewed as part of the EU’s northern neighbourhood, with increased participation in existing forums; highlights that the Northern Dimension serves as a constructive arena for cross-border cooperation, with a successful model for sectoral cooperation, in which the EU contributes equally to the joint policy with Russia, Norway and Iceland, as well as other observers; welcomes further practical cooperation on a broad range of areas; highlights the cooperation between local and national state and non-state actors within the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, of which the EU is a full member, on issues with particular relevance to the Barents region; notes that the Barents Euro-Arctic Council has played an important role in building trust and mutual understanding in the North while enhancing cooperation between Arctic countries; notes that the EU should also aim to participate in other political forums linked to Arctic development;

Welcomes the ongoing process of updating the EU’s Arctic policy, which should reflect the EU’s interest in the Arctic and address the combined challenges of increased international attention and climatic, environmental, geopolitical and geo-economic changes in the region; considers that the policy should include new actors such as China and that the security dimension of the Arctic should be addressed in the EU’s common foreign and security policy; believes, in particular, that it should incorporate a comprehensive approach to security, which should include notably the notions of environment and health, as well as maritime security issues; notes that such an comprehensive updated policy, based on consensus among all Member States, will allow the EU to play an effective, proactive and more ambitious role in the region, taking into account the pressing challenges related to climate change and the growing geopolitical significance of the Arctic, but will also serve the interests of EU citizens, predominantly those living in the Arctic, and of the indigenous peoples in particular; stresses that such a policy must reflect both the internal and external dimensions of EU relations with the Arctic and should include a sustainable connectivity dimension in order to solve key issues faced by Arctic inhabitants, such as ensuring quality internet connections;

Is of the opinion that the new EU Arctic policy should be used more broadly as an opportunity to increase awareness and engagement among EU citizens, academia and businesses as regards Arctic issues; calls for the creation of a single Arctic portal covering all Arctic initiatives and activities of the EU institutions;

Notes that interest in the Arctic and its resources is growing; is deeply concerned about the negative effects of climate change, notably the rapidly melting ice and resource overexploitation, which create new elements and realities for certain forms of economic development and further disruption to the increasingly fragile Arctic ecosystems;

Emphasises that the comprehensive governance model based on international law has benefited all Arctic states and the region as a whole, and has provided predictability and stability in the region; underlines that the existing regional structures foster trust and cooperation between Arctic states; stresses that the Arctic states hold the primary responsibility for tackling issues within their territories; points, however, to the fact that external forces have a key impact on current and future challenges in the region; reiterates that international law is the cornerstone of the legal framework regulating international relations in the Arctic, and underlines the importance of the UNCLOS as the basis of all maritime activity, and particularly Part XV thereof, with regard to the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes and the different dispute resolution procedures for the delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf and for settling intra-Arctic sovereignty issues as regards territorial seas; repeats its call for the EU and the Member States to play a stronger role in the effective implementation of international conventions and calls on the US to ratify the UNCLOS; also underlines the importance of the international bodies established under the UNCLOS, including the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), as well as of platforms such as the Arctic Council, the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians, the Barents Euro-Arctic-Council, the Northern Dimension and the United Nations, and remains committed to a strong and active participation in parliamentary cooperation on Arctic matters;

Recognises the status of Arctic states’ sovereignty and their sovereign rights in accordance with international law; believes that safeguarding the achievements of three decades of peaceful cooperation is crucial; stresses that the EU’s capacity to provide solutions to potential security challenges should be fully harnessed; underlines that, given the multitude of complex and intertwined issues related to the economic, environmental and security development of the Arctic, global, regional and local venues are required for dialogue on the region’s security needs;

Climate change in the Arctic

10.

Expresses deep concern at the findings of the IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, according to which over the past decades global warming has led to the widespread shrinking of the cryosphere, with mass loss from ice sheets and glaciers, reductions in snow cover and Arctic sea ice extent and thickness, and increased permafrost temperature; is highly concerned about the public health and security consequences of thawing permafrost, laying bare bacteria and viruses that have been dormant for centuries or millennia;

11.

Stresses that the Arctic is losing biodiversity at an alarming rate, and expresses deep concern about the findings of the IPBES Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services; underscores that biodiversity loss is due not only to climate change, but also to ocean mining, which the IPBES notes is likely to expand in the Arctic region as it melts;

12.

Is worried by reports that bacteria released by thawing permafrost release climate-damaging carbon, but also, together with viruses, may pose a serious health threat to animals and humans; notes that climate change and melting permafrost are having deleterious impacts on the ability to live and work in the region, as both have led to the loss or degradation of existing infrastructure, roads and buildings, as well as a spate of industrial and transportation accidents, and also threaten cultural and heritage sites and the way of life of indigenous peoples;

13.

Stresses that the EU should pursue policies that ensure that measures to address environmental concerns take into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Arctic region, including its indigenous peoples, in protecting and developing the region;

14.

Urges the EU to take a leading role in the work to forge an ambitious climate action plan for the Arctic, addressing global greenhouse gas emission mitigation and adaption to climate change, while supporting innovative solutions relevant to the Arctic;

Geopolitical developments in the Arctic

15.

Welcomes the fact that the stability of the Arctic has long remained relatively unaffected by conflicts in other areas of the world and underlines the importance of preventing spill-over effects in the Arctic from geopolitical developments in other regions; notes, however, that the security and military situation in the Arctic has changed fundamentally in recent years, and recognises the region’s strategic importance; notes that a safe, stable, sustainable, peaceful and prosperous Arctic plays a crucial role for the wider security of Europe and its strategic context; highlights, furthermore, that military activity in the region needs to be predictable, transparent and carried out in a way that promotes security and stability, as increased militarisation, combined with worsened geopolitical relations globally, can lead to incidents and increased security risks; calls, accordingly, for enhanced regional dialogue, cross-border cooperation and restraint in the military sphere, and encourages a process of negotiations and confidence-building measures aimed at the long-term objective of a reduction in military equipment in the region;

16.

Notes the particular geographical situation of the Russian Federation, whose territorial waters and economic zones far exceed those of all other Arctic states; stresses, in this respect, that Russia’s specific geographic features make it an interlocutor by default, but also give it increased responsibility;

17.

Notes the Arctic’s prominent place in the military strategies of all actors engaged in the region and urges them to enact their Arctic policies with full respect for international law; expresses grave concern about the progressive military build-up pursued by Russia, which has been the most extensive among the Arctic states and includes the development of A2/AD capabilities, and the reactivation and rebuilding of sea-based nuclear forces and a fleet of icebreakers, some of which Russia is planning to equip with cruise missiles and electronic warfare systems; considers that such actions are not justified by the military situation on the ground and significantly exceed legitimate defensive purposes, thus reflecting Russia’s will to achieve strategic military superiority in the region, which would lead to instability and an increased risk of confrontation and deviate from the 1987 Murmansk Initiative, which aimed to transform the Arctic into an international ‘zone of peace’; urges the circumpolar nations not to build military or scientific outposts protected by military forces;

18.

Regrets that Russia, instead of emphasising the benefits of cooperative engagement, has adopted a much more competitive, even confrontational, perspective on the Arctic, taking the view of the Arctic as a sphere of military, territorial and economic expansion, and an arena for its great power ambition;

19.

Calls on all Arctic states to engage in a constructive and mutually beneficial dialogue on all issues ranging from the protection of the environment to economic development and military operations; underlines that the EU and Russia have substantial common interests in a number of areas related to the Arctic, including in the field of maritime security and cross-border cooperation on environmental issues; stresses, however, that constructive cooperation should be consistent with the principle of selective engagement, including in the areas of the climate and the environment, should not jeopardise the purpose of sanctions and restrictive measures adopted as a result of the Russian Government’s actions in other parts of the world, and should be coherent with the EU strategy towards the Russian Federation; notes that the Arctic Council should be seen as a platform to maintain and continue open dialogue with Russia on matters that are also of importance for the EU;

20.

Considers that the inclusion of the Arctic by China in its economic development programmes, with the aspiration of integrating the Arctic’s Northern Sea Route into its Belt and Road Initiative (as a ‘Polar Silk Road’), needs to be closely observed by the EU and factored into its updated Arctic policy, as it challenges any idea that the Arctic could be dealt with as a self-contained region, shielded from global geopolitics; notes, in this regard, China’s investments in research, new icebreakers and strategic infrastructure projects in the Arctic, which are reminiscent of how the country operates in other parts of the world, and recalls that the EU should avoid losing important ground to third countries in this field; expresses concern over China’s investment attempts in the seaports along the Northern Sea Route and its attempts to obtain mining rights, inter alia, as a way to establish its presence in the Arctic, and urges the Arctic states to carry out a thorough screening of foreign investments in their entities and infrastructure of strategic importance;

Safeguarding freedom of navigation

21.

Welcomes the adoption and entry into force on 1 January 2017 of the IMO’s International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code);

22.

Calls for an assessment of the implementation of the IMO’s Polar Code, as well as of that of the standards and obligations under the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions, to ascertain whether they have been fully implemented by the entities operating in the Arctic and to identify gaps and weaknesses to be further addressed; urges all Arctic coastal states to swiftly take the measures necessary to fully enforce the Polar Code; encourages non-SOLAS ships to voluntarily implement those safety measures and to follow other measures and guidance for safe and environmentally friendly navigation and operation in the Arctic;

23.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take a stronger role in promoting the effective implementation of international conventions such as the Paris Agreement, the Minamata Convention, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Gothenburg Protocol, the Stockholm Convention, the Polar Code, the Aarhus Convention and the Convention on Biological Diversity;

24.

Urges a shared responsibility for the safety of life at sea and the sustainability of polar environments as polar shipping grows in volume and diversifies in nature over the coming years; welcomes, in this respect, in addition to the Polar Code, ship routing measures aimed at reducing the risk of incidents, as well as no-go zones to improve the safety of navigation and protect the fragile and unique environment; emphasises the role of the EU and its Member States in helping to prevent and resolve conflicts in the Arctic, helping to build civilian security mechanisms, and enhancing crisis management capacities and search and rescue infrastructures; highlights that the EU can contribute expertise in the area of maritime security and safety, through its capabilities in and awareness of shipping and navigation; acknowledges that there is already significant cross-border cooperation on search and rescue operations; encourages the EU to enhance its contributions to emergency prevention, preparedness and disaster response within the Arctic Council, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council; notes with concern, however, the developing and fast-growing naval traffic and energy extraction along the Northern Sea Route, which has become a source of geopolitical tensions and environmental concerns; notes the increasing economic interest in developing the North Sea Route, notably from Russia and China, as a means to boost economic growth and as a globally competitive national transport network; notes the development of large-scale energy projects, such as the current Russian-Chinese cooperation on the Yamal LNG project and Arctic LNG 2, and is concerned that such projects significantly increase shipping volumes via the North Sea Route and imply substantial pressure on an Arctic ecosystem already under threat;

25.

Recognises Russia’s large numerical advantage in and China’s development of icebreaker programmes and encourages Member States and other partner countries to build their own capacities in this regard; considers that the EU should promote the construction and deployment of more icebreakers and ice-strengthened ships under an EU flag;

26.

Underlines the need to enhance maritime surveillance and information sharing in the Arctic region; supports further investments in space monitoring and navigation, through the Copernicus and Galileo satellite networks, as well as in-situ information from the European Marine Observation and Data Network (EMODnet) in order to improve emergency response, safe navigation and knowledge of climate change; notes that increasing human activity in the region, including growing tourism, raises serious concerns relating to human security, particularly in the context of harsh weather conditions and limited search and rescue (SAR) capabilities; is of the opinion that international cooperation, as well as close partnerships between the military, public and non-governmental sectors, are essential in order to provide adequate civilian protection in the region; underlines the need to promote and exchange best practices in terms of SAR and contribute to the interoperability of SAR units through joint exercises; recommends that Member States consider creating new Permanent Structured Cooperation projects, for example concentrated on SAR or environmental response, which aim to enhance common security and defence policy capabilities in the Arctic; encourages the EU and Member States to perform exercises simulating how the Civil Protection Mechanism may be broadly implemented in the Arctic;

27.

Insists that it is crucial that foreign ships’ rights under the UNCLOS, in particular Articles 17-21 and 37-41 thereof, including the right of innocent passage, the right of transit passage and the freedom of navigation, are fully respected in the Arctic; condemns Russian actions that restrict navigation rights in the Northern Sea routes by designating them as internal waters under its complete sovereign control, by creating regulatory and administrative barriers to foreign navigation along the route and imposing a requirement to obtain Russia’s permission to enter and transit through its exclusive economic zone and territorial seas, and by failing to set out any express exemption for sovereign immune vessels; stresses that any measure restricting navigational freedoms should be consistent with the UNCLOS and with customary international law; calls on the Russian Federation to comply with the rules codified in the UNCLOS and respect the commitments made by joining in annual calls by the UN General Assembly for States Parties to ensure that their maritime claims conform to the UNCLOS;

28.

Underlines that the development of northern transport passages should be sustainable and contribute to a greener transition; notes that, specifically, new northern rail links would stimulate the economies of the northern and Baltic states and improve the North-South dimension of market access; calls on the Commission, therefore, to address northern transport issues and identify opportunities in the context of the Northern Dimension Partnership for Transport and Logistics (NDPTL); underlines that better links are needed within the Northern Dimension region to reduce remoteness and ensure connectivity in response to global development;

Sustainable development and exploitation of strategic resources

29.

Underlines the importance of the Arctic for EU energy security, strongly insists on the sustainable, science-based exploitation of energy resources in the Arctic, and highlights the need for an enhanced policy for EU-generated renewable energies and energy efficiency that significantly reduces the Union’s reliance on external sources and thereby improves its position in terms of security; stresses the need to fight climate change by keeping to the goals of the Paris Agreement;

30.

Notes that, as a result of climate change and the resulting reduction of ice, the increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region is changing the geo-strategic importance of the region, with potential consequences for international stability; calls on the states in the region to continue to resolve any current or future conflicts over access to natural resources in the Arctic by way of a constructive dialogue in line with international law, namely the UNCLOS, and in the spirit of the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration;

31.

Recognises the environmental risk that oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic represents; stresses that Arctic economic development, in particular the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic, should adhere to international law as well as relevant international conventions and rules, and comply with stringent precautionary environmental standards, and calls for the establishment of strict requirements for exploring and exploiting new hydrocarbon reserves in the region; is concerned, in this respect, by the attempts, notably by Russia, as well as private enterprises from other countries, to pursue far-reaching and highly impactful exploitation projects without appropriate assessment of their environmental impacts; urges all Arctic states, therefore, to ensure appropriate ex ante assessment of the environmental impact of any exploitation projects and underlines the importance of abiding by regulatory standards;

32.

Stresses that the protection of the environment and the management of man-made pollution should be a key objective in the Arctic; discourages the exploitation of Arctic resources if it is scientifically proven to cause irreparable damage to the ecosystem of the Arctic and beyond;

33.

Welcomes the work of the Arctic Council in tackling pollution in the Arctic and calls for the EU to play an active role and provide assistance in this regard;

34.

Is highly concerned about the recent environmental catastrophe caused by Norilsk Nickel, resulting in the largest ever oil spill in the polar Arctic, but also toxic wastewater being pumped from a settling basin into the tundra, and other spills that occur regularly and yet remain absent from official statistics; welcomes the court decisions to fine the company responsible for the disaster, but at the same time expresses its concern about restricted access for journalists and experts to the accident sites, and calls on the Russian authorities to develop transparent and effective procedures for reporting and tracking such environmental disasters; regrets that such accidents often occur on the lands of indigenous peoples, which leads to the loss of their ability to continue their traditional way of life; calls for the EU to support environmental rights defenders and journalists investigating such cases and to use its own assets, such as Copernicus, to track such pollution in the Arctic and conduct a thorough assessment of the ecological and human consequences of exploitation solely for profit; encourages cooperation with the Arctic states in developing rapid response systems for the real-time management of environmental disasters, in particular oil spills;

35.

Regrets the fact that Russian companies continue to cut back to a bare minimum their investment in environmental protection and production facilities in order to obtain the maximum profit in the shortest time possible, resulting in the persistent emission of toxic substances into the atmosphere, which has devastated not only the environment but also most Arctic towns, such as Norilsk, making them among the world’s most polluted cities;

36.

Is of the opinion that the Arctic should play a central role in the European Raw Materials Alliance, boosting Europe’s output of critical minerals, cutting dependence on China for rare-earth metals and developing opportunities for green economic growth, which is key for the further development of green technology and the fight against climate change, which constitutes the main threat to the region; is of the opinion that decisions by local authorities on the excavation of mineral resources should be taken transparently; welcomes initiatives in the European Arctic on sustainable mining and reducing carbon dioxide emissions through, for example, the world’s first fossil-free iron production project, HYBRIT, taking into account the increasing demand for steel and the needs of an increasingly electrifying society;

37.

Notes that the Arctic is rich in mineral resources, and underlines that the European Arctic plays an important role for the EU’s supply of raw materials, with, inter alia, essential resources, technology and know-how necessary to achieve digital and green transitions; notes that most of the EU’s critical raw materials are located in the Arctic, which, if managed in a proper and sustainable way, could strengthen the EU’s autonomy; takes note of the fact that one of the factors driving Beijing to gain control over the Arctic’s reserves is the desire to maintain a dominant position in the supply chains of vital resources and key components of emerging technologies;

38.

Calls for an increase in the accessibility of digital infrastructure in the Arctic, thereby promoting entrepreneurship and innovation and diversifying economic development; underscores the importance of promoting the use of renewable energy in remote Arctic communities; encourages further work on innovative energy solutions and related capacity construction in the Arctic with a view to climate change prevention, taking into account the needs of society; stresses the strategic importance of the submarine telecommunication cables in the North Atlantic, which provide over 95 % of international telecommunications; reiterates the importance of strengthened transatlantic cooperation in protecting and ensuring respect for the international instruments that govern submarine cables, including the UNCLOS; emphasises the role that the Arctic plays with regard to its climatological and geographic competitive advantage in digital connectivity between North America, Europe and Asia, and as a location for centres for data storage; notes that new digital highways through extended fibre optic cable systems and infrastructure should also enable better digital connectivity for Arctic communities, as well as healthcare support and social services (e.g. telehealth services), online education, and overall easier access to the global economy;

39.

Acknowledges the underinvestment in the Arctic region; believes that the EU can contribute to economic, social and sustainable development to the benefit of Arctic communities, in particular in energy, transport and infrastructure; considers that the Arctic regions are home to innovative industries essential to sustainable development;

40.

Stresses that long distances, sparsely populated areas, a harsh climate and demographic imbalances mean that increasing the connectivity, accessibility and integration of communities through investment in information and communication technologies and transport infrastructures (by rail, sea, land and air) is crucial in order to improve productivity and trade within and beyond the Arctic; believes that better transport and broadband connectivity will also enhance opportunities for cross-border labour and student mobility, and the further extension of cooperation; emphasises the usefulness of place-based instruments, such as smart specialisation strategies and territorial cooperation, for tailoring sustainable investments in the Arctic, and believes that these EU policies should be further developed and linked to the EU Arctic policy; calls for the establishment of a special investment platform which would facilitate closer economic cooperation between the EU and Arctic economies, in collaboration with the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund;

41.

Notes the role of the private sector in developing sustainable solutions for the Arctic; calls on the Commission to support European companies’ investments in key sectors such as renewable energy production, logistics and the development of the power grid, while identifying investment opportunities under the EU’s investment and funding instruments in order to facilitate European companies’ access to the Arctic market; highlights the importance of trade and investments in digital infrastructure, innovation and economic development in the Arctic, with closer cooperation between governments, academia and business; calls for the EU to reduce technical barriers to trade and strengthen its cooperation with business representatives, and encourages further support to the Arctic Economic Council; insists that companies based in or operating within the EU strictly comply with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in relation to all their business operations and relationships with the Arctic region and ensure effective human rights and environmental due diligence processes; calls on these entities to ensure effective, meaningful and informed consultations at all stages of the process with stakeholders both affected and potentially affected, including indigenous peoples; stresses that economic activities in the Arctic should be sustainable and should take into consideration their environmental impact, in particular on climate change, and their social implications; stresses the need for the further promotion of sustainable regional development for the benefit of those living in the Arctic, low-carbon activities, knowledge and the circular economy;

42.

Supports, as a general rule, the view expressed in the CAO Fisheries Agreement that the exploitation of natural resources should take place only where there is reasonable certainty that no harm will be caused to the environment and underlines the importance of implementing a precautionary approach to Arctic and sub-Arctic fisheries at all stages; stresses the importance of fisheries management measures based on the best available scientific advice to ensure long-term sustainability; notes that the Arctic coastal states have agreed on a framework for managing activities in the Arctic, including committing to settle overlapping claims to maritime areas; expresses its support for existing regional fisheries management organisations and global agreements relating to fisheries, shipping and the marine environment; stresses that the EU should be involved in stock management in accordance with the UNCLOS;

43.

Notes that the EU receives a large share of its fish imports from the Arctic and is aware that disputes around fisheries are likely to increase, inter alia as a result of the depletion of fish stocks in some areas and their migration to other areas, partially driven by climate change; welcomes the signing, therefore, of the CAO Fisheries Agreement, which aims to achieve sustainable development in the Arctic and will implement a precautionary approach to fisheries management in the high seas portion of the Central Arctic Ocean, and calls for its swift entry into force; recognises the importance of the Oslo Declaration in achieving this binding agreement on the prevention of unregulated high seas fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean; welcomes the inclusion of representatives of indigenous organisations in the delegations; regrets, however, that their participation and that of NGOs was solely observational;

Serving local communities and preserving the rights of indigenous peoples

44.

Welcomes the achievements made, but recalls that in most Nordic countries Arctic averages remain worse than national averages in terms of poverty, low life expectancy and very limited human and economic development; is aware that technological transformation and climate change are affecting the traditional lifestyle and way of life of indigenous peoples and consequently reiterates its call for the active involvement of all the communities and inhabitants of the Arctic, and particularly indigenous peoples, who hold local and practical knowledge, in decision-making processes concerning development choices; strongly supports, in this respect, the full and effective implementation of Article 19 of the UNDRIP, especially as regards the need to obtain indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures or launching development projects that may affect them;

45.

Recognises that the effects of melting ice and milder temperatures are displacing indigenous populations and thereby threatening the indigenous way of life; acknowledges the wish of the inhabitants and governments of the Arctic region with sovereign rights and responsibilities to continue to pursue sustainable economic development while at the same time protecting traditional sources of indigenous peoples’ livelihoods and the very sensitive nature of Arctic ecosystems, taking into account their experience in using and developing the various resources of the region in a sustainable way;

46.

Stresses the need to ensure the preservation of indigenous peoples’ cultures, traditions and languages by establishing capacity building programmes to increase awareness about the diversity, history and the rights of indigenous peoples, not only for indigenous youths but also for non-indigenous populations across the region; calls on EU delegations in the Arctic states to engage in a genuine and inclusive dialogue with indigenous peoples at national and regional levels and to serve as focal points on indigenous peoples’ issues; highlights the need for the staff of these EU delegations to be versed in indigenous peoples’ rights, as affirmed under UNDRIP; welcomes the growing acknowledgement of the rights of indigenous peoples in the EU’s external policies; calls for enhanced coherence between the EU’s internal and external Arctic policies in this area;

47.

Reiterates its call to actively involve all the inhabitants of the Arctic, who hold local and practical knowledge, and particularly indigenous peoples, in decision-making processes concerning development choices;

48.

Expresses its regret at the Russian Government’s efforts to subordinate civil society, which is having a very negative impact on indigenous peoples by limiting the autonomy of their representations and partnerships in international forums, blocking access to external funds; notes that similar problems affect other NGOs, including environmental activists;

49.

States that all activities in the Arctic region, including management and sustainable use of Arctic natural resources, should respect the rights of and benefit indigenous peoples and other local inhabitants; advocates, in this regard, for a stronger link between businesses operating in the Arctic and local communities in order to create economic and research opportunities and jobs, and foster the sustainable development of resources, and supports the implementation of standards such as the Arctic Investment Protocol and the UN Global Compact Initiative; recalls the existing international instruments that establish states’ jurisdictions, rights and obligations for the management and sustainable use of natural resources and insists that these instruments continue to be fully respected; stresses the importance of ensuring people-to-people cooperation, access to education and business opportunities and support for young people in the Arctic;

50.

Highlights the importance of addressing the aspirations, needs and challenges faced by local populations, notably in terms of people-to-people cooperation, connectivity, access to the internet, education, healthcare and employment, particularly for young people and marginalised groups; highlights the need for the updated Arctic policy to incorporate an ambitious gender dimension; calls for the funding of programmes such as ‘north2north’ and other mobility programmes directed especially towards young people living in the Arctic to be strengthened, and for greater support and resources to help the peoples of the Arctic adapt to the profound changes driven by climate change;

51.

Reiterates its call on all the remaining Member States to ratify without delay ILO Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples;

Science and knowledge

52.

Calls on Arctic states to meet their commitments under the Convention on Biological Diversity, in particular with regard to in-situ conservation; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities of the Artic are included in the deliberation and decision-making processes of the relevant international climate and biodiversity diplomacy forums; supports the recommendation of indigenous peoples to have direct access to funds from the Green Climate Fund for their sustainable mitigation and adaptation initiatives;

53.

Underlines the important contributions from the EU and its Member States to polar science, which will be necessary to understand the global and local effects of climate change and the importance of knowledge as a fundament for political decisions and sustainable development in the Arctic; reiterates the call from the 14th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region to strengthen the knowledge base and improve scientific cooperation with a new International Polar Year initiative; supports international efforts on science, knowledge and innovation with an Arctic dimension, and cooperation on research in the Arctic, such as the conclusion and implementation of the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation;

54.

Notes that the EU has been a major financial contributor to Arctic research through programmes such as Horizon 2020; stresses the need to increase EU funding for Arctic research and development; calls for greater visibility for and coordination of Arctic-oriented research and innovation, including in Horizon Europe; calls on the Commission to provide a comprehensive overview of EU funding dedicated to the region and the Arctic components of horizontal EU programmes and urges the EU to implement an ambitious, forward-looking and environmentally sustainable investment plan for the Arctic; believes that such a plan should increase funding in key areas such as scientific research and allocate more funding to Arctic research, development and innovation, space, digital and transport infrastructure, space technologies, sustainable shipping, sustainable extraction and processing of raw materials, renewable energy and other low-carbon activities, and tourism; highlights the need for improved synergies between existing financing instruments in order to prevent possible duplications, and to maximise interaction between internal and external EU programmes;

55.

Notes that the Arctic offers huge potential for innovation and sustainable use of resources, developing practices which can thereafter be implemented globally, and that it is a test-bed for, among other things, geothermal, wind and hydro projects, the carbon-free production of steel, and greener battery production; recognises the contribution of EU space programmes such as Copernicus, Galileo, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service and satellite communications to environmental, maritime and human safety and security in the Arctic through enabling, along other things, the monitoring of ice evolution and the sustainable management of marine resources, the detection of pollution, emergency warning systems, the identification and tracking of maritime movements, and search and rescue services; supports continuous investment in the development of these capabilities and advises that they be applied in the Arctic in cooperation with and under the leadership of the Arctic states that are members of the EU and/or NATO;

More EU in the Arctic, more Arctic in the EU

56.

Welcomes the creation of a Special Envoy for Arctic Matters in 2017; supports the continuation of his mandate and commends the work carried out by the current Special Envoy; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to improve inter-service cooperation and coherence between different programmes and investments in the Arctic and urges them to allocate adequate resources to reflect the ambition of the EU’s Arctic policy; urges the Commission to establish a specific working group covering northern Europe and the Arctic in a comprehensive manner; notes that the EU’s internal coordination on Arctic matters should be strengthened both at Commission working group level and between the relevant EU agencies; encourages the Commission to entrust a coordinating role for Arctic policies to one of its Vice-Presidents so as to avoid duplication of competences; calls on the Council to create a working party on northern Europe and the Arctic, and on the EEAS to create a similar unit within its structures; is of the opinion that the role of Parliament should be strengthened in the EU’s Arctic policy formulation and implementation, and that the Arctic should be given more prominence in Parliament, including through the establishment of a specifically designated inter-parliamentary delegation with special responsibility for Arctic cooperation; calls for a broader debate on Arctic issues within the other EU institutions and in the Member States;

57.

Believes that the consultation process around the new EU Arctic policy should be used to assess the effectiveness of the EU’s current policies;

58.

Is of the opinion that the EU as a global actor should actively engage in policy dialogue, react to the growing strategic importance of the Arctic and continue to play its role as an accepted and credible actor in the Arctic, respecting the unique set of existing Arctic consultative forums and successful governance framework mechanisms; believes that the EU may serve as an honest broker in promoting regional stability and prosperity; calls for the EU to continue dialogue and confidence building measures in the existing multilateral frameworks and to include the Arctic as a priority in the EU Global Strategy; calls furthermore for an Arctic-specific connectivity policy (digitalisation, navigation, logistics, transport); strongly believes that the European Green Deal provides a much-needed long-term response to the growing challenges of climate change through an amplified investment agenda for sustainable growth and local innovative initiatives in particular, and will contribute significantly to the solution of the EU’s strategic energy dependence; calls, with that in mind, for the integration of the EU Arctic policy dimension into the European Green Deal, the EU Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024, the EU Global Strategy, the EU connectivity strategy and the EU biodiversity strategy;

59.

Stresses the need for the EU and its Member States to maintain constructive relations with all non-European Arctic states and underlines the need for the EU to pursue and promote a rights-based approach in its engagement with the indigenous peoples of the Arctic; stresses the importance for the EU Arctic states of more extensively sharing information about the current challenges in the region, improving their hybrid warfare capabilities, continuing to invest in defence, improving coherence with regard to current activities in the Arctic and jointly developing maritime and air domains; invites the EU and its Member States to cooperate more closely on Arctic issues in regional and international forums and calls for the EU to involve local and regional levels of governance to a greater extent in the development of its policies affecting the region;

60.

Is of the opinion that the best reply to growing Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic is greater coordination at EU level, as well as consultations with EEA countries, the US and Canada, as well as the UK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India and other partners committed to securing peaceful cooperation and freedom of navigation in the Arctic and to making the most of possible synergies;

61.

Takes note of the US’ Arctic Security Initiative (ASI) and Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and encourages the EU to partner with its like-minded allies where appropriate in order to ensure proper coordination in the region; calls, in this regard, for a robust EU-Arctic dialogue in support of the implementation of the EU’s policy towards the Arctic;

62.

Is of the opinion that issues of security in the Arctic should also be part of consultations and cooperation with NATO, which can use the framework of the NATO-Russia Council to resolve misunderstandings, de-escalate tensions and prevent crises; recognises the importance of surveillance and reconnaissance operations in the region and of the establishment of mechanisms to enhance information sharing; believes that prior notification on military exercises in the Arctic region could increase transparency on military activities in the region;

63.

Notes that the High North falls within the area of responsibility of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and that cooperation with NATO is necessary in order to construct an overarching security concept for the Arctic; with that in mind, welcomes the conclusions of the reflection group tasked by the NATO Secretary-General with undertaking a forward-looking reflection process to assess ways to strengthen the political dimension of the NATO alliance, whereby NATO should enhance its situational awareness across the High North and the Arctic and should develop a strategy that takes into account broader deterrence and defence plans, including provisions for addressing aggressive moves by state actors;

64.

Notes that the 2018 Trident Juncture exercise, which demonstrated that NATO is operationally active in the Arctic, especially in the High North (the Norwegian and Barents seas), ensured the highest level of transparency; calls on all parties that conduct military activities in the Artic to follow such practices, in line with international obligations, including the OSCE Vienna Document, thus reducing risks, clarifying possible misunderstandings and building transparency of intentions;

65.

Supports the efforts to strengthen resilience from potential pressure coming from China or other actors that do not prioritise environmentally friendly and sustainable methods of mineral extraction that respect international norms and UN conventions; calls on the East StratCom Task Force of the EEAS to monitor campaigns aimed at influencing decision-making processes regarding the extractions of minerals in the region;

66.

Stresses the need for the EU and the US to jointly promote security and stability in the Arctic while investing in and expanding their permanent scientific presence in the region;

67.

Calls for the Arctic to be included in discussions on the EU’s Strategic Compass and stresses that Arctic development should also be regularly addressed at the Political and Security Committee and during Council meetings; calls for more regular exchanges of views on Arctic issues as an important area of EU-NATO consultations;

68.

Calls for increased visibility of the EU in the Arctic and for the EU to establish an enhanced political dialogue on bilateral cooperation with the Faroe Islands and Greenland and to consider, together with the Danish authorities, the possibility of the establishment of EU offices in Greenland and the Faroe Islands;

69.

Calls for the aims of the new Arctic strategy to be reflected in the EU’s programmes with dedicated funding, projects and relevant legislation, as well as in the work of the relevant EU agencies;

70.

Takes the view that the EU maritime strategy should be updated to reflect new opportunities and challenges; believes that similar assessments and reviews should be carried out on other EU policies, including EU space policy in order to assess the expansion of existing satellite programmes to cover the Arctic region’s specific needs, including the use of Copernicus to track pollution;

o o

71.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

(1) OJ C 9 E, 15.1.2010, p. 41.

(2) OJ C 136 E, 11.5.2012, p. 71.

(3) OJ C 378, 9.11.2017, p. 174.

(4) OJ C 263, 25.7.2018, p. 136.

(5) OJ C 118, 8.4.2020, p. 32.

(6) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.

(7) OJ C 118, 8.4.2020, p. 15.

(8) OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2.

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/129

P9_TA(2021)0414

The protection of persons with disabilities through petitions: lessons learnt

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the protection of persons with disabilities through petitions: lessons learnt (Petitions Nos 2582/2013, 2551/2014, 0074/2015, 0098/2015, 1140/2015, 1305/2015, 1394/2015, 0172/2016, 0857/2016, 1056/2016, 1147/2016, 0535/2017, 1077/2017, 0356/2018, 0367/2018, 0371/2018, 0530/2018, 0724/2018, 0808/2018, 0959/2018, 0756/2019, 0758/2019, 0954/2019, 1124/2019, 1170/2019, 1262/2019, 0294/2020, 0470/2020, 0527/2020, 0608/2020, 0768/2020, 0988/2020, 1052/2020, 1139/2020, 1205/2020, 1299/2020, 0103/2021 and others) (2020/2209(INI))

(2022/C 132/11)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the petitions received on disability issues as outlined in the title of this resolution and to the previous deliberations of the Committee on Petitions on these petitions,

—	having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union,

—	having regard to Articles 19, 48, 67(4), 153, 165, 168 and 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—	having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), in particular Articles 3, 21, 24, 26, 34, 35, 41 and 47 thereof,

—	having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights, in particular principles 1, 3, 10 and 17 thereof,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and its entry into force on 21 January 2011 in accordance with Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (1),

—	having regard to the General Comments on the CRPD as the authoritative guidance on its implementation,

—	having regard to the Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2),

—	having regard to the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee) of 2 October 2015 on the initial report of the European Union,

—	having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,

—	having regard to the European Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry on how the European Commission ensures that persons with disabilities can access its websites,

—	having regard to the Council measure establishing the revised EU-level framework required by Article 33.2 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,

—	having regard to the European Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry into how the European Commission monitors EU Funds used to promote the right of persons with disabilities and older persons in independent living,

—	having regard to the Fundamental Rights Report 2020 of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights,

—	having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee opinion of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘Shaping the EU agenda for disability rights 2020-2030’,

—	having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender Equality Index 2020,

—	having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations (3),

—	having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (4),

—	having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies (5),

—	having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (6),

—	having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (7),

—	having regard to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (8),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426, ‘the anti-discrimination directive’) and Parliament’s position of 2 April 2009 thereon (9),

—	having regard to the Council recommendation of 4 June 1998 on a parking card for people with disabilities (10),

—	having regard to Council recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 establishing a European Child Guarantee (11),

—	having regard to the Commission staff working document of 27 November 2020 entitled ‘Evaluation of the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020’ (SWD(2020)0291),

—	having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (12),

—	having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the European disability strategy post-2020 (13),

—	having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2020 on the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities and their families in the COVID-19 crisis (14),

—	having regard to its resolution of 29 April 2021 on the European Child Guarantee (15),

—	having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2021 on the implementation of Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation in light of the UNCRPD (16),

—	having regard to its resolution of 29 November 2018 on the situation of women with disabilities (17),

—	having regard to its study of 3 November 2016 entitled ‘European structural and investment funds and people with disabilities in the European Union’,

—	having regard to its study of 15 September 2017 entitled ‘Inclusive education for learners with disabilities’,

—	having regard to its study of 9 October 2015 entitled ‘The protection role of the Committee on Petitions in the context of the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ and its updates of 2016, 2017 and 2018,

—	having regard to its in-depth analysis of 15 August 2016 entitled ‘The European Accessibility Act’,

—	having regard to its study of 8 May 2018 entitled ‘Transport and tourism for persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility’,

—	having regard to its study of 15 July 2020 entitled ‘The Post-2020 European disability strategy’,

—	having regard to Rule 54 and Rule 227(3) of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

—	having regard to the letter from the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Petitions (A9-0261/2021),

A.	whereas approximately 1 % of all petitions received each year by the Committee on Petitions relate to various disability issues;

B.	whereas there are approximately 87 million persons with disabilities in the EU (18);

C.	whereas 37 % of people in the EU aged 15 and over have (moderate or severe) physical or sensory limitations (19);

whereas petitions on disability issues reveal the difficulties encountered by persons with disabilities and the fact that they face discrimination and obstacles in everyday life and that they do not enjoy the fundamental freedoms and rights laid down in the CRPD, such as access to public transport and the built environment, use of sign languages, financing and equal access to education and vocational training;

whereas it is generally acknowledged that persons with disabilities continue to face multiple obstacles and discrimination in everyday life which prevent them from enjoying the fundamental freedoms and rights laid down in the applicable EU and UN legislative frameworks; whereas these include the mutual recognition of disability status between Member States — the lack of which hinders freedom of movement within the EU for persons with disabilities — access to public transport, physical, sensory and cognitive accessibility of the built environment, goods, services and programmes, use of sign languages and all other means and types of accessible communication and information, financing of and equal access to education and vocational training, access to the labour market, access to personal assistance and community inclusion, and equality in opportunity and treatment in employment and occupation;

whereas all persons with disabilities have equal rights on an equal basis with others in all fields of life and are entitled to inalienable dignity, equal treatment, independent living, autonomy and full participation in society, and to expect that their contribution to the social, political and economic progress of the EU is respected and valued;

G.	whereas information stemming from petitions submitted to Parliament by persons with disabilities or on disability issues can serve as a source of information concerning gaps in the implementation of the CRPD at both national and EU level, and can help to frame legislation in all policy areas;

whereas the Committee on Petitions plays a ‘protection role’ to ensure EU compliance with the CRPD within policymaking and legislative actions at EU level; whereas the Committee on Petitions has been asked to draw up an EU framework together with the European Ombudsman, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and the European Disability Forum, as adopted by the Council at its 3513th meeting held on 16 January 2017;

I.	whereas the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs has underlined the significance of petitions pertaining to the rights of persons with disabilities in the light of Parliament’s role and responsibilities set out in the EU framework for monitoring the implementation of the CRPD;

whereas through its role, the Committee on Petitions has a special duty to protect the rights of persons with disabilities in the EU, with the exercise of their fundamental freedoms and rights being guaranteed by EU law and the CRPD; whereas the information available on these rights is insufficient and not accessible enough;

whereas the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs highly appreciates the crucial role of the Committee on Petitions as a bridge between the people in the EU, Parliament and the other EU institutions and an important instrument for getting citizens involved in participatory democracy; whereas the right to petition Parliament is one of the fundamental rights of every individual and organisation based in the EU and is an indispensable direct source of factual information;

whereas the right to petition and the petition process should be more visible and accessible to all individuals and organisations in the EU, including persons with disabilities; whereas the Committee on Petitions should ensure better visibility and sufficient information in this respect through targeted information and awareness-raising campaigns, with a special focus on vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities; whereas Parliament has not yet developed an index of effectiveness for its petition system nor has it collected statistical data on the processing of petitions;

M.	whereas the CRPD is the first international human rights treaty to be ratified by the EU and all its Member States;

N.	whereas the Optional Protocol to the CRPD has not been ratified by the EU and five Member States;

O.	whereas a Union of Equality for all, and in all of its senses, is one of the priorities in the political guidelines of the current Commission;

whereas petitions have repeatedly highlighted the limitations in terms of access to education for persons with disabilities, which lead to lower participation in educational activities than the population average and, as a consequence, to a risk of social and economic exclusion; whereas one person with disabilities out of four leaves the education system prematurely (20);

Q.	whereas the creation of the role of Commissioner for Equality played an instrumental role in establishing the new strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 (European Disability Strategy 2021-2030);

R.	whereas in its resolutions, Parliament has repeatedly urged the Member States to implement appropriate policies to ensure that persons with disabilities can fully enjoy their social, political and economic rights;

S.	whereas the Member States have the responsibility to ensure that everyone in the EU has the right to an effective remedy before an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, and that everyone has the opportunity to be advised, defended and represented;

whereas 24 Member States have comprehensively reported on the progress they have made in the implementation of the CRPD, with accessibility as one of the core principles of the convention, following inquiries sent to the Permanent Representations of all Member States by the Committee on Petitions on petition 0535/2017;

U.	whereas the proposed anti-discrimination directive, which would provide greater protection against discrimination of all kinds through a horizontal approach, still remains blocked in the Council, and whereas this has been the case for over a decade;

whereas accessibility is a precondition for exercising all other rights provided for in the CRPD on an equal basis with others; whereas the Commission has proposed several actions to monitor the implementation of existing legislation on accessibility, as well as new measures to create a barrier-free EU;

whereas initiatives at EU level such as the Access City Award promote the adaptation of public spaces to the needs of the elderly and persons with disabilities; whereas the competition has rewarded cities that make commitments at the level of political decision-making to be inclusive for persons with disabilities and respectful of their rights, are responsive to the needs of persons with disabilities and hold a social dialogue with organisations for persons with disabilities and the elderly; whereas the adaptation of public spaces will not only help to combat social exclusion, but will also contribute to economic growth;

X.	whereas several petitions illustrate the problems of and the need to improve access for persons with disabilities to the built environment, transport, information and communication technologies and systems (ICT), and other facilities and services provided to the public;

whereas it is indispensable for the EU institutions’ to ensure their websites have the necessary technical specifications in order to be accessible to persons with disabilities, so that persons with disabilities can receive correct and direct information on all issues that concern them as citizens, with the aim of increasing the accessibility of documents, videos and websites and promoting alternative means of communication;

Z.	whereas an inter-service working group on sign language was established in Parliament in order to implement measures to fulfil the request in petition 1056/2016 to allow for the tabling of petitions in national sign languages used in the European Union;

AA.	whereas measures taken by governments during the exceptional major health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic should always respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and should not discriminate against citizens with disabilities;

AB.	whereas several petitions prove that the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated the situation of persons with disabilities, including violations of persons with disabilities’ most basic human rights, such as access to healthcare, to protective measures against the spread of the disease and to education;

AC.	whereas Parliament must guarantee that the COVID-19 measures are in line with the Charter and the UN Convention on the Rights for Persons with Disabilities;

AD.

whereas due to the difficult situation during the COVID-19 crisis, institutions for persons with disabilities and older people, such as day centres or schools, have been temporarily closed on occasion; whereas in this emergency situation, the care of persons with intellectual disabilities has fallen to their family members; whereas persons with disabilities living in institutions that have remained open have been highly affected during the pandemic due to their dependence on physical contact with carers and support staff, a lack of staff, a lack of personal protective equipment and disinfectant products and, as a consequence, high rates of illness and increased numbers of deaths;

AE.	whereas confinement measures have a particularly negative impact on persons with disabilities;

AF.	whereas petitions have repeatedly highlighted the fact that employment opportunities for people with disabilities are limited; whereas the average gap between the employment rates of people with and without disabilities in the EU is 25 % (21);

AG.

whereas employment and occupation levels for persons with disabilities are low, standing at 50,6 % compared to 74,8 % for those without disabilities; whereas, in addition, the pandemic and social and economic crisis have increased inequalities between persons with disabilities and those without disabilities;

AH.	whereas work in segregated institutions does not facilitate the integration of persons with disabilities into the open labour market;

AI.	whereas nearly one in four EU citizens surveyed reported some degree of functional limitations due to health conditions (22);

AJ.

whereas social protection and employment rights, the use of the European structural and investment funds in compliance with EU regulations and the CRPD and other issues falling within the competence of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs are among the most common disability equality concerns voiced in the petitions received by Parliament;

AK.

whereas the Committee on Petitions receives a large number of petitions relating to Council Directive 2000/78/EC which concern the failure to implement the principle of equal treatment with regard to access to inclusive education, employment, vocational training, promotion and the working conditions of persons with disabilities; whereas the Member States and the EU have ratified the CRPD, whose Article 24 stipulates that signatories must ensure that persons with disabilities are able to access lifelong learning, adult education, vocational training, general tertiary and secondary education and free and compulsory primary education;

AL.

whereas access to quality employment, education and training, healthcare, social protection, including across borders, adequate housing, support for independent living and equal opportunities to participate in leisure activities and community life are essential to the quality of life of persons with disabilities;

AM.

whereas the recently presented European Disability Strategy 2021-2030 is a welcome step toward addressing the issues faced by persons with disabilities, but whereas these people still face obstacles and discrimination; whereas in 2019, 28,4 % of the EU population with disabilities (aged 16 or over) was at risk of social exclusion or poverty (23); whereas the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030 will have to address this state of affairs;

AN.	whereas principle 17 of the European Pillar of Social Rights states that persons with disabilities ‘have the right to income support that ensures they can live in dignity, services that enable them to participate in the labour market and in society, and a work environment adapted to their needs’;

AO.

whereas sheltered workshops should aim to ensure inclusion, rehabilitation and transition to the open labour market, but are often segregated environments in which workers with disabilities do not have employee status or enjoy labour rights, which clearly constitutes a violation of the CRPD; whereas inclusive models of supported employment can, if they are rights-based and recognised as employment, respect the rights of persons with disabilities and serve inclusion in and transition to the open labour market;

AP.

whereas the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic poses a serious threat to European economies and the preservation of jobs; whereas people from disadvantaged groups, in particular persons with disabilities, have been particularly affected by the pandemic; whereas COVID-19 prevention measures have presented both opportunities and challenges for persons with disabilities when it comes to labour market accessibility and inclusiveness;

AQ.

whereas the EU, through the NextGenerationEU temporary recovery instrument, must support a disability-inclusive COVID-19 response and recovery; whereas civil society and voluntary organisations working in the disability sector have demonstrated their paramount importance and resilience yet again during the COVID-19 crisis;

AR.

whereas COVID-19 prevention measures have created new barriers for persons with disabilities and have exacerbated existing exclusion in all areas of the world of work; whereas persons with disabilities are more likely to lose work and have difficulties finding employment again; whereas COVID-19 has had a negative impact on accessibility and the inclusiveness of the organisation of work and work arrangements, as well as the employment and the working conditions of persons with disabilities, and has exposed many persons with disabilities to the negative effects of teleworking;

AS.

whereas in 2019, almost 18 million children in the EU (22,2 % of the child population) lived in a household at risk of poverty or social exclusion; whereas children with disabilities experience specific disadvantages that make them particularly vulnerable; whereas this underscores the importance of guaranteeing, for children in need, free and effective access to high-quality early childhood education and care, education and school-based activities, at least one healthy meal each school day and healthcare, as well as effective access to healthy nutrition and adequate housing, as stipulated in the Council recommendation establishing a European Child Guarantee;

AT.

whereas all EU Members States have ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, making it binding for them, and whereas Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union establishes the objective for the EU to ensure children’s rights are protected; whereas the Charter guarantees the protection of the rights of the child by the EU institutions and by Member States when they implement EU law; whereas Parliament adopted its resolution on the European Child Guarantee with a strong majority, demanding that access to inclusive education from early childhood to adolescence be ensured for all children, including for Romani children, children with disabilities, stateless and migrant children and those living in humanitarian emergency settings;

AU.

whereas work-related discrimination against persons with disabilities is related to a lack of inclusive education and vocational training, as well as the segregation and discrimination present in the fields of housing and healthcare, and the inaccessibility of transport and other services and products;

AV.	whereas in its resolution on equal treatment in employment and occupation in light of the UNCRPD, Parliament revealed the shortcomings of Council Directive 2000/78/EC;

AW.

whereas Directive (EU) 2019/1158 requires Member States to assess whether the conditions of access to and the detailed arrangements for parental, carers’ and workers leave should be adapted to the specific needs of parents in particularly disadvantaged situations, such as parents with disabilities, adoptive, single or separated parents of children with disabilities or a long-term illness, or parents in difficult circumstances;

AX.	whereas persons with disabilities face numerous hurdles in their everyday lives, inter alia when trying to obtain personal assistance, be included in the community, find adequate and affordable accessible housing and obtain affordable healthcare and person-centred social and healthcare;

AY.	whereas unemployment and a lack of quality and sustainable jobs for persons with disabilities are the main factors contributing to a high risk of poverty, social exclusion and homelessness among persons with disabilities;

AZ.

whereas in 2017, a third of adults in the EU with disabilities lived in households whose financial resources were not sufficient to cover the usual necessary expenses; whereas in 2019, almost two thirds of the EU population with an activity limitation would have been at risk of poverty without social benefits, allowances or a pension (24);

BA.	whereas persons with disabilities are a diverse group and are often subject to intersectional discrimination, the cumulative effects of which have a tangible impact on employment;

BB.

whereas the progress in deinstitutionalisation is uneven across the Member States and whereas despite the introduction of relevant policies and the allocation of substantial funding in the EU, there are still one million people living in institutions; whereas several petitions on the misuse of EU funds for the deinstitutionalisation of persons with disabilities have been submitted; whereas in February 2021, the European Ombudsman opened an own-initiative inquiry into the role of the Commission in ensuring that Member States use EU funds with a view to promoting independent living for persons with disabilities and older persons and transitioning away from residential care institutions; whereas Member States must speed up the process of deinstitutionalisation and the Commission must carefully monitor their progress;

BC.	whereas the collection of EU statistics on populations overlooks the nature of a person’s disabilities, as well as the number of persons with disabilities living in residential care, hampering compliance with Article 31 of the CRPD;

BD.	whereas the catalogue of allowances and rights deriving from disability status varies from one Member State to another, as do the entities which define and recognise these rights;

BE.

whereas the number of persons with disabilities and persons in need of care and long-term care is expected to grow dramatically in the EU due, among other factors, to demographic challenges and the increase in chronic health conditions; whereas most long-term care is currently provided by informal, usually unpaid and predominantly female carers; whereas policies for tackling demographic challenges and responding to growing care and long-term needs should be designed in such a manner that they do not lead to increased pressure on informal carers;

BF.	whereas disabilities are often the result of an occupational injury or are acquired through a chronic condition related to occupational disease and exposure to health hazards;

BG.	whereas commitment to better inclusion and the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities should be reflected in all policy fields, including in the European Semester process;

BH.

whereas the EU and the Member States should adopt all appropriate measures for the implementation of the rights laid down in the CRPD, and modify or withdraw current measures that constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities; whereas the EU and the Member States should protect and promote the fundamental rights of persons with disabilities in all policies and programmes;

BI.	whereas 46 million women and girls in the European Union are living with disabilities (25);

BJ.

whereas women and girls with disabilities experience multiple intersectional discrimination and challenges arising from the intersection of gender and disability with sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, country of origin, class, migration status, age or racial or ethnic origin; whereas women with disabilities from minority backgrounds are more likely to experience triple discrimination on account of their vulnerable situation; whereas discrimination creates obstacles to their participation in all areas of life, including socio-economic disadvantages, social isolation, gender-based violence, forced sterilisation and abortion, lack of access to community services, culture, sports and leisure, low-quality housing, institutionalisation and inadequate healthcare; whereas these obstacles diminish the probability of fully participating in, actively engaging in and contributing to society, including in education and the labour market;

BK.

whereas in the European Union, 20,6 % of women with disabilities are in full-time employment compared with 28,5 % of men with disabilities (26); whereas figures show that, on average, 29,5 % of women with disabilities in the EU are at risk of falling victim to poverty and social exclusion, compared with 27,5 % of men with disabilities (27);

BL.

whereas the CRPD notes that women and girls with disabilities are at greater risk of violence both within and outside the home; whereas some Member States have not yet ratified the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention); whereas extending areas of crime to encompass specific forms of gender-based violence in accordance with Article 83(1) of the TFEU will provide greater protection for women and girls with disabilities;

Governance and implementation

Stresses the need to raise awareness at all levels of the rights of persons with disabilities enshrined in the CRPD in order to protect their rights and dignity, and to promote fruitful cooperation and the exchange of good practices between Member States; highlights the need for commonly accepted definitions of disability, deinstitutionalisation, living in the community, independent living and inclusive education; encourages the Member States to strengthen coordination mechanisms;

Stresses that Member States should step up their efforts to provide support for persons with disabilities in the following priority areas: health, education, accessibility, employment and working conditions, independent living, coordination, living conditions, social protection and awareness-raising;

Calls on all Member States that have not yet ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRPD to do so without further delay, and for the EU to fully ratify it; calls on the Council to take the necessary steps to ensure the accession of the EU to the Optional Protocol;

Considers the Optional Protocol to be an indivisible part of the CRPD; points to the fact that the Optional Protocol provides citizens with a forum to communicate alleged violations of the provisions of the convention by a State Party, and allows the CRPD Committee to initiate confidential inquiries when they receive information indicating that a State Party has committed a grave or systematic violation;

Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive and cross-cutting review of EU legislation and funding programmes with a view to complying fully with the CRPD by constructively involving disability organisations and the members of the EU framework for monitoring the implementation of the CRPD;

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take into account the diversity and heterogeneity of persons with disabilities when designing and implementing policies and measures;

Takes note of the progress made by the Member States in effectively implementing and monitoring the CRPD and in adapting accessibility measures to comply with the standards of the CRPD; calls on the Member States to designate, without further delay, responsible authorities to serve as focal points, and to establish coordinating mechanisms at all administrative levels, in accordance with Article 33 of the CRPD, for its implementation and monitoring; stresses that the Member States should ensure that a significant number of persons with disabilities are involved in the work of these authorities;

Supports the Commission’s proposal to establish a disability platform in order to strengthen governance of cooperation at EU level in this area and of the implementation of the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030 and national disability strategies;

Points out that the new EU disability platform should be aligned with the guidelines set out in the European Pillar of Social Rights;

10.

Calls on the Member States to carry out national disability awareness-raising campaigns promoting the CRPD and the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030 that are accessible for all and involve persons with disabilities and the family members and organisations that represent them; calls on the Member States to adopt ambitious timelines for the implementation of the strategy; calls on the Commission to develop a set of detailed indicators in the forthcoming delegated act on the revised social scoreboard to measure the progress toward the goals and objectives of the strategy and to ensure compliance by all those involved with the commitments outlined in these documents;

11.

Acknowledges the Commission’s call for all EU institutions, bodies, agencies and delegations to designate ‘disability coordinators’; reiterates its call for focal points to be established in all EU institutions and agencies, including Parliament and the Council, with the central focal point within the Commission’s General Secretariat and supported by an appropriate interinstitutional mechanism; calls on the EU institutions to prioritise the appointment of persons with disabilities to the role of disability coordinators;

12.

Welcomes the plans of the Commission to examine the functioning of the EU framework for monitoring the implementation of the CRPD in 2022 and propose actions on this basis; calls on the Commission to strengthen the EU framework and its independence, above all by ensuring greater involvement and participation of experts, non-governmental organisations, social partners and particularly persons with disabilities, without discrimination based on the type of disability or any other personal circumstance; underlines the need for the EU framework to be based on detailed, up-to-date, quality disaggregated data according to the nature of a person’s disability, building on the work of the Washington Group on Disability Statistics;

13.

Calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to reaffirm their commitment to realising inclusive equality for persons with disabilities and to fully implement the CRPD, including its Article 27 on work and employment;

14.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to set clear objectives to improve the living and working conditions of persons with disabilities, while respecting the principles of accessibility and non-discrimination and investing in equal opportunities and the participation of persons with disabilities in all areas of life;

15.

Points out that the Committee on Petitions plays a specific protection role in ensuring that the EU complies with the CRPD when developing policies and taking legislative action; notes that in the context of that responsibility, the committee handles petitions on disability issues, organises debates, thematic workshops and public hearings on the subject, drafts resolutions and reports and carries out field visits;

16.

Stresses that in order to have effective access to justice through petitions to Parliament, persons with disabilities should have access to the support and assistance they need to draft and submit petitions that fulfil the admissibility criteria; calls for better visibility of the petitions mechanism through more awareness-raising, as well as the involvement and participation of persons with disabilities or their representatives in the consideration of petitions;

17.

Urges the Member States to develop national action plans that address the shortcomings in access to public safety-related information, distance and online learning, personal assistance, care and support services for people with disabilities;

18.

Invites the Committee on Petitions to collect and provide statistical data on the processing of petitions and stresses the need for the committee to ensure it can provide interpretation in sign language, as should all committees of the European Parliament, in order to ensure access to information and participation;

19.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to better acknowledge the importance of accessible and quality support services and systems for independent living; stresses the need to promote strategies and standards for personalised quality support for dependent persons with disabilities and their carers, including improved social protection and various forms of support for informal carers; calls on the Commission to present a strategic EU care agenda as a further step forward in qualitatively empowering the healthcare sector in the EU, including personal and household service workers; reiterates that the care agenda also needs to reflect the situation of the 100 million informal carers in the EU, who provide 80 % of long-term care but whose work mostly goes unrecognised;

20.

Recommends that the Committee on Petitions prepare an annual report on problems highlighted in petitions related to persons with disabilities and make recommendations;

21.

Calls on the Commission to structurally integrate the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030 into the European Semester process as the latter should be used to inspire Member State policies and approaches, to strengthen the inclusiveness of society and to support the employment and social protection of people with disabilities; calls on the Commission to carry out an annual review of disability mainstreaming under the European Semester process;

22.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish a common definition of disability in line with the concluding observations of the CRPD Committee on the initial report of the European Union adopted in 2015, and to ensure mutual recognition of disability status across the Member States, so as to ensure the free movement of persons with disabilities and the proper exercise and recognition of their EU citizenship rights;

23.

Calls on the Commission to ensure that the EU and the Member States fully comply with all relevant EU and UN obligations on the rights of persons with disabilities, in particular the CRPD and the CRPD Committee’s general comments to the convention, and with the relevant EU measures and funding rules, and to provide support to them and their families and carers and enable exchanges of best practices in this area;

24.

Stresses the need for more and regular awareness training for justice and law enforcement staff on crisis intervention and management and conflict de-escalation when interacting with persons with specific disabilities;

Data protection

25.

Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States correctly implement Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation — GDPR) (28), and to take the necessary measures in order to protect the sensitive data of persons with disabilities;

26.

Stresses that any processing of personal data must fully comply with the GDPR; underlines that pursuant to the GDPR, the processing of genetic or biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person and of data concerning health (sensitive personal data) is prohibited unless it is expressly allowed by the GDPR;

Participation

27.

Stresses the need to consult and actively involve organisations of persons with disabilities in each stage of planning, adoption, implementation and monitoring of all types of measures so that these measures ensure the promotion of their fundamental rights; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to adequately involve organisations of persons with disabilities at all stages of the implementation of the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030;

28.

Recalls the importance of consulting and involving persons with disabilities and the organisations that represent them when adopting measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as recovery and vaccination plans, and in any future crisis;

29.

Highlights that the full and effective participation of persons with disabilities in all areas of life and society is crucial for the exercise of their fundamental rights;

30.

Recalls that many people with disabilities are still segregated from community life and do not have control over their daily lives, in particular those living in residential institutions, as the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted and intensified the challenges faced by the latter; urges the Member States to mainstream support services in order to ensure people with disabilities enjoy the equal right to live independently and be included in the community;

31.

Urges the Member States to ensure that persons with disabilities are involved in the policymaking process without any constraints; notes that the CRPD requires full political participation, which means that persons with disabilities must be able to participate in elections and decision-making processes on an equal basis with others; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States provide facilitated naturalisation or specific exemptions from naturalisation exams for persons with disabilities to guarantee their access to citizenship;

32.

Recalls the high number of EU citizens deprived of their right to participate in elections, including European Parliament elections, because of their disabilities or mental health problems; thus calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the real right of persons with disabilities to vote in European Parliament elections;

Free movement

33.

Welcomes the Commission’s plan to present a proposal, by the end of 2023, for the creation of an EU disability card to be recognised in all Member States, with a view to scaling up the pilot projects for the EU disability card and the EU parking card for persons with disabilities; is of the opinion that the EU disability card, which should be mandatory in all Member States, will be an important instrument to help persons with disabilities to exercise their right to free movement in a barrier-free EU;

34.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to be ambitious regarding the scope of the entitlements card users will have and ensure proper implementation by all the Member States by way of binding EU legislation if necessary;

35.

Notes that in some Member States where a disability card has already been introduced, there have been reports of misuse, sometimes leading to negative consequences for people who are truly eligible; therefore stresses the need to raise awareness at all levels and take measures to prevent misuse of the new EU disability card;

36.

Calls on the Commission to exempt persons with disabilities and their families and helpers from the payment of tolls across the EU to support their movement, especially when they need to make multiple journeys for medical treatment and their wellbeing;

37.

Calls on the Commission to further strengthen the legislative framework for the participation of persons with disabilities in tourism; notes that 25 % of the EU electorate have some degree of impairment or disability (29) and that the EU total gross turnover contribution of accessible tourism for persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility amounted to about EUR 786 billion in 2012 (30);

38.

Warmly welcomes the adoption of stronger rail passenger rights for persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility, especially the phasing out of the current exemptions for Member States and the reduction of the period of advance notice to be given by persons with disabilities or reduced mobility who require assistance; calls on the Member States to arrange, as soon as possible, shorter pre-notification periods for persons with disabilities who require assistance with travel, in order to allow persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility to more readily exercise their free movement rights as well as to define accessibility time frames; calls for the swift implementation of the rules laid down in the recast of Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 in all Member States; calls on the Commission to consider making a proposal relating to the rights of passengers with disabilities in urban and rural transport, to bridge the gaps that still exist; calls for the adoption of an equally effective maritime transport package;

39.

Calls on the Commission to support the Member States to ensure the necessary conditions at local, regional and national level to allow persons with disabilities to enjoy their rights to free movement, self-determination and personal choices on an equal basis with others, to live independently and to be included in the community, as laid down in Article 19 of the CRPD; calls on the Member States to improve the accessibility of information provided by public administrations by using open and accessible formats;

Accessibility

40.

Notes the Commission’s proposal for the creation of the ‘AccessibleEU’ resource centre by 2022; calls on the Commission to create an EU agency on accessibility (EU Access Board) that would be in charge of developing technical specifications on accessibility in support of specific EU policies and legislation, carrying out consultations with rights-holders, stakeholders and non-governmental organisations, helping Member States and EU institutions to implement accessibility in a harmonised way for the benefit of the single market, and raising awareness of the importance of accessibility for equal societies;

41.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the cognitive, sensory and physical accessibility of EU initiatives on the digitalisation of the labour market;

42.

Regrets the fact that access to the built environment and physical accessibility were not included within the scope of the European Accessibility Act; calls on the Commission to use the European Accessibility Act as a basis for adopting a robust EU framework for an accessible and inclusive environment with fully accessible public spaces, services, including public transport, communication, administrative and financial services, and the built environment; welcomes the Commission’s ‘Access City Award’ initiative;

43.

Welcomes the results of the European Access City competition; calls on the Member States to introduce similar competitions at national level;

44.

Points out that petitioners’ most common concerns regarding the equality of persons with disabilities centre around accessibility and social protection, along with employment rights and the right to live independently in the community; calls, therefore, on the Member States to fully implement and continuously monitor all accessibility-related legislation, including Directive (EU) 2019/882 (the European Accessibility Act) in order to effectively and definitively remove and prevent barriers for workers with disabilities, and to improve and ensure the availability of accessible services and the suitability of the conditions under which these services are provided; calls, in this context, on the Member States to consider, when transposing the European Accessibility Act into national legislation, the interconnectivity between the accessibility of services and the accessibility of the built environment;

45.

Stresses that full accessibility must be guaranteed in all public places in Europe; regrets that the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030 is nowadays being disregarded in many respects, and in particular that there are too many public buildings with architectural barriers, which constitutes an odious form of discrimination; calls on the Commission to mainstream accessibility into all policy areas and calls on the Member States to fully implement existing legislation;

46.

Regrets that in some Member States inaccessible emergency numbers have meant that some persons with disabilities have been unable to communicate with essential support and emergency services; urges, therefore, Member States to carefully implement Directive (EU) 2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code;

47.

Calls on the Member States to ensure the swift and efficient implementation at all levels of Directive (EU) 2016/2102 on the accessibility of public sector bodies’ websites and mobile applications, in order to guarantee that persons with disabilities are able to access all information they require in an accessible format, including national sign languages; welcomes the Commission’s initiative for an action plan on web accessibility for all EU institutions, bodies and agencies with a view to ensuring the compliance of EU websites, and the documents published on these websites and online platforms, with European accessibility standards, which need to be broadened; urges all EU institutions, bodies and agencies to comply with the European accessibility standards in 2022 at the latest;

48.

Urges Member States to transpose into national legislation the long overdue Audiovisual Media Services Directive and, in line with Article 7 thereof, to provide accessible audiovisual media services to persons with disabilities;

49.

Urges the EU institutions to improve the level and quality of accessibility in all of their buildings and remove the existing barriers to their websites, debates and documentation, i.e. to make the information produced accessible by, for example, providing translation into the sign languages of the different Member States and producing documents in Braille and in easy-to-read language;

50.

Highlights the importance of swiftly addressing accessibility concerns in all relevant policies and instruments, including concerns about public procurement rules and the accessibility of petitions to Parliament;

51.

Urges the relevant Parliament services to continue their efforts and finalise the project on the inter-service working group on sign language in the shortest possible time frame in order to meet the requests of petition 1056/2016 to allow for the tabling of petitions in international and national sign languages used in the EU and thereby make the fundamental right to petition more accessible for sign language users;

52.

Highlights the need to provide sign language interpretation services and easy-to-read language translations for committee meetings, plenary meetings and all other Parliament meetings, in order to make them accessible for persons with disabilities;

Combating discrimination

53.

Notes that there is no mutual recognition of disability status between Member States; calls on the Member States to work together in a spirit of mutual trust to recognise the status assigned in another Member State; emphasises the Commission’s goal of working with Member States to expand the scope of the mutual recognition of disability status in areas such as labour mobility and the benefits related to the conditions of service provision; highlights the need to extend the benefits of the EU disability card so that mutually recognised health access benefits are also included; underlines, in this context, the importance of swift action in terms of implementation of the European Disability Card; reiterates the need for mutual understanding of deinstitutionalisation, its implementation and independent living in the community, with a view to better aligning the Member States’ strategies and the EU funds with the CRPD;

54.

Recognises the many areas in which the European Disability Card could be applied, in terms of both access to many services without being discriminated against and safety in times of danger and emergency; points out that the card would ensure that a person with a disability would be immediately recognised by the police forces involved;

55.

Regrets that, according to the WHO, children and adults with disabilities are at higher risk of violence than their non-disabled peers; highlights that minors in particular ‘are 3,7 times more likely than non-disabled children to be victims of any sort of violence, 3,6 times more likely to be victims of physical violence, and 2,9 times more likely to be victims of sexual violence’; underlines that ’children with mental or intellectual impairments appear to be among the most vulnerable, with 4,6 times the risk of sexual violence than their non-disabled peers’; urges, therefore, for the creation of a European framework for the protection of persons with disabilities from any sort of violence;

56.

Stresses the urgent need for EU legislation aimed at protecting citizens against all forms of discrimination in the EU and considers this to be primordial for the correct implementation of CRPD policies; urges the Member States to adopt the EU horizontal anti-discrimination directive tabled by the Commission in 2008; calls on the Commission to present an alternative solution in order to move forward in tackling discrimination across the EU, in all areas of life, as soon as possible;

57.

Strongly condemns all medical discrimination against persons with disabilities; recalls that the relevant measures adopted by the Member States must comply with the CRPD and must ensure equal and non-discriminatory access to healthcare and social services; stresses that the response to future health crises (from preparedness to treatment) must ensure that persons with disabilities are not left behind; urges, in this regard, the relevant authorities to offer persons with disabilities the same medical treatment as any other person, including intensive medical care; recalls the importance for health public services to always play a main role in the protection of persons with disabilities;

58.

Reiterates its call on the Commission to work with the Court of Justice of the European Union on communication and accessibility strategies in order to ensure that persons with disabilities have the ability to access the EU justice system without facing any form of discrimination; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue empowerment programmes for persons with disabilities to enable them to recognise and report cases of discrimination against them;

59.

Condemns all forms of discrimination against persons with disabilities in the workplace; calls on the Member States and the Commission to implement policies aimed at preventing cases of harassment based on disability; calls, in addition, on the Member States to implement policies, in cooperation with employers, to prevent cyberbullying of persons with disabilities in the workplace;

60.

Stresses that imprisonment of persons whose disability is incompatible with detention must be prevented and that alternatives to prison sentences should be provided; calls on the Member States to ensure that the fundamental principles of equality of treatment, non-discrimination, reasonable accommodation and accessibility are respected for detainees with disabilities;

61.

Calls on the Member States to exchange information and good practices, especially with regard to the transition from institutional care to independent living, the provision of accessible and affordable housing for persons with disabilities and inclusion in the community;

62.

Highlights that reasonable accommodation, accessibility and universal design are crucial for combating discrimination against persons with disabilities; underlines the importance of effective non-discriminatory access involving the identification and removal of obstacles and barriers that hamper the access of persons with disabilities to the goods, services and facilities available to the general public; stresses that effective, non-discriminatory access for persons with disabilities should be provided, wherever possible, under the same terms and conditions as for persons without disabilities, and that the use of assistive devices by persons with disabilities should be facilitated where necessary, including aids to mobility and access, and such as recognised guide dogs and other assistance dogs (31); recalls that accessibility standards should be adopted in consultation with persons with disabilities and their representative organisations, since their expertise is essential for the identification of accessibility barriers; highlights that reasonable accommodation, accessibility and universal design are crucial to combating discrimination against persons with disabilities;

63.

Emphasises the vital role of family members who care for people with disabilities and who often fulfil their needs for care and assistance; underlines, therefore, the need for EU and national policies and strategies to provide strong support to family members and carers; considers it vital to provide them with European mutual recognition in their role as care providers;

64.

Highlights the importance of the entitlement of persons with disabilities to exercise their fundamental rights on an equal basis; stresses the need to recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life, in line with Article 12 of the CRPD; calls on the Member States to take appropriate and timely measures to provide effective, fair and inclusive access to the justice system and law enforcement for persons with all kinds of disabilities at all stages of the process; emphasises that facilities and services must be accessible in order to ensure equal access, without discrimination, to justice and the entire legal process;

65.

Highlights the need for financial aids so that persons with disabilities may hire or employ helpers or financially support family members, given that their care services have a cost, both in terms of time and financially, and that this is absolutely necessary for the support of persons with disabilities and for their family helpers;

66.

Highlights that persons with disabilities are socially marginalised and excluded from employment and economic and social life; regrets that persons with disabilities, particularly those with high support needs, are often at high risk of being institutionalised, while the current financial support by Member States is not enough, especially regarding community based, person-centred support that would protect the rights of persons with disabilities (32);

67.

Stresses that Article 19 of the CRPD sets out the right to live independently and be included in the community; calls on the Member States to ensure a process that provides for a shift in living arrangements for persons with disabilities, from institutional settings to a system enabling social participation and in which services are provided in the community according to individual will and preference; calls on the Member States to include specific targets with clear deadlines in their deinstitutionalisation strategies and to adequately finance the implementation of these strategies;

68.

Regrets the fact that persons with disabilities and their support networks were excluded from the priority groups under the EU’s vaccination strategy; urges the Member States to offer persons with disabilities and their support networks priority access to vaccination; insists, in this regard, that receipt of a COVID-19 vaccination be based on the free and informed consent of persons with disabilities and that the autonomy and legal capacity of all persons with disabilities, including persons with intellectual disabilities, persons with psychosocial disabilities and autistic persons, must not be undermined by measures that are deemed to be for the public good or in the best interests of the person;

69.

Calls for EU and national investigations into the disproportionate COVID-19 infection and death rates in nursing and care homes and in the context of residential services for older people and persons with disabilities and other social services, with a view to understanding the causes, identifying those responsible and taking the necessary measures to prevent such cases in the future;

70.

Calls for sites where vaccinations are delivered to be physically accessible and provide live guidance and assistance for those who need it; calls for free or low-cost targeted accessible transport programmes wherever necessary;

Employment and social affairs

71.

Is concerned about the high unemployment rates of persons with disabilities, especially among women with disabilities, compared to other groups in the EU; calls on the Member States to promote and ensure a legislative and policy framework for the participation of persons with disabilities and especially women with disabilities in the labour market, including those with hidden disabilities, chronic illnesses or learning disabilities;

72.

Calls on the Member States to take an intersectional approach, especially in their policies and measures, to creating inclusive employment; regrets that multiple and intersectional discrimination is insufficiently addressed in the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030; calls, therefore, on the Commission to place special emphasis on intersectionality in the implementation of the strategy and to set clear, measurable and ambitious targets relating to workplace diversity that reflect the heterogeneity of persons with disabilities, in order to address multiple and intersectional discrimination; stresses the importance of monitoring the efficiency of the strategy with the involvement of persons with disabilities and the organisations that represent them;

73.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote and support social enterprises focusing on the employment of persons with disabilities, as they are a lever to boost the creation of decent jobs;

74.

Encourages the Member States to give persons with significant and severe disabilities early access to public pension schemes to combat the risk of poverty and social exclusion in old age;

75.

Calls on the Member States to address the underdevelopment and underfunding of public employment services with a view to improving the employment rate of persons with disabilities; urges the Member States to strengthen the links between public employment services and recruitment agencies;

76.

Highlights the positive role played by CRPD-compliant sheltered workplaces in the transition of persons with disabilities to the open labour market;

77.

Urges the Member States to support rights-based, inclusive and decent individual placement and support (‘supported employment’) models as a means for persons with disabilities, where possible, to make the transition to the open labour market;

78.

Calls on the Commission to start revising the Employment Equality Directive as soon as possible with a view to fully harmonising it with the provisions of the CRPD and implementing a participatory process aimed at ensuring the direct and full involvement of organisations that represent persons with disabilities;

79.

Points out that hiring support systems should not reduce the wages of persons with disabilities, particularly through public co-funding; points out that the hiring of persons with disabilities must be based on the employment framework applied to other workers, in terms of pay and working time arrangements, with that framework being adapted to their needs; takes the view that persons with disabilities cannot be included in the open labour market without a general framework for employment regulation, and the promotion of both wage and collective bargaining;

80.

Highlights the need for financial assistance to enable persons with disabilities to hire or employ specially qualified helpers;

81.

Urges the Member States to ensure adequate coordination of social security for persons with disabilities, including by ensuring that they continue to receive disability support covering extra costs relating to their disabilities, even when entering the labour market or when crossing a certain income threshold, in order to support their integration into the labour market and to help ensure their dignity and equality; believes that this should be done through amendments to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and by consulting organisations that represent persons with disabilities;

82.

83.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to step up their efforts to tackle the persisting disability employment gap and to foster access for persons with disabilities to quality and sustainable jobs; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal in the European Pillar of Social Rights action plan to include the disability employment gap in the revised social scoreboard;

84.

Calls for the full implementation by the Member States of Council Directive 2000/78/EC; urges the Member States to develop employment prospects for persons with disabilities by improving their implementation of the directive, particularly Article 5 on reasonable accommodation, and by investing EU funds and Recovery and Resilience Facility funding in training and job creation for persons with disabilities;

85.

Highlights that job-matching, vocational profiling, concurrent employment and training, in-work induction and training support and career development opportunities play an important role in helping persons with disabilities to secure and retain paid employment;

86.

Calls on the Member States to ensure that labour markets and work environments are open, inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities, to support employment services, to raise awareness of inclusive employment practices, to put in place adequate incentives and support measures for companies, in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises that recruit and train persons with disabilities, and to ensure that general self-employment schemes are accessible to and supportive of persons with disabilities;

87.

Calls on the Member States to encourage workplace adaptations and take action to improve occupational health and safety; calls on the Commission to pay special attention to workers with disabilities in the upcoming EU strategic framework on health and safety at work and to set ambitious goals;

88.

Urges the EU institutions and Member States to introduce workplace quotas for persons with disabilities in order to foster an inclusive workplace;

Public procurement and EU funds

89.

Recalls that public procurement procedures in the Member States must be carried out and completed in a way that is fully respectful of the fundamental rights of the beneficiaries, including persons with disabilities; points out that Member States must comply with the CRPD when implementing public procurement legislation, in particular in connection with the choice of means of communications, technical specifications, award criteria and contract performance conditions;

90.

Recalls that a good structure of public services, especially in health and education, is essential to ensure the equal treatment of persons with disabilities, regardless of their economic condition; calls on the Member States to use the EU funds to improve these services and related infrastructures, according to the spirit of the REACT EU and Next Generation EU initiatives;

91.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include in the final content of the partnership agreements on the European Structural and Investment Funds and in these funds’ programmes objectives and approaches that improve the living conditions of persons with disabilities, while respecting the principles of accessibility and non-discrimination, and investing in equal opportunities and the participation of persons with disabilities in all areas of life, including in supporting the transition from institutional to community-based living; asks the Commission to monitor closely the use of EU funds in line with the CRPD; stresses the need for a gradual convergence of the definitions of accessibility, participation and community-based living as a means of enhancing cohesion among Member States;

92.

Calls on the Member States to take advantage of the opportunities provided by relevant EU funds for job creation and training for persons with disabilities, to guarantee and support full accessibility of public spaces and infrastructure and to ensure that EU-funded actions reach persons with disabilities; regrets the fact that the EU funds continue to be used in a number of Member States to build new segregated settings for persons with disabilities;

93.

Underlines the necessity to adequately fund the equipment that persons with disabilities need, to ensure that they can avail of the best available technology and equipment for their everyday life, their employment and their social participation;

94.

Points out that EU funds should never be used to finance inaccessible products, services or infrastructure;

95.

Invites the Commission and the Member States to ensure that rural development programmes and strategies include specific outreach measures for persons with disabilities living in rural areas and to involve them in the design and implementation of said programmes and strategies;

Digitalisation

96.

Calls on the Member States to explore the opportunities and potential brought by digitalisation and digital solutions and recognise the value of assistive and adaptive technologies for persons with disabilities, with due regard to protection of personal data and ethical concerns; recalls that the potential of the use of digital tools and assistive technologies depends on the opportunities persons with disabilities have to develop their digital skills; stresses that the development of necessary digital skills and knowledge of AI can provide a labour market foothold for vulnerable groups such as persons with disabilities;

97.

Points out that the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the entire population should be able to benefit from digital transformation, without any discrimination or exclusion; emphasises the importance of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for mobility, communication and access to public services; calls, therefore, on the Member States to actively promote the participation of persons with disabilities by providing the appropriate means for ensuring their access to online public services;

98.

Calls on the EU institutions to ensure the highest accessibility standards in their infrastructures, services and digital services, to make every effort to publish their documents related to legislative procedures in a user-friendly and accessible way, and to ensure that persons with disabilities can properly and fully access their websites and contact forms; encourages the Member States to develop programmes which aim to include persons with disabilities in society through sport, the arts, culture and leisure activities, and which promote their participation in the political process without any constraints;

Research

99.

Calls on the Commission to conduct further research into the impact and health-related effects of emerging technologies on persons with disabilities, such as the case of LED lights on photosensitive persons;

100.

Recalls that in order to develop appropriate and effective policies and find solutions tailored to the needs of all persons with disabilities in the EU, there is a need for comparable and reliable EU data; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to intensify their efforts for a common framework for European statistics on individuals and households to collect reliable data on the participation of persons with disabilities in the various levels and types of education and labour and in social life;

101.

Stresses the need to invest in innovation and research regarding the employment and entrepreneurship of persons with disabilities to support their financial survival and their participation in economic and social life;

102.

Stresses the need to step up research and innovation in the field of accessible technology in order to strengthen the inclusiveness of labour markets for persons with disabilities; emphasises the importance of ICTs for mobility, communication and access to public services for persons with disabilities;

Education

103.

Welcomes the fact that Member States are willing to implement inclusive educational policies; calls on the Member States to further increase their education systems’ capacity to provide high-quality accessible education for all learners by promoting specific measures and personalised support, such as accessible and tailored curricula and learning materials, accessible ICTs and appropriate digital education calls on the Commission to strengthen the role of the Child Guarantee, giving consideration to an accessible school award scheme, in ensuring the equal treatment of children with disabilities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest in training professionals regarding the needs of persons with disabilities; reiterates that the implementation and allocation of the relevant EU funding programmes should contribute to the transition towards inclusive education; stresses that persons with disabilities should be guaranteed access to education, including during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and that Member States should tackle all forms of discrimination and exclusion in this area; stresses the need to increase the participation of young people with disabilities in training, while taking into account their needs, which would provide them with better access to the labour market; notes the benefits for children from linguistic minorities and with special educational needs of learning in their mother tongue during early years education in cases where it is difficult for them to use language and communicate; calls on the Member States to ensure access to minority language education for children with special educational needs;

104.

Points out that inclusive education and vocational training programmes are two of the key prerequisites for a more inclusive labour market; calls on the Commission to ensure that the upcoming EU approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability is accessible and inclusive and reflects on how to improve the realisation of the right to work of persons with disabilities; calls on the Member States to take advantage of the opportunities that the improved Youth Guarantee provides for employment, education, traineeships or apprenticeships for young persons with disabilities, to ensure equal access for persons with disabilities and to introduce tailor-made policies;

105.

Stresses the importance of early, individualised and comprehensive support for children with disabilities, their parents and carers; calls on the Member States to pay special attention to children with disabilities and special educational needs;

106.

Draws attention to the importance of early childhood intervention and to the fact that children with disabilities must participate and be included in society from the very early stages of their lives; points out the need to increase the funding opportunities for inclusive education, when and where possible and advisable, both for the promotion of inclusive education’s impact on children with or without disabilities as well as for the funding of research in inclusive education; considers it necessary to encourage the use of new technologies, including ICT, mobility support devices, ancillary devices and technologies that are suitable for people with disabilities; stresses that education is central to individual development, and that accessible learning environments for persons with disabilities offer them the possibility to fully contribute to all aspects of society;

107.

Stresses that people with disabilities must be fully integrated into the labour market through the promotion of inclusive education and flexible forms of employment that can meet their needs (such as teleworking or smart working) and through the full involvement of associations for people with disabilities in developing inclusive strategies;

108.

Points out that persons with disabilities often have high levels of skills and qualifications that are undervalued; notes that this prevents them from realising their potential and deprives society of the social and economic value of their inclusion;

109.

Strongly believes that Member States should provide adequate support to children with disabilities to enable public education to become the backbone of the individualised pedagogical paradigm;

110.

Recognises the value of school and sport as crucial in the growth and development of children with disabilities, especially those with autism; regrets that, during the pandemic, distance learning has deprived them of these fundamental activities; hopes that their education will be prioritised in the reopening policies in the Member States;

111.

Proposes the creation of projects to raise awareness of the needs of persons with disabilities, by positively using the power of cultural tools, such as through the promotion of cultural events, as part of a broader educational strategy to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities;

112.

Calls on the Member States to comply with the guidelines issued by the Commission in its communication on achieving a European Education Area by 2025 in relation to the duty of governments to promote mainstreaming in all education and training sectors, in accordance with the UN commitments under the CRPD; calls for the incorporation of an inclusive arrangements system in national, European and regional education policies to facilitate the educational mainstreaming of students with disabilities, in order to avoid any type of discrimination;

Protecting the rights of women with disabilities

113.

Welcomes the European Disability Strategy 2021-2030 and its references to the specific challenges faced by women and girls with disabilities; calls for the intersection of gender and disability to be mainstreamed in all EU policies, programmes, initiatives, and in Member States’ national action plans; calls for optimising the use of the existing and future EU funding instruments to promote accessibility and non-discrimination;

114.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the full development, advancement and empowerment of women with disabilities and to promote their participation in public decision-making; points out that adequate measures should be put in place to ensure that their perspectives are fully taken into account and that, together with disability-specific consultative bodies, the participation of organisations representing women with disabilities is promoted;

115.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently address the gender-based violence that women and girls with disabilities face to a disproportionate degree, via the Istanbul Convention and by extending the areas of crime to encompass specific forms of gender-based violence in accordance with Article 83(1) of the TFEU; calls on the Commission to use this as a legal basis to propose binding measures and a holistic EU framework directive to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; calls on the Commission to ensure that the needs of women with disabilities are included in initiatives that provide support to victims through the Gender Equality Strategy and the Victims’ Rights Strategy, and to ensure that support for victims is designed in accordance with the principle of accessibility;

116.

Regrets the gender-based discrimination that women and girls with both physical and cognitive disabilities experience within the medical sector; considers that women and girls with disabilities must have full and equal access to medical treatments that meet their particular needs, via disability-specific healthcare and mainstream services; calls on the Member States to ensure further education of medical professionals with regard to the specific needs of women and girls with disabilities, and to ensure that women and girls with disabilities receive all appropriate information to enable them to freely take decisions regarding their health;

117.

Calls for universal respect for, and access to, sexual and reproductive health and rights; regrets the backlash against women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights in some countries, which is particularly harmful for women and girls with disabilities, who face additional obstacles in accessing healthcare; emphasises the importance of Member States taking all necessary measures to combat forced sterilisation; urges the Member States to ensure public investment to guarantee full access to sexual and reproductive health and rights for women and girls with disabilities; regrets that sexuality education is often denied to girls with disabilities; urges the Member States to ensure comprehensive and inclusive education on sexuality and relationships;

118.

Calls on the Member States to guarantee an accessible, non-stereotyped education system, with inclusive education measures, which prepare women and girls with disabilities for the labour market, with a specific focus on digital capabilities and lifelong learning, and to guarantee that women and girls with disabilities can choose their areas of study, to enable them to pursue jobs that they want to do and in which they can use their full potential, and in which they are not limited by inaccessibility, prejudice or stereotypes; acknowledges the link between education and subsequent employment; stresses the need for full access to education in order to combat the employment gap;

119.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the employment gap faced by women with disabilities, notably by tackling gender stereotypes, strengthening their participation in the digital economy, increasing their representation in education, training and employment in STEM subjects and occupations, and combating deterrents to work such as sexual harassment; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take concrete measures to ensure that women with disabilities participate in decision-making and receive equal pay for equal work via binding pay transparency measures, to combat their high risk of in-work poverty and to adjust labour regulations such as flexible working arrangements and parental leave to their specific needs; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support social economy business models and initiatives aimed at improving the social and labour inclusion of women with disabilities through the action plan on the social economy;

120.

Notes that more data and information collection are crucial for understanding the situation that women and girls with disabilities face; calls for relevant, accurate and disaggregated gender-sensitive and disability-sensitive data to account for the challenges faced by women with disabilities, particularly in the labour market;

o o

121.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee and the United Nations.

(1) OJ L 23, 27.1.2010, p. 35.

(2) OJ C 340, 15.12.2010, p. 11.

(3) OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 14.

(4) OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 70.

(5) OJ L 327, 2.12.2016, p. 1.

(6) OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36.

(7) OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79.

(8) OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16.

(9) OJ C 137 E, 27.5.2010, p. 68.

(10) OJ L 167, 12.6.1998, p. 25.

(11) OJ L 223, 22.6.2021, p. 14.

(12) OJ C 316, 6.8.2021, p. 2.

(13) OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 8.

(14) OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 6.

(15) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0161.

(16) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0075.

(17) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 164.

(18) Opening remarks by Commissioner Dalli of 3 March 2021 on the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030.

(19) Eurostat, ‘Functional and activity limitations statistics’, data extracted in December 2020.

(20) Eurostat, ‘Archive: Disability statistics — access to education and training’, accessed on 29 July 2021.

(21) Annexes of 17 December 2019 to the proposal for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council accompanying the communication from the Commission on the Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2020 (COM(2019)0653), p. 89.

(22) Eurostat, ‘Functional and activity limitations statistics’, accessed on 6 July 2021.

(23) Eurostat, ‘Disability: higher risk of poverty or social exclusion’, accessed on 6 July 2021.

(24) Eurostat, ‘European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions’ accessed on 2 July 2021.

(25) European Parliament resolution on the situation of women with disabilities.

(26) Gender Equality Index 2020.

(27) European Parliament resolution on the European Disability Strategy post-2020.

(28) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1.

(29) Parliament study of 1 October 2018 entitled ‘2018 Update of the Study on the protection role of the Committee on Petitions in the context of the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’.

(30) Commission presentation of 10 January 2014 entitled ‘Economic impact and travel patterns of accessible tourism in Europe: Presentation of the key study findings’.

(31) Petition Nos 1140/2015, 0857/2016, 0535/2017 and 1140/2015, and 0988/2020.

(32) https://www.edf-feph.org/independent-living-and-de-institutionalisation-policy/

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/151

P9_TA(2021)0415

Banking Union — annual report 2020

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on Banking Union — annual report 2020 (2020/2122(INI))

(2022/C 132/12)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to its resolution of 19 June 2020 on Banking Union — annual report 2019 (1),

—	having regard to the feedback of the Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) on Parliament’s resolution of 19 June 2020 on Banking Union — annual report 2019,

—	having regard to the ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities 2020 of 23 March 2021 (2),

—	having regard to the ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities 2019 of 19 March 2020 (3),

—	having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations (4),

—	having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on ‘Digital Finance: emerging risks in crypto-assets — regulatory and supervisory challenges in the area of financial services, institutions and markets’ (5),

—	having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 entitled ‘Further development of the Capital Markets Union (CMU): improving access to capital market finance, in particular by SMEs, and further enabling retail investor participation’ (6),

—	having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro (7),

—	having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the European Central Bank — annual report 2020 (8),

—	having regard to the report of the Eurosystem High-Level Task Force on Central Bank Digital Currency of October 2020 on a digital euro (9),

—	having regard to the report of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) of 9 October 2020 entitled ‘The Use of Supervisory and Regulatory Technology by Authorities and Regulated Institutions — Market developments and financial stability implications’ (10),

—	having regard to the letter of the Chair of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs to the President of the Eurogroup of 22 July 2020,

—	having regard to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)/European banking supervision response of August 2020 to the European Commission’s public consultation on a new digital finance strategy for Europe/FinTech action plan (11),

—	having regard to The Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

—	having regard to the Commission proposal of 24 November 2015 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (COM(2015)0586),

—	having regard to the 2010 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission,

—	having regard to the ECB recommendation of 15 December 2020 on dividend distributions during the COVID-19 pandemic (12),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 16 December 2020 on tackling non-performing loans in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2020)0822),

—	having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board report of October 2020 entitled ‘EU Non-bank Financial Intermediation Risk Monitor 2020’ (13),

—	having regard to the EBA report of December 2020 entitled ‘Risk Assessment of the European Banking System’ (14),

—	having regard to the study entitled ‘Regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs for FinTech’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies (15) in September 2020,

—	having regard to the statement agreed by the Eurogroup at its meeting of 30 November 2020,

—	having regard to the statements agreed by the Euro Summit at its meetings of 30 November and 11 December 2020,

—	having regard to the statement of the Euro Summit in inclusive format of 11 December 2020 on the ESM reform and the early introduction of the backstop to the Single Resolution Fund,

—	having regard to the quarterly Risk Dashboard covering Q4 2020 published by the EBA (16),

—	having regard to the ECB’s financial stability review of November 2020,

—	having regard to the monitoring report of November 2020 on risk reduction indicators, prepared jointly by the services of the European Commission, the ECB and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) (17),

—	having regard to the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities report of March 2021 on risks and vulnerabilities in the EU financial system (18),

—	having regard to the 2020 Annual Economic Report of the Bank for International Settlements,

—	having regard to the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and the UK establishing a framework for financial services regulatory cooperation,

—

having regard to the briefings of January 2021 entitled ‘Review of the bank crisis management and deposit insurance frameworks’ and ‘Banking Union: Postponed Basel III reforms’, and of October 2020 entitled ‘European Parliament’s Banking Union reports in 2015-2019’, published by the Economic Governance Support Unit of its Directorate-General for Internal Policies,

—	having regard to the Commission’s consultation on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework (19),

—	having regard to the SRB report of March 2020 entitled ‘Expectations for banks’ (20),

—	having regard to ECB paper No 251 of its Occasional Paper Series entitled ‘Liquidity in resolution: comparing frameworks for liquidity provision across jurisdictions’ (21),

—	having regard to the German Presidency progress report of 23 November 2020 on the strengthening of the Banking Union (22),

—	having regard to the Croatian Presidency progress report of 29 May 2020 on the strengthening of the Banking Union (23),

—	having regard to the speech by SRB Chair Elke König of January 2021 entitled ‘The crisis management framework for banks in the EU: what can be done with small and medium-sized banks?’ (24),

—	having regard to the FSB final report of 1 April 2021 on the evaluation of the effects of too-big-to-fail reforms (25),

—

having regard to the blog post written by SRB Chair Elke König on the SRB’s approach to minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) taking into consideration the impact of COVID-19 (26), and to her appearance in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 27 October 2020 (27),

—	having regard to the supervisory blog post by Andrea Enria of 9 October 2020 entitled ‘Fostering the cross-border integration of banking groups in the banking union’ (28),

—	having regard to the EBA report on competent authorities’ approaches to the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism supervision of banks (29),

—	having regard to the Commission’s action plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorism financing, published on 7 May 2020,

—	having regard to the EBA report on the future AML/CFT framework in the EU (30),

—	having regard to the Bruegel blog post of 7 December 2020 entitled ‘Can the gap in the Europe’s internal market for banking services be bridged?’ (31),

—	having regard to the European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report entitled ‘Resolution planning in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, published on 14 January 2021,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0256/2021),

whereas overall, the banking sector has responded to the COVID-19-induced crisis with resilience, founded on the regulatory overhaul enacted since the global financial crisis, facilitated by the Single European Rulebook and single supervision in the Banking Union, and supported by extraordinary public policy relief measures and capital conservation practices;

B.	whereas the COVID-19-induced crisis has demonstrated that a strong banking sector, combined with integrated capital markets, is vital to the recovery of the European economy;

C.	whereas the Banking Union, comprising the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), ensures full alignment between supervision and management of banking crises;

whereas a more stable, competitive and convergent Economic and Monetary Union requires a solid Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) and a more developed and safe Capital Markets Union (CMU), which would also contribute to the international perception of the euro and its increased role in global markets;

E.	whereas the Banking Union is open to all EU Member States; whereas Bulgaria and Croatia have joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II and entered the Banking Union;

whereas the completion of the Banking Union beyond its two existing pillars, in particular the establishment of an EDIS, remains a priority; whereas targeted reforms in the resolution and deposit insurance areas should further enhance the robustness of the banking sector and safeguard overall financial stability;

G.	whereas both the ECB and the SRB have called for the swift completion of the Banking Union, namely through the establishment of the EDIS;

H.	whereas the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will have been introduced by 2022, two years earlier than previously envisaged, providing a common, system-wide safety net for banks in resolution;

whereas, before the COVID-19-induced crisis, the EU banking sector was characterised by structural inefficiencies, expressed in low profitability, reduced cost-efficiency, low interest rates, overcapacity and uncertainty vis-à-vis the sustainability of business models; whereas some problems remain insufficiently addressed;

J.	whereas, despite the overall reduction in non-performing loans (NPLs) in recent years, reinforced efforts are needed to reduce the persisting high levels of NPLs in some financial institutions;

whereas the shortcomings identified during the COVID-19-induced crisis should be taken into account when revising the crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework and further integrating the banking sector; whereas embracing the lessons learned during the pandemic could pave the way for improved cost efficiency and more sustainable business models;

whereas the sovereign-bank nexus continues to exist and the EU regulatory framework for the prudential treatment of sovereign debt should be consistent with international standards; whereas the level of sovereign exposures has been growing in a number of banks; whereas a number of national options and discretions persist within the prudential legislative framework, undermining the European dimension of the Banking Union;

whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the sustainability of banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors; whereas sophisticated risk models should already capture many of the risks associated with climate change;

N.	whereas the ECB has found, in the context of its Targeted Review of Internal Models (TRIM) project, that supervised institutions can continue to use internal models, subject to supervisory measures;

whereas the drive for technological transformation has accelerated, increasing the efficiency of banks and their ambition for innovation, while at the same time exposing them to the new risks and challenges of the digital finance world, cybersecurity, reputational risks, data privacy, money laundering risks and consumer protection;

whereas consumer and investor protection is paramount to the deepening of the CMU, and strong EU consumer protection rules providing a strong minimum baseline are necessary; whereas national rules implementing European consumer protection requirements vary across the Banking Union, pointing to the need for harmonisation; whereas the Banking Union still lacks effective tools to tackle the problems consumers are facing, such as artificial complexity, unfair commercial practices, the exclusion of vulnerable groups from using basic services and the limited involvement of public authorities;

Q.	whereas the further strengthening and harmonisation of EU prudential and anti-money laundering supervision and enforcement, which are necessary to protect the integrity of the EU’s financial system, are a priority;

whereas sound global standards and principles are important for the prudential regulation of banks; whereas the standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should be enacted into European law in a timely fashion and with due regard for their goals, taking proper account of the specific characteristics of the European banking system and the proportionality principle, where appropriate;

whereas the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has resulted in the relocation of some banking services to the EU; whereas the SSM played a crucial steering and monitoring role through its systematic ‘preparedness’ guidance and coordination with significant banks on their operating models; whereas the full assessment of the effectiveness of the banking sector’s preparedness for the new reality will become clear in the medium and long term;

T.	whereas the EU and the UK are currently committed to maintaining regulatory and supervisory cooperation in the field of financial services; whereas this cooperative approach should underpin long-term EU-UK relations;

whereas the current crisis management framework does not ensure a consistent approach in coping with distressed banks’ problems across Member States, as a result, inter alia, of the differing interpretation of the Public Interest Assessment (PIA) by the SRB and national resolution authorities, the availability under national insolvency proceedings of tools similar to the resolution tools under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) (32) and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (33), and the misalignment of incentives when choosing a solution for addressing a bank’s failure as a result of the different conditions for accessing the funding sources available for resolution and insolvency;

whereas the CMDI should ensure a consistent and efficient approach for all banks, regardless of size or business model, as well as contribute to preserving financial stability, minimise the use of taxpayers’ money and ensure a level playing field across the EU, while duly taking into account the principle of subsidiarity;

whereas supervision and resolution rules, as well as the resolution fund, have been centralised, but deposit guarantee schemes remain national and differ across Member States; whereas the provisions set out in the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (34) (DGSD) provide for a minimum baseline of protection for depositors; whereas, however, depositors across the Banking Union should enjoy the same level of protection through the establishment of an EDIS;

General considerations

Welcomes the entry of Bulgaria and Croatia into the Banking Union and the inclusion of the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna in ERM II; takes note of the decisions of the ECB to establish close cooperation with the Bulgarian National Bank and the Croatian National Bank; highlights that the National Banks of Bulgaria and Croatia are duly represented in the ECB Supervisory Board and the SRB’s Plenary Session and Extended Executive Sessions with the same rights and obligations as all other members, including voting rights;

Stresses that participation in the ERM and the Banking Union is inextricably linked to the respective EU standards and legislation; encourages Bulgaria and Croatia to also make significant progress in fighting money laundering and financial crime; recalls that a comprehensive assessment of the banking sector, including of less significant institutions (LSIs), should be conducted prior to accession to the common currency;

Welcomes the discussions in Denmark and Sweden on the possibility of entering the Banking Union and stresses that cooperation among national supervisors is of the utmost importance, in particular with regard to cross-border activities; underlines the importance of preserving existing and well-functioning business models with respect to financial stability;

Recalls that the Banking Union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration through the SSM and the SRM, but that the EDIS, the third pillar of the Banking Union, is still pending; welcomes the possible revision of the resolution framework and supports the current reflection on further targeted harmonisation of insolvency laws, with a view to increasing the efficiency and coherence of the crisis management of banks in the EU, as well as on the completion of the third pillar of the Banking Union by means of a deposit insurance scheme aiming to enhance the level of deposit protection, while minimising moral hazard, reducing the link between banks and sovereigns, and guaranteeing equal protection to all depositors in the Banking Union;

Takes note of the Euro Summit statement of 11 December 2020 which invites the Eurogroup to ‘prepare, on a consensual basis, a stepwise and time-bound work plan on all outstanding elements needed to complete the Banking Union’; regrets that Member States continue to act outside the Community framework, undermining Parliament’s role as co-legislator; asks to be kept informed of the ongoing discussions at the level of the Eurogroup and of the High-level Working Group on the EDIS; reiterates its request for enhanced cooperation with the Eurogroup President, notably by expanding the frequency of the Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup President to mirror the model and regularity of the Monetary Dialogues;

Considers that banks were able to respond to the current crisis with more resilience as they were better-capitalised and less-leveraged than a decade ago, demonstrating the positive effects of the institutional set-up that has been put in place and of the regulatory reforms following the 2008 financial crisis; considers, nevertheless, that the banking sector is characterised by certain structural inefficiencies, which can be further exacerbated by the current crisis; is particularly concerned about the high levels of legacy non-performing exposures that many institutions had before the pandemic; points out that the stock of NPLs has declined considerably since the establishment of the Banking Union and that the downward trend in NPLs continued in 2020, despite the COVID-19 crisis; believes that the deteriorating asset quality of banks may impact the already subdued profitability, potentially leading to insolvency cases for banks highly exposed to the economic sectors most affected;

Notes that the completion of the Banking Union and the deepening of the CMU will deliver better conditions for the financing of the European economy, for both households and companies that are still largely reliant on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, as well as further enhance the competitiveness of European markets and promote sustainable private investments; highlights the stabilising effect of small- and medium-sized banks on the EU’s economy in times of crisis; considers it necessary to pursue a proportional approach in the regulatory developments to complete the Banking Union and the CMU;

Observes that a fully-fledged Banking Union, together with a fully integrated and strong CMU, would contribute to the resilience of the European economy, support the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, and strengthen the international role of the euro; highlights the importance of a level playing field that avoids disadvantages for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in terms of access to finance, and the need to carefully monitor the issuance of securitised products; considers that the full burden of recovery from the crisis should not fall on the banks, but should rather promote a strong CMU that contributes to the reactivation and resilient recovery of the European economy; finds that the Recovery and Resilience Facility may provide impetus for the completion of the Banking Union, considering the crucial role of the banking sector in providing access to credit and channelling the available funding into the real economy, in particular into sustainable and socially responsible investments; underlines the role of private finance and investments, alongside public investments, in supporting the climate transition, as established in the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan; calls on the Commission to make further efforts to better align financial market activity with sustainability objectives and environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria, including a legislative proposal on the development of sustainability ratings based on such criteria; calls on the Commission to pursue its efforts in the field of sustainable finance by adopting the remaining delegated acts under the EU Taxonomy Regulation (35) and the Disclosure Regulation (36) and applying, inter alia, a robust ‘do no significant harm’ methodology;

Considers that while the good relationship between the SSM and the SRB has been fundamental from the inception of the system, a strengthened approach to cooperation between the two pillars is particularly important in the current context to ensure appropriate and timely action;

10.

Underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of temporary measures such as public guarantee schemes, moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty, the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO), asset purchase programme (APP) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP); underlines that these extraordinary temporary measures should be accompanied by measures to mitigate distortions to markets and the economy; further highlights the significance of the flexibility extended by regulators to banks to allow them to operate below Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G) and with reduced capital requirements;

11.

Emphasises the exceptional nature of a pandemic and the temporary character of the relief measures put in place as an initial containment measure to limit economic damage; notes that economic support measures must remain tailored to current and expected economic circumstances; calls for a well-orchestrated, gradual and targeted shift from pandemic relief to recovery support tools, including reforms in the Member States through the national recovery and resilience reform plans, as an early or uncoordinated withdrawal of the temporary measures could see the re-emergence of the pre-crisis deficiencies and vulnerabilities of the banking sector, including increasing banks’ exposure to credit risk, potentially affecting their capital position, and potentially compromising growth and the outcome of the recovery;

12.

Welcomes the targeted changes to the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) introduced by the ‘CRR quick fix’ in order to support banks’ lending capacity to households and businesses (37), thereby mitigating the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuring that the regulatory framework interacts smoothly with other measures to address the crisis;

13.

Notes that in December 2020 the SSM issued a statement changing its previous recommendation on dividend payments and share buybacks, recommending that banks that intend to pay dividends or buy back shares need to be profitable and have robust capital trajectories; calls on the SSM to provide an estimate of the distributions (dividends and share buybacks) and variable remuneration undertaken in the first and second trimesters of 2021 by banking institutions within its remit and to assess their impact on banks’ capital position following this assessment; calls on the SSM to evaluate whether the restrictions on distributions beyond September 2021 can be a useful tool for as long as fundamental uncertainties about the economic recovery and the quality of bank assets persist; calls on the Commission to examine a legally binding dividend and share buyback tool as a supervisory tool in times of crisis;

14.

Invites the Commission, as well as national and European supervisory authorities (ESAs), to prepare for an expected deterioration in the asset quality of banks; welcomes the ESAs’ first joint risk assessment report of March 2021 advising banks to prepare by adjusting provisioning models to ensure the timely recognition of adequate levels of provisions, by undertaking sound lending practices and adequate pricing of risks, bearing in mind that public support measures such as loan moratoria and public guarantee schemes will expire, as well as by following conservative policies on dividends and share buybacks; takes note of the ESAs’ warning to financial institutions that they continue to develop further actions to accommodate a ‘low-for-long’ interest rate environment;

15.

Notes with concern the heterogeneous application of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS 9) with regard to the loss provisioning by institutions revealed during the COVID-19 pandemic; calls on the SSM to take measures to ensure the consistent application of reporting standards across institutions in the Banking Union;

16.

Considers that an integrated Banking Union must be contingent on a well-functioning single market for retail financial services; calls on the Commission to assess the obstacles and barriers that arise for consumers when availing of retail banking products such as mortgage loans on a cross-border basis and to propose solutions to ensure that consumers can benefit from retail financial services across borders; notes, furthermore, the high discrepancy in mortgage interest rates across the Union;

17.

Welcomes the accelerated pace of digitalisation in the banking sector, allowing banks to better serve clients remotely and offer new products and providing opportunities for increased cost-efficiency; stresses, in this respect, that digitalisation in the banking sector should be pursued with full respect for consumers’ rights and should preserve financial inclusion, especially for vulnerable groups with low digital or financial literacy levels; underlines that digitalisation requires considerable investments in IT systems, R&D and new operating models, which may lead to lower profitability in the short term; strongly supports the Commission’s new Digital Finance Strategy and welcomes the Digital Finance Package launched by the Commission in 2020, which will facilitate the scaling-up of innovative technology across borders while ensuring financial sector resilience; looks forward to the further development of the proposals for a regulation and a directive on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), which will ensure that financial entities put in place the adequate safeguards to mitigate the impact of ICT-related incidents; takes the view that its successful implementation will profit from significant public and private investments and cooperation in innovation towards greater security and resilience systems; considers that the digitalisation of the European banking sector offers the Union an opportunity to attract foreign capital and compete on the global market; points out, in this respect, the growing interconnectedness between banks, crypto-assets and digital finance;

18.

Underlines the importance of securing technological neutrality in regulatory and supervisory approaches; highlights the need to address the challenges and opportunities of the use of new innovative technologies related to banking supervision and the oversight of payment systems;

19.

Welcomes the ECB’s work on the digital euro, including its report on the topic and the outcome of its public consultation; points out that, depending on the precise design features of a digital euro, the impact on the banking sector might be significant, affecting areas such as payments, banks’ ability to perform maturity transformation, and overall lending capacity and profitability, and therefore invites the ECB to conduct further analysis of the implications of a digital currency for the banking sector, as well as of the potential financial stability implications; welcomes the objective of the digital euro functioning alongside cash as a means of secure and competitive digital payment, and acknowledges the potential benefits for citizens; supports the ECB’s efforts in ensuring a high level of privacy, data protection, confidentiality of payment data, cyber resilience and security; takes note of the discussion around a digital currency and acknowledges the added value that a digital currency could bring in strengthening the international role of the euro;

20.

Notes that in March 2020, the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) revised the implementation timeline for the final elements of the Basel III framework to increase the operational capacity of banks and supervisors to respond to the immediate consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic; underlines the importance of sound global standards for banking regulation and their consistent and timely implementation; awaits the Commission’s upcoming proposal on the implementation of the finalised Basel III standards; recalls that the implementation should take into account the principle of proportionality, and respect, where appropriate, the specificities and diversity of the EU banking sector, while at the same time ensuring that the EU Capital Requirements Regulation is Basel-compliant; stresses that the current revision should respect the principle of not significantly increasing overall capital requirements, while at the same time strengthening the overall financial position of European banks; recalls its resolution of 23 November 2016 on the finalisation of Basel III (38) and calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations therein when drafting the legislative proposals; calls on the Commission to introduce measures aimed at increasing banks’ lending to the real economy, in particular to SMEs, and to finance the recovery, along with the digital and environmental transition in Europe; underlines that in order to uphold its economic sovereignty and strategic autonomy, the EU needs strong and competitive European banks to offer wholesale banking services to corporates of all sizes;

21.

Highlights that there is considerable interconnectedness between the non-bank financial intermediation sector and the ‘traditional’ banking sector, which raises concerns of systemic risk given the lack of appropriate regulation and supervision of the former; stresses that the recent pandemic shock illustrated that the non-bank sector can amplify market volatility and price dislocation, particularly when market liquidity comes under pressure; calls on the Commission to consider whether additional macro-prudential tools are required, namely the development of ex ante liquidity management tools and careful analysis of existing leverage measures;

22.

Notes the interdependencies between banks and central counterparties (CCPs); points to the doubts arising in connection with the responsibilities of banks and CCPs for potential end-of-waterfall losses and the effects of those responsibilities on banks’ prudential requirements; highlights in this regard the risks of excessive reliance on UK CCPs and welcomes the measures adopted by the Commission over the past year setting the criteria for classifying third-country CCPs;

23.

Regrets the failure to ensure full gender balance in EU financial institutions and bodies, and in particular the fact that women continue to be underrepresented in executive positions in the field of banking and financial services; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; considers that the selection of applicants to EU financial institutions and bodies should be based on criteria of merit and ability, so that the institution or body involved operates as effectively as possible; calls on governments and all institutions and bodies to prioritise the achievement of full gender balance as soon as possible, including by providing gender-balanced shortlists of candidates for all future appointments requiring Parliament’s consent, including at the ECB and the EU’s top financial institutions, endeavouring to include at least one female and one male candidate per nomination procedure; recalls its resolution of 14 March 2019 (39) aiming to secure gender balance in the forthcoming list of candidates for EU economic and monetary affairs nominations and reiterates its commitment not to take into account lists of candidates where the gender balance principle has not been respected;

24.

Calls on the Commission to review the eligibility criteria with the objective of attracting a higher number of applications from women;

Supervision

25.

Acknowledges the role of European banking supervision in ensuring the provision of temporary capital and operational relief to banks as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, so they can continue to provide financial support to businesses and households and absorb losses, while maintaining the high quality of the supervision; notes the SSM’s concerns with regard to high costs, low profitability, depressed market valuations and insufficient investment in new technologies in the banking sector; calls for guidance on the expected time scale for and approach to rebuilding the buffers;

26.

Highlights the importance of enhancing the transparency and predictability of EU banking supervision and commends in this regard the recent practice of publishing bank-specific Pillar 2 requirements; believes that individual requirements make SSM expectations more reliable and facilitate more informed investor decisions;

27.

Expects that recent changes to the SSM organisational structure, while simplifying the system and incorporating technological innovation, will facilitate more risk-based supervision and internal institutional collaboration;

28.

Finds merit in the November 2020 SSM analysis of the potential vulnerabilities of the banking sector in different scenarios, with regard to the effects of the shock on asset quality and capital;

29.

Notes that sound management of credit risk should remain one of the key priorities for the SSM; shares the SSM’s concerns that banks might change their credit risk models and takes note, in this regard, of the SSM supervisory expectations for appropriate operational preparations in anticipation of the increase in NPLs and for robust credit risk management, as outlined in its letters to CEOs of significant institutions and its COVID-19 credit risk strategy; supports the SSM’s intensified oversight of high leveraged markets; notes that not all banks have been able to meet the SSM’s expectations for credit risk management, meaning that further efforts are required;

30.

Acknowledges that the COVID-19-induced crisis increases the risk of the further build-up of NPLs; notes with concern the ECB’s prediction that NPLs in a severe but plausible scenario could reach levels as high as EUR 1.4 trillion by the end of 2022; stresses that ensuring the proper and timely management of deteriorated asset quality on banks’ balance sheets will be key to preventing a build-up of NPLs in the short term; advises the Member States to make further efforts to address this issue; notes in this regard the Commission communication of 16 December 2020 on tackling non-performing loans in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2020)0822) to enable banks to support EU households and businesses; expects that the revision of the Consumer Credit Directive (40) will ensure a high level of consumer protection, namely by laying down more ambitious provisions on the protection of borrowers against abusive practices and ensuring that those rights apply equally to existing and future loans; calls for the monitoring of any potential cliff edge effects, particularly when temporary relief measures are withdrawn; calls on supervisors to continue to adequately consider the side effects that massive disposals of NPLs can have on the prudential balance sheets of banks that use internal models;

31.

Underlines that banks should comply with the applicable prudential rules and supervisory guidance on NPLs and maintain operational capacity so as to proactively manage distressed debtors and control their balance sheets, accelerating the early identification of bad loans in order to reduce the risk of weakening lending capacity in times of great demand for recovery-related investment; highlights the existing flexibility in implementing ECB guidance on NPLs, including granting more time for banks with particularly high NPL levels for the submission of their NPL reduction strategies;

32.

Recalls that risk reduction in the banking sector would contribute to a more stable, strong and economic growth-oriented Banking Union; notes, in this regard, the political agreement that was reached on the Commission’s proposal for a directive on credit servicers and credit purchasers, which will encourage the development of secondary markets for NPLs in the EU and aims to help banks to reduce the stocks of NPLs on their balance sheets;

33.

Recognises the role played by banks in supporting businesses and the real economy during the pandemic in some Member States; stresses that banks should diligently assess the financial soundness and viability of businesses, proactively engage with distressed debtors to manage their exposures, and offer financing and viable restructuring or suitable alternative options to viable sectors and companies, especially SMEs, in order to ensure that defaults are prevented where possible and that businesses and consumers are not at risk of over-indebtedness; stresses that the prudential framework should be consistently amended to allow and encourage the application of forbearance measures to firms and households where banks assess that the prospect of recovery remains high, and calls for the removal of all regulatory obstacles to their application; urges banks to contemplate, as a last resort, the exit of unviable companies from the market in a structured way; considers that banks should ensure adequate credit transmissions from the Eurosystem to the real economy; welcomes the measures set out in the Commission communication of 24 September 2020 entitled ‘A Capital Markets Union for people and businesses — new action plan’ (COM(2020)0590) and its annex on directing SMEs whose credit applications have been turned down to alternative providers of funding;

34.

Calls on the ESAs to make full use of their powers to ensure a high degree of consumer protection, including, where appropriate, product intervention powers where financial and credit products have resulted in or are likely to result in consumer detriment;

35.

Underlines the importance of protecting consumer rights, namely regarding unfair and aggressive terms and practices, banking fees, the transparency of product costs, profitability and risks; notes that the Banking Union still lacks effective tools to tackle the problems consumers are facing, such as unfair commercial practices and artificial complexity; calls, in this respect, on the EBA to devote more focus to fulfilling its mandate on properly collecting, analysing and reporting on consumer trends, and also on the review and coordination of financial literacy and education initiatives by the competent authorities; calls on the Commission to scrutinise the unfair clauses and practices employed by the banking sector in consumer contracts and to ensure the effective and swift implementation by all Member States of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (41) using all means available;

36.

Notes that the expected credit losses, together with the current low interest environment, might negatively affect the profitability of banks; points to the need for banks to readjust their business models towards more sustainable, cost-saving and technologically advanced strategies, and to perform strategic steering and prudent oversight of business functions, with full respect for consumers’ rights; emphasises the importance of ensuring that banks’ provisioning decisions to support their lending capacity are not unduly postponed, particularly when the demand for credit picks up;

37.

Is alarmed that recent banking crises have revealed that credit institutions have routinely mis-sold bonds and other financial products to retail customers; regrets that the enforcement of the BRRD provisions on consumer protection with respect to minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) has been piecemeal; urges the Commission to assess the mis-selling of financial products by banking institutions and, based on the findings, to come up with appropriate proposals, including in the upcoming BRRD revision;

38.

Considers that the possible benefits of banking consolidation, both within the EU and cross-border, in addressing low profitability, overcapacities and the fragmentation of the banking sector should be further documented; acknowledges the trend in the banking sector towards engagement in consolidation and points, in this context, to the ECB guide on the supervisory approach to consolidation, supporting well-designed and well-executed business combinations; highlights the benefits of protecting the diversity/plurality of financial sectors in building up systemic trust and maintaining financial stability; calls on the Commission to take into account and follow up on the conclusions of the Financial Stability Board’s 2021 evaluation of the effects of too-big-to-fail reforms on the financial system;

39.

Regrets that the home-host issue remains a challenge for the completion of the Banking Union and considers the introduction of the EDIS to be part of the solution, in parallel with further risk reduction measures; is concerned that if the level of NPLs rises as public support measures begin to recede, home and host countries may put in place measures to protect assets and proceed with renewed ring-fencing; stresses that banks need to be able to operate across borders while managing their capital and liquidity at a consolidated level, with credible and enforceable safeguards for host countries concerning the availability of resources and the impact on financial stability, in order to diversify their risks and address any lack of profitability; considers that gradual harmonisation is required in areas where national options and discretions apply, including in the area of insolvency law to facilitate resolution-planning for cross-border banking groups within the Banking Union;

40.

Is concerned that as Member States sell increasing amounts of sovereign bonds, the share of sovereign debt on banks’ balance sheets also grows, potentially aggravating the sovereign-bank nexus; considers that the creation of Next Generation EU will provide high-quality, low-risk European assets, allowing for a rebalancing of sovereign bonds on banks’ balance sheets and helping to reduce the doom loop between banks and sovereigns; points out that Next Generation EU will play an important role in supporting the recovery and must serve as an opportunity to enhance investments and implement the reforms needed in every single Member State based on the agreed criteria, and to make a further contribution to strengthening the European banking system;

41.

Believes that resolving the home-host issues, breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and supporting banking consolidation efforts would require the introduction of a pan-European safety net, the elaboration and implementation of intragroup financial support agreements as part of the banks’ recovery plans, and the gradual harmonisation of areas where national options and discretions apply, including in the area of insolvency, while continuing risk reduction efforts;

42.

Reiterates that the regulatory framework on the prudential treatment of sovereign debt must be consistent with international standards;

43.

Stresses the important role of robust internal governance structures within banks, and points to the weakness identified therein in the SSM’s 2020 Supervisory and Evaluation Process (SREP), which focused on how banks handled crisis-linked risk to capital and liquidity, taking into account exceptional circumstances affecting individual banks; commends the targeted approach to collecting information for capital and liquidity assessment; underlines the importance of enacting the highest standards and a level playing field in the ‘fit and proper’ assessments of board members of banks, which are currently construed differently across Member States owing to the highly diverse transposition of the Capital Requirements Directive; calls, therefore, for further harmonisation in this area; insists that fit and proper assessments by the competent authorities must always be conducted ex ante and not ex post; endorses the ECB’s plan to revise its current guide to fit and proper assessment in 2021 in order to outline its supervisory expectations of the quality of board members; anticipates the ECB’s proposals for a package of measures aimed at enhancing fit and proper supervision; encourages in that regard consideration of the integration of the ‘fit and proper’ requirements into the Capital Requirements Regulation;

44.

Notes that the EU-wide stress test launched on 29 January 2021 aims to test the capital trajectories of banks in a situation of worsening asset quality in the scenario of a low interest rate environment; calls on the EBA to enlarge the scope of subsequent stress test exercises, as the sample of 51 banks selected in the exercise is considered too narrow; stresses that running stress tests and, at an appropriate point in time, asset quality reviews of a rolling sample of LSIs are important exercises to build trust;

45.

Welcomes the efforts of the SSM to provide guidance and clarity to banks for self-assessment and the appropriate reporting of environmental and climate change-related risks; stresses that further supervisory pressure is required for financial institutions to disclose climate-related and environmental risks appropriately; considers the SSM climate risk stress test an important step in evaluating banks’ practices and identifying concrete areas of improvement; commends, in this context, the recommendation of the ECB guide on climate-related and environmental risks, enhancing a strategic, comprehensive approach to tackling climate-related risk; supports the idea of banks’ preparing self-assessment and action plans in 2021 followed by a supervisory review of banks’ actions in 2022; considers that these self-assessments and reports must be consistent with the proportionality principle and must not undermine banks’ capacity and competitiveness; takes note of the EBA’s initiative to run an EU-wide pilot exercise on climate risk, and notes its findings that more disclosure on transition strategies and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is needed to allow banks and supervisors to assess climate risk more accurately; recalls that investments and lending in unsustainable economic activities may lead to stranded assets or sunk investments;

46.

Notes the EBA’s role in leading, coordinating and monitoring the EU financial sector’s fight against money laundering and terrorist financing; welcomes the ECB’s efforts over the past two years to enhance the exchange of information between the SSM and anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) supervisors to better take into account AML aspects in prudential supervision measures; calls for this responsibility to be matched by appropriate funding and resources; welcomes the EBA’s support on the individual functioning of AML supervisory powers’ implementation across Member States and calls for further actions to ensure that AML/CFT supervision is risk based, proportionate and effective; points to the differences in approaches taken to AML/CFT supervision by national authorities and in the application of EU legislation, which may result in regulatory arbitrage; encourages partial conversion of Anti-Money Laundering Directive provisions into a regulation; regrets that several Member States have not yet fully transposed Anti-Money Laundering Directive IV and V and that even more Member States have demonstrated serious shortcomings in their effective implementation; welcomes the fact that the Commission has started to launch infringement procedures and calls on the Commission to launch infringement procedures for the remaining cases of lack of transposition and implementation of the AMLDs; takes note of the EBA’s second mandate to build a database on AML, which is expected to be developed in 2021, and to enhance cooperation and the exchange of information across European authorities; stresses the important role of AML colleges for cross-border groups, comprising all the AML authorities of the jurisdictions where the group operates, in assessing how the group is performing in the area of AML;

47.

Welcomes the Commission’s action plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and terrorism financing, published on 7 May 2020; calls on the Commission to swiftly adopt its AML legislative package; urges the Commission to present a proposal to establish a European AML supervisor; stresses that the scope of the AML framework should cover crypto-asset issuers and providers; invites the Commission to consider the creation of a European Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU);

48.

Highlights the important role of the banking sector in the battle against tax avoidance; reiterates Parliament’s position that increased audits and ‘know your customer’ requirements are in order for transactions involving countries in Annex I or II of the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes;

49.

Welcomes the Commission’s Digital Finance Package; considers that the Commission’s proposals on markets in crypto-assets and digital operational resilience are timely, useful and necessary; emphasises that while digital finance increases the financing options for consumers and businesses, consumer protection and financial stability should be preserved;

50.

Takes note of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; acknowledges the progress that many significant banks have achieved in their post-Brexit target operating models as agreed with the SSM, and supports the SSM’s efforts to monitor progress towards these models in the areas of assets, staff and booking practices; reiterates that, in the context of the relocation of business in the EU, empty shell institutions are not acceptable in the euro area; considers that existing regulatory loopholes in the EU legal framework should be addressed in order to strengthen supervision and recalls that the SSM has assumed direct responsibility for the prudential supervision of systemically relevant investment firms since the entry into force of the revised Investment Firms Regulation (42) in June 2021;

51.

Stresses the importance of maintaining a level playing field in the regulatory space and preventing a regulatory race to the bottom; notes in this context that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ECB and the UK authorities based on the template negotiated by the EBA and covering prudential supervision outside insurance and pension schemes, which entered into force on 1 January 2021, provides a solid foundation for supervisory cooperation between the SSM and the UK Prudential Regulation Authority, focusing on information exchange and reciprocal treatment of cross-border banking groups and with a view to sharing responsibilities related to branch supervision;

52.

Notes that adherence to the proportionality principle is key to making banking supervision work, in particular for smaller institutions;

Resolution

53.

Trusts that the introduction of a backstop to the SRF in 2022, two years earlier than originally envisaged, in the form of a revolving credit line from the ESM, thereby providing a safety net for bank resolutions in the Banking Union, will strengthen the crisis management framework and is an important step towards completing the Banking Union; notes that the significant build-up of the SRF, together with the common backstop, will provide the SRB with access to combined funds well above the level of EUR 100 billion; notes the need for risks in the banking systems to continue to be reduced in parallel with the establishment of the EDIS;

54.

Insists on holding banks solely responsible for their performance instead of letting taxpayers shoulder the burden of a crisis management framework;

55.

Welcomes the fact that while the SRB was not required to take resolution action in 2020, it nevertheless meticulously collaborated with the SSM regarding close-to-crisis cases; takes note of the relief measures and flexibility granted by the SRB for meeting MREL interim targets without endangering resolvability; stresses that information on such measures remains extremely limited on the SRB website; urges the SRB to increase transparency and, in particular, to make public the guidance followed by internal resolution teams (IRTs) in applying COVID-19-related relief measures; takes note of the 2020 MREL policy developed by the SRB and the dedicated reporting for MREL under the BRRD frameworks; appreciates the advancement of the current resolution planning cycle for 2021, and reiterates that proportionate MREL-setting represents one of the key elements in enhancing banks’ resolvability, while ensuring broader financial stability;

56.

Points out that the existing overlaps between the requirements for the use of early intervention measures and the standard supervisory powers of the ECB can prevent the implementation of early intervention measures; insists, in this context, that this overlap should be removed and trusts that the legal basis for each instrument will be clarified in order to ensure the appropriate and gradual application of the measures; endorses, in this context, bearing in mind the ECA recommendation on quantified thresholds for triggering early intervention measures, the use of swift supervisory actions, while avoiding automaticity;

57.

Considers it necessary to facilitate the liquidation of banks in whose resolution the SRB or the national resolution authority assess that there is no public interest; notes that the ‘sale of business’ strategy may be an important tool to be used by the SRB as a way to minimise losses in resolution; recognises the need for a more harmonised framework on market exit in insolvency to avoid limbo situations and ensure alignment with regard to the withdrawal of a bank’s licence; acknowledges that alternative measures under deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to fund deposit book transfers may have an important role to play in such cases, in particular for small and medium-sized banks, as long as they are not detrimental to depositor protection and the DGS is sufficiently funded, as a way to minimise taxpayer contributions and the destruction of value and ensure financial stability, and may also, in other cases, bridge the gap between the 8 % bail-in prerequisite for access to the resolution fund and the bank’s actual loss-absorbing capacity, excluding deposits that are meant to be transferred; stresses that such interventions should be subject to the stringent application of a least-cost test; calls on the Commission, therefore, to bring more clarity to the least-cost principle and to the conditions for the use of DGS funds;

58.

Notes that the current diversity of insolvency regimes is a source of uncertainty as regards the outcome of liquidation procedures; is of the opinion that in order for the Banking Union to function effectively, bank insolvency laws need to be further harmonised; invites the Commission, following detailed study and consultation with national authorities and parliaments, to reflect on promoting the further harmonisation of specific aspects of existing national insolvency laws, as well as the conditions for the use of external funding, so as to ensure the alignment of incentives and a level playing field;

59.

Finds merit, in particular, in adopting a targeted approach to the harmonisation of the creditor hierarchy in bank insolvency proceedings, in order to increase the scope of the funding by DGSs in resolution and in measures other than pay-outs, as long as DGSs are sufficiently funded;

60.

Considers it necessary to make resolution work for more banks, which requires a review of the public interest assessment in order to increase transparency and ex ante predictability with regard to its expected outcome, and thus allow resolution tools to be applied to a broader group of banks, in particular medium-sized banks, and to provide the clarity needed to ensure more coherent and proportionate MREL levels; notes the SRB’s ongoing work in that regard; asks that the inconsistencies between the internal resolution teams’ assessments of critical functions, as mentioned in the 2021 ECA report on resolution planning in the SRM, be addressed; further underlines the need to coherently revisit the State aid rules and the Commission’s 2013 Banking Communication to reflect progress in the implementation and improvement of the crisis management framework and to achieve consistency with respect to BRRD requirements, taking due account of recent rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union; notes, in addition, the 2021 ECA recommendation for the SRB to comply with the Single Rulebook by determining substantive impediments to resolvability in each resolution plan and to follow due process for their removal;

61.

Supports the idea of considering the role of group recovery and resolution plans, as well as their practical implementation, in the context of the review of the crisis management framework, with a view to ensuring a more efficient approach to managing difficulties in cross border banking; notes the proposals to offer banking groups the option of having subsidiaries and parent companies enter into a formal agreement to provide each other with liquidity support, and to link this support to their group recovery plans, in order to facilitate the use of existing provisions in a home-host balanced manner; takes the view that competent authorities should be involved in enforcing such formal agreements when needed; notes that these group recovery and resolution plans could allow for the calibration of MREL and that banks’ contributions to the various safety nets would be truly risk based, reflecting the likelihood and magnitude of the use of these safety nets under the preferred crisis management strategy;

Deposit insurance

62.

Stresses the importance of depositors across the Banking Union enjoying the same level of protection for their savings wherever their bank is located; points out that the implementation of the DGSD, guaranteeing up to EUR 100 000 in banking deposits, aims to contribute to a higher level of deposit protection; acknowledges the Commission’s attempt to further strengthen citizens’ confidence in the protection of deposits by introducing an EDIS; recognises at the same time the importance of the EDIS in contributing to helping to reduce the link between sovereigns and banks;

63.

Stresses the importance of the risk proportionality of contributions to DGSs; warns that the absence of a risk-based approach may create risks of moral hazard and free-riding, leading to a subsidisation of speculative business models by conservative ones; emphasises that contributions to a future EDIS must also be proportional to risk; points out that idiosyncratic risks in different institutions still differ within the Banking Union; reiterates the need for all members of the Banking Union to transpose the BRRD and the DGSD to ensure homogenous risk reduction across the Banking Union;

64.

Takes note of the review of the CMDI framework and the intermediate option for a hybrid EDIS as a first step towards the full completion of the EDIS as per the Commission’s 2015 proposal, built around the idea of a new central fund coexisting with funds remaining at national DGS level and combined with a commensurate increase in the role of the SRB; draws attention to the strong interlinkages between crisis management and the EDIS and the need to address them jointly to avoid the re-nationalisation of the Banking Union and maintain a level playing field; points out, in that context, that the review of the CMDI should strive to improve the coherence and consistency of the framework;

65.

Calls on the Commission to take further steps to relaunch the negotiations on the EDIS through a roadmap-based work plan; calls for a firm commitment on the part of Member States to work for an agreement that is consistent with Union interests as a whole; declares its commitment to working towards an agreement on the EDIS, while aiming to continue its work on risk-reducing measures;

66.

Calls on the Commission to duly take into account the role of institutional protection schemes in protecting and stabilising member institutions;

o o

67.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 45.

(2) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/annual-report/pdf/ssm.ar2020~1a59f5757c.en.pdf.

(3) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/annual-report/pdf/ssm.ar2019~4851adc406.en.pdf.

(4) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 105.

(5) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 72.

(6) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 89.

(7) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0110.

(8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0039.

(9) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf

(10) https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P091020.pdf

(11) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.esbceuropeanbankingsupervisionresponsetoeuropeancommissionpublicconsultationdigitalfinancestrategyeuropefintechactionplan2020~b2e6cd0dc4.en.pdf

(12) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/en_ecb_2020_62_f_sign~6a404d7d9c..pdf

(13) https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/nbfi_monitor/esrb.202010_eunon-bankfinancialintermediationriskmonitor2020~89c25e1973.en.pdf

(14) https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/Risk%20Analysis%20and%20Data/Risk%20Assessment%20Reports/2020/December%202020/961060/Risk%20Assessment_Report_December_2020.pdf

(15) Study — ‘Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs for FinTech: Impact on innovation, financial stability and supervisory convergence’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, September 2020.

(16) https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/Risk%20Analysis%20and%20Data/Risk%20dashboard/Q4%202020/972092/EBA%20Dashboard%20-%20Q4%202020.pdf

(17) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46978/joint-risk-reduction-monitoring-report-to-eg_november-2020_for-publication.pdf

(18) https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/jc_2021_27_jc_spring_2021_report_on_risks_and_vulnerabilities.pdf

(19) https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/finance-2021-crisis-management-deposit-insurance-review-targeted_en

(20) https://srb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/efb_main_doc_final_web_0.pdf

(21) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op251~65a080c5b3.en.pdf

(22) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13091-2020-INIT/en/pdf

(23) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8335-2020-ADD-1/en/pdf

(24) https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/1118

(25) https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P010421-1.pdf

(26) https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/967

(27) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/product/product-details/20201021CAN58122

(28) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/blog/2020/html/ssm.blog201009~bc7ef4e6f8.en.html

(29) https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/News%20and%20Press/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2020/EBA%20acts%20to%20improve%20AML/CFT%20supervision%20in%20Europe/Report%20on%20CA%20approaches%20to%20AML%20CFT.pdf

(30) https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/Publications/Reports/2020/931093/EBA%20Report%20on%20the%20future%20of%20AML%20CFT%20framework%20in%20the%20EU.pdf

(31) https://www.bruegel.org/2020/12/can-the-gap-in-the-europes-internal-market-for-banking-services-be-bridged/

(32) Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).

(33) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1).

(34) Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).

(35) Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13).

(36) Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector (OJ L 317, 9.12.2019, p. 1).

(37) Regulation (EU) 2020/873 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 as regards certain adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 204, 26.6.2020, p. 4).

(38) OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 45.

(39) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 105.

(40) Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ L 133, 22.5.2008, p. 66).

(41) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29).

(42) Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1).

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/167

P9_TA(2021)0416

Reforming the EU policy on harmful tax practices (including the reform of the Code of Conduct Group)

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on reforming the EU policy on harmful tax practices (including the reform of the Code of Conduct Group) (2020/2258(INI))

(2022/C 132/13)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to Articles 113, 115 and 116 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—	having regard to the Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States on a code of conduct for business taxation, adopted on 1 December 1997 (1) with the objective of curbing harmful tax competition within the European Union,

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 28 April 2009 entitled ‘Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters’ (COM(2009)0201),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 17 June 2015 entitled ‘A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action’ (COM(2015)0302),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 28 January 2016 on an external strategy for effective taxation (COM(2016)0024),

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 8 March 2016 on the code of conduct on business taxation (2),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 5 July 2016 on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance (COM(2016)0451), which includes an explanation of the EU listing process for non-cooperative tax jurisdictions,

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 8 November 2016 on the criteria for and process leading to the establishment of the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes,

—	having regard to the outcome of the Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) Council meeting of 5 December 2017,

—	having regard to the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation): work programme during the Portuguese Presidency (3) of 9 February 2021,

—	having regard to the Council’s most recent update to the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes of 26 February 2021 (4),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 15 July 2020 entitled ‘An Action Plan for Fair and Simple Taxation Supporting the Recovery Strategy’ (COM(2020)0312),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 15 July 2020 on tax good governance in the EU and beyond (COM(2020)0313),

—	having regard to its position on the Commission proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) (5) and on the Commission proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (6),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2021 entitled ‘Business taxation for the 21st century’ (COM(2021)0251),

—	having regard to its resolutions of 25 November 2015 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect (7), of 6 July 2016 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect (8), and of 26 March 2019 on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance (9),

—	having regard to its resolution of 16 December 2015 with recommendations to the Commission on bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the Union (10),

—	having regard to its recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (11),

—	having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on reforming the EU list of tax havens (12) and to its questions to the Commission and to the Council on reforming the EU list of tax havens (O-000082/2020 — B9-0002/2021 and O-000081/2020 — B9-0001/2021),

—	having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to the above-mentioned European Parliament resolutions and recommendation (13),

—	having regard to the report prepared for the Commission by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) GmbH entitled ‘The Impact of Tax Planning on Forward-Looking Effective Tax Rates’ (14),

—	having regard to the report prepared for the Commission entitled ‘Aggressive tax planning indicators’ (15),

—	having regard to the study entitled ‘An overview of shell companies in the European Union’, published by its Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services on 17 October 2018 (16),

—	having regard to the report of February 2021 of the UN High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity for Achieving the 2030 Agenda (FACTI Panel) entitled ‘Financial Integrity for Sustainable Development’ (17),

—	having regard to the ongoing work of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) on the tax challenges arising from digitalisation,

—	having regard to the inception impact assessment on fighting the use of shell entities and arrangements for tax purposes (18),

—	having regard to the International Monetary Fund report entitled ‘Taxing Multinationals in Europe’ (19),

—

having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (the ‘Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive I’ or ‘ATAD I’) (20) and Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 amending the Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries (‘ATAD II’) (21),

—	having regard to Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States (the ‘Interest and Royalties Directive’) (22),

—	having regard to Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (the ‘Parent Subsidiary Directive’) (23),

—

having regard to Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC (the ‘Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation’ or ‘DAC 1’) (24), Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation (‘DAC 3’) (25), Council Directive (EU) 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation (‘DAC 4’) (26) and Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (‘DAC 6’) (27),

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0245/2021),

whereas since 1997 the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation (CoC) has been the Union’s primary instrument to prevent harmful tax measures; whereas harmful tax measures are defined in the CoC as measures (including administrative practices) which affect, or may affect, in a significant way the location of business activity in the Union, and which provide for a significantly lower level of taxation than those that generally apply in the Member State concerned;

B.	whereas, according to the Commission’s Annual Report on Taxation 2021, an estimated EUR 36-37 billion of corporate income tax (CIT) revenue are lost per year due to tax avoidance in the EU (28);

whereas anti-tax avoidance policies have led to a decline in preferential regimes all around the world, particularly in the Union; whereas, according to the OECD BEPS Action 5, a preferential regime is a regime offering some form of tax preference in comparison with the general principles of taxation in the relevant country; whereas a preference offered by a regime may take a wide range of forms, including a reduction in the tax rate or tax base or preferential terms for the payment or repayment of taxes (29); whereas new forms of harmful tax practices (HTP) have emerged, notably through the transformation of preferential regimes into aggressive general regimes;

whereas aggressive tax planning consists of taking advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability; whereas tax measures should not impede private-led initiatives that allow for sustainable growth; whereas according to empirical research the effective level of taxation is lower for large multinationals than for domestic SMEs (30);

E.	whereas the work conducted by the Union against HTP includes the adoption of legislation, soft law, and intergovernmental cooperation; whereas Parliament is consulted in the area of direct taxation and respects the sovereignty of Member States in that area;

whereas concerns about HTP arose in the Union in the early 1990s when a Committee of Independent Experts was set up and delivered a report with recommendations on corporate taxation within the EU (the ‘Ruding Report’) (31); whereas in 1997 the Council of the European Union established a Code of Conduct on Business Taxation (CoC); whereas a Code of Conduct Group (CoC Group) was set up within the Council to assess tax measures that could fall within the scope of the CoC; whereas empirical research (32) suggests that EU Member States collectively lose most corporate tax revenues to other EU Member States rather than to third countries; underlines that the main cause for this loss of revenue is the lack of legislative action against intra-EU aggressive tax practices and harmful tax competition;

whereas the CoC Group aims to assess the tax measures that may fall within the scope of the CoC and is a space for cooperation and peer review of potential harmful regimes within the EU; whereas the CoC has acquired some authority among Member States, putting peer pressure on them to reform, and, by mirror effect, on third countries to cooperate in the framework of the EU listing process;

whereas the CoC Group was efficient in deterring preferential tax regimes; whereas tax competition in Europe appears to have influenced the decline in CIT rates that has brought the average European CIT rate below the average rate in OECD countries (33); whereas the CoC has contributed to preventing aggressive tax competition between Member States by setting out principles for fair competition; whereas the CoC Group has failed to eradicate unfair tax arrangements offered by some Member States to large companies, such as harmful advance pricing arrangements (‘tax rulings’), and the consequential unfair competitive advantage created; whereas the latest peer reviews of the CoC Group have focused on intellectual property (IP) regimes; whereas the CoC Group remains of purely intergovernmental nature;

whereas both pillars of the future global agreement are in line with the Commission’s vision for a business taxation framework expressed in its recent communication entitled ‘Business Taxation for the 21st century’; whereas the Commission announced in that communication a proposal for a directive that will reflect the OECD Model Rules with the necessary adjustments for the implementation of Pillar II on minimum effective taxation;

whereas the CoC Group was successful in opening a dialogue with third-country jurisdictions that are invited to repeal their HTP in order to avoid being included on an EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (the ‘EU list’); whereas the EU list must be an instrument to deter HTP by third-country jurisdictions in order to preserve global fair competition; whereas the current EU list only comprises 12 third-country jurisdictions (34) and regretfully leaves out certain notorious tax havens; whereas the EU list is established on the basis of criteria defined in the CoC;

whereas the criteria for the EU list still diverge from those used in the context of the EU peer review of HTP, while both assessments are performed by the CoC Group; whereas six Member States have received Country-Specific Recommendations on strengthening their tax system against the risk of aggressive tax planning;

L.	whereas the Commission has adopted a Communication on Tax Good Governance in the EU and beyond and envisages a reform of the Code of Conduct and improvements to the EU list;

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has plunged the EU’s economy into its deepest recession in modern times, with signs of recovery appearing only recently; whereas, as part of their response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments across the Union were quick to introduce tax measures to provide liquidity to both businesses and households (35), resulting in lower tax revenues for Member States; whereas business taxation should be a tool to support recovery through simple, stable and SME-friendly tax rules that do not hamper economic recovery with an excessive tax burden;

Current EU policies tackling harmful tax practices in the Union

Notes that several tax scandals, notably LuxLeaks, the Panama Papers, the Paradise Papers and, more recently, the OpenLux revelations, as well as public and parliamentary pressure, have boosted the EU policy agenda on HTP; stresses that tax evasion and tax avoidance result in an unacceptable loss of substantial revenue for Member States, currently needed to address the devastating consequences of the pandemic; recalls the conservative estimates by the OECD on BEPS which costs around 4-10 % of global corporate income tax revenues, or USD 100-240 (EUR 84-202) billion annually (36); recalls that Parliament’s estimates of corporate tax avoidance range from EUR 160 to 190 billion when both BEPS and other tax regimes are considered (37); calls on the Commission to undertake regular assessment of the scale of tax evasion and avoidance;

Welcomes the significant actions taken at EU and international level to strengthen the principles of tax transparency, fight harmful tax competition, and ensure that measures against harmful tax practices are respected; welcomes the interinstitutional agreement reached on the directive amending Directive 2013/34/EU (38) as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches (public country-by-country reporting); looks forward to a swift adoption by the Council of its first-reading position so that the directive can be adopted and enter into force as soon as possible; highlights the variety of EU instruments adopted to address HTP inside the Union, which include ATAD I and II, the Interest and Royalties Directive, the Parent Subsidiary Directive, the Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, and, in particular, DAC 3, 4 and 6 (on tax rulings, country-by-country reporting and mandatory disclosure rules for intermediaries), the various Commission recommendations to the Council, the CoC, and the Council recommendations in the framework of the European Semester dealing with aggressive tax planning;

Recalls that Union legislation provides minimum standards for cooperative actions and information exchange in the field of taxation; supports further discussions among Member States in order to strengthen administrative cooperation in the field of taxation; stresses that emphasis should be put on the proper implementation and monitoring of existing rules; highlights that within the EU’s social market economy, adequate tax levels and simple and clear tax laws help create jobs, improve the EU’s competitiveness, and contribute to combating tax evasion and tax avoidance; recognises that Member States enjoy discretion to decide on their tax policy as they deem appropriate, in light of their own circumstances; recalls, in this regard, that Member States should exercise their competences consistently with Union law;

Notes that the CoC works on the premise that, while tax competition among countries is not problematic per se, there need to be common principles on the extent to which they can use their tax regimes and policies to attract businesses and profits; highlights that the Commission recognises that both the nature and form of tax competition have changed substantially over the past two decades and that the CoC has not evolved to meet the new challenges, testing the very parameters of fairness (39);

Welcomes the internal and external dimension of the work conducted by the CoC Group on HTP; notes that the external dimension of HTP is mainly dealt with by the CoC Group with the application of the ‘Fair Taxation’ criterion; considers that the EU listing process needs to be reformed; recommends that this process be formalised in EU law, notably via a binding instrument; calls on the Commission to provide further information to assess the coherence between the weak criteria on HTP applied to Member States and the tougher criteria, in particular on economic substance, applied to third-country jurisdictions in the listing process; highlights that the ‘Transparency’ criterion should also be respected by Member States as per the implementation of the DAC Directive; notes that the influence of the Union in combating tax evasion and HTP worldwide depends on the example it sets at home; welcomes in this regard the announcement on stepping up the fight against the abusive use of shell companies and looks forward to the proposal on substance rules on shell companies mentioned in the Commission communication on Business Taxation for the 21st century, aimed at addressing aggressive tax-planning opportunities linked to the use of companies with no or minimal substantial presence and real economic activity in a territory;

Notes that since 1997 the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation has been the Union’s primary instrument to prevent harmful tax competition; recalls that a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) was created within the OECD in 1998 with the task of monitoring and reviewing tax practices, and with a focus on the characteristics of preferential tax regimes; highlights that the FHTP evaluations have a determinant impact on the qualification of harmful regimes in the EU listing process; calls for the CoC to remain independent from the FHTP when assessing HTP;

Recommendations for future EU work on HTP

Highlights the proposed Pillar II reform of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Inclusive Framework), which aims to address remaining BEPS challenges and to set out rules giving jurisdictions a right to tax back where other jurisdictions have not exercised their primary taxing rights or the payment is otherwise subject to low levels of effective taxation, to combat HTP and impose an effective tax rate (40); looks forward, in this regard, to a globally agreed consensus that is in line with the Union’s interests in having simple and fair tax principles and standards;

Notes the new momentum in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework negotiations created by the US administration’s recent proposals, as well as the recent Inclusive Framework Agreement and G20 Finance Ministers’ communiqué, which could facilitate a deal on Pillar II by mid-2021, gathering together more than 130 countries; shares the commitment of G7 as of 13 June 2021‘to a global minimum tax of at least 15 % on a country by country basis’ as a basis for further negotiations, reiterated on 1 July 2021 in the ‘Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising From the Digitalisation of the Economy’;

Calls on the Commission to come forward with an impact assessment of the future outcome of the international tax negotiations; recalls the Commission’s commitment to propose a similar solution to the Pillar II solution on minimum effective taxation, whether an agreement is reached or not at OECD Inclusive Framework level;

10.

Calls for the adoption of a definition of ‘minimum level of economic substance’, compatible with the global standard of the OECD and subsequent work related to BEPS Action 5, preferably based on a formulaic approach, and which would evolve progressively as reported income increases; proposes that such a criterion could be used to assess whether a tax regime is potentially harmful; recalls that the Commission considers possible new substance requirements and indicators of real economic activity for the purpose of taxation rules in its communication on Business Taxation for the 21st century; highlights the economic substance requirement already included in the EU list’s ‘Fair Taxation’ criterion; considers, however, that this criterion leaves room for interpretation and remains too vague, since it still allows for notorious tax havens to be delisted after de minimis reforms;

11.

Calls on the Commission to produce guidelines on how to design fair and transparent tax incentives with fewer risks of distorting the Single Market, and that ensure fair competition and favour job creation, notably by looking at the type (profit-based or costs-based), the temporal nature (temporary or permanent), the geographical limitation (economic zones) and the intensity (full or partial exemptions) of such incentives; takes note of a study commissioned by the European Economic and Social Committee on the reduction of corporate tax rates and its impact on revenues and growth (41);

12.

Welcomes the fact that the Commission recognises that a future minimum global taxation standard should be considered in the CoC regardless of whether a consensus is found at global level or not, to ensure that all businesses pay their fair amount of tax when they generate profits in the single market (42); observes that the Commission recently announced in its communication on ‘Business taxation for the 21st century’ legislative proposals that will be necessary to implement Pillar II at Union level, including a revision of ATAD to adapt the Controlled Foreign Company rules to the agreed Income Inclusion Rule in Pillar II, the recast of the Interest and Royalties Directive, the reform of the CoC and the introduction of Pillar II in the criteria used for assessing third countries in the EU listing of non-cooperative jurisdictions; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to guarantee that the implementing rules on a minimum effective tax rate will be designed without excessive compliance costs; understands that, overall, the national effective tax rate of any large undertaking should not fall below the minimum tax rate, following the logic of the current Pillar II proposal;

13.

Recalls that the proposal to amend the Interest and Royalties Directive has remained blocked in the Council since 2012, notably due to a disagreement on a minimum withholding tax; calls on the Council and the Presidency to relaunch negotiations in this regard;

14.

Highlights the need to tax multinational corporations on the basis of a fair and effective formula for the allocation of taxing rights between Member States; regrets in this regard that the Council did not agree on the CCTB and CCCTB proposals; urges the Commission to adjust the timeline of the future BEFIT legislative proposal to the international tax agenda; is concerned by the lack of a clear strategy to ensure that the new framework for business taxation in the Union will achieve support from the Member States;

15.

Underlines that according to the International Monetary Fund (43), even though corporate tax rates have been on a downward trend, CIT revenue collection in percentage of GDP has remained remarkably constant over time, taking account of the business cycle;

16.

Insists that the future implementation of new EU tools against HTP should prioritise the recourse to binding instruments and explore all possibilities offered by the TFEU allowing decision-making to be more efficient; recalls that the procedure laid down in Article 116 TFEU can be applied when harmful tax practices are distorting the condition of competition in the internal market and that this Treaty provision does not alter the distribution of competences between the Union and the Member States;

17.

Calls on the Commission to evaluate the effectiveness of patent boxes and other intellectual property (IP) regimes under the new nexus approach defined by Action 5 of the BEPS Action Plan on HTP, including the impact on revenue losses; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals in the event that the evaluation establishes an absence of impact of IP regimes on real economic activities; notes that the US administration is proposing to repeal its Foreign-Derived Intangible Income (FDII);

18.

Highlights that Member States’ taxation policies are monitored through the European Semester; believes the European Semester could be further developed as a tool to support curbing aggressive tax planning within the EU via the dedicated country-specific recommendations;

Reform of the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation

19.

Welcomes the fact that the CoC Group has assessed 480 regimes since its creation, deeming around 130 (44) harmful (45); recognises that the peer review of national tax regimes conducted within the framework of the CoC has had an impact on reducing harmful tax competition and has led to a consequential decrease in preferential tax regimes within the Union; anticipates a potential similar impact at global level via the EU listing process; warns, however, of the development of harmful non-preferential regimes; considers, therefore, that the current criteria defining HTP in the CoC are partially outdated given its focus on preferential regimes; emphasises the need to improve the CoC’s effectiveness in light of recent tax scandals and current challenges such as globalisation, digitalisation and the growing importance of intangible assets;

20.

Calls on the CoC to make full use of the current scope of its mandate; invites the Council, however, to continue reforming the scope of the mandate promptly and where appropriate, and notably to look into all aggressive tax planning indicators by Member State, including the general characteristics of a tax system, to determine whether its legislation comprises harmful tax measures; calls on the Council to follow up on the July 2020 Commission communication on Tax Good Governance in the EU and beyond, which advocates a reform of the CoC to ensure fair taxation within the Union; notes that this is already partially done by the CoC Group, notably for Notional Interest Deduction regimes and the Foreign Resource Income Exemption Regimes and in the framework of the EU listing process;

21.

Highlights that the CoC is a soft law instrument whose purpose is to preserve an EU tax framework allowing for a level playing field on taxation, on the basis of peer review and peer pressure; regrets, however, the non-binding nature of the CoC; takes note of the fact that Member States could delay the repealing of and even maintain a harmful regime without facing any repercussions; insists that the documentation regarding the decision-making of the CoC should be publicly available;

22.

Calls for a revision of the criteria, the governance and the scope of the CoC through a binding instrument built on the current intergovernmental arrangements and with a more efficient decision-making procedure; believes that the revision of the CoC should be conducted using a democratic, transparent and accountable process and involve an expert group consisting of experts from the field of civil society, the Commission and Parliament; calls for the revised instrument to be applied more transparently and effectively, and for it to provide for an adequate participation of Parliament in the process of designing and adopting new policies and criteria to combat HTP;

23.

Considers the reform of the criteria of the CoC to be a matter of urgency and that it should incorporate, as a first step, an effective tax rate criterion in line with the future internationally agreed minimum effective tax rate in the framework of Pillar II of the Inclusive Framework, and robust and progressive economic substance requirements, while allowing for fair competition, which is an ideal possible outcome of an ambitious effort, mainly driven by the Union and the US as its most important partner;

24.

Considers that a broad range of potential risk factors could potentially facilitate profit shifting, such as the number of Special Purpose Entities, the relocation of intangibles and high levels of passive income (royalties, interests, dividends, etc.);

25.

Supports the Commission’s intention as outlined in its Action Plan for Fair and Simple Taxation Supporting the Recovery Strategy to widen the scope of the CoC to cover further types of regimes and general aspects of the national corporate tax systems; recommends the inclusion of preferential personal income tax regimes, to cover special citizenship schemes or measures to attract highly mobile wealthy individuals and digital nomads, which could lead to significant single market distortions;

26.

Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider a ‘Framework on Aggressive Tax Arrangements and Low Rates’ (FATAL) along the following lines, and which would replace the current CoC:

Without prejudice to the respective spheres of competence of the Member States and the Union, this framework concerns those measures which affect, or may affect, in a significant way the location of business activity in the Union and the relocation of personal income and capital (individual taxation regimes).

Business activity in this respect also includes all activities carried out within a group of companies.

The tax measures covered by the framework include both laws or regulations and administrative practices.

Within the scope specified in paragraph A, tax measures which provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the Member State in question, or below any minimum effective level of tax agreed in the Inclusive Framework on BEPS or in international forums where the EU is represented, are to be regarded as potentially harmful and therefore covered by this code (gateway criterion).

Such a level of taxation may operate by virtue of the nominal tax rate, and/or the tax base or any other relevant factor determining the effective tax rate.

When assessing whether such measures are harmful, account should be taken of, inter alia:

1.	whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in respect of transactions carried out with non-residents; or

2.	whether advantages are ring-fenced from the domestic market, so they do not affect the national tax base; or

whether advantages are granted even without any real economic activity and substantial economic presence within the Member State offering such tax advantages, as defined by the European Commission and based on a proportionate substance requirement evolving progressively as reported income increases within the Member State concerned. Particular attention will be given to intellectual property regimes in this regard;

4.	whether the rules for profit determination in respect of activities within a multinational group of companies depart from internationally accepted principles, notably the rules agreed upon within the OECD; or

5.	whether the tax measures lack transparency, including where legal provisions are relaxed at administrative level in a non-transparent way.

Within the scope specified in paragraph A, preferential personal income and capital tax regimes resulting in a significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the Member State in question are to be regarded as potentially harmful and therefore covered by this code. Similarly, general personal income and wealth tax regimes that would lead to single market distortion may be covered by the scope and assessed.

Standstill and rollback

Standstill

Member States commit themselves not to introduce new tax measures which are harmful within the meaning of this framework. Member States will therefore respect the principles underlying the framework when determining future policy and will have due regard for the review process referred to in paragraphs E to I in assessing whether any new tax measure is harmful.

Rollback

Member States commit themselves to re-examining their existing laws and established practices, having regard to the principles underlying the framework and to the review process outlined in paragraphs E to I. Member States will amend such laws and practices as necessary with a view to eliminating any harmful measures as soon as possible taking into account the Council’s and Commission’s discussions following the review process.

Review process

Provision of relevant information

In accordance with the principles of transparency and openness Member States will inform each other and the Commission of existing and proposed tax measures which may fall within the scope of the framework. In particular, Member States are called upon to provide at the request of another Member State information on any tax measure which appears to fall within the scope of the framework. Where envisaged tax measures need parliamentary approval, such information need not be given until after their announcement to Parliament. The regimes that will be evaluated in the scope of the framework should be notified for information to the European Parliament.

Assessment of harmful measures

Any Member State may request the opportunity to discuss and comment on a tax measure of another Member State that may fall within the scope of the framework. This will permit an assessment to be made of whether the tax measures in question are harmful, in the light of the effects that they may have within the Union. That assessment will take into account all the factors identified in paragraphs B and C.

The Council also emphasises the need to evaluate carefully in that assessment the effects that the tax measures have on other Member States, inter alia in the light of how the activities concerned are effectively taxed throughout the Union.

Insofar as the tax measures are used to support the economic development of particular regions, an assessment will be made of whether the measures are in proportion to, and targeted at, the aims sought. In assessing this, particular attention will be paid to special features and constraints in the case of the outermost regions and small islands, without undermining the integrity and coherence of the Union legal order, including the internal market and common policies. Such assessment would consider the progressive minimum substantial economic presence requirements as defined in paragraph B.

Procedure

A group will be set up jointly by the Council and the Commission to assess the tax measures that may fall within the scope of this framework and to oversee the provision of information on those measures. The Council invites each Member State and the Commission to appoint a high-level representative and a deputy to this group, which will be chaired by a representative of a Member State. The group, which will meet regularly, will select and review the tax measures for assessment in accordance with the provisions laid down in paragraphs E to G. The group will report regularly on the measures assessed. These reports will be forwarded to the Council for deliberation and, if the Council so decides, published. The documents should be communicated to Parliament upon request and disclosed once the evaluation process is over.

Enforcement

Member States are entitled to implement countermeasures that would reduce tax avoidance incentives should a Member State fail to roll back a regime that had been assessed as harmful in the context of this framework within 2 years, and in particular:

(a)	non-deductibility of costs;

(b)	withholding tax measures;

(c)	limitation of participation exemption;

(d)	special documentation requirements, especially regarding transfer pricing;

Geographical extension

The Council considers it advisable that principles aimed at abolishing harmful tax measures should be adopted on as broad a geographical basis as possible. To this end, Member States commit themselves to promoting their adoption in third countries; they also commit themselves to promoting their adoption in territories to which the Treaty does not apply. In this context, the Council and the Commission should rely on criteria on tax transparency, fair taxation and implementation of anti-BEPS measures to establish an EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. The Fair taxation criteria should be based on factors identified in paragraphs B and C of this framework.

Member States with dependent or associated territories, or which have special responsibilities or taxation prerogatives in respect of other territories, commit themselves, within the framework of their constitutional arrangements, to ensuring that these principles are applied in those territories. In this connection, those Member States will take stock of the situation in the form of reports to the group referred to in paragraph H, which will assess them under the review procedure described above.

Monitoring and revision

In order to ensure the even and effective implementation of the framework, the Council invites the Commission to report back to it annually on the implementation thereof and on the application of fiscal State aid. The report should be made publicly available. The Council and the Member States will review the provisions of the framework two years after its adoption;

27.

Welcomes the exchange of views with Lyudmila Petkova, chair of the CoC Group, on 19 April 2021; invites the Chair of the CoC Group to appear at least once a year before Parliament at a public hearing and to present the progress report to the Council;

28.

Welcomes the publication of the biannual reports of the CoC Group to the Council; believes that a dedicated online tool should be created to avoid relying only on Council conclusions to retrieve essential information about tax policy at EU level; appreciates the efforts made to release CoC Group-related documents and work; calls for the public information to be made available on a user-friendly platform;

29.

Calls on the CoC Group to invite Members of the European Parliament to CoC Group discussions as observers; encourages the CoC Group to publicly stream some of their meetings when they do not require confidential deliberations;

o o

30.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) Annex I to the Conclusions of the Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) Council meeting of 1 December 1997 concerning taxation policy — Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 1 December 1997 on a code of conduct for business taxation (OJ C 2, 6.1.1998, p. 2).

(2) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/08/ecofin-conclusions-code-conduct-business-taxation/

(3) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6004-2021-INIT/en/pdf

(4) OJ C 331, 7.10.2020, p. 3 and OJ C 66, 26.2.2021, p. 40.

(5) OJ C 162, 10.5.2019, p. 182.

(6) OJ C 162, 10.5.2019, p. 152.

(7) OJ C 366, 27.10.2017, p. 51.

(8) OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 79.

(9) OJ C 108, 26.3.2021, p. 8.

(10) OJ C 399, 24.11.2017, p. 74.

(11) OJ C 369, 11.10.2018, p. 132.

(12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0022.

(13) The joint follow-up to the European Parliament (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs) resolution with recommendations to the Commission on bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the Union and the European Parliament (Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect (TAXE 1)) resolution on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect, adopted by the Commission on 16 March 2016; the follow-up to the European Parliament (Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect (TAX2)) resolution on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect, adopted by the Commission on 16 November 2016; the follow-up to the European Parliament (Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (PANA)) non-legislative resolution of 12 December 2017 on the European Parliament draft recommendation to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion, adopted by the Commission in April 2018; and the follow-up of 27 August 2019 to the European Parliament (Special Committee on Financial Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance (TAX3)) resolution on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance.

(14) Taxation Papers, Working Paper No 64, 31 August 2016, available at: https://ec.europa. eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/taxation_paper_64.pdf

(15) Taxation Papers, Working Paper No 71, Institute for Advanced Studies in consortium with CPB and DONDENA, 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ sites/taxation/files/taxation_papers_71_atp_.pdf

(16) Kiendl Krišto, I. and Thirion, E., An overview of shell companies in the European Union, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, Ex-Post Evaluation Unit and European Added Value Unit, 17 October 2018, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/155724/EPRS_STUD_627129 _Shell%20companies%20in%20the%20EU.pdf

(17) https://www.un.org/pga/75/wp-content/uploads/sites/100/2021/02/FACTI_ Panel_Report-compressed.pdf

(18) https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12999-Tax-avoidance-fighting-the-use-of-shell-entities-and-arrangements-for-tax-purposes_en

(19) Crivelli, E., De Mooij, R., De Vrijer, J.E.J., Hebous, S., Klemm, A., Taxing Multinationals in Europe, 2021 (https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2021/05/25/Taxing-Multinationals-in-Europe-50129)

(20) OJ L 193, 19.7.2016, p. 1.

(21) OJ L 144, 7.6.2017, p. 1.

(22) OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, p. 49.

(23) OJ L 345, 29.12.2011, p. 8.

(24) OJ L 64, 11.3.2011, p. 1.

(25) OJ L 332, 18.12.2015, p. 1.

(26) OJ L 146, 3.6.2016, p. 8.

(27) OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1.

(28) Annual Report on Taxation 2021 — Review of taxation policies in the EU Member States (https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/db46de2a-b785-11eb-8aca-01aa75ed71a1/language-en).

(29) OECD (2015), Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, Action 5 — 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1787/9789264241190-en

(30) IMF report, Taxing Multinationals in Europe, 2021: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2021/05/25/Taxing-Multinationals-in-Europe-50129

(31) Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0044caf0-58ff-4be6-bc06-be2af6610870

(32) Tørsløv, T., Wier, L., and Zucman, G., The Missing Profits of Nations, Working Paper, April 2020, available from https://missingprofits.world/

(33) IMF, op.cit. 2021.

(34) American Samoa; Anguilla; Dominica; Fiji; Guam; Palau; Panama; Samoa; Trinidad and Tobago; US Virgin Islands; Vanuatu; Seychelles.

(35) European Commission, Annual Report on Taxation 2021.

(36) https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/

(37) Drover, R., Ferrett, B., Gravino, D., Jones, E. and Merler, S., Bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the European Union, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research, European Added Value Unit, 24 November 2015. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/STUD/2015/558773/EPRS_STU(2015)558773_EN.pdf

(38) Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19).

(39) COM(2020)0313.

(40) OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation — Report on Pillar One Blueprint: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020, p. 12. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-report-on-pillar-two-blueprint.pdf

(41) Baert, P., Lange. F., Watson, J., The Role of Taxes on Investment to Increase Jobs in the EU — An Assessment of Recent Policy Developments in the Field of Corporate Taxes, May 2019.

(42) COM(2020)0313.

(43) https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/087/2021/012/article-A001-en.xml

(44) Exchange of views of the Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) with Lyudmila Petkova, Chair of the Code of Conduct Group, held on 19 April 2021.

(45) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9639-2018-REV-4/en/pdf

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/179

P9_TA(2021)0417

Human rights situation in Myanmar, including the situation of religious and ethnic groups

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the human rights situation in Myanmar, including the situation of religious and ethnic groups (2021/2905(RSP))

(2022/C 132/14)

The European Parliament,

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Myanmar and on the situation of the Rohingya, in particular those of 22 November 2012 (1), 20 April 2012 (2), 20 May 2010 (3), 25 November 2010 (4), 7 July 2016 (5), 15 December 2016 (6), 14 September 2017 (7), 14 June 2018 (8), 13 September 2018 (9), 19 September 2019 (10) and 11 February 2021 (11),

—	having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 February 2021 on Myanmar,

—

having regard to the statements of the Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 23 March 2021 on the escalation of violence in Myanmar, and of 19 April 2021, 30 April 2021, 12 May 2021 and 27 July 2021 on the situation in Myanmar,

—	having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 30 April 2021 on the outcome of the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting,

—	having regard to the statements by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 3 March 2021 on continued human rights violations by the military, and of 23 May 2021 on the latest developments in Myanmar,

—	having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1000 of 21 June 2021 amending Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma (12),

—	having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/711 of 29 April 2021 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma (13),

—	having regard to the EU guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief,

—	having regard to Article 34 of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar recognising the freedom of religion or belief and guaranteeing citizens the ‘right to freely profess and practice religion’,

—	having regard to the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s Five Point Consensus of 24 April 2021,

—	having regard to the report of the UN Secretary-General of 31 August 2021 entitled ‘Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar’,

—	having regard to Resolution 75/287 of 18 June 2021 of the UN General Assembly on the situation in Myanmar,

—	having regard to the report of 22 August 2019 of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar entitled ‘Sexual and gender-based violence in Myanmar and the gendered impact of its ethnic conflicts’,

—	having regard to the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the reports of the International Labour Organization supervisory mechanism,

—	having regard to the report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 16 September 2021 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,

—	having regard to the statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Myanmar of 23 September 2021,

—	having regard to the statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, of 22 September 2021,

—	having regard to the UN Human Rights Council reports on Myanmar and the situation of the human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities,

—	having regard to the report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar of 1 July 2021,

—	having regard to the final report and recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (Annan Report),

—

having regard to the order of the International Court of Justice of 23 January 2020 on the request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by the Republic of the Gambia in the case concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar),

—	having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

—	having regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols thereto,

—	having regard to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948,

—	having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

whereas on 1 February 2021, the military of Myanmar, known as the Tatmadaw, in a clear violation of the constitution of Myanmar, arrested President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as leading members of the government, seized power over the legislative, judicial and executive branches of the government by means of a coup d’état, and declared a one-year state of emergency; whereas in August 2021, the commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing, announced that he was appointing himself Prime Minister and that the state of emergency would be extended until August 2023;

whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar indicated in a formal statement that the military junta’s widespread, systematic attacks against the people of Myanmar likely amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes under international law; whereas the UN Special Rapporteur explicitly stated that the architects and perpetrators of the coup and the violations should be held accountable;

C.	whereas in May 2021, the military junta took initial steps to dissolve the political party of Aung San Suu Kyi, which was in government until the coup d’état of February 2021;

D.	whereas the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the National Unity Government (NUG) were formed to represent the democratic wishes of the people of Myanmar;

whereas in response to the coup, peaceful protests and demonstrations broke out in various cities in Myanmar; whereas since 1 February 2021, politicians, government officials, civil society representatives, religious actors, peaceful protestors and writers have been unlawfully arrested or put under house arrest; whereas the latest report from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights states that since the coup, more than 1 120 people have been killed and military authorities have arrested over 8 000 people, including hundreds of politicians, activists and civil servants; whereas the courts have sentenced 312 people, 26 of whom have been sentenced to death, including two children; whereas at least 120 people have reportedly died in custody; whereas as of July 2021, the junta had killed at least 75 children;

whereas the military has, in parallel, been increasing its crackdown on the media in Myanmar, with a growing number of journalists having been arbitrarily arrested, detained and charged in order to silence the media and eradicate freedom of expression; whereas the junta is increasingly making use of tools of surveillance and censorship through restrictions on telecommunications and the internet;

whereas torture is widely used against the people held in custody for taking part in pro-democracy demonstrations; whereas methods of torture include beatings, mock executions with guns, cigarette burns, and rape and threats of rape; whereas torture by the police has been a problem in Myanmar before, but the Tatmadaw is now using a systematic threat of torture as a part of its efforts to oppress the opposition;

whereas the junta is increasingly relying on the use of collective punishment, including the abduction of the family members of those who have been issued with arrest warrants, but who the police and military forces are unable to locate; whereas children, including toddlers, have also been killed or abducted, presumably to force their parents to turn themselves in to the authorities;

I.	whereas ethnic minorities practice Christianity (6,3 %, particularly the Chin, Kachin and Karen people), Islam (2,1 %, particularly the Rohingya, Malays, people from Yangon and other minorities), and Hinduism (0,5 %, particularly Burmese Indians);

J.	whereas violations of the freedom of religion or belief and other human rights are being perpetrated against religious and ethnic minorities in Myanmar;

K.	whereas churches have been shelled and raided, and priests and pastors have been arrested; whereas military troops have also set up camps in church compounds, thus further undermining their role as sanctuaries for people in need;

L.	whereas there are numerous ethnic groups in Myanmar; whereas internal conflicts have led to the tragic loss of thousands of lives over the past decades;

whereas Myanmar’s Citizenship Law declares the Rohingya ‘non-national’ or ‘foreign residents’ and therefore deprives them of citizenship, which further exacerbates their precarious situation; whereas the persecution of the Rohingya minority has not ended, despite numerous calls by the international community;

whereas the roughly 600 000 Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State are being subjected to persistent discriminatory policies and practices, systematic violations of their fundamental rights, arbitrary arrests, confinement in overcrowded camps and severely limited access to education and healthcare; whereas the oppressive conditions imposed on the Rohingya amount to crimes against humanity;

O.	whereas the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities, in particular women and girls, remain at significant risk of sexual violence, notably in the context of the protracted conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army;

whereas the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar is worsening, with more than 210 000 people internally displaced this year alone, three million people in need of humanitarian aid, a number which has tripled in the last eight months, and half the population, approximately 20 million people, living below the poverty line;

Q.	whereas the UN Secretary-General has warned that ‘the risk of a large-scale armed conflict requires a collective approach to prevent a multi-dimensional catastrophe in the heart of Southeast Asia and beyond’;

R.	whereas the World Food Programme estimates that 6,2 million people across Myanmar are at risk of food insecurity and hunger, up from 2,8 million prior to the military coup;

S.	whereas the humanitarian situation in Myanmar has also been worsened by the COVID-19 crisis; whereas the arbitrary mass detention of protesters, crowded prisons and the overall neglect of prisoners’ health have also contributed to an increase in the number of COVID-19 infections;

whereas the military has used COVID-19 measures to crack down on pro-democracy activists, human rights defenders and journalists; whereas the right to health is being undermined; whereas the junta has shut down hospitals and targeted medical professionals, leading to the collapse of the health system as COVID-19 surges across the country; whereas troops have destroyed medical supplies and equipment and have occupied dozens of medical facilities, which has prompted the people of Myanmar to stay away from medical facilities for fear of being detained or shot;

U.	whereas the Tatmadaw and its generals are illegally securing funds through the illegal sale of timber, gems, gas and oil, and are faced with widespread allegations of corruption;

V.	whereas according to the UN, the 2021 UN Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan has received only 46 % of the requested funds to date and humanitarian operations are suffering as a result of a major funding shortfall;

Strongly condemns the coup d’état of 1 February 2021 executed by the Tatmadaw under the leadership of commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing; calls on the Tatmadaw to fully respect the outcome of the democratic elections of November 2020 and to immediately reinstate the civilian government, end the state of emergency, end the use of violence against peaceful protesters, respect the right to freedom of expression and association, and allow all elected parliamentarians to assume their mandates; calls on Myanmar’s military to release all political detainees, to reverse restrictions on the freedom of expression, assembly and association, and to respect the freedom of religion or belief;

Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and all others who have been arrested on unfounded accusations; considers the release of all political leaders and prisoners the first essential step towards a peaceful solution to the crisis and the restoration of the legitimate authorities;

Expresses its support for the people of Myanmar in their struggle for democracy, freedom and human rights;

Denounces the Tatmadaw’s widespread violent response to any kind of protest and the gross human rights violations it has committed and continues to commit against the people of Myanmar, including against ethnic and religious minorities, which amount to crimes against humanity; expresses its deep concern at the frequent attacks on churches, mosques, schools and medical facilities, and the arrests of religious leaders;

Supports the CRPH and the NUG as the only legitimate representatives of the democratic wishes of the people of Myanmar, and calls on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the international community to include and involve them in genuine and inclusive political dialogue and efforts aimed at the peaceful resolution of the crisis based on respect for the rule of law;

Calls for immediate and regular access for the International Committee of the Red Cross to detainees and prisons, as covered by the Geneva Conventions; calls on the military and police forces to provide the families of all individuals detained in connection with the security force operations across Myanmar prior to and in the aftermath of 1 February 2021 with full information about their fate and whereabouts;

Recalls the multi-ethnic nature of Myanmar; urges the Tatmadaw to fully respect each ethnicity’s inalienable rights; calls for an immediate, rigorous, independent and transparent investigation into the crimes committed in the country by the military and for their perpetrators to be brought to justice;

Is appalled by the Tatmadaw’s crimes against ethnic and religious groups in Myanmar; strongly condemns the attacks by the Tatmadaw in the states of Kayin, Kayah, Kachin, Shan and Chin, which have led to large-scale displacement, the death of civilians, including children, the destruction of religious buildings, and other violations of human rights and humanitarian law;

Condemns the persecution of Christians in the country; urges the Tatmadaw to stop killing and arresting Christians and to end the shelling and raiding of churches; stresses that the international community has expressed its deep concerns about the violent targeting of Christian communities in Myanmar;

10.

Reiterates its condemnation of the human rights violations and systematic and widespread attacks against the Rohingya population; underlines that the EU will continue to closely monitor the actions of the military leadership towards minorities in the country, in particular the Rohingya; reiterates its call on the authorities of Myanmar to establish conditions and guarantees for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return, under the oversight of the UN, of those Rohingya who wish to return to their native land;

11.

Strongly condemns the ongoing discrimination against ethnic minorities, whose freedom of movement is severely restricted and who are deprived of basic services in Myanmar;

12.

Condemns any use of violence by the junta against its citizens, as well as other forms of harassment, in particular towards human rights defenders, civil society activists and journalists; urges the junta to remove any restrictions on telecommunications and the internet, including independent media websites and social media platforms;

13.

Calls for an immediate end to the violence towards labourers and unions, and for the rights of unions and their members to be protected, including the right to operate freely;

14.

Calls for immediate humanitarian access to and assistance for vulnerable communities, including women, children and ethnical minorities, and for the empowerment of civil society organisations and ethnic community-based organisations, in order to ensure that humanitarian aid effectively reaches those in need; asks the Commission to redirect and step up humanitarian aid, including healthcare support, through cross-border channels, local humanitarian networks, ethnic service providers, and community-based and civil society organisations; asks the Commission to analyse how best to pursue development projects with these groups and to direct development assistance accordingly;

15.

Notes with grave concern that the humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by a third wave of COVID-19 in Myanmar, with particularly worrying transmission levels among the most marginalised populations, including those in the country’s overcrowded and unsanitary prisons; urges the junta to re-establish a containment strategy and a contact-tracing system, and to ensure that people have access to healthcare services and vaccines; asks the Commission to step up its support in this regard and to guarantee that this support reaches the citizens, including by providing doses of COVID-19 vaccines;

16.

Is appalled by the attacks, harassment, detainment and torture of healthcare workers, especially during the ongoing COVID-19 healthcare crisis; calls on the junta to guarantee the security and safety of all healthcare workers and to immediately cease all harassment and attacks against these people; stresses the responsibility of the Myanmar authorities to guarantee full access to healthcare;

17.

Condemns the attacks by the military authorities against medical professionals and facilities, and the response of these authorities to the COVID-19 pandemic; highlights that health and access to healthcare and vaccinations are universal human rights;

18.

Calls on the Tatmadaw to stop denying the right of the population to protection against and proper treatment for COVID-19, which could cause significant loss of life in Myanmar;

19.

Urges the governments of the neighbouring countries to ensure that their authorities do not prevent anyone from crossing the border in search of refuge; calls on these governments to ensure that aid organisations and local civil society organisations are allowed to access areas with internally displaced people along their borders with Myanmar;

20.

Reiterates its support for civil society and democracy advocates in Myanmar and calls for the EU and its institutions to continue efforts aimed at civil society advancement, despite the current and possibly ongoing limitations imposed by the current military government;

21.

Calls on ASEAN, its members and particularly its Special Envoy to Myanmar to make more proactive use of their special role in Myanmar, to cooperate with the UN Special Envoy and to engage with all parties involved, notably with the NUG and representatives of civil society, in particular women and ethnic groups, in order to promote, at a minimum, the effective and meaningful implementation of the five-point consensus with a view to achieving the sustainable and democratic resolution of the current crisis in the near future;

22.

Further calls on China and Russia to actively engage in international diplomacy and live up to their responsibility as permanent members of the UN Security Council; expects them to play a constructive role when scrutinising the situation in Myanmar;

23.

Urges Myanmar to cooperate with international efforts to ensure accountability, including by finally granting the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) full access to the country; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to ensure that the IIMM has the requisite support to execute its mandate; recalls that Myanmar is under the obligation to comply with the provisional measures order of the International Court of Justice;

24.

Welcomes the recent rounds of sanctions imposed by the Council against members of the Tatmadaw and their businesses, and calls on the Council to continue imposing targeted and robust sanctions, with the aim of cutting off the lifelines of the junta while ensuring that the people of Myanmar come to no harm; is of the opinion that the international community must continue to take additional action against, and impose costs on, the military and its leaders until they reverse course and provide for a return to democracy; stresses the need for all EU Member States to strengthen and enforce sanctions imposed against any state-run Myanmar businesses, notably in the timber and gem industry; urges the Commission to ensure that national penalties imposed on Member States and associated countries for breaching EU sanctions are effective; stresses that this would require imposing specific asset freezes and bans on international financial transfers to the two state-owned banks, the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and the Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank, through which all foreign currency is collected, and adding to the sanctions list the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, which generates the junta’s single largest foreign currency inflow;

25.

Calls on the Council to continue to impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for the coup of February 2021 and to consider other possible measures; urges the Council to include the State Administrative Council as an entity instead of its individual members, on the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures;

26.

Reiterates its call on EU-based businesses with operations or supply chains in Myanmar to conduct heightened human rights due diligence and to ensure that they have no ties with Myanmar’s security forces, their individual members or entities owned or controlled by them, and that they do not contribute, directly or indirectly, to the junta’s crackdown on democracy and human rights; calls on EU-based businesses to publicly disclose their conclusions and to work on continually improving labour conditions and environmental standards within their undertakings in Myanmar;

27.

Reiterates its call to continue implementing targeted sanctions against those who are responsible for the atrocities against the Rohingya;

28.

Reiterates its call on the Commission to swiftly launch an investigation into the trade preferences that benefit Myanmar, especially regarding companies owned by members of the Myanmar military, in specific sectors and to keep Parliament duly informed of the steps to take; acknowledges that improvements have been achieved since Myanmar was reinstated into the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme in 2013, for example the creation of jobs in the garment sector, which has benefited women in particular; underlines, however, that the enhanced engagement process had already been established in 2018, focusing on compliance with international human rights conventions and labour rights, and that the coup reversed the progress made during the democratisation process, thereby undermining the conditions for granting EBA preferences;

29.

Calls on the EU delegation to Myanmar and the embassies of the Member States to closely monitor the human rights and health situation in Myanmar and the cases of political leaders and others who are currently detained and imprisoned;

30.

Calls on the Member States and associated countries to maintain the embargo on the direct and indirect supply, sale and transfer, including transit, shipment and brokering, of all weapons, munitions and other military, security and surveillance equipment and systems, as well as the provision of training, maintenance and other military and security assistance; highlights the need for the further investigation of the situation by the International Criminal Court;

31.

Warns of the risk of an even larger humanitarian emergency as a consequence of the escalation of violence and of the country’s severe economic crisis, poverty and number of displaced people; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to urgently meet their financial obligations to the 2021 UN Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan;

32.

Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to vigorously address the situation in Myanmar, and calls on the VP/HR to report back to Parliament, in particular to its Committee on Foreign Affairs, on a regular basis, including on the situation of religious and ethnic groups, in order to ensure adequate parliamentary dialogue on this important and worrying situation;

33.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the legitimate President and National Unity Government of Myanmar, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the State Counsellor of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the governments and parliaments of the United States, Bangladesh, the United Kingdom, Japan, India, Australia, Canada, the Member States of ASEAN, the governments and parliaments of Russia and China, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Human Rights Council.

(1) OJ C 419, 16.12.2015, p. 189.

(2) OJ C 258 E, 7.9.2013, p. 79.

(3) OJ C 161 E, 31.5.2011, p. 154.

(4) OJ C 99 E, 3.4.2012, p. 120.

(5) OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 134.

(6) OJ C 238, 6.7.2018, p. 112.

(7) OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 109.

(8) OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 80.

(9) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 124.

(10) OJ C 171, 6.5.2021, p. 12.

(11) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0054.

(12) OJ L 219 I, 21.6.2021, p. 57.

(13) OJ L 147, 30.4.2021, p. 17.

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/189

P9_TA(2021)0419

The state law relating to abortion in Texas, USA

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state law relating to abortion in Texas, USA (2021/2910(RSP))

(2022/C 132/16)

The European Parliament,

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 November 2020 on the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III — an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

—	having regard to the WHO’s guidance entitled ‘Safe abortion: technical and policy guidance for health systems’,

—	having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

—	having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966,

—	having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 1979,

—	having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (‘the Istanbul Convention’),

—	having regard to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989,

—	having regard to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984,

—	having regard to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 2006,

—	having regard to the statement by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘UN experts denounce further attacks against right to safe abortion and Supreme Court complicity’,

—	having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

—	having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed in 2015 and, in particular, Goals 3 and 5, on promoting health and on gender equality respectively,

—	having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’),

—	having regard to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, its Programme of Action, and the outcomes of its review conferences,

—

having regard to the Nairobi Statement on the 25th anniversary of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD25) of 1 November 2019 entitled ‘Accelerating the Promise’ and to the national and partner commitments and collaborative actions that were announced at the Nairobi Summit,

—

having particular regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU, in the frame of women’s health (1), declaring access to reproductive healthcare a fundamental pillar of women’s human rights, and the denial thereof to be a form of violence against women and girls,

—	having regard to the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcomes of its review conferences,

—	having regard to the Constitution of the United States of America,

—	having regard to the Roe v. Wade ruling of 1973, and affirmed in the Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt rulings, which establishes the US constitutional right for pregnant women to decide whether to continue a pregnancy pre-viability,

—	having regard to 2021 Texas Senate Bill 8 (SB8) ‘Relating to abortion, including abortions after detection of an unborn child’s heartbeat; authorizing a private civil right of action’,

—	having regard to the US Supreme Court order of 1 September 2021 refusing to block Texas law SB8,

—	having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

whereas on 1 September 2021, the State of Texas enacted SB8, prohibiting women from accessing abortion care following the commencement of foetal cardiac impulses, de facto as little as six weeks since the last menstrual cycle, necessitating two separate ultrasound scans before the procedure may be performed, and with no exception if the pregnancy results from for rape, incest or for foetal health conditions incompatible with sustained life after birth; whereas SB8 amounts to a near-total abortion ban;

B.	whereas both the USA and the EU must uphold the principle of human rights as inalienable and inherent to all human beings;

C.	whereas the fundamental nature of the transatlantic partnership means that it is rooted in our shared values, including respect for human rights;

whereas gender equality, empowering all women and girls, ensuring healthy lives, ending poverty everywhere and promoting well-being for all at all ages are fundamental goals set out in SDGs 1, 3 and 5; whereas all UN Member States have assumed duties and obligations to respect and promote these goals set out in the SDGs, including targets 3.7 and 5.6 on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR);

whereas SRHR are grounded in fundamental human rights, are protected in international and European human rights law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CEDAW and the European Convention on Human Rights, and constitute an essential element of comprehensive healthcare provision;

whereas the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities issued a joint statement in August 2018 emphasising that access to safe and legal abortion, as well as to related services and information, is an essential aspect of women’s reproductive health, and urging countries to put an end to restrictions on the SRHR of women and girls, as this threatens their health and lives; whereas access to abortion is a human right, while the delaying or denying access to abortion constitutes a form of gender-based violence and may amount to torture and/or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; whereas SRHR are targets under UN SDGs 3 and 5, and whereas gender-based violence and eliminating all harmful practices against women is a target under SDG 5;

whereas access to comprehensive sexuality and relationship education, and SRHR, including family planning, contraceptive methods and safe and legal abortion, as well as every person’s autonomy and ability to make free and independent decisions about their bodies and lives, is a precondition for their independence and is thus essential for achieving gender equality in all areas of private and public life, including participation in the labour market and in politics, and eliminating gender-based violence; whereas the principle of ‘their body, their choice’ applies;

H.	whereas engaging men and boys for and in SRHR is both a goal and a prerequisite for achieving sustainable equality;

whereas the realisation of SRHR is an essential element of human dignity and is intrinsically linked to the achievement of gender equality and combating gender-based violence; whereas the participation of women and girls in the formulation of laws and policies that affect them and concern their human rights, including SRHR and abortion, and ensuring that they can access justice and remedies when their rights are violated, is key to achieving gender equality;

J.	whereas the right to respect for a person’s physical and mental integrity is central to the Charter;

whereas in the landmark case Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court legalised abortion across the US, which establishes the US constitutional right for pregnant women to decide whether to continue a pregnancy pre-viability; whereas this was further affirmed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt cases;

L.	whereas 12 other US states have enacted bans on abortion early in pregnancy, but have all been blocked from entering into force by being declared unconstitutional by federal courts;

M.	whereas SB8 bans abortion after approximately six weeks of pregnancy and whereas given that prior to SB8, around 85 to 90 % of women who obtained abortion care in Texas were at least six weeks into pregnancy, the law will lead to the de facto end of abortion care in the state;

whereas SB8 is designed to absolve government officials from enforcing the law, but instead incentivises private citizens to seek monetary rewards by suing anyone who provides abortion care or assists someone in obtaining such care in the state, which will most likely lead to legalised harassment of healthcare providers, women in need of abortion care and anyone who helps them, including their loved ones; whereas SB8 will in any case lead to a chilling effect on healthcare providers;

whereas the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has observed that criminalising abortion serves no deterrent value; whereas, as noted by the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, where there are legal restrictions on abortion, safe termination of pregnancy becomes a privilege of socio-economically advantaged women, while women with limited resources are compelled to resort to unsafe and clandestine abortions, thereby putting their life and health at risk; whereas as has already been seen in other cases of abortion restrictions, SB8 will disproportionately affect people already facing discrimination or obstacles in accessing health care, including racialised people, ethnic minorities, undocumented women and those living on low incomes or in rural areas who do not have the means to travel in order to access these services;

P.	whereas prohibiting abortion and thereby forcing women to seek unsafe abortions results in increased maternal mortality, deaths that are entirely preventable;

whereas Texas has already enacted 26 abortion restrictions in the past decade, including this year’s ban on abortion after six weeks and a ban on abortion that would take effect if Roe v. Wade were overturned; whereas during this time, the number of abortion clinics in the state has gone down from 46 in 2011 to only 21 clinics in 2017; whereas this means that women cannot access the care they need;

whereas abortion was already difficult to access in Texas and in other regions across the United States, and those who face barriers to obtaining health care, including marginalised and vulnerable groups, primarily those with lower incomes, are those who feel the greatest impact from a ban such as SB8;

whereas with abortion to all intents and purposes being banned in Texas, patients are heading to reproductive health clinics in neighbouring states and overwhelming the region’s fragile abortion infrastructure; whereas more than 56 000 abortions take place in the state of Texas each year; whereas it seems unlikely that neighbouring states would be able to accommodate all the patients who would typically be getting abortions since the enactment of SB8;

whereas among adolescent girls aged between 15 and 19, pregnancy and childbirth complications are the leading cause of death globally; whereas the Committee on the Rights of the Child urges countries to decriminalise abortion and ensure that girls have access to safe abortion services; whereas teenage pregnancy exacerbates the cycle of poverty; whereas Texas is the seventh state with the highest teen birth rates in the US, and the state with the highest rate of repeat births among teens; whereas Hispanic and African American girls have particularly high rates of teen pregnancy, as well as girls with low educational attainment, living in rural areas, in foster care, and those living in poverty; whereas teenage mothers are significantly more likely to discontinue their studies and face unemployment; whereas 65 % of children born to young parents in Texas live in poverty, and are more likely to be in poor health and have low educational attainment;

whereas SB8 is one of the strictest abortion measures in the US, banning abortions in the state after foetal cardiac activity is detectable, with an exception only for medical emergencies but not for rape, incest or for foetal health conditions incompatible with sustained life after birth; whereas this constitutes a form of gender-based violence that may amount to torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment;

V.	whereas the Center for Reproductive Rights and its partners filed an emergency request with the US Supreme Court on 30 August 2021 to block the law in Texas from entering into force;

whereas the bill was opposed by more than 300 Texas lawyers, who said it undermined long-standing rules and tenets of the legal system; whereas more than 200 physicians across Texas expressed deep concerns over their ability to administer healthcare, cautioning that the bill would create a ‘chilling effect’ that would prevent physicians in over 30 specialties, including primary care, emergency medicine, obstetrics-gynaecology and internal medicine, from providing information on all pregnancy options to patients for fear of frivolous lawsuits;

whereas UN human rights experts have denounced the adoption of the SB8 as alarming, as well as the harm the ban will cause to pregnant women in Texas and, in particular, women from marginalised communities, women with low incomes, women living in rural areas, and women from racial and ethnic minorities, as well as migrant women, who will be disproportionately affected by this ban, and have called on the US Government to prevent retrogression in access to abortion and instead enact positive measures to ensure access to safe and legal abortion;

Y.	whereas the US Supreme Court ruled by five to four against blocking the Texas law, stating that the challengers did not carry their burden on the ‘complex and novel antecedent procedural questions’ in the case;

Z.	whereas on 9 September 2021 the US Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Texas, arguing that the ban violates an individual’s constitutional right to an abortion before viability, and whereas the federal district court has set a preliminary injunction hearing for 1 October 2021;

AA.

whereas President Biden has declared that the bill represents an ‘unprecedented assault on a woman’s constitutional rights’, pledging a ‘whole-of-government effort’ to counter the law and calling for ‘women in Texas to have access to safe and legal abortions’, and affirmed in his statement that the Biden-Harris Administration will always fight to protect access to healthcare and defend a woman’s right to make decisions about her body and determine her future;

AB.

whereas the Guttmacher Institute’s report of September 2019 entitled ‘Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2017’ noted a worrying upward trend of potentially dangerous non-medical attempts at self-induced abortion in American states with restrictive access to reproductive healthcare;

Joins the vocal condemnations across the USA of the adoption by the Texas Legislature of SB8, which de facto amounts to a total ban on abortion with no exception for rape, incest or for foetal health conditions incompatible with sustained life after birth, as a strong attack on women’s freedom and SRHR which are fundamental human rights, and as a violation of US women’s constitutional rights; is deeply concerned about the extent to which this prohibition will contribute to the trauma experienced by rape and incest victims;

Calls on the Government of the State of Texas to swiftly repeal SB8, to ensure safe, legal, free and good quality abortion services in the State and to make these services easily accessible to all women and girls;

Expresses its firm solidarity with and support to the women of Texas and those involved in both the provision of and advocacy for abortion healthcare in such trying circumstances;

Welcomes President Joe Biden’s efforts in directing the Council and the Office of the White House Counsel to launch a whole-of-government effort to respond to the decision, in order to ensure that women in Texas have access to safe and legal abortions as protected by Roe v. Wade; welcomes the fact that on Friday 1 October 2021, President Joe Biden’s Administration urged a judge to block the ban on abortion imposed by Texas;

Expresses its full support and solidarity to medical professionals and those engaged in legal challenges against Senate Bill 8, in the hope that their work will result in the restoration of Texan women’s right to reproductive healthcare; recognises the role played by NGOs as service providers and also as advocates for SRHR in the US, and encourages them to continue with their work as advocates for these fundamental rights; affirms that these NGOs need a proper level of funding in order to operate;

Underlines that on 14 September 2021, the UN experts stressed that ‘women’s human rights are fundamental rights that cannot be subordinated to cultural, religious or political considerations’, and that ‘adding that the influence of ideologically and religiously motivated interference in public health matters has been particularly detrimental to the health and well-being of women and girls’;

Deeply regrets the fact that the US Supreme Court, by a sharply divided split decision (four to five), declined to rule on blocking the introduction of the unprecedented SB8; recalls that this decision does not mean that the law has been deemed constitutional;

Calls on President Joe Biden to continue his efforts to ensure access to safe and legal abortions; encourages further efforts to be made in order to ensure that abortion and contraception are integrated within the provision of comprehensive SRHR information and services, that they are universally accessible, and in order to secure continued access during emergency situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic;

Calls on the United States Government to fully decriminalise abortion, which requires not only putting an end to the penalisation of pregnant women and girls, healthcare providers and others for accessing, assisting with or providing abortion services, but also removing abortion from criminal law statutes and abolishing all other punitive laws, policies and practices;

10.

Calls on the United States Government to establish federal legal protection for universal access to abortion; stresses that health is a human right, and that it is the obligation of the state to provide accessible healthcare to all;

11.

Calls on the United States Congress to pass federal legal protection for access to abortion through the Women’s Health Protection Act (WHPA), which recently passed the US House of Representatives in an historic vote and which safeguards abortion from the imposition of state-level bans and restrictions;

12.

Stresses that highly restrictive laws prohibiting abortion do not reduce the need for abortions, but result in women having to seek clandestine abortions, to travel in order to obtain abortions or to carry their pregnancy to term against their will, which is a violation of human rights and a form of gender-based violence affecting women’s and girls’ rights to life, physical and mental integrity, equality, non-discrimination and health;

13.

Highlights that only education, information and universal access to contraception, the eradication of sexual violence and shared responsibility for contraception can reduce the number of unintended pregnancies; stresses that universal access to age-appropriate and evidence-based sexuality and relationship education, to a range of high-quality and universally accessible modern contraceptive methods and supplies, to family planning counselling and information on contraception, and guarantees of safe and legal abortion care should be prioritised;

14.

Is deeply concerned about the fact that this law will disproportionately affect people experiencing socioeconomic hardships, people living in rural areas, racialised people, LGBTIQ+ people and those experiencing multiple and intersecting discrimination, mostly vulnerable groups of women who, due to financial or logistical barriers, cannot afford to travel to reproductive health clinics in neighbouring states, leaving them at greater risk of undergoing unsafe and life-threatening procedures, and at greater risk of being forced to carry their pregnancy to term against their will;

15.

Deeply questions the moral context and is, furthermore, concerned about the design of this law which empowers and gives monetary incentives to private citizens to sue anyone who may have helped women obtain an abortion, such as abortion providers or abortion care advocates, thus opening the floodgates to harassment and frivolous lawsuits from anti-abortion vigilantes and laying the groundwork for witch hunts in the 21st century;

16.

Calls on the United States Government to put an end to any bounty-based system of state or individual enforcement of abortion bans that creates a climate of fear and intimidation;

17.

Is deeply concerned about the effect of Texas law on other US states, which will be encouraged by the inaction of the US Supreme Court, and will attempt to pass abortion bans across the country, as has already been seen in Florida;

18.

States that this law, one of 26 restrictions on abortion already enacted in Texas in the last decade, constitutes a further attempt to undermine women’s rights and their reproductive freedom, as well as their right to healthcare, and takes into account neither women’s constitutional rights nor the will of the people;

19.

Is concerned that this law not only leads to a de facto ban on abortion, but also flagrantly violates women’s human rights, in complete disregard of international human rights standards, including the principle of non-retrogression, and that it limits access to healthcare by reducing the number of care facilities treating women, leading to a care gap for women and further endangering women’s lives;

20.

Strongly condemns the backsliding in women’s rights and SRHR taking place in the US and globally, and calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission and all EU Member States to use all instruments at their disposal to strengthen their actions to counteract it; recalls that SRHR are fundamental human rights which should be enhanced and cannot in any way be watered down or withdrawn;

21.

Underlines that, in keeping with the Beijing Platform for Action and the ICPD Programme of Action, the right of all individuals to bodily integrity and autonomy needs to be protected, and access to essential services giving effect to this right need to be ensured; calls for a comprehensive approach in the essential sexual and reproductive health package, including measures for preventing and avoiding unsafe abortions, as well as the provision of post-abortion care, to be integrated into the national universal health coverage strategies, policies and programmes;

22.

Is concerned by the upcoming consideration of the Supreme Court with Roe v. Wade and that this groundbreaking ruling which guarantees women’s rights could be overturned in the near future; fears that this would have a severe and broad impact on the access to healthcare and free choice of women in other states, given the fact that a further 11 states have so-called trigger laws banning the right to abortion currently in place, which would automatically enter into force in the event that Roe v. Wade were overruled;

23.

Welcomes the Biden Administration’s lifting of the global anti-abortion gag rule and its intention to restore US funding to the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), the UN’s sexual and reproductive health agency; urges that this restoration of funding enter into effect without delay;

24.

Recalls that one of the five pillars of GAP III of the EEAS is promoting SRHR; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that human rights clauses, including the right to free and safe abortions, are respected and promoted in all international relations with the US;

25.

Calls on the EU delegation in the US to monitor the situation of SRHR in Texas and other states, and to prioritise SRHR in its engagement with the relevant US authorities and in its local implementation of GAP III;

26.

Calls for the EU and the Member States to offer all possible support, including financial support, to US-based civil society organisations protecting and promoting SRHR in the country, as an expression of its universal commitment to these rights; calls further on the Member States to offer a safe haven for all medical professionals who might be at risk of legal or other forms of harassment as a result of their legitimate work; recalls that a total ban on abortion care or the denial of abortion care is a form of gender-based violence;

27.

Calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to denounce this violation of women’s sexual and reproductive rights in his exchanges with US officials;

28.

Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to condemn and denounce this violation of women’s sexual and reproductive rights and their right to healthcare in his exchanges with US officials;

29.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the President of the United States of America and his Administration, the US Congress and to the Governor and Legislature of the State of Texas.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0314.

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/196

P9_TA(2021)0420

The situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression (2021/2881(RSP))

(2022/C 132/17)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus,

—	having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 May 2021 and 25 June 2021 on Belarus,

—	having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on 21 June 2021 on Belarus,

—	having regard to the 2021 State of the Union address by President von der Leyen,

—

having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Josep Borrell, of 26 March 2021 on the EU’s support to the International Accountability Platform for Belarus and of 15 July 2021 on the crackdown against civil society in Belarus, and to his declarations on behalf of the EU of 30 July 2021 on the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees by the regime and of 8 August 2021 on the first anniversary of the 9 August 2020 fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus,

—

having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson of 6 July 2021 on the sentencing of Viktar Babaryka and other political trials, of 7 July 2021 on limiting the diplomatic presence of Lithuania, of 30 August 2021 on the repressions against journalists and media, and of 6 September 2021 on the sentencing of Maryia Kalesnikava and Maksim Znak,

—	having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all human rights conventions to which Belarus is a party,

—	having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Charter of Paris for a New Europe,

—	having regard to the report of 5 July 2021 of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Anaïs Marin, to the UN Human Rights Council,

—	having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 13 July 2021 on the situation of human rights in Belarus,

—	having regard to its recommendation of 16 September 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the direction of EU-Russia political relations (1),

—	having regard to the awarding of the European Parliament’s 2020 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the democratic opposition in Belarus,

—	having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

whereas more than one year after the so-called 9 August 2020 elections, the Belarusian authorities are continuing their repression against the Belarusian people, with many citizens being harassed, arrested, tortured and convicted for expressing opposition to the regime or to the widespread human rights violations taking place in Belarus; whereas the EU and its Member States did not recognise the results of the presidential election;

whereas almost 40 000 Belarusians are estimated to have been detained at some point for protesting against the regime; whereas human rights defenders have documented hundreds of cases of torture and ill-treatment, while several people are still missing and others have been found dead; whereas inhumane treatment, torture and deliberate refusal to provide medical care continue to take place in Belarusian detention centres and prisons, where several protesters have died; whereas several cases of suicide attempts in court and in prison have been documented; whereas the country’s entire judiciary appears to have been transformed into an agent of the regime and is being used to ensure its survival; whereas there are more than 720 political prisoners in Belarus and more than 4 600 criminal cases open against Belarusian citizens, while not a single case has been opened against persons responsible for or complicit in the violence and repression; whereas human rights defenders, opposition politicians, civil society, independent journalists and other activists are systematically subjected to violent repression; whereas thousands of Belarusians have been forced or otherwise compelled to leave their homeland and seek safety abroad;

C.	whereas the Member States, in particular Poland and Lithuania, have provided shelter, medical treatment and scholarships for thousands of asylum seekers fleeing persecution by Lukashenka for their democratic aspirations;

whereas the Belarusian regime is running a repression campaign against civil society and human rights defenders aiming to silence all remaining independent voices in Belarus; whereas close to 250 civil society organisations have been liquidated or are in the process of being liquidated, including the Human Rights Center Viasna, which suffered an unprecedented crackdown through the arrest and charging of its leadership, staff members and volunteers, including Ales Bialiatski, the Chair of Viasna; Valiantsin Stefanovich, member of the Viasna Board and Vice-President of the International Federation for Human Rights; Marfa Rabkova, the coordinator of Viasna’s network of volunteers; Andrei Chepyuk; Leanid Sudalenka; Tatsyana Lasitsa; Maryia Tarasenka; Uladzimir Labkovich; and other Viasna staff members and volunteers;

whereas Belarusian courts have delivered more than 120 unfair and arbitrary verdicts in politically motivated trials, often held behind closed doors and without due process of law; whereas Belarusian opposition politician Viktar Babaryka has been sentenced to 14 years in prison, and the Belarusian opposition leaders and political prisoners Maryia Kalesnikava, a laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought and recipient of the International Women of Courage Award, and Maksim Znak, a prominent lawyer, have been sentenced to 11 years and 10 years respectively for allegedly plotting a coup; whereas almost 500 journalists have been arrested and the Belarusian authorities are continuing their crackdown on and harassment of independent Belarusian journalists and are engaging in deliberate attempts to hamper objective reporting; whereas on 27 August 2021, the Belarusian regime ordered the closure of the Belarusian Association of Journalists, the largest independent journalist organisation in the country, which was awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 2004; whereas two Belsat journalists, Yekaterina Andreeva and Darya Chultsova, continue to serve their sentences in a penal colony in Belarus;

whereas pressure on the Belarusian trade unions has dramatically increased in recent weeks, with leaders and members of the Belarusian Independent Trade Union (BITU) and the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BKDP) being arrested, fined and subjected to searches by the KGB; whereas Belarus rates as one of the worst countries for working people in the 2021 ITUC Global Rights Index;

G.	whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka continues his campaign against the Polish minority, having imprisoned Andżelika Borys and Andrzej Poczobut, two leaders of the Polish community, attacking Polish-language schools and running a propaganda campaign based on false historical narratives;

whereas there is no indication that Belarusian authorities are investigating the thousands of reports of police brutality filed since August 2020, or the killings of protesters; whereas the widespread impunity for human rights violations perpetuates the desperate situation of the Belarusian people; whereas the absence of the rule of law impedes their right to a fair trial; whereas Belarus is the only country in Europe to still carry out capital punishment;

whereas on 23 May 2021, Ryanair flight FR4978, an international passenger flight between two EU capitals (Athens to Vilnius), was forcefully diverted to Minsk on the orders of Aliaksandr Lukashenka on the false pretence of a bomb threat, in breach of international conventions and jeopardising the safety of the more than 170 passengers and crew on board; whereas in Minsk, the Belarusian authorities detained passenger Raman Pratasevich, a Belarusian journalist and activist, and his companion Sofia Sapega;

whereas in retaliation against the EU sanctions imposed in response to the forced diversion of Ryanair flight FR4978, Lukashenka publicly threatened to flood the EU, notably neighbouring Lithuania and Poland, with migrants and drugs; whereas this threat was implemented by instrumentalising migrants for political purposes: whereas the Lukashenka regime devised a scheme to ferry migrants from Iraq, Turkey and other countries to Minsk, and with the help of Belarusian border guards, facilitated their illegal crossing into the European Union; whereas this lead to around 4 000 illegal migrants entering Lithuania, more than 1 400 entering Poland and around 400 entering Latvia; whereas Lithuania, Latvia and Poland declared a state of emergency at their borders with Belarus; whereas the number of irregular entries to the EU remains high and attempts to cross illegally continue; whereas the Belarusian regime uses force to push migrants into EU territory and creates propaganda and disinformation accusing EU Member States of facilitating illegal migration to Belarus; whereas Lukashenka has suggested ending Belarus’ obligation to accept returning migrants and has submitted a draft law on its suspension to the Belarusian Parliament; whereas at least five migrants have died from hypothermia and exhaustion and several migrants have become stranded for weeks at the EU’s external border with Belarus; whereas Poland has restricted access for civil society organisations and media to the border area where the state of emergency was introduced; whereas the situation at the EU’s border with Belarus remains tense, with many and diverse provocations from the side of Belarusian officers and soldiers;

K.	whereas in her State of the Union address of 15 September 2021, the Commission President called the instrumentalisation of migrants a hybrid attack by Belarus aimed at destabilising the EU;

L.	whereas on 3 August 2021, Vitaly Shishov, a founder of the Belarusian House in Ukraine, a group helping people who have left Belarus, was found hanged in a park in Kyiv;

M.	whereas on 17 September 2021, the Belarusian Prosecutor-General’s Office suspended an investigation into the death of Raman Bandarenka;

N.	whereas after the recent fatal shooting in Minsk that claimed the lives of Andrei Zeltser and of a KGB agent, over hundred people that commented about the event on social media were arrested by the regime and made to give forced confessions;

whereas after criticising her coaches, Belarusian athlete Krystina Timanovskaya was forced to leave the Tokyo Olympics early, and, due to fears for her safety, sought police protection at Tokyo Airport and accepted a humanitarian visa provided by Poland; whereas the International Olympic Committee (IOC) expelled Belarusian coaches Artur Shimak and Yury Maisevich from the Tokyo Olympics and opened an investigation;

whereas in an already tense climate, in September 2021 Russia and Belarus held the massive Zapad 2021 joint military exercise involving 200 000 personnel, putting further pressure on the EU’s borders; whereas Russia and Belarus established a joint air force and air defence training centre in Grodno, less than 15 kilometres from the border with Poland; whereas on 9 September 2021, Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin met in Moscow and announced the approval of 28 further programmes for integration at economic and fiscal level, as well as the creation of a ‘joint defence sphere’, which represents another step towards merging the Belarusian and Russian armed forces and the possible permanent deployment of Russian troops in Belarus; whereas Lukashenka has announced plans to acquire USD 1 billion worth of weapons from Russia by 2025, including S-400 missile systems; whereas on 9 September 2021, Lukashenka and Putin also agreed to set up a unified oil and gas market and to deepen economic integration, increasing the risk that Lukashenka will continue to trade off Belarus’s sovereignty in exchange for more support from Russia;

Q.	whereas on 28 June 2021, the Belarusian regime suspended its participation in the Eastern Partnership initiative;

R.	whereas over the past year, the Lukashenka regime has ordered several diplomats and embassy staff of the EU and its Member States to leave the country, closing even more diplomatic channels of communication;

S.	whereas the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has decided to give Belarus access to nearly USD 1 billion in new Special Drawing Rights as part of a broader USD 650 billion allocation to all IMF members;

whereas Belarus started the commercial operation of the Belarusian nuclear power plant (NPP) in Astravyets without addressing all the safety recommendations contained in the 2018 EU stress test report; whereas the Belarusian side is not transparent and does not provide trustworthy information about events at the NPP site, reconfirming that the Belarusian NPP is unsafe and poses a serious nuclear safety threat;

whereas the Council adopted the fourth package of restrictive measures on Belarusian individuals and entities on 21 June 2021, following the forced and unlawful landing of Ryanair flight FR4978 in Minsk; whereas on 4 June 2021, the Council decided to introduce a ban on Belarusian carriers of all kinds entering EU airspace and accessing EU airports; whereas the European Union has so far imposed sanctions against 166 persons and 15 entities, including Aliaksandr Lukashenka, as well as targeted economic sanctions against several sectors of the Belarusian economy; whereas in 2020, the Belarusian economy recorded a real GDP decline amounting to 0,9 %, and whereas prognoses for 2021 estimate a further GDP decline of 2,7 %; whereas China continues to cooperate with and invest in Belarus, particularly in the China-Belarus Great Stone Industrial Park;

Continues to stand firmly in solidarity with the people of Belarus, as well as with the peaceful protesters who continue to stand up for a free and democratic Belarus; recalls that the European Union and its Member States did not recognise the results of the 2020 presidential election due to massive falsification and fabrication and do not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as president of Belarus;

Continues to condemn the repression, torture and ill-treatment of the peaceful people of Belarus, the suppression of the media and the internet, and the beating, arrest and intimidation of journalists, bloggers and other independent voices in Belarus; continues to call for the immediate and unconditional release and dropping of all charges against all political prisoners and persons arbitrarily detained and demands an immediate end to the violence and repression;

Insists on the need to ensure fundamental freedoms and human rights, the rule of law and a functioning independent judiciary in Belarus, and the ceasing of all repression, persecution, ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, enforced disappearances and torture, as well as on the immediate and permanent abolition of the death penalty; calls for an end to discrimination against women and vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities and LGBTQI persons;

Denounces the political trials of and condemns the harsh and unjust court sentences recently given out to opposition leaders Maria Kalesnikava and Maksim Znak and other political prisoners and detainees; deplores the fact that the court hearings were held behind closed doors and without due process of law and that EU and Member State diplomats were prevented from attending;

Continues to condemn the authorities’ reprisals against the Human Rights Center Viasna and calls for the immediate and unconditional release and dropping of all charges against Ales Bialiatski, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Marfa Rabkova, Andrei Chepyuk, Leanid Sudalenka, Tatsyana Lasitsa, Maryia Tarasenka, Uladzimir Labkovich and other Viasna staff and volunteers;

Condemns the acts of repression and hostile actions carried out by the authorities against representatives of the Polish minority and against Polish-language schools in Belarus; calls, in this respect, for the immediate and unconditional release of Andżelika Borys, journalist Andrzej Poczobut and other political prisoners;

Condemns the behaviour of Belarusian coaches Artur Shimak and Yury Maisevich at the Tokyo Olympics; recalls the prosecutions of Belarusian sportspeople for their participation in peaceful protests and the alleged ties between the Belarusian Ice Hockey Federation and the murder of Raman Bandarenka; calls on the IOC and other international sports committees and federations to follow their codes of ethics and conduct when engaging with representatives of Belarus;

Reiterates its call on the EEAS, the Commission and the EU Member States’ national diplomatic representations in Belarus to closely monitor the situation of individual political prisoners in Belarus, to report to Parliament on this monitoring, to offer them support and to work to secure their release;

Calls for unequivocal support for the Belarusian democratic opposition in organising free and fair elections, under international observation by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE and underpinned by independent and free media and a strong civil society;

10.

Considers the hijacking and forced landing of Ryanair flight FR4978 in Minsk to be an act of state terrorism and therefore calls for the EU to apply restrictive measures against the persons or entities in Belarus and Russia that are responsible, with a view to combating terrorism;

11.

Urges the European Council to agree at its next meeting on 21-22 October 2021 on a comprehensive and strategic approach to sanctions against the Belarusian regime, which should include a shift from a step-by-step approach towards a more determined sanctions approach based on the systemic nature of repression and serious violations of human rights;

12.

Welcomes the Council’s decision to adopt the fourth package of restrictive measures and urges it to proceed with the fifth package of sanctions with the utmost urgency by focusing on individuals and entities involved in the crackdown and repression in Belarus and on individuals and entities involved in human trafficking, as well as to tackle circumventions that are already occurring;

13.

Regrets the fact that the imposed economic sanctions have only had a partial effect on the Lukashenka regime and have not significantly affected important sectors such as the potash and petroleum products sectors; calls on the Council to further strengthen the EU’s targeted economic sanctions, focusing on key Belarusian economic sectors and public and private companies supporting and funding the Lukashenka regime, to include additional sectors such as the steel, wood and chemicals sectors as well as all the remaining state-owned banks and key companies such as Belaruskali and Beltelecom in the economic sanctions package, and to ban imports of products which are often produced by inmates in penal colonies; welcomes the additional sanctions imposed by the US, UK and Canada on the first anniversary of Belarus’s fraudulent presidential elections; calls, therefore, for the EU to coordinate its measures with the United States, the G7 partners and other like-minded democracies;

14.

Calls on the Member States to collectively declare Belarussian KGB officials on the soil of the European Union as persona non grata; Reiterates that the EU should pay special attention to financial flows from Belarus and invites the EU institutions to report to Parliament on the assets of Lukashenka’s entourage and those linked to Lukashenka’s corrupt oligarchs; reiterates its call for the EU to coordinate these actions with the United States, the G7 partners and other like-minded countries;

15.

Deplores the expulsion of EU and Member State diplomats from Belarus, notably the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Belarus and ambassadors and diplomats from Lithuania, Latvia and Poland; invites the Member States to recall for consultation their ambassadors from Minsk as a political signal to the Lukashenka regime and to refuse the accreditation of Belarusian diplomats in the EU; underlines that Belarusian MPs and officials should not be invited to any international or bilateral events; urges the EEAS to review its working methods and ensure an active role for the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Belarus currently recalled to Brussels and to take additional measures to ensure a safe working environment for EU diplomats and EU delegation staff in Minsk, particularly protection against propaganda attacks by the Lukashenka regime;

16.

Strongly condemns the Lukashenka regime’s instrumentalisation of human beings for political purposes, in breach of international norms and Belarus’s bilateral treaties with its EU neighbours; underlines that Belarus’s state-sponsoring of illegal crossings at the EU’s external border, coupled with a disinformation campaign, is a form of hybrid warfare aimed at intimidating and destabilising the EU; expresses strong solidarity with Lithuania, Poland and Latvia, as well as other EU Member States targeted by the Belarusian regime; reiterates the need for the countries most affected to effectively protect the EU’s external borders, in compliance with relevant international law, in particular the Geneva Convention, as well as EU law on asylum, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

17.

Welcomes the support provided by the Member States, Norway and the EU institutions and agencies, notably Europol, Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office, to the Member States affected by the migratory crisis created by the Belarusian regime and encourages them to continue their support, including through further allocation of EU emergency aid, and invites those who have not yet taken advantage of it to do so; calls on the Member States and EU institutions to deal urgently with the multidimensional crisis at the Belarusian border, to help migrants stuck at the EU’s borders with Belarus and to provide them with the necessary support; expresses concern about the lack of transparency at the Polish-Belarusian border and urges the Polish authorities to ensure, in a transparent way, that any legislation, policy or practice at the Polish-Belarusian border complies with EU law and to secure access to the border region for civil society organisations and media as well as to cooperate with Frontex to jointly resolve the ongoing crisis; calls for the EU, its Member States and international organisations to step up their efforts towards dismantling these state-ordered human trafficking flows, including by placing diplomatic pressure on the countries of origin of migrants and by imposing sanctions on Belarusian officials, individuals and entities involved, as well as on international criminal networks operating on the EU’s territory responsible for transfers to final destinations; highlights that Belarus has recently suspended its visa regime with Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt and South Africa, enabling visa-free travel from these countries to Belarus;

18.

Calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to adopt a common approach to this situation based on relevant EU and international law and on the principles of solidarity, transparency, accountability and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; calls on the Commission to urgently table targeted legislative proposals providing Member States with the necessary safeguards to swiftly and effectively react and respond to migration instrumentalisation campaigns by non-EU countries, in particular by ensuring strong and effective protection of the EU’s external borders and by providing effective measures to prevent irregular crossings as well as elaborating ways to stop the abuse of the asylum system by any hostile third country or criminal network;

19.

Is concerned over the deaths of people at the border between Belarus and the EU and expresses its sympathy to the families and relatives of the deceased; calls on the authorities of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and other affected Member States to ensure that EU asylum and return law and international human rights law are respected also during the emergency situation, including access to asylum and access of media, civil society organisations and legal aid providers to the border area to the largest extent possible, and to take into account the guidance by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and bodies of the Council of Europe; calls on the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties to ensure compliance with relevant EU law;

20.

Calls on the Member States to improve their cooperation on border management, the fight against human trafficking, cigarette smuggling and other security challenges created or aggravated by the Belarusian regime; supports the Commission proposal to suspend certain articles of the EU’s Visa Facilitation Agreement with the Republic of Belarus targeting specific categories of officials linked to the Lukashenka regime, with no impact on ordinary citizens of Belarus; calls for the broadening of the list of persons concerned and for consideration to already be given to including categories of individuals that may be targeted by individual restrictive measures as part of future sanctions packages;

21.

Regrets the IMF’s unconditional special drawing rights allocation of USD 910 million, which will not serve the people of Belarus, but rather the interests of the illegitimate leader of the country; calls on the Member States to coordinate with international partners in multilateral organisations such as the IMF to restrict the disbursement of funds to the Lukashenka regime and freeze all cooperation with it; takes note of the continuous investments by non-democratic countries, notably Russia and China, in Belarus;

22.

Reiterates the urgency of exposing Russia’s support for Lukashenka’s brutal crackdown on the people of Belarus, as well as its involvement in the hybrid actions of Lukashenka’s regime against the EU, including the use of migrants for political purposes, and holds the Kremlin accountable for such actions;

23.

Notes with concern the aggressive scenario of the Zapad 2021 military exercise and the poor opportunities to observe it; reiterates that this exercise, as well as other, similar large-scale exercises, underline Russia’s offensive posturing and determination to use its capabilities in a hostile fashion; reiterates its call for EU strategic autonomy and a genuine European Defence Union as part of a strengthened NATO;

24.

Condemns the continuous dealings between Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin to prepare road maps for greater integration between Belarus and Russia, including the progressive militarisation of Belarus, and sees this as a violation of the sovereignty of Belarus, as the Belarusian people are being deprived of their right to determine the future of their country; highlights the illegality of Lukashenka’s rule and rejects all agreements made by Lukashenka on behalf of the Belarusian state, notably after the expiry of his presidential term on 5 November 2020; reiterates that the EU has to make it clear that if Russia continues its current policy on Belarus, the EU will have to introduce additional containment and deterrence measures on Russia; asks that the EU institutions report periodically to Parliament on the Kremlin’s interference in Belarus, including its exploitation of the situation with a view to deeper political, military and economic control of Belarus;

25.

Expresses its disappointment at the fact that until now the EU has not managed to develop a comprehensive strategy towards the Belarusian regime, and urges the Council, the Commission and the VP/HR to devise a coherent and comprehensive strategy towards Belarus, based on current emergency support to victims of repression, strategic and long-term political, technical and financial support to Belarusian civil society, human rights defenders, independent media, trade unions and democratic forces in the country and abroad, cooperation with neighbouring countries on urgent humanitarian issues, close coordination with international partners and relevant multilateral organisations (e.g. UN, OSCE) as well as international donors, and joint international action to address impunity; calls for the EEAS to take the lead in coordinating such a coherent policy with the Member States and other EU institutions;

26.

Urges the Commission, the Council, the VP/HR and the Member States to continue raising the situation in Belarus in all relevant European and international organisations, in particular the OSCE, the UN and its specialised bodies, with the aim of enhancing international action on the situation in Belarus and overcoming the obstruction of Russia and other countries to such action;

27.

Continues to support the Belarusian people in their legitimate demands and aspirations for free and fair elections, fundamental freedoms and human rights, democratic representation, and political participation in a free and sovereign Belarus;

28.

Praises the systematic and consistent work of Belarusian democratic forces in Belarus and in exile, in particular the leader of the democratic opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Coordination Council and National Anti-Crisis Management; reiterates the urgent need to maintain and expand contacts and cooperation with these forces; welcomes, in this context, the decision of Lithuania to grant official accreditation to the Belarusian democratic representation in Vilnius and invites the remaining Member States to follow suit; calls for the EU to provide its good services to support the establishment of a democratic Belarus representation office in Brussels;

29.

Calls for the EU to engage on an operational level with the representatives of the democratic forces of Belarus in order to conclude work on the adoption of a roadmap aimed at the implementation of a EUR 3 billion comprehensive plan of economic support to a future democratic Belarus in areas such as advocacy capacity building, reform capacity building, investment management capacity building and state governance capacity building for the democratic forces of Belarus; invites the EU to start the necessary preparations for the dialogue with the democratic forces of Belarus and to report periodically to Parliament on the progress made, including on the adoption of an EU strategy on its future relations with a democratic Belarus and on a comprehensive set of actions to prepare the democratic forces of Belarus for the implementation of this plan;

30.

Reiterates its call for the representatives of democratic Belarus to be officially invited to the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit and for them to be included in high-level bilateral and preparatory meetings at EU and national level, as well as in parliamentary sessions and interparliamentary meetings with the European and national parliaments; reiterates the importance of establishing official groups dedicated to Belarus in all national parliaments of the EU Member States, Eastern Neighbourhood and G7 countries; calls for increased engagement with and presence of representatives of Belarusian civil society and democratic opposition in the multilateral bodies of the Eastern Partnership, in particular the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum and the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly;

31.

Recalls its previous initiative for a high-level mission, involving former high-ranking European officials, to explore every possible avenue to stop the violence and free political prisoners and which could help create a conducive environment for an inclusive domestic political dialogue in Belarus; Reiterates its call on the Commission and the VP/HR to organise, together with international partners, a high-level ‘Future of Democratic Belarus’ international conference on the resolution of the crisis in Belarus and the pledging of a multi-billion euro financial package to support future reform efforts and the restructuring of the Belarusian economy; asks the Commission to inform Parliament about the progress in achieving this;

32.

Underlines the need for a comprehensive investigation into the crimes committed by the Lukashenka regime against the people of Belarus, including the murder of Raman Bandarenka and of other Belarusian citizens; awaits the results of the Ukrainian authorities’ investigation into the death of Vitaly Shishov; calls on the Member States to actively apply the universal jurisdiction principle and prepare court cases against Belarusian officials responsible for or complicit in violence and repression, including Aliaksandr Lukashenka;

33.

Commits to the effective functioning of the European Parliament’s Platform on the fight against impunity in Belarus and to coordinating a timely international reaction to developments in Belarus; invites the Platform to outline at its forthcoming meeting the way forward for the EU to contribute to a litigation strategy and participate alongside partners in the international trial process, including universal jurisdiction, for convicting Aliaksandr Lukashenka and members of his regime personally for the crimes committed against the people of Belarus on a massive scale; calls, in particular, for the platform to consider bringing the case of Belarus to the International Court of Justice on the basis of the violations of the Chicago Convention, the Montreal Convention and the UN Convention against Torture committed by Lukashenka’s regime;

34.

Reminds all EU businesses operating in Belarus of its previous call to exercise particular diligence and uphold their responsibility to respect human rights, in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: asks them to refrain from any new investment and to publicly protest to the Belarusian authorities against the continuing repression of workers and citizens in general;

35.

Urges the Commission, the EEAS and the EU Member States to increase the direct support to the Belarusian opposition, civil society, human rights defenders and independent media organisations inside and outside of Belarus; underlines the importance of maintaining relations with these individuals and organisations despite the Belarusian regime’s announcement of its withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership; commits to stepping up its own democracy support activities; reiterates its call for a targeted EU assistance programme to help civil society, independent media, academia, and the Belarusian opposition in exile, as well as victims of political repression and police violence and those fleeing the oppressive regime;

36.

Calls on the Commission, the Member States and the EEAS to cooperate with international partners, such as the OSCE Moscow Mechanism and the UN Human Rights Council, as well as human rights defenders and civil society on the ground, to ensure the monitoring, documentation and reporting of human rights violations and subsequent accountability and justice for victims; welcomes and supports the establishment of the International Accountability Platform for Belarus and calls on the EU institutions and Member States to support its functioning, as well that of the UNHRC and other international initiatives for holding perpetrators to account; supports further discussions about a possible international tribunal for human rights violations in Belarus to be set up in The Hague;

37.

Highlights the tremendous importance of the establishment of people’s embassies of Belarus worldwide and urges the Commission and the Member States to provide further support to protect the rights and interests of Belarusian citizens abroad and the interests of a democratic Belarus, for example by exploring ways to fund the people’s embassies of Belarus;

38.

Encourages the Member States to further simplify the procedures for obtaining visas and residence for those fleeing Belarus for political reasons or for those who require medical treatment as a result of violence perpetrated against them, and to offer them and their families the necessary support and assistance; calls on the Member States and the Commission to offer scholarships to Belarusian students and scholars expelled from universities and imprisoned for their pro-democratic stance;

39.

Stresses the importance of addressing the nuclear safety threats posed by the Belarusian NPP in Astravyets; insists that Belarus engage on the nuclear safety of the Belarusian NPP in complete transparency and commit to the full implementation of the recommendations made in the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group peer review of the plant; until that is the case, it supports banning imports of energy from the Belarusian NPP into the EU market and reflecting this position in the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism;

40.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the authorities of the Republic of Belarus and of the Russian Federation, and to the representatives of the Belarusian democratic opposition.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0383.

24.3.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/205

P9_TA(2021)0421

Humanitarian situation in Tigray

European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the humanitarian situation in Tigray (2021/2902(RSP))

(2022/C 132/18)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the situation in Ethiopia (1),

—	having regard to the statement of 25 June 2021 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security (VP/HR) Josep Borrell and the Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič on the killing of three humanitarian workers in Tigray,

—	having regard to the joint statement of 24 June 2021 by the VP/HR and Commissioner Lenarčič on the airstrike in the Tigray region,

—	having regard to the declaration of 4 October 2021 by the VP/HR on behalf of the European Union on the decision to expel seven United Nations officials,

—	having regard to the joint statement of 10 June 2021 by the EU and the US following the roundtable on the humanitarian emergency in Tigray,

—	having regard to the conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 12 July 2021 on Ethiopia,

—	having regard to Resolution 47/13 of the UN Human Rights Council of 13 July 2021 entitled ‘Situation of human rights in the Tigray region of Ethiopia’,

—	having regard to Resolution 2417 of the UN Security Council of 24 May 2018 condemning the starving of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations,

—	having regard to the remarks of 26 August 2021 by UN Secretary-General António Guterres to the UN Security Council meeting on Ethiopia,

—	having regard to the statement of 13 September 2021 by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet,

—	having regard to the statement of 17 September 2021 by US President Joe Biden on the Executive Order regarding the crisis in Ethiopia,

—	having regard to the statement of 30 September 2021 by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres following the expulsion of seven UN officials from Ethiopia,

—	having regard to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia adopted on 8 December 1994, and in particular the provisions of Chapter Three on fundamental rights and freedoms, human rights and democratic rights,

—	having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

—	having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

—	having regard to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

—	having regard to the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and its additional protocols of 1977 and 2005,

—	having regard to the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and to its 1967 Protocol,

—	having regard to Resolution 2286 of the UN Security Council of 3 May 2016 on the protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian personnel in armed conflict,

—	having regard to Resolution 47/13 of the UN Human Rights Council of 13 July 2021 on the situation of human rights in the Tigray region of Ethiopia,

—	having regard to the resolution of 12 May 2021 of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the fact-finding mission to the Tigray region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,

—	having regard to the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement,

—	having regard to the resolution of 11 March 2021 of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the EU on democracy and the respect for constitutions in EU and ACP countries,

—	having regard to the Amnesty International report of 10 August 2021 entitled ‘“I don’t know if they realised I was a person”: Rape and other sexual violence in the conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia’,

—	having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

whereas the unilateral ceasefire declared by the Ethiopian Government on 28 June 2021 did not stop the fighting, with the parties to the conflict launching new offensives; whereas the conflict is now spreading to the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara and there is a risk that the impact will spread to the whole Horn of Africa; whereas this 11-month conflict has triggered a human-induced crisis and this wide-scale human suffering is entirely preventable;

whereas, even before the fighting began, there were 15,2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia, 2 million of whom in the Tigray region; whereas nearly one million people are living in famine-like conditions and 5,2 million out of 6 million people in Tigray are facing acute food insecurity as a direct consequence of the violence; whereas 91 % of the population is in extreme need of humanitarian aid and 100 000 children will face life-threatening severe acute malnutrition over the next 12 months; whereas in June 2021 the UN had already warned that 5,5 million people in Tigray and the neighbouring regions of Amhara and Afar were in need of food aid and 350 000 were facing starvation; whereas the Tigray region is home to 100 000 internally displaced people and 96 000 Eritrean refugees; whereas it has several large refugee camps in which, according to NGOs, 44 % of those living there are children; whereas as of July 2021, the conflict has displaced around 1,9 million people in Tigray;

whereas there are multiple and severe reports of alleged gross violations of human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law perpetrated by all parties to the conflict; whereas these reports include attacks on civilians, extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, mass detentions, systematic lootings and the systematic and deliberate destruction of basic services, water systems, crops and livelihoods;

whereas, despite the Ethiopian Government’s expressed commitment to accountability for sexual violence (2), rape and other sexual violence against women and girls continue to be widely used by Ethiopian, Eritrean and Amhara regional armed forces in addition to death threats, the use of ethnic slurs, and capture in conditions of sexual slavery; whereas government forces and officials have harassed and threatened humanitarian organisations and national health providers which support survivors of sexual violence;

whereas there have been several reports of extrajudicial killings since the beginning of the conflict in Tigray, including massacres alleged to have taken place in Mai-Kadra on the night of 9 November 2020, in Axum on 28 November 2020 and in Mahbere Dego in January 2021; whereas in August 2021, Sudanese authorities reported that the bodies of around 50 people were found in the Tekeze River, bordering western Tigray and Sudan; whereas evidence has been found of more than 250 alleged massacres in Tigray since the beginning of the civil war in November 2020; whereas it has been reported that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front also committed extrajudicial killings in Tigray’s neighbouring regions in August 2021, such as in Chenna and Kobo;

whereas according to credible sources, both the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Ethiopian National Defence Force have perpetrated human rights violations in Tigray; whereas the Eritrean forces have infiltrated Tigray and other parts of Ethiopia and have also been committing serious human rights violations; whereas the majority of allegations relate to violations committed by the Ethiopian National Defence Force and the Eritrean forces;

G.	whereas on 13 September 2021 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet spoke of violations ‘by all parties’; whereas the EU has consistently supported High Commissioner Bachelet’s work;

H.	whereas the final report of the joint investigation by the UN Human Rights Officer and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission into alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian and refugee law committed by all parties to the conflict in Tigray will be published on 1 November 2021;

I.	whereas in addition to the looting and destruction of crops, desert locus swarms were seen southwest of Mekele in Tigray; whereas the ongoing conflict and humanitarian situation has made COVID-19 prevention and vaccination efforts impossible in many areas;

whereas only 10 % of humanitarian supplies for the embattled Tigray region have been allowed to enter the area over the past month; whereas 100 trucks are needed daily to provide sufficient humanitarian supplies to Tigray; whereas since 12 July 2021, only 525 trucks have entered Tigray because of closed borders, controlled access by armed forces, the destruction of infrastructure such as bridges, insecurity for drivers, a severe lack of fuel and cash to return to the supply points and extended delays in searching and clearing humanitarian supplies;

whereas targeting aid workers is considered a war crime and a crime against humanity; whereas three staff members of Médecins Sans Frontières were killed on 25 June 2021 while delivering aid to those needing it most; whereas 23 aid workers have been killed in the region since November 2020; whereas on 22 June 2021, Ethiopian Government forces had blocked ambulances from responding to an airstrike at a market in Togoga; whereas the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that on 17 June 2021, Eritrean Government forces had stopped and assaulted a vaccination team in Asgede Woreda; whereas the looting of health facilities is reported to be recurrent in Tigray; whereas government forces and officials have harassed and threatened humanitarian organisations and national health providers which support survivors of sexual violence;

whereas more than two million people have been displaced from their homes; whereas nearly 76 500 people in Afar and an estimated 200 000 in Amhara are reported to have been displaced after Tigrayan forces moved into these regions; whereas 55 000 Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers are reported to be seeking shelter in Sudan;

M.	whereas some refugee camps in Tigray have been destroyed; whereas Eritrean refugees living in Tigray face abductions and forcible returns; whereas healthcare is unavailable and clean drinking water is running out in the refugee camps in Tigray;

N.	whereas there are reports of children being recruited into the conflict by the warring parties, including the Tigrayan forces; whereas the use of child soldiers constitutes a war crime;

whereas the Ethiopian authorities have arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared ethnic Tigrayans in Ethiopia’s capital, and have committed other abuses against them such as closing Tigrayan-owned businesses; whereas incitement to hatred and discrimination and rising levels of inflammatory anti-Tigray rhetoric are evident throughout Ethiopia, including by high-level government officials;

P.	whereas on 30 September 2021, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared seven UN staff members (from Unicef, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNOCHA) personae non gratae in Ethiopia;

whereas there have been intermittent restrictions and shutdowns of the internet and telecommunications in Tigray and neighbouring regions; whereas journalists have been attacked and several media outlets’ licences have been suspended, which hampers the ability to monitor the situation on the ground; whereas basic services, including electricity and banking services, continue to be restricted;

R.	whereas the current state of instability in Ethiopia is the result of a long history of ethnic division and ethnic tension;

S.	whereas the unity of Ethiopia, as a multi-ethnic state, is of great importance for the stability of the region and the African continent as a whole;

T.	whereas with a population of more than 110 million people and being strategically located near the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is a key country on the African continent and a potential partner of strategic importance for the EU and its Member States;

whereas as the world’s leading humanitarian donor, the EU continues to stand in solidarity with those in need through its humanitarian funding; whereas from the outset of the conflict in Ethiopia, the EU has continued to consistently advocate for full and unimpeded humanitarian access in line with international humanitarian law;

V.	whereas the recently adopted communication on the EU’s humanitarian action envisages strengthening the processes that put the promotion and application of international humanitarian law consistently at the heart of our external action;

W.	whereas the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe) considers human development, governance and peacebuilding in Ethiopia as priority areas for action, with 65 % of the multiannual indicative programme dedicated to these fields;

whereas the Commission has included humanitarian actions worth EUR 5 million in Amhara and Afar in order to address the recent developments of the crisis, as part of the total humanitarian funding that has already been mobilised and contracted in 2021, amounting to EUR 53,7 million, to support people in need in Ethiopia; whereas EUR 118 million has been mobilised for assistance to Tigray and Ethiopian refugees in Sudan; whereas as a result of the ongoing conflict the EU has postponed budget support disbursements to Ethiopia;

whereas in September 2021 the EU attempted to organise a humanitarian air bridge through the Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) in order to deliver urgently needed humanitarian goods to the Tigray region, but faced major hurdles from the Ethiopian Government; whereas as a result only one EU humanitarian air bridge flight was carried out, with only a small proportion of its humanitarian cargo delivered;

whereas on 21 June 2021 the EU appointed Annette Weber as the new EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa; whereas following a mandate from the VP/HR, the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto visited the region twice earlier this year to discuss the ongoing crisis in Ethiopia and its regional impacts;

AA.	whereas on 26 August 2021 the African Union appointed the former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as a mediator for the conflict;

AB.

whereas in December 2018 the newly installed Government of Ethiopia set up the Ethiopian Reconciliation Commission and the Ministry of Peace; whereas thus far, both institutions have failed to live up to their initial mandates of encouraging peace and preventing and resolving armed conflict in Ethiopia in the difficult environment following their creation;

AC.

whereas during the ongoing conflict the Ethiopian Prosperity Party, led by Abiy Ahmed, declared itself the winner of a general election that was boycotted and the result of which was denounced by some opposition parties; whereas there was no electoral process in Tigray; whereas the EU did not send an election observation mission;

AD.	whereas Ethiopia is a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement, Article 96 of which stipulates that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential element of ACP-EU cooperation;

Demands the immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties, which is a necessary prerequisite for much-needed improvements to the humanitarian situation in Tigray and other regions, in particular Afar and Amhara; calls for an immediate return to constitutional order and for the establishment of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism;

Calls on all national, regional and local actors concerned to allow immediate and unimpeded humanitarian access and relief to affected populations in Tigray, ending the de facto blockade on humanitarian assistance and critical supplies, including food, medicine and fuel, and to facilitate assistance to populations in need in the regions of Amhara and Afar;

Strongly condemns the deliberate targeting of civilians by all the belligerent parties, the reported recruitment of children by warring parties, including the Tigrayan forces, and the continued use of rape and sexual violence; recalls that deliberate attacks against civilians and the recruitment and use of child soldiers constitute war crimes;

Condemns the killing of civilians, refugees, and humanitarian and medical workers; calls on forces on all sides to respect international human rights and international humanitarian and refugee law and to ensure the protection of people in the affected areas; calls for accountability for crimes committed during the ongoing conflict and for those responsible to be found and brought to justice; calls for those suspected of committing rape or sexual slavery to be investigated for such war crimes and crimes against humanity as rape, sexual slavery, torture and persecution;

Urges the Tigray People’s Liberation Front to halt its offensive and withdraw its forces immediately from the Amhara and Afar Regions; calls on the Amhara regional government to withdraw its forces from western Tigray, and for the Eritrean Government to withdraw its forces immediately and permanently from Ethiopia; calls on neighbouring countries to refrain from all political and military interventions that could further fuel the conflict;

Calls for an independent and impartial inquiry commission to investigate the attacks targeting specific ethnic and religious groups with the intention of inciting intercommunity violence and endangering the peace and security of the Ethiopian people; calls on the Ethiopian Government to ensure that those responsible are held accountable;

Recalls that the Ethiopian Government is responsible for the safety and security of the refugees and internally displaced persons on its territory; calls on the Ethiopian authorities to provide immediate and adequate protection and assistance to the thousands of Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers displaced from camps in Tigray and to determine the fate and whereabouts of the thousands of unaccounted Eritrean refugees; deplores the hateful and inflammatory language used by high-level officials and urges all actors involved to choose their words carefully in order to avoid a further escalation and prevent additional human suffering; calls for the international and regional borders to remain open for the safe and free movement of civilians; recalls that Ethiopia is an important country of origin of, and transit and destination for, migrants; insists that the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the regional authorities protect the population and guarantee their fundamental rights;

Calls on the Ethiopian authorities to immediately account for the forced disappearances of all civilians, to release those detained without credible evidence of a crime and to end all discriminatory treatment; deplores the use of hate speech by public figures that may stoke violence, intimidation and discrimination against Tigrayan or other communities, thereby creating mistrust and instigating ethnic conflicts, and urges national, local and regional authorities to adopt a more inclusive dialogue and to refrain from engaging in incitement to violence;

Encourages the authorities to set up a court-like restorative justice body which would be charged with the task of investigating human rights abuses which took place during the conflict, including the circumstances, factors and context of any violations, thereby giving victims the opportunity to testify and allowing for the creation of an impartial historical record of the past, and calls for the body to draft a reparations policy, together with recommendations for measures to prevent future violations of human rights;

10.

Strongly condemns all attacks on humanitarian aid workers and critical infrastructure, including hospitals and medical facilities, and the widespread looting and destruction of humanitarian aid; strongly condemns the blocking of ambulances trying to provide medical assistance to the wounded following the bombardments;

11.

Deplores the fact that seven UN human rights and humanitarian workers of Unicef, the OHCHR, UNOCHA and the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Ethiopia were declared personae non gratae by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia; expresses concern for the safety and well-being of independent humanitarian and human rights workers in the region and for the neutrality of humanitarian aid distribution in Tigray; welcomes the strong statement by the EU and its 27 Member States of 30 September 2021, which firmly condemns the expulsion of these workers and calls on the government to reverse its decision;

12.

Calls on the Ethiopian Government to sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; calls on the warring parties to guarantee unfettered access to independent human rights monitors and investigators, including UN and African Union investigators;

13.

Underlines the important work of journalists in the region and calls upon all actors to ensure free access to the press and to allow journalists to carry out their work in safety;

14.

Calls for basic public services such as electricity and banking services to be fully re-established, and for restrictions on telecommunications and internet access in Tigray to be lifted; highlights the importance of ensuring education and schools for the children in Tigray and beyond;

15.

Recalls the importance of Ethiopia for the stability of the Horn of Africa and the continent as a whole; recalls that the EU and other international interlocutors have offered to serve as mediators between the sides to the Ethiopian conflict, but these offers have not been accepted by Ethiopia; calls on all belligerent parties to come to the negotiating table without preconditions; calls for an Ethiopian-led inclusive national political dialogue to find a solution to the crisis, including representatives from all the affected areas (Tigray, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Oromia, Sidama, Somali, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), and Gambella);

16.

Recalls that the situation can only be resolved through peaceful means and with inclusive dialogue among all warring parties, an effective ceasefire and the protection of human rights;

17.

Reiterates the EU’s readiness to support, engage in and organise a dialogue, in close coordination with others, in order to keep the space for dialogue open and try to forge a basis for talks between the two principal warring parties;

18.

Expresses its support for regional mediation efforts such as those of the African Union mediator President Obasanjo; welcomes, furthermore, the recent appointment of a new EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa;

19.

Regrets that the UN Security Council has so far not addressed the situation in Tigray; urges the EU and its Member States to press the UN Security Council to hold regular public meetings on Tigray and to take decisive action to ensure unhindered humanitarian access, to safeguard the protection of civilians, to end grave violations of international law, and to ensure accountability for the atrocities; calls on the UN Security Council to consider deploying UN peacekeepers to the region;

20.

Urges the EU Member States to encourage the VP/HR to hold an intersessional briefing on Tigray at the UN Human Rights Council before the end of the year in order to present the findings of the report of the OHCHR-Ethiopian Human Rights Commission joint investigation; stresses that the joint investigation should help lay the foundation for a robust international investigative mechanism to be established by the UN Human Rights Council as a matter of urgency;

21.

Calls on the EU Foreign Affairs Council to act swiftly, resolutely and in a united manner to adopt the measures necessary to effectively address the seriousness and urgency of the situation on the ground in Tigray;

22.

Welcomes and supports the Commission’s decision of December 2020 to postpone budget support disbursements to the Ethiopian Government; welcomes the diplomatic efforts and repeated statements by the VP/HR and the Commission urging accountability and unhindered humanitarian access, and condemning the abuses by all parties; strongly reiterates the EU’s support for Michelle Bachelet’s important work as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

23.

Calls for the EU and its Member States to consider adopting measures to protect human rights and to ensure that perpetrators of human rights abuses are held accountable, for example through the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Mechanism;

24.

Emphasises that the EU stands on the side of the people of Ethiopia; emphasises its willingness for a peaceful solution to the conflict; suggests, however, the use of sanctions by the Commission against members of the Government of Ethiopia, the Government of Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and others responsible for actions prolonging the conflict and exacerbating the humanitarian situation for millions of Ethiopians if the humanitarian situation has not significantly improved by the end of October 2021, in particular after a new Ethiopian Government has been formed;

25.

Calls on the Member States to halt exports of arms and surveillance technology to Ethiopia that are being used to facilitate attacks on civilians and perpetrate human rights violations;

26.

Welcomes the US Executive Order of 17 September 2021 regarding the Ethiopian crisis, which targets those responsible for and complicit in prolonging the conflict in Ethiopia, obstructing humanitarian access, preventing a ceasefire and committing human rights abuses; regrets, however, that the US has continued its budget support and that this has meant that US actions have been less effective and resolute than the EU’s actions;

27.

Strongly welcomes the Commission’s life-saving support in the region and supports a further extension of it; calls for the mobilisation of additional funding of at least EUR 30 million from the EU Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve in order to address the most acute needs of the people affected by the conflict in Tigray and the other areas directly affected by the spread of the northern Ethiopia conflict, with a particular focus on the bordering regions of Afar and Amhara;

28.

Urges the EU and the leaders of its Member States to prioritise the human rights and humanitarian situation in Tigray and northern Ethiopia during the forthcoming African Union-EU summit and leaders’ meeting, and to identify concrete actions and promote greater coordination in strategy and messaging;

29.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the European External Action Service, the Federal Government and House of Federation of Ethiopia, the Tigrayan authorities, the Government of the Republic of the Sudan, the Government of the State of Eritrea, the governments of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union and its member states, the Pan-African Parliament, and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0330.

(2) Statement of 12 August 2021 regarding the latest report by Amnesty International on the alleged rape and other sexual violence in the Tigray Regional State of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

		ISSN 1977-091X
Official Journal of the European Union		C 132

English edition	Information and Notices	Volume 65 24 March 2022

	III Preparatory acts
	European Parliament
	Tuesday 5 October 2021
2022/C 132/19	P9_TA(2021)0397 Environment: The Aarhus Regulation ***I European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 October 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (COM(2020)0642 — C9-0321/2020 — 2020/0289(COD)) P9_TC1-COD(2020)0289 Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 5 October 2021 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2021/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies	212
2022/C 132/20	European Parliament decision of 5 October 2021 on setting up a delegation to the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly, and defining its numerical strength (2021/2917(RSO))	215
2022/C 132/21	European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 October 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand and the Implementation Protocol thereto (06566/2021 — C9-0154/2021 — 2021/0037(NLE))	216
2022/C 132/22	European Parliament non-legislative resolution of 5 October 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand and the Implementation Protocol thereto (06566/2021 — C9-0154/2021 — 2021/0037M(NLE))	217
2022/C 132/23	European Parliament decision of 5 October 2021 proposing the appointment of Julia Laffranque to the panel set up under Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2021/2171(INS))	221
2022/C 132/24	European Parliament decision of 5 October 2021 on the proposal for the appointment of the Chairperson of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (N9-0058/2021 — C9-0369/2021 — 2021/0902(NLE))	222
2022/C 132/25	European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 October 2021 on the proposal for a Council regulation temporarily suspending autonomous Common Customs Tariff duties on import of certain industrial products into the Canary Islands (COM(2021)0392 — C9-0351/2021 — 2021/0209(CNS))	223

Contents		page

	EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2021-2022 SESSION Sittings of 4 to 7 October 2021 TEXTS ADOPTED	1

	I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions
	RESOLUTIONS
	European Parliament
	Wednesday 6 October 2021
2022/C 132/01	European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the role of development policy in the response to biodiversity loss in developing countries, in the context of the achievement of the 2030 Agenda (2020/2274(INI))	2
2022/C 132/02	European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters (2020/2016(INI))	17
2022/C 132/03	European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the impact of intimate partner violence and custody rights on women and children (2019/2166(INI))	27
2022/C 132/04	European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the EU Road Safety Policy Framework 2021-2030 — Recommendations on next steps towards Vision Zero (2021/2014(INI))	45
2022/C 132/05	European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on rebuilding fish stocks in the Mediterranean: assessment and next steps (2019/2178(INI))	56
2022/C 132/06	European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1449 of 3 September 2021 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 as regards the extension of the approval periods of the active substances 2-phenylphenol (including its salts such as the sodium salt), 8-hydroxyquinoline, amidosulfuron, bifenox, chlormequat, chlorotoluron, clofentezine, clomazone, cypermethrin, daminozide, deltamethrin, dicamba, difenoconazole, diflufenican, dimethachlor, etofenprox, fenoxaprop-P, fenpropidin, fludioxonil, flufenacet, fosthiazate, indoxacarb, lenacil, MCPA, MCPB, nicosulfuron, paraffin oils, paraffin oil, penconazole, picloram, propaquizafop, prosulfocarb, quizalofop-P-ethyl, quizalofop-P-tefuryl, sulphur, tetraconazole, tri-allate, triflusulfuron and tritosulfuron (2021/2869(RSP))	65
2022/C 132/07	European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the future of EU-US relations (2021/2038(INI))	70
	Thursday 7 October 2021
2022/C 132/08	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the implementation report on the EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (2020/2045(INI))	88
2022/C 132/09	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (2020/2256(INI))	102
2022/C 132/10	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges (2020/2112(INI))	113
2022/C 132/11	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the protection of persons with disabilities through petitions: lessons learnt (Petitions Nos 2582/2013, 2551/2014, 0074/2015, 0098/2015, 1140/2015, 1305/2015, 1394/2015, 0172/2016, 0857/2016, 1056/2016, 1147/2016, 0535/2017, 1077/2017, 0356/2018, 0367/2018, 0371/2018, 0530/2018, 0724/2018, 0808/2018, 0959/2018, 0756/2019, 0758/2019, 0954/2019, 1124/2019, 1170/2019, 1262/2019, 0294/2020, 0470/2020, 0527/2020, 0608/2020, 0768/2020, 0988/2020, 1052/2020, 1139/2020, 1205/2020, 1299/2020, 0103/2021 and others) (2020/2209(INI))	129
2022/C 132/12	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on Banking Union — annual report 2020 (2020/2122(INI))	151
2022/C 132/13	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on reforming the EU policy on harmful tax practices (including the reform of the Code of Conduct Group) (2020/2258(INI))	167
2022/C 132/14	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the human rights situation in Myanmar, including the situation of religious and ethnic groups (2021/2905(RSP))	179
2022/C 132/15	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the case of Paul Rusesabagina in Rwanda (2021/2906(RSP))	186
2022/C 132/16	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state law relating to abortion in Texas, USA (2021/2910(RSP))	189
2022/C 132/17	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression (2021/2881(RSP))	196
2022/C 132/18	European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the humanitarian situation in Tigray (2021/2902(RSP))	205