—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2 and 3 thereof, and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 8, 10, 18 and 21 thereof,

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), in particular Articles 7, 9, 21, 24(2), 24(3) and 45,

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular Article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life and Article 14 and Protocol No 12 on the prohibition of discrimination,

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

—

having regard to the European Social Charter signed in Turin on 18 October 1961,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC),

—

having regard to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Resolution 2239 (2018) of 10 October 2018 on private and family life: achieving equality regardless of sexual orientation (1),

—

having regard to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Resolution 2048 (2015) of 22 April 2015 on discrimination against transgender people in Europe (2),

—

having regard to Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (3),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0698),

—

having regard to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (4),

—

having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on the declaration of the EU as an LGBTI Freedom Zone (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 18 December 2019 on public discrimination and hate speech against LGBTI people, including LGBTI-free zone (6),

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2019 on the future of the LGBTI List of Actions (2019-2024) (7),

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (8),

—

having regard to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgment of 5 June 2018 in the case Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne (9) and of 23 April 2020 in the case NH v Associazione Avvocatura per i diritti LGBTI — Rete Lenford (10), and to the opinion of the Advocate General Kokott delivered on 15 April 2021 in the case V.M.A. v Stolichna Obsthina, Rayon ‘Pancharevo’ (11),

—

having regard to the Maruko, Römer, and Hay judgments of the CJEU (12) and the Taddeucci & McCall judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (13),

—

having regard to Rule 227(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas LGBTIQ rights are human rights;

B.

whereas the Committee on Petitions has received several petitions raising concerns over the discrimination experienced by LGBTIQ persons in the EU in general and in particular same-sex couples and rainbow families;

C.

whereas these petitions call, on the one hand, for rainbow families to be guaranteed the same family rights as different-sex families and their children in all Member States, and in particular the right to free movement within the EU and the mutual recognition of their relationship and of parenthood, and, on the other hand, for measures against Poland for violating the principles of non-discrimination, equality and freedom of expression, including in relation to ‘Regional Charters of Family Rights’ and resolutions declaring municipalities and regions free from ‘LGBTI ideology’ (so-called ‘LGBTI-free zones’);

D.

whereas on 22 March 2021 the Committee on Petitions held a workshop on LGBTI+ rights in the EU, during which the study that the European Parliament’s Policy Department on Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs had commissioned on the committee’s behalf on ‘Obstacles to the Free Movement of Rainbow Families in the EU’ was presented;

E.

whereas the aforementioned study concludes that rainbow families still face major obstacles to their freedom of movement in the EU in 2021 with adverse consequences for the interests of their children, and that by exercising the EU’s competence in relation to free movement of EU citizens and their family members the EU institutions could act to remove these hindrances; whereas transgender parents whose identity documents are not recognised after crossing a border may lose all legal ties to their children, impacting severely on the best interests of the children;

F.

whereas Article 21 TFEU establishes that every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;

G.

whereas the European Union must combat social exclusion and discrimination;

H.

whereas the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter, and should be fully respected; whereas equality and the protection of minorities are among the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU that the EU is developing through the ‘Union of Equality’ initiatives and actions;

I.

whereas in September 2020 Commission President von der Leyen, in her State of the Union Address, stressed that ‘If you are parent in one country, you are parent in every country’, referring to the need for mutual recognition of family relations in the EU;

J.

whereas all Member States have assumed obligations and duties under international law and the EU Treaties to respect, guarantee, protect and fulfil fundamental rights;

K.

whereas while the EU has seen progress in terms of marriage and civil unions, adoption rights for LGBTIQ persons and protection in law from discrimination, hate speech and hate crime, there have also been steps backwards, such as hostile rhetoric from elected politicians, surges in homophobic and transphobic violence and the proclamation of the so-called ‘LGBTI-free zones’;

L.

whereas LGBTIQ persons continue to suffer discrimination and violence in Europe; whereas the 2021 Rainbow Europe Map, ILGA-Europe’s annual benchmarking tool, reveals widespread and almost complete stagnation on human rights of LGBTIQ persons, in particular regarding the recognition of family legislation across Europe, and that this year there was no single legal or policy change positively affecting LGBTIQ persons;

M.

whereas in a 2019 survey the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) found that discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics was increasing in the EU;

N.

whereas LGBTIQ persons still face discrimination in some Member States regarding social protection, social security, healthcare, education, and access to and supply of goods and other services which are available to the public, including housing; whereas the horizontal directive on non-discrimination, which could partially fill this this gap in protection beyond employment, has remained blocked in the Council for over 10 years;

O.

whereas not all EU Member States provide legal protection for LGBTIQ persons against discrimination;

P.

whereas there are no EU rules on the recognition of judgments on parenthood between Member States and no EU provisions aimed at resolving conflicts in this respect; whereas some Member States do not recognise a same-sex marriage from another Member State for any purpose of national law other than a residence permit; whereas some Member States that allow same-sex couples to marry appear to be unwilling to recognise same-sex registered partners from other Member States; whereas in some Member States same-sex couples with children may be refused to be legally recognised as the joint parents of their children (14); whereas transgender parents are frequently denied recognition of their legal gender when crossing borders, resulting in border authorities not recognising them as parents to their own children;

1.

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3.

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6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

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14.

15.

—

having regard to the Commission staff working document of 25 February 2021 entitled ‘Evaluation of Directive 2005/44/EC on Harmonised River Information Services (RIS)’ (SWD(2021)0050),

—

having regard to the Commission staff working document of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Evaluation of the 2013 Urban Mobility Package (SWD(2021)0047),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2020 entitled “Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy — putting European transport on track for the future” (COM(2020)0789), and the accompanying staff working document (SWD(2020)0331),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

—

having regard to the Commission staff working document of 18 September 2018 entitled “Mid-term progress report on the implementation of the NAIADES II action programme for the promotion of inland waterway transport (covering the period 2014-2017)” (SWD(2018)0428),

—

having regard to the Commission white paper of 28 March 2011 entitled “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area — Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system” (COM(2011)0144),

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/2397 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on the recognition of professional qualifications in inland navigation (1),

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/1629 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 laying down technical requirements for inland waterway vessels (2),

—

having regard to Directive 2014/94/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure (3), and the future revision thereof,

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (4) (TEN-T Regulation), and the future revision thereof,

—

having regard to Council Directive 92/106/EEC of 7 December 1992 on the establishment of common rules for certain types of combined transport of goods between Member States (5), and the future revision thereof,

—

having regard to Directive 2005/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on harmonised river information services (RIS) on inland waterways in the Community (6),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 October 2020 on policy considerations for a pandemic and other major crisis contingency plan for the European freight transport sector,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 5 June 2020 on the EU waterborne transport sector — future outlook: towards a carbon-neutral, zero accidents, automated and competitive EU waterborne transport sector,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 15 November 2018 on inland waterway transport — “See its potential and promote it!”,

—

having regard to its resolution of 27 April 2021 on technical and operational measures for more efficient and cleaner maritime transport (7),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (8),

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2019 on NAIADES II — An action programme to support inland waterway transport (9),

—

having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2016 on unleashing the potential of waterborne passenger transport (10),

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A9-0231/2021),

A.

whereas the EU’s waterborne transport sector, including inland waterway transport, is of strategic interest to the integrity of its supply and the competitiveness of its ports; whereas 75 % of inland waterway navigation takes place across borders and coordination is therefore essential for the single market;

B.

whereas European countries have a variety of large and smaller navigable waterways and different fleets of inland vessels, which makes inland waterway transport very convenient and useful for transporting different types and large quantities of cargo to different destinations over water;

C.

whereas inland waterway transport is an essential pillar in the shift towards multimodal sustainable transport, but is also facing considerable challenges; whereas inland waterways currently represent a very small share of freight transport in the EU (6,1 %), while road has a 76,3 % share and rail 17,6 %; whereas the current modal share of inland waterway transport is far too small and a sharp increase is needed to reduce road congestion, enhance safety, reduce emissions and ensure a more sustainable transport system as a whole; whereas further action is urgently needed to achieve the objective of shifting a substantial part of the 76,3 % of inland freight currently carried by road onto rail and inland waterways; whereas it is crucial, in this regard, to link new sustainable circular and energy markets to inland waterway transport;

D.

whereas the further development of the inland waterway sector is a cornerstone for building a smart, sustainable and competitive European transport network; whereas the current navigability of Europe’s waterways is patchy and the modal shift is hindered by bottlenecks, missing links and a lack of reliability of free-flowing inland waterways; whereas inland waterways, as one of the most environmentally friendly modes of transport with a largely untapped further potential for transporting substantial amounts of goods across the European Union, can play a fundamental role in meeting the EU’s climate objectives;

E.

whereas the total share of cross-border freight by our inland waterways is 54 % on the Rhine-Alpine corridor, 35 % on the North Sea-Mediterranean corridor and 38 % on the North Sea-Baltic corridor; whereas it is important to advance the completion of the TEN-T inland waterway core network and connections with the comprehensive network;

F.

whereas European waterway traffic relies on seamless and smooth cross-border connections, which makes the completion of the TEN-T core networks by 2030 a matter of utmost importance;

G.

whereas the Commission’s white paper on transport published as long ago as 2011 highlighted the fact that the modal share of inland waterways in Europe needs to be increased and whereas insufficient progress has been achieved since then;

H.

whereas there is strong consensus in the inland waterway transport sector that greening is key to ensure the sector’s long-term competitiveness and enable it to play a significant, reliable and credible role in the multimodal shift; whereas a broad reflection on how to finance this green transition is ongoing in the sector; whereas the time has come for more concrete measures, tools and means to help put this ambition into practice;

I.

whereas insufficient infrastructure investments have led to a backlog; whereas qualitative infrastructure is the basis and backbone of a successful inland waterway sector; whereas increasing capacity has its limits and focus should equally be on increasing performance and ensuring reliability of the sector at all times;

J.

whereas a substantial share of EU inland waterway freight is seaport related; whereas both sea and inland ports play an important role as multimodal hubs, providing connections with other modes of transport that can also take over freight loads; whereas it is therefore important and required by the TEN-T guidelines that sea and inland ports should be well connected with one another and have good connections with the hinterland; notes that inland ports should become energy hubs for sustainable alternative fuels;

K.

whereas drought and climate change are two of the major problems facing European inland waterway transport; whereas in several European regions, inland waterway transport was hit hard by the long period of drought in 2018 owing to extremely low water levels; whereas the consequences were devastating for the Rhine and its tributaries, the Upper and Middle Danube and the Upper and Middle Elbe; whereas in Germany this led to a decline of EUR 5 billion in industrial production; whereas, moreover, inland water areas in Northern Europe tend to be frozen during the severest winter months, which disrupts traffic;

L.

whereas the modal shift from road to inland waterways not only concerns freight but also passenger transport, notably in urban areas; whereas as 50 % of the EU population lives close to the sea and along rivers, inland waterway passenger transport offers an environmentally friendly alternative in terms of both energy consumption and noise emissions; whereas it also helps to decongest overloaded road networks and provides an alternative to the expansion of road infrastructure in densely populated areas;

M.

whereas river cruises, ferries, day trip vessels, water taxis and water shuttles play an important role in European tourism and should become a cleaner option for tourism and public transport in regions and cities with accessible and navigable rivers, canals and lakes, which would also make urban mobility more sustainable and effective; whereas the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy should take this into account;

N.

whereas together with rail, inland waterway freight transport will play a crucial role in attaining the objectives of the Green Deal in terms of the modal shift in freight transport; whereas the two modes in supply chains should be mainstreamed and made more accessible;

O.

whereas inland waterway transport could play an important role for maritime transport in terms of enhancing digitalisation and creating scale regarding zero-emission propulsion solutions, such as electrification and hydrogen;

P.

whereas the procedures to obtain a certificate for a hydrogen vessel are still very lengthy; whereas for a series of hydrogen vessels with exactly the same technical characteristics, separate applications have to be submitted for every single vessel; whereas this kind of administrative burden discourages private investment and thus stymies technological progress and cost efficiency improvements;

Q.

whereas the energy transition is also a challenge for the inland navigation sector despite inland waterways being one of the most environmentally friendly modes of transport; whereas it is important to take account of the role of contractors in the entire supply chain in order to improve the business case for sustainable investments in the inland waterway transport sector;

R.

whereas the inland waterway fleet needs to be modernised and adapted to reflect technical progress in order to further improve vessels’ environmental performance; whereas zero-emission technologies are not yet viable at scale in the inland waterway transport sector due to poor technical maturity, a lack of infrastructure and uncompetitive prices;

S.

whereas the inland waterway transport sector ensured the continued distribution of essential goods during the COVID-19 pandemic, with certain parts of it even experiencing peaks in traffic, thereby demonstrating its flexibility and resilience;

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—

having regard to Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

—

having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, as adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015,

—

having regard to the agreement adopted on 12 December 2015 in Paris at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) (‘the Paris Agreement’), in particular Article 7(2) and Article 11(2) thereof, which recognise the local, sub-national and regional dimensions of climate change and climate action,

—

having regard to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on global warming of 1,5 oC, its fifth assessment report (AR5) and its synthesis report thereon, its special report on climate change and land, and its special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate,

—

having regard to the agreement concluded on 15 April 2021 between the European Union and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States,

—

having regard to the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) of the European Union for the period 2021-2027, approved by the European Parliament and the Council in December 2020,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe — the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082) and the related impact and vulnerability assessment for the outermost regions of the European Union,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

—

having regard to the report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank of 23 March 2020 on the implementation of the Commission communication on ‘A stronger and renewed strategic partnership with the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2020)0104),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 October 2017 entitled ‘A stronger and renewed strategic partnership with the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2017)0623),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 June 2012 entitled ‘The outermost regions of the European Union: towards a partnership for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (COM(2012)0287),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 17 October 2008 entitled ‘The outermost regions: an asset for Europe’ (COM(2008)0642),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2007 entitled ‘Strategy for the Outermost Regions: Achievements and Future Prospects’ (COM(2007)0507),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 26 May 2004 entitled ‘A stronger partnership for the outermost regions’ (COM(2004)0343),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 on the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 23 October 2020 on the ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030’,

—

having regard to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 November 2019 on oceans and seas,

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 10 December 2020 on the European Commission report on the implementation of the renewed strategic partnership with the EU’s outermost regions (2021/C 37/10),

—

having regard to the declarations by the presidents of the outermost regions, in particular the declaration adopted at the 25th Conference of Presidents of the Outermost Regions of the European Union held in Mayotte on 26 and 27 November 2020,

—

having regard to the Joint Declaration by the Presidents of the Outermost Regions of the European Union (CPOR), resulting from the mid-term meeting of 3 May 2021,

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (1),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (2),

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on cohesion policy and the circular economy,

—

having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency (3),

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on climate change — a European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy in accordance with the Paris Agreement (4),

—

having regard to the 2021 European Parliament study entitled ‘Cohesion Policy and Climate Change’,

—

having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2017 on promoting cohesion and development in the outermost regions of the EU: implementation of Article 349 TFEU (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 27 April 2017 on the management of the fishing fleets in the outermost regions (6),

—

having regard to its resolution of 26 February 2014 on optimising the potential of outermost regions by creating synergies between the Structural Funds and other European Union programmes (7),

—

having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2012 on the role of Cohesion Policy in the outermost regions of the European Union in the context of EU 2020 (8),

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A9-0241/2021),

A.

whereas it is important to take into account the European Green Deal, the ‘Do no significant harm’ principle, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the Paris Agreement;

B.

whereas it is important to note the principles set out in the European Pillar of Social Rights, including its contribution to eliminate inequalities and to promote gender equality and gender mainstreaming;

C.

whereas the outermost regions (ORs) are connected to three Member States and whereas they currently number nine (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Réunion, Mayotte, Martinique and Saint Martin (France), the Azores and Madeira (Portugal) and the Canary Islands (Spain)), spread across two oceans (the Atlantic and Indian Oceans), with more than 4,8 million inhabitants;

D.

whereas over 80 % of Europe’s biodiversity is in the ORs and the European overseas countries and territories (OCT); whereas the ORs have a strategic geopolitical value in terms of global biodiversity protection;

E.

whereas the ORs add to the maritime dimension of the European Union, making it the world’s largest maritime area with over 25 million km2 of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and major economic opportunities;

F.

whereas the ORs suffer more from marine pollution than any other mainland region of Europe because of their insularity, and this affects their environmental and economic development;

G.

whereas the school drop-out rate among young people aged between 18 and 24 in the ORs regrettably exceeds 20 %, which is significantly higher than the EU average of 10 % (9);

H.

whereas the ORs have an extremely rich cultural heritage that helps to extend Europe’s influence and strengthen its soft power in the world; whereas the 2017 Commission communication identified culture as an important aspect and an element of differentiation for the ORs;

I.

whereas the current COVID-19 crisis has worryingly exposed the already vulnerable OR economies; and whereas this crisis and Brexit will have long-term social, economic, environmental, territorial and cultural consequences;

J.

whereas the health crisis has also exacerbated the weaknesses of the regional health services in the ORs, requiring relatively strict measures to combat the pandemic there;

K.

whereas it is a matter of concern that various sectors of the blue economy, especially coastal and maritime tourism, are likely to be affected by the current pandemic crisis;

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—

having regard to Articles 174, 225 and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 23 July 2020 entitled ‘A new approach to the Atlantic maritime strategy — Atlantic action plan 2.0: An updated action plan for a sustainable, resilient and competitive blue economy in the European Union Atlantic area’ (COM(2020)0329),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

—

having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement) (1),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’(COM(2019)0640),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (2),

—

having regard to the first Atlantic action plan of 13 May 2013 (COM(2013)0279) and the mid-term review of 23 February 2018 thereon (SWD(2018)0049),

—

having regard to the EU strategies of 10 June 2009 for the Baltic Sea region (COM(2009)0248), of 8 December 2010 for the Danube region (COM(2010)0715), of 28 July 2015 for the Alpine region (COM(2015)0366) and of 17 June 2014 for the Adriatic and Ionian region (COM(2014)0357), and its resolutions on those strategies (3),

—

having regard to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (4),

—

having regard to Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (the Birds Directive) (5) and Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (the Habitats Directive) (6),

—

having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2020 on the 15th meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (7),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (8),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments (9),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (10),

—

having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2018 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2018)0390),

—

having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency (11),

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 19 March 2021 on the Commission communication entitled ‘A new approach to the Atlantic maritime strategy — Atlantic action plan 2.0: An updated action plan for a sustainable, resilient and competitive blue economy in the European Union Atlantic area’,

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on establishing an EU strategy for sustainable tourism (12),

—

having regard to the report of the Commission’s Mission Board on Healthy Oceans, Seas, Coastal and Inland Waters of 21 September 2020 entitled ‘Mission Starfish 2030: Restore our Ocean and Waters by 2030’,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 5 June 2019 on the implementation of EU macro-regional strategies,

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2011 on the European Strategy for the Atlantic Region (13),

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2012 on the EU Cohesion Policy Strategy for the Atlantic Area (14),

—

having regard to the Commission report of 20 May 2014 concerning the governance of macro-regional strategies (COM(2014)0284),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 26 January 2011 entitled ‘Regional policy contributing to sustainable growth in Europe 2020’ (COM(2011)0017),

—

having regard to Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (15),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 17 May 2021 entitled ‘A new approach for a sustainable blue economy in the EU — Transforming the EU's Blue Economy for a Sustainable Future’ (COM(2021)0240),

—

having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) (16),

—

having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks (17),

—

having regard to Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (18),

—

having regard to the study by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies (Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies) of 15 January 2015 entitled ‘New Role of Macro-Regions in European Territorial Cooperation’,

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Transport and Tourism and the Committee on Fisheries,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A9-0243/2021),

A.

whereas the Atlantic area is severely affected by the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 and the negative effects of Brexit;

B.

whereas the Atlantic area is the largest sea basin in the European Union;

C.

whereas coastal and maritime tourism is a major source of employment for the Atlantic regions and has been hit particularly hard by the socioeconomic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic;

D.

whereas the climate crisis and rising sea levels are causing severe damage to all the Atlantic seaboards and islands, which constitute a fragile and unique land and maritime environment;

E.

whereas the EU Atlantic area encompasses Madeira, the Azores, the Canary Islands, French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe and Saint Martin as outermost regions (ORs), and whereas the new Atlantic action plan should be targeted at all these regions while fostering close cooperation with Atlantic overseas countries and territories (OCTs) and Atlantic non-EU countries and their regions;

F.

whereas in 2015, the total GDP of the Atlantic area stood at EUR 2 175 billion, representing 15 % of the EU’s GDP (19);

G.

whereas the Atlantic strategy should include tangible and intangible exchange flows with Atlantic OCTs and non-EU countries, taking the EU’s Atlantic regions, including the ORs, as its base;

H.

whereas the new EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, the review of the Renewable Energy Directive (20) and the blue economy are key elements in the transition to a highly energy-efficient and fully renewable-based economy, including reinforced sustainability criteria;

I.

whereas oceans are playing a fundamental role in adaptation to climate change;

J.

whereas healthy oceans and the preservation and restoration of their ecosystems are essential for humankind as climate regulators, producers of oxygen supply in Earth’s atmosphere, hosts of biodiversity, a resource for global food security and human health, and a resource for economic activities such as fisheries, transport, shipbuilding, trade, tourism, gastronomy, renewable energy, research and health products;

K.

whereas the Farm to Fork Strategy aims to build an equitable, healthy and environmentally friendly food system;

L.

whereas ports and transport as a whole play a major role in the promotion of sustainable development and the transition to a carbon-free and renewable-based economy;

M.

whereas the EU maritime sector should also contribute to tackling biodiversity loss and environmental degradation, and to the objectives of the new EU biodiversity strategy for 2030;

N.

whereas the revised Atlantic action plan 2.0 must unlock the potential of the blue economy in the Atlantic area while preserving marine ecosystems and contributing to efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change;

O.

whereas blue skills education and training, joint research projects and raising public awareness of the potential and fragility of the ocean as a natural environment will contribute to the success of the strategy;

P.

whereas the Atlantic action plan 2.0 contains no reference to the Atlantic ORs that enhance the maritime and Atlantic dimension of the European Union;

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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 March 2019 entitled ‘EU-China — A strategic outlook’ (JOIN(2019)0005),

—

having regard to the EU-China dialogue on human rights, launched in 1995, and the 37th round thereof, held in Brussels on 1 and 2 April 2019,

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having regard to the EU-China Strategic Partnership launched in 2003,

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having regard to the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation,

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having regard to the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016,

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 (1) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 (2) of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 28 July 2020 on Hong Kong,

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on the human rights situation in China, in particular those of 17 December 2020 on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (3), of 18 April 2019 on China, notably the situation of religious and ethnic minorities (4), of 4 October 2018 on mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and Kazakhs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (5), of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU-China relations (6), and of 15 December 2016 on the cases of the Larung Gar Tibetan Buddhist Academy and Ilham Tohti (7),

—

having regard to its previous resolutions and recommendations on Hong Kong, in particular those of 19 June 2020 on the PRC national security law for Hong Kong and the need for the EU to defend Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy (8), of 21 January 2021 on the crackdown on the democratic opposition in Hong Kong (9), and of 13 December 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Hong Kong, 20 years after handover (10),

—

having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the EU Trade Policy Review (11),

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on Chinese countersanctions on EU entities and MEPs and MPs (12),

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia relations (13),

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other UN human rights treaties and instruments,

—

having regard to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

—

having regard to the 2014 Protocol to the International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention of 1930, which has not been signed by China,

—

having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to the Paris Agreement, which came into force on 4 November 2016,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded on 10 December 1982 and in force since 16 November 1994,

—

having regard to the report of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era’,

—

having regard to China’s 14th Five-Year Plan and to the principles of ‘dual circulation’ and ‘secure supply chains’,

—

having regard to Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of religious belief, and to Article 4 thereof, which upholds the rights of ‘minority nationalities’,

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0252/2021),

A.

whereas in its strategic framework on human rights and democracy, the EU pledges that human rights, democracy and the rule of law will be promoted ‘in all areas of the EU’s external actions without exception’, and that it will ‘place human rights at the centre of its relations with all third countries, including its strategic partners’;

B.

whereas through its strong economic growth and assertive foreign policy agenda, notably its investment strategy, its ‘Going Global’ and ‘Made in China 2025’ policies, and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is asserting a stronger global role both as an economic power and as foreign policy actor, which poses serious political, economic, security and technological challenges to the EU, which in turn has significant and long-lasting consequences for the world order, and poses serious threats to rules-based multilateralism and core democratic values;

C.

whereas the People’s Republic of China is a unitary, one-party communist state, governed by the Communist Party of China (CPC), which is committed to Marxism–Leninism; whereas as such it does not share democratic values such as individual freedom, freedom of speech and freedom of religion;

D.

whereas China is increasingly aspiring to a more global role, as Chinese President Xi Jinping openly vowed in his report delivered at the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017 that by 2049 China would become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence;

E.

whereas the long-term tradition of democracy in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan demonstrates that democracy is valued by the Chinese people;

F.

whereas in Macau, after prohibiting ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre and pressuring media organisations to adopt a pro-China editorial line, this summer, the Chinese authorities excluded 21 candidates, most of whom are members of pro-democracy movements, from participating in the next legislative elections;

G.

whereas China has a track record of human rights violations that eschew the country’s bilateral and multilateral commitments in these areas; whereas China has regularly submitted resolutions to the UN Human Rights Council aimed at making ‘sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect’ fundamental, non-negotiable principles that override the promotion and protection of the human rights of individuals; whereas China has been pursuing the systemic persecution of the Uyghur people, Tibetans, Mongols and other ethnic minorities, human rights defenders, social activists, religious groups, journalists, and petitioners and protesters against injustices, as well as increasingly repressing all dissenting and opposition voices, especially in Hong Kong; whereas goodwill measures and non-binding commitments have not been sufficient to increase China’s commitment to values that are fundamental for the EU;

H.

whereas the recent departure of foreign correspondents from China and the labelling by the Chinese authorities of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club as an ‘illegal organisation’ are the latest in a long and increasing series of cases of harassment and obstruction against foreign journalists, who are ultimately being driven out of China; whereas this comes as part of an effort to police speech about China worldwide and to determine what kind of speech and discussions are allowed globally, and sees this effort as part of a totalitarian threat;

I.

whereas the existing EU-China strategy has revealed its limitations in the light of recent developments and the global challenges posed by China and needs to be updated;

J.

whereas Parliament has called on the Commission to start the scoping exercise and impact assessment in order to formally commence the negotiations with Taiwan as soon as possible;

K.

whereas since the launch of the Chinese Government’s ‘Strike hard against violent terrorism’ campaign in 2014, the situation of Uyghur and other primarily Muslim ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has rapidly deteriorated; whereas more than one million people are imprisoned in detention camps, called ‘political re-education’ or ‘training’ centres, in which Uyghurs are subject to systemic forced labour, torture, enforced disappearance, mass surveillance, cultural and religious erasure, the forced sterilisation of women, sexual violence, violations of reproductive rights and family separation; whereas legal analysis has concluded that these offences constitute crimes against humanity, even alleged genocide, within the international legal framework; whereas several national parliaments have adopted positions along these lines;

L.

whereas the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime enables the EU to impose restrictive measures on targeted individuals, entities and bodies, including states and non-state actors, responsible for, involved in or associated with serious human rights violations and abuses; whereas on 22 March 2021 four Chinese individuals and one entity directly responsible for serious human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region were included on the list of natural persons and entities subject to these restrictive measures; whereas in response to these measures, China imposed counter-sanctions on ten European individuals and four entities, including five Members of the European Parliament and two EU institutional bodies, the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament and the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union, as well as two European scholars, two think tanks in Germany and the Alliance of Democracies Foundation in Denmark; whereas Chinese sanctions lacked legal justification and a legal basis and directly targeted not only the individuals and entities concerned but also the European Union as a whole; whereas the sanctions are clearly an attempt to deter the EU from continuing its work and action against human rights abuses in China;

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—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (1),

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union (2),

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services (3),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) (4),

—

having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

—

having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed (5),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 October 2019 on ‘The Future of Work: the European Union promoting the ILO Centenary Declaration’ (6),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 June 2019 on ‘The changing world of work: reflections on new forms of work and implications for the safety and health of workers’ (7),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 15 December 2020 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (COM(2020)0825),

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 15 December 2020 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) (COM(2020)0842),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘A European strategy for data’ (COM(2020)0066),

—

having regard to the Commission White Paper of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘On Artificial Intelligence — A European approach to excellence and trust’ (COM(2020)0065),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 January 2020 entitled ‘A strong social Europe for just transitions’ (COM(2020)0014),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 2 June 2016 entitled ‘A European agenda for the collaborative economy’ (COM(2016)0356),

—

having regard to the Commission consultation document of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘First phase consultation of social partners under Article 154 TFEU on possible action addressing the challenges related to working conditions in platform work’ (C(2021)1127),

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on the right to disconnect (8),

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on a strong social Europe for Just Transitions (9),

—

having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2020 on the employment and social policies of the euro area 2020 (10),

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies (11),

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on the Digital Services Act: Improving the functioning of the Single Market (12),

—

having regard to its position of 10 July 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (13),

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 October 2019 on employment and social policies of the euro area (14),

—

having regard to the its resolution of 19 January 2017 on a European Pillar of Social Rights (15),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2017 on a European Agenda for the collaborative economy (16),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2017 on online platforms and the digital single market (17),

—

having regard to the its resolution of 4 July 2017 on working conditions and precarious employment (18),

—

having regard to the mission letter of 10 September 2019 of Commissioner Nicolas Schmit and to the 2021 Commission work programme,

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 18 September 2020 entitled ‘Fair work in the platform economy’,

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 5 December 2019 entitled ‘A European framework for regulatory responses to the collaborative economy’,

—

having regard to the European Social Partners’ Framework Agreement on Digitalisation of June 2020 (19),

—

having regard to International Labour Organization (ILO) Recommendation No. 198 on Employment Relationship,

—

having regard to the Commission study of 13 March 2020 entitled ‘Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers’,

—

having regard to the Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) report entitled ‘The changing nature of work and skills in the digital age’,

—

having regard to the Commission JRC report entitled ‘Platform Workers in Europe’,

—

having regard to the study entitled ‘The platform economy and precarious work’ published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 11 September 2020 (20),

—

having regard to the study entitled ‘The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 7 December 2017 (21),

—

having regard to the Cedefop report of 24 September 2020 entitled ‘Developing and matching skills in the online platform economy’,

—

having regard to the Cedefop briefing note of 30 July 2020 entitled ‘Online working and learning in the coronavirus era’,

—

having regard to the Eurofound study of 24 September 2018 entitled ‘Employment and working conditions of selected types of platform work’,

—

having regard to the Eurofound policy brief of 23 September 2019 entitled ‘Platform work: Maximising the potential while safeguarding standards?’,

—

having regard to the Eurofound research report of 21 September 2020 entitled ‘Back to the future: Policy pointers from platform work scenarios’,

—

having regard to Eurofound’s web repository of the platform economy (22),

—

having regard to the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) study of 7 November 2017 entitled ‘Protecting Workers in the Online Platform Economy: An overview of regulatory and policy developments in the EU’,

—

having regard to the ILO report of 23 February 2021 entitled ‘World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world of work’,

—

having regard to the ILO report of 20 September 2018 entitled ‘Digital labour platforms and the future of work: Towards decent work in the online world’,

—

having regard to the ILO’s ‘Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work’ of 21 June 2019,

—

having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender Equality Index 2020: Digitalisation and the future of work,

—

having regard to the Data & Society reports of February 2019 entitled ‘Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance’ and ‘Algorithmic Management in the Workplace’,

—

having regard to study entitled ‘Data subjects, digital surveillance, AI and the future of work’, published by its Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services on 23 December 2020 (23),

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A9-0257/2021),

A.

whereas ‘platform workers’ refers to individuals executing work or providing services, with a greater or lesser extent of control, via a digital labour platform; whereas, accordingly, it may include both workers and genuinely self-employed persons;

B.

whereas ‘digital labour platform’ refers to a company which intermediates or offers, with a greater or lesser extent of control, on-demand services, requested by individual or corporate customers and provided directly or indirectly by individuals, regardless of whether such services are performed on-location or online;

C.

whereas ‘platform work’ refers to the work executed and services provided on demand and for remuneration by platform workers, regardless of their employment status, the type of digital labour platforms (on-location or online) or the level of skills required;

D.

whereas there is a lack of sufficient and up-to-date European-wide data on platform work, and whereas data collection methodology varies across Member States, making it difficult to determine the extent of platform work and the number of workers concerned; whereas the further growth of platform work within the labour market is considered highly likely;

E.

whereas platform work can create employment, increase choice, provide additional income, and lower barriers to entering the labour market; whereas platform work may facilitate flexibility and optimisation of resources, and provide opportunities for both people working in or through digital labour platforms and clients, and the matching of demand for and supply of services; whereas innovation in digital tools is a precondition for platform work and can contribute to growth in times of crisis and recovery; whereas platform work can offer advantages for students and those who wish to combine study and work at the same time, as well as creating access to employment for young people not in education, employment or training (NEETs), and people with lower skill levels;

F.

whereas platform work can by no means be limited to the transport of persons or food delivery, as it also consists of professional tasks, household tasks and micro-tasks;

G.

whereas platform work facilitates access to the labour market through modern forms of employment and encourages the development of technologies in order to facilitate the use of platforms and bring them closer both to companies and consumers;

H.

whereas platform work has also raised concerns about precariousness and poor working conditions, lack of or difficult access to adequate social protection, unfair competition, undeclared work, fragmented and unpredictable income and work schedules, lack of dispute resolution mechanisms, deskilling and lack of career advancement, as well as lack of occupational health and safety measures, especially for lower-skilled on-location platform workers and workers performing micro-tasks, as highlighted once again during the COVID-19 crisis; whereas the erroneous classification of workers as self-employed contributes to this situation;