19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/2

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 24 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione — Italy) — Agenzia delle Dogane v Silcompa SpA

(Case C-95/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 76/308/EEC - Articles 6 and 8 and Article 12(1) to (3) - Mutual assistance for the recovery of certain claims - Excise duty payable in two Member States for the same transactions - Directive 92/12/EC - Articles 6 and 20 - Release of products for consumption - Falsification of the accompanying administrative document - Offence or irregularity committed in the course of movement of products subject to excise duty under a duty suspension arrangement - Irregular departure of products from a suspension arrangement - ‘Duplication of the tax claim’ relating to the excise duties - Review carried out by the courts of the Member State in which the requested authority is situated - Refusal of the request for assistance made by the competent authorities of another Member State - Conditions)

(2021/C 138/02)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agenzia delle Dogane

Respondent: Silcompa SpA

Operative part of the judgment

Article 12(3) of Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other measures, as amended by Council Directive 2001/44/EC of 15 June 2001, read in conjunction with Article 20 of Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products, as amended by Council Directive 92/108/EEC of 14 December must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of an action disputing enforcement measures taken in the Member State in which the requested authority is situated, the competent body of that Member State may refuse to grant the request to recover excise duties submitted by the competent authority of another Member State in respect of goods which irregularly departed from a suspension arrangement, for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Directive 92/12, as amended by Directive 92/108, where that request is based on the facts relating to the same export transactions which are already subject to excise duty recovery in the Member State in which the requested authority is situated.

(1) OJ C 182, 27.5.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/3

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 February 2021 — European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden, Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of Finland, European Parliament, European Chemicals Agency

(Case C-389/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 - Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals - European Commission decision authorising certain uses of lead sulfochromate yellow and lead chromate molybdate sulfate red, substances listed in Annex XIV of that regulation - Substances of very high concern - Conditions of authorisation - Assessment of the lack of suitable alternatives)

(2021/C 138/03)

Language of the case: Swedish

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: R. Lindenthal, K. Mifsud-Bonnici and G. Tolstoy, and subsequently by R. Lindenthal and K. Mifsud-Bonnici, acting as Agents, and K. Nordlander, advokat)

Other parties to the proceedings: Kingdom of Sweden (represented by: C. Meyer-Seitz, H. Shev, J. Lundberg, H. Eklinder and A. Falk, and subsequently by: O. Simonsson, C. Meyer-Seitz, M. Salborn Hodgson, R. Shahsavan Eriksson, H. Shev and H. Eklinder, acting as Agents), Kingdom of Denmark (represented initially by: J. Nymann-Lindegren, M.S. Wolff and P.Z.L. Ngo, and subsequently by: J. Nymann-Lindegren and M.S. Wolff, acting as Agents), Republic of Finland (represented by: S. Hartikainen, acting as Agent), European Parliament (represented by: A. Neergaard, A. Tamás and C. Biz, acting as Agents), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) (represented initially by: M. Heikkilä, W. Broere and C. Schultheiss, and subsequently by: M. Heikkilä, W. Broere and J. Löfgren, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Sets aside point 2 of the operative part of the judgment of 7 March 2019, Sweden v Commission (T-837/16, EU:T:2019:144);

2.	Dismisses the appeal as to the remainder;

Orders the effects of Commission Implementing Decision C(2016) 5644 final of 7 September 2016 authorising certain uses of lead sulfochromate yellow and lead chromate molybdate sulfate red in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council to be maintained until the European Commission has adopted a fresh decision on the application for authorisation submitted by DCC Maastricht BV;

4.	Orders the European Commission, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the European Parliament and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) each to bear their own costs relating to the appeal proceedings.

(1) OJ C 246, 22.7.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/4

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 25 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — France) — Société Générale SA v Ministre de l’Action and des Comptes publics

(Case C-403/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 63 TFEU - Free movement of capital - Corporation tax - Bilateral conventions for the avoidance of double taxation - Taxation of dividends distributed by a non-resident already subject to a levy in another Member State - Maximum amount of tax credit accorded - Legal double taxation)

(2021/C 138/04)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Société Générale SA

Defendant: Ministre de l’Action and des Comptes publics

Operative part of the judgment

Article 63 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding the legislation of a Member State which, pursuant to a scheme intended to offset the double taxation of dividends received by a company subject to corporation tax in the Member State in which it is established, which has been subject to a levy by another Member State, grants such a company a tax credit limited to the amount which the first Member State would receive if only those dividends were subject to corporation tax, without offsetting in full the levy paid in that other Member State.

(1) OJ C 270, 12.8.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/4

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny we Wrocławiu — Poland) — Gmina Wrocław v Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

(Case C-604/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 2(1)(a) - Article 9(1) - Article 13(1) - Article 14(1) and (2)(a) - Concept of ‘supply of goods’ - Transformation of the right of perpetual usufruct into full immovable property ownership rights by operation of law - Municipality collecting fees for the transformation - Concept of ‘compensation’ - Concept of ‘taxable person acting as such’ - Exception - Bodies governed by public law which engage in activities or transactions as public authorities)

(2021/C 138/05)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny we Wrocławiu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Gmina Wrocław

Defendant: Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

Operative part of the judgment

Article 14(2)(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the transformation of the right of perpetual usufruct into full immovable property ownership rights provided for by national legislation against payment of a fee constitutes a supply of goods within the meaning of that provision.

Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that, where the transformation of the right of perpetual usufruct into full immovable property ownership rights provided for by national legislation takes place against payment of a fee to the municipality which owns the property, enabling it to obtain income therefrom on a continuing basis, that municipality, subject to the verifications to be made by the referring court, acts as a taxable person within the meaning of Article 9(1) of that directive, and not as a public authority for the purposes of Article 13(1) of that directive.

(1) OJ C 383, 11.11.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/5

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 February 2021 — John Dalli v European Commission

(Case C-615/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Action for damages - Non-contractual liability of the European Union - Allegedly illegal conduct of the European Commission and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) - Termination of office of a Member of the Commission - Procedural rules governing the OLAF investigation - Opening of an investigation - Right to be heard - OLAF Supervisory Committee - Presumption of innocence - Assessment of the alleged damage)

(2021/C 138/06)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: John Dalli (represented by: L. Levi and S. Rodrigues, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: J.P. Keppenne and J. Baquero Cruz, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Mr John Dalli to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

(1) OJ C 328, 30.9.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/6

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 25 February 2021 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

(Case C-658/19) (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Article 258 TFEU - Directive (EU) 2016/680 - Processing of personal data - Prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences - Failure to transpose and notify the transposition measures - Article 260(3) TFEU - Application for the imposition of a lump sum and a penalty payment)

(2021/C 138/07)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: D. Nardi, G. von Rintelen and S. Pardo Quintillán, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: L. Aguilera Ruiz, acting as Agent)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

Declares that, by failing to adopt, by the expiry of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and, therefore, by failing to notify those measures to the European Commission, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 63 of that directive;

Declares that, by failing to adopt, by the time the Court examined the facts, the provisions necessary to transpose into its national law the provisions of Directive 2016/680 and, therefore, failing to notify those measures to the Commission, the Kingdom of Spain persisted in its failure to fulfil its obligations;

3.	Should the infringement established in point 1 persist at the date of delivery of this judgment, orders the Kingdom of Spain to pay the Commission, as from that date and until that Member State has put an end to that infringement, a daily penalty payment of EUR 89 000;

4.	Orders the Kingdom of Spain to pay the Commission a lump sum in the amount of EUR 15 000 000;

5.	Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission;

6.	Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs.

(1) OJ C 357, 21.10.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/7

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 24 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State — Netherlands) — M, A, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, T

(Case C-673/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Asylum and immigration - Directive 2008/115/EC - Articles 3, 4, 6 and 15 - Refugee staying illegally in the territory of a Member State - Detention for the purpose of transfer to another Member State - Refugee status in that other Member State - Principle of non-refoulement - No return decision - Applicability of Directive 2008/115)

(2021/C 138/08)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: M, A, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Defendants: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, T

Operative part of the judgment

Articles 3, 4, 6 and 15 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from placing in administrative detention a third-country national residing illegally on its territory, in order to carry out the forced transfer of that national to another Member State in which that national has refugee status, where that national has refused to comply with the order to go to that other Member State and it is not possible to issue a return decision to him or her.

(1) OJ C 423, 16.12.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/7

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 25 February 2021 — VodafoneZiggo Group BV v European Commission

(Case C-689/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Electronic communications networks and services - Directive 2002/21/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC - Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications - Article 7(3) and (7) - Draft measure made accessible by the national regulatory authority - Wholesale fixed access market in the Netherlands - Joint significant market power - Comments of the European Commission communicated to the national regulatory authority - Obligation for the national regulatory authority to take the utmost account of them - Scope - Article 263 TFEU - Action for annulment - Admissibility - Challengeable act - Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)

(2021/C 138/09)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: VodafoneZiggo Group BV (represented by: W. Knibbeler, A. Pliego Selie and B.A. Verheijen, advocaten)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: L. Nicolae and G. Braun, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders VodafoneZiggo Group BV to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 372, 4.11.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/8

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 25 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Novo Banco SA v Junta de Andalucía

(Case C-712/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Freedom of establishment - Free movement of capital - Taxation - Tax on customer deposits held by credit institutions - Tax deductions granted only to establishments with registered offices or branches in the territory of the Autonomous Community of Andalusia - Tax deductions granted only for investments in projects carried out in that autonomous community - Common system of value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 401 - Prohibition on the levying of other domestic taxes which can be characterised as turnover taxes - Concept of ‘turnover tax’ - Essential characteristics of VAT - None)

(2021/C 138/10)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Novo Banco SA

Defendant: Junta de Andalucía

Operative part of the judgment

The freedom of establishment enshrined in Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of deductions applied to the gross amount of a tax on deposits made by customers of credit institutions which have their head office or branches in the territory of a region of a Member State,

—	it precludes a deduction of EUR 200 000 from the gross amount of that tax in favour of credit institutions which have their head office in the territory of that region;

—

it does not preclude deductions from the gross amount of that tax of EUR 5 000 per branch established in the territory of that region, the latter amount being increased to EUR 7 500 for any branch situated in a municipality with fewer than 2 000 inhabitants, unless those deductions de facto entail an unjustified discrimination based on the location of the registered office of the credit institutions concerned, which it is for the national court to determine.

Article 63(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a tax on deposits made by customers of credit institutions which have their head office or branches in the territory of a region of a Member State, it precludes deductions from the gross amount of that tax equal to credits, loans and investments intended for projects carried out in that region, provided that those deductions pursue an objective of a purely economic nature.

Article 401 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation introducing a tax payable by credit institutions in respect of the holding of customer deposits, the taxable amount of which corresponds to the arithmetical average of the quarterly balance of those deposits and which cannot be passed on by the taxpayer to third parties.

(1) OJ C 423, 16.12.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/9

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 25 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — Bartosch Airport Supply Services GmbH v Zollamt Wien

(Case C-772/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common Customs Tariff - Combined Nomenclature - Tariff classification - Tariff heading 8701 and Tariff heading 8705 - Interpretation - Aircraft tractor)

(2021/C 138/11)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Bartosch Airport Supply Services GmbH

Defendant: Zollamt Wien

Operative part of the judgment

The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2016/1821 of 6 October 2016, must be interpreted as meaning that heading 8705 of that nomenclature does not cover vehicles designed to tow and push aircraft, referred to as ‘aircraft tractors’, since those aircraft tractors fall within heading 8701 of that nomenclature.

(1) OJ C 27, 27.1.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/10

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg — Austria) — BU v Markt24 GmbH

(Case C-804/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters - Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 - Jurisdiction in respect of individual contracts of employment - Provisions of Section 5 of Chapter II - Applicability - Contract entered into in a Member State for employment with a company established in another Member State - No work performed throughout the duration of the contract - Exclusion of the application of national rules of jurisdiction - Article 21(1)(b)(i) - Concept of the ‘place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work’ - Contract of employment - Place of performance of the contract - Obligations of the employee towards his or her employer)

(2021/C 138/12)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht Salzburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BU

Defendant: Markt24 GmbH

Operative part of the judgment

The provisions set out in Section 5 of Chapter II of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, under the heading ‘Jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment’, must be interpreted as applying to a legal action brought by an employee domiciled in a Member State against an employer domiciled in another Member State in the case where the contract of employment was negotiated and entered into in the Member State in which the employee is domiciled and provided that the place of performance of the work was located in the Member State of the employer, even though that work was not performed for a reason attributable to that employer;

The provisions set out in Section 5 of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as precluding the application of national rules of jurisdiction in respect of an action such as that referred to in point 1 of the operative part of the present judgment, irrespective of whether those rules are more beneficial to the employee;

Article 21(1)(b)(i) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that an action such as that referred to in point 1 of the operative part of the present judgment may be brought before the court of the place where or from where the employee was required, pursuant to the contract of employment, to discharge the essential part of his or her obligations towards his or her employer, without prejudice to point 5 of Article 7 of that regulation.

(1) OJ C 45, 10.2.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/11

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 25 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky — Slovakia) — Slovak Telekom a.s. v Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky

(Case C-857/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Competition - Article 102 TFEU - Abuse of a dominant position - Division of competences between the European Commission and the national competition authorities - Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 - Article 11(6) - National competition authorities relieved of their competence - Principle ne bis in idem - Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)

(2021/C 138/13)

Language of the case: Slovak

Referring court

Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant in the appeal on a point of law: Slovak Telekom a.s.

Defendant and respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky

Operative part of the judgment

The first sentence of Article 11(6) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] must be interpreted as meaning that the competition authorities of the Member States are relieved of their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the case where the European Commission initiates proceedings for the purposes of adopting a decision finding an infringement of those provisions in so far as that formal act relates to the same alleged infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, committed by the same undertaking or undertakings on the same product market or markets and the same geographical market or markets during the same period or periods as those concerned by the proceeding or proceedings previously brought by those authorities.

The principle ne bis in idem, as enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to infringements of competition law, such as the abuse of a dominant position referred to in Article 102 TFEU, and precludes an undertaking from being found liable or proceedings from being brought against it afresh on the grounds of anticompetitive conduct for which it has been penalised or declared not liable by an earlier decision that can no longer be challenged. By contrast, that principle does not apply where proceedings are brought against or sanctions imposed on an undertaking separately and independently by a competition authority of a Member State and the European Commission for infringements of Article 102 TFEU relating to separate product markets or separate geographical markets, or where a competition authority of a Member State is relieved of its competence pursuant to the first sentence of Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003.

(1) OJ C 36, 3.2.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/12

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 25 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — France) — Les chirurgiens-dentistes de France and Others v Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé, Ministre de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l’Innovation, Premier ministre

(Case C-940/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Recognition of professional qualifications - Directive 2005/36/EC - Article 4f(6) - National regulation - Allowing for the possibility of partial access to one of the professions covered by the mechanism for the automatic recognition of professional qualifications)

(2021/C 138/14)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Les chirurgiens-dentistes de France, Confédération des syndicats médicaux français, Fédération des syndicats pharmaceutiques de France, Syndicat des biologistes, Syndicat des laboratoires de biologie clinique, Syndicat des médecins libéraux, Union dentaire, Conseil national de l’ordre des chirurgiens-dentistes, Conseil national de l’ordre des masseurs-kinésithérapeutes, Conseil national de l’ordre des infirmiers

Defendants: Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé, Ministre de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l’Innovation, Premier ministre

Operative part of the judgment

Article 4f(6) of Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, as amended by Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013, must be interpreted as not precluding legislation allowing for the possibility of partial access to one of the professions covered by the mechanism for the automatic recognition of professional qualifications laid down by the provisions of Chapter III of Title III of that directive, as amended.

(1) OJ C 77, 9.3.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/12

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 25 February 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg — Luxembourg) — XI v Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants

(Case C-129/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Directive 2010/18/EU - Revised Framework Agreement on parental leave - National legislation making the grant of a right to parental leave subject to a condition of employment and to the mandatory affiliation in that regard of the worker to the social security scheme concerned on the date on which the child was born)

(2021/C 138/15)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: XI

Defendant: Caisse pour l’avenir des enfants

Operative part of the judgment

Clauses 1.1, 1.2, 2.1 and 3.1(b) of the Framework Agreement on parental leave (revised) of 18 June 2009, annexed to Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which makes the grant of a right to parental leave subject to the condition that the parent concerned is employed without interruption for a period of at least 12 months immediately preceding the start of the parental leave. By contrast, those clauses preclude national legislation which makes the grant of a right to parental leave subject to the condition that the parent has the status of a worker at the time of the birth or adoption of his or her child.

(1) OJ C 191, 8.6.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/13

Order of the Court (Tenth chamber) of 14 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Bucaresti — Romania) — Krakvet sp. z o.o. sp.k. v Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti, Administraţia Fiscală pentru Contribuabili Nerezidenţi

(Case C-108/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Common system of value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 33 - Determination of the place where taxable transactions are carried out - Supply of goods with transport - Supply of goods dispatched or transported by or on behalf of the supplier - Sale through a website - Contract for the carriage of goods concluded by the buyer with a company suggested by the supplier)

(2021/C 138/16)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Bucureşti

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Krakvet sp. z o.o. sp.k.

Defendants: Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti, Administraţia Fiscală pentru Contribuabili Nerezidenţi

Operative part of the order

Article 33 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that, as regards goods sold through a website by a supplier established in a Member State to buyers located in another Member State, when, for the purposes of delivering those goods, those buyers, in accordance with the dispatching options offered by the supplier, choose a company suggested by that website with which they conclude a contract separate from the one which bounds them to that supplier for the purchase of those goods, the latter must be regarded as transported ‘by or on behalf of the supplier’, within the meaning of Article 33, where the role of that supplier is predominant in terms of initiating and organising the essential stages of the transport of those goods, which it is for the referring court to ascertain, taking account of all the relevant circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings.

(1) OJ C 172, 20.5.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/14

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 20 January 2021 — CCPL — Consorzio Cooperative di Produzione e Lavoro SC, Coopbox group SpA, Coopbox Eastern s.r.o.v European Commission

(Case C-706/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Retail food packaging market - Appeal directed against the grounds - Appeal manifestly inadmissible)

(2021/C 138/17)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: CCPL — Consorzio Cooperative di Produzione e Lavoro SC, Coopbox group SpA, Coopbox Eastern s.r.o. (represented initially by: S. Bariatti, E. Cucchiara and A. Cutrupi, avvocati, and subsequently by E. Cucchiara, avvocato)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented initially by: P. Rossi and T. Vecchi, and subsequently by P. Rossi, G. Conte and C. Sjödin, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the order

1.	The appeal is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

2.	CCPL — Consorzio Cooperative di Produzione e Lavoro SC, Coopbox group SpA and Coopbox Eastern s.r.o. are ordered to bear their own costs and those incurred by the European Commission.

(1) OJ C 383, 11.11.2019.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/14

Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 14 January 2021 — (request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad — Bulgaria) — Criminal procedure against UC, TD

(Case C-769/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Directive 2012/13/EU - Right to information in criminal proceedings - Article 6 - Right of suspects or accused persons to be informed of their rights - Second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Dealing with a case in a reasonable time - National legislation providing for the discontinuance of judicial proceedings in the case of a finding of deficiencies in the bill of indictment by the court - Remission of the matter to the public prosecutor’s office for a new bill of indictment to be drawn up - Admissibility)

(2021/C 138/18)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Parties in the main criminal proceedings

UC, TD

Interested party: Spetsializirana prokuratura

Operative part of the order

Article 6(1), (3) and (4), of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as well as the principle of primacy of EU law and the right to respect for human dignity must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, in the case of a deficient bill of indictment the content of which is unclear, incomplete or inconsistent, in no circumstances allows the public prosecutor to remedy the deficiencies by correcting them at the preliminary hearing during which they are established and instead obliges the court to discontinue the judicial proceedings and remit the matter to the public prosecutor’s office for a new bill of indictment to be drawn up.

(1) OJ C 27, 27.1.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/16

Order of the Court of 21 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal du travail de Nivelles — Belgium) — UF v Partena, Assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants ASBL, Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti), Union Nationale des Mutualités Libres (Partenamut) (UNMLibres)

(Case C-105/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Decision to refer - Insufficient information as to the reasons justifying the need for an answer to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling for the purposes of resolving the dispute in the main proceedings - Manifest inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling)

(2021/C 138/20)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de travail de Nivelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UF

Defendants: Partena, Assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants ASBL, Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti), Union Nationale des Mutualités Libres (Partenamut) (UNMLibres)

Operative part of the order

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Tribunal du travail de Nivelles (Nivelles Labour Court, Belgium), by decision of 3 February 2020, is manifestly inadmissible.

(1) OJ C 175, 25.5.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/16

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Aragón (Spain) lodged on 11 December 2020 — Asociación Estatal de Entidades de Servicios de Atención a Domicilio (ASADE) v Consejería de Sanidad de la Diputación General de Aragón

(Case C-676/20)

(2021/C 138/22)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Aragón

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Asociación Estatal de Entidades de Servicios de Atención a Domicilio (ASADE)

Defendant: Consejería de Sanidad de la Diputación General de Aragón

Questions referred

Is national legislation which permits contracting authorities to make use of agreements with private non-profit organisations — not solely voluntary associations — to provide all manner of social services to persons in return for reimbursement of costs, without following the procedures in the Procurement Directive [2014/24/EU] and irrespective of the estimated value, simply by classifying the arrangements in question as non-contractual, compatible with EU law — Article 49 TFEU (1) and Articles 76 and 77 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 (2) (as read with Article 74 and Annex XIV thereof)?

Is national legislation compatible with EU law — Article 49 TFEU and Articles 76 and 77 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 (as read with Article 74 and Annex XIV thereof) — when, with regard to the provision of health and social services of general interest, it enables public procurement legislation to be avoided through the use of public-private agreements that supplement or replace direct provision, not because such agreements are a more appropriate way to provide these services but because they are a means to achieve specific social policy objectives which affect the way in which the service is provided or which the service provider must satisfy in order to be selected, even if the principles of advertising, competition and transparency continue to apply?

If so, is it compatible with EU law — the provisions cited above, and also Article 15(2)(b) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (3) — to restrict these arrangements solely and exclusively to non-profit organisations (not solely voluntary associations), even if the principles of transparency and advertising are observed?

Having regard to Article 15(2)(b) of the Services Directive [2006/123/EC], can giving contracting authorities discretion to make use of public-private agreements in order to appoint non-profit organisations to manage social and health services be interpreted as making access to such services conditional on taking a specific legal form? And if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, is national legislation such as that at issue here (which the State has not notified to the Commission with regard to the requirement concerning legal form) lawful under Article 15(7) of the Services Directive?

If the answers to the previous questions are in the affirmative, must Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, Articles 76 and 77 of the Public Procurement Directive [2014/24/EU] 2014 (as read with Article 74 and Annex XIV thereof) and Article 15(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market be interpreted as permitting contracting authorities, when selecting non-profit organisations (not solely voluntary associations) with which to enter into agreements to provide all manner of social services to persons, to include not only the selection criteria set out in Article 2(2)(j) of the said directive but also the criterion that the organisation be established in the place or geographical area where the service is to be provided?

(1) OJ 2012 C 326, p. 47.

(2) OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65 (public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC).

(3) OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/18

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 4 January 2021 — FS v Chief Appeals Officer, Social Welfare Appeals Office, Minister for Employment affaires, Minister for Social Protection

(Case C-3/21)

(2021/C 138/23)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court (Ireland)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FS

Defendants: Chief Appeals Officer, Social Welfare Appeals Office, Minister for Employment Affairs, Minister for Social Protection

Questions referred

does the concept of ‘claim’ in art. 81 of regulation 883/2004 (1) include the ongoing state of being in receipt of a periodic benefit from a first Member State (where the benefit is correctly payable by a second Member State) on each and every occasion on which such benefit Is paid, even after the original application and the original decision by the first Member State to grant the benefit;

if the answer to the first question is yes, then in circumstances where a claim for social security is made incorrectly to a Member State of origin, when It should have been made to a second Member State, is the obligation of the second Member State pursuant to art. 81 of regulation 883/2004 (specifically, the obligation to treat a claim to the Member State of origin as being admissible in the second Member State) to be interpreted as being entirely independent of the applicant's obligation to give correct information regarding her place of residence pursuant to art, 76(4) of regulation 883/2004, such that a claim made incorrectly to the Member State of origin must be accepted as admissible by the second Member State for the purposes of art. 81, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to provide correct information as to her place of residence in accordance with art. 76(4), within the period for making a claim prescribed by the law of the second Member State;

whether the general EU law principle of effectiveness has the consequence that access to EU law rights is rendered ineffective in circumstances such as those in the present proceedings (in particular, in circumstances where the EU national exercising free movement rights is in breach of her obligation under art. 76(4) to notify the social welfare authorities of the Member State of origin of her change of country of residence) by a requirement of national law in the Member State in which the right of free movement is exercised that in order to obtain a backdating of claims for child benefit an EU national must apply for such a benefit in the second Member State within a period of twelve months prescribed by the domestic law of the latter Member State.

(1) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ 2004, L 166,p. 1).

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/18

Reference for a preliminary ruling from Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 14 January 2021 — SRS, AA v Minister for Justice and Equality

(Case C-22/21)

(2021/C 138/24)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Supreme Court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: SRS, AA

Defendant: Minister for Justice and Equality

Questions referred

1.	Can the term member of the household of an EU citizen, as used in Article 3 of Directive 2004/38/EC (1), be defined so as to be of universal application throughout the EU and if so what is that definition?

2.	If that term cannot be defined, by what criteria are judges to look at evidence so that national courts may decide according to a settled list of factors who is or who is not a member of the household of an EU citizen for the purpose of freedom of movement?

(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004, L 158, p. 77).

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski gradski sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 4 February 2021 — Criminal proceedings against KT

(Case C-71/21)

(2021/C 138/25)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Sofiyski gradski sad

Requested person

Questions referred

Do the provisions of Article 1(2) and (3) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway allow the issue of a new arrest warrant for the purposes of criminal prosecution in the same case against a person whose surrender has been refused by a Member State of the European Union on the basis of Article 1(3) of that agreement, read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?

Do the provisions of Article 1(3) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway, as well as those of Articles 21(1) and 67(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and those of Articles 6 and 45(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, allow a Member State, to which an arrest warrant is addressed, to rule again in the case in which another Member State refused to surrender the same person for the purposes of criminal prosecution in the same case, after the requested person has exercised his or her right of free movement and moved from the State in which surrender had been refused to the State to which the new arrest warrant is addressed?

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/20

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 4 February 2021 — SIA ‘PRODEX’ v Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

(Case C-72/21)

(2021/C 138/26)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Augstākā tiesa (Senāts)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant at first instance and appellant: SIA ‘PRODEX’

Defendant at first instance and respondent: Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

Questions referred

Must the Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature (1) and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1006/2011 (2) of 27 September 2011, be interpreted as meaning that subheading 4418 20 of the Combined Nomenclature can include door frames and thresholds as separate goods?

In the light of the first sentence of rule 2(a) of the general rules for the interpretation of the Combined Nomenclature, included in Annex I, Part One, Section I A of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1006/2011 of 27 September 2011 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, can subheading 4418 20 of the Combined Nomenclature also include unfinished door frames, door panels and thresholds provided that they have the essential features of complete and finished door frames and thresholds?

Must the wood panels and mouldings at issue in the main proceedings, which have a profile and decorative finish which objectively establish that their use in the manufacture of doors, door frames and thresholds is foreseeable, but which, prior to assembly of the door, must be cut to adjust their length and must have spaces made on them for fixing, and, if necessary, must have spaces for hinges and spaces for locks included in them, be classified under subheading 4418 20 or, based on the features of the specific panels or mouldings, under headings 4411 and 4412 of the Combined Nomenclature?

(1) OJ 1987 L 256, p. 1.

(2) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1006/2011 of 27 September 2011 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ 2011 L 282, p. 1).

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/20

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā apgabaltiesa (Latvia) lodged on 1 February 2021 — AS ‘PrivatBank’, A, B, Unimain Holdings Limited v Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija

(Case C-78/21)

(2021/C 138/27)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Administratīvā apgabaltiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: AS ‘PrivatBank’, A, B, Unimain Holdings Limited

Defendant: Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija

Questions referred

May financial loans and credits and operations in current and deposit accounts with financial institutions (including banks), referred to in Annex 1 to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the [EC] Treaty, (1) also be classed as movements of capital within the meaning of Article 63(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

Does a restriction (which does not follow directly from the Member State’s legislation) imposed on a specific credit institution by the competent authority of a Member State, prohibiting the institution from entering into business relationships with persons who are not nationals of the Republic of Latvia and requiring it to terminate any such existing relationships, constitute a measure adopted by a Member State for the purposes of Article 63(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and, as such, amount to a restriction on the principle of free movement of capital between Member States arising from that provision?

Is the restriction on the free movement of capital, which is guaranteed under Article 63(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, justified by the objective of preventing the use of the Union’s financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing, which is set out in Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC? (2)

Is the means chosen by the Member State — the imposition on a specific credit institution of a prohibition on entering into business relationships with persons who are not nationals of a specific Member State (the Republic of Latvia) and a requirement to terminate any such existing relationships — appropriate to achieve the objective established in Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, and does it therefore constitute an exception provided for in Article 65(1)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

(1) OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5, Special edition in Latvian: Chapter 10 Volume 001 P. 10.

(2) OJ 2015 L 141, p. 73.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal du travail de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 15 February 2021 — VW v Agence fédérale pour l’Accueil des demandeurs d’asile (Fedasil)

(Case C-92/21)

(2021/C 138/28)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal du travail de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VW

Defendant: Agence fédérale pour l’Accueil des demandeurs d’asile (Fedasil)

Questions referred

Is a remedy, provided for by domestic law to asylum seekers who have been requested to have their applications for international protection examined in another Member State, which does not have suspensory effect and may acquire such effect only if the asylum seeker is deprived of liberty with a view to his imminent transfer an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation? (1)

Must the effective remedy prescribed in Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation be interpreted as precluding only the implementation of a measure of enforced transfer while an appeal against that transfer decision is being examined or as prohibiting any measure preparatory to removal, such as relocation to a centre which establishes return paths for asylum seekers who have been requested to have their asylum applications examined in another European country?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31).

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/23

Action brought on 26 February 2021 — Czech Republic v Republic of Poland

(Case C-121/21)

(2021/C 138/30)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Czech Republic (represented by: M. Smolek, L. Dvořáková and J. Vláčil, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

rule that the Republic of Poland:

—

by allowing the extension by 6 years of the development consent for the extraction of lignite without conducting an environmental impact assessment, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1) and (2) of Directive 2011/92 (1) in conjunction with Article 4(4) to (6), Article 5(1) and (2) and Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 of that directive;

—	by allowing the exclusion of the public concerned from the procedure for the grant of development consent for extraction activity, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(2) to (7), Article 7(5), Article 8, Article 9 and Article 11(1) of Directive 2011/92;

—	by declaring the EIA decision to be immediately enforceable, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11(1) of Directive 2011/92;

—

by failing to include in the EIA decision a potential procedure to be followed in the case where exemptions are not granted for the bodies of water concerned under Article 4(5) of Directive 2000/60, (2) has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1)(a)(ii) and 4(1)(b)(ii) of Directive 2000/60;

—	by failing to allow the intervention of the public concerned and of the Czech Republic in the procedure for the grant of the mining development consent until 2026, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(2) to (7), Article 7(1), (2) and (5) and Article 8 of Directive 2011/92;

—	by failing to publish the mining development consent granted until 2026 and failing to provide it to the Czech Republic in a comprehensible form, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 9(1) and (2) of Directive 2011/92;

—	by failing to enable judicial review of the mining development consent granted until 2026, has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 11(1) of Directive 2011/92;

—	by failing to publish the mining development consent granted until 2026, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7 of Directive 2003/4; (3)

—	by failing to provide complete information in connection with the procedure for the grant of the mining development consent until 2026, has failed to fulfil its obligations under the principle of sincere cooperation within the meaning of Article 4(3) TEU;

—	by failing, in the mining development consent granted until 2026, to have sufficient regard to the EIA decision, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/92 in conjunction with Article 4(1) thereof;

—	by failing to set sufficient environmental conditions in the mining development consent granted until 2026, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 8a(1)(b) of Directive 2011/92

—	order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its application, the applicant puts forward pleas in law based on the infringement of Directive 2011/92, Directive 2000/60 and Directive 2003/4 and of the Treaty on European Union (the principle of sincere cooperation).

The Republic of Poland has introduced national legislation under which it is possible to extend by 6 years the development consent for extraction activity without an environmental impact assessment and under which the procedure for the grant of development consent for extraction activity is in most cases non-public. It has thereby infringed Directive 2011/92.

By declaring to be immediately enforceable the decision on the environmental conditions attached to the project for the extension in scope and duration of mining activity in the Turów mine until 2044, and thereby precluding effective legal protection with regard to that decision, the Republic of Poland has infringed Directive 2011/92. At the same time, the Republic of Poland has infringed Directive 2000/60 inasmuch as the decision on environmental conditions does not adequately cover the entire period of the project from the point of view of the impact of the extraction on the condition of bodies of water.

The Republic of Poland has infringed Directive 2011/92 inasmuch as it did not allow the public concerned or the Czech Republic to intervene in the procedure for the grant of the final development consent until 2026 for extraction activity in the Turów mine, inasmuch as it failed to publish the development consent issued and sent it to the Czech Republic late and in an incomplete form, inasmuch as Polish law precludes the review of that development consent by the public concerned and also inasmuch as in that development consent the environmental impact assessment was not properly taken into account. By that conduct, the Republic of Poland also infringed Directive 2003/4 and the principle of sincere cooperation within the meaning of Article 4(3) TEU.

(1) Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment; OJ 2012 L 26, p. 1.

(2) Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy; OJ 2000 L 327, p. 1.

(3) Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC; OJ 2003 L 41, p. 26.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/24

Action brought on 11 March 2021 — Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union

(Case C-156/21)

(2021/C 138/31)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér and M.M. Tátrai, acting as Agents)

Defendants: European Parliament and Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget. (1)

In the alternative

—	annul the following articles of Regulation 2020/2092:

—	Article 4(1);

—	Article 4(2)(h);

—	Article 5(2);

—	Article 5(3), penultimate sentence;

—	Article 5(3), final sentence;

—	Article 6(3) and (8);

and

—	order the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

1. First plea in law: the legal basis for the regulation is inappropriate and that there was no appropriate legal basis

Article 322(1)(a) TFEU, the provision designated as the legal basis for the contested regulation, empowers the EU legislature to adopt financial rules for implementing the EU budget; however, the contested regulation does not contain such rules. Consequently, the legal basis of the regulation is not the appropriate basis and it does not have an appropriate legal basis.

2. Second plea in law: infringement of Article 7 TEU, together with Articles 4(1) TEU, 5(2) TEU, 13(2) TEU and 269 TFEU

The procedure laid down by the contested regulation implies, in relation to a particular situation, that the procedure referred to in Article 7 TEU is put into effect, which is not permitted by Article 7 TEU. The creation, in itself, of a parallel procedure by means of the contested regulation infringes and circumvents Article 7 TEU. At the same time, the procedure laid down by the regulation is contrary to the division of powers as defined in Article 4(1) TEU, infringes the principle of conferral laid down in Article 5(2) TEU and the principle of institutional balance laid down in Article 13(2) TEU and infringes Article 269 TFEU through the powers conferred on the Court of Justice.

3. Third plea in law: infringement of the general principles of EU law of legal certainty and legislative clarity

The underlying concepts used in the contested regulation are in part not defined and in part cannot be the subject of a uniform definition, and, for that reason are not a suitable basis for the assessments and the measures which may be made or adopted based on the contested regulation or to allow the Member States to identify with the necessary certainty from that regulation what is expected of them concerning their legal systems or the functioning of their authorities. Similarly, various specific provisions of the contested regulation, both individually and together, involve such a degree of legal uncertainty in relation to the application of the regulation that they infringe the general principles of EU Law of legal certainty and legislative clarity.

4. Fourth plea in law: annulment of Article 4(1) of the regulation

Article 4(1) of the contested regulation allows measures to be adopted both in the event of risk to the Union Budget or to the financial interests of the Union. Where there is no specific adverse effect or specific impact, the application of the measures that may be adopted under the regulation may be regarded as disproportionate. Similarly, that provision infringes the principle of legal certainty.

5. Fifth plea in law: annulment of Article 4(2)(h) of the regulation

Article 4(2)(h) of the contested regulation also permits, when there are other situations or conduct of authorities of the Member States that are relevant to the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union, a finding of breaches of the principles of the rule of law and the adoption of measures, which, in the absence of a specific definition of the conduct and situations which may be penalised, infringes the principle of legal certainty.

6. Sixth plea in law: annulment of Article 5(2) of the regulation

In accordance with Article 5(2) of the contested regulation, in the event that measures are adopted in respect of a Member State, namely, that it is deprived of funds from the Union Budget, that does not exempt the government of the Member State from its obligation to continue financing the end users of previously agreed programmes. That article, first, is contrary to the legal basis of the regulation, since it imposes an obligation which has an impact on the budgets of the Member States, and, secondly, infringes the provisions of EU law concerning budget deficits and infringes the principle of equality of the Member States.

7. Seventh plea in law:annulment of the third sentence of Article 5(3) of the regulation

In accordance with the third sentence of Article 5(3) of the contested regulation, the measures which are to be adopted are to take into account the nature, duration, gravity and scope of the breaches of the principles of the rule of law, which calls into question the relationship between the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that are held to exist and the actual impact on the Union budget or on the financial interests of the Union and, therefore, is incompatible with the legal basis of the regulation and with Article 7 TEU. Similarly, the fact that the measures are not defined with the necessary accuracy infringes the principle of legal certainty.

8. Eighth plea in law: annulment of the final sentence of Article 5(3) of the regulation

In accordance with the final sentence of Article 5(3) of the contested regulation, the measures which are to be taken are, in so far as possible, to target the Union actions affected by the breaches of the principles of the rule of law, which does not guarantee the existence of a direct relationship between the breaches of the principles of the rule of law which are in fact found to exist and the measures which are to be adopted and, therefore, infringes both the principle of proportionality and, on account of an inadequate determination of the link between the breaches of the principles of the rule of law which are in fact found to exist and the measures which are to be adopted, of the principle of legal certainty.

9. Ninth plea in law: annulment of Article 6(3) and (8) of the regulation

In accordance with Article 6(3) and (8) of the contested regulation, in the assessment to be conducted, the Commission is to take into account relevant information from available sources, including decisions, conclusions and recommendations of Union institutions, other relevant international organisations and other recognised institutions, and, when assessing the proportionality of the measures to be imposed, the Commission is to take into account that information and guidance, which does not provide a sufficiently accurate definition of the information to be used. The fact that the references and the sources used by the Commission are not adequately defined infringes the principle of legal certainty.

(1) OJ 2020 L 433I, p. 1.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/26

Action brought on 11 March 2021 — Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union

(Case C-157/21)

(2021/C 138/32)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent)

Defendants: European Parliament and Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (1) in its entirety;

—	order the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Plea alleging that Regulation 2020/2092 lacks a valid legal basis

Poland submits that a regulation issued under Article 322(1)(a) TFEU cannot establish the conditions under which infringement of the constituent principles of the concept of ‘the rule of law’ is indicated; nor can it authorise the Commission and the Council to declare that those principles have been infringed by Member States and, consequently, to adopt, in implementing acts, measures for the protection of the Union budget. Additionally, Poland indicates that the mechanism thus created does not meet the requirements that ought to be met by a conditionality mechanism and is, therefore, a mechanism for imposing penalties on the Member States for failure to fulfil their obligations under the Treaties.

2.	In the alternative, in the event that the Court of Justice recognises the competence of the EU legislature to adopt Regulation 2020/2092, plea alleging that that regulation has an incorrect legal basis

3.	In the alternative, in the event that the Court of Justice recognises the competence of the EU legislature to adopt Regulation 2020/2092, plea alleging breach of Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality

4.	Plea alleging infringement of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU on the basis that the reasoning in the proposal for a regulation made in respect of Regulation 2020/2092 was insufficient

Plea alleging infringement of Article 7 TEU

Poland indicates that Regulation 2020/2092 establishes a new control mechanism in relation to Member States’ observance of the principles of the rule of law which is not provided for in the Treaties and therefore produces effects that are equivalent to amendment of the Treaties. Additionally, because the purpose of the mechanism established by Regulation 2020/2092 overlaps with the purpose of the procedure established by Article 7 TEU, Regulation 2020/2092 leads to the bypassing of the procedure established by Article 7 TEU, thus challenging the validity of its continued application, and even rendering it futile.

6.	Plea alleging infringement of the first paragraph of Article 269 TFEU through the definition of the value of ‘the rule of law’, as a primary law concept set out in Article 2 TEU, by way of an act of secondary legislation, that is to say, by way of Regulation 2020/2092

Plea alleging infringement of Article 4(1), the second sentence of Article 4(2), and Article 5(2) TEU

This plea elaborates on the reasoning set out under the first plea in law. Poland submits that, by establishing the control mechanism provided for in Regulation 2020/2092 in relation to Member States’ observance of the principles of the rule of law, the EU legislature infringed the principle of conferral laid down in Article 4(1) and Article 5(2) TEU. Additionally, Poland indicates that the legislature also failed to fulfil its obligation, under the second sentence of Article 4(2) TEU, to respect essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order, and safeguarding national security.

Plea alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment of Member States (first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU)

Poland submits that the provisions of the regulation do not guarantee that a finding that the principles of the rule of law have been infringed will be preceded by a ‘thorough qualitative assessment’ that will be objective, impartial and fair. Additionally, Poland indicates that the procedure for adopting measures for the protection of the Union budget unambiguously and directly discriminates against smaller and medium-sized Member States as compared with larger States.

Plea alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty

Poland submits that the provisions of Regulation 2020/2092, and in particular the conditions listed in Article 3 and Article 4(2) thereof for assessing whether there has been infringement of the principles of the rule of law, do not meet the requirements of clarity and precision.

10.	Plea alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality (Article 5(4) TEU)

11.

Plea alleging abuse of power by establishing a mechanism, the actual purpose of which is not the protection of the Union budget but the circumvention of both the procedural requirements for triggering the procedure laid down in Article 7 TEU and the substantive requirements for initiating the proceedings referred to in Article 258 TFEU

(1) OJ 2020 L 433I, p. 1.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/30

Judgment of the General Court of 17 February 2021 — Ryanair v Commission

(Case T-238/20) (1)

(State aid - Air transport market in Sweden, from Sweden and to Sweden - Loan guarantees to support airlines amid the Covid-19 pandemic - Decision not to raise any objections - Temporary Framework for State aid measures - Measure intended to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State - Free provision of services - Equal treatment - Proportionality - Criterion of holding a licence issued by the Swedish authorities - Failure to weigh the beneficial effects of the aid against its adverse effects on trading conditions and the maintenance of undistorted competition - Article 107(3)(b) TFEU - Ratio legis - Duty to state reasons)

(2021/C 138/40)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ryanair DAC (Swords, Ireland) (represented by: E. Vahida, F. C. Laprévote, S. Rating and I. G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn, S. Noë and F. Tomat, acting as Agents)

Interveners in support of the defendant: French Republic (represented by: E. de Moustier, C. Mosser, A. Daniel and P. Dodeller, acting as Agents), Kingdom of Sweden (represented by: C. Meyer-Seitz, H. Eklinder, A. Runeskjöld, M. Salborn Hodgson, H. Shev, R. Shahsavan Eriksson and J. Lundberg, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2020) 2366 final of 11 April 2020 on State Aid SA.56812 (2020/N) — Sweden — COVID-19: Loan guarantee scheme to airlines.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Ryanair DAC to bear its own costs and to pay those of the European Commission, including the costs relating to the request for confidential treatment;

3.	Orders the French Republic and the Kingdom of Sweden to bear their own respective costs.

(1) OJ C 209, 22.6.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/31

Judgment of the General Court of 17 February 2021 — Ryanair v Commission

(Case T-259/20) (1)

(State aid - French air transport market - Deferral of payment of civil aviation tax and solidarity tax on airline tickets due on a monthly basis during the period from March to December 2020 in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic - Decision not to raise any objections - Aid intended to make good the damage caused by an exceptional occurrence - Free provision of services - Equal treatment - Criterion of holding a licence issued by the French authorities - Proportionality - Article 107(2)(b) TFEU - Duty to state reasons)

(2021/C 138/41)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ryanair DAC (Swords, Ireland) (represented by: E. Vahida, F. C. Laprévote, S. Rating and I. G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn, S. Noë and C. Georgieva-Kecsmar, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: French Republic (represented by: E. de Moustier, C. Mosser, A. Daniel and P. Dodeller, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2020) 2097 final of 31 March 2020 on State Aid SA.56765 (2020/N) — France — Covid-19 — Deferral of the payment of airline taxes in favour of public air transport undertakings.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Ryanair DAC to bear its own costs and to pay those of the European Commission, including the costs relating to the request for confidential treatment;

3.	Orders the French Republic to bear its own costs.

(1) OJ C 215, 29.6.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/31

Order of the General Court of 12 February 2021 — sprd.net v EUIPO — Shirtlabor (I love)

(Case T-19/20) (1)

(Action for annulment - EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark I love - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Trade mark consisting of an advertising slogan - Obligation to state reasons - Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Inapplicability of Article 16(1)(a) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 - Admissibility of evidence - Article 97(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Impartiality - Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2021/C 138/42)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: sprd.net AG (Leipzig, Germany) (represented by: J. Hellenbrand, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: S. Hanne, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Shirtlabor GmbH (Münster, Germany) (represented by: O. Wallscheid, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 October 2019 (Case R 5/2019-5), relating to invalidity proceedings between Shirtlabor and sprd.net.

Operative part of the order

1.	The action is dismissed.

2.	sprd.net AG shall pay its own costs and the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

3.	Shirtlabor GmbH shall bear its own costs.

(1) OJ C 68, 2.3.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/32

Order of the General Court of 11 February 2021 — Fryč v Commission

(Case T-92/20) (1)

(Non-contractual liability - State aid - Block exemption regulations - Aid programme granted by the Czech authorities in favour of certain undertakings - Commission decision approving that programme - Action for annulment dismissed as being out of time - Damage allegedly caused by acts of the Commission and the EU Courts - Limitation period - Action in part manifestly inadmissible - Causal link - Action in part manifestly unfounded in law)

(2021/C 138/43)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Applicant: Petr Fryč (Pardubice, Czech Republic) (represented by: Š. Oharková, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Braga da Cruz, C. Georgieva-Kecsmar and K. Walkerová, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 268 TFEU seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of, first, the adoption of Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation) (OJ 2008 L 214, p. 3), second, the adoption by the Commission of the decision of 3 December 2007 and the failure to publish that decision, third, the shortcomings in the Commission’s handling of the complaints lodged by the applicant between 2016 and 2018 and, fourth, the orders of 5 September 2019, Fryč v Commission (C 230/19 P, not published, EU:C:2019:685), and 15 January 2019, Fryč v Commission (T-513/18, not published, EU:T:2019:22).

Operative part of the order

1.	The action is dismissed.

2.	There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene by the Czech Republic.

3.	Mr Petr Fryč shall bear his own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission, with the exception of those relating to the application for leave to intervene.

4.	Mr Petr Fryč and the Commission shall each bear their own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene.

(1) OJ C 161, 11.5.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/33

Order of the General Court of 11 February 2021 — Sam McKnight v EUIPO — Carolina Herrera (COOL GIRL)

(Case T-176/20) (1)

(EU trade mark - Revocation of the contested decision - Action which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate)

(2021/C 138/44)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Sam McKnight Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: V. von Bomhard and J. Fuhrmann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: P. Sipos, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO intervening before the General Court: Carolina Herrera Ltd (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: E. Stoyanov Edissonov and I. Robledo McClymont, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 30 January 2020 (Case R 689/2019-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Carolina Herrera and Sam McKnight.

Operative part of the order

1.	There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.	The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by Sam McKnight Ltd and Carolina Herrera Ltd.

(1) OJ C 191, 8.6.2020.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/33

Order of the President of the General Court of 8 February 2021 — PNB Banka v ECB

(Case T-230/20 R)

(Interim relief - Economic and monetary policy - Prudential supervision of credit institutions - Specific supervisory tasks assigned to the ECB - Decision to withdraw a credit institution’s authorisation - Application for suspension of operation of an act - No urgency)

(2021/C 138/45)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: PNB Banka AS (Riga, Latvia) (represented by: O. Behrends, lawyer)

Defendant: European Central Bank (represented by: F. Bonnard, V. Hümpfner and C. Hernández Saseta, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Republic of Latvia (represented by: K. Pommere, V. Soņeca and E. Bārdiņš, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking the suspension of operation of the decision of the ECB of 17 February 2020 withdrawing the applicant’s authorisation.

Operative part of the order

1.	The application for interim relief is dismissed.

2.	The costs are reserved.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/34

Action brought on 19 December 2020 –Commission v CEVA and Others

(Case T-748/20)

(2021/C 138/46)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J. Estrada de Solà, and M. Ilkova, acting as Agents, and by E. Bouttier, lawyer)

Defendants: Centre d’étude et de valorisation des algues SA (CEVA) (Pleubian, France), SELARL TCA, acting as court-appointed representative in CEVA’s sauvegarde procedure (Saint-Brieuc, France) and SELARL AJIRE, acting as administrator for the implementation of CEVA’s ‘safeguard’ plan (Rennes, France)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	order CEVA, represented by its President, to pay the applicant an amount of EUR 234 491,02, which corresponds to the principal sum of EUR 168 220,16 and to the sum EUR 66 270,86 in interest for late payment;

—	order CEVA to pay the costs of the present action.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

First plea in law, based on the validity of the application pursuant to the arbitration clause of grant contract No Q5RS-2000-31334, which provides in Article 5 that the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (now ‘General Court of the European Union’) and, in case of appeal, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (now ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’) have sole jurisdiction to hear any dispute between the Community (now ‘European Union’), on the one hand, and the other parties to the contract, on the other hand, as regards the validity, application or any interpretation of that contract.

Second plea in law, based on the obligation to bring proceedings against the administrator for the implementation of the ‘safeguard’ plan and the court-appointed representative in CEVA’s sauvegarde procedure by reason of the opening of that procedure. The applicant considers that, since the present action follows the adoption of the ‘safeguard’ plan, the creditor should bring proceedings not only against the administrator for the implementation of the plan but also against the court-appointed representative, as bodies involved in the procedure of verification and admission of claims.

Third plea in law, alleging fraud by CEVA and serious financial irregularities which were allegedly found in the context of an audit. The applicant claims, inter alia, that the French courts found that the fraudulent declarations relating to the number of hours dedicated to the different projects for which CEVA received EU grants amounted to a breach of contractual obligations by CEVA. Thus an obligation to reimburse the advances agreed by the applicant arises as a result of the fraudulent nature of CEVA’s alleged acts.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/35

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — EVH v Commission

(Case T-53/21)

(2021/C 138/47)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: EVH GmbH (Halle (Saale), Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16);

—

order the defendant to produce the M.8870 and M.8871 files concerning (i) the discussions between the defendant and the merging parties before and during the merger proceedings, (ii) the separate notification of the individual parts of the transaction, and (iii) its change of opinion during the proceedings;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s lawyers’ and travel costs incurred as a result of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on the following pleas in law.

First plea in law: The approval decision is flawed as to its form:

—

Merger M.8870, approved by the defendant and hereby contested, was erroneously separated from the overall merger of E.ON SE (E.ON) and RWE AG (RWE), which demarcated the value added stages of the energy sector. The overall operation is closely intertwined and involves, in addition to the transfer of the RWE subsidiary innogy SE (innogy) to E.ON, also the acquisition of E.ON production assets by RWE, which was separately approved by the defendant (Case M.8871), and the acquisition of a 16,67 % share in E.ON by RWE, which was approved by the German Federal Cartel Office. Furthermore, the defendant did not give the applicant a proper hearing and gave insufficient and late reasons for the decision.

Second plea in law: The defendant insufficiently assessed the facts

—

In determining the relevant product market, the defendant failed to investigate, with regard to the retail supply of electricity and gas to German households and small business customers (HSBs), from the customer’s perspective, the impact on the product market definition of the homogeneity of the products, the uniformity of their intended use and other important factors for the retail supply to HSBs. It therefore incorrectly took the view that there were separate markets for basic supply and supply under special contracts.

—	The defendant failed to clarify in connection with the geographic market definition how the supply side and demand side is configured for the local retail supply to HSBs and accordingly misunderstood the actual local structure, which was differentiated by postcode.

—

As regards conditions on the local HSB markets, E.ON and innogy’s pooling of customer portfolios in their established supply areas, the dominant presence of E.ON on the central distribution channels Google, Verivox and Check24 and the ability to exclude third party providers were not (correctly) assessed.

—

The assessment of the network business was also insufficient. That was the case in relation to both (i) E.ON’s high market penetration in sourcing of network equipment, network services and network IT and its own network-related services offering to third parties in relation to the operation of distribution networks and (ii) competition for distribution networks themselves (so-called competition for concessions). In particular, there was a failure to forecast, or to forecast correctly, the future consequences of innogy being eliminated as a competitor to E.ON in competition for concessions.

—

There was only a selective analysis of the innovative business at the interface between the distribution business and network business dominated by E.ON, including with reference to the significance of metering as a gateway to innovative product solutions and E.ON’s role therein. Only the operation of charging points on motorways was considered in relation to E-mobility, which is undergoing rapid growth, but the operation of such charging points forms only one part of the market. The important forward-looking topics of Big Data and innovative (bundle) products received only a cursory assessment.

—	As a whole, the assessment was incorrectly based on considerations concerning the past. Effects over the coming years (e.g. through increasing shortages of skills in network deployment, increasing importance of data) were not examined.

Third plea in law: The defendant made a manifest error of assessment in finding that the merger was compatible with competition, partly as a result of shortcomings in its investigation.

—	The defendant manifestly defined incorrectly the product market of distribution to HSBs as it did not define the supply of energy to HSBs on the basis of basic supply and special contract customers as a single market.

—

The defendant’s assessment of E.ON’s market power in retail supply to HSBs was systematically incorrect because the defendant, having already incorrectly limited it to supply under special contracts, erroneously assumed the market to be national rather than comprising a number of local markets. It therefore overlooked the fact that E.ON’s (growing) local market share was 70 % or more in many cases.

—

The defendant also incorrectly characterised the significant presence and superior position of E.ON in competition for network contracts as of no concern and in so doing, in particular, made an incorrect finding regarding the negative effects on competition of innogy being eliminated as a competitor.

—

E.ON’s market power was not acknowledged due to a distinction incorrectly being made between various product markets in metering, which led to the harm to competition for innovative business being underestimated. The same occurred as regards the E-Mobility sector where only selected negative consequences for the operation of motorway charging points were acknowledged.

—	The defendant apparently erroneously also failed to take into consideration the anticompetitive effects which would result from E.ON’s improved access to even more data.

—	The defendant failed to recognise that the division of the value added stages of the energy sector between E.ON and RWE, which was agreed in connection with the overall merger, constituted a restriction of competition which was incompatible with Article 101 TFEU.

—

Finally, the defendant’s minimum requirements, limited for the German market to the niche segments of heating electricity and motorway charging points, were not capable of removing the existing competition concerns. They did not concern the markets adversely affected by the merger and were of no relevance for ensuring competition.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/37

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — Stadtwerke Leipzig v Commission

(Case T-55/21)

(2021/C 138/48)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Stadtwerke Leipzig GmbH (Leipzig, Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16);

—

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s lawyers’ and travel costs incurred as a result of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-53/21, EVH v Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/37

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — TEAG v Commission

(Case T-56/21)

(2021/C 138/49)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: TEAG Thüringer Energie AG (Erfurt, Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/Innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16);

—

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s lawyers’ and travel costs incurred as a result of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-53/21, EVH v Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/38

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — GWS Stadtwerke Hameln v Commission

(Case T-58/21)

(2021/C 138/50)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: GWS Stadtwerke Hameln GmbH (Hameln, Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the merger of E.ON/Innogy to be compatible with the internal market, (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16);

—

order the defendant to provide the M.8870 and M.8871 files concerning (i) the discussions between the defendant and the merging parties before and during the merger proceedings, (ii) the separate notification of the individual parts of the transaction, and (iii) its change of opinion during the proceedings;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the legal and travel-related costs incurred by the applicant during the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-53/21, EVH v European Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/38

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — eins energie in sachsen v Commission

(Case T-59/21)

(2021/C 138/51)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: eins energie in sachsen GmbH & Co. KG (Chemnitz, Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16);

—

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s lawyers’ and travel costs incurred as a result of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-53/21, EVH v Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/39

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — Naturstrom v Commission

(Case T-60/21)

(2021/C 138/52)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Naturstrom AG (Dusseldorf, Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16);

—

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s lawyers’ and travel costs incurred as a result of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-53/21, EVH v Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/40

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — EnergieVerbund Dresden v Commission

(Case T-61/21)

(2021/C 138/53)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: EnergieVerbund Dresden GmbH (Dresden, Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16);

—

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s lawyers’ and travel costs incurred as a result of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-53/21, EVH v Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/40

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — GGEW v Commission

(Case T-62/21)

(2021/C 138/54)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: GGEW, Gruppen-Gas- und Elektrizitätswerk Bergstraße AG (Bensheim, Germany) (represented by: I. Zenke and T. Heymann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16);

—

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the applicant’s lawyers’ and travel costs incurred as a result of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-53/21, EVH v Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/41

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — Stadtwerke Frankfurt am Main v Commission

(Case T-63/21)

(2021/C 138/55)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Stadtwerke Frankfurt am Main Holding GmbH (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) (represented by: C. Schalast, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 (Case M.8870);

—	join the proceedings within the meaning of Article 68(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court with the actions concerning the same decision M.8870, which, on account of the substantive connection between them, are cumulative and form a single decision closing the proceedings;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action against the Commission’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market, (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16), the applicant, in essence, relies on one plea in law, namely infringement of the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 . (1) In doing so, it relies on the following arguments:

Dividing the proposed concentration into three transactions.

—

By artificially dividing the proposed concentration, the defendant infringed the Treaties of the European Union and the provisions of the Merger Regulation. In particular, it disregarded procedural rules relating to mergers and thereby failed to take account, or failed correctly to take account, of circumstances relevant to the decision. These included, in particular, the failure to take into account the legal, economic and factual link between the entire merger project, the incorrect characterisation of the transaction as an asset swap, the failure to take into account the competitive effects of the consideration of RWE AG’s 16,67 % share in E.ON SE and the incorrect assessment of the effects of the transaction under competition law.

Incorrect assessment of the proposed concentration and its effects on the European internal market.

—

The defendant also failed properly to define the market. In addition, the defendant had based its assessment of the effects of the transaction on an incorrect scope of assessment and had incorrectly assessed the effects on competition. In so doing, it also relied on materially incorrect facts. In that respect, the defendant came to the incorrect conclusion that the merger could be examined separately and that it had no adverse effects on Community-wide competition.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1).

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/42

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — Mainova v Commission

(Case T-64/21)

(2021/C 138/56)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Mainova AG (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) (represented by: C. Schalast, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 (Case M.8870);

—	join the proceedings within the meaning of Article 68(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court with the actions concerning the same decision M.8870, which, on account of the substantive connection between them, are cumulative and form a single decision closing the proceedings;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action against the Commission’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/Innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market (Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16), relies on a single plea in law which is, in essence, identical or similar to that raised in Case T-63/21, Stadtwerke Frankfurt am Main v Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/42

Action brought on 29 January 2021 — enercity v Commission

(Case T-65/21)

(2021/C 138/57)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: enercity AG (Hannover, Germany) (represented by: C. Schalast, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Annul the defendant’s decision of 17 September 2019 (Case M.8870);

—	join the proceedings within the meaning of Article 68(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court with the actions concerning the same decision M.8870, which, on account of the substantive connection between them, are cumulative and form a single decision closing the proceedings;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action against the Commission’s decision of 17 September 2019 declaring the E.ON/Innogy concentration to be compatible with the internal market,(Case M.8870) (OJ 2020 C 379, p. 16), relies on a single plea in law which is, in essence, identical or similar to that raised in Case T-63/21, Stadtwerke Frankfurt am Main v Commission.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/43

Action brought on 28 January 2021 — QA v Commission

(Case T-68/21)

(2021/C 138/58)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: QA (represented by: C. Roth, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	order the European Commission to pay a sum of EUR 397 038,30 [to QA] on account of the material damage she suffered as a result of the infringement by the Commission of the principles of proportionality, good administration and the rights of the defence, as derived from European Union law;

—	order the European Commission to pay a sum of EUR 100 000 [to QA] on account of the non-material damage she suffered as a result of the infringement of the principle of proportionality, as derived from European Union law;

—	order the European Commission to pay the costs, including non-recoverable expenses.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law, the first three of which concern the material damage which she has allegedly suffered due to a shortfall in her present and future remuneration, and the fourth concerns the non-material damage which she allegedly suffered due to injury to her reputation.

1.	First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality by the European Commission, which thus constitutes an unlawful act for which the Commission is responsible and which caused damage to the applicant.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging non-observance of the rights of the defence by the European Commission, which thus constitutes an unlawful act for which the Commission is responsible and which caused damage to the applicant.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of good administration by the European Commission, which thus constitutes an unlawful act for which the Commission is responsible and which caused damage to the applicant.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality by the European Commission, which thus constitutes an unlawful act for which the Commission is responsible and which caused damage to the applicant.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/44

Action brought on 4 February 2021 — PIC CO v EUIPO — Haribo Ricqles Zan (P.I.C. Co.)

(Case T-73/21)

(2021/C 138/59)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: PIC CO AD (Kazichene, Bulgaria) (represented by: A. Ivanova, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Haribo Ricqles Zan (Marseille, France)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trademark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark P.I.C. Co. — European Union trade mark No 15 400 138

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 November 2020 in Case R 1847/2019-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision.

Plea in law

—	Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/44

Action brought on 4 February 2021 — QC v Commission

(Case T-77/21)

(2021/C 138/60)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: QC (represented by: F. Moyse, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the implied refusal decision of 8 November 2020;

—	order the recalculation of [QC’s] pension rights with effect from 1 May 2020 on the basis of all its actual contributions in the Spanish social system;

—

award the applicant the amount equivalent to the difference between the recalculated amount of his pension and the amount actually received by [QC], for the period starting on 1 May 2020 and ending on the date of that recalculation of pension rights, together with statutory interest, to be calculated as from the payment of that sum, or, in the alternative, as from the date on which the complaint was lodged, or, in the further alternative, as from the date on which the present application was lodged, subject to an increase in that amount for the months after January 2021, and until the annulment of the contested implied refusal decision;

—	award the applicant the amount of EUR 25 000 (twenty-five thousand euros) for material damages;

—	award the applicant the amount of EUR 50 000 (fifty thousand euros) for non-material damages;

—	order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 45 and 48 TFEU which lay down the [principle of] freedom of movement for workers and the protection of social rights in the context of the free movement of workers, and, more specifically, alleging infringement of the protection of the social rights of an EU citizen who has worked for an international organisation while exercising his freedom of movement within the European Union. According to the applicant, that infringement includes also the infringement of other EU law rules, such as:

—	Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community (OJ 1971 L 149, p. 2);

—	Article 7 and Article 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, and;

—	Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1).

2.	Second plea in law, concerning the applicant’s request for compensation, based on material and non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant because of the non-recognition of his pension rights.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/45

Action brought on 12 February 2021 –Paesen v EEAS

(Case T-88/21)

(2021/C 138/61)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Sandra Paesen (Beersel, Belgium) (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, lawyer)

Defendant: European External Action Service

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the decision dated 10 April 2020 on re-assignment to a non-managerial post and, alternatively, annul the end of probation report confirmed by that decision;

—	annul the Appointing Authority’s decision dated 12 May 2020 rejecting the request for assistance of the complainant submitted on 17 January 2020 under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations;

—	annul, where necessary, the decision of 4 November 2020 rejecting the applicant’s complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations;

—	compensate the applicant for the material and non-material damage she allegedly suffered as a result of psychological harassment and unlawful actions by the administration;

—	order the defendant to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, so far as concerns the annulment aspect, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging infringement of the fundamental rights to good administration, of the right to be heard, manifest error of assessment and misuse of powers.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 11 of Commission Decision on middle management staff C (2008) 5028/2 and the decision of the Secretary General of EEAS of 15 November 2019 on the exercise and subdelegation of powers entrusted to the Appointing Authority and to the AECE ADMIN (2019) 31, and manifest error of assessment.

Third plea in law, divided into two parts.

—	First part, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons, stemming from Article 25 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, infringement of Article 7(1) of the Staff Regulations, and manifest error of assessment.

—	Second part, alleging failure to observe Article 26 of the Staff Regulations and manifest error of assessment.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of dignity and decent working conditions and of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and of the prohibition of any form of psychological harassment.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/46

Action brought on 13 February 2021 — Creaticon v EUIPO — Paul Hartmann (SK SKINTEGRA THE RARE MOLECULE)

(Case T-93/21)

(2021/C 138/62)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Creaticon d.o.o. (Zagreb, Croatia) (represented by: P. Krmpotić, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Paul Hartmann AG (Heidenheim, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: International registration designating the European Union in respect of the figurative mark SK SKINTEGRA THE RARE MOLECULE — International registration designating the European Union No 1 424 199

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 December 2020 in Case R 847/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	allow the trade mark registration No 1 424 199 for the relevant products in Class 3;

—	alternatively, annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO to reimburse the applicant’s costs.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/47

Action brought on 15 February 2021 — Portugal v Commission

(Case T-95/21)

(2021/C 138/63)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: Portuguese Republic (represented by: L. Inez Fernandes, P. Barros da Costa, M. J. Marques, L. Borrego and A. M. Soares de Freitas, acting as Agents, and by M. Gorjão-Henriques and A. Saavedra, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should

—	order that the documents in the administrative procedure that gave rise to the adoption of the contested decision be added to the case file, in the terms sought by the present application;

—	annul Article 1 and Articles 4 to 6 of European Commission Decision of 4 December 2020, C(2020)8550 final, ‘on aid scheme SA.21259 (2018/C) (ex2018/NN) implemented by Portugal in favour of the Madeira Free Zone (MFZ) — Regime III’;

—	order the European Commission to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law.

1.	First plea, alleging an error in law, on the ground that the measure at issue was of general, and not selective, application and therefore did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

2.	Second plea, alleging that, in any event, the Commission failed to demonstrate that the criterion of distortion of competition and of effects on trade between Member States had been met.

3.	Third plea, alleging an error in law concerning the application of Article 108 TFEU and Articles 21 to 23 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589, on the ground that the aid in question was existing aid.

4.	Fourth plea, alleging an error of law in the decision, on the ground that Madeira Free Zone (MFZ) Regime III was implemented in accordance with the Commission’s decisions of 2007 and 2013, and with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.

5.	Fifth plea, alleging an error as to the assumptions of fact in the decision and/or a failure to state reasons, on the ground that the requirements of the tax scheme and the supervision thereof by the national authorities were suitable for the purposes of monitoring MFZ Regime III.

6.	Sixth plea, alleging an error as to the assumptions of fact in the decision and/or a failure to state reasons, on the ground that the Portuguese Republic carried out checks as to the requirement that jobs be created/maintained.

7.	Seventh plea, alleging infringement of general principles of EU law. The applicant relies, in particular, on infringement of the rights of the defence and of the principles of legal certainty and sound administration, and a failure to state reasons.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/48

Action brought on 17 February 2021 — Construcciones Electromecanicas Sabero v EUIPO — Magdalenas de las Heras (Heras Bareche)

(Case T-99/21)

(2021/C 138/64)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Construcciones Electromecanicas Sabero, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: I. Valdelomar Serrano, P. Román Maestre and D. Liern Cendrero, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Magdalenas de las Heras, SA (Aranda de Duero, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark Heras Bareche — Application for registration No 17 979 710

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 December 2020 in Case R 1019/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	Declare that Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council was erroneously applied in the contested decision;

—	Grant protection in respect of all the goods and services sought in the application for registration of EU trade mark No 17 979 710 Heras Bareche (figurative) in Classes 30 and 35.

—	Order the defendant to pay the costs associated with these proceedings, including the representation costs incurred by the applicant

Plea in law

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/49

Action brought on 19 February 2021 — Ryanair v Commission

(Case T-111/21)

(2021/C 138/65)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ryanair DAC (Swords, Ireland) (represented by: E. Vahida, F-C. Laprévote, V. Blanc, S. Rating and I. Metaxas-Maranghidis, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the defendant’s decision of 30 November 2020 on State aid SA.55373 (2020/N) — Croatia — COVID-19: Damage compensation to Croatia Airlines (1); and

—	order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant’s decision violated specific provisions of the TFEU and the general principles of European law that have underpinned the liberalization of air transport in the EU since the late 1980s (i.e., non-discrimination, the free provision of services and free establishment (2)).

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant misapplied Article 107(2)(b) TFEU and committed a manifest error of assessment in its review of the proportionality of the aid to the damage caused by the COVID-19 crisis.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant failed to initiate a formal investigation procedure despite serious difficulties and violated the applicant’s procedural rights.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging that the defendant violated its duty to state reasons.

(1) OJ 2021 C 17, p. 3.

(2) Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast) (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ 2008 L 293, p. 3–20).

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/49

Action brought on 25 February 2021 — Suez v Commission

(Case T-121/21)

(2021/C 138/66)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Suez (Paris, France) (represented by: O. Billard, I. Simic, Y. Trifounovitch, G. Fabre, G. Vatin, D. Théophile, G. Aubron and O. Chriqui, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order the Commission to pay all the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action against Commission Decision C(2020) 8969 final of 17 December 2020, which dismisses its request seeking, first, a declaration that Veolia Environnement S.A. infringed Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by acquiring a 29,9 % stake in the capital of Suez without obtaining the Commission’s prior consent and, second, the adoption of interim measures against that company, pursuant to Article 8(5)(a) of that regulation, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging failure to state reasons under Article 296 TFEU. The applicant claims that the Commission failed to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 296 TFEU by adopting a decision the reasoning of which does not allow the applicant or the Court to understand the reasons which led the Commission to consider that the automatic derogation laid down in Article 7(2) of the EC Merger Regulation was applicable. The applicant also complains that the contested decision is vitiated by a contradiction in its reasoning with regard to the applicability of Article 7(1) of the EC Merger Regulation to the acquisition of a 29,9 % stake in its capital. Finally, the applicant considers that the contested decision deviated, without adequate reasoning, from the settled case-law of the EU Courts relating to the principle that the exception with suspensive effect laid down in Article 7(2) of the EC Merger Regulation must be interpreted strictly.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(2) of the EC Merger Regulation. The applicant claims in that regard that the Commission infringed that provision by finding that, first, the exception laid down in that article must be applied to the single concentration envisaged by Veolia as a whole although that exception was clearly devoid of purpose and therefore inapplicable to that concentration and, second, all the legal transactions which constitute a single concentration must be covered by the same legal regime in the light of that article. The applicant also considers that the application, by the Commission, of the exception laid down by that provision to the private acquisition of securities acquired from a single seller constitutes an additional infringement of that article. Finally, the applicant criticises the Commission for having considered that Veolia had met the condition related to notification without delay of the concentration.

(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1).

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/50

Action brought on 25 February 2021 — QI v Commission

(Case T-122/21)

(2021/C 138/67)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: QI (represented by: N. de Montigny, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the 2018 and 2019 final career evaluation reports of the applicant;

—	annul, in so far as necessary, the decision rejecting the complaint of 16 November 2020;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the applicable general implementing provisions. As regards the 2018 evaluation report, the applicant alleges an unlawful review of the satisfactory nature of the services at the appeal stage. As regards the 2019 evaluation report, the applicant complains that the appeal assessor intervened at an early stage. Finally, as regards the two reports, the applicant alleges the erroneous interpretation and application of Article 2(3)(a) of the general implementing provisions and of Article 4 of those provisions to her situation.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty to be impartial and neutral, infringement of the duty to provide assistance and of good administration, infringement of Article 21a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, as well as misuse or abuse of process.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment, material inaccuracies as regards the facts, abusive claims not related to objective facts and infringement of the concept of duty to act in good faith.

19.4.2021

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/51

Action brought on 25 February 2021 — Mariani and Others v Parliament

(Case T-124/21)

(2021/C 138/68)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Thierry Mariani (Paris, France) and 22 other applicants (represented by: F. Wagner, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

—

annul Article 1 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2223 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020, amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations (OJ 2020 L 437, p. 49), in particular Article 3(11), Article 4(2)(a) and (b), Article 5(a)(1), Article 7(b)(3a) [and] Article 9a(1) to (4) thereof, as added and amended by Regulation 2020/2223;

—	order the Parliament to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), of the European Convention on Human Rights, of the general principles recognised by case-law, of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of Members of the European Parliament, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, and of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament.

The applicants claim that the contested measure will allow the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) immediately to access, without giving prior notice, any information about, as well as the premises of, Members of the European Parliament (‘Members’) and their assistants, without obtaining a warrant to that effect from an independent judicial official as is required in any democratic State.

The applicants also criticise the contested measure because, in their view, it will allow OLAF to access private devices as well as bank statements and bank accounts of Members and their assistants.

The applicants consider that such investigative procedures may be initiated by OLAF acting solely on the basis of an anonymous tip-off, and fear that, because of this, Members, especially Members of the parliamentary opposition, may be subjected to pressure, blackmail and other forms of intimidation, which may enable others to influence their parliamentary activity.

The applicants also argue that the Controller of procedural guarantees is in no way an independent body, as would be the case with an investigating judge, with regard to the criminal police investigators, because he or she is appointed by and financially dependent on the Commission. The applicants submit that such a system does not offer any guarantee of impartiality in respect of the elected Members of the opposition who might be the subject of investigations by OLAF.

The applicants further claim that the contested measure calls into question the general principles of EU law enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, because it allows OLAF to access information that does not concern it and, what is more, does not concern the Parliament or any other European institution.

Lastly, the applicants submit that the contested measure calls into question the general principles of EU law enshrined in Articles 8 and 9 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of Members of the European Parliament, because the contested measure allows OLAF to infringe Members’ immunity without a judicial institution having first requested that their parliamentary immunity be waived and, a fortiori, without that institution having first obtained such a waiver, and without the operation in question being one that requires exceptional expedition. According to the applicants, the contested measure allows OLAF — and, consequently, the Parliament, at the latter’s request — to circumvent Members’ immunity and inviolability in order to gain access to material to which it would otherwise not have access.

		ISSN 1977-091X
Official Journal of the European Union		C 138

English edition	Information and Notices	Volume 64 19 April 2021

Contents		page
	IV Notices
	NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES
	Court of Justice of the European Union
2021/C 138/01	Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union	1