—

having regard to Articles 165 and 166 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

—

having regard to Article 2 of the Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the right to education,

—

having regard to Decision (EU) 2018/646 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 April 2018 on a common framework for the provision of better services for skills and qualifications (Europass) and repealing Decision No 2241/2004/EC (1),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2018 on modernisation of education in the EU (2),

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2017 on a new skills agenda for Europe (3),

—

having regard to its resolution of 19 January 2016 on skills policies for fighting youth unemployment (4),

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 September 2015 on empowering girls through education in the EU (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on promoting youth entrepreneurship through education and training (6),

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2014 on new technologies and open educational resources (7),

—

having regard to the Council recommendation of 22 May 2018 on key competences for lifelong learning (8),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 May 2018 on moving towards a vision of a European education area,

—

having regard to the Council recommendation of 22 May 2017 on the European Qualifications Framework for lifelong learning and repealing the recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on the establishment of the European Qualifications Framework for lifelong learning (9),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 30 May 2016 on developing media literacy and critical thinking through education and training,

—

having regard to the Council recommendation of 19 December 2016 entitled ‘Upskilling pathways: new opportunities for adults’ (10),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2015 on the role of early childhood education and primary education in fostering creativity, innovation and digital competence,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 May 2014 on effective teacher education,

—

having regard to the Council recommendation of 20 December 2012 on the validation of non-formal and informal learning (11),

—

having regard to the Council resolution of 28 November 2011 on a renewed European agenda for adult learning (12),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 17 January 2018 on the Digital Education Action Plan (COM(2018)0022),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 30 May 2017 on school development and excellent teaching for a great start in life (COM(2017)0248),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 2 May 2012 on a European strategy for a better internet for children (COM(2012)0196),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 10 June 2016 on a new Skills Agenda for Europe (COM(2016)0381),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 7 December 2016 on improving and modernising education (COM(2016)0941),

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 30 November 2017 on modernising school and higher education (13),

—

having regard to the report of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training of 9 March 2018 entitled ‘Skill needs anticipation: systems and approaches. Analysis of stakeholder survey on skill needs assessment and anticipation’,

—

having regard to the Commission’s 2017 policy report entitled ‘DigComp 2.1: The digital competence framework for citizens: With eight proficiency levels and examples of use’,

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture and Education and the opinion of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A8-0400/2018),

A.

whereas, with technology developing at an accelerating rate, the digital society and economy are now a fact of life, meaning that digital skills are essential for the successful professional realisation and personal development of all citizens;

B.

whereas digital competence is a key competence for lifelong learning, as defined in the Reference Framework annexed to the Council recommendation of 22 May 2018;

C.

whereas the innovative capacity of technology is conditioned, inter alia, by critical thinking, the level of people’s digital and creative skills, and the quality and reach of internet connectivity;

D.

whereas a basic knowledge of digital technologies is vital for completing essential administrative and everyday tasks;

E.

whereas it is estimated that approximately half of the current jobs worldwide — and 30 % in the European Union — will disappear over the next 25 years (14), with the emergence of new professions requiring advanced digital skills;

F.

whereas digital skills, which go well beyond the requirements of the labour market, offer people better opportunities to participate in the life of society, both today and in the future, facilitate information and cultural exchange, and give people a greater say in political decision-making;

G.

whereas it is essential to reclaim the internet as a common good and promote active e-citizenship;

H.

whereas the technological transformation across industries means that digital tools are frequently used even in traditionally non-technical professions, with 9 out of 10 jobs in the near or immediate future estimated to require digital skills;

I.

whereas currently 44 % of the EU population aged between 16 and 74 lack basic digital skills and 19 % have no digital skills at all, with substantial disparities across the Member States, a situation that risks creating a new social divide;

J.

whereas the importance of digital skills, the skills gap, which is particularly significant between men and women, generations and different social groups, and disparities in digital skills across the Member States demand a joined-up policy response;

K.

whereas it is essential that educational institutions prepare pupils and students to confront the social and economic challenges brought about by rapid technological and social developments, by equipping them with the appropriate skills to adapt to the challenges of the digital world;

L.

whereas access to and the use of the internet and of technological and digital equipment have transformed social behaviour and relationships, particularly among the younger sections of society;

M.

whereas the goal of ensuring that by 2025 all schools in the EU have access to internet connections with download/upload speeds of 1 gigabit of data per second has yet to be reached;

N.

whereas excessive use of technological and digital equipment, such as computers and tablets, can cause problems related to health and well-being, including sleep deprivation, a sedentary lifestyle and addiction;

O.

whereas digital learning strategies also need to take into account research on the detrimental effects that early use of digital technology may have on the development of young children’s brains;

P.

whereas digital technologies should be an integral part of a learner-focused, age-appropriate approach to education and can offer new and innovative approaches to teaching and learning; whereas it is vital to maintain personal contact between students and teachers and to prioritise the well-being and healthy development of children and adult learners;

Q.

whereas technologies should be better used to support new pedagogies that focus on learners as active participants with tools for inquiry-based learning and collaborative workspaces;

R.

whereas basic education in cyber hygiene, cyber safety, data protection and media literacy must be age- and development-oriented in order to help children become critical learners, active citizens, internet users and shapers of a democratic digital society, make informed decisions, and be aware of and able to counter the risks associated with the internet, such as online disinformation, harassment and personal data breaches; whereas cybersecurity-related teaching programmes should be introduced in academic and vocational training curricula;

S.

whereas quality, innovative digital learning can be captivating and interactive, thus complementing lecture-style teaching methods and providing platforms for collaboration and knowledge creation;

T.

whereas we are seeing the growing commercial use of education by large digital companies, which are trying to influence teaching practices by introducing equipment, software and educational resources or providing training for teachers;

U.

whereas, to better deliver on the promise of technology, Member States need effective strategies to build teachers’ capacity and policymakers need to do more to build support for this agenda;

V.

whereas public libraries participate in the common effort to familiarise citizens with digital skills, by providing open services for digital support in a social and helpful environment;

W.

whereas adults who are out of work or in jobs that do not require digital skills tend to fall quickly behind their more digitally proficient peers, thus hampering their job prospects and exacerbating social and economic disparities;

X.

whereas the progressive digitalisation of work will result in the disappearance of many professions and an increase in unemployment; whereas the new professions that will emerge with digitalisation may compensate for some of the jobs lost;

Y.

whereas digital technologies can facilitate access to knowledge and learning and their use enables all training facilities at various levels to be easily accessible and inclusive;

Z.

whereas without appropriate and targeted policies, older people and people with disabilities are likely to suffer the most from the digital transformation;

AA.

whereas women make up only 20 % of professionals in the field of science, only 27 % of engineering graduates (15) and only 20 % of computer science graduates (16); whereas the share of men working in the digital sector is 3,1 times greater than the share of women; whereas only 19 % of workers in ICT have a female boss, compared with 45 % of workers in other sectors;

AB.

whereas lifelong learning opportunities tend to be far more available to already highly-skilled workers (17);

AC.

whereas ongoing monitoring and assessment of digital skills proficiency both in organisations and among individuals is a prerequisite for effective policy delivery;

AD.

whereas mastering basic transversal skills, such as numeracy, critical thinking and social communication skills, is a fundamental prerequisite for the acquisition of digital skills and competences;

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—

having regard to Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in particular Articles 4, 18 and 19 thereof,

—

having regard to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

—

having regard to Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (1),

—

having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and to the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees, which followed the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2016,

—

having regard to the European Added Value Assessment on Humanitarian Visas prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service,

—

having regard to Rules 46 and 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0423/2018),

A.

whereas, despite numerous announcements and requests for safe and legal pathways offering access to European territory for persons seeking international protection, there is currently no harmonisation at Union level of protected entry procedures (PEPs) and no legal framework at Union level for humanitarian visas, i.e. visas issued for the purpose of reaching the territory of the Member States in order to seek international protection;

B.

whereas, according to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 7 March 2017 in Case C-638/16 (2), X and X v État belge, Member States are not required, under Union law, to grant humanitarian visas to persons who wish to enter their territory with a view to applying for asylum, but they remain free to do so on the basis of their national law; whereas this ruling interprets existing Union law, which may be modified;

C.

whereas several Member States currently have or have previously had national schemes for issuing humanitarian visas or residence permits to guarantee national PEPs for people in need;

D.

whereas the number of persons admitted on the basis of national entry procedures for humanitarian protection or through resettlement remains low in comparison to global needs, with significant disparities between Member States; whereas the scope of national entry procedures for humanitarian protection and resettlement is narrowly defined and, in the case of resettlement, is strictly connected to the criteria of vulnerability and registration as a refugee of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

E.

whereas, as a result, an estimated 90 % of those granted international protection have reached the Union through irregular means, which leads to them being stigmatised before they even arrive at the external borders of the Member States;

F.

whereas single women travelling alone or with children, women heads of household, pregnant and lactating women, people with disabilities, adolescent girls and elderly women are among those who are particularly vulnerable along migration routes to Europe and are facing particular greater risks of gender-based violence, such as rape, violence and being the target of smugglers and traffickers to be sexually and economically exploited; whereas women and girls furthermore tend to be more vulnerable to all forms of exploitation, including labour exploitation and sexual exploitation, along the migration routes to the Union and are often forced into survival sex in exchange for continuing their journey;

G.

whereas the human cost of those policies has been put at at least 30 000 deaths at the Union's borders since 2000; whereas a Union legal framework is urgently needed as one means to address the intolerable death toll in the Mediterranean and on the migration routes to the Union, to truly combat human smuggling, exposure to trafficking in human beings, to labour exploitation and violence, to manage the orderly arrival, dignified reception and fair processing of asylum claims and to optimise Member States’ and the Union’s budget for asylum, procedures, border control and search and rescue activities as well as to achieve coherent practices in the Union asylum acquis;

H.

whereas Parliament has tried to include provisions in that vein in its amendments to Regulation (EC) No 810/2009;

I.

whereas both the Council and the Commission have rejected those amendments on the ground, among others, that such provisions should not be included in Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 given that its scope covers short-stay visas only;

J.

whereas Parliament, faced with the Commission’s inaction, has therefore decided to proceed with drawing up this resolution on humanitarian visas;

K.

whereas intensive work was undertaken, including with the help of experts, to draw up the recommendations which are annexed to this resolution;

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

—

having regard to the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union (11997D/PRO/02),

—

having regard to Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession,

—

having regard to the draft Council decisions on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania of 29 September 2010 (14142/2010) and of 8 July 2011 (14142/1/2010),

—

having regard to the draft Council decision on the framework for the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania of 7 December 2011 (14302/3/11),

—

having regard to its legislative resolution of 8 June 2011 on the draft Council decision on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (1),

—

having regard to the conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 9 and 10 June 2011, 22 and 23 September 2011, 25 and 26 October 2012, 7 and 9 March 2013, and 5 and 6 December 2013,

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 October 2011 on the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to Schengen (2),

—

having regard to the Commission’s eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area of 15 December 2015 (COM(2015)0675),

—

having regard to its resolution of 30 May 2018 on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area (3),

—

having regard to the Council decision (EU) 2017/1908 of 12 October 2017 on the putting into effect of certain provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Visa Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (4),

—

having regard to the draft Council decision on 18 April 2018 on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (15820/1/2017),

—

having regard to its legislative resolution of 13 June 2018 on the draft Council decision on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania (5),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0365/2018),

A.

whereas Bulgaria and Romania adopted the Schengen acquis upon their accession to the European Union in 2007; whereas in 2008 Bulgaria issued its declaration of readiness to start the evaluations carried out by the Schengen Evaluation Working Group (SCH-EVAL), comprising experts from Schengen Member States; whereas in 2007 and 2008 Romania issued its declaration of readiness to start the evaluations carried out by SCH-EVAL;

B.

whereas the completion of the Schengen evaluation process for Bulgaria and Romania and the state of preparedness of the two countries to implement all the provisions of the Schengen acquis were confirmed by SCH-EVAL experts, and by the Council in its conclusions of 9 and 10 June 2011; whereas in its draft decision of 8 July 2011, the Council verified that the necessary conditions for the application of the Schengen acquis had been met in all areas, namely data protection, air borders, land borders, police cooperation, the Schengen Information System, sea borders and visas; whereas in addition to the challenge of managing external borders of the European Union, the completion of the Schengen evaluation process has entailed both countries fundamentally restructuring their border surveillance systems and investing in increased law enforcement capacity; whereas according to the 2005 Act of Accession, the successful completion of the Schengen evaluation procedures is the only prerequisite for the full application of the Schengen acquis, including the abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders; whereas Bulgaria and Romania’s state of preparedness to apply the Schengen acquis in full has been acknowledged by heads of state and government in the Council on multiple occasions, as well as by the Commission and Parliament, most recently in the Commission communication of 27 September 2017 and Parliament’s resolution of 30 May 2018;

C.

whereas in its draft decision of 29 September 2010, the Council proposed the full application of the Schengen acquis in Bulgaria and Romania and the abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders; whereas in its legislative resolution of 8 June 2011, Parliament approved this decision and asked the Council to consult Parliament again if it intended to substantially amend it;

D.

whereas in September 2011 the Council Presidency presented a proposal for partial implementation of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in Bulgaria and Romania, namely the abolition of checks at internal sea and air borders only, while envisaging a separate decision, at a subsequent stage, as regards land borders;

E.

whereas in its conclusions, the Justice and Home Affairs Council confirmed on multiple occasions its commitment to base any future decision on the abolition of checks at internal borders for Bulgaria and Romania on a two-step approach; whereas the adoption of that decision by the Justice and Home Affairs Council has been repeatedly deferred;

F.

whereas with the Council decision of 12 October 2017 Bulgaria and Romania were granted passive access to the Visa Information System; whereas in its draft decision of 18 April 2018 the Council proposed the full application of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in both Member States;

G.

whereas neither the 2005 Act of Accession nor the Schengen evaluation mechanism provide for setting different timeframes for the abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders; whereas all previous enlargements of the Schengen area were established with a single legal act;

H.

whereas the Schengen area is an unique arrangement and one of the greatest achievements of the European Union, allowing the free movement of people through internal Schengen borders; whereas this has been made possible through a variety of compensatory measures, such as the establishment of the Schengen Information System (to reinforce the exchange of information), as well as the creation of an evaluation mechanism to verify the implementation of the Schengen acquis by Member States and foster mutual trust in the functioning of the Schengen area;

I.

whereas the maintenance of internal border controls in the Union and their reintroduction in the Schengen area has a serious impact on the lives of European citizens and all those who benefit from the principle of free movement within the EU, and seriously undermines their trust in the European institutions and integration; whereas this entails direct operational and investment costs for cross-border workers, tourists, road freight transporters and public administrations, with crippling effects on the economies of the Member States and the functioning of the internal market of the EU; whereas the maintenance of internal border controls for Bulgaria and Romania has a negative impact on the exports and imports from and to both Member States, as well as on the transport operations from and to some of Europe’s largest southern civilian fleet and freight ports, meaning lost benefits and increased spending; whereas estimates of the costs linked to the reintroduction of border controls for the European Union range between EUR 0,05 billion and EUR 20 billion in one-off costs and EUR 2 billion in annual operating costs (6);

J.

whereas the maintenance of internal border controls in the Union and their reintroduction in the Schengen area appears linked to a perception of threats to public policy and internal security, rather than sound evidence of the actual existence of a serious threat; whereas the abolition of checks at internal borders as a result of the full application of the Schengen acquis in Member States that have already acceded has not led to higher crime rates; whereas the Schengen enlargement of 2007 is associated with lower acquisitive crime rates in both the newly acceding Schengen Member States and existing Schengen Member States, and has not increased the perception of insecurity among EU citizens (7);

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having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—

having regard to the document entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016,

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 December 2013, 26 June 2015, 15 December 2016, 9 March 2017, 22 June 2017, 20 November 2017, 14 December 2017 and 28 June 2018,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 November 2017 and 25 June 2018 on security and defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 7 June 2017 entitled ‘Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence’ (COM(2017)0315),

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the VP/HR of 10 November 2017 on improving military mobility in the European Union (JOIN(2017)0041),

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the VP/HR of 28 March 2018 on the Action Plan on Military Mobility (JOIN(2018)0005),

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (1),

—

having regard to the Council recommendation of 6 March 2018 concerning a roadmap for the implementation of PESCO (2),

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO (3),

—

having regard to the joint declarations by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO of 8 July 2016 and of 10 July 2018, to the common sets of proposals for the implementation of the joint declarations endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, and to the progress reports on the implementation thereof of 14 June and 5 December 2017 and of 6 June 2018, including the relevant Council conclusions,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 5 December 2017 and 25 June 2018 on the implementation of the joint declarations,

—

having regard to the Brussels Declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity and the NATO Brussels Summit Declaration, both of 11 July 2018,

—

having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2016 on the European Defence Union (4) and its resolution of 13 June 2018 on EU-NATO relations (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2017 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) (6),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A8-0372/2018),

A.

whereas the basic values on which the EU is founded — democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, as well as the rules-based international system and European unity, are being increasingly challenged in an era of geopolitical turbulence and degradation of the strategic environment;

B.

whereas credible deterrence, as well as planning for a response to crises and for the defence of continental Europe, depends on the ability to rapidly and efficiently deploy forces forward, including external allied forces;

C.

whereas the post-1989 ‘peace dividend’ saw the gradual erosion of defence needs in terms of infrastructure and mobility of forces across Europe;

D.

whereas the EU, in full cooperation with NATO, aims to act globally as a security provider, contributing to peace and stability both internally and externally and guaranteeing the security of its citizens and territory through a unique and wide array of policies, instruments and tools at its disposal to fulfil these ambitions;

E.

whereas, in line with the objectives of the Global Strategy, the EU is increasing its responsibility for its own security and defence and its role as a partner for international peace and security, in particular in its neighbourhood, but also beyond, as well as its strategic autonomy, based on the implementation of a common foreign and security policy;

F.

whereas the EU must develop its own strategic autonomy through an efficient foreign and security policy, in order to maintain peace, prevent conflicts and reinforce international security, while guaranteeing the security of its own citizens and the people involved in CSDP missions, with a view to protecting its interests and defending its founding values, all while contributing to effective multilateralism;

G.

whereas the EU must be able to decide and act without depending on third-party capacities if it is to build its own resilience and consolidate its strategic autonomy in the field of defence, the fight against terrorism and cybersecurity;

H.

whereas standardisation and interoperability at infrastructure and procurement level are key prerequisites for the achievement of strategic autonomy, the Defence Union and efficient military mobility;

I.

whereas effective military mobility can only be achieved with the full involvement and commitment of all Member States, cooperating effectively with NATO, taking into account each Member State’s available resources, needs and regional specificities and in a manner consistent with relevant EU-level initiatives with the purpose of building an efficient European infrastructure for security needs through coherent and complementary projects;

J.

whereas military mobility is a strategic and operational means of supporting military action, boosting the strategic autonomy of the Union and helping with the deployment and redeployment of, and support for, the Member States’ forces, with a view to achieving the EU’s military ambitions;

K.

whereas the EU is facing hybrid and multidirectional challenges, notably coming from the High North, the East, the Balkans and the South / Mediterranean; whereas a faster and smoother deployment of assets and goods on these axes (North-South, West-East) could be crucial to enable a credible response;

L.

whereas at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016 Allied leaders agreed to strengthen the Alliance’s Deterrence and Defence Posture, and have increased the readiness of response forces while having launched the ‘enhanced forward presence’ and ‘tailored forward presence’ to accomplish these goals;

M.

whereas military mobility is a concrete step that is designed to meet the EU’s specific security and defence needs, and one which forms part of the CSDP; whereas the collective security and defence of the EU Member States and their ability to intervene in crises abroad is fundamentally dependent on the ability to move allied troops and civilian crisis management personnel, material and equipment across each other’s territory and outside the EU freely and rapidly; whereas 22 EU Member States are also NATO allies and have a commitment to collective defence, possessing only a single set of armed forces and transport infrastructure; whereas the planned investments in transport infrastructure need to be better harmonised with security and defence needs;

N.

whereas a substantial number of obstacles, physical, legal and regulatory, often make these movements difficult by imposing significant delays, thus threatening to undermine their purpose, especially in crisis situations; whereas the European military exercises carried out under the auspices of NATO in recent years have shown the huge importance of suitable transport infrastructure for the success of military objectives;

O.

whereas the EU has substantial policies and tools at its disposal to help Member States meet their military mobility needs and international commitments;

P.

whereas on 28 March 2018 the Commission and the VP/HR published an Action Plan on Military Mobility, which provides a timetable for steps to be taken by the EU and its Member States; whereas implementation has commenced with the identification of common military requirements for military mobility within and beyond the EU and the presentation of a proposal for funding military mobility via the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), making it possible to fund projects pertaining to the dual use (civil and defence) of transport infrastructure;

Q.

whereas the Council conclusions of 25 June 2018 call on the Member States to take measures at national level to improve the effectiveness of military mobility and simplify the relevant rules and procedures in line with the Action Plan and military requirements applicable to military mobility in the Union and beyond, in accordance with the national legislation of the Member States, as soon as possible and not later than 2024;

R.

whereas a PESCO project on military mobility has been launched with a view to complementing the activities of the Commission and the VP/HR; whereas a further PESCO project on a network of logistic hubs in Europe and support to operations should complement this effort; whereas the purpose of enabling dual use of infrastructure is of the utmost importance for these logistical needs; whereas Member States have furthermore made commitments on military mobility as part of the more binding commitments required by the PESCO protocol; whereas PESCO projects should be developed in coordination with NATO; whereas there is a need for a PESCO project on the challenge of mobility as regards the military tasks set out in Article 43(1) of the TEU, in particular air and sea lift actions;

S.

whereas the CEF is a common, centrally managed funding programme designed to promote the development of a high-performing, sustainable, interconnected trans-European network (TEN) in the fields of transport, energy and digital services, focusing on facilitating cross-border connections and removing bottlenecks, and providing clear EU added value in facilitating transnational cooperation and coordination; whereas the draft MFF for the period 2021-2027 includes, under the CEF budget line for the transport sector, a new envelope dedicated to military mobility needs; whereas it is highly desirable to maintain and further increase the efficiency of the CEF;

T.

whereas the European Defence Agency is running several projects in the field of military mobility, on diplomatic clearances and on EU multimodal transport hubs, as well as the recently established ad hoc programmes on cross-border movement permission procedures and on harmonising customs-related military requirements; whereas the work of the European Defence Agency and the Commission must be coordinated in a clear and coherent manner to help the Member States finalise certain aspects of the Action Plan; whereas account is to be taken of the Member States’ needs, priorities and military requirements during a consultation process;

U.

whereas military mobility has recently been identified as a priority area for EU-NATO cooperation in the common set of proposals for the implementation of the joint declaration, and has been reaffirmed as a priority in the new joint declaration and in the Brussels Declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity; whereas NATO has transmitted to the EU its standards relating to military mobility, including NATO’s generic parameters for transport infrastructure;

V.

whereas NATO is also focusing on improving its own logistical capabilities through the Enablement Plan for SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, notably by adjusting legislation and procedures, enhancing command and control, increasing transport capabilities and upgrading infrastructure; notes in this context the establishment of two new commands, the Joint Force Command in Norfolk and the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm;

W.

whereas three out of four framework nations which deploy forces in NATO’s enhanced forward presence on the eastern flank as of 2019 will be from outside of the EU; whereas permanent presence on the continent and transport of reinforcements from the US, Canada and the UK is decisive for Europe’s security;

X.

whereas enhanced pre-positioning of military logistic stocks, including munitions and fuel, will help alleviate some mobility pressures;

Y.

whereas, despite all these institutional measures, the main improvements in military mobility capabilities will have to come from EU Member States, which need to adjust their national infrastructure and regulatory environments; whereas this will require a whole-of-government approach owing to the broad range of issues that need to be tackled; whereas this common effort is to be implemented with full respect for the national decision-making procedures and constitutional requirements of EU Member States, while also taking into account military mobility requirements identified by EU-NATO cooperation;

Z.

whereas according to the Action Plan on Military Mobility and a pilot analysis initiated by the Estonian Presidency in 2017 for the countries of the North Sea-Baltic Corridor of the trans-European transport network showed that the maximum height clearance and weight tolerance of many road bridges is not sufficient for military vehicles and that there is insufficient loading capacity to move oversized military equipment by rail;

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having regard to the Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth held in Gothenburg on 17 November 2017, to the Leaders’ Agenda on education and culture of November 2017 and to the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2017 on the social dimension of the Union, education and culture,

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 May 2011 on unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries (1),

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having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2013 on promoting the European cultural and creative sectors as sources of economic growth and jobs (2),

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having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2016 on a coherent EU policy for cultural and creative industries (3),

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having regard to its resolution of 10 April 2008 on cultural industries in Europe (4),

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having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2007 on the social status of artists (5),

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having regard to its resolution of 12 May 2011 on the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external actions (6),

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having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 entitled ‘Towards an integrated approach to cultural heritage for Europe’ (7),

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having regard to its resolution of 19 January 2016 on the role of intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity and education in promoting EU fundamental values (8),

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having regard to its resolution of 12 April 2016 on learning EU at school (9),

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having regard to its resolution of 10 April 2008 on a European agenda for culture in a globalising world (10),

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having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2018 on structural and financial barriers in the access to culture (11),

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having regard to its resolution of 2 March 2017 on the implementation of Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) and repealing Decisions No 1718/2006/EC, No 1855/2006/EC and No 1041/2009/EC (12),

—

having regard to the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) on 20 October 2005,

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having regard to the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro Convention) of 27 October 2005,

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) and repealing Decisions No 1718/2006/EC, No 1855/2006/EC and No 1041/2009/EC (13),

—

having regard to the Council resolution of 16 November 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture (14),

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 23 December 2014 on a Work Plan for Culture (2015-2018) (15),

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having regard to the EU Work Plan for Culture for the period 2015-2018,

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2015 on cultural and creative crossovers to stimulate innovation, economic sustainability and social inclusion (16),

—

having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 8 June 2016 entitled ‘Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations’ (JOIN(2016)0029),

—

having regard to the Commission report on the implementation of the European Agenda for Culture (COM(2010)0390),

—

having regard to the Commission Green Paper of 27 April 2010 entitled ‘Unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries’ (COM(2010)0183),

—

having regard to the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Cultural Heritage (2018) (COM(2016)0543),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 26 September 2012 entitled ‘Promoting cultural and creative sectors for growth and jobs in the EU’ (COM(2012)0537),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 18 December 2012 on content in the Digital Single Market (COM(2012)0789),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 22 July 2014 entitled ‘Towards an integrated approach to cultural heritage for Europe’ (COM(2014)0477),

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having regard to the 2012 report by the Working Group of EU Member States’ Experts on Access to Culture,

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 December 2010 on removing cross-border tax obstacles for EU citizens (COM(2010)0769),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 11 November 2011 on double taxation in the single market (COM(2011)0712),

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having regard to the 2015 report on ‘Ways to tackle cross-border tax obstacles facing individuals within the EU’ by the Commission’s expert group on removing tax problems facing individuals who are active across borders within the EU,

—

having regard to the 2017 report by the Working Group of EU Member States’ Experts on intercultural dialogue under the open method of coordination (OMC), entitled ‘How culture and the arts can promote intercultural dialogue in the context of the migratory and refugee crisis’,

—

having regard to the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017, in which the leaders of 27 EU Member States and EU institutions stated their wish for an ambitious Union, ‘where citizens have new opportunities for cultural and social development and economic growth’, ‘a Union which preserves our cultural heritage and promotes cultural diversity’,

—

having regard to the Davos Declaration of 22 January 2018 on high-quality Baukultur for Europe, in which European Ministers of Culture highlighted the ‘urgent need […] to develop new approaches to protecting and advancing the cultural values of the European built environment’ and for ‘a holistic, culture-centred approach to the built environment’,

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture and Education (A8-0388/2018),

A.

whereas the priorities for the New Agenda and the sector-specific approach are welcome; whereas equal, tailor-made support focusing on sector-specific challenges should be given to all cultural and creative sectors, and whereas cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue should be maintained as cross-cutting priorities; whereas culture is a public good and the New Agenda for Culture should aim at preserving, expanding and disseminating a vibrant and diverse cultural scene, ensuring access for all and fostering participation;

B.

whereas the New Agenda for Culture should provide a flexible framework for changing cultural ecosystems and fostering synergies between sectors;

C.

whereas Europe is emerging from a severe financial crisis, during which national and regional budgets for culture have, unfortunately, often been among the first to suffer cuts;

D.

whereas Europe is facing growing social inequalities and youth unemployment, rising populism and radicalisation, as well as having an increasingly diverse population; whereas culture is therefore more important than ever in achieving social cohesion and intercultural dialogue and in guaranteeing citizens’ freedom and diversity of expression, communication, and creation, and in building bridges among individuals;

E.

whereas Europe’s creative and cultural sectors are the EU’s strongest assets; whereas they represent 4,2 % of the EU’s GDP, create 8,4 million jobs, equal to 3,7 % of total employment in the EU, and are economically resilient, even in times of crisis; whereas these sectors encourage creativity, which feeds into all sectors of activity, while providing a higher percentage of employment among young people and women than other sectors;

F.

whereas Europe’s music sector is very dynamic, accounting for 1 million jobs and a turnover of EUR 25 billion; whereas, however, it remains severely underfunded, particularly when taking into account new online distribution models; whereas, out of a total budget of EUR 1,46 billion for Creative Europe, as of July 2018 only EUR 51 million have gone to music projects, and mainly towards classical music; whereas this does not reflect the diversity of Europe’s music sector, nor its economic, social and cultural contribution;

G.

whereas culture plays an important role in social cohesion and integration, particularly through the participation of minorities, disadvantaged groups, marginalised communities, migrants and refugees in cultural and social life, and whereas the special call for migrants’ integration in the Creative Europe programme has proved to be efficient but oversubscribed and underfunded;

H.

whereas artists and cultural professionals often face precarious and unstable situations with weak or no social security and unpredictable incomes;

I.

whereas cultural awareness and expression has been recognised at EU level in the revised recommendation on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning; whereas the arts and humanities should be fully incorporated into education systems so as to contribute to shaping a Europe that is collaborative, creative and mobilised to promote sustainability, integration and civic cohesion;

J.

whereas cultural networks are a powerful tool in forging interpersonal bonds and long-lasting peaceful connections and dialogue across national borders and therefore in fostering international cultural relations, which are at the heart of global regulations and the emergence of a European cultural space;

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—

having regard to the Commission communication of 28 October 2015 entitled ‘Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for people and business’ (COM(2015)0550),

—

having regard to the Commission staff working document of 28 October 2015 entitled ‘Report on single market integration and competitiveness in the EU and its Member States’ (SWD(2015)0203),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 6 May 2015 entitled ‘A digital single market strategy for Europe’ (COM(2015)0192),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 13 April 2011 entitled ‘Single Market Act — Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence — Working together to create new growth’ (COM(2011)0206),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 3 October 2012 entitled ‘Single Market Act II — Together for new growth’ (COM(2012)0573),

—

having regard to the report of 9 May 2010 by Mario Monti to the President of the Commission entitled ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market — At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society’,

—

having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2015 on single market governance within the European Semester 2015 (1),

—

having regard to its study of September 2014, commissioned by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, entitled ‘The cost of non-Europe in the single market’,

—

having regard to its study of January 2016, commissioned by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, entitled ‘A strategy for completing the single market: the trillion euro bonus’,

—

having regard to its resolution of 26 May 2016 on non-tariff barriers in the single market (2), based on a report by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

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having regard to its resolution of 26 May 2016 on the single market strategy (3), based on a report by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

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having regard to the Commission communication of 10 May 2017 entitled ‘Mid-Term Review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy — A Connected Digital Single Market for All’ (COM(2017)0228),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 22 November 2018 entitled ‘The Single Market in a changing world — A unique asset in need of renewed political commitment’ (COM(2018)0772),

—

having regard to Rule 123(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the single market has been, and remains, the cornerstone of European integration and a highly competitive social market economy, as well as an engine of growth and jobs; whereas this has been highlighted further during the recent negotiations on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU;

B.

whereas the world is going through a process of rapid and significant change that also has an impact on the EU single market;

C.

whereas the single market is not fully exploiting its potential;

D.

whereas the single market cannot be considered in purely economic terms;

E.

whereas, according to Parliament’s own research, the anticipated gain from completing the single market stands at EUR 1 trillion in increased GDP collectively across the Union, including significant gains to be made in the services sector;

F.

whereas a strategic and comprehensive approach is needed, and whereas the response to the challenges faced should be as much political as technical in nature;

G.

whereas recent signs of transposition are not reassuring; whereas, according to the Commission communication on the single market in a changing world, the transposition deficit for 16 directives with transposition dates between December 2017 and May 2018 was 25 % in June 2018;

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—

having regard to its decision of 6 July 2017 on setting up a special committee on terrorism, its responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office (1), adopted under Rule 197 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Special Committee on Terrorism (A8-0374/2018),

A.

whereas the Union is founded on the values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as on the principles of democracy and the rule of law; whereas acts of terrorism constitute one of the most serious violations of these universal values and principles;

B.

whereas the EU should do the utmost possible to guarantee the physical and mental integrity of its citizens who are endangered by terrorists; whereas the fight against terrorism requires putting its victims at the centre; whereas societies must protect, recognise, support and compensate victims of terrorism; whereas Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines both the right to liberty and the right to security, which complement each other;

C.

whereas the response to the terrorist threat should always be in full compliance with the principles recognised by Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and should observe fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as the principles recognised, in particular, by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, considering the possible effect on innocent people who make up the vast majority of the population;

D.

whereas terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, must be condemned, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security;

E.

whereas the terrorist threat has grown and rapidly evolved in recent years; whereas terrorist attacks have affected all of us deeply and have claimed the lives of and injured many innocent people; whereas the cross-border nature of terrorism requires a strong coordinated response and cooperation within and between the Member States, as well as with and among the competent Union agencies and bodies, and with relevant third countries;

F.

whereas the security of one Member State is the security of all in the Union; whereas the threats posed by terrorism require a holistic approach linking internal and external security and ensuring national and European coordination; whereas the EU and the Member States have made progress in countering these threats, but this progress is unfortunately made under pressure of events rather than through pro-active measures, and the same level of progress is not being achieved across all Member States;

G.

whereas national security is the sole responsibility of the Member States as laid down in Article 4(2) TEU and Article 73 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), while according to Article 4(3) and Article 42 TEU, the Union and the Member States shall assist each other in carrying out tasks which stem from the Treaties; whereas national security is increasingly dependent on its broader European dimension; whereas national security is not defined at EU level thus leaving a wide margin of discretion to Member States;

H.

whereas at the same time Article 4(2) TFEU designates the area of freedom, security and justice as an area of shared competence between the Union and the Member States; whereas the EU has specific competences as regards facilitating and encouraging coordination and cooperation between Member States, including harmonisation of the laws and practices of the Member States; whereas the mandate for EU action is provided by Article 67 TFEU to ensure a ‘high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime’;

I.

whereas the national security and intelligence agencies of EU Member States and of some third countries cooperate effectively through the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), an informal body outside the EU, and on a bilateral and multilateral basis; whereas the CTG has a platform for the exchange of operational intelligence that has improved the speed and quality of shared intelligence; whereas the EU has an established complex of structures dealing wholly or in part with terrorism, notably through Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) as the central hub for law enforcement information exchange and cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism at EU level, and the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) as the gateway for strategic intelligence from the intelligence and security services to the EU through which CTG information reaches European policy makers, and this is facilitated by the European Counter-Terrorism Coordinator;

J.

whereas the line between EU and national competence is not always clear because of different characteristics and geographical prerogatives, thus underlining the importance of cooperation between the two governance levels; whereas the diverse landscape of regional, national, EU and international actors in the fight against terrorism with overlapping competences and insufficiently delineated mandates, the multitude of formal and informal fora for cooperation and exchange of information, as well as the division of competences between the different regional and national agencies, between law enforcement services and intelligence services and between the EU and the Member States, underline the complexity of, and may give rise to difficulties with regard to, the coordination, efficiency and coherence of the response to the terrorist threat;

K.

whereas the Commissioner for Security Union is a valued actor in joining up the Commission’s policy development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; whereas the establishment of the position of Commissioner for Security Union signals the EU’s commitment to encouraging and supporting cooperation between Member States on issues of internal security, as well as to harmonising counter-terrorism legislation and ensuring better cooperation between law enforcement and judicial authorities, while fully respecting the status of these matters as national competencies as laid down in the Treaties;

L.

whereas the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator plays an important role in tracking the implementation of the EU counter-terrorism strategy; whereas the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, in accordance with his or her mandate as determined by the European Council, ensures the implementation and assessment of the strategy and the coordination of work within the Union, and facilitates contact between the Union and third countries; whereas the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator provides valuable advice to, maintains contacts with, and helps strengthen the coordination between EU institutions, agencies and Member States; whereas his or her mandate and status are nevertheless ill-defined;

M.

whereas on 6 July 2017 Parliament set up a temporary Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR) with the aim of providing Parliament’s view as to the practical and legislative gaps in the current counter-terrorism regime that have allowed the recent terrorist attacks in the EU to occur and to making recommendations that would help tackle the terrorist threat at EU level;

N.

whereas the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, to be established on the basis of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, shall have the important task of investigating and prosecuting criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union; whereas its establishment and the allocation of financial resources to this new body should not negatively impact the abilities of existing structures, such as Eurojust, to facilitate the efforts of the Member States in the fight against terrorism;

O.

whereas of 88 legally binding counter-terrorism measures proposed from September 2001 to summer 2013 only a quarter were subject to impact assessments and only three to public consultation (2); whereas this ratio has improved in recent years and the most recent initiatives presented by the Commission in 2017 and 2018 were accompanied by the necessary justification; whereas with the Agenda on Better Regulation adopted in 2015 the Commission has also strengthened its policy on stakeholder consultation; whereas counter-terrorism measures could be more effective and coherent if appropriate stakeholders are consulted and impact assessments are conducted;

P.

whereas the Commission’s Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy mentioned incomplete implementation as one of the challenges of the Security Union;

Q.

whereas evaluation of counter-terrorism measures is vital for assessing their effectiveness, relevance, coherence and compliance with fundamental rights, and determining whether additional action is necessary to address the shortcomings; whereas a difference exists between monitoring the extent of implementation and the actual effectiveness of implemented measures; whereas between 2001 and 2016 there were 17 monitoring implementation and evaluation reports compared to 10 counter-terrorism strategies and 55 legislative and non-binding measures; whereas it is necessary for Member States to implement EU security laws quickly so that no loopholes emerge in the EU’s comprehensive body of counter-terrorism measures;

R.

whereas in recent years, the EU Member States have suffered major terrorist attacks; whereas the deadliest attacks have been perpetrated or inspired by jihadist groups such as Daesh and Al-Qaeda; whereas these terrorist groups (3) and their activities are sometimes facilitated by certain countries; whereas far right, far left and ethno-nationalist separatist violent extremism, aimed at overthrowing the democratic values and system governed by the rule of law in the EU through the illegitimate use of violence, also remain matters of concern;

S.

whereas the Member States face a growing threat of far-right violent extremism, as well as neo-fascist and neo-Nazi violence targeting political opponents, refugees and immigrants, ethnic and religious minorities, LGBTQI people, human rights defenders, activists and members of the law enforcement agencies;

T.

whereas, while most terrorist attacks carried out in the EU in 2017 were specified as separatist attacks (137 out of 205), Europol’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2018 report clearly states that none of the reported activities in any terrorist category have been as lethal and have had such an impact on society as a whole as those committed by jihadist terrorists; whereas the growing risk of retribution terrorism is a serious concern which should not be underestimated;

U.

whereas, as long as a terrorist attack is a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’, terrorist murders should be covered by and fall under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998;

V.

whereas developments and instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have enabled Daesh and other terrorist groups to gain a foothold in countries bordering the EU and to recruit fighters from the EU on an unprecedented scale; whereas as a result the nexus between internal and external security has become more prominent;

W.

whereas thousands of European-born or resident citizens joined Daesh in terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq, but there has been a change of strategy since the military collapse of Daesh, with a decline in the numbers of those travelling to these countries for terrorist purposes, and terrorist jihadists and ‘sleeper-cells’ inside the EU being encouraged to carry out attacks in their home countries or countries of residence;

X.

whereas recent attacks have demonstrated that firearms and explosives are still traditional methods used by terrorist groups; whereas, however, there is a growing use by individuals of other weapons and methods that are much less sophisticated and more difficult to detect, aiming to cause a maximum number of random casualties among civilians;

Y.

whereas the return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their families poses particular challenges in terms of security and radicalisation, especially child returnees who pose specific problems as they need protection as victims but at the same time can also be potential perpetrators;

Z.

whereas some of these returnees have received prolonged ideological indoctrination and military training in the use of weapons and explosives, as well as various cover, assault and combat tactics, and have in some cases established links with other terrorists, possibly former foreign fighters, with whom they form transnational networks (4);

AA.

whereas perpetrators of terrorist attacks in the EU very often include EU nationals, often second- or third-generation migrants, who have grown up in the Member States which they have attacked, as well as foreigners who may in some cases have resided for a significant time in the Member State targeted;

AB.

whereas our open societies and open borders are vulnerable and are exploited by terrorist groups; whereas terrorists have made use of migrants’ and asylum seekers’ routes of access to European countries, exploiting the freedom of movement across Europe;

AC.

whereas there are documented cases (5) in which victims of severe crimes perpetrated by Daesh terrorists on Syrian or Iraqi territory have — despite considering themselves safe — met their tormentors again on EU soil where both have asked for protection;

AD.

whereas the flow of irregular migrants and refugees poses challenges to their integration into European societies and requires reinforced and specific investment directed towards social and cultural inclusion;

AE.

whereas new forms of terrorism may be used for an attack, among them cyber-terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction, possibly in connection with new technical equipment such as drones; whereas there is the precedent of a foiled attack involving the highly toxic biological agent ricin; whereas there are cases where terrorist groups have used or planned to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials, and shared via social media channels possible tactics and methods for attacks and targets;

AF.

whereas Member States have different strategies to respond to hybrid and CBRN-related threats and therefore different levels of preparedness;

AG.

whereas the European Council on 28 June 2018 welcomed the Joint Communication on Europe’s resilience to hybrid and CBRN-related threats, seeking to identify areas where action should be intensified in order to further deepen and strengthen the EU’s essential contribution to addressing these threats, as well as urging Member States and the Commission to work together to fully implement the CBRN Action Plan as a matter of urgency;

AH.

whereas caution should be used in political discourse exploited by both left- and right-wing agitators regarding or invoking the terrorist threat so as to avoid polarisation within societies and not to undermine democracy, social cohesion and human rights, thus playing into the hands and aims of terrorist organisations;

AI.

whereas the European Agenda on Security of April 2015 highlighted the need to tackle the nexus between terrorism and organised crime, underlining that organised crime feeds terrorism through various different channels, inter alia supplying weapons, financing through drug smuggling, and infiltrating financial markets;

AJ.

whereas large-scale international terrorist organisations such as Daesh and Al-Qaeda are financially self-reliant and whereas illicit trade in goods, weapons, raw materials, fuels, drugs, cigarettes and cultural objects, among other items, as well as trafficking in human beings, slavery, child exploitation, racketeering and extortion, have proved to be means for terrorist groups to obtain funding; whereas the link between organised crime and terrorist groups constitutes a major security threat; whereas these sources could enable the continued funding of their future criminal activities;

AK.

whereas significant risks are posed by interactions between terrorist organisations and organised crime groups, through which the capability to cause mass casualties among the civilian population of EU Member States connects with the logistical capacity to enable it; whereas there is a low level of law enforcement and intelligence reporting and analysis on the nexus between organised crime and terrorism; whereas investigative and judicial capacities focused on organised crime are often lacking in many Member States and at EU level;

AL.

whereas terrorism seeks to weaken and defeat democracies; whereas politicians and governments are crucial actors for achieving broad consensus and social resilience in order to effectively defend our democratic systems;

AM.

whereas the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence offers an important platform for the exchange of best practices among practitioners, including law enforcement authorities, and has contributed to the gathering of important knowledge in the field of preventing and countering radicalisation (6);

AN.

whereas the situation in each Member State differs and a newly revised European strategy for combating radicalisation could support national strategies, which are important in terms of providing general frameworks for programmes at national and local level; whereas these strategies must be coherent and effective and need sufficient financing for local authorities and civil society stakeholders so that these programmes can be implemented;

AO.

whereas it is impossible to identify only one path towards radicalisation; whereas, for instance, social cohesion, political context, economic condition, religious and ideological ideals, personal traumas and psychological vulnerabilities, as well as surroundings and networks, may constitute factors and triggers; whereas the gender dimension was until recently underestimated and there is a misconception about the role women can play; whereas women are not always passive subjects and they also act as mobilisers, recruiters, fundraisers and even as perpetrators of terrorist acts;

AP.

whereas some low-income neighbourhoods in European cities are facing mass unemployment and the systematic breakdown of the rule of law, creating the breeding grounds for religious extremism and terrorism; whereas the promotion of social inclusion and the active promotion of democratic values which all citizens must respect can help to reduce feelings of marginalisation and mitigate the risk of radicalisation; whereas combating radicalisation and violent extremism requires close and coordinated collaboration between all actors concerned at all levels of governance (local, regional and national), as well as with civil society and the private sector;

AQ.

whereas experts highlight the positive experience offered by a multi-agency approach, focusing on creating infrastructures which take into account the various routes to radicalisation and the demographics at risk, and which ensure the provision of early-stage support to those vulnerable to radicalisation and their families from different authorities and organisations across multiple levels, and emphasising the supportive role of the police, thus strengthening the relationship;

AR.

whereas community policing plays a positive role in getting to know and interacting with vulnerable people, by building trusting relationships based on mutual respect for the groups in question, with the aim of taking action upstream from radicalisation and preventing distrust towards the state and its institutions;

AS.

whereas so far no clear methodologies exist to measure the effectiveness of projects for preventing and countering radicalisation;

AT.

whereas several European funds and programmes can be used for projects countering and preventing radicalisation at the European, national, regional and local levels; whereas the EU budget up to 2020 allocates EUR 314 million for anti-radicalisation projects (7); whereas there is a need for a continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of those programmes; whereas measuring the effectiveness of preventive counter-radicalisation actions is intrinsically difficult and requires close cooperation between the Commission, Member States, individual stakeholders and researchers;

AU.

whereas Europol estimates that there were around 30 000 radicalised jihadists in the EU by 2018;

AV.

whereas a violent radicalised extremist discourse has been increasingly present in the territory of many EU Member States, often in printed form, or as teaching or audiovisual content, including on social media and satellite TV channels; whereas this discourse opposes democracy, the rule of law and human rights, undermines pluralism, promotes violence and intolerance against all other religions, is openly anti-Semitic, refuses equality between men and women, and promotes a retrograde model of culture and society;

AW.

whereas there is a prevalence of specifically Wahhabi and Salafist literature, which is fuelled by hate speech, available in certain bookshops and online in Europe; whereas this globalised and simplistic version of Islam breaks with the practices of Muslim communities in Europe and contributes to undermining their broader integration;

AX.

whereas it is the aspiration of Radical Islamic Fundamentalism for religion to dominate all spheres of life — individual, political and social — the consequence of which may be a form of communitarianism sensitive to the actions of jihadist recruiters;

AY.

whereas significant numbers of cases of radical hate preachers have been documented throughout Europe; whereas the hate preachers often originate from outside the EU, while some places of worship receive opaque funding from third countries, many of which have authoritarian or religious regimes that do not govern in accordance with democracy, the rule of law and human rights;

AZ.

whereas there are self-designated religious teaching centres propagating extremist ideas in the EU, in which minors, including young children, may be exposed to a learning content contrary to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and including violent content; whereas extremist organisations laying the ground for terrorist recruitment often exploit the vulnerabilities of young people by attracting them with social and cultural offers;

BA.

whereas the sophisticated web communication strategy of marketing terrorism by glorifying it, employed especially by Daesh, but also by other large-scale international terrorist groups, offers design copied from the global ‘youth culture’ such as online gaming, and thus has a strong appeal to children and young people; whereas this model is also luring them with social and cultural opportunities;

BB.

whereas several recent investigations have shown that the internet and namely social media can act as a driver of radicalisation leading to violent extremism, as well as a tool for xenophobic groups to disseminate hate speech and illicit content especially among young people;

BC.

whereas following repeated calls for better commitment to countering terrorism, major internet companies are facing up to their responsibilities; whereas in the European Internet Forum launched in 2015 companies cooperate to remove terrorist content from their websites on a voluntary basis if they believe it is in breach of their terms and conditions; whereas a code of conduct for major IT companies was implemented in May 2016 with the aim of tackling illegal hate speech online; whereas this voluntary cooperation is nevertheless insufficient;

BD.

whereas by the end of the second quarter of 2018 Europol’s European Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) had already assessed 54 752 pieces of content produced in 10 different languages across 170 online platforms, triggering 52 716 decisions for referral with a removal success rate of 89,5 % on the basis of voluntary consideration of abused OSPs (8);

BE.

whereas, although some progress has been made with regard to removal of online terrorist content, there is a need to scale up the companies’ engagement; whereas the removals are often neither complete, nor timely or permanent, the content being removed from one website but left on another belonging to the same company or the account being allowed to remain live and/or reappear after it has posted content in violation of a company’s terms of service; whereas effective, comprehensive and transparent reporting by companies and law enforcement has to be improved; whereas the companies and users in question should be able to seek judicial redress;

BF.

whereas, in response to larger companies removing more content, terrorist groups are increasingly using new and/or smaller platforms which are less suited to fast removal of terrorist material; whereas this diversification to smaller platforms makes additional technical support essential to enable, for example, the introduction of platform-agnostic automated tools, such as hashing technology, which can identify online terrorist content in advance with a high degree of accuracy and prevent publication;

BG.

whereas the development of new technologies and access to artificial intelligence and algorithms may allow online terrorist content to be identified and reported swiftly; whereas the use of automated tools also carries risks of false hits;

BH.

whereas studies and reports show how prisons can easily evolve into microcosms of the crime-terror nexus, where recruitment and networking take place; whereas the internal situation in many prisons accelerates the threat of radicalisation of offenders, incubating and enabling terrorism; whereas many of those serving prison sentences will soon be released back into their communities, posing particular reintegration challenges and high risk of re-offending; whereas monitoring of such high-risk offenders is extremely resource-intensive for Member States’ security services; whereas prison regimes and risk management can play a significant role in mitigating these threats; whereas even though Member States recognise the need to address the rise in prison radicalisation, more effective measures are needed;

BI.

whereas retention of data, taking account of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, is an essential part of the investigative process; whereas the police and judicial authorities and intelligence services usually rely heavily on communications data to successfully proceed with their casework; whereas the necessity of an appropriate data retention regime when it comes to the fight against terrorism was consistently raised during the work of the TERR Committee;

BJ.

whereas the use of encryption will on the one hand make a significant contribution to security in the field of IT, but on the other hand will also be used by terrorists to protect their communications or stored data, which represents a considerable challenge for law enforcement, security and intelligence services, since they can be denied access to essential intelligence and evidence; whereas encryption becomes particularly critical when even the responsible online service providers are unwilling or unable to decrypt the communication;

BK.

BL.

BM.

BN.

BO.

BP.

BQ.

BR.

BS.

BT.

BU.

whereas the Commission put forward two proposals for a regulation establishing a framework for interoperability between existing and proposed centralised information systems in the fields of police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration, borders and visas, namely VIS, SIS, EES and Eurodac, as well as ETIAS and ECRIS-TCN once the respective legal bases are adopted;

BV.

whereas criminals can still today be recorded in different databases that are not connected under different aliases; whereas the current EU data management architecture therefore needs to be improved by interoperability to eliminate blind spots and multiple false identities and provide the right information at the right time;

BW.

whereas within the territory of one Member State there may be a multitude of separate decentralised databases at federal, regional and local level, with different data inputs in different systems and complex procedures — or none at all — for the sharing or checking of the data by the relevant authorities at the different levels;

BX.

whereas the use of a common messaging format at EU level, such as a universal message format (UMF), will facilitate smoother exchange of data and information between parties and across interoperability systems; whereas establishing the need to use certain UMF fields for particular exchanges can contribute to the improvement of data quality in all of the systems across which messages are being exchanged; whereas the use of this common message format by Europol and Interpol should also be encouraged;

BY.

whereas eu-LISA should establish automated data quality control mechanisms and procedures as well as common data quality indicators and minimum quality standards for data stored in the information systems; whereas the goal would be for the EU information systems and interoperability components to automatically identify apparently incorrect or inconsistent data submissions so that the originating Member State is able to verify the data and carry out any necessary remedial actions;

BZ.

whereas obstacles to a more fluid cooperation often stem from organisational and legal difficulties between the different national, regional and local structures within the Member States themselves, such as: overlapping competences and insufficiently delineated mandates; hesitancy to share information as this might result in loss of responsibility or loss of important information flows; legal obstacles when it comes to sharing information between different authorities; services being obliged to compete with each other for resources; and technical barriers to information exchange;

CA.

whereas the principle of data ownership is crucial for ensuring the confidence of counter-terrorism authorities in sharing information via EU databases between Member States and with Europol;

CB.

whereas mixing intelligence and law enforcement information entails major legal challenges and risks due to the different accountability rules applying to both types of information, including risks to the fundamental right of suspects to a fair trial when intelligence information is used as evidence in court proceedings; whereas a legal framework must be put in place for information exchange between intelligence and law enforcement authorities, especially since intelligence often concerns information on people who are not yet suspects within the framework of criminal investigations but might belong to terrorist networks or may be returning FTFs; whereas, however, this must not lead to any lowering of legal standards;

CC.

whereas policing and intelligence services receive, process and transfer both classified and unclassified information, which involves different regimes at every stage of using the information; whereas it is also necessary to distinguish between information used as intelligence, i.e. information that is processed by professionals for a specific purpose, and regular information; whereas it is necessary to at least distinguish between criminal intelligence, which is related to a police criminal case, from security intelligence, which is processed within an administrative framework;

CD.

whereas intelligence information should be given a special, even higher level of protection over police information because of the different working methods involved, such as the gathering of confidential information from sources and informants who must be kept anonymous, as well as the different objectives that require greater sensitivity;

CE.

whereas a possible solution could also be offered by the creation of counter-terrorism centres or units within the national territory; whereas such centres allow representatives of the different services to communicate with each other on a regular basis and discuss how best to cooperate and exchange information; whereas this helps build trust between the services and fosters a better understanding of their respective working methods and challenges;

CF.

whereas security services tend to cooperate and exchange information bilaterally or multilaterally — notably through the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) and with the EU bodies via EU INTCEN — by sharing strategic intelligence; whereas it is necessary to find a practical solution to fill the existing gaps between the parallel tracks of the law enforcement community and the intelligence community, for example by identifying specific areas of cooperation, in order to allow for more efficient cooperation, while still keeping them separate;

CG.

whereas it is possible to increase effectiveness in the use of the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) and the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) structures for the exchange of information;

CH.

whereas the Member States’ civilian and military security and intelligence agencies systematically share their intelligence, including that related to terrorism, with the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) within the External Action Service (EEAS) which provides intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness to the various EU decision-making bodies;

CI.

whereas communicating the post-hit information only to the SIRENE Bureau of the Member State issuing the alert under Article 36 and not to other Member States is sometimes insufficient for the purposes of following up the movements of individuals related to terrorism or completing the relevant information in respect of such individuals; whereas the early warning of other Member States that might be concerned could, for example, be necessary in cases where the person did not return directly to the Member State of origin or where s(he) was accompanied by nationals of another/other Member State(s) in respect of whom no alert had been issued since they remained unknown to the latter’s competent authorities;

CJ.

whereas the UK Government has notified the EU of its intention to leave on 29 March 2019; whereas it has, however, expressed its wish to continue its cooperation with the EU in the area of security and counter-terrorism; whereas the EU and the UK are highly interdependent in the area of security and counter-terrorism, with the UK participating in many key EU legal instruments in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and having access to many EU systems and databases for the exchange of information; whereas arrangements should be found with the EU as regards all pending proceedings; whereas any future agreement should seek to make provision for the UK and the EU to be able to continue to share, collect and analyse vital information in the fight against serious crime; whereas the withdrawal agreement should ensure a smooth transition regime and avoid, as far as possible, operational gaps or obstacles that reduce the EU’s capacity to effectively fight organised crime and terrorism;

CK.

whereas efficient and systematic cooperation between the Member States and the EU agencies, in accordance with their legal mandates, as well as among the agencies in the counter-terrorism field, is imperative, especially cooperation between Europol and Eurojust in order to more effectively support the efforts to detect, prevent, investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of a terrorist attack; whereas Eurojust has appointed a specialised counter-terrorism prosecutor to make the bridge with the ECTC at Europol in order to increase cooperation and information exchange between the two agencies;

CL.

whereas information exchange between EU agencies is not ideal because of the use of different secure means of communication; whereas the establishment of an interinstitutional secure means of communication could facilitate and improve information exchange between agencies such as EU INTCEN, Europol and Frontex;

CM.

whereas designated CT Liaison Officers can bring added value both to the work of the agencies and to their own Member States;

CN.

whereas there are differences in the Member States as to the number of competent authorities that can consult the Europol databases or be in contact with Europol without going through the national liaison officers; whereas some Member States lack restricted and safe national police communication networks, preventing their competent authorities from decentralised access, particularly to the Secure Information Exchange Network Application CT-SIENA;

CO.

whereas several EU instruments such as Decision 2005/671/JHA, the CT Directive and the Europol regulation require Member States to share information on terrorism with the relevant agencies; whereas increased information sharing with Europol and Eurojust on a regular basis and in a timely and systematic manner, including contextual information, in accordance with their legal mandates, facilitates their work in detecting links between cases and providing an overview of challenges and best practice related to investigations, prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences; whereas within the framework of Decision 2005/671/JHA, Member States still do not spontaneously exchange relevant information with other Member States where such information could be used in the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences; whereas information shared with Eurojust has increased over the past years, but differences continue to exist between the Member States in relation to the amount, type and scope of the information shared, which may result in fragmentation of the information available;

CP.

whereas CEPOL substantially contributes to counter-terrorism training for law enforcement officials of the Member States and in priority third countries;

CQ.

whereas mutual legal assistance (MLA) mechanisms are progressively being replaced by mutual recognition instruments as the latter help improve cross-border cooperation between competent authorities within the EU by speeding up and streamlining the procedures; whereas the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) Decision and the European Investigation Order (EIO) Directive are examples of mutual recognition instruments that have been found by practitioners to be useful;

CR.

whereas the principle of mutual recognition is, on the one hand, dependent on the existence of a high level of mutual trust between Member States and, on the other, helps increase mutual trust by allowing the authorities of different Member States to work efficiently together in the fight against terrorism;

CS.

whereas joint investigation teams (JITs) facilitate the coordination of investigations and prosecutions in cases with a cross-border dimension and allow for real-time exchange of information/evidence; whereas the practical benefits resulting from the use of JITs include improved information exchange, exchange of best practices, enhanced collection of evidence and mutual recognition of the actions carried out by the parties; whereas JITs require appropriate funding to work effectively;

CT.

whereas close cooperation by online service providers (OSPs) is necessary when it comes to securing and obtaining electronic evidence at the request of the responsible law enforcement authority and based on due legal process, given its importance for investigating terrorist offences;

CU.

whereas the Schengen area without internal borders is a fundamental achievement of the EU, which is only sustainable if the external borders are effectively secured and protected, illegal border crossings cease and internal security measures are adopted to face the risk of serious crimes; whereas many proposals have been adopted in order to strengthen security checks at the external borders; whereas some Member States have asked for more flexibility regarding the temporary reintroduction of checks at internal borders in the event of a serious threat to public order or public security, as proposed by the Commission;

CV.

whereas on 7 April 2017, the new Regulation (EU) 2017/458 (9) amending the Schengen Borders Code entered into force in response, in particular, to the worsening terrorist threat in order to provide for systematic checks on all persons crossing the external borders, including individuals enjoying the right of free movement, against the relevant databases;

CW.

whereas some areas of the regulation governing certain fields of border control, such as the systematic consultation of databases during border checks and thorough checking of the required entry conditions, have not been implemented;

CX.

whereas the thwarted attack on the Thalys train of 21 August 2015, the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015 and the Brussels attacks of 22 March 2016 have demonstrated that in a limited number of cases, terrorists abused shortcomings in the border management policies of the EU and of several Member States, which were not ready for a mass influx; whereas it has been reported by law enforcement authorities that at least eight of these attacks’ perpetrators entered the EU via irregular flows in July, August and October 2015; whereas in other cases, future perpetrators had remained in Member States in spite of being due to depart or be returned; whereas this demonstrates certain flaws in the EU’s border management policies and their implementation at Member State level;

CY.

whereas the Council conclusions 10152/17 recommend to Member States that, when faced with irregular migrants, they perform checks, where relevant, at national level against databases fed and used by competent authorities and the national Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), at European and international level against the SIS, Europol, VIS, Eurodac and Interpol databases (I-24/7 network) and more specifically Nominal data, Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD), FTFs and Travel Documents Associated with Notices (TDAWN);

CZ.

whereas on the basis of Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 and the positive opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA) is allowed to process personal data; whereas, however, EBCGA is experiencing difficulties in monitoring terrorism due to the short personal data retention period established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 that comprises only 90 days; whereas between Eurojust and EBCGA there is only a memorandum of understanding which includes the exchange of general, strategic and technical information but not the exchange of personal information; whereas there is need for a specific legal framework for EBCGA to process personal data in order to fulfil its tasks;

DA.

whereas there is a need for EBCGA officers to also access the Eurodac, SIS, EES and VIS databases at border crossing points in order to perform checks;

DB.

whereas there are currently no minimum standards or common rules for the security of identity cards of Union citizens or of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement;

DC.

whereas three quarters of the fraudulent documents detected at the external borders and in the EU imitate identity documents issued by the Member States and countries associated with the Schengen area; whereas national identity cards with a lower degree of security are the most frequently detected among the fakes;

DD.

whereas some Member States do not oblige air carriers on their territory to conduct conformity checks on passengers’ personal data on their ticket and ID card or passport, which makes it difficult to ascertain whether the given identity matches the true identity of the person; whereas this is of capital importance for flights within the EU; whereas, however, proper identity checks and the authentication of travel documents should remain tasks for the police authorities;

DE.

whereas battlefield evidence is often essential to identify potential foreign terrorist fighters and victims, and needs to be included in the relevant databases in order to reach border guards in real time, and to be shared with investigators and prosecutors for investigations and prosecutions;

DF.

whereas several Member States have not yet ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism of 16 May 2005, also known as the ‘Warsaw Convention’, which constitutes the most comprehensive international convention on money laundering and terrorist financing; whereas confiscating the assets generated by criminal activities is a very efficient tool in fighting crime and terrorism, as it deprives criminals of the proceeds of their illegal activities and prevents terrorists from organising an attack; whereas the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) sets global standards for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism and identifies jurisdictions with weak measures in place to combat money laundering and terrorist financing;

DG.

whereas the EU has adopted two legislative instruments to implement FATF recommendations, namely the 4th and 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directives (AMLD), in order to address the gaps identified in the light of terrorist attacks; whereas the Member States had until 26 June 2017 to transpose the AML Directive into their national legislation, but not all of them have done so; whereas several Member States continue to allow ultimate beneficiary owners of trusts, foundations and incorporated companies to remain anonymous as well as bearer shares which facilitate the concealment of the origin and destination of financial flows and the ownership of economic activities that provide cover to the financing of terrorism and organised crime; whereas the 5th AMLD will increase transparency on these issues;

DH.

whereas the European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (PANA) verified how tax evaders count on the active help of professional intermediaries, who apparently fulfil the relevant legal obligations;

DI.

whereas in July 2017, the Commission and Europol were granted observer status in the Egmont Group, an international united body composed of 156 financial intelligence units (FIUs), with the aim of increasing cooperation not only between FIUs, but also among other competent authorities;

DJ.

whereas abuse and misuse of social media fundraising, funding through charity and non-profit organisations, small wire transfers and pre-paid cards are among the funding methods for Daesh and other terrorist organisations; whereas micro lending platforms are used to facilitate all of these typologies;

DK.

whereas alongside traditional terrorist financing methods such as private donations, extortion, kidnapping for ransoms, abuse and misuse of non-profit organisations, formal and informal remittance systems, the use of proceeds of criminal activities, cash or funds transfers through banks, recent terrorist attacks have shown that emerging financing methods via electronic, online payment methods such as virtual currencies or anonymous pre-paid cards and informal value transfer systems (IVTS) also pose a risk of being misused by terrorist organisations to finance their activities; whereas the anonymity surrounding certain cryptocurrencies is leading to an increase in their use for illegitimate activities; whereas their use by organised crime groups to finance criminal activities and terrorism, and to launder criminal proceeds, has increased over the past few years; whereas Europol has collaborated with national authorities in dismantling several criminal operations which involved trading in cryptocurrencies;

DL.

whereas in certain countries with less developed banking systems the prevalent use of mobile banking services often makes it difficult to identify the beneficiaries of cash transfers; whereas such transfers of funds by means of mobile banking present high risks for terrorist financing and whereas, on the other hand, the relevant services must be enabled to track certain terrorist financing without coming up against banking secrecy in the vast majority of cases; whereas the use and transfer of funds through alternative remittance systems also present a risk for terrorist financing;

DM.

whereas cooperation and exchange of information between obliged entities, FIUs and competent authorities are key to the effective fight against terrorist financing; whereas FIUs, in the performance of their tasks, should have access to information and be able to exchange it, including through appropriate cooperation with law enforcement authorities; whereas it is essential to further enhance their effectiveness and efficiency by having the Member States clarify their powers and the cooperation between them;

DN.

whereas the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) is a useful tool for counter-terrorist financing; whereas it does not allow tracing terrorist financing activities using SEPA transactions, which leads to a significant information gap; whereas a TFTS system complementary to the existing TFTP Agreement would enhance the EU’s capacity to prevent and investigate terrorist attacks by providing key additional information on terrorist financing activities and would be more efficient and effective than pursuing financial information concerning suspicious transactions through bilateral or multilateral information and/or legal assistance requests; whereas Parliament has on several occasions called for the introduction of such a system, including in its resolution of 25 November 2015 on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations (10);

DO.

whereas incidents involving critical infrastructure, in particular those related to terrorist attacks or attempted attacks, can have severe and cross-border consequences for the security of European citizens and states;

DP.

whereas services are delivered through increasingly complex systems, which makes the current sectoral approach to European critical infrastructures (ECIs) outdated;

DQ.

whereas cyber-attacks on electronic services or interconnected systems are a key component of hybrid threats; whereas an increasing number of cyber-attacks have, or can have, physical effects on critical infrastructure and its users; whereas there is a need to increase readiness to counter cyber terrorist threats;

DR.

whereas the Commission Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy and the evaluation study of Directive 2008/114/EC indicate that: the threat to critical infrastructures is likely to continue to rise, that there is a need to enhance preparation and response capabilities and to revise Directive 2008/114/EC, and that there is an interest in targeting transport infrastructures; whereas a better framework is needed to improve rail security and to address the issue of protection of public areas of transport infrastructures, such as airports, ports and maritime transport facilities, as well as railway stations and also of energy production facilities, with particular attention to nuclear power plants;

DS.

whereas attacks on critical infrastructure could have catastrophic consequences; whereas Member States must ensure adequate, fail-safe protection of these facilities;

DT.

whereas incident reporting is essential in identifying shortcomings, improving the effectiveness of existing measures, assessing the performance of critical infrastructures during a disruptive event, raising awareness of the need to review existing security plans, and detecting the emergence of new threats;

DU.

whereas Member States need to organise more exercises in crisis response, including in third countries seeking their cooperation and upgrading of capacities;

DV.

whereas the protection and insurance of critical infrastructure and soft targets requires public-private cooperation, including in the cyber-domain;

DW.

whereas private security services play a role in ensuring resilient security chains, public procurement of their services should therefore be subject to specific quality criteria, with regard to aspects such as the training, vetting and screening of personnel, quality control and compliance assurance, and the implementation of technological developments and contract management;

DX.

whereas, following the 2012 evaluation of Directive 2008/114/EC, the Commission launched a pilot phase involving four critical infrastructures of a European dimension (Eurocontrol, Galileo, the electricity transmission grid and the gas transmission network);

DY.

whereas the Commission, in its communication on the new Multiannual Financial Framework, proposes to significantly increase EU funding for security and defence, including EU internal security;

DZ.

whereas several terrorist attacks in the EU were perpetrated by individuals known to the authorities; whereas vehicle rental companies lack the ability to exchange information, such as booking or reservation data, with law enforcement agencies for the purpose of cross-checks against official watch lists and police databases;

EA.

whereas in 2015 and 2016, explosives were used in 40 % of the terrorist attacks committed in the EU (11);

EB.

whereas the explosive used in most of the attacks was triacetone triperoxide (TATP) (12), a home-made explosive that remains the explosive of choice for terrorists; whereas TATP can be quite easily manufactured using only a few substances; whereas many civilian factories and facilities which use those substances remain accessible by criminals, including terrorists, since no executive measures of control have been enforced by the Member States, in spite of the EU CBRN Action Plan;

EC.

whereas despite Regulation (EU) No 98/2013, some terrorists are still obtaining explosives precursors, especially for TATP; whereas it is still possible to acquire the substances under Annex I; whereas Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 does not provide sufficient restrictions and controls, for example by only requiring a registration of transactions; whereas ensuring stricter controls is a key priority;

ED.

whereas the greatest problems regarding implementation include a lack of awareness of the existing legislation across the supply chain due to the large number of economic operators (retailers of household products), and enforcing the restrictions on internet sales, imports and intra-EU movements;

EE.

whereas the Commission proposal of 17 April 2018 for a regulation on the marketing and use of explosives precursors (COM(2018)0209) provides for stricter and more harmonised rules concerning the making available, introduction, possession and use of substances or mixtures that could be misused for the illicit manufacture of explosives, with a view to limiting their availability to the general public and ensuring the appropriate reporting of suspicious transactions throughout the supply chain;

EF.

whereas on online marketplaces chemicals can be found by their written name, their formula, or their Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) identification number, but in many cases are only listed by their generic name; whereas there are so many variations to names that it would be easier to identify listings for specific substances if inclusion of a searchable CAS number were also required;

EG.

whereas the Regulation only covers sales to the general public, and not to professional users, who are not defined in the Regulation; whereas the criteria for defining who is a professional user differ across the internal market;

EH.

whereas, pursuant to the impact assessment of 17 April 2018 (SWD(2018)0104) and the associated proposal for a regulation (COM(2018)0209), training for customs authorities on recognising explosives and explosives precursors during the course of their duties at the external border should be expanded;

EI.

whereas access to firearms and components of explosive devices plays a very important role in enabling terror attacks; whereas in the EU, violent-extremist groups often have to turn to criminal networks to acquire weaponry; whereas according to Europol’s TE-SAT 2018 report, firearms were used in 41 % of all attacks, a slight increase compared to 2016 (38 %) (13);

EJ.

whereas in recent years an increase in converted blank firing weapons and reactivated firearms has been observed; whereas several recent attacks have also been carried out with different types of knives;

EK.

whereas the crime-terror nexus also eases the access of terrorists to firearms;

EL.

whereas the Council conclusions of 8 October 2015 invite Member States to systematically supply relevant information to Interpol and Europol;

EM.

whereas a number of regions in the EU’s neighbourhood, such as MENA and also the Balkans, are facing important challenges such as those relating to FTF and returnees management, as well as to home-grown radical cells;

EN.

whereas the Balkans remain a key region for European stability; whereas the challenges related to terrorism and Islamist extremism compound a regional context already weakened by ethnic, political and social polarisation as well as criminal networks; whereas the countries of the region have already been targets for terrorism (the attacks were prevented), and are already used as transit countries for people and weapons;

EO.

whereas all MENA countries have been confronted with major terrorist actions and remain prime targets; whereas these countries, on top of critical social and economic situations, may also face multiple challenges in relation to the return of FTFs from Daesh and Al-Qaeda, considering the large number of jihadists from this region; whereas information exchange and strong partnerships with these key third countries through an EU-coordinated approach, by offering cooperation and assistance in the form of capacity-building, make it possible to thwart attacks and dismantle terrorist networks;

EP.

whereas regions, such as MENA, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, the Gulf and Central Asia, have also experienced the development of terrorist networks linked to Daesh and Al-Qaeda; whereas religious extremism and sectarian violence benefiting from financing are serious concerns, enabling terrorist networks to spread, link up with other criminal enterprises and operate in those regions, targeting Europe and European interests;

EQ.

whereas the funding for Daesh and other terrorist groups has been made possible through the active or passive involvement of certain states, including supposed EU allies in counter-terrorism, as well as of private actors;

ER.

whereas it is vital for the European Union to maintain strong cooperation with third country partners in counter-terrorism; whereas the dialogue concerning the measures and actions undertaken to combat terrorism and terrorist funding, including full implementation of the recommendations of the FATF, and to prevent radicalisation must be maintained, particularly with the Gulf countries; whereas interparliamentary cooperation with these key third countries is one of the tools that should be strengthened;

ES.

whereas the EU is cooperating with third countries in the area of counter-terrorism in a variety of ways; whereas a number of EU instruments can be used to finance CT programmes abroad; whereas the EU has deployed a network of CT experts within EU delegations; whereas EU agencies such as Europol, Eurojust and CEPOL are also cooperating with third countries in the area of counter-terrorism, through strategic and operational agreements for example;

ET.

whereas there is an EU sanction system in the area of CT with three types of measures, which is implemented by the EEAS; whereas this system is incomplete and underused owing to procedural constraints and reluctance on the part of the Member States;

EU.

whereas the Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-terrorism adopted on 19 June 2017 recall the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations in combating terrorism through enhancing security, stability, border control and security sector reform and in building counter-terrorism capacity and information sharing;

EV.

whereas too many people have been the direct victims of terrorism across the EU, leaving thousands of families with post-traumatic conditions affecting their long-term well-being; whereas there is a lack of harmonised figures on the exact number of victims; whereas prior to 2001 most victims of terrorism were mainly attributable to the IRA and ETA, while since then the vast majority of deaths were as a result of terrorist actions organised or inspired by Al-Qaeda and Daesh;

EW.

whereas deaths caused by terrorist attacks destroy families, and many of the injured survivors of terrorist attacks suffer from disabilities, disfiguring and life-changing loss of limbs and psychological problems and their plight impacts heavily on close family and the community, while too often once the media spotlight has passed, the long-term needs of the victims are neglected; whereas post-traumatic stress syndrome is a major public health issue in Europe; whereas there are no overall European figures on the impact of terrorism on the mental health of the population following the various attacks;

EX.

whereas victims of terrorism have a very specific status, and meeting their needs is not only a legal obligation under EU, international and national law but also a responsibility for the whole of our societies; whereas recent attacks in the EU have seen victims emanating from a large number of different Member States;

EY.

whereas at European level there is no defined legal statute for victims of terrorism for the purposes of access to community services or compensation rights; whereas victims of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe still lack justice, proper treatment, victim support services and financial assistance; whereas victims of terrorism are at risk of secondary victimisation affecting them not only in judicial proceedings, but also in the many interactions they have with other state and non-state entities;

EZ.

whereas there are still discrepancies in the way the provisions enshrined in Directive 2012/29/EU (14) have been translated into procedures at national level; whereas the Commission has still not provided its report on the implementation of this directive; whereas on 30 May 2018 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the implementation of this directive (15);

FA.

whereas compensation for the victims of terrorism serves both as a form of recognition by society of the harm caused by the attack and as a means of financial support and restitution; whereas levels of compensation and procedures vary considerably among Member States, thereby aggravating victims’ perceptions of injustice and the suffering they experience;

FB.

whereas support systems need to be set up in such a way as to ensure that cross-border victims too are continuously and systematically accounted for and provided with support in their country while staying in touch with support providers in the country where the attack took place;

FC.

whereas Eurojust has been facilitating the execution of MLA requests for coordinating and granting assistance in the exercise of rights of victims of terrorism, considering the different rights and roles of foreign victims in their national legal systems;

FD.

whereas businesses, including small and medium-sized enterprises, can also suffer damage from terrorism such as property damage and business interruption;

FE.

whereas Parliament has put forward a pilot project to establish a ‘European Coordination Centre for victims of terrorism’ by bringing together key operational experts, victim advocates and relevant organisations from around Europe with a view to identifying key priorities and issues for victims of terrorism and delivering coordinated support across borders;

FF.

whereas the European Union has a necessary role to play in promoting the respect of democratic values, including the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas, however, there are extreme religious and political views and practices within the EU that fundamentally oppose these values;

FG.

whereas counter-terrorism measures and the protection of freedoms are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing; whereas fundamental rights must be secured and protected for each and every individual and all measures in the fight against terrorism should affect the innocent and uninvolved general population as little as possible;

FH.

whereas any CT measures always have to fully guarantee all fundamental rights and principles, including those with regard to privacy and data protection, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as procedural safeguards, such as the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial and the right to information, ensuring that individuals have effective remedies at their disposal to challenge any violation of their fundamental rights, including the possibility of judicial redress, and that the Union acquis on procedural rights is respected; whereas such measures should take due account of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union;

FI.

whereas it is crucial that CT investigations adhere to high standards of professionalism with all the measures applied being targeted, proportionate and necessary; whereas CT policies should not lead to social exclusion and stigmatisation; whereas the Fundamental Rights Agency could be requested to provide an opinion on counter-terrorism legislation within the context of its Multiannual Framework;

FJ.

whereas law enforcement and judicial personnel are at the forefront of CT operations; whereas there are multiple documented cases of police and judicial officials and their families being singled out for targeting and threats by violent extremists, some of which culminated in violent physical attacks and even murders; whereas political and public support of the law enforcement and judicial personnel who safeguard fundamental rights in CT investigations by risking life and limb, is of the utmost importance;

FK.

whereas the Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits discrimination on the ground of disability and recognises the right of people with disabilities to benefit from measures to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration, and participation in the life of the community; whereas the rights of persons with disabilities in the EU are also protected by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;

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