Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2020/C 313/01)

Last publication

OJ C 304, 14.9.2020

Past publications

OJ C 297, 7.9.2020

OJ C 287, 31.8.2020

OJ C 279, 24.8.2020

OJ C 271, 17.8.2020

OJ C 262, 10.8.2020

OJ C 255, 3.8.2020

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 6 February 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Dresden — Germany) — hapeg dresden gmbh v Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG

(Case C-137/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Freedom to provide services - Directive 2006/123/EC - Legislation of a Member State providing for a minimum tariff for the fees of engineers and architects)

(2020/C 313/02)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Dresden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: hapeg dresden gmbh

Defendant: Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG

Operative part of the order

Article 15(1)(2)(g) and (3) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which it is prohibited to agree, in contracts concluded with architects or engineers, tariffs lower than the minimum amounts determined in accordance with the rules on fees for architects and engineers laid down in that legislation.

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(1)  OJ C 268, 30.7.2018.

Order of the Court (Third Chamber) of 29 January 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy — Poland) — DŚ v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Jaśle

(Case C-522/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - No need to adjudicate)

(2020/C 313/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Najwyższy

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: DŚ

Defendant: Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Jaśle

Intervener: Prokuratura Krajowa

Operative part of the order

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland), made by decision of 2 August 2018 in Case C-522/18.

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(1)  OJ C 427, 26.11.2018.

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 15 January 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Okrazhen sad — Vidin — Bulgaria) — Corporate Commercial Bank, in liquidation v Elit Petrol AD

(Case C-647/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) of Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Judicial cooperation in civil matters - Insolvency proceedings - Retroactive amendment to the implementation conditions for reciprocal compensation entered into with a bankrupt credit institution - Rule of law - Principle of legal certainty - Right to an effective remedy)

(2020/C 313/04)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Okrazhen sad — Vidin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Corporate Commercial Bank, in liquidation

Defendant: Elit Petrol AD

Operative part of the order

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Okrazhen sad Vidin (Regional Court of Vidin, Bulgaria), by decision of 15 October 2018, is manifestly inadmissible.

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(1)  OJ C 455, 17.12.2018.

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 6 February 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea v Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova

(Case C-11/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Public procurement - Directive 2014/24/EU - Article 10(h) - Article 12(4) - Specific exclusions for service contracts - Civil defence, civil protection, and danger prevention services - Non-profit organisations or associations - Ordinary and emergency medical transport services - Regional legislation requiring priority to be given to recourse to a partnership between contracting authorities - Freedom of the Member States to choose how services are provided - Limits - Obligation to state reasons)

(2020/C 313/05)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea

Respondent: Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova

Interveners: Azienda Ospedaliera di Padova, Regione Veneto, Croce Verde Servizi

Operative part of the order

1.

Article 10(h) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC must be interpreted as not precluding a regional law that makes the award of a public contract conditional on a partnership between public bodies being unable to provide the ordinary medical transport service, provided that the choice made in favour of one means of providing services in particular, made at a stage prior to that of public procurement, has due regard to the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency.

2.

Article 10(h) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24 do not preclude a regional law that requires a contracting authority to provide reasons for its decision to award the contract for the provision of ordinary patient transport services by way of a tendering procedure rather than by direct award of the contract by means of an agreement entered into with another contracting authority.

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(1)  OJ C 164, 13.5.2019.

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 6 February 2020 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Rieco SpA v Comune di Lanciano, Ecolan SpA (C-89/19), Comune di Ortona, Ecolan SpA (C-90/19), Comune di San Vito Chietino, Ecolan SpA (C-91/19)

(Joined Cases C-89/19 to C-91/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure - Public procurement - Directive 2014/24/EU - Article 12(3) - National legislation favouring public procurement procedures to the detriment of in-house contracts - Freedom of the Member States as to the choice of how services are to be provided - Limits - National legislation excluding the possibility for a contracting authority to acquire, in a body owned by contracting authorities, a shareholding which cannot guarantee control of that body or a power of veto)

(2020/C 313/06)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Rieco SpA

Defendants: Comune di Lanciano, Ecolan SpA (C-89/19), Comune di Ortona, Ecolan SpA (C-90/19), Comune di San Vito Chietino, Ecolan SpA (C-91/19)

Interveners: Comune di Ortona (C-89/19), Comune di Treglio (C-89/19), Autorità nazionale anticorruzione (ANAC).

Operative part of the order

1.

Article 12(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national law which makes the conclusion of an in-house transaction, also referred to as an ‘in-house contract’, conditional on it not being possible to use a public procurement procedure and, in any event, on the demonstration by the contracting authority of the benefits specifically arising, for society at large, from recourse to an in-house transaction.

2.

Article 12(3) of Directive 2014/24 must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national law which prevents a contracting authority from acquiring a shareholding in an entity whose shareholders are other contracting authorities where that shareholding cannot guarantee control or a power of veto and where that contracting authority intends to later acquire joint control and, consequently, the possibility of directly awarding contracts to that entity whose share capital is owned by a number of contracting authorities.

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(1)  OJ C 182, 27.5.2019.

Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 31 January 2020 — Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) v European Commission, Deutscher Braunkohlen-Industrie — Verein eV, Lausitz Energie Kraftwerke AG, Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft mbH, eins energie in sachsen GmbH & Co. KG

(Case C-172/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Environment - Directive 2010/75/EU - Best available techniques (BAT) conclusions - Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1442 - Large combustion plants - Action for annulment - Inadmissibility - Lack of direct concern - Participation in the process leading to the adoption of the act - Procedural guarantees at the time of the adoption of the act - Substitution of grounds - No grounds alleging infringement of the appellant’s procedural rights - Act not of individual concern - Appeal manifestly unfounded)

(2020/C 313/07)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) (represented by: W. Spieth and N. Hellermann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Deutscher Braunkohlen-Industrie — Verein eV, Lausitz Energie Kraftwerke AG, Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft mbH, eins energie in sachsen GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: W. Spieth and N. Hellermann, Rechtsanwälte), European Commission (represented by: R. Tricot and A. C. Becker, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the order

1.	The appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded.

2.	Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) shall pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 164, 13.5.2019.

Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 16 January 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Telecom Italia SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Vodafone Italia SpA, Lindam Srl v Roma Capitale, Regione Lazio, Vodafone Italia SpA, Telecom Italia SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA

(Case C-368/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Approximation of laws - Electronic communications networks and services - Restrictions on the installation of mobile phone base transceiver stations established by local authorities - Insufficient details concerning the reasons why an answer to the question referred is necessary for the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2020/C 313/08)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Telecom Italia SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Vodafone Italia SpA, Lindam Srl

Respondents: Roma Capitale, Regione Lazio, Vodafone Italia SpA, Telecom Italia SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA

Interveners: Regione Lazio, Wind Tre SpA, Telecom Italia SpA, Ente Suore Francescane Missionarie del Cuore Immacolato di Maria and Others, Agenzia Regionale Protezione Ambiente (ARPA), Congregazione delle Religiose di Gesù e Maria

Operative part of the order

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy), by decision of 2 February 2018, is manifestly inadmissible.

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(1)  OJ C 312, 16.9.2019.

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 15 January 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj — Romania) — SC Banca E S.A. v G.D.

(Case C-381/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Consumer protection - Directive 93/13/EEC - Introduction of a new legal remedy in the course of the proceedings - Principles of legal certainty and effectiveness)

(2020/C 313/09)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Cluj

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: SC Banca E S.A.

Respondent: G.D.

Operative part of the order

The principles of legal certainty and effectiveness must be interpreted as not precluding a procedural rule which modifies the system of legal remedies provided for under national law, by introducing an additional legal remedy and an additional level of jurisdiction, and which applies to proceedings between a consumer and a seller or supplier already in progress at the time of that modification, where that new legal remedy is available to both the consumer and the seller or supplier.

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(1)  OJ C 288, 26.8.2019.

Appeal brought on 29 May 2020 by Eurofer, Association Européenne de l'Acier, AISBL against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 12 March 2020 in Case T-835/17, Eurofer v Commission

(Case C-226/20 P)

(2020/C 313/10)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Eurofer, Association Européenne de l'Acier, AISBL (represented by: J. Killick, advocaat, G. Forwood, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, HBIS Group Serbia Iron & Steel LLC Belgrade

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside the judgment under appeal;

—	annul article 2 of the contested regulation (1);

—	in the alternative refer the matter back to the General Court;

—	order the Commission and the intervener before the General Court to pay the costs of the appeal and the proceedings before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellant relies on four grounds of appeal.

1.	An error of law by interpreting article 3(4) of the basic regulation (2) to mean that the Commission has the discretion to consider that imports representing a market share exceeding 1 % are ‘negligible’.

2.

Errors as regards the assessment that ‘the volume of imports’ from Serbia were ‘negligible’ for the purpose of article 3(4) of the basic regulation. Specifically, the General Court committed: 2.1. an error of law in including price elements in the assessment of negligibility, which is solely a quantitative assessment related to volumes; 2.2. in the alternative, an error of law in failing to consider other factors (notably undercutting and underselling data) that could (more accurately) indicate the potential effects that the imported volumes are capable of having; and 2.3. further, a manifest error of assessment and distortion of the evidence in finding that the average prices associated with volumes amounting to an insignificant market share could, without more, support a finding that the volume is ‘negligible’ in this specific case.

3.

Errors as regards the finding that ‘protective measures are unnecessary’ for the purpose of article 9(2) of the basic regulation. Specifically, the General Court committed: 3.1. an error of law in finding that the Commission could terminate the investigation with no analysis of potential injury; and 3.2. an error in law and a manifest error of assessment in finding that the Commission did not exceed its margin of discretion in applying article 9(2) of the basic regulation.

4.

An error in law in finding that the Commission was not required to disclose data on undercutting and underselling in relation to the Serbian exporter. Specifically, the General Court committed: 4.1. an error in law in finding that the respect for Eurofer’s rights of defence did not require the disclosure of data on undercutting and underselling; 4.2. an error of law in finding that the complainant in an anti-dumping investigation cannot rely on the requirements stemming from respect for the rights of the defence; and 4.3. an error in law in finding that the contested regulation respected the principle of sound administration enshrined in article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

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(1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 of 5 October 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine and terminating the investigation on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Serbia (OJ 2017, L 258, p. 24).

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016, L 176, p. 21).

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Appeals Service Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) made on 7 April 2020 — VI v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

(Case C-247/20)

(2020/C 313/11)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Appeals Service Northern Ireland

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VI

Defendant: Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

Questions referred

1.	Is a child EEA Permanent Resident required to maintain Comprehensive Sickness Insurance in order to maintain a right to reside, as s/he would as a self-sufficient person, pursuant to Regulation 4(1) of the 2016 Regulations?

2.

Is the requirement, pursuant to Regulation 4(3)(b) of The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (that Comprehensive Sickness Insurance cover in the United Kingdom is only satisfied for a student or self-sufficient person, with regard to Regulation 16(2)(b)(ii) of The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, if such cover extends to both that person and all their relevant family members), illegal under EU law in light of Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38 (1) and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union in paragraph 70 of Teixeira C-480/08?

3.

Following the decision in paragraph 53 of Ahmad v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 988, are the Common Travel Area reciprocal arrangements in place regarding Health Insurance cover between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland considered ‘reciprocal arrangements’ and therefore constitute Comprehensive Sickness Insurance for the purposes of Regulation 4(1) of the 2016 Regulations?

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(1)  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004, L 158, p. 77).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 15 June 2020 — Thelen Technopark Berlin GmbH v MN

(Case C-261/20)

(2020/C 313/12)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Thelen Technopark Berlin GmbH

Respondent: MN

Questions referred

1.

Does it follow from EU law, in particular from Article 4(3) TEU, the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU and Article 260(1) TFEU, that, in the context of ongoing court proceedings between private persons, Article 15(1), (2)(g) and (3) of Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market (1) has direct effect in such a way that the national provisions contrary to that directive that are contained in Paragraph 7 of the German Verordnung über die Honorare für Architekten- und Ingenieurleistungen (Decree on fees for services provided by architects and engineers (‘the HOAI’)), pursuant to which the minimum rates for planning and supervision services provided by architects and engineers laid down in that official scale of fees are mandatory — save in certain exceptional cases — and any fee agreement in contracts with architects or engineers which falls short of the minimum rates is invalid, are no longer to be applied?

2.

If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative: (a) Does the Federal Republic of Germany’s scheme of mandatory minimum rates for planning and supervision services provided by architects and engineers in Paragraph 7 of the HOAI constitute an infringement of the freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU or of other general principles of EU law? (b) If Question 2(a) is to be answered in the affirmative: Does it follow from such an infringement that the national rules on mandatory minimum rates (in this case: Paragraph 7 of the HOAI) are no longer to be applied in ongoing court proceedings between private persons?

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(1)  OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van beroep Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 15 June 2020 — FN v Universiteit Antwerpen, Vlaamse Autonome Hogeschool Hogere Zeevaartschool, PB, ZK, NG, ZN, UM

(Case C-265/20)

(2020/C 313/13)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hof van beroep Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FN

Defendants: Universiteit Antwerpen, Vlaamse Autonome Hogeschool Hogere Zeevaartschool, PB, ZK, NG, ZN, UM

Questions referred

Must Clause 4.1 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, as set out in the Annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, (1) and Clause 4.1 of the Framework Agreement on part-time work set out in the Annex to Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, (2) be interpreted as precluding a university, on the basis of national legislation (Article 91 of the Decree concerning universities) under which independent academic staff with full-time positions are appointed on a permanent basis, and staff with part-time positions may either be appointed, or employed on a temporary basis for renewable periods of a maximum of six years, from being permitted to:

1.

employ a professor, using the justification of ‘freedom of policy’, over a period of twenty years on the basis of some twenty consecutive, short-term and part-time employment contracts and statutory appointments of between one and three years, without any limit on the total number of renewals, while other colleagues with similar duties were appointed on a permanent and full-time basis?

2.

stipulate in its staff regulations only a general minimum limit of an appointment percentage at 50 percent in order to be eligible for a permanent appointment, but not lay down a single criterion on the basis of which the part-time staff appointed at 50 percent or greater can be appointed on a permanent or temporary basis?

3.	award appointment percentages to a part-time professor, using the justification of unlimited ‘freedom of policy’, without laying down objective criteria, and without applying any objective workload measurement?

4.

deny a temporary and part-time professor, when his employment is not renewed, using the justification of the university’s ‘freedom of policy’, the right to invoke the allegedly abusive nature of the past employment conditions, because he had, so to speak, always accepted those conditions by carrying out the allocated work, with the result that he forfeits the protection afforded by EU law?

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(1)  OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43.

(2)  OJ 1998 L 14, p. 9.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 24 June 2020 — UM

(Case C-277/20)

(2020/C 313/14)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UM

Other parties to the proceedings: HW as administrator of the estate of ZL, Marktgemeinde Kötschach-Mauthen, Finanzamt Spittal Villach

Questions referred

1.

Is Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a contract of donation mortis causa entered into between two German nationals habitually resident in Germany in respect of real estate located in Austria, granting the donee a right having the character of an obligation against the estate to registration of his title after the donor’s death pursuant to that contract and the donor’s death certificate, that is without the intervention of the probate court, is an agreement as to succession within the meaning of that provision?

2.

If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative: Is Article 83(2) of Regulation No 650/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that it also regulates the effect of a choice of applicable law made before 17 August 2015 for a contract of donation mortis causa that is to be qualified as an agreement as to succession within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the regulation?

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(1)  OJ 2012 L 201, p. 107.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Netherlands) lodged on 29 June 2020 — K v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen (Uwv)

(Case C-285/20)

(2020/C 313/15)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Centrale Raad van Beroep

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: K

Defendant: Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen (Uwv)

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 65(2) and (5) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a wholly unemployed person who has transferred his place of residence from the competent Member State to another Member State while receiving a benefit as referred to in Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, and/or before his employment relationship has been terminated, is entitled to unemployment benefit under the legislation of the Member State in which he resides?

2.	Are the reasons for which the unemployed person has transferred his residence to a Member State other than the competent Member State, for example, on family grounds, relevant in that regard?

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(1)  Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 7 July 2020 — UE, HC v Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypothekenbank AG

(Case C-301/20)

(2020/C 313/16)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: UE, HC

Respondent: Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypothekenbank AG

Intervening party: Verlassenschaft des VJ

Question referred

1.

Is Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession (‘the EU Succession Regulation’) (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a copy of the certificate issued for an indefinite duration without indicating an expiry date, contrary to that provision, a. is valid and effective indefinitely, or b. is valid only for a period of six months from the date of issue of the certified copy, or c. is valid only for a period of six months from another date, or d. is invalid and unsuitable for use within the meaning of Article 63 of the EU Succession Regulation?

2.

Is Article 65(1) of the EU Succession Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 69(3) thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that the certificate produces effects in favour of all persons who are mentioned on the certificate by name as heirs, legatees, executors of wills or administrators of the estate, with the result that even those who have not applied for the issue of the certificate themselves can use that certificate pursuant to Article 63 of the EU Succession Regulation?

3.

Must Article 69 of the EU Succession Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 70(3) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that the legitimising effect of the certified copy of a certificate of succession must be recognised if it was still valid when it was first submitted but expired before the requested decision of the authority, or does that provision not preclude national law if the latter requires the certificate to be valid even at the time of the decision?

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(1)  OJ 2012 L 201, p. 107.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Paris (France) lodged on 9 July 2020 — A. — Other party: Autorité des marchés financiers

(Case C-302/20)

(2020/C 313/17)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour d’appel de Paris

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A.

Other party: Autorité des marchés financiers

Questions referred

1.

In the first place, (a) Is the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), (1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation, (2) to be interpreted as meaning that information relating to the forthcoming publication of a press article relaying a market rumour about an issuer of financial instruments can satisfy the requirement of precision laid down in those articles for classification as inside information? (b) Does the fact that the press article, the forthcoming publication of which constitutes the information at issue, mentions — as a market rumour — the price of a public takeover bid affect the assessment of the precise nature of the information at issue? (c) Are the reputation of the journalist who authored the article and of the media outlet which published it and the genuinely significant (‘ex post’) effect of that publication on the price of the securities to which the published article relates relevant factors for the purposes of assessing the precise nature of the information at issue?

2.

In the second place, if the first question is answered to the effect that information such as that at issue can satisfy the necessary requirement of precision: (a) Is Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC (3) to be interpreted as meaning that the disclosure by a journalist, to one of his usual sources, of information relating to the forthcoming publication of an article authored by him relaying a market rumour is made ‘for the purpose of journalism’? (b) Is the answer to that question dependent on, inter alia, whether or not the journalist was informed of the market rumour by that source or whether or not the disclosure of the information on the forthcoming publication of the article was expedient in order to obtain clarifications from that source with regard to the credibility of the rumour?

3.

In the third place, are Articles 10 and 21 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 to be interpreted as meaning that, even where inside information is disclosed by a journalist ‘for the purpose of journalism’ within the meaning of Article 21, the lawful or unlawful nature of the disclosure requires an assessment of whether the disclosure was made ‘in the normal exercise of … [the] profession [of journalist]’ for the purposes of Article 10?

4.

In the fourth place, is Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to occur in the normal exercise of the profession of journalist, the disclosure of inside information must be strictly necessary for the exercise of that profession and must comply with the principle of proportionality?

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(1)  OJ 2003 L 96, p. 16.

(2)  OJ 2003 L 339, p. 70.

(3)  OJ 2014 L 173, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Nürnberg (Germany) lodged on 21 July 2020 — DQ v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-323/20)

(2020/C 313/18)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Nürnberg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: DQ

Defendant: Ryanair Designated Activity Company

Question referred

1.	Does a trade union organised strike by an operating air carrier’s own staff constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

2.	Is it relevant whether the strike in question is proceeding on the basis of demands by the staff that have not thus far been contractually agreed by the staff and the operating air carrier?

3.	Is it relevant whether the specific strike was triggered by certain conduct of the operating air carrier during the negotiations with the trade union? By order of the President of the Court of Justice of 7 August 2020, the case was removed from the register of the Court.

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(1)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 22 July 2020 — Finanzamt B v X-Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH

(Case C-324/20)

(2020/C 313/19)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Finanzamt B

Defendant: X-Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH

Questions referred

1.	Does a service provided on a single occasion and therefore not in relation to a certain period of time give rise to successive statements of account or successive payments within the meaning of Article 64(1) of the VAT Directive (1) merely on the basis of an agreement to pay in instalments?

2.

Alternatively, if the first question is answered in the negative: Is non-payment within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the VAT Directive to be assumed if the taxable person, when providing his service, agrees that the service is to be paid for in five annual instalments and the national law relating to cases of subsequent payment provides for an adjustment by which the previous reduction in the taxable amount is cancelled again in accordance with that article?

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(1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal du travail du Brabant wallon, division Wavre (Belgium) lodged on 24 July 2020 — PR v Agence fédérale pour l’Accueil des demandeurs d’asile (Fedasil)

(Case C-335/20)

(2020/C 313/20)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal du travail du Brabant wallon, division Wavre

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: PR

Defendant: Agence fédérale pour l’Accueil des demandeurs d’asile (Fedasil)

Questions referred

1.

Does the decision taken by a public administrative authority to change the mandatory place of registration of an asylum applicant in a reception centre, where the primary mission of that centre is to facilitate the transfer of that individual to the Member State with jurisdiction to examine his application for protection, interpreted as a preparatory measure for the effective transfer, where that individual has lodged a motion to set aside and suspend that removal order before a national court, already constitute the enforcement of that removal order within the meaning of the Dublin III Regulation? (1)

2.

In the affirmative, is the only remedy with suspensory effect — namely an application for suspension on grounds of extreme urgency provided by Article 39/82(4) of the Law of 15 December 1980 on entry into the territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign nationals — for an asylum applicant who has been requested to have his application for international protection examined in another Member State, and linked to the imminent enforcement of a removal or refoulement order, an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation?

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(1)  Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31).

Appeal brought on 28 July 2020 by Nord Stream 2 AG against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 20 May 2020 in Case T-526/19, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council

(Case C-348/20 P)

(2020/C 313/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Nord Stream 2 AG (represented by: L. Van den Hende, advocaat, M. Schonberg, Solicitor, J. Penz-Evren, J. Maly, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Parliament, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside the Order of the General Court (Eight Chamber) of 20 May 2020 in Case T-526/19 Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, in particular points 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the operative part;

—

to the extent that the Court considers the state of the proceedings so permit, to reject the plea of inadmissibility, declare the action admissible and refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the substance or, in the alternative, to declare the contested measure to be of direct concern to the appellant and refer the case back to the General Court to rule on individual concern or join it to the substance; and

—	order the Council and Parliament to pay the appellant’s costs, including the costs before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By the first ground of appeal, which is divided into two parts, the appellant claims that the General Court made errors in law in applying the requirement of direct concern and in finding that the appellant lacked standing in relation to its action for annulment of Directive (EU) 2019/692 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 (the ‘amending Directive’):

The General Court erred in considering that a directive, including the amending Directive, cannot of itself, before the adoption of transposition measures or the expiry of the transposition deadline, directly affect the legal situation of an operator, which would effectively rule out any action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

The General Court erred in assessing the issue of Member State’s discretion in entirely general terms and without examining what the impact of any discretion would be specifically on the appellant’s legal situation and in light of the subject-matter of its action.

By the second ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court made errors in law in its assessment of the Council’s requests to remove certain documents from the case file and in granting its requests. In particular, the General Court erred in undertaking its assessment entirely under the framework of Regulation 1049/2001 (2) on public access to documents while failing to consider whether the documents in question were manifestly relevant for the determination of the dispute. The General Court also erred in applying the restrictive framework established by the Court of Justice in the specific and acute circumstances of the Hungary v Commission and Slovenia v Croatia cases (3), to other situations of a fundamentally different nature. Finally, the General Court erred in law by attaching significant weight to the existence of the separate arbitration brought by the appellant under the Energy Charter Treaty, which is not relevant to its assessment on any basis, even under Regulation 1049/2001.

---

(1)  Directive (EU) 2019/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (OJ 2019, L 117, p. 1).

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001, L 145, p. 43).

(3)  Order of 14 May 2019, Hungary v Parliament, C-650/18, not published, EU:C:2019:438; judgment of 31 January 2020, Slovenia v Croatia, C-457/18, EU:C:2020:65.

Appeal brought on 30 July 2020 by Liviu Dragnea against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 12 May 2020 in Case T-738/18, Dragnea v Commission

(Case C-351/20 P)

(2020/C 313/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Liviu Dragnea (represented by: C. Toby, O. Riffaud, B. Entringer, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside the disputed order of the General Court in whole;

—	annul the Commission decision (OCM(2018)20575) sent to the legal representative of the applicant by letter dated 1 October 2018;

—	order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging a breach of articles 9(1), 9(2) and 9(4) of the OLAF Regulation (1) and a violation of the rights of defence of the applicant in the investigations, including the right to be heard and the respect of the presumption of innocence.

Second plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of sound administration in relation to the investigations as well as the refusal to open an investigation on the conduct of the OLAF investigation.

Third plea in law, alleging a violation of the right of access to documents concerning the OLAF investigations.

---

(1)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ 2013, L 248, p. 1).

Order of the President of the Fourth Chamber of the Court of 17 January 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) — Royaume-Uni) — Sandoz Ltd, Hexal AG v G.D. Searle LLC, Janssen Sciences Ireland

(Case C-114/18) (1)

(2020/C 313/23)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Fourth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 152, 30.4.2018.

Order of the President of the Court of 3 February 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy — Poland) — Proceedings brought by YV, interested party Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa

(Case C-537/18) (1)

(2020/C 313/24)

Language of the case: Polish

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 427, 26.11.2018.

Order of the President of the Court of 4 February 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Canarias — Spain) — KA v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS), Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social

(Case C-811/18) (1)

(2020/C 313/25)

Language of the case: Spanish

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 139, 15.4.2019.

Order of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of 20 January 2020 — Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd v European Commission

(Case C-202/19 P) (1)

(2020/C 313/26)

Language of the case: English

The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 164, 13.5.2019.

Order of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of 20 January 2020 — Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd v European Commission

(Case C-203/19 P) (1)

(2020/C 313/27)

Language of the case: English

The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 164, 13.5.2019.

Order of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of 20 January 2020 — Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd v European Commission, Council of the European Union

(Case C-204/19 P) (1)

(2020/C 313/28)

Language of the case: English

The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 164, 13.5.2019.

Order of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of 20 January 2020 — Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd v European Commission, Council of the European Union

(Case C-205/19 P) (1)

(2020/C 313/29)

Language of the case: English

The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 164, 13.5.2019.

Order of the President of the Court of 23 January 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — YX v Eurowings GmbH

(Case C-542/19) (1)

(2020/C 313/30)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 353, 11.11.2019.

Order of the President of the Court of 8 January 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Handelsgericht Wien — Austria) — flightright GmbH v Austrian Airlines AG

(Case C-661/19) (1)

(2020/C 313/31)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 406, 2.12.2019.

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Ocean Capital Administration and Others v Council

(Case T-332/15) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures against Iran - Freezing of funds - List of persons and entities to whom those measures apply - Inclusion of the applicants’ names)

(2020/C 313/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Ocean Capital Administration GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) and the other applicants whose names are set out in the annex (represented by: P. Moser QC, E. Metcalfe, Barrister, and M. Taher, Solicitor)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bishop and V. Piessevaux, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application, first, based on Article 263 TFEU for the annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/556 of 7 April 2015 amending Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2015 L 92, p. 101), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/549 of 7 April 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2015 L 92, p. 12), in so far as those acts concern the applicants, and, second, an application based on Article 277 TFEU for a declaration of the inapplicability of Council Decision 2013/497/CFSP of 10 October 2013 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2013 L 272, p. 46), and of Council Regulation (EU) No 971/2013 of 10 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2013 L 272, p. 1).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Ocean Capital Administration GmbH and the other applicants, whose names are set out in the annex, to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 294, 7.9.2015.

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — VQ v ECB

(Case T-203/18) (1)

(Economic and monetary policy - Prudential supervision of credit institutions - Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 - Administrative pecuniary penalty imposed by the ECB on a credit institution for infringement of Article 77(a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 - Rules for publication on the ECB’s website - Article 18(6) of Regulation No 1024/2013 and Article 132(1) of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014)

(2020/C 313/33)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: VQ (represented by: G. Cahill, Barrister)

Defendant: European Central Bank (represented by: E. Koupepidou, E. Yoo and M. Puidokas, acting as Agents)

Intervening parties in support of the defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: I. Gurov and J. Bauerschmidt, acting as Agents), European Commission (represented by: L. Armati, A. Steiblytė, K. P. Wojcik and A. Nijenhuis, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Decision ECB-SSM-2018-ESSAB-4, SNC 2016-0026 of the ECB, of 14 March 2018, adopted pursuant to Article 18(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63), to the extent that, first, it imposed on the applicant an administrative pecuniary penalty of EUR 1 600 000 and, second, it decided to publish that penalty, without anonymising the name of the applicant, on the ECB’s website.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders VQ to bear, in addition to its own costs, the costs incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB), including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures;

3.	Orders the Council of the European Union and the European Commission to bear their own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 182, 28.5.2018.

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Crédit agricole v ECB

(Case T-576/18) (1)

(Economic and monetary policy - Prudential supervision of credit institutions - Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 - Administrative pecuniary penalty imposed by the ECB on a credit institution - First subparagraph of Article 26(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 - Continued breach of capital requirements - Negligent breach - Retroactive application of less severe enforcement legislation - Absence - Rights of defence - Amount of the penalty - Obligation to state reasons)

(2020/C 313/34)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Crédit agricole SA (Montrouge, France) (represented by: A. Champsaur and A. Delors, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank (represented by: C. Hernández Saseta, A. Pizzolla and D. Segoin, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Decision ECB/SSM/2018-FRCAG-75 of the ECB of 16 July 2018, taken pursuant to Article 18(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63) and imposing on the applicant an administrative pecuniary penalty of EUR 4 300 000 for continued breach of the capital requirements laid down in Article 26(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1, and corrigenda OJ 2013 L 208, p. 68, and OJ 2013 L 321, p. 6).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls Decision ECB/SSM/2018-FRCAG-75 of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 16 July 2018 in so far as it imposes on Crédit Agricole SA an administrative pecuniary penalty of EUR 4 300 000;

2.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.	Orders Crédit Agricole to bear its own costs;

4.	Orders the ECB to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 436, 3.12.2018.

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank v ECB

(Case T-577/18) (1)

(Economic and monetary policy - Prudential supervision of credit institutions - Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 - Administrative pecuniary penalty imposed by the ECB on a credit institution - First subparagraph of Article 26(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 - Continued breach of capital requirements - Negligent breach - Rights of defence - Amount of the penalty - Obligation to state reasons)

(2020/C 313/35)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank (Montrouge, France) (represented by: A. Champsaur and A. Delors, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank (represented by: C. Hernández Saseta, A. Pizzolla and D. Segoin, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Decision ECB/SSM/2018-FRCAG-76 of the ECB of 16 July 2018, taken pursuant to Article 18(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63) and imposing on the applicant an administrative pecuniary penalty of EUR 300 000 for continued breach of the capital requirements laid down in Article 26(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1, and corrigenda OJ 2013 L 208, p. 68, and OJ 2013 L 321, p. 6).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls Decision ECB/SSM/2018-FRCAG-76 of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 16 July 2018 in so far as it imposes on Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank an administrative pecuniary penalty of EUR 300 000;

2.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.	Orders Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank to bear its own costs;

4.	Orders the ECB to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 436, 3.12.2018.

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Pablosky v EUIPO — docPrice (mediFLEX easystep)

(Case T-20/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU word mark mediFLEX easystep - Earlier EU figurative mark Stepeasy - Relative grounds for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 313/36)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Pablosky, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: M. Centell, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, H. O’Neill and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: docPrice GmbH (Koblenz, Germany) (represented by: K. Landes, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 November 2018 (Case R 77/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Pablosky and docPrice.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 November 2018 (Case R 77/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Pablosky, SL and docPrice GmbH, in so far as it concerns ‘clothing’ and ‘headgear’ in Class 25 of the Nice Agreement;

2.	Dismisses the appeal which docPrice brought before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO in so far as it concerns the goods referred to in point 1;

3.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

4.	Orders each party to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 82, 4.3.2019.

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Pablosky v EUIPO — docPrice (mediFLEX easySTEP)

(Case T-21/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark mediFLEX easySTEP - Earlier EU figurative mark Stepeasy - Relative grounds for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 313/37)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Pablosky, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: M. Centell, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, H. O’Neill and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: docPrice GmbH (Koblenz, Germany) (represented by: K. Landes, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 November 2018 (Case R 76/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Pablosky and docPrice.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 November 2018 (Case R 76/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Pablosky, SL and docPrice GmbH, in so far as it concerns ‘clothing’ and ‘headgear’ in Class 25 of the Nice Agreement;

2.	Dismisses the appeal which docPrice brought before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO in so far as it concerns the goods referred to in point 1;

3.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

4.	Orders each party to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 82, 4.3.2019.

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Scorify v EUIPO — Scor (SCORIFY)

(Case T-328/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark SCORIFY - Earlier EU word mark SCOR - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 313/38)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Scorify UAB (Vilnius, Lithuania) (represented by: V. Viešūnaitė, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Botis and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Scor SE (Paris, France) (represented by: T. de Haan and C. de Callataÿ, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 March 2019 (Case R 1639/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Scor and Scorisk.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Scorify UAB to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 246, 22.7.2019.

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Essential Export v EUIPO — Shenzhen Liouyi International Trading (TOTU)

(Case T-633/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for a figurative EU trade mark allegedly containing the word element ‘TOTU’ and coloured red and black - Earlier EU trade marks TOTTO - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 313/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Essential Export SA (San José, Costa Rica) (represented by: A.B. Padial Martínez, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Hanne, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Shenzhen Liouyi International Trading Co. Ltd (Shenzhen, China)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 July 2019 (Case R 362/2019-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Essential Export and Shenzhen Liouyi International Trading.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Essential Export SA to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 383, 11.11.2019.

Order of the General Court of 22 June 2020 — Sherpa Europe v EUIPO — Núcleo de comunicaciones y control (SHERPA NEXT)

(Case T-170/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Withdrawal of the opposition - No need to adjudicate)

(2020/C 313/40)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Sherpa Europe, SL (Erandio, Spain) (represented by: M. Esteve Sanz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. García Murillo and M. J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Núcleo de comunicaciones y control, SL (Tres Cantos, Spain)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 December 2018 (Case R 523/2017-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Núcleo de comunicaciones y control and Sherpa Europe.

Operative part of the order

1.	There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.	Sherpa Europe, SL, is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

3.	Núcleo de comunicaciones y control, SL, shall bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 155, 6.5.2019.

Order of the President of the General Court of 24 June 2020 — Price v Council

(Case T-231/20 R)

(Interim measures - Area of freedom, security and justice - Decision (EU) 2020/135 - Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and from Euratom - Loss of EU citizenship - Application for suspension of operation - Manifest inadmissibility of the main action - Inadmissibility - Referral to the Court of Justice - Not competent)

(2020/C 313/41)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: David Price (Dorat, France) (represented by: J. Fouchet, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer, R. Meyer and M.-M. Joséphidès, acting as Agents)

Re:

First, application based on Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking partial suspension of the operation of Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 of 30 January 2020 on the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 2020 L 29, p. 1), and of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 2020 L 29, p. 7), in so far as those acts do not permit the applicant to retain his EU citizenship, or, at the very least, partial suspension of the operation of Article 127(1)(b) of that agreement, and, second, application based on the second subparagraph of Article 256(3) TFEU seeking a stay of the proceedings and a referral to the Court of Justice in order to put questions to it for a preliminary ruling.

Operative part of the order

1.	The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.	The costs are reserved.

Action brought on 20 July 2020 — Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe v EUIPO –Wong (GT RACING)

(Case T-463/20)

(2020/C 313/42)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: S. Malynicz, QC and M. Maier, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Wai Leong Wong (Glasgow, United Kingdom)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark GT RACING — Application for registration No 17 138 033

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 May 2020 in Case R 1612/2019-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO and other party to bear their own costs and pay those of the applicant.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by failing to identify specifically the relevant public;

—	Infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by erring in the comparison of the signs;

—	Infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by erring in the comparison of the class 9, 16 and 28 goods of the earlier mark and the class 18 goods of the contested EUTM;

—	Infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by failing to take into account the evidence as to the likely perception of the earlier European Union Trade mark by the relevant public;

—	Failure to consider the other elements of the above mentioned Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(5) objections;

—	Failure to realise that its own finding of fact was sufficient to establish goodwill, misrepresentation an damage under the UK law of passing off;

—	Failure to consider the other criteria of passing off law under Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 20 July 2020 — LF v Commission

(Case T-466/20)

(2020/C 313/43)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: LF (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the decision of 11 September 2019 by which the applicant was refused entitlement to the expatriation allowance;

—	order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 4(1)(b) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

Action brought on 27 July 2020 — Alteryx v EUIPO — Allocate Software (ALLOCATE)

(Case T-476/20)

(2020/C 313/44)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Alteryx, Inc. (Irvine, California, United States) (represented by: A. Poulter and M. Holah, Solicitors)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Allocate Software Ltd (London, United Kingdom)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark ALLOCATE — European Union trade mark No 6 740 658

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 May 2020 in Case R 1709/2019-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	annul the Cancellation Division decision;

—	order the defendant to bear its own costs and to pay those of the applicant, including those relating to the procedure before the Board of Appeal;

—	in the event that the other party participates in the proceedings as intervener, order it to bear his own costs.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Article 58(1)(a) in connection with Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council insofar as the Board of Appeal failed to state the reasons on which the decision is based.

Action brought on 6 August 2020 — Eos Products v EUIPO (Shape of a spherical container)

(Case T-489/20)

(2020/C 313/45)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Eos Products Sàrl (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: S. Stolzenburg-Wiemer, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for tridimensional EU mark (Shape of a spherical container) — Application for registration No 15 903 081

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 June 2020 in Case R 2017/2020-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Article 95 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 23 July 2020 — El Corte Inglés v EUIPO — Ou (-Vpro)

(Case T-491/20)

(2020/C 313/46)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: El Corte Inglés, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J.L. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Kuei-Chin Ou (Taipei, Taiwan)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for the EU figurative mark –Vpro — Application for registration No 17 741 133

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 30 April 2020 in Case R 1758/2019-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

—	annul the contested decision, in so far as, by dismissing the appeal brought by the opponent, it upholds the decision of the Opposition Division in opposition proceedings B 3 055 001, granting EU trade mark No 17 741 133 -Vpro (figurative), to distinguish goods in Classes 24 and 25;

—	order any party or parties opposing this action to pay the costs.

Plea in law

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 24 July 2020 — S. Tous v EUIPO — Zhejiang China-Best Import & Export (Lamp)

(Case T-492/20)

(2020/C 313/47)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: S. Tous, SL (Manresa, Spain) (represented by: D. Gómez Sánchez and J.L. Gracia Albero, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Zhejiang China-Best Import & Export Co. Ltd (Hangzhou, China)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the design at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Design at issue: Community design (Luminaires) — Community design No 4422343-0012

Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 May 2020 in Case R 1553/2019-3

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order the proprietor of the contested design to pay the costs of the present proceedings, including those incurred in respect of the proceedings before the Invalidity Division and the Third Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law

Infringement of Article 25(1)(b) and (c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 (in conjunction with Article 6, Article 7 and Article 9(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council).

Action brought on 10 August 2020 — Banco Cooperativo Español v SRB

(Case T-499/20)

(2020/C 313/48)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Banco Cooperativo Español, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: D. Sarmiento Ramírez-Escudero, J. Beltrán de Lubiano Sáez de Urabain and P. Biscari García, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

(i)	declare Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 to be inapplicable;

(ii)	annul the contested decision for infringement of the second subparagraph of Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59 and Article 70 of Regulation 806/2014, interpreted in the light of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of proportionality;

(iii)

in any event, declare that the contested decision cannot have retroactive effect from the date of adoption of the 2016 decision and, consequently, annul Article 3 of the contested decision in so far as it has retroactive effect;

(iv)

in any event, order the SRB to indemnify Banco Cooperativo Español, SA (BCE) in respect of: a. the amount corresponding to the default interest in respect of the amount paid in 2016 for the period between 23 June 2016 and the date on which the SRB paid the amounts owed, calculated on the basis of the applicable European Central Bank refinancing rate (at present 0 %), increased by 3,5 percentage points; b. in the alternative to (a) above, and only in the event that the Court considers that the contested decision is lawful but that it does not have retroactive effect, the amount corresponding to the default interest on the amount paid in 2016 for the period between 23 June 2016 to 19 March 2020, the date from which the contested decision took effect, with the interest calculated on the basis of the applicable European Central Bank refinancing rate (at present 0 %), increased by 3,5 percentage points; c. in the alternative to (a) or (b) above, the amount corresponding to the profit that BCE would have obtained from acquiring, in the tender of 16 June 2016, 10-year Spanish sovereign bonds in the amount corresponding to the contribution ex ante for 2016, calculated from 23 June 2016 up to the date on which the SRB paid the amounts owed (or, in the event that the Court holds that the contested decision is lawful but does not have retroactive effect, to 19 March 2020).

(v)	in any event, order the SRB to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

This action is brought against the decision of the Single Resolution Board (‘SRB’) of 19 March 2020 concerning the calculation of the ex ante contributions for 2016 to the Single Resolution Fund (SRB/ES/2020/16) (‘the contested decision’). The applicant states that the SRB claimed that the contested decision had retroactive effect from 15 April 2016, the date on which the first decision was adopted on the ex ante contributions for the financial year 2016.

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

1.

The first plea in law is based on a plea of illegality, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, and is seeking that the General Court declare Article 5(1) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 44) to be inapplicable. — It is claimed in that regard that Article 5(1) of the Delegated Regulation: a) infringes Article 103(7) of Directive 2014/59, in that it establishes a calculation system that imposes on an institution with a conservative risk profile an ex ante contribution of an institution with a very high risk profile; b) infringes Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in that it unjustifiably restricts the applicant’s fundamental right of freedom to conduct a business; c) infringes the principle of proportionality, in failing to take into consideration the double counting of some of the applicant’s liabilities, thereby generating an unnecessary and disproportionate restriction which is manifestly unjustifiable.

2.

The second plea in law alleges infringement of the second subparagraph of Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59 and Article 70 of Regulation 806/2014, interpreted in the light of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of proportionality. — It is claimed, in that regard, that the reasons justifying the non-application of Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 clearly show that it is necessary to adjust the applicant’s risk profile to the operative singularity of the cooperative network it leads, as the abovementioned provisions require. Consequently, and to that extent, the contested decision, the content of which corresponds to a strict and literal application of a rule that takes no account of the applicant’s risk profile, must be regarded as being contrary to the second subparagraph of Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59 and, in particular, Regulation No 806/2014, Article 70 of which, relating to ex ante contributions, refers to the provisions of Directive 2014/59 and to its implementing legislation.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging a misapplication of the case-law of the Court of Justice which allows a decision to be given retroactive effect. – It is claimed, in that regard, that the contested decision disregards the case-law in that: a) the objectives alleged by the SRB in order to justify the retroactive application of the contested decision are not public interest objectives capable of justifying a departure from the general principle that acts of the European Union should not be applied retroactively; b) in any event, retroactive application is neither essential nor necessary to achieve those objectives, given that there are less onerous alternatives for the parties to ensure that those objectives are achieved, and c) the legitimate expectations of the applicant were infringed, since the action taken by the SRB was contrary to the intended aims of the General Court in Case T-323/16.

4.

Fourth plea in law, based on the SRB’s non-contractual liability pursuant to Articles 268 and 340 TFEU and Article 87(3) of Regulation 806/2014 on the ground of unjust enrichment. — It is claimed, in that regard, that the SRB must compensate the BCE in respect of non-contractual liability for unjust enrichment in respect of the interest accrued from the time of payment of the 2016 ex ante contribution — a payment which was not in line with a decision of the SRB which was compatible with the annulment of the decision of 2016 in Case T-323/16– and the time of final payment or, in the alternative, the date of the contested decision.

Order of the General Court of 25 June 2020 — Einkaufsbüro Deutscher Eisenhändler v EUIPO — Tigges (TOOLINEO)

(Case T-877/19) (1)

(2020/C 313/49)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Ninth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 61, 24.2.2020.