1.

Must Article 2(b) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 4 of Directive 93/13 and its following recitals:

2.

If the answer to the first question is that consumer protection under Directive 93/13 is not available to every consumer, but only to an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, can a consumer who did not read a contract for a mortgage loan indexed to a foreign currency amounting to PLN 150 000, concluded for 30 years, before its conclusion, be considered an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? Can such a consumer be granted protection under Directive 93/13?

3.

If the answer to the first question is that consumer protection under Directive 93/13 is not available to every consumer, but only to an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, can a consumer who, although he did read a draft contract for a mortgage loan indexed to a foreign currency amounting to PLN 150 000, concluded for 30 years, he did not fully understand it, and yet did not try to understand its meaning before its conclusion, and in particular did not ask the other party to the contract (the bank) to explain its meaning and the meaning of its individual provisions, be considered an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect? Can such a consumer be granted protection under Directive 93/13?

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set aside the order of 25 March 2020 of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-129/19, Necci v Commission;

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refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for it to be adjudged afresh;

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reserve the costs.

1.

In the light of Articles 3(1), 4(1) and 5 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) and its recitals, pursuant to which contracts must be drafted in plain and intelligible language and doubts must be interpreted in the consumer’s favour, must a contractual term setting out the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency in a loan agreement indexed to a foreign currency be worded unequivocally, that is to say, in a manner that enables the borrower/consumer to determine that rate himself on any given day, or, in the light of the type of contract as referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13, the long-term nature (spanning several decades) of the contract and the fact that the amount in foreign currency is subject to constant changes (may change at any time), is it possible to formulate a more general wording of the contractual term, that is to say, one that refers to the market value of the foreign currency, in a manner which prevents a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer within the meaning of Article 3(1) of that directive?

2.

If the answer to the first [question] is in the affirmative, in the light of Article 5 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts and its recitals, it is possible to interpret a contractual term concerning the determination by the creditor (bank) of the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency in such a manner as to resolve doubts in the consumer’s favour and to assume that the contract determines the buying and selling rates of a foreign currency not in an arbitrary manner, but on free-market terms, especially if both parties had the same understanding of the contractual terms determining the buying and selling rates of the foreign currency or if the borrower/consumer was not interested in the disputed contractual term at the time of conclusion of the contract and during its performance, and was also not familiar with the content of the contract at the time of its conclusion and throughout its duration?

1.

Is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, (1) in conjunction with point 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to provide the information indicated therein also covers the assured person if he is not at the same time the policyholder and he acts as a person acceding, as a consumer, to a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract, concluded between the assurance undertaking and the undertaking which is the policyholder, and as the actual investor in respect of the monies paid by way of the assurance premium?

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a legal relationship such as that set out in the first question, the obligation to provide information on the characteristics of the capital assets that are associated with the unit-linked fund also means that the consumer, the assured person, must be informed in a comprehensive and comprehensible manner of all the risks, and their kind and scale, associated with investment in a unit-linked asset (such as structured bonds or derivatives), or is it, for the purposes of the provision cited, sufficient to provide him with just basic information on the principal kinds of risk associated with investing monies by means of a unit-linked fund?

3.

Is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a legal relationship such as that described in the first and second questions, a consumer acceding to a life assurance contract as an assured person must be informed about all investment risks and associated terms and conditions about which the issuer of the assets (structured bonds or derivatives) making up the unit-linked fund informed the assurer?

4.

If the preceding questions are answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life assurance to be interpreted as meaning that a consumer acceding to a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract as an assured person must receive information on the characteristics of the capital assets and the risks associated with investing in those assets before conclusion of the contract, in a separate pre-contractual procedure, and does it therefore preclude a provision of national law [such as] Article 13(4) of the Ustawa o działalności ubezpieczeniowej z dn. 22 maja 2003 r. (Law on insurance business of 22 May 2003) (Dz.U. No 124, item 11510; consolidated text of 16 December 2009, Dz.U. 2010 No 11, item 66), under which it is sufficient for that information to be disclosed for the first time in the assurance contract and during the conclusion thereof, and the time at which the information is received is not unambiguously and clearly kept separate and distinct in the procedure for acceding to the contract?

5.

If the first three questions are answered in the affirmative, is Article 36(1) of Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life assurance, in conjunction with points 11 and 12 of Annex III(A) thereto, also to be interpreted as meaning that proper implementation of the obligation laid down therein to provide information must be regarded as an essential element of a unit-linked group endowment and life assurance contract and, consequently, may a finding that that obligation was not performed correctly have the effect of conferring on the assured consumer the right to claim repayment of all the assurance premiums paid on the ground of a possible declaration that the contract is invalid or is ineffective ab initio or that the individual declaration of accession to that contract is invalid or ineffective?

1.

In the context of criminal proceedings that are being conducted in order to protect a monopoly system, must the national court or tribunal examine the applicable criminal penalty rule in the light of the freedom to provide services if it has previously examined the monopoly system in accordance with the guidance provided by the Court of Justice and that examination has revealed that the monopoly system is justified?

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

3.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

1.

Is Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a framework for future development consent of projects listed in Annexes I and II to Directive 2011/92/EU (2) (‘the EIA Directive’) is set where a regulation on nature conservation and landscape management provides for general prohibitions (with possible exemptions) and compulsory permits which do not specifically relate to projects listed in the annexes to the EIA Directive?

2.

Is Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42 to be interpreted as meaning that plans and programmes were prepared for agriculture, forestry, land use, etc. if their objective was to establish a reference framework for one or more of those areas? Or does it suffice if, for the purpose of nature conservation and landscape management, general prohibitions and permit requirements are regulated which have to be assessed in the permit procedure for a variety of projects and uses and which may indirectly impact (‘by default’) one or more of those areas?

3.

Is Article 3(4) of Directive 2001/42 to be interpreted as meaning that a framework for future development consent of projects is set if a regulation adopted for the purpose of nature conservation and landscape management lays down prohibitions and permit requirements for a variety of projects and measures in the protected area which are described in abstract terms, where there are no actual foreseeable or envisaged projects when it is adopted and therefore it does not specifically relate to actual projects?

1.

On a correct interpretation of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, may the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors (under which the distributor who was first to register a potential transaction with the producer enjoys priority in progressing the sale process with the end user concerned for 6 months from that registration, unless the user objects) be regarded as an agreement between undertakings which has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) [TFEU]?

2.

Does the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, contain indications from which it can be found not to be exempt from the general prohibition on collusion?

3.

May the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, be found to constitute an exception? Does the exception permitting the conclusion of vertical agreements which restrict active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group that the supplier has reserved exclusively for itself or has allocated exclusively to another buyer, where such a restriction does not limit sales by the customers of the buyer and where the market share of the supplier (the applicant) does not exceed 30 %, apply only to exclusive distribution systems?

4.

May the agreement to which this case relates, between a producer and a number of distributors, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, constitute a prohibited agreement on the basis solely of the unlawful conduct of a single economic operator? Is it possible to find evidence in the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, that a single economic operator participated in a prohibited agreement?

5.

In the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is it possible to find evidence that competition was reduced (distorted) within the distribution system, that there was an advantage benefiting the applicant or that competition was adversely affected?

6.

In the circumstances of this case, interpreted in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, if the market share of the distribution network does not exceed 30 % (the applicant is a producer, and its market share therefore also includes the sales volumes of its distributors), is it possible to find evidence of negative effects on competition in the distribution system and elsewhere, and is that agreement subject to the prohibition on collusion?

7.

In accordance with Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2 in conjunction with Article 4(b) of Commission Regulation No 330/2010 (1) of 20 April 2010:

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on the principle of protection of human health and the environment (Article 13);

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on the principle of self-sufficiency and proximity laid down in Article 16(1), according to which ‘Member States shall take appropriate measures, in cooperation with other Member States where this is necessary or advisable, to establish an integrated and adequate network of waste disposal installations and of installations for the recovery of mixed municipal waste collected from private households, including where such collection also covers such waste from other producers, taking into account best available techniques’;

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on the principle, also laid down in the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 16(1), according to which ‘Member States may also limit outgoing shipments of waste on environmental grounds as set out in Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006’; (2)

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on recital 33 of Directive 2008/98/EC, according to which, ‘for the purposes of applying Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 … on shipments of waste, mixed municipal waste as referred to in Article 3(5) of that regulation remains mixed municipal waste even when it has been subject to a waste treatment operation that has not substantially altered its properties’:

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pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision No SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

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pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

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order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment in that the methods of calculation of ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) laid down in the SRM Regulation and the Delegated Regulation do not reflect the actual size or the actual risk of the institutions.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality in that the mechanism of ex ante contributions to the SRF laid down in the SRM Regulation and the Delegated Regulation is based on an assessment that artificially exacerbates the risk profile of large French institutions, such as the applicants, and therefore leads to disproportionately high contributions in the light of the actual risk posed by those institutions.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty since the calculation of the amount of the ex ante contributions fixed by the SRM Regulation, the Delegated Regulation and the Implementing Regulation, first, cannot be predicted with sufficient clarity and, second, does not depend so much on the inherent situation and risk profile of the institution but rather on its relative situation compared to the other contributing institutions. Finally, the applicants consider that the Commission should not have had responsibility for determining risk indicators in the context of the Delegated Regulation since those criteria have an extremely fundamental and decisive function in determining the amounts of the contributions (Article 290 TFEU).

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of good administration in that the SRB does not apply, for the calculation of the risk-adjusted variable, all the risk criteria laid down in the Delegated Regulation. In addition, the applicants take the view that the contested decision does not put forward sufficiently clear and precise information to allow them to recalculate the amount of the contribution owed, which also entails infringement of Article 296 TFEU.

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pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

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pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicant;

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicants;

—

pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

—

pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, annul decision SRB/ES/2020/24 on the calculation of the 2020 ex-ante contributions to the SRF in so far as it concerns the applicant;

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pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, declare the following provisions of the SRM Regulation, the Implementing Regulation and the Delegated Regulation inapplicable:

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order the defendant to pay the costs.

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annul the contested decision;

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order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred in these proceedings.

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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partially annul the contested decision in so far as it upheld the opposition for goods and services in classes 29, 30, 35 and 43 and reject the existence of likelihood of confusion within the meaning of article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council for all the contested goods and services;

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order EUIPO and if the case might be, the other party in proceedings before the EUIPO, to pay the costs of the current appeal.

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Infringement of Article 47(2) and (3) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Rule 22(3) and (4) of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EC) 2868/95;

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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annul the defendant’s decision of 2 July 2020 to transfer the applicant to the European Parliament’s liaison office in Luxembourg with effect from 1 September 2020;

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order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law: failure to state reasons

2.

Second plea in law: failure to comply with the procedure under the terms of the decision

3.

Third plea in law: breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials. The transfer to another place of employment was contrary to the employer’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, since it was incompatible with several fundamental rights laid down in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In particular, the following rights have been infringed:

4.

Fourth plea in law: Disproportionate character of the transfer to another place of employment

5.

Fifth plea in law: Improper use of discretion

6.

Sixth plea in law: Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

7.

Seventh plea in law: Forfeiture

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annul the contested decision;

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order EUIPO and the opposing party to pay the costs, including those of the proceedings before the Opposition Division and those of the appeal before the Board of Appeal.

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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declare the application admissible;

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annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/611 of 30 April 2020 re-imposing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of certain iron or steel fasteners consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not (1); and

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order the European Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that by retroactively ‘repairing’ a violation of an essential procedural requirement, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Articles 266 and 264 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the principle of effective judicial protection.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that because it has no valid legal basis, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (2), Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (‘TEU’) and the principle of good administration.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that by prohibiting repayment and ordering collection of repaid anti-dumping duties, Regulation (EU) 2020/611 violates Articles 5(1) and 5(2) TEU.

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annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/776 of 12 June 2020 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China and Egypt (1) and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt, in as far as it relates to the applicants;

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order the Commission and any intervener who may be allowed to support the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s methodology for calculating the applicants’ subsidy margin violates Articles 1(1), 5(1), 6, 12(1)(c) and 24(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union. (2)

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail financial contributions granted by Chinese public bodies violates Articles 2(a), 2(b), 3(1)(a), 4(2) and 4(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision regarding the provisions of land to Jushi violates the applicants’ rights of defence and Article 30 as well as Articles 3(2), 5 and 6(d) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail the import tariff rebate scheme for imported materials for Jushi violates Articles 3(1)(a)(ii), 3(2) and 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s decision to countervail the tax treatment of foreign exchange losses violates Articles 3(2) and 4(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

6.

Sixth plea in law alleging that the Commission’s methodology for the determination of the undercutting margin with regard to the applicants violates Articles 1(1), 2(d), 8(1), 8(2) and 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037.

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annul the contested decision;

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order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings.

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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Annul Commission Directive (EU) 2020/739 of 3 June 2020 amending Annex III to Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the inclusion of SARS-CoV-2 in the list of biological agents known to infect humans and amending Commission Directive (EU) 2019/1833, published in the Official Journal of the European Union of 4 June 2020 (OJ 2020 L 175, p. 11).

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 2 and 18 of Directive 2000/54/EC and Annex III thereto.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements on account of the failure to state reasons for the classification of the biological agent SARS-CoV-2 in group 3.

1.

First plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union, of 19 December 2019, in the preliminary ruling proceedings C-502/19, Junqueras Vies, in so far as that judgment allowed Mr Junqueras to take his seat as an MEP from 13 June 2019, as, in accordance with that judgment, that was not contrary to Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the need, in the case in point, for a non-formalistic interpretation of Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976, in so far as, given the Parliament’s failure to take action to protect Mr Junqueras’s immunity, he was materially and physically prevented, against his will, from resigning as a deputy in the Congress of Deputies and taking up his duties as a Member of the European Parliament.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the need, in the case in point, for a specific and non-formalistic interpretation of Article 7.2 of the European Electoral Act of 1976, in so far as it was not materially incompatible with that act for Mr Junqueras, who was suspended from his position as a deputy in the Congress of Deputies at the relevant time and whose remuneration and other entitlements related to that office were also suspended and who was, in addition, maintained in that role against his will by being prevented physically and materially and against his will from resigning, to resign from that position in order to take up his position as a Member of the European Parliament.