—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 5(3) thereof, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 May 2009 on the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the development of the institutional balance of the European Union (1),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 19 May 2015 entitled ‘Better regulation for better results — An EU agenda’ (COM(2015)0215),

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2), and in particular Article 41 thereof,

—

having regard to the Pact of Amsterdam establishing the Urban Agenda for the EU, agreed by the EU Ministers Responsible for Urban Matters on 30 May 2016,

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 September 2015 on the urban dimension of EU policies (3),

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having regard to the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds (4),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2014 entitled ‘The urban dimension of EU policies — key features of an EU urban agenda’ (COM(2014)0490),

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having regard to the Declaration towards the EU Urban Agenda, agreed on by the Ministers responsible for Territorial Cohesion and Urban Matters on 10 June 2015,

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having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (5),

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having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union (6),

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 June 2016 on an Urban Agenda for the EU,

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having regard to the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities, agreed at the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24 and 25 May 2007,

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having regard to the New Urban Agenda adopted at the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) in Quito, Ecuador, on 20 October 2016,

—

having regard to the Commission’s State of European Cities Report 2016,

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having regard to its resolution of 12 December 2017 on the EU Citizenship Report 2017: Strengthening Citizens’ Rights in a Union of Democratic Change (7);

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Regional Development (A8-0203/2018),

A.

whereas the Maastricht Treaty instituted the European Committee of the Regions, thus involving cities — through their representation on the committee — in its consultative role in the EU decision-making process;

B.

whereas the Committee of Regions fulfils this role by carrying out a series of activities aimed at promoting dialogue and active participation in the EU’s decision-making process;

C.

whereas Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality gives the European Committee of the Regions the power to bring action, via the Court of Justice of the European Union, against legislative acts if the principle of subsidiarity or proportionality is not respected in the case of acts for the adoption of which the treaty provides that the Committee be consulted; whereas cities thus have a tool that can be used to defend their interests in the European Union;

D.

whereas a clear distinction should be made between cities' representatives enshrined in the treaties, such as members of the Committee of the Regions, and associations representing cities' interests;

E.

whereas the majority of the EU population (more than 70 %) live in urban areas;

F.

whereas the process of de-linking power from territory, which is inherent in globalisation, does not dispense with the need for networks of European cities, in which the interests of the citizens of the Union are created and pursued;

G.

whereas most EU policies and legislation are implemented at local and regional level, including at the level of cities, and today extend to almost all political, economic and social domains;

H.

whereas the institutional architecture of the EU is based on the principle of multi-level governance and subsidiarity;

I.

whereas the Charter for Multilevel Governance in Europe, adopted by the Committee of the Regions, points to the close correlation between loyal cooperation in partnership between the European Union, Member States and regional and local authorities and to the equal legitimacy and accountability of each level within their respective competences;

J.

whereas the Committee of Regions created the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network to facilitate the exchange of information, between local and regional authorities in the European Union and the EU institutions, on Commission documents and legislative proposals that have a direct impact on regional and local authorities;

K.

whereas in its aforementioned resolution of 12 December 2017, it called on the Commission, with the aim of strengthening Union citizenship and the exercise of that citizenship, to encourage local authorities to designate councillors responsible for European affairs, since this is the level that is closest to the citizens;

L.

whereas the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities employs the term ‘European cities’;

M.

whereas the Covenant of Mayors has helped to develop integrated climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, improve energy efficiency and make greater use of renewable energy; whereas such initiatives demonstrate how cooperation among cities and exchange of best practices can help deliver the EU's policy goals;

N.

whereas, according to the Leipzig Charter, European cities are considered ‘valuable and irreplaceable economic, social and cultural assets’ and should assume responsibility for territorial cohesion, while one of the core conclusions of the Commission’s 2016 Cities Report is that cities are central to reaching key EU economic, social and environmental goals; whereas cities should, therefore, be accorded a key role in cohesion policy;

O.

whereas the Leipzig Charter acknowledges the obligation of the Member States’ responsible ministers to promote balanced territorial organisation based on a European polycentric urban structure and states that cities should be the main centres for the development of urban regions and assume responsibility for territorial cohesion;

P.

whereas the Urban Agenda for the EU (‘Pact of Amsterdam’), while affirming its full adherence to the principle of subsidiarity and competences under the EU Treaties, creates a platform of cooperation between Member States, regions, cities, the Commission, Parliament, the Union’s advisory bodies, and other stakeholders in the context of partnerships, with a view to making an informal contribution to the design and revision of both future and existing EU legislation;

Q.

whereas the scope of the Urban Agenda includes in particular a pillar on Better Regulation, aimed at focusing on a more effective and coherent implementation of EU policies, legislation and legal instruments, while not aiming at initiating new legislation;

R.

whereas the Commission invites, as part of the Better Regulation Package local authorities, on an ad-hoc basis, to participate in territorial impact assessments of future legislative proposals;

S.

Whereas, in its conclusions of 24 June 2016, the Council welcomed the Pact of Amsterdam and invited the Commission, Member States, local and regional authorities, the European Parliament, among others, to take further action in this context, inviting the Parliament to consider the results and recommendations of the partnerships after guidance by the Directors General responsible for Urban Matters, in the context of the agendas of the relevant Committees when discussing relevant new and existing EU legislation;

T.

whereas the same Urban Agenda tasks the Commission, among others, with considering the results and recommendations of the partnerships when drafting or reviewing relevant EU legislation, instruments and initiatives, and with working with urban authorities and their representative organisations through the various existing opportunities for consultation and feedback offered in the development of new policy and legislative initiatives and the evaluation of existing EU strategies, policies and legislation;

U.

whereas new global challenges posed by security and immigration, demographic shift, youth unemployment, challenges relating to the quality of public services, access to clean and affordable energy, natural disasters and environmental protection demand local responses and, therefore, a stronger commitment on the part of cities when designing and implementing EU policies;

V.

whereas the value of European cities also derives from the fact that they are home to a substantial part of Europe’s common cultural heritage;

W.

whereas cities represent the level of politics best understood by the public and therefore hold great potential as places for citizens to engage in constructive discussions, for which the Committee of the Regions' experience in organising the Citizens Dialogues, in conjunction with local and regional partners, provides promising prospects;

X.

whereas, in the light of the political requirements deriving from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and from the Paris Agreement on climate change, cities have enhanced their ability to develop innovative policy solutions and instruments in the interests of social, ecological and economic sustainability and fair trading systems, and to link up within the EU, and internationally, going beyond existing formats, in order to put them into practice;

Y.

whereas the declaration ‘Towards the EU Urban Agenda’, agreed on by the EU Ministers Responsible for Territorial Cohesion and Urban Matters in June 2015, recognises the important role of the Committee of the Regions, EUROCITIES and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) in voicing the interests of urban areas;

Z.

whereas cities can offer an opportunity to fulfil the potential of European citizenship and to reinforce it through the promotion of active citizenship, stemming from the recognition that cities can implement intermediation structures between the EU and its citizens with greater efficiency;

AA.

whereas participation in EU policies by cities contributes to increased local ownership of EU processes, better governance through more participative European democracy, improved administrative capacity and a better quality of public services at the scale of the whole EU, thereby contributing to the implementation of the right to good administration as enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

AB.

whereas it is important to involve local and regional authorities at the earliest stage possible in the policy-making cycle and to enhance them as an integral part in territorial impact assessments;

AC.

whereas the current forms of cities’ participation remain unsatisfactory from the perspective of the desired impact on the design and implementation of EU policies and legislation; whereas, moreover, this impact would be magnified if the cities joined together in networks founded on shared historical, geographical, demographic, economic, social and cultural affinities;

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having regard to Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (1),

—

having regard to Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (2),

—

having regard to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee entitled ‘Living tomorrow. 3D printing — a tool to empower the European economy’ (3),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 29 November 2017 entitled ‘A balanced IP enforcement system responding to today’s societal challenges’ (COM(2017)0707),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 29 November 2017 entitled ‘Guidance on certain aspects of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the enforcement of intellectual property rights’ (COM(2017)0708),

—

having regard to the Commission reflection paper of 10 May 2017 on harnessing globalisation (COM(2017)0240),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A8-0223/2018),

A.

whereas three-dimensional (3D) printing became accessible to the general public when 3D printers for individuals were placed on the market and when companies arrived on the market offering both digital models and 3D printing services;

B.

whereas 3D printing is viewed as one of the most prominent technologies, with regard to which Europe can play a leading role; whereas the Commission recognised the benefits of 3D printing by sponsoring 21 projects based on the technology by Horizon 2020 between 2014-2016;

C.

whereas, on an experimental level, 3D printing dates back to the 1960s, and whereas, initially developed in the United States, 3D-printing technology started to break through into industry in the early 1980s;

D.

whereas the market for 3D printers constitutes a sector which is experiencing rapid growth and whereas this is expected to continue in the coming years;

E.

whereas, however, the development of community spaces for 3D printing (more usually known as ‘fablabs’) and services for printing at a distance, sometimes linked to an on-line 3D file exchange, enables everyone to have 3D objects printed, which is a boon for inventors and project organisers;

F.

whereas 3D printing has an enormous potential to transform supply chains in manufacturing which could help Europe increase output levels; whereas the application of this technology offers new opportunities for business development and innovation;

G.

whereas the EU has made 3D printing one of the priority areas of technology; whereas the Commission referred to it, in its recent reflection paper on harnessing globalisation, as one of the main factors in bringing about industrial transformation;

H.

whereas the Commission has identified 3D printing as a priority area for action offering significant economic potential, notably for small innovative enterprises; whereas many countries have already recognised the transformative potential of 3D printing and have begun to adopt, albeit in an unequal manner, various strategies to create an economic and technological ecosystem to promote its development;

I.

whereas the majority of the 3D-printed products being created are currently prototypes; whereas some industries have been using final parts for a number of years already and the final parts market continues to grow at a relatively fast rate; whereas a growing proportion of the 3D-printed products being created are now more ready-to-be-used or -commercialised items than mere prototypes;

J.

whereas the potential advantages of 3D printing for innovative enterprises are numerous; whereas, in particular, 3D printing allows a reduction in overall costs when developing, designing and testing new products or improving existing ones;

K.

whereas the use of 3D printing is becoming more and more widespread in society, notably in the field of education, in citizens’ and start-up fora, such as ‘maker spaces’, as well as in the private sphere;

L.

whereas 3D printing is becoming simpler and more accessible to all; whereas it is to be expected that the limitations as regards materials that can be used, speed, and the consumption of raw materials and energy will be significantly reduced in a short period of time;

M.

whereas most of today’s high-tech industries use this technology, whereas opportunities to use 3D printing have highly increased in many areas, and whereas expectations are high in many areas, for example the medical (ranging from regenerative medicine to the manufacture of prosthetics), aeronautics, aerospace, automotive, household electrical appliance, building, archaeological research, architecture, mechanical engineering, leisure and design sectors;

N.

whereas the lack of regulation has limited the use of 3D printing in key industrial sectors such as, for instance, the aerospace and medical/dental sectors, and whereas regulating the use of 3D printers will help increase the use of technologies and offer opportunities for research and development;

O.

whereas the above-mentioned opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee states that, with the digital revolution as an enabler and ‘using the right advanced manufacturing technology, Europe could re-shore production from lower wage regions to spur on innovation and create sustainable growth at home’;

P.

whereas 3D printing would lower both transport costs and CO2 emissions;

Q.

whereas 3D-printing technology is expected to create more new jobs for skilled labour that are in some cases less physically demanding and less dangerous (maintenance technicians, engineers, designers, etc.), and whereas with the creation of new technician positions (e.g. operators for 3D printers) new liabilities will emerge and the 3D-printing industry will need to provide appropriate training courses in order for the technicians to be at the same level as their counterparts in traditional manufacturing; whereas 3D-printing technology will also reduce production and storage costs (low-volume manufacturing, personalised manufacturing, etc.); whereas, however, the decrease in manufacturing jobs will greatly affect the economy of countries that rely on a large number of low-skill jobs;

R.

whereas the economic impact of developing the 3D industry in the Member States cannot yet be accurately ascertained;

S.

whereas 3D-printing might enable consumers to hit back at in-built obsolescence, as they will be able to make replacement parts for household appliances, whose lifespan is becoming increasingly shorter;

T.

whereas 3D-printing technology may raise some specific legal and ethical concerns regarding all areas of intellectual property law, such as copyright, patents, designs, three-dimensional trademarks and even geographical indications, and civil liability, and whereas, moreover, those concerns fall within the remit of Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs;

U.

whereas new technologies are able to scan objects or people and generate digital files which can subsequently be printed in 3D, and whereas this can affect image rights and the right to privacy;

V.

whereas 3D-printing technology may also raise security and especially cyber-security concerns, particularly with regard to the manufacturing of weapons, explosives and drugs and any other hazardous objects, and whereas particular care should be taken with regard to production of that kind;

W.

whereas, from a copyright point of view, useful distinctions should be made: for instance, between home printing for private use and printing for commercial use, and between B2B services and B2C services;

X.

whereas a report drawn up by France’s Higher Council for Literary and Artistic Property on 3D printing and copyright found that ‘the democratisation of 3D printing does not appear, to date, to be causing a huge problem with copyright infringement; whereas it acknowledges that “the main risk of counterfeiting is with works of art”;

Y.

whereas the few examples which may be envisaged now will probably become more complex as the technology evolves; whereas they raise the question as to what needs to be done to tackle the potential for counterfeiting using 3D printing technologies;

Z.

whereas, as a result of the processes that it uses, 3D printing leads to what the industry has described as a kind of “fragmentation of the act of creating” in that a work may be circulated digitally before it takes a physical form, which makes it easier to copy and complicates the fight against counterfeiting;

AA.

whereas, in conclusion, legal experts are of the view that 3D printing has not fundamentally altered intellectual property rights, but files created may be considered a work and whereas, if that is the case, the work must be protected as such; whereas, in the short and medium term, and with a view to tackling counterfeiting, the main challenge will be to involve professional copyright intermediaries more closely;

AB.

whereas, although the development of 3D printing makes industrial production possible, consideration should be given to the need to establish means of collective redress in order to provide compensation to consumers for damage;

AC.

whereas the impact of 3D printing on consumers’ rights and on consumer law in general should be carefully examined in light of the directive currently under negotiation on certain aspects of contracts for the supply of digital content;

AD.

whereas Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for defective products covers all contracts; whereas it should be noted that it is progress in 3D printing among other things that has led the Commission to undertake a public consultation with the aim of assessing whether this directive is fit for purpose in relation to new technological developments;

AE.

whereas general liability rules also cover the liability of intermediary service providers as defined in Articles 12 to 14 of the e-Commerce Directive; whereas a specific liability regime should be envisaged for damage caused by an object created using 3D-printing technology, as the number of stakeholders involved and the complex process used to create the finished product often make it difficult for the victim to identify the person responsible; whereas the liability could lie with the creator or vendor of the 3D file, or the producer of the 3D printer, the producer of the software used in the 3D printer, the supplier of the materials used or even the person who created the object, depending on the cause of the defect discovered;

AF.

whereas for the specific use of 3D printing in a commercial setting, the liability rules are generally established in contracts between the stakeholders;

AG.

whereas all elements of additive manufacturing technology must meet certain criteria and be certified to guarantee that it is possible to manufacture reproducible quality parts; whereas certification is rendered complex owing to the numerous transformations of machinery, materials and processes, and to the absence of a database; whereas it will therefore be necessary to develop rules allowing a speedier and more cost-effective certification of all materials, processes and products;

AH.

whereas 3D printing has a role to play in reducing the consumption of energy and natural resources for the purpose of combating climate change; whereas the use of 3D printing would minimise waste in the production process and prolong the lifespan of consumer products by enabling the production of replacement parts at consumer level;

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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other United Nations (UN) human rights treaties and instruments, in particular the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December 2007,

—

having regard to International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, as adopted on 27 June 1989,

—

having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

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having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

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having regard to Articles 21, 22 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

—

having regard to the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy as adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 25 June 2012, and to the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019 adopted by the Council on 20 July 2015,

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having regard to the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders of 1998,

—

having regard to the European Union’s Human Rights Guidelines, in particular the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, and to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),

—

having regard to its resolutions on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law,

—

having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2016 on the situation of the Guarani-Kaiowá in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul (1),

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 April 2016 on Honduras: situation of human rights defenders (2),

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2015 on Tanzania, notably the issue of land grabbing (3),

—

having regard to the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2016 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (4),

—

having regard to UN General Assembly resolution 69/2 of 22 September 2014 adopting the outcome document of the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples 2014 (5),

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having regard to UN General Assembly resolution 71/178 of 19 December 2016 on rights of indigenous peoples, in particular paragraph 13 thereof proclaiming 2019 as the International Year of Indigenous Languages (6),

—

having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples to the UN Human Rights Council of 8 August 2017 (7),

—

having regard to UN Human Rights Council resolution 26/9 of 26 June 2014 establishing an open-ended intergovernmental working group with the aim of drawing up an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights (8),

—

having regard to the process of the open-ended intergovernmental working group drawing up a Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, established by the UN Human Rights Council on 13 October 2015 (9),

—

having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity adopted on 22 May 1992,

—

having regard to the Durban Accord and Action Plan adopted by the Vth International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Parks Congress in 2003 (10),

—

having regard to the Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament of 19 October 2004 on EU Guidelines to support land policy design and reform processes in developing countries (COM(2004)0686),

—

having regard to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of National Food Security, endorsed by the UN Committee on World Food Security on 11 May 2012 (11),

—

having regard to the Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament on EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan endorsed in 2003 (COM(2003)0251) and to the bilateral FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) between the EU and partner countries,

—

having regard to the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights and the UN Global Compact,

—

having regard to the Maastricht Principles issued on 28 September 2011, which clarify extra-territorial obligations of states on the basis of standing international law (12),

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 15 May 2017 on indigenous peoples (13),

—

having regard to the human rights provisions included in the Cotonou Agreement,

—

having regard to the Declaration of 9 August 2017 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, on the occasion of the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (14),

—

having regard to its decision to nominate Aura Lolita Chavez Ixcaquic for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 2017, as the first ever indigenous human rights defender to be nominated for the award,

—

having regard to the Paris Agreement of 12 December 2015 on climate change,

—

having regard to the joint staff working document of 21 September 2015 entitled ‘Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020’ (SWD(2015)0182),

—

having regard to UN General Assembly resolution 64/292 of 3 August 2010 on the human right to water and sanitation (15),

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 on corporate liability for serious human rights abuses in third countries (16),

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2017 on corruption and human rights in third countries (17),

—

having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2017 on EU action for sustainability (18),

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Development and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A8-0194/2018),

A.

whereas the total population of indigenous peoples is estimated to be over 370 million people living in over 70 countries worldwide, representing around 5 % of the total world population, and whereas there are at least 5 000 distinct indigenous peoples; whereas despite their geographical dispersion these peoples face similar threats and challenges;

B.

whereas indigenous peoples enjoy a unique relationship with the land and the environment in which they live, using the natural resources available to establish unique knowledge systems, innovations and practices, which in turn shape a fundamental part of their identity and spirituality and are of great importance for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; whereas indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge has been a significant contributing factor in the development of humanity; whereas commercialisation and/or marginalisation of indigenous peoples’ knowledge threatens their role as the traditional holders and custodians of this knowledge;

C.

whereas indigenous peoples’ communal rights arise by virtue of a traditional occupation of their territories and whereas the sense of belonging connecting them to these territories does not coincide with the concept of ownership as commonly conceived in western societies;

D.

whereas territories traditionally inhabited by indigenous peoples encompass approximately 22 % of the world’s land surface and are estimated to hold 80 % of the planet’s biodiversity; whereas indigenous reservations constitute an important barrier against deforestation; whereas the tropical forests inhabited by indigenous peoples and local communities contribute to storing carbon across the tropical forest biome, making them valuable in any strategy to address climate change; whereas indigenous people are among the most vulnerable to the negative impact generated by climate change owing to their lifestyle and close relationship with the land, which depend directly on the constant availability of natural resources;

E.

whereas land is a fundamental, limited and non-renewable natural resource which is an integral part of the natural wealth of every country;

F.

whereas human rights treaties recognise the right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and resources and provide that states must consult indigenous peoples in good faith in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent pertaining to projects that can have an impact on their traditional ways of life, that may threaten the natural resources they have traditionally cultivated, and continue to depend upon, or that can lead to the displacement of their populations and to a consequential loss of distinct cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible; whereas such consultations should take place before legislative and administrative measures are adopted or applied, in accordance with the right to self-determination of indigenous people, which implies their right to own, use, develop and control their lands, territories, waters, coastal seas and other resources; whereas indigenous peoples have a right to freely determine their political status, freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development and freely use their natural wealth and resources, and in no case are to be deprived of their means of subsistence;

G.

whereas the UNDRIP recognises indigenous peoples’ collective and individual rights, in particular their right to their lands, possessions, natural resources, territories, culture, identity and language, to employment, health and education, and to determine freely their political status and economic development;

H.

whereas the collective and individual rights of indigenous peoples continue to be violated in various regions of the world by state and non-state actors, and as a result they continue to face physical, psychological and sexual violence as well as racism, exclusion, discrimination, forced evictions, destructive settlement, illegal or forced expropriation of their traditional domains or deprivation of access to their resources, livelihoods and traditional knowledge; whereas according to the UN, indigenous peoples are facing greater violations of their rights than was the case 10 years ago;

I.

whereas indigenous women face barriers to sexual and reproductive health and rights, including a lack of sexual and reproductive health advice, lack of access to facilities and supplies and legislation banning abortion even in cases of rape, which leads to high levels of maternal mortality, teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases;

J.

whereas indigenous women face widespread impunity regarding violations of their rights, especially due to the denial of their right to remedy and the lack of monitoring mechanisms and gender-disaggregated data;

K.

whereas states are ultimately responsible for guaranteeing the security, safety and rights of indigenous peoples, including those of indigenous environmental and human rights defenders;

L.

whereas indigenous languages around the world continue to disappear at an alarming rate, in spite of the fact that languages are a basic component of human rights and fundamental freedoms and are essential to the realisation of sustainable development; whereas intergenerational transmission of indigenous knowledge is vital to addressing global environmental challenges; whereas a UN report published in 2016 (19) estimates that 95 % of the almost 6 700 languages spoken in the world today are at risk of vanishing by the end of the century, the great majority of those threatened being indigenous languages; whereas states have an obligation to protect and promote indigenous peoples’ languages to ensure that these peoples fully enjoy their cultural rights; whereas states should invest in measures to change socially rooted stereotypes;

M.

whereas in some countries large numbers of indigenous people have migrated to major urban centres, where feelings of detachment and loss of cultural values ensue; whereas their traditional knowledge and practices are not adapted to urban contexts and contemporary job market dynamics, which exposes them to poverty and new forms of exclusion and discrimination;

N.

whereas indigenous peoples face alarming poverty, disease and illiteracy rates, insufficient access to safe, clean water, sanitation, healthcare, education, employment and civil rights, including political participation and representation, and high rates of substance abuse and suicide among young people;

O.

whereas women in indigenous communities are particularly marginalised by a lack of access to healthcare, social services and economic opportunities, are discriminated against as a result of their gender, ethnicity and socio-economic backgrounds, leading to higher mortality rates, and are subject to distinct gender-based violence and feminicide; whereas according to the UN, at least one indigenous woman in three is raped at some point in her life and rates of maternal mortality, teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, are higher than the average; whereas women often face specific gender-based threats and obstacles, which must be understood from an intersectional perspective;

P.

whereas illicit drug trafficking disproportionately affects indigenous communities as demand for drugs continues to rise and illicit drug producers increasingly push indigenous communities from their traditional land; whereas indigenous people are often physically or economically forced to participate in the drug trade, particularly in transport operations; whereas armed conflicts increase the militarisation of indigenous lands and lead to human rights abuses and the use of excess force on indigenous communities;

Q.

whereas increasing demand and growing competition over natural resources is driving a ‘global land rush’ that in several countries is putting the territories traditionally inhabited and used by indigenous peoples and local communities under unsustainable pressure; whereas the exploitation of those natural resources by the agribusiness, energy, timber and mining sectors, among other extractive industries, illegal logging, large infrastructure and development projects, governments and the local population constitute one of the main causes of enduring conflict over land tenure and the main cause of water and soil contamination;

R.

whereas development cannot be measured on the basis of growth indicators, but should primarily take account of the reduction of poverty and inequality;

S.

whereas poorly regulated tourism can have a negative cultural and ecological impact on these communities and, in some cases, is the instigating factor in land grabbing;

T.

whereas forcible land grabbing by private companies is usually accompanied by the presence of private security or military forces, leading inter alia to an increase in direct and indirect violence on indigenous peoples’ territories, directly affecting communities and, in particular, social leaders and women;

U.

whereas nowadays there is a trend towards the militarisation of some reserves and protected areas, which sometimes overlap with the lands of indigenous and local communities, causing serious human rights violations;

V.

whereas civil conflicts in some countries are related to land rights and are the cause of forced displacements of indigenous and local communities, thus opening the door to land grabbing and landholding concentration;

W.

whereas land grabbing is a complex issue which requires a comprehensive international solution; whereas the protection of indigenous women and girls should be given particular emphasis;

X.

whereas land grabbing is not necessarily a result of foreign investment, and land grabs may also be conducted by governments and local communities;

Y.

whereas there has been an increase in private forms of compensation through which private undertakings offer financial compensation to women who are victims of violence in return for signing an agreement not to sue the undertaking; whereas states bear the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with international commitments with respect to indigenous peoples’ rights and must therefore be primarily responsible for avoiding infringements and promoting truth, justice and reparations for the victims;

Z.

whereas some indigenous peoples around the globe have decided to refuse contact with the outside world, living in voluntary isolation, lack the capacity to defend their own rights, and are therefore especially vulnerable when their rights are violated; whereas these communities are the most vulnerable on the planet and their existence is being imperilled, in particular by oil prospecting, deforestation, drug trafficking and the infrastructures associated with those activities;

AA.

whereas many indigenous peoples continue to be victims of murder, extrajudicial executions, mutilation, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions, physical assault, harassment and intimidation for defending the right to their ancestral territories and natural resources, including their access to water and food, and to their spiritual sites and sacred burial grounds;

AB.

whereas human rights defenders are among the most central and crucial agents of sustainable development, especially when it comes to building societal resilience, and are among the key actors in inclusive democratic governance; whereas these defenders work towards securing not only the rights of their peoples but also the environmental sustainability and natural heritage of all humanity; whereas indigenous human rights defenders and activists work to enable their communities to participate in political processes, social inclusion and economic empowerment and to democratically and peacefully make their voices heard in their respective countries and in the international community;

AC.

whereas in recent years there has been a disturbing increase in homicides, attacks and other forms of violence against human rights defenders and activists, who are among the key actors in sustainable development, in the context of the defence of the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, environmental rights and land rights; whereas according to Front Line Defenders, of the 312 human rights defenders reportedly murdered around the world in 2017, 67 % were fighting for indigenous peoples’ land and defending environmental rights against extractive projects; whereas indigenous human rights defenders often face the systemic impunity of the perpetrators of attacks against them;

AD.

whereas even though indigenous female human rights defenders play a vital role in the protection of women in indigenous communities, their activities have been criminalised and they have been subjected to various forms of violence, including harassment, rape and murder;

AE.

whereas the implementation of non-binding corporate social responsibility and voluntary regulation schemes needs to be improved to protect indigenous and local communities from the violation of their human rights, prevent land grabbing and ensure effective corporate accountability; whereas the lack of control and accountability mechanisms constitutes a major impediment to effective and adequate remedy;

AF.

whereas a number of EU-based investors and companies, among many others, are involved in hundreds of land acquisition operations in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which in some cases has led to violations of the rights of indigenous and local communities; whereas EU-based actors may be implicated in human rights violations related to land grabbing in different ways, such as through EU-based private and finance companies, that finance land grabbing directly or indirectly, or through public-private partnerships; whereas in many cases, their multiple foreign ramifications can make it difficult to trace their roots directly to countries of origin; whereas even where those roots can be traced, there remain significant legal and practical barriers to accessing justice and accountability via the courts of the EU and its Member States, including as a result of jurisdictional limitations in respect of cases concerning immovable property (including land and natural resources), severe constraints on the value of the remedy available and on legal aid availability, and difficulties in demonstrating parent-company liability;

AG.

whereas most land in developing countries is inhabited, thus exposing the investments and reputation of companies to tenure risks and significantly increasing their operating costs when land transfers occur in a context of conflict, without the prior consent of indigenous and local communities and in contempt of their rights;

AH.

whereas the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights defenders, Michael Frost, has singled out Latin America as a region of concern, where ‘government and corporate actors are involved in the murders of environmental human rights defenders’;

AI.

whereas the obligation to protect and provide access to remedy under the European Convention on Human Rights applies both to extraterritorial activities and to domestic activities with extraterritorial impact; whereas the degree of commitment of the EU and its Member States to their extraterritorial obligations should be increased considerably;

AJ.

whereas the EU provides assistance for the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights worldwide through the EIDHR, which is complementary to its other external assistance instruments and is mainly channelled through civil society organisations; whereas through its protectdefenders.eu mechanism, the EU provides swift assistance to human rights defenders at risk, helps them meet their most urgent needs and reinforces their capacity to do their work in the medium and long term;

AK.

whereas international financial institutions have a central role to play in ensuring that the projects they fund do not entail or contribute to the violation of the human and environmental rights of indigenous peoples; whereas multinational corporations carry the responsibility of ensuring that their operations and/or supply chains are not implicated in human and environmental rights violations, specifically the rights of indigenous peoples;

AL.

whereas the EU is the largest provider of development aid in the world, a large proportion of which goes to Africa; whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission must carry out exhaustive controls of the funds third-country receptors use, by putting respect for human rights at the forefront of their aid granting policy;

AM.

whereas indigenous peoples within Europe still suffer from marginalisation, discrimination, and social exclusion, which must be combated and redressed using a rights-based approach;

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having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 21, 191,192, 220 and 221 thereof,

—

having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

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having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,

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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),

—

having regard to the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC and the 11th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP11) held in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015,

—

having regard to the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP22) to the UNFCCC and the 1st Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1), held in Marrakech, Morocco, from 15 November to 18 November 2016,

—

having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2016 on the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2016 UN Climate Change Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco (COP22) (1),

—

having regard to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and to its Synthesis Report,

—

having regard to its resolution of 4 October 2017 on the 2017 UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn, Germany (COP23) (2),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 July 2016 entitled ‘Accelerating Europe’s transition to a low-carbon economy’ (COM(2016)0500),

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 16 April 2013 on ‘An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change’ (COM(2013)0216),

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having regard to the EU Climate Diplomacy Action Plan 2015 adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council,

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having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 6 March 2017 and 19 June 2017,

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 June 2017,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 February 2018 on Climate Diplomacy,

—

having regard to the European External Action Service (EEAS) communication of June 2016 on a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy and the Commission and EEAS joint communication of 7 June 2017 on a Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action (JOIN(2017)0021),

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 9 February 2017 entitled ‘Towards a new EU climate change adaptation strategy — taking an integrated approach’ (3),

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 26 April 2016 entitled ‘The Road from Paris’ (4),

—

having regard its resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual Report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (5),

—

having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2018 on women, gender equality and climate justice (6),

—

having regard to UNFCCC Decision 36/CP.7 of 9 November 2001 on improving the participation of women in the representation of Parties in bodies established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol,

—

having regard to the study of 2009 conducted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) on ‘Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence’,

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2018 on gender equality in EU trade agreements (7),

—

having regard to Pope Francis’ encyclical letter ‘Laudato Si’’ on ‘care for our common home’,

—

having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety under Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A8-0221/2018),

A.

whereas the effects of climate change are having increasingly severe impacts on different aspects of human life as well as on development opportunities, the worldwide geopolitical order and global stability; whereas those with fewer resources to adapt to climate change will be hardest hit by the impact of climate change; whereas climate diplomacy can be understood as a form of targeted foreign policy to promote climate action through reaching out to other actors, cooperating on specific climate-related issues, building strategic partnerships and strengthening relations between state and non-state actors, including major contributors to global pollution, thereby contributing to mitigating the effects of climate change, as well as to enhancing climate action and strengthening Union’s diplomatic relationships;

B.

whereas the effects of climate change include the rise, warming and acidification of the oceans, a loss of biodiversity and an increase in extreme climate events; whereas the first victims of these disturbances are the most vulnerable countries and populations, in particular people living on islands; whereas climate change has a particularly severe social and cultural impact on indigenous communities, which not only contribute marginally to CO2 emissions, but in fact play an active and vital role in protecting the ecosystems in which they live, thereby mitigating the effects of climate change;

C.

whereas the EU has been one of the leading forces on climate action and has shown its leadership in international climate negotiations; whereas the EU has used climate diplomacy to create strategic alliances with relevant stakeholders to fight jointly against climate change as a key component of sustainable development and preventive action in view of climate-related threats;

D.

whereas EU climate diplomacy contributed to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement and, since then, the EU’s approach to climate diplomacy has been broadened; whereas, as part of the EU’s Global Strategy, climate policy has been integrated into foreign and security policy, and the link between energy and climate, security and climate change adaptation and migration has been strengthened;

E.

whereas the responsibility for long-term sustainable climate actions cannot be put on individuals and their individual choices as consumers; whereas a human rights-based climate policy should clarify that responsibility for creating sustainable societies lies primarily with politicians who have the means to create climate-sustainable policies;

F.

whereas climate change and security concerns are interlinked and transnational, and require climate diplomacy aimed, inter alia, at the full implementation of Paris Agreement commitments; whereas several studies have found indirect links between climate change, natural disasters and the outbreak of armed conflicts, and whereas climate change can be regarded as a ‘threat multiplier’ which has the ability to amplify existing social tensions; whereas the negative long-term implications of climate change may lead to an increase in political tensions, both inside and outside of national borders, and hence risk being an element of crisis and putting a strain on international relations as such;

G.

whereas climate change has a direct and indirect impact on migration, propelling increasing numbers of people to move from vulnerable to more viable areas of their countries or abroad to build new lives;

H.

whereas Parliament’s resolution of 4 October 2017 on the 2017 UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn, Germany (COP23) recognised the nature and extent of climate-induced displacement and migration resulting from disasters caused by global warming; whereas, according to various important and well-founded studies and reports, such as those by the International Organisation for Migration and the World Bank, unless serious efforts are made, the number of migrants, as well as internally displaced persons, driven by environmental changes could, in the worst scenario, reach up to 200 million by 2050, many of whom are currently living in coastal areas or could be internal migrants in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America;

I.

whereas people who migrate for environmental reasons do not benefit from refugee status nor from the international protection granted to refugees because they are not recognised by the 1951 Geneva Convention;

J.

whereas, as a contribution to the achievement of a net-zero carbon economy, the Commission has set the promotion of energy efficiency and making the EU the world leader in renewables as objectives for Union energy policy;

K.

whereas EU climate diplomacy must encourage risk management projects, model public opinion and encourage political and economic cooperation to counter climate change and to promote a low-carbon economy;

L.

whereas EU climate diplomacy should produce a model of proactive adjustment encouraging interaction between policies countering climate change; whereas the institutionalisation of climate change policies would mean greater public awareness and should translate into a clearer political will;

M.

whereas the problem of the scarcity of water resources is at the root of an ever increasing number of conflicts between communities; whereas those resources are often exploited unsustainably for intensive and industrial farming in situations that are already unstable;

N.

whereas, in order to achieve its objectives, the fight against climate change should become a strategic priority in all diplomatic dialogues and initiatives with a human rights-based approach; whereas Parliament has been actively contributing to the process and has been using both its legislative power and its political influence to further integrate climate change into development action and the aid portfolio, as well as into several other EU policies, such as investments, agriculture, fisheries, energy, transport, research and trade;

O.

whereas sources of discrimination and vulnerability based on gender, race, ethnicity, class, poverty, ability, indigeneity, age, geography, and traditional and institutional discrimination all combine intersectionally to obstruct access to the resources and means required to cope with dramatic changes such as climate change;

P.

whereas there is an intrinsic link between climate change and deforestation caused by land grabbing, fossil fuel extraction and intensive agriculture;

Q.

whereas the proportion of women in political decision-making and diplomacy, and especially in climate change negotiations, is still unsatisfactory and whereas little or no progress has been made in this respect; whereas women account for only 12 to 15 % of heads of delegation and around 30 % of the delegates;

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—

having regard to the draft Council decision (12543/2017),

—

having regard to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part (12548/2017),

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 37 of the Treaty on European Union and in accordance with Article 91, Article 100(2) and Articles 207 and 209, Article 218(6), the second subparagraph, point (a), Article 218(7) and Article 218(8), second subparagraph, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C8-0422/2017),

—

having regard to its relevant resolutions on EU-Armenia relations,

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (1),

—

having regard to the joint declarations of the Eastern Partnership summits, notably that agreed in 2017 in Brussels,

—

having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), notably the report of 18 May 2017 on the implementation of the ENP review (JOIN(2017)0018) and the joint working document of 9 June 2017 entitled ‘Eastern Partnership — 20 Deliverables for 2020: Focusing on key priorities and tangible results’ (SWD(2017)0300), as well as the 2016 communication on ‘A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy’,

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in the Eastern Neighbourhood and, in particular, its recommendation of 15 November 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit (2), and to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide (3),

—

having regard to its legislative resolution of 4 July 2018 (4) on the draft decision,

—

having regard to the Partnership Priorities between the European Union and Armenia, signed on 21 February 2018,

—

having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

—

having regard to Rule 99(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0179/2018),

A.

whereas the current framework for relations between Armenia and the European Union is the 1996 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force in 1999 and is to be replaced by the proposed Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA);

B.

whereas, through the Eastern Partnership, the EU and Armenia have based their relations on a shared commitment to international law and fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

C.

whereas there remain concerns about Armenia’s full respect for some of the above-mentioned core values, notably as regards democracy and the rule of law, which are being undermined by corruption, vote-buying, organised crime and abusive oligarchic control;

D.

whereas the geographic location of Armenia between Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East and neighbouring regional powers, notably Russia, Iran and Turkey, is both strategic and challenging; whereas the non-recognition by some of past tragedies, notably the Armenian genocide, the presence of foreign troops in Armenia as well as the protracted conflicts in the southern Caucasus, affecting also Azerbaijan and Georgia, pose a major threat to all partners’ security and regional stability; whereas the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can only be solved peacefully in line with the OSCE 2009 Basic Principles, notably through the efforts and proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs;

E.

whereas the EU is Armenia’s main trading partner and most important donor; whereas Armenia is also a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, thus demonstrating that the EU does not make it a prerequisite that partners should have to choose a deepening of relations with the EU at the expense of their relations with third parties, even if some opportunities — such as a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU — were not attainable in this context;

F.

whereas the new agreement sets a new legal basis to reinvigorate the political dialogue and broaden the scope of economic cooperation, as well as cooperation in sectors such as energy, transport, infrastructure and the environment; whereas these provisions are expected to have a positive impact on Armenia in terms of promoting democratic standards, economic growth and sustainable development; whereby such prospects are particularly important for Armenia’s, youth including through improved education and more job opportunities; whereas both EU and Armenian citizens stand to benefit from increased cooperation;

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having regard to the draft Council decision (10209/1/2012),

—

having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Iraq, of the other part (1),

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 91, Article 100, Article 207, Article 209 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C8-0038/2018),

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2013 on the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (2),

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Commission of 8 January 2018 on elements for an EU strategy for Iraq,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 establishing a new strategy on Iraq,

—

having regard to the Commission’s Multiannual Indicative Programme for Iraq (2014-2017),

—

having regard to its resolution of 4 February 2016 on the systematic mass murder of religious minorities by the so-called ‘ISIS/Daesh’ (3),

—

having regard to its resolution of 27 October 2016 on the situation in Northern Iraq/Mosul (4),

—

having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 2367 (2017) of 14 July 2017 and 2379 (2017) of 21 September 2017,

—

having regard to its legislative resolution of 4 July 2018 (5) on the draft decision,

—

having regard to Rule 99(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Development (A8-0224/2018),

A.

whereas Europe and Iraq are linked by thousands of years of mutual cultural influences and a common history;

B.

whereas Iraq has been ravaged by decades of dictatorial rule by Saddam Hussein, who initiated wars of aggression against Iran in 1980 and against Kuwait in 1990, by crippling sanctions, and by internal conflict after the US-led invasion of 2003, including sectarian violence and Kurdish secessionism, and jihadist terrorism by Daesh; whereas all of these factors explain the magnitude of the challenges that Iraq faces as it strives to make progress towards better governance, economic progress and national reconciliation;

C.

whereas the EU has reaffirmed its commitment to building a strong partnership with Iraq, based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and to supporting the Iraqi authorities throughout the transition to democracy and reconstruction process, while also tackling the root causes of the political, social and economic instability; whereas the reconstruction efforts have been estimated to cost as much as USD 88 billion;

D.

whereas the EU Member States involved in the 2003 war, and the EU as a whole, have a particular responsibility in assisting the Iraqi population and supporting efforts to achieve peace and stability in the country;

E.

whereas parliamentary elections took place on 12 May 2018; whereas in the region, beset with the retrenchment of authoritarian regimes and practices, Iraq provides one of the few examples of a competitive political environment, including a multi-party system and relatively free media; whereas the political forces in the country seem to realise the need to form cross-sectarian alliances in order to enhance the legitimacy and stability of the system; whereas genuine and competitive elections are of fundamental importance for democratic consolidation in Iraq; whereas the full participation of all parts of Iraqi society will be an important step towards an inclusive democracy and a shared sense of nationhood;

F.

whereas a significant improvement in the security situation is needed to promote stabilisation, reconciliation, inclusive governance and economic and social progress in the country both at national and local level; whereas accountability for the crimes committed by all parties is necessary to achieve reconciliation; whereas the EU provides assistance for security sector reform in Iraq through the EU Advisory Mission; whereas the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) has been present in the country since 2003 and has undertaken significant work in advancing inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation; whereas NATO continues to carry out its Capacity Building Initiative in Iraq, which focuses on countering improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal, de-mining, civil-military planning, Soviet-era equipment maintenance, military medicine and reform of Iraqi security institutions;

G.

whereas Iraq faces governance challenges in terms of institutional and administrative capacity-building and consolidating the rule of law, law enforcement and respect for human rights, including women rights and rights of all ethno-religious minorities;

H.

whereas it is important to tackle unemployment and social exclusion, especially among young people, in order to prevent them from becoming radicalised and hence easy recruits for terrorist organisations or other organised crime groups;

I.

whereas the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, the main actor behind the liberation of Mosul, suffered heavy casualties and must receive proper recognition and support in order to enhance its recruitment capabilities so that the force can return to an equitable and sustainable size;

J.

whereas the Iraqi authorities should view the country’s oil revenues as an opportunity and a tool for achieving sustainable social and economic reconstruction which will benefit Iraqi society as a whole, rather than distributing these revenues on the basis of clientelism; whereas significant oil deposits lie within the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq; whereas it is necessary to normalise relations between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq in line with the provisions of the constitution;

K.

whereas Iraq is a patchwork of communities often in competition for power and control over national resources; whereas thousands of Iraqi citizens, including from minority communities, and in particular women and girls, were inhumanly exterminated or enslaved by Daesh in acts of war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas terrorist and extremist groups are still able to easily exploit inter-sectarian and local tensions; whereas more than 1,5 million Christian Iraqi citizens (Chaldeans, Syriacs, Assyrians and members of other Christian minorities) were living in Iraq in 2003, and whereas they constitute an ancient, native population group which is in serious danger of persecution and exile; whereas millions of Iraqi citizens, including Christians, were forced to flee the violence, either leaving their country completely or being displaced within its borders; whereas Kurds make up a significant minority of the population of Iraq, the majority of whom live within the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq;

L.

whereas Daesh, al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist organisations are inspired by the extreme version of Salafism/Wahhabism; whereas, despite the military and territorial defeat of Daesh, the threat of this ideology still needs to be tackled through improved governance, education, provision of services, de-radicalisation efforts and full inclusion of the Sunni community in the Iraqi political process;

M.

whereas, to date, in a country of 26 million inhabitants, there are 11 million people in need of humanitarian aid, more than 3 million Iraqis have been internally displaced, many of whom are hosted within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and there are 246 000 refugees from Syria; whereas providing economic support for internally displaced persons (IDPs) to rebuild their livelihoods is essential for their return;

N.

whereas the territorial defeat of Daesh is the result of the efforts of the Iraqi armed forces, supported by the Global Coalition against Daesh, as well as the various Popular Mobilisation Units, the Peshmerga and other allied forces; whereas, despite the territorial defeat of Daesh in Iraq, the jihadist threat persists and endangers the consolidation of stability and security in the country, especially along the Syrian border; whereas it is necessary, for the reconstruction of the country and the integration of Iraqi society, to surpass the differences based on religious criteria, dissolving the Popular Mobilisation Units and integrating its members according to the needs of the state, a move without which it will not be possible to achieve a functional state based on democracy and pluralism; whereas in 2016 the Iraqi Parliament passed a law that effectively made the constellation of militias a permanent fixture of Iraq’s security forces; whereas a united, plural and democratic Iraqi state is the prerequisite for stability and development of the country and its citizens;

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having regard to its resolution of 4 October 2017 on ending child marriage (1),

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and, in particular, Article 16 thereof, and all other UN treaties and instruments concerning human rights,

—

having regard to Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

—

having regard to Article 10(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1989, and its four fundamental principles of non-discrimination (Article 2), the best interests of the child (Article 3), survival, development and protection (Article 6) and participation (Article 12), and having regard to its resolution of 27 November 2014 on the 25th anniversary of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (2),

—

having regard to Article 16 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,

—

having regard to the UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages,

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 18 December 2014 and 19 December 2016 on child, early and forced marriage,

—

having regard to the UN Human Rights Council’s resolution 29/8 of 2 July 2015 on Strengthening efforts to prevent and eliminate child, early and forced marriage, its resolution 24/23 of 9 October 2013 on Strengthening efforts to prevent and eliminate child, early and forced marriage: challenges, achievements, best practices and implementation gaps and its resolution 35/16 of 22 June 2017 on Child, early and forced marriage in humanitarian settings,

—

having regard to the position adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in June 2015 on child marriage, in Johannesburg (South Africa),

—

having regard to the Joint General Comment of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) on Ending Child Marriage,

—

having regard to Articles 32, 37, and 59(4) of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention),

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having regard to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) Report of 2012 entitled ‘Marrying Too Young — End Child Marriage’,

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having regard to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

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having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and, in particular, Article 9 thereof,

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 October 2015 on the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020,

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having regard to the Council conclusions of 3 April 2017 on the promotion and protection of the rights of the child,

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having regard to the fundamental principles laid down in the 2016 European External Action Service communication on a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,

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having regard to the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted by the Council on 25 June 2012 (3); having regard to the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019, adopted by the Council on 20 July 2015 (4); having regard to the joint staff working document of the Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 27 June 2017 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019): Mid-Term Review — June 2017’ (SWD(2017)0254),

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having regard to the revised EU guidelines for the promotion and protection of the rights of the child of 6 March 2017 entitled ‘Leave No Child Behind’,

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having regard to the European Consensus on Development of 7 June 2017, which underscores the EU’s commitment to mainstreaming human rights and gender equality in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

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having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A8-0187/2018),

A.

whereas child, early and forced marriages are a serious violation of human rights and, in particular, women’s rights, including the rights to equality, autonomy and bodily integrity, access to education and freedom from exploitation and discrimination, and are a problem that exists not only in third countries, but might also occur in some Member States; whereas eliminating these practices is one of the priorities for the EU’s external action in the field of promoting women’s rights and human rights; whereas various international charters and laws prohibit the marriage of minors such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols; whereas child, early and forced marriages have an extremely negative impact on the physical and mental health and personal development of the individuals concerned and on the children born from the marriages, and, as a result, on society as a whole; whereas child marriage is a form of forced marriage since children inherently lack the ability to give their full, free and informed consent to their marriage or its timing; whereas children represent part of a highly vulnerable group;

B.

whereas the EU is committed to promoting the rights of the child, and whereas child, early, and forced marriages are a violation of these rights; whereas the EU is committed to comprehensively protecting and promoting the rights of a child in its external policy;

C.

whereas no marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both parties, and by any person under a minimum age for marriage;

D.

whereas child marriage is a global problem which cuts across countries, cultures and religions; whereas child brides can be found in all regions of the world, from the Middle East to Latin America, from Asia to Europe and from Africa to North America; whereas child marriage also affects boys, but to a much lesser extent than girls;

E.

whereas, to date, more than 750 million women have married before the age of 18, of whom 250 million were married before the age of 15; whereas there are currently around 40 million girls between the ages of 15 and 19 who are married or cohabiting; whereas, every year, some 15 million more get married before the age of 18, of whom 4 million get married before the age of 15; whereas 156 million boys have also married before the age of 18, of whom 25 million were married before the age of 15; whereas child, early and forced marriages are more frequent in poor, underdeveloped regions; whereas the number of child, early and forced marriages is increasing as the global population grows; whereas a recent UNICEF report estimates that, in 2050, around 1,2 billion girls will have married before the age of 18; whereas nine out of 10 countries with the highest child marriage rates are classified as fragile states;

F.

whereas the root causes of child marriage are, in general, poverty, lack of education, deep-rooted gender inequalities and stereotypes, the perception that marriage will provide ‘protection’, family honour and the lack of effective protection of the rights of boys and girls as well as harmful practices, perceptions, customs, and discriminatory norms; whereas these factors are often exacerbated by limited access to quality education and job opportunities and are reinforced by certain entrenched social standards of child, early and forced marriages;

G.

whereas child, early and forced marriages are linked to a high risk of early and unwanted pregnancies, high rates of maternal and child mortality, lower use of family planning and unwanted pregnancies with increased health risks, inadequate or non-existent access to information about sexual and reproductive health services and usually signal the end of a girl’s education; whereas some countries even prohibit pregnant girls and young mothers from returning to the classroom; whereas child marriage can also lead to forced labour, slavery, and prostitution;

H.

whereas, although the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child emphasises the importance of measures that encourage regular school attendance, many girls are not in education due to a number of factors, for example because schools are inaccessible or expensive; whereas child, early and forced marriages have a disproportionate devastating impact and lifelong consequences for their victims and very often deprive the persons concerned of the possibility of continuing their studies as girls tend to drop out of school during the preparatory time before a marriage or shortly afterwards; whereas education, including sex education, is an effective way of preventing child, early and forced marriages because access to education and training contributes to empowerment, employment opportunities and promotes freedom of choice, the right to self-determination and active participation in society enabling individuals to free themselves from any form of control adversely affecting their rights without which the economic, legal, health and social situation of women and girls and the development of society as a whole continues to be hampered;

I.

whereas, every year, 17 million children have a child, forcing them to take on adult responsibilities and endangering their health, education and economic prospects; whereas child, early and forced marriages expose girls to early childbearing involving considerable risks and difficulties during pregnancy and childbirth, particularly owing to highly inadequate or non-existent access to medical support, including high-quality health centres, frequently resulting in maternal mortality and morbidity; whereas there is an increased risk of contracting transmitted infections including HIV; whereas complications in pregnancy and childbirth are the leading cause of death in girls aged 15 to19 in low- and middle-income countries; whereas the mortality rate of babies born to adolescent mothers is around 50 % higher and these babies have a higher risk of physical and cognitive development problems; whereas the experience of frequent and early pregnancies may also cause a range of long-term health complications, and even death;

J.

whereas child, early and forced marriages are a violation of the rights of the child and a form of violence against girls and boys, and whereas, as such, states have an obligation to investigate allegations, prosecute perpetrators and provide redress to the victims, who are primarily women and girls; whereas these marriages must be condemned and cannot be justified on any cultural or religious grounds; whereas child, early and forced marriages increase the risk of gender-based violence, and are often at the origin of domestic and intimate partner violence and sexual, physical, psychological, emotional and financial abuse and other practices harmful to girls and women, such as female genital mutilation and so-called honour crimes, as well as increasing the risk of girls and women being exposed to discrimination and gender-based violence during their lives;

K.

whereas the number of child, early and forced marriages increases significantly in situations of instability, armed conflict and natural and humanitarian disasters, during which medical and psychological care or access to education as well as opportunities to make a livelihood are often lacking and social networks and routines are disrupted; whereas during the recent migration crises, some parents, seeking to protect their children, especially daughters, from sexual aggression, or because they are regarded as a financial burden on their families, feel they have no choice but to have them marry before the age of 18 in the belief that it could provide a route out of poverty;

L.

whereas the Istanbul Convention classifies forced marriage as a form of violence against women, and calls for the acts of forcing a child to enter into a marriage and of luring a child abroad with the purpose of forcing her or him to enter into a marriage to be criminalised; whereas the lack of access by victims to legal, medical, and social support can exacerbate the issue; whereas 11 EU Member States have yet to ratify the convention;

M.

whereas the nature of child, early or forced marriages means many cases often go unreported, with cases of abuse crossing international borders and cultural boundaries, and can amount to a form of human trafficking, leading to slavery, exploitation, and/or control;

N.

whereas in July 2014 the first Girl Summit, aimed at mobilising domestic and international efforts to end female genital mutilation and child, early and forced marriages within a generation, took place in London;

O.

whereas preventing and responding to all forms of violence against girls and women, including child, early and forced marriages, is one of the targets of the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020;

P.

whereas child marriage will cost developing countries trillions of dollars by 2030 (5);

Q.

whereas early and child marriages remain a taboo subject which needs to be addressed publicly so as to put an end to the daily suffering of the young and adolescent girls involved and the continuous violation of their human rights; whereas one way of doing so would be to support and disseminate the work of journalists, artists, photographers and activists addressing the issue of early marriages;

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having regard to the Commission recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (1),

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having regard to the Commission communication of 23 February 2011 entitled ‘Review of the “Small Business Act” for Europe’ (COM(2011)0078), and to Parliament’s resolution of 12 May 2011 on that communication (2),

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having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2012 on ‘Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs): competitiveness and business opportunities’ (3),

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having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on family businesses in Europe (4),

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having regard to the judgment of the General Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 15 September 2016,

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having regard to the Commission communication of 22 November 2016 entitled ‘Europe’s next leaders: the Start-up and Scale-up Initiative’ (COM(2016)0733),

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having regard to the question to the Commission on the definition of SMEs (O-000050/2018 — B8-0031/2018),

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having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy,

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having regard to Rules 128 and 123(2) to (8) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas the 23 million SMEs in the EU, which make up around 99 % of all businesses, employ almost two thirds of the European working population and provide more than 90 million jobs while generating some EUR 3,9 trillion in added value; whereas they make a vital contribution to economic growth, social cohesion and the creation and maintenance of sustainable and high-quality jobs, and are key drivers in the context of the energy transition, the fight against climate change and EU competitiveness on green technology, as well as a major source of innovation in the EU;

B.

whereas 90 % of EU SMEs and 93 % of all EU companies in the non-financial business sector are micro firms, which contribute the largest share of value added and employment among SMEs as they employ approximately 30 % of the EU workforce, and thus need special attention;

C.

whereas, in comparison with larger firms and regardless of their organisational structure, SMEs are disproportionately affected by administrative burdens and financial obstacles that impede their competitiveness, exports, and job creation; whereas they benefit at EU, Member State, regional and local level from specific support, including financing opportunities and simplified procedures, but further efforts extending beyond the political pledges already given could be made to create a simpler SME-friendly environment;