1.

Consideration of the question referred for a preliminary ruling has disclosed no factor such as to affect the validity of:

2.

Council Regulation (EC) No 501/2009 of 15 June 2009 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2009/62/EC is invalid in so far as, by that regulation, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were kept on the list provided for in Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism.

1.

An examination of the questions of validity referred to the Court has revealed nothing capable of affecting the validity of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1395 of 18 August 2016 re-imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People’s Republic of China and produced by Buckinghan Shoe Mfg Co. Ltd, Buildyet Shoes Mfg., DongGuan Elegant Top Shoes Co. Ltd, Dongguan Stella Footwear Co. Ltd, Dongguan Taiway Sports Goods Limited, Foshan City Nanhai Qun Rui Footwear Co., Jianle Footwear Industrial, Sihui Kingo Rubber Shoes Factory, Synfort Shoes Co. Ltd, Taicang Kotoni Shoes Co. Ltd, Wei Hao Shoe Co. Ltd, Wei Hua Shoe Co. Ltd, Win Profile Industries Ltd, and implementing the judgment of the Court of Justice in joined cases C-659/13 and C-34/14, or the validity of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1647 of 13 September 2016 re-imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in Vietnam and produced by Best Royal Co. Ltd, Lac Cuong Footwear Co., Ltd, Lac Ty Co., Ltd, Saoviet Joint Stock Company (Megastar Joint Stock Company), VMC Royal Co Ltd, Freetrend Industrial Ltd and its related company Freetrend Industrial A (Vietnam) Co, Ltd, Fulgent Sun Footwear Co., Ltd, General Shoes Ltd, Golden Star Co, Ltd, Golden Top Company Co., Ltd, Kingmaker Footwear Co. Ltd, Tripos Enterprise Inc., Vietnam Shoe Majesty Co., Ltd, and implementing the judgment of the Court of Justice in joined cases C-659/13 and C-34/14;

2.

The rules on limitation laid down in Article 221(3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2000, are applicable to the collection of the anti-dumping duties established by the implementing regulations referred to in point 1 of the operative part of the present judgment.

1.

Declares that the Federal Republic of Germany, by introducing the infrastructure use charge for passenger vehicles and by providing, simultaneously, a relief from motor vehicle tax in an amount at least equivalent to the amount of the charge paid, to the benefit of owners of vehicles registered in Germany, failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 18, 34, 56 and 92 TFEU.

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder.

3.

Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to pay three quarters of the costs incurred by the Republic of Austria and to bear its own costs.

4.

Orders the Republic of Austria to bear one quarter of its own costs.

5.

Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Denmark to bear their own costs.

1.

For the purposes of the assessment of the finality of the losses of a non-resident subsidiary, within the meaning of paragraph 55 of the judgment of 13 December 2005, Marks & Spencer (C-446/03, EU:C:2005:763), the fact that the subsidiary’s Member State of establishment does not allow the losses of one company to be transferred, in the event of a merger, to another company liable for corporation tax, whereas such a transfer is provided for by the Member State in which the parent company is established in the event of a merger between resident companies, is not decisive, unless the parent company demonstrates that it is impossible for it to deduct those losses by ensuring, in particular by means of a sale, that they are fiscally taken into account by a third party for future tax periods;

2.

If the fact referred to in the first question becomes relevant, the fact that there is, in the State of establishment of the subsidiary, no other entity which could have deducted those losses in the event of a merger if such a deduction had been authorised is irrelevant.

1.

The concept of final losses of a non-resident subsidiary, within the meaning of paragraph 55 of the judgment of 13 December 2005, Marks & Spencer (C-446/03, EU:C:2005:763), does not apply to a sub-subsidiary unless all the intermediate companies between the parent company applying for group relief and the sub-subsidiary sustaining losses that could be regarded as final are established in the same Member State;

2.

For the purposes of the assessment of the finality of a non-resident subsidiary’s losses, within the meaning of paragraph 55 of the judgment of 13 December 2005, Marks & Spencer (C-446/03, EU:C:2005:763), the fact that the subsidiary’s Member State of establishment does not allow the losses of one company to be transferred to another company in the year of liquidation is not decisive, unless the parent company demonstrates that it is impossible for it to deduct those losses by ensuring, in particular by means of a sale, that they are taken into account by a third party for future periods;

3.

If the fact referred to in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the present judgment becomes relevant, the extent to which the legislation of the State of establishment of the subsidiary sustaining the losses that could be regarded as final results in it not being possible to set off part of them against the current profits of the loss-making subsidiary or against those profits of another company in the same group is irrelevant.

1.

Rejects the request for admission of new evidence;

2.

Dismisses the appeal;

3.

Orders RF to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.

1.

Article 3(u) of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that an installation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which produces, within the framework of its activity of ‘combustion of fuels in installations with a total rated thermal input exceeding 20 [megawatts (MW)]’, referred to in Annex I to that directive, electricity intended essentially to be used for its own needs, must be regarded as an ‘electricity generator’, within the meaning of that provision, where that installation, first, carries out simultaneously an activity for producing a product which does not fall within that annex and, second, continuously feeds, for consideration, even a small part of the electricity produced into the public electricity network, to which that installation must be permanently connected for technical reasons.

2.

Article 3(c) of Commission Decision 2011/278/EU of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87 must be interpreted as meaning that, in so far as an installation such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be regarded as an ‘electricity generator’, within the meaning of Article 3(u) of Directive 2003/87, it is not entitled to be allocated free emission allowances in respect of the heat produced within the framework of its activity of ‘combustion of fuels in installations with a total rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW’, referred to in Annex I to that directive, where that heat is used for purposes other than the production of electricity, since such an installation does not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 10a(4) and (8) of the directive.

1.

Article 30(2)(b) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 82/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996, must be interpreted as meaning that when the customs value of goods, such as the medicinal product at issue in the main proceedings, is calculated by applying the deductive method laid down in that provision, the competent national customs authority must, in order to identify ‘similar goods’, take into consideration any relevant factor, such as the respective compositions of those goods, their substitutability in the light of their effects and their commercial interchangeability, thus conducting a factual assessment which takes into account any factor that may have an impact on the real economic value of those goods, including the market position of the imported goods and of their manufacturer.

2.

Article 152(1)(b) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Regulation No 2913/92 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine the unit price of imported goods using the method laid down in Article 30(2)(c) of Regulation No 2913/92, as amended by Regulation No 82/97, the time-limit of 90 days within which the imported goods must be sold in the European Union, referred to in Article 152(1)(b) of Regulation No 2454/93, is a mandatory time-limit.

3.

Article 30(2)(c) of Regulation No 2913/92, as amended by Regulation No 82/97, must be interpreted as meaning that reductions in the sales price of the imported goods cannot be taken into account in determining the customs value of those goods pursuant to that provision.

1.

The appeal against the order of the General Court is based on the infringement of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

2.

The appellant, first of all, claims infringement of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, in so far as the General Court disregarded the fact that Associazione GranoSalus has standing to bring an action by virtue of the fact that its members have individual standing, since the contested Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2324 ‘is of direct and individual concern to them’ as a ‘regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures’.

In that regard, the association claims that the General Court erred in applying the provision in question, in so far as it considered that the condition of individual concern was not met because ‘some of the applicant’s members are allegedly affected by the contested act in their general capacity as consumers and citizens of the EU’ (paragraph 57 of the order).

That classification of the members of the applicant GranoSalus is however incorrect in the light of the statute of the association which makes its members, and through them, the association, holders and promoters of an interest relating to the protection of consumers and of agricultural producers via the implementation, in particular, of actions ‘seeking to combat, especially at EU level, any increase in the thresholds of mycotoxins and other contaminants in order to protect the health of consumers and, in particular, children’.

Since the condition of individual concern is satisfied and that condition is cumulative with respect to that of direct concern, the Court was wrong to rule from that point of view without taking account of it.

3.

The association also claims that the General Court was wrong, in its order, to consider that the condition of direct concern required for admissibility, in accordance with the last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU was not satisfied on account of the alleged existence of national measures implementing the contested Regulation (EU) 2017/2325, giving the reason for its decision in that regard as ‘renewal of marketing authorisations of phytopharmaceutical products containing the active substance “glyphosate”’, such acts being regarded as constituting ‘implementing measures of the contested act, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph, last sentence, of Article 263 TFEU’ (paragraphs 84 and 85 of the contested order).

The incorrect nature of that assessment is illustrated by the fact, demonstrated by documentary evidence, that the Member State in which the association, and its members, has its headquarters (Italy) received Regulation (EU) 2017/2325 via a communication from the Ministry of Health of 19 December 2017, which merely gave rise to the automatic renewal of the active substance ‘glyphosate’ for a period no longer than five years, while at the same time extending the authorisations relating to phytosanitary products containing glyphosate until 15 December 2022, without any discretionary assessment, even concerning the technical requirements laid down in Annexes I and II to Regulation (EU) 2017/2325.

The association claims in that regard that, even if the ministerial communication of 19 December 2017 were to be considered to be an implementing measure, the General Court did not take into account the fact that that communication could not be the subject of an action before the national courts because such an action is precluded under Italian law and the relevant case-law (Consiglio di Stato (Council of State), judgment No 6243 of 9 November 2005).

4.

The association then claims that the order infringes the last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263, in so far as the General Court did not take the subject matter of the dispute, as defined in the application, into consideration. The association notes in that regard that the General Court did not taken into consideration the fact that the direct effects of the contested regulation on the association, and through it on its members, arise from the potentially carcinogenic nature of the active substance ‘glyphosate’ (see the study of the International Agency for Research on Cancer published on 20 March 2015, disregarded in the contested Regulation (EU) 2017/2324), approval of which falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States because the national authorisation of a plant protection product does not involve any assessment concerning the active substance ‘glyphosate’ which was already approved previously by the European Union, which consequently precludes the Italian State from being entitled to authorise or refuse the placing on the market of plant protection products by reference to the active substance ‘glyphosate’. In the present case, the General Court examined the conditions laid down in the last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 without taking into account the arguments put forward in the dispute, that is to say that glysophate residues are present in groundwater, food (pasta) and soil, with the consequent harm that the placing on the market of that substance causes to the territory, citizens of Member States and the interests of the association, and through it, of its members.

The General Court should therefore have examined the concern within the meaning of the abovementioned Article 263 with regard to that the circumstance and the provisions of the association, as well as with regard to the standing of its members, which it did not do in its order.

5.

On the basis of the foregoing, the association disputes the interpretation of the last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263, given by the court of first instance, which deprives that provision of any effect and is contrary to the intention of the European legislature. In that regard, the applicant refers to the findings made by Advocates General in various proceedings (see, inter alia, the Opinion in case C-456/13 P, EU:C:2014:2283 and in joined cases C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P), in accordance with which such a restrictive interpretation would deprive Article 263 of meaning and concrete effect.

In the light of the foregoing, the association argues that the interpretation of last limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263, given by the General Court in the contested order is manifestly contrary to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing …’) and Articles 6 (Right to a fair trial) and 13 (Right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby hindering the possibility of bringing an action before the General Court on account of direct concern in such a scenario, and causing unjustified harm to the system of protection of rights enshrined in EU law.

1.

Should point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 (1) of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing be interpreted as meaning that Member States are permitted, by way of derogation from the provision contained in Article 4(4) of that regulation and with a view to promoting animal welfare, to adopt rules such as those contained in the decreet van het Vlaamse Gewest van 7 juli 2017‘houdende wijziging van de wet van 14 augustus 1986 betreffende de bescherming en het welzijn der dieren, wat de toegelaten methodes voor het slachten van dieren betreft’ (Decree of the Flemish Region of 7 July 2017‘amending the Law of 14 August 1986 on the protection and welfare of animals, regarding permitted methods of slaughtering animals’), rules which provide, on the one hand, for a prohibition of the slaughter of animals without stunning that also applies to the slaughter carried out in the context of a religious rite and, on the other hand, for an alternative stunning procedure for the slaughter carried out in the context of a religious rite, based on reversible stunning and on condition that the stunning should not result in the death of the animal?

2.

If the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is to be answered in the affirmative, does point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) of Regulation No 1099/2009, in the interpretation referred to in the first question, infringe Article 10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

3.

If the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is to be answered in the affirmative, does point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) read in conjunction with Article 4(4) of Regulation No 1099/2009, in the interpretation referred to in the first question, infringe Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, since, in the case of the killing of animals by particular methods prescribed by religious rites, provision is only made for a conditional exception to the obligation to stun the animal (Article 4(4), read in conjunction with Article 26(2)), whereas in the case of the killing of animals during hunting and fishing and during sporting and cultural events, for the reasons stated in the recitals of the regulation, the relevant provisions stipulate that those activities do not fall within the scope of the regulation, or are not subject to the obligation to stun the animal when it is killed (Article 1(1), second subparagraph, and Article 1(3))?

1.

which uses a flat-rate tariff in tranches, instead of a tariff that takes into account the precise share (making use of advanced technical tools) of the music repertoire protected by the management company played during the event?

2.

which makes licence fees dependent on external elements such as, inter alia, the admission price, the price of refreshments, the artistic budget for the performers and the budget for other elements, such as decor?

—

declare that the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7(1) and (5) and Article 15(1) of Directive 2007/60/EC (1) as regards river basin districts ES120 Gran Canaria, ES122 Fuerteventura, ES123 Lanzarote, ES124 Tenerife, ES125 La Palma, ES126 La Gomera and ES127 El Hierro;

—

declare that the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 10(1) and (2) of Directive 2007/60/EC as regards river basin districts ES120 Gran Canaria, ES122 Fuerteventura and ES125 La Palma;

—

order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

1.

Should the provisions of Article 57(4)(c) and (g), in conjunction with paragraphs 6 and 7 of that article, of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC be interpreted as precluding an application whereby the economic operator is required to provide evidence on its own initiative of the measures that the economic operator has taken to demonstrate its reliability?

2.

If so, do the provisions of Article 57(4)(c) and (g), in conjunction with paragraphs 6 and 7 of that article, of Directive 2014/24 therefore have direct effect?

—

annul Article 17(4)(b) and Article 17(4)(c), in fine (i.e. the part containing the following wording: ‘and made best efforts to prevent their future uploads in accordance with point (b)’) of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC; (1)

—

order European Parliament and Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

1.

Must Article 20(2)(a) of Directive 2011/16 (1) be interpreted as meaning that where a request for exchange of information formulated by an authority of a requesting Member State designates the taxpayers to which it relates simply by reference to their status as shareholders and beneficial owners of a company, without those taxpayers having been identified by the requesting authority in advance, individually and by name, the request satisfies the identification requirements laid down by that provision?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must Article 1(1) and Article 5 of that directive be interpreted as meaning that the standard of foreseeable relevance may be met, if the requesting Member State, in order to establish that it is not engaged in a fishing expedition, despite the fact that it has not individually identified the taxpayers concerned, provides a clear and sufficient explanation evidencing that it is conducting a targeted investigation into a limited group of persons, and not simply an investigation by way of general fiscal surveillance, and that its investigation is justified by reasonable suspicions of non-compliance with a specific legal obligation?

3.

Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that, where

that person is entitled, in the event of a definitive incidental finding upholding the validity of the decision requiring the requested information and of the decision imposing a fine on him, to a period of grace for the payment of that fine, so that he has an opportunity, having thus been given disclosure of the material supporting the contention — definitively accepted by the competent court — that the test of foreseeable relevance is met, to comply with the decision requiring the requested information?

1.

Should Article 10 of Directive 2008/115/EC (1) (“the Return Directive”), read in conjunction with Articles 4 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”), recital 22 of the preamble and Article 5(a) of the Return Directive and Article 15 of Directive 2011/95/EU (2) (‘the Qualification Directive’), be interpreted as meaning that, before imposing an obligation to return on an unaccompanied minor, a Member State should ascertain and then should investigate whether, at least in principle, adequate reception facilities exist and are available in the country of origin?

2.

Should Article 6(1) of the Return Directive, read in conjunction with Article 21 of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is not permitted to make distinctions on the basis of age when granting lawful residence on a territory if it is established that an unaccompanied minor does not qualify for refugee status or subsidiary protection?

3.

Should Article 6(4) of the Return Directive be interpreted as meaning that, if an unaccompanied minor does not comply with his obligation to return and the Member State does not and will not undertake any concrete actions to proceed with removal, the obligation to return should be suspended and lawful residence should be granted? Should Article 8(1) of the Return Directive be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State imposes a return decision on an unaccompanied minor without then undertaking any removal actions until the unaccompanied minor reaches the age of eighteen, that must be considered to be contrary to the principle of loyalty and the principle of sincere cooperation in the Union?

1.

Does the obligation for a national court to order an aid recipient to pay illegality interest (see the judgment in CELF (1)) apply also in a situation such as that in the present case, in which the unlawful State aid constituted public service compensation which was subsequently found to be compatible with the internal market under Article 106(2) TFEU and in which approval was granted on the basis of an assessment of the entire public service undertaking’s overall financial situation, including its capitalisation?

2.

Does the obligation for a national court to order an aid recipient to pay illegality interest (see the judgment in CELF) apply also in respect of amounts which, in circumstances such as those of the present case, are transferred from the aid recipient to affiliated undertakings pursuant to a public-law obligation but which are categorised by a final Commission decision as constituting an advantage for the aid recipient within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU?

3.

Does the obligation for a national court to order an aid recipient to pay illegality interest (see the judgment in CELF) apply also in respect of State aid which the aid recipient, in circumstances such as those of the present case, received from a publicly-controlled undertaking, given that the latter’s resources are derived partly from sales of the aid recipient’s services?

1.

set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 April 2019 in Case T-229/17, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission;

2.

annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/133 of 25 January 2017 on the maintenance with a restriction in the Official Journal of the European Union of the reference of harmonised standard EN 14342:2013 ‘Wood flooring and parquet: Characteristics, evaluation of conformity and marking’ in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; (1)

3.

annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/145 of 25 January 2017 on the maintenance with a restriction in the Official Journal of the European Union of the reference of harmonised standard EN 14904:2006 ‘Surfaces for sport areas — Indoor surfaces for multi-sports use: Specification’ in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; (2)

4.

annul the Commission communications in the framework of the implementation of Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC of 10 March 2017, 11 August 2017, 15 December 2017 and 9 March 2018 (3) in so far as they relate to the harmonised standards EN 14342:2013 and EN 14904:2006;

5.

as an alternative to the second, third and fourth heads of claim above, refer the case back to the General Court;

6.

order the Commission to pay the costs in the proceedings.

—

uphold the appeal, set aside the order of the General Court in Case T-530/18 in its entirety, and give a new ruling on Case T-530/18 upholding the action for partial annulment of Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/873 of 13 June 2018 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD): (1)

—

uphold the appeal, set aside the order of the General Court in Case T-530/18 in its entirety, and remit Case T-530/18 back to the General Court so that it may give a new ruling on the action and, in so doing, uphold the action for annulment and annul in part Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/873 as described above;

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

A.

Infringement of Articles 263 and 297 TFEU, and failure to observe the principle of legal certainty

B.

Failure to observe the principle of audi alteram partem, including in relation to Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court

Romania considers that the General Court failed to observe the principle of audi alteram partem by failing to offer the Romanian authorities the opportunity to adopt a position with regard to the information, communicated by the Commission in response to the question put by that court, on the basis of which the action was dismissed as inadmissible.

—

Annul, pursuant to Article 270 TFEU, the act excluding the applicant from the open competition EPSO/AD/338/17;

—

Annul, pursuant to Article 263(4) TFEU, European Commission decision C(2018) 3969;

—

Annul, pursuant to Article 270 TFEU, the reserve list of open competition EPSO/AD/356/18;

—

Order compensation for harm to the extent determined by the Court and order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 3 and 7 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, as interpreted in particular by the judgment settling Cases T-361/10 Pachitis v Commission and T-587/16 HM v Commission

2.

Second plea in law based on the fact that, according to the applicant, the preparation procedure for the e-tray exercise constitutes an infringement of the obligation of secrecy of the proceedings of the selection board laid down in Article 6 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations.

3.

Third plea in law, based on the fact that the conduct of the e-tray exercise in accordance with the arrangements provided for by EPSO constituted indirect discrimination against the applicant in terms of access and an infringement of the obligation to provide reasonable adjustment.

Concerning the application for annulment, pursuant to Article 263(4) TFEU, of European Commission Decision C(2018) 3969

4.

Fourth plea in law based on the infringement of the principles set out in the judgments in Cases T-516/14 Alexandrou v Commission and C-491/15 P Typke v Commission

Concerning the application for annulment, pursuant to Article 270 TFEU, of the reserve list of open competition EPSO/AD/356/18

5.

Fifth plea in law alleging that EPSO was not entitled to fail to submit its request for re-examination to the selection board within the meaning of point 4.2.2 of the General rules governing open competitions or to take its place in decisions and/or statements of reasons.

6.

Sixth plea in law alleging infringement of the provisions of the Staff Regulations and of the Directive concerning discrimination on the grounds of disability.

—

annul or vary the contested measure;

—

hold that the applicant Committee is entitled to have its ‘legal entity’ form validated and, consequently, to obtain the financing at issue.

—

infringement of Article 131.2 of Regulation No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002;

—

infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations and legal certainty;

—

infringement of the principle of proportionality and the prohibition of arbitrariness;

—

manifest error of assessment;

—

and failure to state adequate, sufficient and relevant reasons in that the contested decision states that the legitimate expectations and the legal certainty of the applicant Committee have not been breached.

—

find that the European Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations with regard to ensuring that Romania fulfils its obligations as set out in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data;

—

find that the European Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations with regard to ensuring that Romania fulfils its obligations as set out in Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA;

—

find that the European Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations with regard to ensuring that Romania fulfils its obligations as set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation);

—

find that the European Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations with regard to ensuring that Romania observes the rule of law, the independence of courts, and the fundamental rights of persons falling within its jurisdiction;

—

order the defendant to pay EUR 2 by way of compensation for the non-material damage caused;

—

order the defendant to address existing omissions in future.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the European Commission failed to fulfil its obligations relating to judicial independence as set out in the decision to introduce a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, the Treaty and the Charter

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the European Commission failed to fulfil its obligations concerning the protection of personal data

—

annul the ECB’s decision of 21 March 2019 regarding the proposed acquisition of qualifying holdings by the applicants in the target bank.

—

order the defendant to bear the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the assessment period for the ECB pursuant to Article 22(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU (1) expired prior to the contested decision and that it was therefore no longer possible for the ECB to oppose the proposed acquisition.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the procedure prescribed under Article 15 of the SSM Regulation (2) and Articles 85 to 87 of the SSM Framework Regulation. (3)

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the assessment criteria pursuant to Article 23 of Directive 2013/36/EU and its Latvian implementation.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principle of proportionality.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the ECB failed to take into account the discretionary nature of the decision to oppose a proposed acquisition.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the ECB distorted the relevant facts of the case.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.

8.

Eighth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the nemo auditor principle by failing to take into account its own responsibility for the loss of confidence in the regulatory process.

—

declare its action for annulment admissible;

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order the Council to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the Council’s lack of competence to adopt the contested decision, in so far as the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco do not have the competence to conclude an international agreement applicable to Western Sahara instead of the Sahrawi people, represented by the Polisario Front.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the obligation to examine the question of respect for fundamental rights and for international humanitarian law, in so far as the Council failed to examine that question before adopting the contested decision.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breach, on the part of the Council, of its obligation to execute the judgments of the Court, in so far as the contested decision disregards the grounds of the Court’s judgments of 27 February 2018, Western Sahara Campaign UK (C-266/16, EU:C:2018:118).

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the essential principles and values guiding the Union’s action on the international scene, since:

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, in so far as the contested decision is contrary to the declarations of the European Union which has consistently reiterated the need to observe the principles of self-determination and of the relative effect of treaties.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging misapplication of the principle of proportionality since, given the separate and distinct status of Western Sahara, the intangible character of the right to self-determination and the status of third party of the Sahrawi people, it was not for the Council to carry out a balancing exercise between the alleged ‘benefits’ from the Fisheries Agreement and its impact on Sahrawi natural resources.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging conflict with the Common Fisheries Policy since, in accordance with the agreement concluded by the contested decision, Union vessels will have access to the fishery resources of the Sahrawi people, without its consent, in exchange for a financial contribution paid to the Moroccan authorities, although Western Sahara waters are not Moroccan ‘waters’ for the purposes of Articles 61 and 62 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

8.

Eighth plea in law, alleging breach of the right to self-determination since:

9.

Ninth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of the relative effect of treaties since the contested decision denies the Sahrawi people’s status of third party to EU-Morocco relations and imposes international obligations on the Sahrawi people concerning its national territory and its natural resources, without its consent.

10.

Tenth plea in law, alleging violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal law since:

11.

Eleventh plea in law, alleging breach, on the part of the Union, of its obligations under the law of international responsibility since, by concluding an international agreement with the Kingdom of Morocco that is applicable to Western Sahara, the contested decision is endorsing serious violations of international law committed by the Moroccan occupying forces against the Sahrawi people and supporting the situation arising from those violations.

—

declare its action for annulment admissible;

—

annul the contested regulation;

—

order the Council to pay the costs.

—

declare the action admissible and well-founded;

—

annul, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the Commission Decision of 7 March 2019 in Case AT.40023 so far as concerns the French market and the existing and future contracts of Groupe Canal +;

—

order the Commission to pay all of the costs incurred by the company Groupe Canal +.

1.

First plea in law, alleging misuse of powers by the Commission in so far as the commitments, which it rendered binding, for the purposes of ending geo-blocking in the field of cinema interfere with the legislative reforms recently adopted by the EU legislature.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment in relation to Article 101(1) TFEU in so far as it found that the commitments proposed by NBCUniversal, Sony Pictures, Warner Bros and Sky do not affect the cultural diversity and more generally the financing and exploitation of films in the European Economic Area.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality in that the Commission made binding a number of commitments which were manifestly disproportionate to the competition concerns raised and which infringed the interests of third parties.

—

declare the application admissible and well-founded;

—

consequently, annul the contested decision in part;

—

order compensation for non-material damage caused by a series of measures and actions of the PMO which must be the subject of a global assessment and which the applicant estimates at the sum ex aequo et bono of EUR 50 000;

—

order the Commission to pay all of the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 1 and 25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and of Article 6 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) and alleging an error of assessment. In that connection, the applicant claims that there is neither any reason nor legal basis which justifies the decision of the PMO to continue to seize more than two thirds of her pension.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legality and legal certainty. According to the applicant, the Staff Regulations are a ‘lex specialis’ which has primacy over any other national law: as regards the minimum subsistence figure there are thus substantive provisions of the Staff Regulations that derogate both from general EU employment law and national employment law.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration and duty of care in that no statement of reasons has been provided in relation to the facts or evidence which could justify the decision adopted by the PMO by which it still reserves the right to deduct the sum of EUR 3 839,60 from the pension payments that the applicant is yet to receive.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equality and non-discrimination, in particular in so far as, if the interpretation of PMO were to be followed, the minimum subsistence figure would depend on the country where the public official resided.

The applicant also seeks compensation for the non-material damage that she claims to have suffered as a result of irregularities allegedly committed by the PMO which make it impossible for her to live in dignity.

—

declare that the defendant has failed to comply with its obligations under Article 108 TFEU in so far as it failed to close the formal investigation procedure in Case SA.34402 (2015/C ex 2012/NN) by means of a decision within a reasonable time in accordance with Article 108(2) TFEU and Article 9(1) of Regulation 2015/1589; (1)

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

Infringement of Article 108 TFEU through a failure to close the formal investigation procedure

2.

Infringement of the right to have one’s case heard within a reasonable period as part of the right to good administration under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

3.

Infringement of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 20 of that charter

4.

Infringement of the right to be given reasons as part of the right to an effective remedy under Articles 47 and 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

—

annul the communication of the European Parliament Directorate-General for Finance implementing Resolution No 14/2018 of 12 July 2018 of the Office of the President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and/or Resolution No 6/2018 of the Presidential Council of the Senate of the Italian Republic, and, in any event,

—

annul the redetermination and recalculation of the life annuity disbursed by the European Parliament;

—

accordingly, declare that the applicant is entitled to the maintenance of the life annuity in question in so far as it was accrued and is being accrued on the basis of the legislation in force prior to Resolution No 14/2018 of the Office of the President of the Italian Chamber [of Deputies] and/or Resolution No 6/2018 of the Presidential Council of the Senate of the Italian Republic, and order the European Parliament to pay him all the sums unduly withheld, adjusted for inflation, together with statutory interest from the date of withholding until the date of payment;

—

order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and immediately to restore in full the original amount of the life annuity, and to pay compensation for all damages if and to the extent that damages are payable to the applicant; and,

—

in any event, order the Parliament to pay all costs, lawyers’ fees, plus VAT, taxes, duties and flat-rate charges.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 60(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 60(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision in so far as it dismisses the appeal;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision in so far as it dismisses the appeal;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

declare the ground of appeal to be founded and annul the contested decision, declare the existence of likelihood of confusion between the trade marks in dispute, and accordingly, order the complete rejection of the requested trade mark;

—

order EUIPO and the opposing party, should it appear in the proceedings before the General Court, to bear the costs.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to declare valid the contested international trademark registration No. 898 322 for all the goods and services as registered in classes 39 and 41;

—

order EUIPO and the intervener, Sky Limited, to pay all the costs of the dispute before the General Court, including those relating to the procedure before the Fourth Board of Appeal.

—

Infringement of Article 60(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 94 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul Regulation (EU) 2019/592 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 2019 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of Member States and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, as regards the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union;

—

order the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament to pay the costs of the proceedings in full, including legal fees of EUR 5 000.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement by Regulation (EU) 2019/592 of the acquired rights derived from European citizenship.

In the first place, the applicants are of the opinion that the Parliament and the Council infringed their right to respect for private and family life in that for over fifteen years they have established their lives in another Member State of the European Union, a State with which they have a close connection: some of the applicants have spouses and children who are nationals from another Member State or they own property in another Member State.

In the second place, the applicants take the view that the contested regulation infringes the principle of equality since it recognises that the rights they derive from their European citizenship will cease without making any distinction between citizens subject to the rule depriving them of their right to vote after residing for fifteen years outside the United Kingdom and other citizens.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement by the contested regulation of the status of Gibraltar, in that the reference to Gibraltar in the contested regulation as a ‘colony of the British Crown’ can only create an unfavourable climate for conciliation between Spain and the United Kingdom to the detriment of the rights of the inhabitants of Gibraltar.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the visa exemption granted to British citizens by Regulation 2018/1240, on the ground that the applicants will have to apply for an ETIAS travel authorisation and that there is therefore a possibility that they be denied that authorisation.

—

annul the communication of the European Parliament Directorate-General for Finance implementing Resolution No 14/2018 of 12 July 2018 of the Office of the President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and/or Resolution No 6/2018 of the Presidential Council of the Senate of the Italian Republic, and, in any event,

—

annul the redetermination and recalculation of the life annuity disbursed by the European Parliament;

—

accordingly, declare that the applicant is entitled to the maintenance of the life annuity in question in so far as it was accrued and is being accrued on the basis of the legislation in force prior to Resolution No 14/2018 of the Office of the President of the Italian Chamber [of Deputies] and/or Resolution No 6/2018 of the Presidential Council of the Senate of the Italian Republic, and order the European Parliament to pay him all the sums unduly withheld, adjusted for inflation, together with statutory interest from the date of withholding until the date of payment;

—

order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and immediately to restore in full the original amount of the life annuity, and to pay compensation for all damages if and to the extent that damages are payable to the applicant; and,

—

in any event, order the Parliament to pay all costs, lawyers’ fees, plus VAT, taxes, duties and flat-rate charges.

—

annul the Parliament’s decision to deny the applicants’ access to the special reception service set up for elected members of Parliament and the instruction of the President of the Parliament of 29 May 2019, which prevented them from submitting the written declaration required by Rule 3(2) of the Rules of Procedure;

—

annul the Parliament’s decision, as confirmed by the letter without legal basis of the President of the Parliament of 27 June 2019, not to take note of the results officially declared by Spain of the election to the European Parliament of 26 May 2019, and the subsequent decision to take note of a different and incomplete list of elected members notified on 17 June 2019 by the Spanish authorities, which does not include the applicants;

—

annul the Parliament’s decision to treat the communication of the Spanish Electoral Commission of 20 June 2019 as depriving of effect the declaration of the applicants as elected members of Parliament, which amounts to an unlawful declaration of a vacancy that violates Article 13 of the 1976 Electoral Act, attributable to the Parliament;

—

annul the Parliament’s decision, as confirmed by the letter without legal basis of the President of the Parliament of 27 June 2019, refusing to guarantee, pursuant to Rule 3(2) of its Rules of Procedure, the right of the applicants to take their seats in Parliament and on its bodies and to enjoy all the rights attaching thereto from the date of the first sitting and until a ruling has been given on the disputes referred both to Parliament and to the judicial authorities of Spain;

—

annul the President of the Parliament’s decision, as confirmed by the letter without legal basis of the President of the Parliament of 27 June 2019, refusing to assert the privileges and immunities of the applicants under Article 9 of Protocol (No 7) on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, in accordance with Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure;

—

order the defendant to pay all costs of these proceedings, and in accordance with Article 340, second paragraph, TFEU, order the defendant to pay compensation for the damages suffered: the loss of monthly salary granted to the members of the European Parliament, plus 1 symbolic euro for the moral damages.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Parliament’s decision to deny the applicants access to the special reception service set up for elected members of Parliament and the instruction of the President of the Parliament of 29 May 2019 infringe Articles 20, 21 and 39(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘Charter’).

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Parliament’s decision not to take note of the results officially declared by Spain of the election to the European Parliament of 26 May 2019, and the subsequent decision to take note of a different and incomplete list of elected members notified on 20 June 2019 by the Spanish authorities, which does not include the applicants, infringe Article 12 of the 1976 Electoral Act and Article 3(2) of the European Council Decision 2018/937 (1), in connection with Article 39(2) of the Charter, Article 10(1) and (2) TEU, Article 14(2) and (3) TEU and Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral Act.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Parliament’s decision to treat the communication of the Spanish Electoral Commission of 20 June 2019 as depriving of effect the declaration of the applicants as elected members of Parliament, amounts to an unlawful declaration of a vacancy that violates Article 13 of the 1976 Electoral Act, attributable to Parliament, that infringes Articles 6(2), 8 and 13 of the 1976 Electoral Act, in connection with Article 39(2) of the Charter, Article 10(1) and (2) TEU, Article 14(2) and (3) TEU and Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral Act.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Parliament’s decision refusing to guarantee, pursuant to Rule 3(2) of its Rules of Procedure, the right of the applicants to take their seats in Parliament and on its bodies and to enjoy all the rights attaching thereto from the date of the first sitting and until a ruling has been given on the disputes referred both to Parliament and to the judicial authorities of Spain, infringes Rule 3(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament and Articles 5(1) and 12 of the 1976 Electoral Act, in connection with Article 39(2) of the Charter, Article 10(1) and (2) TEU, Article 14(2) and (3) TEU and Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral Act.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the President’s decision refusing to assert the privileges and immunities of the applicants under Article 9 of Protocol (No 7) on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, infringes Rule 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Article 6(2) of the 1976 Electoral Act and Article 9 of the said Protocol in connection with Article 39(2) of the Charter, Article 10(1) and (2) TEU, Article 14(2) and (3) TEU, and Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral Act.

—

declare non existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament redetermined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs of the legal proceedings.

1.

By the first plea in law, the applicant claims incompetence on the part of the author of the act, infringement of essential procedural requirements and the consequent infringement of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

2.

By the second plea in law, the applicant claims that there is no legal basis for the contested act and that there was an error of law in the interpretation of Article 75 of the Implementing measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament

3.

By the third plea in law, the applicant claims that the communication clearly infringes the statutory reservation of powers established in Article 75(2) of the Statute, which refers expressly to the conditions laid down by national law, thereby rendering internal resolutions of the Chamber of Deputies of a Member State irrelevant.

4.

By the fourth plea in law, the applicant alleges clear infringement of the general principles of EU law, such as the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, protection of acquired rights and the principle of equality.

—

declare non existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament redetermined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs of the legal proceedings.

—

declare non existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament redetermined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs of the legal proceedings.

—

declare non existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament redetermined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs of the legal proceedings.

a)

principally:

b)

in the alternative, and in the event that the above claims are rejected:

c)

in any event, order the Single Resolution Board to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging (i) failure to carry out a proper inquiry, (ii) error of assessment of the facts, (iii) infringement and misapplication of Article 5[(1)](a) of Regulation 2015/63, and (iv) infringement of the principles of non-discrimination and sound administration.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging (i) failure to carry out a proper inquiry, (ii) error of assessment of the facts, (iii) infringement and misapplication of Article 5[(1)](f) of Regulation 2015/63, and (iv) infringement of the principles of non-discrimination and sound administration.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the unlawful conduct of an EU body giving rise to non-contractual liability under Article 268 TFEU

4.

Fourth plea in law, in the alternative and incidentally, alleging that Regulation 2015/63 infringes the principles of effectiveness, equivalence and equal treatment and is consequently inapplicable.