—

the President of the General Court will be Mr Jaeger;

—

the Vice-President of the General Court will be Mr van der Woude;

—

the Presidents of the Chambers of five or three Judges will be Ms Pelikánová, Mr Prek, Mr Frimodt Nielsen, Mr Kanninen, Mr Gratsias, Mr Berardis, Ms Tomljenović, Mr Collins and Mr Gervasoni;

—

the decision on the assignment of Judges to Chambers, as most recently amended by the decision of 20 March 2019 (OJ 2019 C 139, p. 2), the decisions of 13 July 2016 on the composition of the Grand Chamber and on the method of designation of the Judge replacing a Judge prevented from acting (OJ 2016 C 296, p. 2) and the decision of 11 May 2016 on the criteria for assigning cases to Chambers (OJ 2016 C 296, p. 2) will continue to apply.

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-832/17 of 10 January 2019;

—

grant the first and third heads of claim in the form of order sought at first instance in the application of 22 December 2017;

—

order EUIPO also to pay the further costs incurred in these proceedings.

It is alleged in the first ground of appeal that the General Court erred in law in its assessment of the distinctive character of the mark applied for, ‘achtung!’ (word/figure), under Article 7(1)(b) of the European Union Trade Mark Regulation. (1) The General Court erred in law in so far as it accepted in the judgment under appeal that a sign was devoid of any distinctive character if, according to one possible meaning of that sign, it can be interpreted as advertising praise. Further, the General Court assessed the distinctive character of the term ‘Achtung’ instead of that of the sign applied for, ‘achtung!’. In addition, in the course of its assessment of distinctive character, the General Court made an incorrect assumption of fact without taking evidence on the material questions.

It is also alleged in the second ground of appeal that the General Court erred in law in its assessment of distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b) of the European Union Trade Mark Regulation. The General Court erred in law in the judgment under appeal in so far as it assumed that the fact that goods and services were the ‘subject of advertising’ was a suitable common indicator to justify the automatic conclusion that there is no distinctive character in respect of all goods and services covered by the application.

In the third ground of appeal it is alleged that the principles of equal treatment and sound administration have been breached. The General Court erred in law in so far as it failed to examine whether the Board of Appeal had considered to a sufficient degree the appellant’s relevant prior registrations and had examined in its decision whether the same conclusion should be reached or not. The complete failure to take into account identical prior registrations with EUIPO constitutes an error in law.

1.

Where a national provision, such as Article 2(2)(a) of Order TAS 2865/2003, requires that a person must have left a social security scheme in order to be eligible for voluntary insurance or optional continued insurance, must the person concerned have left a Spanish social security scheme or, on the other hand, in accordance with the principle of equal treatment of facts laid down in Article 5(b) of Regulation No 883/2004, (1) must the Spanish competent institution take account of the fact that the person concerned has left a similar social security scheme of another Member State, as though that had occurred in Spain?

2.

Where a national provision, such as Article 3(3) of Order TAS 2865/2003, requires evidence of contribution periods as a condition of eligibility for voluntary insurance or optional continued insurance, is it necessary for the person concerned to have been subject to the Spanish legislation at some earlier stage or, in accordance with Article 6 of Regulation No 883/2004, must the competent Spanish institution take account of contribution periods completed under the legislation of another Member State, as though those contribution periods were completed in Spain?

1.

Must the non-binding effect laid down in Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 (1) be interpreted as precluding the validity of an agreement amending an unfair term concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier in circumstances in which (a) the unfair term had not been declared null and void when that amending agreement was concluded, nor had its lack of validity been identified and nor had the consumer been advised of the possibility that that term might be declared unfair, and (b) the amending agreement is not in the nature of a settlement? In that situation, is it material to the validity of that agreement that the consumer has negotiated the wording of the amendment?

2.

Must Articles 3(1) and 4 of Directive 93/13 be interpreted as meaning that, for a term laid down by an agreement concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier, which amends an earlier unfair term, to be considered transparent, the consumer must have been informed, when concluding the amending agreement, that the original term was unfair or, as the case may be, that there is a possibility that that term might be declared unfair? In that connection, does the fact that the new term was individually negotiated preclude, in any event, a review of whether that term is unfair?

1.

Must Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC (1) be interpreted as meaning that, after a term establishing the mechanism for determining the variable rate of interest by the formula ‘fixed margin and the benchmark interest applied by a bank on the basis of non-transparent criteria’ has been found to be unfair in connection with a credit agreement applying a fixed interest rate limited to the first year and a variable rate for the subsequent years, in accordance with the above formula, the national court may vary the agreement by imposing a method for calculating the variable rate of interest on the basis of transparent benchmarks (LIBOR/EURIBOR) and the bank’s fixed margin, in the light of the facts contained in the credit agreement, for the purposes of ensuring better consumer protection?

2.

If the answer to that question is in the negative, must Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC be interpreted as meaning that, after a term such as that mentioned above has been found to be unfair, the national court may apply, by judicial process, a fixed rate of interest by reference to the fixed margin agreed for the second year of the agreement or to the fixed rate of interest for the first year?

3.

If the answer to that question is in the negative, must Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC and the principle of effectiveness be interpreted as precluding the national court, after a term such as that mentioned above has been found to be unfair, from instructing the parties to conduct negotiations with a view to fixing a new interest rate, without setting any benchmarks?

4.

If the answer to that question is in the negative, what possible remedies are there to ensure that consumers are protected in line with Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC?

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 12 February 2019 delivered in Case T-201/17, Printeos S.A. v European Commission

—

give a ruling on the substance of the case and dismiss in its entirety the action on the grounds that

—

First ground of appeal: The General Court infringed the European Commission’s rights of defence and respect for due process by infringing the principle of non ultra petita, when it unduly altered the subject matter and essence of the dispute after inviting the applicant to amend, at the hearing, the classification of the interest which it claimed in its application initiating proceedings.

—

Second ground of appeal: The General Court misinterpreted Article 266 TFEU by declaring that that article imposes an absolute and unconditional obligation to pay default interest in the event of annulment of a decision imposing a penalty or fine with retroactive effect from the date of provisional payment.

—

Third ground of appeal: The General Court erred in law by interpreting Article 266 TFEU in the light of the judgments in IPK (2) and Corus (3) and the order in Holcim (4) without taking into account the new regulatory framework applicable to penalties in competition matters.

—

Fourth ground of appeal: The General Court erred in law by finding that, in the present case, the conditions laid down by the case-law for non-contractual liability to be incurred had been met.

—

Fifth ground of appeal: The General Court infringed the principles of legality and legal certainty by not applying, in the present case, Article 90 of Delegated Regulation No 1268/2012 in spite of the finality of a previous decision which did apply that article.

—

declare that, in accordance with Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, by not adopting national provisions on the installation of individual measuring devices for the consumption of heating, cooling and hot water in buildings, in accordance with Article 9(3) of Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, (1) the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under the abovementioned provisions of Directive 2012/27/EU;

—

order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

—

set aside the judgment under appeal;

—

refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union;

—

reserve the costs.

—

First, the Commission submits that the General Court erred in finding that the examination to determine whether a particular tax regime confers an advantage on its beneficiaries requires not only an analysis of the inherent and well established criteria of the regime being examined, which may place the beneficiaries in a more favourable position in comparison with other undertakings subject to the general regime, but also that that assessment also requires the analysis of unfavourable elements caused by variable circumstances outside the regime in each tax year, even when those unfavourable elements are uncertain and cannot systematically negate the advantage and that, furthermore, they cannot be foreseen in an ex ante review of the regime.

—

Second, including on the basis of that incorrect assessment of the concept of advantage, the General Court misinterpreted the Commission’s due diligence obligation in the context of the examination of the existence of a State aid system, and erred in law with regard to the burden of proof which the Commission has in showing that there is an advantage in this case.

1.

Can Article 35(4) of Directive 2009/72/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC be interpreted, in particular in the light of recital 33 thereof, as precluding, in a Member State, in the context of the amendment of a national measure transposing that directive, the power to nominate and dismiss the chairman of the Regulatory Authority from being withdrawn from the President of the Republic, who is directly elected by the citizens, and conferred instead on the Government, with the result that the legal situation which existed prior to the transposition of the directive is restored?

2.

Is it possible to interpret Article 35(5) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, in particular in the light of recital 34 thereof, as precluding a rule of national law which, in order to ensure defence of the public interest, permits ministers to take part in the tariff regulation procedure at the Regulatory Authority?

—

Set aside in part the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 12 March 2019, in Case T-26/18, France v Commission;

—

Give final judgment in the matter by annulling Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/2014 of 8 November 2017 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (1), in so far as it imposes on France a flat-rate correction of 100 % on account of deficiencies in the control system for area aid in Haute-Corse;

—

Order the Commission to pay the costs.

—

Set aside the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 19 March 2019, joined cases

T-98/16, Italian Republic v European Commission

T-196/16, Banca Popolare di Bari S.C.p.A. v European Commission

T-198/16, Fondo interbancario di tutela dei depositi v European Commission;

—

dismiss the applications at first instance, in so far as they dispute that the decision at issue shows that the requirements relating to imputability to the State have been met for the measures in question and for their financing through State resources;

—

refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration of the remaining pleas in law at first instance and

—

reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

—

In the first place, the Commission claims that the General Court infringed Article 107(1) TFUE for two reasons:

—

In the second place, the findings of the General Court are further vitiated by serious material inaccuracies concerning the facts and the interpretation of the relevant Italian law which are clearly apparent from the case-file.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Remag Metallhandel GmbH and Mr Werner Jaschinsky to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Mr Alexandru Negru to pay the costs, including those incurred by Sky Ltd for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Dentsply De Trey GmbH to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders J. García Carrión SA to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Arçelik AS to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Sintokogio Ltd to pay the costs.

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/87 of 21 January 2019 (1), as far as it applies to the applicant;

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/85 of 21 January 2019 (2), as far as it applies to the applicant; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that a manifest error of assessment of the facts was committed by the defendant stating that the applicant would be supporting the Syrian regime and would be benefiting from it, while such view would be plainly unfounded.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the general principle of proportionality was committed and the measures taken in the contested acts would have such effects that they should be regarded as disproportionate in themselves. The economic consequences of the sanctions made against the applicant would be disastrous and disproportionate compared to the purposes the contested acts would be supposed to reach.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that a disproportionate infringement of the right to property and the right to work was committed, in that the disputed measures would prevent the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of his property and his economic freedom by way of infringing the first additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a misuse of powers. The contested acts would have been adopted with the aim of achieving objectives other than those stated herein, namely targeting the applicant himself instead of the regime for reasons that would be unknown to him, and so they would be vitiated by a misuse of powers.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296, paragraph 2, of TFEU was committed. The reasoning given for the contested acts would be, in reality, purely a formality and probably would have not been thought through by the defendant.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the rights of defence and right to a fair trial was committed. The applicant would have never been able to secure a hearing prior imposing the disputed restrictive measures, and since he would have been unable to exercise correctly his rights of defence, including his right to a fair trial, notably guaranteed by Article 6, paragraph 3, of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 48, paragraph 2, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/87 of 21 January 2019 (1), as far as it applies to the applicant;

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/85 of 21 January 2019 (2), as far as it applies to the applicant, and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that a manifest error of assessment of the facts was committed by the defendant stating that the applicant would be supporting the Syrian regime and would be benefiting from it, while such view would be plainly unfounded.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the general principle of proportionality was committed and the measures taken in the contested acts would have such effects that they should be regarded as disproportionate in themselves. The economic consequences of the sanctions made against the applicant would be disastrous and disproportionate compared to the purposes the contested acts would be supposed to reach.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that a disproportionate infringement of the right to property and the right to work was committed, in that the disputed measures would prevent the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of his property and his economic freedom by way of infringing the first additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a misuse of powers. The contested acts would have been adopted with the aim of achieving objectives other than those stated herein, namely targeting the applicant himself instead of the regime for reasons that would be unknown to him, and so they would be vitiated by a misuse of powers.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296, paragraph 2, of TFEU was committed. The reasoning given for the contested acts would be, in reality, purely a formality and probably would have not been thought through by the defendant.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the rights of defence and right to a fair trial was committed. The applicant would have never been able to secure a hearing prior imposing the disputed restrictive measures, and since he would have been unable to exercise correctly his rights of defence, including his right to a fair trial, notably guaranteed by Article 6, paragraph 3, of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 48, paragraph 2, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/87 of 21 January 2019 (1), as far as it applies to the applicant;

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/85 of 21 January 2019 (2), as far as it applies to the applicant; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that a manifest error of assessment of the facts was committed by the defendant stating that the applicant would be supporting the Syrian regime and would be benefiting from it, while such view would be plainly unfounded.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the general principle of proportionality was committed and the measures taken in the contested acts would have such effects that they should be regarded as disproportionate in themselves. The economic consequences of the sanctions made against the applicant would be disastrous and disproportionate compared to the purposes the contested acts would be supposed to reach.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that a disproportionate infringement of the right to property and the right to exercise an economic activity was committed, in that the disputed measures would prevent the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of his property and his economic freedom by way of infringing the first additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a misuse of powers. The contested acts would have been adopted with the aim of achieving objectives other than those stated herein, namely targeting the applicant itself instead of the regime for reasons that would be unknown to it, and so they would be vitiated by a misuse of powers.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296, paragraph 2, of TFEU was committed. The reasoning given for the contested acts would be, in reality, purely a formality and probably would have not been thought through by the defendant.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that an infringement of the rights of defence and right to a fair trial was committed. The applicant would have never been able to secure a hearing prior imposing the disputed restrictive measures, and since it would have been unable to exercise correctly his rights of defence, including its right to a fair trial, notably guaranteed by Article 6, paragraph 3, of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 48, paragraph 2, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

1.

annul Article 5(8) and (9) of Annex I and Article 5(8) and (9) of Annex II of Decision No 02/2019 of the defendant of 21 February 2019;

2.

annul the second clause of Article 10(4) and Article 10(5), the second sentence of Article 16(2), Article 3(d)(vii) of Annex I and Article 17(3)(d)(vii) of Annex II of Decision No 02/2019 of the defendant of 21 February 2019;

3.

in the alternative, in the event that the Court considers that the contested provisions under point 1 of Annexes I and II are inextricably linked with the other provisions of its corresponding Article or Annex or with the entirety of Decision No 02/2019 of the defendant of 21 February 2019, annul the corresponding Article or Annex or the decision in its entirety;

4.

in the alternative, in the event that the Court considers that the contested provisions under point 2 of Annexes I and II are inextricably linked with the other provisions of its corresponding Article or Annex or with the entirety of Decision No 02/2019 of the defendant of 21 February 2019, annul the corresponding Article or Annex or the decision in its entirety;

5.

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging an infringement of Articles 14 to 16 of the forthcoming Regulation on the internal market in electricity in conjunction with Article 13(2) TEU and the general principle of legal certainty

In the context of the first plea, it is claimed that, with the clarification in Article 5(8)(b) and (c) of Annexes I and II of Decision No 02/2019, which is a critical network element, the defendant infringes the basic structure of Articles 14 to 16 of the Regulation on the internal market in electricity, which comes into force on 1 January 2020. Articles 14 to 16 of the Regulation on the internal market in electricity would govern how internal grid congestion will be taken into consideration in the calculation of cross-border trade capacities. Under Article 16(8) of the Regulation on the internal market in electricity, it is irrefutably presumed that there is no discrimination of cross-border electricity flows when, on internal and cross-border network elements, a minimum capacity of 70 % of the network element in question is made available to cross-border trade. Under Article 16(4) of the Regulation on the internal market in electricity, re-dispatch measures must not be applied in excess of the minimum capacity. In addition, in compliance with the minimum capacity, a bidding zone may be re-configured only with the agreement of the relevant Member State. Moreover, the minimum capacity of 70 % is initially to be in the form of a gradual linear trajectory. The minimum capacity of 70 % and the linear trajectory are to take account of the fact that the internal network expansion takes time. This basic structure is reversed by Article 5(8)(b) and (c) of Annexes I and II of the decision, since the minimum capacity of 70 % can be applied to internal network elements only if the transmission system operator can demonstrate that a re-configuration of the bidding zone, or more re-dispatch, or more network expansion, would be less efficient. Furthermore, the efficiency criterion under Article 5(8)(c) of Annexes I and II undermines the established minimum capacity of 70 %, since it is in practice not achievable.

The early consideration of remedial actions under the second clause of Article 10(4), Article 10(5) and the second sentence of Article 16(2), Article 3(d)(vii) of Annex I and Article 17(3)(d)(vii) of Annex II infringes Article 16(4) of the Regulation on the internal market in electricity, in accordance with which the maximum capacity should be made available to operators.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 (1)

In the context of the second plea in law, it is claimed that the decision unlawfully restricts the three existing exemptions for taking internal network elements into account under point 1.7 of Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, since it makes provision only for the effectiveness criterion and incorrectly implements that criterion.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging an infringement of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 (2)

In the context of the third plea in law, it is claimed that the effectiveness criterion under Article 5(8)(c) of Annexes I and II of the decision infringes the procedure for verifying the bidding zone under Article 32 et seq. of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 and the rule for taking network elements into account in the calculation of capacities in accordance with Article 29(3)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality

In the context of the fourth plea in law, it is claimed that the exclusion of internal network elements above the effectiveness criterion under Article 5(8)(c) of Annexes I and II of the decision infringes the principle of proportionality, since that exclusion undermines system security and is not the least onerous method.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging a formal irregularity in the contested decision

In the context of the fifth plea in law, it is claimed that the decision infringes Articles 2 and 4 of Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community (OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385), since the publication and notification thereof took place only in English. In addition, it infringes the obligation to state reasons and was adopted by the Agency outside of its competence.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order the defendant and possible co-defendants to pay all expenses of the proceedings.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul Commission decision C(2018) 9209 final of 8 January 2019 in State aid case SA.45765 (2018/NN) — Lithuania — Support to power plants producing electricity from renewable energy sources;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

—

The applicants maintain that all the evidence indicates that the Commission should have had doubts about the compatibility of the State aid and its financing method with the internal market and EU law. Therefore, it should have opened a formal investigation.

—

The applicants refer to an ample body of evidence ranging from the length of the pre-notification phase and the disproportionate time allocation between that phase and the preliminary examination procedure, other circumstances under which the contested decision was adopted and the alleged flaws reflected in the content of that decision, which, they argue, is insufficiently reasoned and vitiated by serious errors of assessment or the lack of assessment. These factors are said to show that the Commission made an insufficient analysis of the relevant aspects and did not have all the information needed before declaring the State aid and its financing method compatible with the internal market and EU law.

—

In particular, it is alleged that (i) the Commission erred in its assessment of an allegedly stand-alone Renewable Energy Sources (RES) scheme and RES levy, while misinterpreting the Lithuanian legislative framework and the applicants’ complaints; (ii) the Commission failed to assess investment aid granted to RES generators and therefore its substantive analysis is incomplete and insufficient; (iii) the Commission erred in its assessment of the exemptions from the levy under Article 107(1) TFEU; (iv) the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of the RES scheme with the internal market was inadequate and erroneous; and (v) the assessment of the financing method’s compliance with EU law is flawed and insufficient.

—

annul the Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/354, (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant;

—

annul the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/352, (2) insofar as it concerns the applicant;

—

order the Council to pay the applicant’s costs of and occasioned by this application.

—

annul the Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/354, (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant;

—

annul the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/352, (2) insofar as it concerns the applicant;

—

order the Council to pay the applicant’s costs of and occasioned by this application.

—

annul the decision issued by the Commission on 2 August 2018;

—

order the Commission to pay EUR 21 440;

—

order the Commission to pay default interest from 23 January 2017 until payment is made;

—

order the Commission to pay damages in the amount of EUR 500 000 or another equitably determined amount;

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

—

order the Commission to recognise that the present case falls within the scope of the specific case described in Article 10 of the rules (in force before 2006), and reimburse the sum claimed principally;

—

order the Commission to request the opinion of the medical committee in accordance with Articles 20 and 22 of the common rules (post 2006).

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the report of the doctor treating the applicant and the result obtained leave no doubt as to the urgency and necessity of the treatment within the meaning of Article 10 of the rules;

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of good administration on account of the incomplete documentation provided to the expert relied upon by the designated doctor, in accordance with Article 23, and on account of the abnormally unethical conduct of the three doctors who took part at that stage, including refusal to acknowledge basic nasal functions, in particular the protection against infection of the applicant’s impaired breathing apparatus, and consequently refusal to acknowledge the relief provided by the closure of the open bite.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the appointing authority refused to apply by analogy Article 22 of the common rules on insurance against the risk of accident and of occupational disease to the applicant in place of Article 23, which was deemed inapplicable, even though it requested the President of the Court of Justice to apply Article 22 in order to appoint the ‘other doctor’ of its own motion: recourse to the medical committee ensures for the applicant that the mandate is properly formulated and that the case-file is complete.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

Annul the contested Regulation No 2019/474, in particular Article 1(1), and the second sentence of Article 2 and declare that, as a consequence of that invalidity, Directive No 2019/475 has no effect in so far as it is functionally connected to the contested regulation;

—

Pending the judgment to be delivered, suspend the application of the contested regulation and Directive No 2019/475 until the day of the judgment of the General Court;

—

Pending the judgment to be delivered, order the suspension of the implementation of all implementing measures contained in Regulation No 2019/474 and Directive 2019/475, in particular those relating to the registration of motor vehicles provided for in the Act of 1 December 2018, No 132 (law converting Decree-Law No 113 of 4 October 2018 into law);

—

If appropriate, admit the testimonies that the applicant reserves the right to propose to substantiate the factual circumstances described in the application;

—

In any event, order the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament to pay all the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of international law

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the right to freedom of movement of European citizens