1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 13 July 2017, OZ v EIB (T-607/16, not published, EU:T:2017:495), in so far as it rejected, first, the heads of claim seeking damages set out by OZ in her application based on the liability of the European Investment Bank (EIB) for alleged unlawful acts committed during the investigation procedure, including the failure to respect the appellant’s right to a fair hearing, and, second, the head of claim seeking annulment set out in the application;

2.

Dismisses the appeal as to the remainder;

3.

Annuls the decision of the President of the European Investment Bank of 16 October 2015 to take no further action on the complaint alleging sexual harassment made by OZ;

4.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

5.

Orders the European Investment Bank to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by OZ relating to the proceedings at first instance and the appeal proceedings.

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is not, in principle, entitled to rely, in an action brought under Article 27(1) of the Regulation in that second Member State against a decision to transfer him or her, on the criterion for determining responsibility set out in Article 9 thereof;

—

may, by way of exception, invoke, in such an action, that criterion for determining responsibility, in a situation covered by Article 20(5) of the Regulation, in so far as that third-country national has provided the competent authority of the requesting Member State with information clearly establishing that it should be regarded as the Member State responsible for examining the application pursuant to that criterion for determining responsibility.

1.

Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [European Union] trade mark, and Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks must be interpreted as meaning that they do not entitle the proprietor of an individual trade mark consisting of a quality label to oppose the affixing, by a third party, of a sign identical with, or similar to, that mark to products that are neither identical with, nor similar to, the goods or services for which that mark is registered.

2.

Article 9(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95 must be interpreted as meaning that they entitle the proprietor of an individual trade mark with a reputation, consisting of a quality label, to oppose the affixing, by a third party, of a sign identical with, or similar to, that mark to products that are neither identical with, nor similar to, the goods or services for which that mark is registered, provided that it is established that, by that affixing, the third party takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the reputation of the mark concerned or causes detriment to that distinctive character or reputation and provided that, in that case, the third party has not established the existence of a ‘due cause’, within the meaning of those provisions, in support of such affixing.

—

examine, prior to refusing the right to deduct, whether the issuer of that incorrect invoice could reimburse the recipient of the invoice the amount of VAT unduly paid and could correct that invoice under a self-correction procedure, in accordance with the applicable national rules, in order to recover the tax which it unduly paid to the Treasury, or

—

itself decide to reimburse the recipient of that invoice the tax which the recipient unduly paid to the issuer of the invoice and that the latter, subsequently, unduly paid to the Treasury.

1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 13 December 2017, CJ v ECDC (T-602/16, not published, EU:T:2017:893);

2.

Annuls the decision of the appeal assessor of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) of 21 September 2015 closing CJ’s appraisal report for 2011;

3.

Orders the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by CJ relating both to the proceedings at first instance and the appeal.

1.

Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a contractual term, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which refers to the national law applicable so far as concerns the determination of jurisdiction to hear disputes between the parties to the contract, does not fall outside the scope of that directive.

2.

Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as not precluding procedural rules, to which a contractual term refers, which allow the seller or supplier to choose, in the event of an action for alleged non-performance of a contract by the consumer, between the court which has jurisdiction in the place where the defendant is domiciled and that which has jurisdiction in the place of performance of the contract, unless the choice of place of performance of the contract gives rise, for the consumer, to procedural conditions which are such as to restrict excessively the right to an effective remedy conferred on him by the European Union legal order, which is a matter for the national court to determine.

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

2.

Orders The Green Effort Limited to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA).

1.

Article 2(1) of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, must be interpreted to the effect that the notion of ‘payment services’, for the purposes of that provision, includes the execution of direct debits, initiated by the payee, on a payment account of which it is not the holder, where the holder of the account thus debited does not consent to those direct debits.

2.

Article 58 of Directive 2007/64 must be interpreted to the effect that the notion of ‘payment service user’, for the purposes of that article, includes the holder of a payment account on which direct debits were executed without its consent.

1.

Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a court of a Member State does not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute concerning a claim for compensation brought under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, and directed against an airline, established in the territory of another Member State, on the ground that that company has a branch within the territorial jurisdiction of the court seised, without that branch having been involved in the legal relationship between the airline and the passenger concerned.

2.

Article 26(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as not applying in a case, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where the defendant has not submitted observations or entered an appearance.

1.

First question

2.

Second question

1.

First question

2.

Second question

1.

Does the change in reservation of a passenger at check-in, who has a confirmed reservation on a specific flight, to a later flight against his will constitute denied boarding within the meaning of Article 4(3) of the Air Passenger Rights Regulation, (1) if the flight on which the passenger had a confirmed reservation is then carried out?

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Does Article 5(1)(c)(iii) of the Air Passenger Rights Regulation apply by analogy in the event of denied boarding within the meaning of Article 4(3) of the Air Passenger Rights Regulation?

1.

Is Article 10(2)(p) of Directive 2008/48/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that the required information in relation to the ‘period during which the right of withdrawal may be exercised’ or ‘other conditions governing the exercise thereof’ must also include the requirements governing the start of the withdrawal period?

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:

Does Article 10(2)(p) of Directive 2008/48 preclude an interpretation to the effect that withdrawal information is ‘clear’ and ‘concise’ if it does not itself cite in full the mandatory information to be provided with regard to the start of the withdrawal period, but in this respect refers to a provision of national law — in the present case, Paragraph 492(2) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code; ‘the BGB’) in the version valid up to 12 June 2014 — which in turn refers to further national provisions — in the present case, Article 247, Paragraphs 3 to 13, of the Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (Introductory Law to the Civil Code; ‘the EGBGB’) in the version valid up to 12 June 2014 — and the consumer is therefore obliged to read numerous legislative provisions in a variety of legislative texts so as to gain clarity as to what mandatory information must be provided in order for the withdrawal period to start to run in the case of his loan agreement?

3.

If Question 2 is answered in the negative (and there are no concerns in principle against a reference to provisions of national law):

Does Article 10(2)(p) of Directive 2008/48 preclude an interpretation to the effect that withdrawal information is ‘clear’ and ‘concise’ if the reference to a provision of national law — in the present case, Paragraph 492(2) of the BGB in the version valid from 30 July 2010 up to 12 June 2014 — and the further reference — in the present case, to Article 247, Paragraphs 3 to 13, of the EGBGB in the version valid from 4 August 2011 up to 12 June 2014 — necessarily mean that the consumer has to carry out a process of legal inference beyond simply reading the provisions — for instance, as to whether the loan was granted to him under conditions customary for contracts secured by mortgage and the interim financing thereof or whether linked agreements exist — so that he can gain clarity as to what mandatory information must be provided in order for the period of withdrawal to start to run in the case of his loan agreement?

1.

Does the owner of eligible hectares have those hectares at his disposal within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 24(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 (1) if no third party has a right of use in respect of the eligible hectares, and, in particular, no right of use derived from the owner, or is the area at the disposal of a third party or at no one’s disposal if a third party is actually using that area for agricultural purposes without any right of use?

2.

Is the phrase ‘any area which gave a right to payments in 2008 under the single payment scheme or the single area payment scheme laid down, respectively, in Titles III and IVA of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003’ (2) in Article 32(2)(b) of Regulation No 1307/2013 to be interpreted as meaning that the area must in 2008 have satisfied the conditions laid down in Titles III and IVA of Regulation No 1782/2003 for a right to payments under the single payment scheme or the single area payment scheme?

3.

If the answer to Question 2 is in the negative: Is the phrase ‘any area which gave a right to payments in 2008 under the single payment scheme or the single area payment scheme laid down, respectively, in Titles III and IVA of Regulation No 1782/2003’ in Article 32(2)(b) of Regulation No 1307/2013 to be interpreted as meaning that, in order for an area that is afforested in accordance with Article 31 of Regulation No 1257/1999 (3) to be classified as eligible hectares within the meaning of Article 32(2)(b)(ii) of Regulation No 1307/2013, it is necessary that a set-aside entitlement or other payment entitlement within the meaning of Article 44(1) or Article 54(1) of Regulation No 1782/2003 has been granted in respect of that area?

4.

If the answer to Question 3 is in the negative: Is the phrase ‘any area which gave a right to payments in 2008 under the single payment scheme or the single area payment scheme laid down, respectively, in Titles III and IVA of Regulation No 1782/2003’ in Article 32(2)(b) of Regulation No 1307/2013 to be interpreted as meaning that, in order for an area that is afforested in accordance with Article 31 of Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 to be classified as eligible hectares within the meaning of Article 32(2)(b)(ii) of Regulation No 1307/2013, it is necessary that in 2008 the farmer made an application under Article 22(1) and/or Article 34(1) of Regulation No 1782/2003 and satisfied the other conditions for a direct payment under Titles III or IVA?

1.

Is Article 9(2)(e) of Directive 2011/95/EU (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a ‘refusal to perform military service in a conflict’ does not require the person concerned to have refused to perform military service in a formalised refusal procedure, where the law of the country of origin does not provide for a right to refuse to perform military service?

2.

If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative:

By the reference to ‘refusal to perform military service in a conflict’, does Article 9(2)(e) of Directive 2011/95/EU also protect persons who, after the deferment of military service has expired, do not make themselves available to the military administration of the State of origin and evade compulsory conscription by fleeing?

3.

If Question 2 is to be answered in the affirmative:

Is Article 9(2)(e) of Directive 2011/95/EU to be interpreted as meaning that, for a conscript who does not know what his future field of military operation will be, the performance of military service would, directly or indirectly, include ‘crimes or acts falling within the grounds for exclusion as set out in Article 12(2)’ solely because the armed forces of his State of origin repeatedly and systematically commit such crimes or acts using conscripts?

4.

Is Article 9(3) of Directive 2011/95/EU to be interpreted as meaning that, in accordance with Article 2(d), there must be a connection between the reasons mentioned in Article 10 and the acts of persecution as qualified in Article 9(1) and (2) of Directive 2011/95/EU or the absence of protection against such acts, even in the event of persecution under Article 9(2)(e) of Directive 2011/95/EU?

5.

In the event that Question 4 is to be answered in the affirmative, is the connection, within the meaning of Article 9(3) in conjunction with Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU, between persecution by virtue of prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service and the reason for persecution already established in the case where prosecution or punishment is triggered by refusal?

1.

Does the transport of pallets from one Member State to another Member State, for the purposes of their subsequent rental in the latter Member State to a taxable person established and registered for VAT purposes in Romania, constitute a non-transfer in accordance with Article 17(2) of Directive [2006/112/EC]? (1)

2.

Irrespective of the answer to the first question, is the taxable person under Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112/EC, who is not established in the Member State of refund but in the territory of another Member State, considered a taxable person under Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/9/EC, (2) even where that person is registered for VAT purposes or would be required to be registered for VAT purposes in the Member State of refund?

3.

In the light of the provisions of Directive 2008/9/EC, does the condition of not being registered for VAT purposes in the Member State of refund constitute a further condition to those laid down in Article 3 of Directive 2008/9/EC in order that a taxable person established in another Member State and not established in the Member State of refund may be entitled to a refund in a case such as the present?

4.

Must Article 3 of Directive 2008/9/EC be interpreted as precluding a practice of a national administration of refusing to refund VAT on grounds of failure to satisfy a condition laid down exclusively in national law?

1)

Does a decision to extend the duration of a development consent constitute the agreement of a project such as to trigger Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC (1) of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (hereinafter ‘the Habitats Directive’)?

2)

Is the answer to Question (1) above affected by any of the following considerations?

3)

In the event that the answer to Question (1) is ‘yes’, what considerations are the competent authority required to have regard to in carrying out a Stage 1 screening exercise pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive? For example, is the competent authority required to have regard to any or all of the following considerations: (i) whether there are any changes to the proposed works and use; (ii) whether there has been any change in the environmental background, e.g. in terms of the designation of European Sites subsequent to the date of the decision to grant development consent; (iii) whether there have been any relevant changes in scientific knowledge, e.g., more up-to-date surveys in respect of qualifying interests of European Sites? Alternatively, is the competent authority required to assess the environmental impacts of the entire development?

4)

Is there any distinction to be drawn between (i) a development consent which imposes a time-limit on the period of an activity (operational phase), and (ii) a development consent which only imposes a time-limit on the period during which construction works may take place (construction phase) but, provided that the construction works are completed within that time-limit, does not impose any time-limit on the activity or operation?

5)

To what extent, if any, is the obligation of a national court to interpret legislation insofar as possible in accordance with the provisions of the Habitats Directive and the Aarhus Convention subject to a requirement that the parties to the litigation have expressly raised those interpretive issues? More specifically, if national law provides two decision-making processes, only one of which ensures compliance with the Habitats Directive, is the national court obliged to interpret national legislation to the effect that only the compliant decision-making process can be invoked, notwithstanding that this precise interpretation has not been expressly pleaded by the parties in the case before it?

6)

If the answer to Question (2)(a) above is to the effect that it is relevant to consider whether the development consent (the duration of which is to be extended) was granted pursuant to a provision of national law which did not properly implement the Habitats Directive, is the national court required to disapply a rule of domestic procedural law which precludes an objector from questioning the validity of an earlier (expired) development consent in the context of a subsequent application for development consent? Is such a rule of domestic procedural law inconsistent with the remedial obligation as recently restated in Case C-348/15, Stadt Wiener (4)?

1.

Is ‘protection of the country of nationality’ within the meaning of Article 11(l)(e) and Article 2(e) of the Qualification Directive (1) to be understood as state protection?

2.

In deciding the issue of whether there is a well-founded fear of being persecuted within the meaning of Article 2(e) of the QD and the issue of whether there is protection available against such persecution, pursuant to Article 7 QD, is the ‘protection test’ or ‘protection inquiry’ to be applied to both issues and, if so, is it governed by the same criteria in each case?

3.

Leaving to one side the applicability of protection by non-State actors under Article 7(l)(b), and assuming the answer to question (1) above is yes, is the effectiveness or availability of protection to be assessed solely by reference to the protective acts/functions of state actors or can regard be had to the protective acts/functions performed by private (civil society) actors such as families and/or clans?

4.

Are (as is assumed in questions (2) and (3)) the criteria governing the ‘protection inquiry’ that has to be conducted when considering cessation in the context of Article 11(l)(e), the same as those to be applied in the Article 7 context?

—

declare that by failing to provide for an investigative body which is independent in its organisation, legal structure and decision-making of any party whose interests could conflict with the task entrusted to it, Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 8(1) of Directive 2009/18/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector and amending Council Directive 1999/35/EC and Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

order Ireland to pay the costs.

1.

Do Articles 41(1) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as recitals 10, 29, 107, 109 and 111 and Articles 1(2) and 72 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, (1) preclude a national rule or a practice in relation to the interpretation and application of that rule which, taking into account the contractual legal relationship between the contracting parties, stipulates that an infringement for an unlawful failure to hold a public tender, allegedly violating the rules concerning the modification of contracts, and a failure to comply with the provisions governing the modification of contracts, is committed not only by the contracting entity, but also by the successful tenderer which concluded the contract with it, on the basis that the unlawful modification of the contracts requires joint action by the parties?

2.

In the event that the first question is answered in the negative, taking into account the provisions of Articles 41(1) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and recitals 10, 29, 107, 109 and 111 and Articles 1(2) and 72 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, do recitals 19, 20 and 21 of Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, (2) and Article 2(2) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, (3) and Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, (4) preclude a national rule or a practice in relation to the interpretation and application of that rule which allows a penalty (fine) — other than a reduction in the duration of the contract — for unlawful failure to hold a public tendering procedure and for failure to comply with the rules on the modification of contracts to be imposed also on the successful tenderer which concluded the contract with the contracting entity?

3.

If the first two questions are answered in the negative, the referring court asks the Court of Justice of the European Union to also provide it with guidance as to whether, in order to determine the amount of the penalty (fine), it is sufficient that there is a contractual legal relationship between the parties, without it being necessary to examine the action and the contribution of the parties which led to the modification of the contract.

1.

Is the obligation on a national court to interpret the Directive 2006/115 (1) on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (‘the Directive’) in the light of the purpose and objective of the Rome Convention (2) and/or the WPPT (3) confined to concepts which are expressly referenced in the Directive, or does it, alternatively, extend to concepts which are only to be found in the two international agreements? In particular, to what extent must Article 8 of the Directive be interpreted in light of the requirement for ‘national treatment’ under Article 4 of the WPPT?

2.

Does a Member State have discretion to prescribe criteria for determining which performers qualify as ‘relevant performers’ under Article 8 of the Directive? In particular, can a Member State restrict the right to share in equitable remuneration to circumstances where either (i) the performance takes place in a European Economic Area (‘EEA’) country, or (ii) the performers are domiciles or residents of an EEA country?

3.

What discretion does a Member State enjoy in responding to a reservation entered by another Contracting Party under article 15(3) of the WPPT? In particular, is the Member State required to mirror precisely the terms of the reservation entered by the other Contracting Party? Is a Contracting Party required not to apply the 30-day rule in Article 5 of the Rome Convention to the extent that it may result in a producer from the reserving party receiving remuneration under Article 15(1) but not the performers of the same recording receiving remuneration? Alternatively, is the responding party entitled to provide rights to the nationals of the reserving party on a more generous basis than the reserving party has done, i.e. can the responding party provide rights which are not reciprocated by the reserving party?

4.

Is it permissible in any circumstances to confine the right to equitable remuneration to the producers of a sound recording, i.e. to deny the right to the performers whose performances have been fixed in that sound recording?

1.

Given that the Portuguese State did not inform the European Commission of the technical regulations contained in Decree-Law No 442/89 of 2 December 1989, should those provisions ‒ more specifically Article 3 (using the wording shown) and Article 9 mentioned below ‒ be unenforceable, and can individuals rely on that lack of enforceability?

2.

Given that the Portuguese State did not inform the European Commission of the technical regulations contained in Decree-Law No 282/2003 of 8 November 2003, should those provisions ‒ more specifically Article 2 and Article 3 mentioned below ‒ be unenforceable as against service providers in Portugal?

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declare that by introducing new simplification measures that extend the zero-rating and the exception to the normal requirement of keeping Value Added Tax records provided for by the original Terminal Markets Order 1973 without applying to the Commission with a view to seek the Council’s authorisation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 395 (2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (‘VAT Directive’);

—

order the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to pay the costs.

1.

Does the different treatment accorded only to Catholic religious education teachers, such as the applicants, constitute discrimination on grounds of religion, within the meaning of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive 2000/78/EC, (1) or does the fact that the certificate attesting to their suitability issued to these workers can be revoked constitute an adequate reason why only Catholic religious education teachers, such as the applicants, are treated differently from other teachers and are not covered by any measure precluding such treatment, as required under Clause 5 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999 and annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP?; (2)

2.

If direct discrimination is taken to have occurred, within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC, on grounds of religion (Article 1), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Court is requested to consider what instruments are available to the referring court to eliminate the effects of such discrimination, bearing in mind that all teachers other than Catholic religious education teachers are now covered by the special recruitment plan laid down in Law No 107/15, being granted tenure and consequently given employment contracts of indefinite duration. Should this court therefore impose an employment relationship of indefinite duration with the defendant public authorities?;

3.

Must Clause 5 of the framework agreement laid down in Directive 1999/70/EC be interpreted as precluding a national legal provision, such as the provision at issue, under which the rules of ordinary law governing employment relationships and intended to penalise the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts by the automatic conversion of a fixed-term contract into a contract of indefinite duration where the employment relationship continues for more than a certain period of time, do not apply to the schools sector — specifically to Catholic religious education teachers — and therefore permit successive fixed-term employment contracts for an indefinite period of time? In particular, can the requirement to obtain the approval of the diocesan ordinary constitute an objective reason within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(a) of the framework agreement, or, instead, should such treatment be regarded as discrimination prohibited under Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?;

4.

If the answer to question 3 is in the affirmative, do Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Clause 4 of the framework agreement laid down in Directive 1999/70/EC and/or Article 1 of Directive 2000/78/EC permit the disapplication of provisions that preclude the automatic conversion of a fixed-term employment contract into an employment contract of indefinite duration where the employment relationship continues for more than a certain period of time?

1.

Whether both limbs of Article 3(2)(a) apply in the case of a delayed flight:

2.

The burden of proving ‘presentation at check-in’

If the answer to question 1(a) is in the affirmative, that is to say, if Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 does apply to compensation applied for by a passenger whose flight has been delayed:

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Adapta Color, SL to pay the costs.

1.

The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

2.

Electroquimica Onubense, SL is ordered to pay the costs.

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.

The order of 14 February 2019, Lantmännen and Lantmännen Agroetanol v Commission (T-79/19 R), is cancelled.

3.

The costs are reserved.

—

declare the present action admissible in respect of the European Commission’s failure to act and establish the non-contractual liability of the Commission on the basis of Article 340 TFEU;

—

declare the present action for annulment of the European Commission’s implicit decision to refuse to act, in a letter dated 20 December 2018, admissible;

—

as regards the substance, first,

—

secondly,

1.

First plea in law, alleging Switzerland’s failure to comply with the Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons (OJ 2002 L 114, p. 6) and Directive No 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications (OJ 2005 L 255, p. 22). The applicant submits that the Swiss Confederation, in July 2013, adopted a provision restricting doctors from setting up in overstaffed areas covered by compulsory Swiss medical insurance, which constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality, in so far as that restriction does not relate to doctors with 3 years’ experience in Swiss university hospitals.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that there are no discriminatory measures on the part of the European Union vis-à-vis doctors who are Swiss nationals, in the name of the principle of reciprocity in international law, which the General Court should find, in the submission of the applicant.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the Commission’s wrongful failure to act, in so far as it was obliged to act because it is the guarantor of the Treaties under Article 17(1) TEU and of the fundamental rights of European Union citizens. In that regard, the applicant relies on the principles of legitimate expectations towards institutions and legal certainty of acquired rights.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s failure to deal with the applicant’s request to act urgently constitutes, as fact, an implied refusal and therefore a decision adversely affecting him.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission is non-contractually liable on the basis of Article 340 TFEU for failure to act.

—

annul the Commission’s decision of 17 January 2019 bearing the reference Ares(2018)6073379; and

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

Misapplication of the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 (1) (protection of commercial interests)

2.

Second plea in law: misapplication of Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001(processing of applications)

—

annul the decisions of the appointing authority of EUIPO, sent by letter of 6 June 2018, not to promote the applicant to the next grade (AST 8) in the 2014 promotion exercise, the 2015 promotion exercise, the 2016 promotion exercise and the 2017 promotion exercise; and

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

1.

Infringement of Article 45 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, manifest errors of assessment and incorrect implementation of, or failure to comply with, the judgment of 14 November 2017, Vincenti v EUIPO (T-586/16, EU:T:2017:803)

In the context of the first plea, the applicant claims that the appointing authority of the defendant infringed Article 45 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’), made manifest errors of assessment and failed to implement, or incorrectly implemented, the judgment of 14 November 2017, Vincenti v EUIPO (T-586/16, EU:T:2017:803), in so far as that authority did not treat the applicant as though it had, at the material times, allowed him to take part in the individual reporting procedures, but instead carried out an overall assessment when the contested decisions were adopted on 6 June 2018. The refusal to promote the applicant should, in accordance with that judgment, not have been based on circumstances which, at the time when the appointing authority would have been required to make a decision, were not yet known to the Office.

The applicant further submits that the overall refusal to promote him for four consecutive years by reference to the same conduct is unlawful because it constitutes a similarly severe penalty to that of Article 9(1)(e) and (f) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and therefore ultimately constitutes a sustained and punitive refusal to promote him which circumvents the rights of the defence to which he is entitled in disciplinary proceedings, as well as ‘double jeopardy’.

The applicant also claims that the contested decisions of the Office unlawfully discriminated against him on account of his long-term illness, since the defendant did not positively count the time of his illness as time in which he had improved the conduct for which he was reproached, which constitutes a manifest error of assessment and a misapplication of Article 45 of the Staff Regulations and the judgment of 14 November 2017, Vincenti v EUIPO (T-586/16, EU:T:2017:803).

2.

Infringement of the applicant’s right to be heard under Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and of the applicant’s procedural rights under Article 5 of Commission Decision C(2013) 8968 final of 16 December 2013 laying down general provisions for implementing Article 45 of the Staff Regulations, in particular under Article 5(5) and (7) of that decision

In the context of the second plea, the applicant claims that the defendant infringed the applicant’s fundamental right to be heard before the adoption of a decision adversely affecting him, after the applicant was not given the opportunity to make his views known beforehand. This is not disputed by the defendant.

The defendant therefore also directly infringed the applicant’s procedural rights under Article 5 of Commission Decision C(2013) 8968 final of 16 December 2013 laying down general provisions for implementing Article 45 of the Staff Regulations, in particular under Article 5(5) and (7) of that decision, which, moreover, reflect the considerable importance of the fundamental right to be heard that was infringed and confirm that the applicant also had the right to be heard in the present case before the adoption of the contested decisions.

—

annul EUIPO’s decisions notified by letter of 4 June 2018 refusing the applicant’s applications made by letter of 25 January 2018 seeking:

—

order EUIPO to pay to the applicant compensation of a reasonable amount, at the Court’s discretion, in respect of the non-pecuniary and non-material loss caused to the applicant by EUIPO’s decision referred to above; and

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

Manifest error of assessment, failure to exercise the defendant’s discretion, infringement of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment, infringement of the principle of non-arbitrariness

2.

Unlawfulness of the termination clause due to infringement of the Guidelines, the principle of sound administration, the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment and the principle that the ending of the contract of a temporary agent requires a justifying ground (a ‘iusta causa’) and infringement of Article 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Directive 1999/70/EC, (1) the Framework Agreement (in particular Articles 1(b) and 5.1 thereof) and Article 4 of ILO Convention No 158 concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer

3.

Infringement of the Guidelines, which also constitutes a significant procedural defect, infringement of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment, of the principle of sound administration and sound financial management, of the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken (Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), of the defendant’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff and of the duty to take into account the legitimate interests of the applicant, manifest error of assessment in its balancing of the applicant’s interests with those of the service and infringement of the principle of non-arbitrariness

4.

As a result of the infringement of the second and third sentences of the first paragraph of Article 8 CEOS and of the prohibition on repeated fixed-term employment, the applicant’s contract remains valid for an unlimited period of time without a termination clause

5.

Unlawful retention of a termination clause in the context of the Reinstatement Protocol and infringement of legitimate expectations, the applicant’s legitimate interests and the defendant’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff when exercising the clause at issue

6.

Infringement of the applicant’s legitimate expectations, of the defendant’s duty to have regard for the applicant’s welfare and failure to take into account the legitimate interests of the applicant as a result of the refusal to renew the contract and manifest error of assessment in the assessment of the interests of the service

—

annul and alter the contested decision;

and, consequently,

—

recognise the validity of EU trade mark No 13270046 ‘goclean’, registered on 9 February 2013, in respect of all or some of the goods in Class 11 (Flushing tanks for toilets; Toilet bowls; Water distribution installations);

—

order EUIPO and/or the applicant Ceramica Cielo S.p.A. to pay Ceramica Flaminia S.p.A.’s costs relating to the present proceedings as well as the two previous stages before the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal.

—

Infringement and misapplication of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Interpretation of distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Unfounded classification of the mark as a slogan;

—

Infringement and misapplication of Article 95(1) in conjunction with Article 59 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement and misapplication of Article 7(3) and Article 59(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul Commission decision C(2018) 7141 final, adopted by the European Commission on 31 October 2018 in State aid case SA.44678 (2018/N) — Lithuania — Modification of aid for LNG Terminal in Lithuania;

—

order the Commission and any interveners in support of the Commission to pay the costs.

—

The applicants argue that all the evidence in this case indicates that the Commission should have had doubts about the compatibility of the State aid with the internal market and therefore should have opened a formal investigation. The evidence ranges from the length of the preliminary investigation, other circumstances under which the contested decision was adopted and the flaws reflected in the content of the decision, which is insufficiently reasoned and vitiated by serious errors of assessment. Moreover, it is alleged that the Commission ignored very relevant aspects that should have been considered before concluding that it had enough information to declare the aid compatible with the internal market.

—

In particular, the applicants argue that: (i) the assessment of the need for a Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI) and its scope is flawed and insufficient; (ii) the Commission erred in finding that the aid was compliant with the SGEI framework; (iii) the contested decision did not sufficiently assess the latest amendments to the aid and therefore lacks adequate reasoning; (iv) the assessment in the contested decision of the necessity and proportionality of the aid measures is flawed and insufficient; and (v) the contested decision fails to sufficiently assess the significant impact on competition in the supply of gas in Lithuania and trade with other Member States.

—

annul Commission decision BUDG/DGAl/C/4/PL/Ares(2019) s. 283284 of 24 January 2019; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision violates Article 266 TFEU as it would have declined to repay the fines paid by the applicant in order to comply with Commission decision C(2016) 3920 of 29 June 2016.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision violates Article 266 TFEU as it would have reapplied de facto decision C(2010) 727 (final) of 8 February 2010 or Commission decision C(2016) 3920 of 29 June 2016 which both would have been annulled by the General Court by the judgment of 15 July 2015, GEA Group v Commission, T-189/10, EU:T:2015:504 and by the judgment of 18 October 2018, GEA Group v Commission, T-640/16, EU:T:2018:700 respectively.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use (Großbreitenbach and Schleusingen locations) repay more than 20 % of the published network charges and baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use (Steinbach am Wald location) repay more than 15 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders the repayment of more than 20 % of the published network charges for the Steinbach am Wald location; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the year 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders the repayment of more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

primarily,

—

with regard to the other rights:

—

in the alternative,

—

order the defendants to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging an abuse of rights by the defendants in the use of consecutive fixed-term contracts, and alleging infringement by the defendants of the principle of proportionality.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement by the defendants of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement by the defendants of the applicants’ right to be heard.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging legal uncertainty caused to the applicants by the defendants and infringement by the defendants of the right to proper administration.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement by the defendants of the principle that staff representatives should be consulted.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement by the defendants of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging infringement by the defendants of the right to freedom of movement for workers.

Furthermore the applicants allege that there is discrimination between workers within the institutions and, in particular, in the light of the rights granted to temporary agents, inter alia, the non-payment of various allowances, contribution to the pension scheme, reimbursement of costs and, potentially, 20 years’ service not being taken into account.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders the repayment of more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the year 2012;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges and baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges and baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the year 2012;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders the repayment of more than 20 % of published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the second plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges and baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges and baseload consumers with more than 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders the repayment of more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of published network charges and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders the repayment of more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the second plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC.. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the second plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

—

in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

—

annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

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in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

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in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

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in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges;

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in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28. Mai 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders the repayment of more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

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order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

1.

Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU

In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.

In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.

It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

2.

Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.

In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

3.

Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

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Declare the present action admissible and well founded; and, accordingly,

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Rule that the applicant is not liable to pay debit notes Nos 3241901815 (EUR 94 445.00) and 3241901886 (EUR 121 517.00) issued on 4 February 2019, and in so far as necessary, declare those debit notes invalid in accordance with Articles 263 and 264 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

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Order the European Commission to pay the entirety of the costs and expenses, the amount of which is provisionally fixed at EUR 8 000.

1.

First plea in law, alleging failure to disclose the final audit report and the fact that it was impossible for the applicant to put forward its point of view in full knowledge of the facts. The failure to disclose means that the debit notes issued by the Commission are not substantiated.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging failure on the part of the auditor and the Commission to comply with the rules determining eligible costs. The applicant disputes the position of the Commission which, by its decision, allegedly added a requirement which was not provided for in the legislation applicable to telework matters in particular. The Commission’s conduct was therefore inconsistent with that which it had itself adopted during previous audits involving the applicant.

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annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/73 of 17 January 2019 (1), in as far as it relates to the applicant; and

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order the defendant to pay the costs.