Dernières publications de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne au Journal officiel de l’Union européenne

(2019/C 155/01)

Dernière publication

JO C 148 du 29.4.2019

Historique des publications antérieures

JO C 139 du 15.4.2019

JO C 131 du 8.4.2019

JO C 122 du 1.4.2019

JO C 112 du 25.3.2019

JO C 103 du 18.3.2019

JO C 93 du 11.3.2019

Ces textes sont disponibles sur

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság — Hungary) — Zsuzsanna Dunai v ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt

(Case C-118/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Consumer protection - Unfair terms in consumer contracts - Directive 93/13/EEC - Article 1(2) - Article 6(1) - Loan contract denominated in a foreign currency - Exchange difference - Substitution of a legislative provision for an unfair term declared void - Exchange rate risk - Continued existence of the contract after the unfair term has been deleted - National system for a uniform interpretation of law)

(2019/C 155/02)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Zsuzsanna Dunai

Defendant: ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that: — it does not preclude national legislation which prevents the court seised of the case from granting an application for the cancellation of a loan contract on the basis of the unfair nature of a term relating to the exchange difference, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, provided that a finding that terms in such an agreement were unfair would restore the legal and factual situation that the consumer would have been in had that unfair term not existed; and — it precludes national legislation which prevents, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the court seised of the case from granting an application for the cancellation of a loan contract on the basis of the unfair nature of a term relating to exchange rate risk where it is found that that term is unfair and that the contract cannot continue to exist without that term.

2.

Directive 93/13, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, does not preclude a supreme court of a Member State from adopting, in the interest of ensuring uniform interpretation of the law, binding decisions concerning the modalities for implementing that directive, in so far as those decisions do not prevent the competent court from ensuring the full effect of the norms laid down in that directive and from offering consumers an effective remedy for the protection of the rights that they can derive therefrom, or from referring a question for a preliminary ruling to the Court in that regard, which it is for the referring court to determine.

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(1)  OJ C 221, 10.7.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 13 March 2019 — Republic of Poland v European Parliament, Council of the European Union

(Case C-128/17) (1)

(Action for annulment - Directive (EU) 2016/2284 - Reduction of national emissions of certain atmospheric pollutants - Adoption of EU legal acts - Functioning of the legislative procedure - Article 4(3) TEU - Principle of cooperation in good faith - Actual exercise of the EU legislature’s powers of discretion - Impact assessment - Sufficient assessment of the effects of the contested act - Article 5(4) TEU - Principle of proportionality - Article 4(2) TEU - Equality of Member States before the Treaties - Article 191(2) TFEU - EU policy on the environment - Account taken of the diversity of the EU regions - Judicial review)

(2019/C 155/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, Agent)

Defendants: European Parliament (represented by: A. Tamás and A. Pospíšilová Padowska, Agents), Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Simm, A.-Z. Varfi, K. Adamczyk Delamarre and A. Sikora-Kalėda, Agents)

Interveners in support of the applicant: Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér, G. Koós and E. Tóth, Agents), Romania (represented by: C. Canțăr, R.H. Radu, A. Wellman and M. Chicu, Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendants: European Commission (represented by: K. Petersen, K. Herrmann and G. Gattinara, Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders the Republic of Poland to pay the costs incurred by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union;

3.	Orders Hungary, Romania and the European Commission to bear their own respective costs.

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(1)  OJ C 151, 15.5.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State — Netherlands) — M.G. Tjebbes and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

(Case C-221/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Citizenship of the European Union - Article 20 TFUE - Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Nationalities of a Member State and of a third country - Loss of the nationality of a Member State and of citizenship of the Union by operation of law - Consequences - Proportionality)

(2019/C 155/04)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: M.G. Tjebbes, G.J.M. Koopman, E. Saleh Abady, L. Duboux

Defendant: Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Operative part of the judgment

Article 20 TFEU, read in the light of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides under certain conditions for the loss, by operation of law, of the nationality of that Member State, which entails, in the case of persons who are not also nationals of another Member State, the loss of their citizenship of the Union and the rights attaching thereto, in so far as the competent national authorities, including national courts where appropriate, are in a position to examine, as an ancillary issue, the consequences of the loss of that nationality and, where appropriate, to have the persons concerned recover their nationality ex tunc in the context of an application by those persons for a travel document or any other document showing their nationality. In the context of that examination, the authorities and the courts must determine whether the loss of the nationality of the Member State concerned, when it entails the loss of citizenship of the Union and the rights attaching thereto, has due regard to the principle of proportionality so far as concerns the consequences of that loss for the situation of each person concerned and, if relevant, for that of the members of their family, from the point of view of EU law.

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(1)  OJ C 239, 24.7.2017.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 March 2019 — European Commission v Czech Republic

(Case C-399/17) (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 - Shipment of waste - Refusal of the Czech Republic to ensure the take-back of the mixture TPS-NOLO (Geobal) shipped from that Member State to Poland - Existence of waste - Burden of proof - Proof)

(2019/C 155/05)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: P. Němečková, E. Sanfrutos Cano and L. Haasbeek, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Czech Republic (represented by: M. Smolek, J. Vláčil, T. Müller and L. Dvořáková, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders the European Commission to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 293, 4.9.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 14 March 2019 — Meta Group Srl v European Commission

(Case C-428/17 P) (1)

(Appeal - Arbitration clause - Grant agreements concluded in the context of the Sixth Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities (2002-2006) - Grant agreements concluded in the context of the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (2007-2013) - Amounts allegedly owed by the European Commission in relation to the performance of those agreements - Outstanding balance of the total amount of the financial contribution granted to the appellant - Contractual liability)

(2019/C 155/06)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Meta Group Srl (represented by: A. Formica, avvocato)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal and D. Recchia, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	dismisses the appeal;

2.	orders Meta Group Srl to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 293, 4.9.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 13 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — Gemeinsamer Betriebsrat EurothermenResort Bad Schallerbach GmbH v EurothermenResort Bad Schallerbach GmbH

(Case C-437/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Free movement of workers - Article 45 TFEU - Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 - Article 7(1) - Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality - Right to paid annual leave based on the seniority of the worker with the employer - Account taken only in part of previous periods of service completed with other employers - Social law - Disparity between the schemes and legislation of the Member States)

(2019/C 155/07)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Gemeinsamer Betriebsrat EurothermenResort Bad Schallerbach GmbH

Defendant: EurothermenResort Bad Schallerbach GmbH

Operative part of the judgment

Article 45 TFEU and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, for the purposes of determining whether a worker with 25 years of professional experience is entitled to an increase in his paid annual leave from five to six weeks, the years of service completed with one or more employers prior to the start of the worker’s period of service with his current employer account for only a maximum of five years of professional experience, even if their actual number is more than five.

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(1)  OJ C 382, 13.11.2017.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof — Germany) — A & G Fahrschul-Akademie GmbH v Finanzamt Wolfenbüttel

(Case C-449/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common system of value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 132(1)(i) and (j) - Exemption for certain activities in the public interest - School or university education - Concept - Driving school tuition provided by a driving school)

(2019/C 155/08)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A & G Fahrschul-Akademie GmbH

Defendant: Finanzamt Wolfenbüttel

Operative part of the judgment

The concept of ‘school or university education’, within the meaning of Article 132(1)(i) and (j) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, must be interpreted as not covering motor vehicle driving tuition provided by a driving school, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, for the purpose of acquiring driving licences for vehicles in categories B and C1 referred to in Article 4(4) of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences.

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(1)  OJ C 330, 2.10.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State — Netherlands) — Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie v Y.Z., Z.Z., Y.Y.

(Case C-557/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Right to family reunification - Directive 2003/86/EC - Article 16(2)(a) - Article 17 - Withdrawal of the residence permit of a member of the family of a third-country national - Status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents - Directive 2003/109/EC - Article 9(1)(a) - Loss of that status - Fraud - Lack of knowledge of the fraud)

(2019/C 155/09)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

Defendants: Y.Z., Z.Z., Y.Y.

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 16(2)(a) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification must be interpreted as meaning that, where falsified documents were produced for the issuing of residence permits to family members of a third-country national, the fact that those family members did not know of the fraudulent nature of those documents does not preclude the Member State concerned, in application of that provision, from withdrawing those permits. In accordance with Article 17 of that directive, it is however for the competent national authorities to carry out, beforehand, a case-by-case assessment of the situation of those family members, by making a balanced and reasonable assessment of all the interests in play.

2.

Article 9(1)(a) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, must be interpreted as meaning that, where long-term resident status has been granted to third-country nationals on the basis of falsified documents, the fact that those nationals did not know of the fraudulent nature of those documents does not preclude the Member State concerned, in application of that provision, from withdrawing that status.

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(1)  OJ C 402, 27.11.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 13 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag zittingsplaats Haarlem — Netherlands) — E. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

(Case C-635/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Area of freedom, security and justice - Immigration policy - Right to family reunification - Directive 2003/86/EC - Exclusions from the scope of the directive - Article 3(2)(c) - Exclusion of persons benefiting from subsidiary protection - Extension of the right to family reunification to those persons under national law - Jurisdiction of the Court - Article 11(2) - Lack of official documentary evidence of the family relationship - Explanations regarded as insufficiently plausible - Obligations on the authorities of the Member States to take additional steps - Limits)

(2019/C 155/10)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag zittingsplaats Haarlem

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: E.

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

Operative part of the judgment

1.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 267 TFEU, to interpret Article 11(2) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where a national court is called upon to rule on an application for family reunification lodged by a beneficiary of subsidiary protection, if that provision was made directly and unconditionally applicable to such a situation under national law.

2.

Article 11(2) of Directive 2003/86 must be interpreted as precluding, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, in which an application for family reunification has been lodged by a sponsor benefiting from subsidiary protection in favour of a minor of whom she is the aunt and allegedly the guardian, and who resides as a refugee and without family ties in a third country, that application from being rejected solely on the ground that the sponsor has not provided official documentary evidence of the death of the minor’s biological parents and, consequently, that she has an actual family relationship with him, and that the explanation given by the sponsor to justify her inability to provide such evidence has been deemed implausible by the competent authorities solely on the basis of the general information available concerning the situation in the country of origin, without taking into consideration the specific circumstances of the sponsor and the minor and the particular difficulties they have encountered, according to their testimony, before and after fleeing their country of origin.

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(1)  OJ C 63, 19.2.2018.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 13 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen — Sweden) — Skatteverket v Srf konsulterna AB

(Case C-647/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 53 - Supply of services in respect of admission to educational events - Place of taxable transactions)

(2019/C 155/11)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Skatteverket

Defendant: Srf konsulterna AB

Operative part of the judgment

Article 53 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008, must be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘services in respect of admission to events’ in that provision includes a service, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in the form of a five-day course on accountancy and management which is supplied solely to taxable persons and requires advance registration and payment.

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(1)  OJ C 52, 12.2.2018.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 March 2019 — AlzChem AG v European Commission

(Case C-666/17 P) (1)

(Appeal - Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Third indent of Article 4(2) - General presumption of confidentiality of documents relating to an investigation procedure in the field of State aid - Scope)

(2019/C 155/12)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: AlzChem AG (represented by: A. Borsos, avocat, and J.A. Guerrero Pérez, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: L. Armati and A. Buchet, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders AlzChem AG to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 112, 26.3.2018.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Helsingin käräjäoikeus — Finland) — Metirato Oy, in liquidation v Suomen valtio/Verohallinto, Eesti Vabariik/Maksu- ja Tolliamet

(Case C-695/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2010/24/EU - Mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures - Article 13(1) - Article 14(2) - Enforced recovery, by the authorities of the requested Member State, of claims of the applicant Member State - Procedure relating to an application seeking the restitution of those claims to the insolvency estate of a company established in the requested Member State - Defendant in those proceedings - Determination)

(2019/C 155/13)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Helsingin käräjäoikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Metirato Oy, in liquidation

Defendants: Suomen valtio/Verohallinto, Eesti Vabariik/Maksu- ja Tolliamet

Operative part of the judgment

Article 13(1) and Article 14(2) of Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures must be interpreted as meaning that, first, they apply to proceedings seeking restitution, to the insolvency estate of a company established in the requested Member State, of claims which were recovered at the request of the applicant Member State, if those proceedings are based on disputes concerning the enforcement measures, within the meaning of Article 14(2) and, second, the requested Member State, within the meaning of those provisions, must be regarded as the defendant in those proceedings, the fact that the amount represented by those claims has been separated from the assets of that Member State or merged with them being irrelevant in that regard.

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(1)  OJ C 83, 5.3.2018.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein oikeus — Finland) — Vantaan kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy

(Case C-724/17) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Competition - Article 101 TFEU - Compensation for the damage caused by a cartel prohibited by that article - Determination of the undertakings liable to provide compensation - Succession of legal entities - Concept of ‘undertaking’ - Economic continuity test)

(2019/C 155/14)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Vantaan kaupunki

Respondents: Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy

Operative part of the judgment

Article 101 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, in which all the shares in the companies which participated in a cartel prohibited by that article were acquired by other companies which have dissolved the former companies and continued their commercial activities, the acquiring companies may be held liable for the damage caused by the cartel in question.

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(1)  OJ C 83, 5.3.2018.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea hovrätt — Sweden) — Textilis Ltd, Ozgur Keskin v Svenskt Tenn Aktiebolag

(Case C-21/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - EU trade mark - Concept of ‘shape’ - Shape giving substantial value to the goods - Two-dimensional mark - Figurative mark also constituting a work for the purpose of copyright - Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - Article 7(1)(e)(iii) - Regulation (EU) 2015/2424)

(2019/C 155/15)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Svea hovrätt

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Textilis Ltd, Ozgur Keskin

Defendant: Svenskt Tenn Aktiebolag

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [European Union] trade mark, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015, must be interpreted as meaning that it is not applicable to marks registered before the entry into force of Regulation No 207/2009, as amended by Regulation 2015/2424.

2.

Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of Regulation No 207/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that a sign such as that at issue in the main proceedings, consisting of two-dimensional decorative motifs, which are affixed to goods, such as fabric or paper, does not ‘consist exclusively of the shape’, within the meaning of that provision.

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(1)  OJ C 94, 12.3.2018.

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen — Belgium) — Maria Vester v Rijksinstituut voor ziekte- en invaliditeitsverzekering

(Case C-134/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social security systems - Invalidity benefits - Articles 45 and 48 TFEU - Freedom of movement for workers - Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 - Different benefit schemes in the Member States - ‘Primary period of incapacity to work’ - Duration - Benefits for incapacity for work - Disadvantages for migrant workers)

(2019/C 155/16)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Maria Vester

Defendant: Rijksinstituut voor ziekte- en invaliditeitsverzekering

Operative part of the judgment

Articles 45 and 48 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which a worker who is unfit to work for one year and who has been granted invalidity status by the competent institution of the Member State of his residence, without being entitled to receive invalidity benefits on the basis of the law of that Member State, is required by the competent institution of the Member State in which he completed all his insurance periods to complete an additional one-year period of incapacity to work in order to be granted invalidity status and receive pro-rata invalidity benefits, without receiving any benefits for incapacity to work during that period.

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(1)  OJ C 182, 28.5.2018.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance de Liège — Belgium) — Jean Jacob, Dominique Lennertz v État belge

(Case C-174/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Freedom of movement for workers - Equal treatment - Income tax - Legislation for the avoidance of double taxation - Pension received in a Member State other than that of residence - Method of calculating the exemption in the Member State of residence - Loss of part of the benefit of certain tax advantages)

(2019/C 155/17)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de première instance de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Jean Jacob, Dominique Lennertz

Defendant: État belge

Operative part of the judgment

Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the application of tax legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which has the effect of depriving a couple resident in that State, one of whom receives a pension in another Member State which is exempt from taxation in the first Member State pursuant to a bilateral convention for the avoidance of double taxation, of part of the benefit of the tax advantages granted by the Member State of residence.

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(1)  OJ C 166, 14.5.2018.

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 13 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Piotrkowie Trybunalskim — Poland) — Criminal proceedings against B. S.

(Case C-195/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages - Directive 92/83/EEC - Article 2 - Definition of ‘beer’ - Beverage produced from wort obtained from a mixture containing more glucose than malt - Combined Nomenclature - Heading 2203 (beer made from malt) or 2206 (other fermented beverages))

(2019/C 155/18)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Piotrkowie Trybunalskim

Party to the main proceedings

B. S.

Other parties: Prokuratura Okręgowa w Piotrkowie Trybunalskim, Łódzki Urząd Celno-Skarbowy w Łodzi, Urząd Celno-Skarbowy w Piotrkowie Trybunalskim

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2 of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages must be interpreted as meaning that an intermediate product intended to be mixed with non-alcoholic beverages, obtained from a wort containing less malt ingredients than non-malt ingredients and to which glucose syrup is added before the fermentation process, may be classified as ‘beer made from malt’ within heading 2203 of the Combined Nomenclature in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff in the version of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2587/91 of 26 July 1991, provided that the organoleptic characteristics of the product correspond to those of beer, which is for the referring court to ascertain.

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(1)  OJ C 221, 25.6.2018.

Judgment of the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour administrative d’appel de Nancy — France) — Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes publics v Mr and Mrs Raymond Dreyer

(Case C-372/18) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social security - Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons - Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 - Article 3 - Matters covered - Levies on income from assets charged to a French resident insured under the Swiss social security scheme - Levies apportioned for the funding of two benefits administered by the French National Solidarity Fund for Independent Living - Direct and sufficiently relevant link with certain branches of social security - Definition of ‘social security benefit’ - Individual assessment of an applicant’s personal needs - Taking into account the applicant’s resources in calculating the amount of the benefits)

(2019/C 155/19)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour administrative d’appel de Nancy

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes publics

Respondents: Mr and Mrs Raymond Dreyer

Operative part of the judgment

Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems must be interpreted as meaning that benefits, such as the personal independence allowance and the disability compensation allowance, must, for the purposes of their classification as ‘social security contributions’ within the meaning of that provision, be regarded as granted without any individual assessment of a recipient’s personal needs, since the recipient’s resources are taken into account for the sole purpose of calculating the actual amount of those benefits on the basis of legally defined, objective criteria.

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(1)  OJ C 285, 13.8.2018.

Appeal brought on 3 August 2018 by Prada SA against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 June 2018 in Case T-111/16: Prada v EUIPO

(Case C-510/18 P)

(2019/C 155/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Prada SA (represented by: C: Mazzi, G. Guglielmetti, P. Tammaro, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, The Rich Prada International PT

By order of 14 February 2019 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.

Action brought on 8 October 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

(Case C-631/18)

(2019/C 155/21)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: T. Scharf, B. Rous Demiri, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Slovenia

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

—

declare that, by having failed to adopt (all) the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, or by having failed to notify the Commission that it has adopted such provisions, the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 14 of that directive; and

—	order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2017/593, the Member States were under an obligation to adopt and publish, by 3 July 2017 at the latest, the provisions necessary to comply with that directive and to communicate them forthwith to the Commission. As the Republic of Slovenia did not, within that deadline, communicate to the Commission the measures transposing that directive, the Commission has decided to bring an action before the Court of Justice.

The deadline for transposing the directive expired on 3 July 2017.

Appeal brought on 23 November 2018 by Sevenfriday AG against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 27 September 2018 in Case T-449/17: Sevenfriday v EUIPO

(Case C-733/18 P)

(2019/C 155/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Sevenfriday AG (represented by: M. Mostardini, F. Mellucci, S. Pallavicini, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Seven SpA

By order of 19 March 2019 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.

Appeal brought on 23 November 2018 by Sevenfriday AG against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 27 September 2018 in Case T-448/17: Sevenfriday v EUIPO

(Case C-734/18 P)

(2019/C 155/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Sevenfriday AG (represented by: M. Mostardini, F. Mellucci, S. Pallavicini, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Seven SpA

By order of 19 March 2019 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.

Action brought on 21 December 2018 — European Commission v Hungary

(Case C-808/18)

(2019/C 155/24)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Condou-Durande, A. Tokár and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hungary

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court of Justice should:

a)

Declare that, by: — providing that an asylum application must be made in person before the competent asylum authority, and exclusively in the transit zones, access to which is restricted to a limited number of people; — applying generally a special procedure, in which there is no guarantee that the safeguards laid down in Directive 2013/32 will be observed; — ordering that a procedure is to be applied to all asylum seekers (with the exception of those under 14 years), following which the asylum seekers must be compulsorily detained in the transit zones during the entire asylum procedure, in facilities which lead only to Serbia, without having given that detention the guarantees laid down in Directive 2013/33; — moving third-country nationals staying illegally in Hungary to the other side of the border fence, without respecting the procedures and guarantees laid down in Article 5, Article 6(1), Article 12(1) and Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/115; — not transposing Article 46(5) of Directive 2013/32 into the national legal system and adopting provisions which depart from the general rule relating to the automatic suspensive effect in situations which are not included in Article 46(6) of that directive, — Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3, Article 6, Article 24(3), Article 43 and Article 46(5) and (6) of Directive 2013/32/EU, (1) under Article 2(h), Article 8, Article 9 and Article 11 of Directive 2013/33/EU, (2) and under Article 5, Article 6(1), Article 12(1) and Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC, (3) all in conjunction with Articles 6, 18 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

b)	Order Hungary to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission takes the view that Hungary has infringed Articles 3 and 6 of Directive 2013/32 by providing that an asylum application must be made in person before the competent asylum authority, and exclusively in the transit zones, access to which is restricted to a limited number of people. In doing so, Hungary is not guaranteeing applicants for international protection effective access to the asylum procedure.

In the Commission’s view, the provisions of the Law on the right to asylum, according to which applicants are required to remain in the transit zones until their application for international protection is dealt with, give rise to a situation whereby Hungary systematically detains all asylum applicants, contrary to Directive 2013/33.

Furthermore, the Commission takes the view that Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5, Article 6(1), Article 12(1) and Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/115 by moving third-country nationals staying illegally in Hungary to the other side of the border fence, without respecting the procedures and guarantees laid down in that directive.

According to the Commission, Hungary has not transposed the general rule laid down in Article 46(5) of Directive 2013/32 into the national legal system, given that, in the event of an administrative action being brought against an application refused on the ground of being unfounded, the Law on the right to asylum has removed the provision which provided for the automatic suspensive effect of legal proceedings.

Furthermore, the Commission submits that Hungary is infringing Article 46(5) and (6) of Directive 2013/32 because, in the event of an application for international protection being refused, the Law on the right to asylum does not clearly provide for the possibility of requesting said suspensive effect. Consequently, asylum seekers’ right to remain in Hungary until the outcome of the proceedings is not guaranteed, given that the decision refusing asylum is enforceable irrespective of whether legal proceedings are brought.

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(1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).

(2)  Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96).

(3)  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Austria) lodged on 15 January 2019 — kunsthaus muerz gmbh v Zürich-Versicherungs AG

(Case C-20/19)

(2019/C 155/25)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Wien

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: kunsthaus muerz gmbh

Defendant: Zürich-Versicherungs AG

Question referred

Is Directive 2002/83/EC (1) — in particular Article 35 and Article 36 — to be interpreted as precluding a national provision under which, irrespective of a (correct) notice before conclusion of the contract regarding the right of cancellation, the cancellation period comes to an end within 30 days after the contract has been concluded, (even) if the policy holder is not a consumer?

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(1)  Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance (OJ 2002 L 345, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 23 January 2019 — FX v GZ, represented for legal purposes by her mother

(Case C-41/19)

(2019/C 155/26)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FX

Defendant: GZ, represented for legal purposes by her mother

Questions referred

1.

Does an application opposing enforcement made pursuant to Paragraph 767 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) against a foreign maintenance order constitute a matter relating to maintenance within the meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations (the European Maintenance Regulation)? (1)

2.

If not, does an application opposing enforcement made pursuant to Paragraph 767 ZPO against a foreign maintenance order constitute proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments within the meaning of Article 24(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters? (2)

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(1)  OJ 2009 L 7, p. 1.

(2)  OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 24 January 2019 — Repsol Petróleo, S.A. v Administración del Estado

(Case C-44/19)

(2019/C 155/27)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Repsol Petróleo, S.A.

Respondent: Administración del Estado

Question referred

Must Article 21(3) of Directive 2003/96 (1) be interpreted as meaning that it permits the self-consumption of energy products within the curtilage of the producer to be made subject to the excise duty on mineral oils in the proportion in which non-energy products are obtained?

Or, on the contrary, does the purpose of that provision, which is to exclude from taxation the use of energy products that is deemed necessary for obtaining final energy products, preclude the taxation of that self-consumption in so far as it results in the production of other non-energy products, even when such production is residual and occurs inevitably as a result of the production process itself?

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(1)  Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ 2003 L 283, p. 51).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo A Coruña (Spain) lodged on 24 January 2019 — Compañía de Tranvías de La Coruña, S.A. v Ayuntamiento de A Coruña

(Case C-45/19)

(2019/C 155/28)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo A Coruña

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Compañía de Tranvías de La Coruña, S.A.

Defendant: Ayuntamiento de A Coruña

Question referred

Having regard to Article 8(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, (1) does the maximum term of 30 years for contracts referred to therein begin to run: (a) when the contract is awarded or entered into; (b) on the entry into force of the aforesaid provision; (c) on the day following the expiry of the transitional period established in Article 8(2) of that regulation (3 December 2019), or (d) on any other date deemed correct by the Court of Justice of the European Union?

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(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ 2007 L 315, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Wikingerhof GmbH & Co. KG v Booking.com BV

(Case C-59/19)

(2019/C 155/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: Wikingerhof GmbH & Co. KG

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Booking.com BV

Question referred

Is Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) to be interpreted as meaning that jurisdiction for matters relating to tort or delict exists in respect of an action seeking an injunction against specific practices if it is possible that the conduct complained of is covered by contractual provisions, but the applicant asserts that those provisions are based on an abuse of a dominant position on the part of the defendant?

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(1)  OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

Appeal brought on 30 January 2019 by Suzanne Saleh Thabet, Gamal Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak, Alaa Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak, Heidy Mahmoud Magdy Hussein Rasekh, Khadiga Mahmoud El Gammal against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 22 November 2018 in Joined Cases T-274/16 and T-275/16: Saleh Thabet and Others v Council

(Case C-72/19 P)

(2019/C 155/30)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Suzanne Saleh Thabet, Gamal Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak, Alaa Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak, Heidy Mahmoud Magdy Hussein Rasekh, Khadiga Mahmoud El Gammal (represented by: D. Anderson QC, B. Kennelly QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, G. Martin, C. Enderby Smith, F. Holmey, Solicitors)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

—	set aside the decision under appeal;

—	itself give final judgment in this case, annulling the contested acts in so far as they concern the appellants;

—	in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment, in line with the legal assessment of the Court of Justice; and

—	order the Council to pay the appellants’ costs of the proceedings before the Court of Justice and the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council was not required to verify that the Egyptian authorities had respected the appellants’ fundamental EU rights.

Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council was not required to verify that the judicial proceedings and investigations involving the appellants concern acts that are such as to undermine the rule of law in Egypt.

Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 10427 (Al Watany Bank Allegations).

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 8897 (Private Villa Refurbishment Case).

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 756 (Al-Ahram Establishment Gifts Allegation) and Case No. 53 (Dar El Tahrir Gifts Allegation)

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 144 (Money Laundering Allegation).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven administrativen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 31 January 2019 — Direktor na Teritorialna direktsia Yugozapadna Agentsia ‘Mitnitsi’ pravopriemnik na Mitnitsa Aerogara Sofia v ‘Curtis Balkan’ EOOD

(Case C-76/19)

(2019/C 155/31)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Varhoven administrativen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in cassation: Direktor na Teritorialna direktsia Yugozapadna Agentsia ‘Mitnitsi’ pravopriemnik na Mitnitsa Aerogara Sofia

Respondent in the appeal in cassation:‘Curtis Balkan’ EOOD

Questions referred

1.

Is Article 158(3) of Regulation No 2454/93 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that it provides an independent basis for the adjustment of the customs value via the addition of royalties or licence fees to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods, irrespective of the rule in Article 157 of Regulation No 2454/93?

2.

Is Article 158(3) of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted as meaning that it makes provision for two alternative scenarios for the adjustment of the customs value: firstly, the scenario in which the royalties or licence fees, such as those at issue here, relate partly to the imported goods and partly to other component parts added to the goods after their importation, and, secondly, the scenario in which the royalties or licence fees relate to post-importation activities or services?

3.

Is Article 158(3) of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted as meaning that it makes provision for three scenarios for the adjustment of the customs value: firstly, the scenario in which the royalties or licence fees relate partly to the imported goods and partly to other component parts added to the goods after their importation; secondly, the scenario in which the royalties or licence fees relate partly to the imported goods and partly to post-importation activities or services; thirdly, the scenario in which the royalties or licence fees relate partly to the imported goods and partly to other component parts added to the goods after their importation, or to post-importation activities or services?

4.

Is Article 158(3) of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted as meaning that it always allows an adjustment of the customs value if it is established that the royalties or licence fees paid relate to activities or services following the importation of the goods being valued, which, in this specific case, are services that are provided to the Bulgarian company by the American company (and are connected with manufacturing and management), irrespective of whether the requirements for the adjustment pursuant to Article 157 of Regulation No 2454/93 have been met?

5.

Is Article 158(3) of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted as meaning that it constitutes a special case of customs value adjustment under the arrangements and conditions of Article 157 of Regulation No 2454/93, whereby the special nature resides solely in the fact that the royalties or licence fees relate only partly to the goods being valued, meaning that they are to be apportioned appropriately?

6.	Is Article 158(3) of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted as meaning that it is also applicable if the buyer pays a fee or royalties or licence fees to a third party?

7.

If both of the preceding questions are answered in the affirmative, must the court assess, for the appropriate apportionment of the royalty or licence fee pursuant to Article 158(3) of Regulation No 2454/93, whether both conditions of Article 157(2) have been met, namely that the royalty or licence fee relates, even if only partly, to the imported goods and that it constitutes a condition of sale of those goods, and, if so, does the rule under Article 160, pursuant to which the conditions of Article 157(2) are met if the seller or a person related to him requires the buyer to make that payment, have to be taken into account in that assessment?

8.

Is Article 160 of Regulation No 2454/93 applicable only to the fundamental rule of Article 157 of Regulation No 2454/93 in the case where the royalties or licence fees are payable to a third party and relate wholly to the product being valued, or is it also applicable in cases in which the royalties or licence fees relate only partly to the imported goods?

9.

Is Article 160 of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘relationship’ between licensor and seller should be understood to refer to cases in which the licensor is related to the buyer, because he exerts direct control over the buyer that goes beyond quality control, or is it to be interpreted as meaning that the relationship between licensor and buyer described above is not sufficient to assume an (indirect) relationship between licensor and seller, in particular if the latter disputes the view that the prices for the buyer’s orders for the imported goods were dependent on the payment of royalties or licence fees and likewise disputes the view that the licensor was in a position to direct or restrict its actions operationally?

10.

Is Article 160 of Regulation No 2454/93 to be interpreted as meaning that it allows an adjustment of the customs value only if both of the conditions set out in Article 157 of Regulation No 2454/93 are met, namely that the royalty or licence fee that is paid to a third party is related to the goods being valued and constitutes a condition of sale of those goods, and the condition that the seller or a person related to him requires the buyer to pay the royalty or licence fee is also met?

11.

Is the requirement under the first indent of Article 157(2) of Regulation No 2454/93 — that the royalty or licence fee be related to the goods being valued — to be regarded as having been fulfilled in the case where there is an indirect connection between the royalty or licence fee and the imported goods, such as that in the present case, if the goods being valued are component parts of the licensed end product?

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(1)  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1993 L 253, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 7 February 2019 — TV Play Baltic AS v Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija

(Case C-87/19)

(2019/C 155/32)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TV Play Baltic AS

Defendant: Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija

Questions referred

1.

Is Article 2(m) of Directive 2002/21/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) to be interpreted as meaning that the ‘provision of an electronic communications network’ does not cover activities of television rebroadcasting over satellite networks owned by third parties, such as those carried out by the applicant?

2.

Is Article 31(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, to be interpreted as precluding Member States from imposing a ‘must carry’ obligation (to broadcast a television channel over satellite networks owned by third parties and to provide access for end-users to that broadcast) on economic operators, such as the applicant, which (1) broadcast a television channel protected by a conditional access system over satellite networks owned by third parties, to that end receiving signals of television programmes (channels) broadcast at that time, converting them, encrypting them and transmitting them to an artificial Earth satellite from which they are uninterruptedly transmitted back to Earth, and (2) offer television channel packages to customers, to that end providing access to that protected television broadcast (or part thereof) by conditional access devices in return for remuneration?

3.

Is Article 31(1) of Directive 2002/22, as amended by Directive 2009/136, to be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of the application of that provision, a significant number of end-users are not considered to use electronic communications networks (in the present case, a satellite broadcasting network) as their principal source (means) to receive television broadcasts where those networks are used as that principal source (means) by only approximately 6 % of all end-users (in the present case, households)?

4.	When assessing whether application of Article 31(1) of Directive 2002/22, as amended by Directive 2009/136, is justified, is regard to be had to the internet users who may, free of charge, view the television programmes in question (or part thereof) live online?

5.

Is Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be interpreted as precluding Member States from imposing a mandatory obligation on economic operators, such as the applicant, to rebroadcast a television channel over electronic communications networks free of charge where the broadcaster for whose benefit that obligation is laid down is fully capable of broadcasting those television channels itself over the same network with its own funds?

6.

Is Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be interpreted as precluding Member States from imposing a mandatory obligation on economic operators, such as the applicant, to rebroadcast a television channel over electronic communications networks free of charge where that obligation would cover only approximately 6 % of all households and those households have the possibility of viewing that television channel by means of the terrestrial broadcasting network or the internet?

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(1)  OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33.

(2)  OJ 2002 L 108, p. 51.

(3)  OJ 2009 L 337, p. 11.

Appeal brought on 6 February 2019 by the European External Action Service against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 27 November 2018 in Case T-315/17, Hebberecht v EEAS

(Case C-93/19P)

(2019/C 155/33)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European External Action Service (represented by: S. Marquardt and R. Spac, Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Chantal Hebberecht

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside the judgment of the General Court of 27 November 2018 in Case T-315/17;

—	dismiss the action at first instance as unfounded;

—	order the other party to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

According to the EEAS, the General Court erred in law in basing its judgment on an infringement of Article 1d(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials and in considering that that provision contains a principle directly applicable to individual decisions adopted by the institution pursuant to those regulations (paragraphs 93 and 94 of the judgment under appeal).

In addition, even if Article 1d(2) of the Staff Regulations were to impose a directly applicable obligation, that provision could not apply in the present case, given the nature of the decision at issue, which concerned only the applicant in her capacity as Head of Delegation, and which was not suitable for the application of the principle of gender equality.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 11 February 2019 — Donex Shipping and Forwarding B.V., other party: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

(Case C-104/19)

(2019/C 155/34)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Donex Shipping and Forwarding BV

Other party: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Questions referred

1.

Is Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 (1) invalid in respect of an EU importer due to the infringement of Article 2(11) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (2) in so far as the Council, in determining the dumping margin for the relevant products of non-cooperating Chinese exporting producers, excluded the export transactions of certain types of the product from the comparison referred to in that article?

2.

Is Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 invalid in respect of an EU importer due to the infringement of Article 2(10) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 in so far as, in the context of calculating the magnitude of the dumping margin for the products concerned, the institutions of the Union refused to take into account, when comparing the normal value of the products of an Indian producer with the export prices of similar Chinese products, adjustments relating to import duties on raw materials and indirect taxes in the analogue country India and to differences in production (costs) and/or in so far as the institutions of the Union, during the investigation, did not provide cooperating Chinese exporting producers (in a timely manner) with all the data of the Indian producer with regard to the determination of the normal value?

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(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ 2009 L 29, p. 1).

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 15 February 2019 — X, other parties: College van burgemeester en wethouders van de gemeente Purmerend, Tamoil Nederland B.V.

(Case C-120/19)

(2019/C 155/35)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: X

Other parties: College van burgemeester en wethouders van de gemeente Purmerend, Tamoil Nederland B.V.

Questions referred

1.

a. Must Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/68/EC (1) be interpreted as precluding a licensing condition, included in the licence for the LPG service station, which stipulates that the individual LPG service station concerned may exclusively be supplied by LPG road tankers that are fitted with a heat-resistant lining whereas that obligation is not directly imposed on one or more operators of LPG road tankers? b. In answering the first question, does it matter that the Member State has concluded an agreement in the form of the ‘Safety Deal hittewerende bekleding op LPG-autogastankwagens’ (‘Safety Deal on heat-resistant lining on LPG automotive-fuel road tankers’) with organisations of market participants in the LPG industry (including operators of LPG service stations, producers, sellers and carriers of LPG), in which the parties have committed themselves to implementing the heat-resistant lining and that, subsequently, that Member State issued a circular such as the ‘Circulaire effectafstanden externe veiligheid LPG-tankstations voor besluiten met gevolgen voor de effecten van een ongeval’ (‘Circular on safety distances external safety LPG service stations for decisions with consequences for the effects of an accident’), in which an additional risk policy is laid down that is based on the assumption that LPG service stations are supplied by means of road tankers fitted with a heat-resistant lining?

2.

a. If a national court is assesses the lawfulness of an enforcement decision aimed at enforcing compliance with a licensing condition that has become legally unchallengeable and is contrary to EU law: — does EU law, in particular the case-law of the Court of Justice on national procedural autonomy, allow the national court in principle to proceed on the assumption of the legality of such a licensing condition, unless it is clearly contrary to higher law, including EU law? And if so, does EU law impose (additional) conditions on that exception?; — or does EU law entail, having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice in Ciola (Case C-224/97, EU:C:1999:212) and Man Sugar (Case C-274/04, EU:C:2006:233), that the national court should disregard such a licensing condition because it is contrary to EU law? b. In answering question 2 a., is it relevant whether the enforcement decision is a remedy or a criminal charge?

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(1)  Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on the inland transport of dangerous goods (OJ 2008 L 260, p. 13).

Appeal brought on 22 January 2019 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16, Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission

(Case C-177/19 P)

(2019/C 155/36)

Languages of the case: Spanish and French

Parties

Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: J. Möller, S. Eisenberg and D. Klebs, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

1.	set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 13 December 2018, Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v Commission (T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16, EU:T:2018:927);

2.	dismiss the actions;

3.	order the applicants at first instance to pay the costs incurred before the General Court and the Court of Justice; and

4.	in the alternative, vary point 3 of the operative part of the judgment referred to above so that the effectiveness of the annulled provision is maintained for a maximum period that is significantly longer than 12 months from the date on which that judgment takes effect.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on four grounds of appeal:

First, the General Court wrongly found that the action was admissible. The General Court erred in law when it accepted that the applicant municipalities were directly concerned by Regulation (EU) 2016/646 (1) when exercising their powers to enact measures to prevent air pollution.

Second, the judgment under appeal contains insufficient reasoning, in so far as it contains no reasons explaining how that regulation directly concerns the applicants. Rather, the General Court concludes that the applicants at first instance are directly concerned solely on the basis that Directive 2007/46/EC (2) precludes them from imposing bans on vehicles compliant with the Euro 6 standard. This interpretation of Directive 2007/46 is also incorrect.

Third, the General Court also erred in law when, contrary to Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007, (3) it accepted that the Commission did not have the power to enact Regulation 2016/646 in that particular form. The General Court overlooked the fact that the Commission had greater discretion when it set the conformity factors for exhaust gas measurements in RDE test procedures in Regulation 2016/646. The Commission was not amending the limits in Regulation No 715/2007 — although the General Court accepted that it was — but rather was setting those limits, which was necessary on account of the novelty and particular nature of the measurement procedure (measurement tolerances).

Fourth, the General Court also erred in law when it accepted that an annulment in part of Regulation 2016/646 is legally possible. When it did so, it failed to take into account that the measurement procedure could not practically be carried out without conformity factors and that the Commission expressly made the binding nature of the RDE procedure for approval purposes contingent on the introduction of correction factors.

In its alternative form of order, the German Government claims that the General Court failed sufficiently to take into account the fact that it is impossible for the EU legislature to enact a new provision in the period set out in the judgment under appeal. Consequently, the effectiveness of the provision annulled by the judgment under appeal should be maintained for a maximum period that is significantly longer than 12 months from the date on which that judgment takes effect.

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(1)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/646 of 20 April 2016 amending Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 as regards emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 6); OJ 2016 L 109, p. 1.

(2)  Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles; OJ 2007 L 263, p. 1.

(3)  Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information; OJ 2007 L 171, p. 1.

Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Hungary against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16, Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v Commission

(Case C-178/19 P)

(2019/C 155/37)

Languages of the case: Spanish and French

Parties

Appellant: Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér, acting as Agent)

Other parties to the proceedings: Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles, Ayuntamiento de Madrid, European Commission

Form of order sought

Hungary claims in its appeal before the Court of Justice that the Court should:

Principally, — Set aside the judgment delivered on 13 December 2018 by the General Court in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16, Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission, and declare that the actions brought by the Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid are inadmissible;

In the alternative: — Annul the operative part of the judgment at first instance in part in so far as it sets a 12-month period starting on the date on which that judgment takes effect and during which the effects of the provision annulled by the judgment are to be maintained and, simultaneously, order that the effects of the annulled provision be maintained until new rules replacing those provisions have been adopted;

In addition: — Order the applicants in the proceedings before the General Court to bear the costs of the appeal proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In its appeal, the Hungarian Government disputes, first, the findings in the judgment under appeal concerning admissibility and, consequently, the admissibility of the actions for annulment and, second, the assessment and finding in the judgment under appeal relating to the future effects of the annulled provisions.

According to the Hungarian government, the General Court finds erroneously in the judgment under appeal that Regulation 2016/646 (1) does not require any implementing measures with respect to the applicants and that they are directly concerned by the regulation and, accordingly, that they have standing to institute proceedings under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. In fact, Regulation 2016/646 requires implementing measures concerning the applicants also; in addition, the regulation does not concern the applicants directly, since the limitation relating to measures restricting the use of vehicles adopted or envisaged by the applicants which is found to exist in the judgment under appeal does not stem from the regulation.

Furthermore, in the opinion of the Hungarian government, the General Court infringes in the judgment under appeal the principle of legal certainty by setting a 12-month period during which the effects of the provision annulled are to be maintained, given that that period cannot be considered to be sufficient to adopt rules to replace that provision. The shortened period granted to businesses to prepare is not sufficient to comply with the modified provisions and it does not either allow for the mitigation of business losses which have already been assessed. A situation which is contrary to the principle of legal certainty will arise during the period between the end of the transitional effects of the annulled provision and the adoption of the new rules and the rights of both car manufacturers and consumers will be seriously infringed.

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(1)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/646 of 20 April 2016 amending Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 as regards emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 6) (OJ 2016 L 109, p. 1).

Appeal brought on 23 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16 Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission

(Case C-179/19 P)

(2019/C 155/38)

Languages of the case: Spanish and French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: J.F. Brakeland, Agent)

Other parties to the proceedings: Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles, Ayuntamiento de Madrid

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018, of which the Commission was notified on the same date, in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16 Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission, dismiss the action at first instance and order the applicants to pay the costs; or, in the alternative,

—	set aside the judgment and refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is founded on a single ground of appeal. The Commission submits that, in paragraphs 121 to 151 of its judgment, the General Court erred in law in concluding that Regulation 2016/646 (1) modifies an essential element of Regulation 715/2007. (2) That error is due, first, to the General Court’s incorrect interpretation of the concept of modification, illustrated by its recourse to the concept of ‘de facto’ modification, and, secondly, to an incorrect interpretation of the scope of Regulation 2016/646. In doing so, the judgment endangers the inter-institutional balance of the European Union.

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(1)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/646 of 20 April 2016 amending Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 as regards emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 6) (OJ 2016 L 109, p. 1)

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information (OJ L 2007 L 171, p. 1)

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 26 February 2019 — Supreme Site Services GmbH, Supreme Fuels GmbH & Co KG, Supreme Fuels Trading Fze v Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

(Case C-186/19)

(2019/C 155/39)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Supreme Site Services GmbH, Supreme Fuels GmbH & Co KG, Supreme Fuels Trading Fze

Defendant: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

Questions referred

1.

(a) Must Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1; ‘Brussel I Regulation (recast)’) be interpreted as meaning that a matter such as that at issue in the present case, in which an international organisation brings an action to (i) lift an interim garnishee order levied in another Member State by the opposing party, and (ii) prohibit the opposing party from levying, on the same grounds, an interim garnishee order in the future and from basing those actions on immunity of execution, must be wholly or partially considered to be a civil or commercial matter as referred to in Article 1(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast)? (b) In answering question 1(a), what significance, if any, should be attached to the fact that the court of a Member State has granted leave to attach for a claim which the opposing party alleges to have against the international organisation, a claim in respect of which substantive proceedings are pending in that Member State, relating to a contractual dispute over the payment for fuels supplied for a peace operation carried out by an international organisation connected to the international organisation concerned?

2.

(a) If question 1(a) is answered in the affirmative, must Article 24(5) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) be interpreted as meaning that, in a case in which the court of a Member State has granted leave to levy an interim garnishee order and that garnishee order has subsequently been levied in another Member State, the courts of the Member State where the interim garnishee order was levied have exclusive jurisdiction to hear a claim for the lifting of that garnishee order? (b) In answering question 2(a), what significance, if any, should be attached to the fact that the international organisation has based its action to lift the interim garnishee order on immunity of execution?

3.

If, in answering the question of whether a civil or commercial matter as referred to in Article 1(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) is at issue, or alternatively, the question of whether a claim falling within the scope of Article 24(5) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) is at issue, significance is attached to the fact that the international organisation has based its claims on immunity of execution, to what extent is the court seised of the matter obliged to assess whether the reliance on immunity of execution is effective, and in that regard does the rule apply that it must assess all the evidence available to it, including, where appropriate, the disputes involving the respondent, or any other rule?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Förvaltningsrätten i Malmö (Sweden) lodged on 27 February 2019 — A v Migrationsverket

(Case C-193/19)

(2019/C 155/40)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Förvaltningsrätten i Malmö

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A

Defendant: Migrationsverket

Questions referred

1.

Do the provisions of the Schengen Convention, including, in particular, the provisions on the systematic consultation of the SIS and the Schengen Borders Code and including, in particular, the requirement to hold a valid passport laid down therein, constitute obstacles to the grant of residence permits on the basis of applications which were submitted in Sweden and which are not based on grounds of protection or humanitarian grounds, when the identity is unclear?

2.	If that is the case, can the exception on establishment of identity be governed by national law or by case-law?

3.	If the situation described in paragraph 2 above is not the case, what, if any, derogation is provided for in EU law?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā rajona tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 5 March 2019 — SIA ‘KOB’ v Madonas novada pašvaldības Administratīvo aktu strīdu komisija

(Case C-206/19)

(2019/C 155/41)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Administratīvā rajona tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SIA ‘KOB’

Defendant: Madonas novada pašvaldības Administratīvo aktu strīdu komisija

Question referred

Does European Union law, in particular Articles 18, 49 and 63 TFEU, preclude national legislation which requires legal persons – in cases where the member or members who together represent more than half of the voting capital in the company, and all persons who are entitled to represent that company, are nationals of other Member States of the European Union – to submit certificates of registration of those members or representatives as Union citizens and a document demonstrating that they have a knowledge of the official language corresponding to at least level B.2, in order to acquire ownership of agricultural land?

Judgment of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Italy and Others v Commission

(Joined Cases T-98/16, T 196/16 and T-198/16) (1)

(State aid - Intervention by a consortium governed by private law of banks in favour of one of its members - Intervention authorised by the Central Bank of the Member State - Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market - Action for annulment - Definition of State aid - Whether imputable to the State - State resources)

(2019/C 155/42)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant in Case T-98/16: Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieir, Agent, S. Fiorentino and P. Gentili, avvocati dello Stato)

Applicant in Case T-196/16: Banca Popolare di Bari SCpA, formerly Tercas-Cassa di risparmio della provincia di Teramo SpA (Banca Tercas SpA) (Teramo, Italy) (represented by: A. Santa Maria, M. Crisostomo, E. Gambaro and F. Mazzocchi, lawyers)

Applicant in Case T-198/16: Fondo interbancario di tutela dei depositi (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Siragusa, G. Scassellati Sforzolini and G. Faella, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P. Stancanelli, L, Flynn, A. Bouchagiar and D. Recchia, Agents,)

Intervener in support of the applicant in Cast T-198/16: Banca d’Italia (represented by: M. Perassi, O. Capolino. M. Marcucci and M. Todino, lawyers)

Re:

Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/1208 of 23 December 2015 on State aid SA.39451(2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) granted by Italy to the bank Tercas (OJ 2016 L 203 p. 1),

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2016/1208 of 23 December 2015 on State aid SA.39451(2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) granted by Italy to the bank Tercas);

2.	Orders the European Commission to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 145, 25.4.2016.

Judgment of the General Court of 12 March 2019 — Perry Ellis International Group v EUIPO (PRO PLAYER)

(Case T-220/16) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark PRO PLAYER - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2019/C 155/43)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Perry Ellis International Group Holdings Ltd (Nassau, Bahamas) (represented by: O. Günzel and C. Tenkhoff, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini and K. Markakis, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 24 February 2016 (Case R 1091/2015-2), relating to an application for registration of the word sign PRO PLAYER as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Perry Ellis International Group Holdings Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

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(1)  OJ C 232, 27.6.2016.

Judgment of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Inpost Paczkomaty and Inpost v Commission

(Joined Cases T-282/16 and T/283/16) (1)

(State aid - Postal sector - Compensation of the net costs resulting from universal service obligations - Decision declaring the aid compatible with the internal market - Action for annulment - Interest in bringing proceedings - Obligation to state reasons - Equal treatment - Proportionality - Right to property - Freedom to conduct a business)

(2019/C 155/44)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant in Case T-282/16: Inpost Paczkomaty sp. z o.o. (Krakow, Poland) (represented by: initially, T. Proć, then D. Doktór, lawyers)

Applicant in Case T-283/16: Inpost S.A. (Krakow, Poland) (represented by: W. Knopkiewicz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Herrmann, K. Blanc and D. Recchia, Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, Agent)

Re:

Applications based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking annulment of Commission Decision C(2015) 8236 final, of 26 November 2015, by which the Commission did not raise objections to the measure notified by the Polish authorities in relation to the aid granted to Poczta Polska in the form of compensation of the net cost resulting from the delivery, by that company, of its universal postal service obligations in respect of the period from and including 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the actions;

2.	Declares that Inpost Paczkomaty sp. z o.o. and Inpost S.A. are each to bear their own costs and orders them to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission;

3.	Declares that the Republic of Poland is to pay its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 270, 25.7.2016.

Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Foshan Lihua Ceramic v Commission

(Case T-310/16) (1)

(Dumping - Imports of ceramic tiles originating in China - Article 11(4) and (5) and Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (now Article 11(4) and (5) and Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036) - Refusal to grant new exporting producer treatment in accordance with Article 3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 - Sampling - Individual examination - Confidentiality)

(2019/C 155/45)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Foshan Lihua Ceramic Co. Ltd (Foshan, China) (represented by: B. Spinoit, D. Philippe and A. Wese, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented initially by: A. Demeneix, M. França and T. Maxian Rusche, and subsequently by A. Demeneix, T. Maxian Rusche and N. Kuplewatzky, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Cerame-Unie AISBL (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: V. Akritidis, lawyer)

Re:

Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, for the annulment of the Commission’s Implementing Decision C(2016) 2136 final of 15 April 2016 rejecting a request for a new exporting producer treatment with regard to the definitive anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Foshan Lihua Ceramic Co. Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

3.	Orders Cerame-Unie AISBL to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 305, 22.8.2016.

Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Prim v EUIPO — Primed Halberstadt Medizintechnik (PRIMED)

(Case T-138/17) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU word mark PRIMED - Earlier national figurative marks PRIM S.A., PRiM, S.A. SUMINISTROS MEDICOS and GRUPO PRiM - Genuine use of the earlier marks - Article 57(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 64(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Right to be heard - Second sentence of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now second sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001) - Submission of evidence for the first time before the Board of Appeal - Discretion of the Board of Appeal - Classification as new or additional evidence - Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001))

(2019/C 155/46)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Prim, SA (Móstoles, Spain) (represented by: L. Broschat García, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Lukošiūtė, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Primed Halberstadt Medizintechnik GmbH (Halberstadt, Germany) (represented by: D. Donath, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 December 2016 (Joined Cases R 2494/2015-4 and R 163/2016-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Prim and Primed Halberstadt Medizintechnik.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 19 December 2016 (Joined Cases R 2494/2015-4 and R 163/2016-4);

2.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.	Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay half of those incurred by Prim, SA;

4.	Orders Primed Halberstadt Medizintechnik GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay half of those ińcurred by Prim.

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(1)  OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.

Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Spain v Commission

(Case T-237/17) (1)

(EAGF and EAFRD - Expenditure excluded from financing - Expenditure incurred by Spain - Criterion for the recognition of a producer organization - Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 - Financial correction)

(2019/C 155/47)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: initially A. Gavela Llopis, M.A. Sampol Pucurull and S. Jiménez García, then M.A. Sampol Pucurull and S. Jiménez García, Agents)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: D. Triantafyllou and I. Galindo Martín, Agents)

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking the partial annulment of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/264 of 14 February 2017 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2017 L 39, p. 12), in so far as it excludes certain expenditure incurred by the Kingdom of Spain.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Annuls, inasmuch as it applies a flat-rate correction of 10 %, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/264 of 14 February 2017 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2017 L 39, p. 12), in so far as it excludes certain expenditure incurred by the Kingdom of Spain;

2.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.	Declares that the Kingdom of Spain and the European Commission are to bear their own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 202, 26.6.2017.

Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Meesenburg Großhandel v EUIPO (Triotherm+)

(Case T-760/17) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark Triotherm+ - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Right to be heard)

(2019/C 155/48)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Meesenburg Großhandel KG (Flensburg, Germany) (represented by: D. Freiherr von Oldershausen, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 September 2017 (Case R 1786/2016-1), concerning an application for registration of the word sign Triotherm+ as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action.

2.	Orders Meesenburg Großhandel KG to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 22, 22.1.2018.

Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Grammer v EUIPO (Representation of a shape)

(Case T-762/17) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark representing a shape - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2019/C 155/49)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Grammer AG (Amberg, Germany) (represented by: J. Bühling and D. Graetsch, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Fischer, agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 September 2017 (Case R 2250/2016-4), concerning an application for registration of a shape as an EU figurative mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 6 September 2017 (Case R-2250/2016).

2.	Orders EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs necessarily incurred by Grammer AG for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

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(1)  OJ C 22, 22.1.2018.

Judgment of the General Court of 21 March 2019 –Pan v EUIPO — Entertainment One UK (TOBBIA)

(Case T-777/17) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark TOBBIA - Earlier EU figurative mark Peppa Pig - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) and Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2019/C 155/50)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Xianhao Pan (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Oliva, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka and A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Entertainment One UK Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: J. Guise, L. Cassidy and N. Rose, Solicitors)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Astley Baker Davies Ltd (London, United Kingdom)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 September 2017 (Case R 1776/2016-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between, on the one hand, Entertainment One UK and Astley Baker Davies, and, on the other hand, Mr Xianhao.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mr Xianhao Pan to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 22, 22.1.2018.

Judgment of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — IQ Group Holdings Bhd v EUIPO — Krinner Innovation (Lumiqs)

(Case T-133/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - International registration designating the European Union - Figurative mark Lumiqs - Earlier EU word and figurative marks Lumix - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2019/C 155/51)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: IQ Group Holdings Bhd (Heckmondwike, United Kingdom) (represented by: S. Carter, Barrister)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Krinner Innovation GmbH (Straßkirchen, Germany) (represented by: T. Schmidpeter, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 December 2017 (Case R 983/2017-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Krinner Innovation and IQ Group Holdings Bhd.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 12 December 2017 (Case R 983/2017-1);

2.	Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by IQ Group Holdings Bhd;

3.	Orders Krinner Innovation GmbH to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 142, 23.4.2018.

Order of the General Court of 12 March 2019 — Strabag Belgium v Parliament

(Case T-784/17) (1)

(Action for annulment - Public works contracts - Tender procedure - General contractor works for European Parliament buildings in Brussels - Rejection of a tenderer’s bid and award of the contract to other tenderers - Replacement of the contested measure in the course of the proceedings - Action which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate)

(2019/C 155/52)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Strabag Belgium (Antwerp, Belgium) (represented by: initially by M. Schoups, K. Lemmens and M. Lahbib, and subsequently by M. Schoups and K. Lemmens, lawyers)

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: Z. Nagy and B. Simon, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action under Article 263 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of the Parliament of 24 November 2017 rejecting the applicant’s tender and awarding to five tenderers a framework contract involving general contractor works for Parliament buildings in Brussels (Belgium) (call for tenders 06D20/2017/M036) and, second, an order for the Parliament to produce various documents.

Operative part of the order

1.	There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action;

2.	The European Parliament is ordered to pay the costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures;

3.	The head of claim requesting that the Parliament be ordered to pay ‘procedural compensation’ is rejected as inadmissible.

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(1)  OJ C 32, 29.1.2018.

Order of the General Court of 8 March 2019 — Legutko and Poręba v Parliament

(Case T-156/18) (1)

(Action for failure to act - Institutional law - Rules of Procedure of the Parliament - Article 130 - Annex II - Question for written answer - Request that the question be forwarded to the Council - Notification of the decision finding the question inadmissible - Invitation to act - Position of the Parliament - Application for an injunction - Inadmissible)

(2019/C 155/53)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicants: Ryszard Antoni Legutko (Morawica, Poland) and Tomasz Piotr Poręba (Mielec, Poland) (represented by: M. Mataczyński, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: N. Görlitz, S. Alonso de León and A. Pospíšilová, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action under Article 265 TFEU seeking a declaration that the Parliament unlawfully failed to forward Question for written answer P-003358/17 to the Council of the European Union, in breach of Article 130 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament and the provisions of Annex II thereto.

Operative part of the order

1.	The action is dismissed as inadmissible;

2.	Mr Ryszard Antoni Legutko and Mr Tomasz Piotr Poręba are ordered to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 161, 7.5.2018.

Action brought on 25 February 2019 — Necci v Commission

(Case T-129/19)

(2019/C 155/54)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Claudio Necci (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the decision of 18 April 2018 rejecting his application for membership of the JSIS;

—	order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on one main plea in law and one alternative plea in law.

Primarily, he claims that the European Commission infringed Article 95 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (‘the CEOS’) by refusing to admit him as a member of the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme (JSIS), without taking into account the additional contribution period granted to him in the pension scheme of the institutions of the Union in consideration for the transfer of his national pension rights.

In the alternative, the applicant raises an objection of illegality in respect of Article 95 of the CEOS having regard to Article 45 of the TFEU.

Action brought on 28 February 2019 — AM v EIB

(Case T-134/19)

(2019/C 155/55)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: AM (represented by: L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers)

Defendant: European Investment Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	declare the present action admissible and well founded;

as a result,

—	annul the decisions of the President of the EIB of 30 June 2017 and 11 December 2017 in so far as they refuse to grant the applicant the geographical mobility allowance provided for in Article 1.4 of the Staff Rules;

—	in so far as necessary, annul the decision of the President of the EIB dated 20 November 2018 rejecting the findings of the Conciliation Board and confirming the decisions of 30 June 2017 and 11 December 2017;

accordingly,

—	order the defendant to pay the geographical mobility allowance retroactively as of 1 April 2017, that is, at the date the present action was brought, EUR 36 045.6 (EUR 1 567.20 x 23 months);

—	order the defendant to pay the default interest on the geographical mobility allowance payable since 1 April 2017, until full payment, the default interest being set at the interest rate of the European Central Bank, increased by 2 points.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 1.4 of the Staff Rules and infringement of Articles 1 and 11 of Annex VII to those Rules.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations, that of the predictability of the law and that of the duty to have regard to the welfare of staff.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, of Article 1.3 of the EIB’s Staff Code of Conduct and of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration and of the ‘reasonable time’ principle.

Action brought on 4 March 2019 — ZU v Commission

(Case T-140/19)

(2019/C 155/56)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: ZU (represented by: C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul, first, the applicant’s appraisal report of 25 April 2018;

—	annul second, the decision of non-promotion of 18 June 2018;

—	annul, third, the decision of 28 May 2018, rejecting the applicant’s request for assistance;

—	annul, fourth, in so far as necessary, decision No R/400/18 of 21 November 2018, rejecting the applicant’s complaint against his appraisal report and the decision of non-promotion;

—	annul, fifth, in so far as necessary, decision No R/461/18 of 21 November 2018, rejecting the applicant’s complaint against the decision rejecting his request for assistance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, in support of the applicant’s claim for annulment of the decision rejecting his request for assistance, alleging manifest error of assessment, violation of the duty of care, infringement of the principle of good administration, and misuse of power.

2.	Second plea in law, in support of the applicant’s claim for annulment of his appraisal report and the decision of non-promotion, alleging manifest error of assessment, omission of relevant facts and misuse of powers.

Action brought on 7 March 2019 — Jap Energéticas y Medioambientales v Commission

(Case T-145/19)

(2019/C 155/57)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Jap Energéticas y Medioambientales, SL (Valencia, Spain) (represented by: G. Alabau Zabal, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should annul the act adopted by the European Commission setting the amount to be repaid by the applicant due to the reduction of funding in Programme LIFE 11.

Pleas in law and main arguments

This action is brought against the act of the European Commission of 14 January 2019, notified on 24 January 2019, setting the amount which the applicant must repay due to the reduction of funding in Programme LIFE 11 ENV/ES/000593-H2AL RECYCLING, and making an order for payment.

In support of its action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of an essential procedural requirement. — In that regard, the applicant submits that the European Commission did not present any arguments or data enabling the applicant to counter its arguments beyond the content of the initial letter of January 2017, in which the applicant was informed of the expenses which were not eligible for funding, given that, in all its communications, the Commission merely reproduced the same arguments.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaty or any legal rule relating to its application. — In that regard, the applicant submits that acts which limit subjective rights or legitimate interests must state the reasons on which they are based, in accordance with EU law, given that, otherwise, there may be arbitrary conduct in favour of the party adopting the act, and there may be an abuse of power, which would be contrary to the principles of proportionality, legitimate expectation, equal treatment and ‘prohibition of arbitrariness’ laid down in EU law.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the right of defence — In that regard, the applicant submits that there is a lack of justification for the act, as no solid administrative criteria have been stated for declaring certain costs ineligible and, consequently, it is not possible to challenge them.

Action brought on 8 March 2019 — Société des produits Nestlé v EUIPO — Jumbo Africa (Device of a human figure centered over an escutcheon)

(Case T-149/19)

(2019/C 155/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Société des produits Nestlé SA (Vevey, Switzerland) (represented by: A. Jaeger-Lenz, A. Lambrecht and C. Elkemann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Jumbo Africa, SL (L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark representing a human figure centered over an escutcheon in colours red, blue, light blue, dark blue, grey and white — Application for registration No 15 273 634

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 30 November 2018 in Case R 876/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	dismiss the appeal relating to Opposition Proceedings No. B 2 738 030;

—	order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and order the potential intervener to pay the costs before EUIPO.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Article 94(1), second sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of Article 91(1), first sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of Article 46(1)(a) read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 8 March 2019 — Brunswick Bowling Products v Commission

(Case T-152/19)

(2019/C 155/59)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Brunswick Bowling Products LLC (Muskegon, Michigan, United States) (represented by: R. Martens and V. Ostrovskis, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul, in its entirety, the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1960 (1);

—	order the Commission to pay all costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging a breach of (i) the procedural rules contained in Article 11 of Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and Article 18(5) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) and of (ii) the principle of proportionality as stipulated in Article 18(4) of Regulation No 765/2008, since the Swedish safeguard measure is not justified in view of the fact that the applicant was misguided by the market surveillance authorities and that less far reaching measures were available in order to attain compliance with Directive 2006/42/EC.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations and of the principle of good administration, since the observations and subsequent approach by the UK, German, Finnish and Danish market surveillance authorities were not taken into account by the Commission and no reasonable and effective implementation term has been foreseen in the Contested Decision.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging a breach of procedural rules contained in Annex I of Directive 2006/42/EC, since it appears from the Contested Decision and from the decision of the Swedish Work Environment Authority of 30 August 2013 that no adequate reference is made to the general principle of the state of the art in the examination of the products in question on the basis of essential health and safety requirements (‘EHSR’) laid down in Annex I of Directive 2006/42/EC.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in its assessment of the facts and acted against the principle of good administration, since no necessary information was asked at the manufacturer despite the fact that the Contested Decision states that the manufacturer did not provide in the technical file a link between the references of the harmonized standards and the respective EHSR as required by Annex VII to Directive 2006/42/EC. Indeed, a decent acting reasonable administration would have asked this missing information prior to any decision of this amplitude.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging a breach of Article 6 of Directive 2006/42/EC and of the principle of equal treatment, as the measure in issue is specifically directed towards the products of the applicant, whilst similar and less compliant products by other manufacturers exist on the EU internal market. Furthermore, by considering only the withdrawal and recall of the products in question, the Contested Decision distorts the market, since similar machines by other manufacturers are still allowed on the EU internal market.

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(1)  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1960 of 10 December 2018 on a safeguard measure taken by Sweden pursuant to Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, to prohibit the placing on the market a type of pinsetter machine and a supplementary kit to be used together with that type of pinsetter machine, manufactured by Brunswick Bowling & Billiards, and to withdraw those machines already placed on the market (notified under document C(2018) 8253) (OJ L 315, 12.12.2018, p. 29).

(2)  Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC (OJ L 157, 9.6.2006, p. 24).

(3)  Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30).

Action brought on 11 March 2019 — European Union Copper Task Force v Commission

(Case T-153/19)

(2019/C 155/60)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Union Copper Task Force (Essex, United Kingdom) (represented by: I. Moreno-Tapia Rivas and C. Vila Gisbert, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/1981, (1) to the extent that it renews the approval of copper compounds as a candidate for substitution on an unlawful legal basis;

—	extend the effects of the annulment to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/408, (2) insofar as it implemented Article 80(7) of Regulation 1107/2009 and included copper compounds in the list of active substances as candidates for substitution;

—	declare that Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/1981 has infringed the principle of proportionality;

—	order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1981 renews the approval of copper compounds as a candidate for substitution on an unlawful legal basis. In particular: — Articles 24 and Annex II, point 4, of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 (3) infringe EU law because: (i) Scientific evidence indicates that ‘PBT criteria’, in particular persistence, are not appropriate for copper. (ii) Application of PBT criteria to inorganic substances is not consistent with other pieces of legislation that have been implemented in the field of regulated chemical substances. (iii) As far as candidates for substitution are concerned, the application of PBT criteria to copper compounds goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. In addition, Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 misinterprets the precautionary principle.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging the illegality of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/408 in relation to the qualification of copper compounds as candidates for substitution.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging, as a subsidiary plea, that Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1981 has infringed the principle of proportionality.

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(1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1981 of 13 December 2018 renewing the approval of the active substances copper compounds as candidates for substitution, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, and amending the Annex to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 (OJ 2018 L 317, p. 16).

(2)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/408 of 11 March 2015 on implementing Article 80(7) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and establishing a list of candidates for substitution (OJ 2015 L 67, p. 18).

(3)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).

Action brought on 11 March 2019 — ZU v EEAS

(Case T-154/19)

(2019/C 155/61)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: ZU (represented by: C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyer)

Defendant: European External Action Service (EEAS)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the decision of the Appointing Authority of the EEAS of 30 November 2018, rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 27 July 2018, insofar as it implicitly rejects his statement of expenses of 26 February 2018;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging failure to comply with applicable provisions of the Staff Regulations (inter alia, Articles 12a, 56 and 71 thereof) and infringement of Articles 31(1) and (2), 41(1) and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, violation of the ‘reasonable time’ principle, the principle of good administration and the principle of sound financial management (waste of EU resources), misuse of powers and concealing of evidence, breach of the rules governing the reimbursement of travel expenses, failure to comply with the principle of proportionality, manifest error of assessment, violation of the duty of care, and omission of prima facie elements identified in the applicant’s complaint based on Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.

Action brought on 12 March 2019 — AP v EIF

(Case T-155/19)

(2019/C 155/62)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: AP (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Investment Fund

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the decisions of the defendant dated 30 August 2018 and 3 October 2018 rejecting the applicant’s request dated 20 June 2018;

—	order the defendant to pay the benefits provided by article 33 of the Staff Regulations retroactively as of 1st April 2018 increased by late interest calculated at the level of the European Central Bank rate +2 points until full payment is received by the applicant;

—	order the defendant to compensate the moral harm, which can be evaluated, ex aequo et bono to the sum of at least 20 000 euros;

—	order the defendant to pay all costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the illness of the applicant involved the suspension of the notice period and the application of the social security scheme. The applicant submits that the contrary would constitute a breach of the staff regulations, of the duty of care and of the principle of legitimate expectations.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that the refusal to accept the withdrawal of the resignation of the applicant breaches the duty of care.

Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Bog-Fran v EUIPO — Fabryki Mebli ‘Forte’ (Furniture)

(Case T-159/19)

(2019/C 155/63)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Bog-Fran sp. z o.o. sp.k. (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: M. Mikosza, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Fabryki Mebli ‘Forte’ S.A. (Ostrów Mazowiecka, Poland)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the design at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Design at issue: European Union design No 1384 002-0034

Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 January 2019 in Case R 291/2018-3

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision and uphold the application for a declaration of invalidity;

—	order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to bear the costs of the proceedings and reimburse the applicant’s costs.

Plea in law

—	Infringement of Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

Action brought on 14 March 2019 — LTTE v Council

(Case T-160/19)

(2019/C 155/64)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Herning, Denmark) (represented by: A. van Eik and T. Buruma, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/25 (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant.

In the alternative, the applicant submits that a lesser measure than continued placement on the EU List of Terrorist Organizations is warranted in this case.

The applicant additionally seeks an award of costs interest to be paid with interest by the Council and which will be specified at a later stage.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging that the Contested Decision is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since the latter cannot be qualified as a terrorist organization as defined in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. (2)

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that the Contested Decision is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since no decision by a competent authority, as required by Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, has been taken.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging that the Contested Decision is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since the Council has not conducted any proper review as required by Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Contested Decision is void insofar as it concerns the applicant as it does not comply with the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity.

5.	Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Contested Decision is void insofar as it concerns the applicant as it does not comply with the obligation to state reasons in conformity with Article 296 TFEU.

6.	Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Contested Decision is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since it infringes upon the applicant’s rights of defence and its right to effective judicial protection.

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(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/25 of 8 January 2019 amending and updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2018/1084 (OJ L 6, 9.1.2019, p. 6).

(2)  Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93).

Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden/Commission

(Case T-167/19)

(2019/C 155/65)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Tempus Energy Germany GmbH (Berlin, Germany), T Energy Sweden AB (Göteborg, Sweden) (represented by: D. Fouquet and J. Derenne, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

—	annul the Commission’s decision dated 7 February 2018 relating to the planned Polish Capacity Mechanism (SA.46100, C(2018) 601 final) (1);

—	order the Commission to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the applicant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that, by failing to initiate the formal investigation procedure following the notification of the planned Polish capacity mechanism, the Commission violated Article 108(2) TFEU, Articles 4(4) and 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589 (2), together with the principles of non-discrimination, proportionality and protection of legitimate expectations and made a wrong assessment of the facts. The Commission had not succeeded in overcoming the doubts that it must have encountered during the preliminary examination phase and this affected the applicants’ procedural rights.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to provide adequate reasoning in the contested decision, in breach of Article 296 TFEU.

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(1)  OJ 2018, C 462, p. 1

(2)  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (codification), OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p.9.

Action brought on 19 March 2019 — Style & Taste v EUIPO — The Polo/Lauren Company (Representation of a polo player)

(Case T-169/19)

(2019/C 155/66)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Style & Taste, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: L. Plaza Fernández-Villa, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: The Polo/Lauren Company LP (New York, New York, United States)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Figurative mark (Representation of a polo player) — European Union trade mark No 4 049 201

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of

7 January 2019 in Case R 1272/2018-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should declare that Community trade mark No 4 049 201 was preceded by industrial design 24087 and, consequently, declare that EU trade mark No 4 049 201, the property of PRL, lacks distinctiveness as laid down in the applicable rules and, consequently, annul that EU trade mark.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Article 53(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 207/2009.

—	Infringement of national legislation on legal protection of an industrial design, and of the Intellectual Property Act.

Action brought on 20 March 2019 — Sherpa Europe v EUIPO — Núcleo de comunicaciones y control (SHERPA NEXT)

(Case T-170/19)

(2019/C 155/67)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Sherpa Europe, SL (Erandio, Spain) (represented by: M. Esteve Sanz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Núcleo de comunicaciones y control, SL (Tres Cantos, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark SHERPA NEXT — Application for registration No 12 891 495

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 December 2018 in Case R 523/2017-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order the defendant and, if appropriate, the intervener, to bear the costs of the proceedings before the General Court, and the costs incurred in the appeal before the Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) and of Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Order of the General Court of 5 March 2019 — Buck v EUIPO — Unger Holding (BUCK)

(Case T-311/18) (1)

(2019/C 155/68)

Language of the case: English

The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 240, 9.7.2018.