1.

Should the first sentence of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) No 967/2006 (1) be interpreted to mean that the time-limit stated therein also applies to the amendment of a timely notification of the levy following an amended determination of the attributable quantity of surplus sugar after the passing of the time-limit based on a check under Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 952/2006? (2)

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative,

In that case, where a timely notification is amended on the basis of findings made during checks, do the conditions established by the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 10 January 2002 in British Sugar, C-101/99, EU:C:2002:7, for exceeding the notification time-limit stipulated in Article 3(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2670/81, as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 3559/91, (3) also apply for exceeding a notification time-limit under Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) No 967/2006?

3.

If the first sentence of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) No 967/2006 does not apply to amending notifications based on checks (see Question 1) or if the conditions for exceeding the time-limit are fulfilled (see Question 2), should the time-limit by which the amendment to the levy must be notified be 1 May of the following year or should national law apply?

4.

If the answer to Question 3 is that neither 1 May of the following year nor national law applies:

Is it compatible with the general principles of EU law, which include the principles of proportionality, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, if, in a case such as the present, the levy for the 2007/2008 sugar marketing year was notified on 20 October 2010 or 27 October 2011 due to the time needed for checks and the time needed for preparation and evaluation of the inspection report? Is objection by the sugar producer to the determination of the surplus quantities relevant in this context?

1.

Is this court’s interpretation of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC (1) correct and is it correct to take the view that the employment of the applicants on temporary appointments constitutes abuse in so far as the public employer uses different contractual models, all of which are temporary, to ensure, on a permanent and stable basis, performance of the ordinary duties of permanent regulated staff and to cover structural defects and needs which are, in fact, not temporary but fixed and permanent? Is the type of temporary appointment described therefore not justified as an objective reason for the purposes of clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement, in that such use of fixed-term contracts conflicts directly with the second paragraph of the preamble of the Framework Agreement and with general considerations 6 and 8 of that agreement, since there are no circumstances which would justify the use of such fixed-term employment contracts?

2.

Is this court’s interpretation of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC correct and is it correct to take the view that, in line with that interpretation, the holding of a conventional selection process, with the features described, is not an equivalent measure and cannot be regarded as a penalty, since it is not proportional to the abuse committed, the consequence of which is the termination of the temporary worker’s appointment, in breach of the objectives of the directive, and the continued unfavourable situation of temporary regulated employees, nor can it be regarded as an effective measure in so far as it does not create any detriment to the employer, and nor does it fulfil any deterrent function, and therefore it is not compatible with the first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70 in that it does not ensure that the Spanish State achieves the results imposed by the directive?

3.

Is this court’s interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70 and of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 14 September 2016 in Case C-16/15 (2) correct and is it correct to take the view that, in line with that interpretation, the holding of a selection process that is open to external candidates is not an appropriate measure to penalise abuse arising from the use of successive temporary appointments, since Spanish legislation does not provide for an effective, dissuasive penalty mechanism which puts an end to the abuse arising from the appointment of temporary regulated staff and does not enable those permanent posts created to be filled by the staff who were the victims of the abuse, such that the precarious situation of those workers continues?

4.

Is it correct to take the view, as this court does, that the conversion of a temporary worker who has been the victim of the misuse of temporary appointments into a worker having a appointment ‘of indefinite duration but not permanent’ is not an effective penalty, in so far as a worker classified in this way may have his appointment terminated either because his post has been filled in a selection process or because his post has been abolished, and therefore that penalty is incompatible with the Framework Agreement for the purposes of preventing misuse of fixed-term contracts, since it does not comply with the first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70 in that it does not ensure that the Spanish State achieves the results imposed by the directive?

In the light of that situation, it is necessary in the circumstances described to repeat the following questions, included in the reference for a preliminary ruling made on 30 January 2018 in Expedited Proceedings 193/2017 before J[uzgado] C[ontencioso-]A[dministrativo] n.o 8 de Madrid (Administrative Court No 8, Madrid): (3)

5.

If the national courts find that there is abuse arising from the use of successive appointments of temporary regulated staff to cover vacancies in the Madrid Health Service and that they are being used to cover permanent structural needs in the provision of services by permanent regulated employees, given that domestic law contains no effective or deterrent measure to penalise such misuse and eliminate the consequences of the breach of EU legislation, must Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC be interpreted as requiring the national courts to adopt effective deterrent measures to ensure the effectiveness of the Framework Agreement, and therefore to penalise that misuse and eliminate the consequences of the breach of that EU legislation, disapplying the rule of domestic law that prevents it from being effective?

If the answer should be affirmative, as held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in paragraph 41 of its judgment of 14 September 2016 in Cases C-184/15 and C-197/15: (4)

As a measure to prevent and penalise the misuse of successive temporary appointments and to eliminate the consequence of the breach of EU law, would it be consistent with the objectives pursued by Directive 1999/70/EC to convert the temporary interim/occasional/replacement regulated relationship into a stable regulated relationship, the employee being classified as a permanent official or an official with an appointment of indefinite duration, with the same security of employment as comparable permanent regulated employees, on the basis that the national legislation prohibits absolutely, in the public sector, the conversion into a contract of indefinite duration of a succession of fixed-term employment contracts, since no other effective measure exists to prevent and, where relevant, penalise the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts?

6.

If there is abuse of successive temporary appointments, can the conversion of the temporary regulated relationship into an indefinite or permanent relationship be regarded as satisfying the objectives of Directive 1999/70/EC and its Framework Agreement only if the temporary regulated employee who has been the victim of this misuse enjoys exactly the same working conditions as permanent regulated employees (as regards social security, promotion, opportunities to cover vacant posts, training, leave of absence, determination of administrative status, sick leave and other permitted absences, pension rights, termination of employment and participation in selection competitions to fill vacancies and obtain promotion) in accordance with the principles of permanence and security of employment, with all associated rights and obligations, on equal terms with permanent regulated staff?

7.

Taking into account the existence, if any, of improper use of temporary appointments to meet permanent staffing needs for no objective reason and in a manner inconsistent with the urgent and pressing need that warrants recourse to them, and for want of any effective penalties or limits in Spanish national law, would it be consistent with the objectives pursued by Directive 1999/70/EC to grant, as a means of preventing abuse and eliminating the consequence of infringing EU law, compensation comparable to that for unfair dismissal, that is to say, compensation that serves as an adequate, proportional, effective and dissuasive penalty, in circumstances where an employer does not offer a worker a permanent post?

1.

Is the competent authority, the College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden (Netherlands Board for the Authorisation of Plant Protection Products and Biocides; ‘the Ctgb’), authorised, after having taken a decision to re-register the reference product, whether or not of its own motion, to change the period of validity of a parallel trade permit as referred to in Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, (1) where that permit was granted before the re-registration decision, in accordance with the — later — date of the period of validity applying to the decision to re-register the reference product?

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, is the change to the period of validity of a parallel trade permit an automatic consequence of a decision to re-register the reference product resulting from Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 itself? Is the entry of the new date of the period of validity of the parallel permit into the database of the competent authority thus a purely administrative act, or does it require a decision taken by that authority of its own motion or in response to a request?

3.

If the answer to Question 2 is that a decision must be taken, does Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, and, in particular, the third paragraph of that article, apply to that decision?

4.

If Question 3 is answered in the negative, which provision(s) is/are then applicable?

5.

Can a plant protection product already be considered not to be identical within the meaning of Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 if the reference product does not (any longer) originate from the same undertaking? The Court of Justice is requested, in answering that question, also to consider whether the notion of an associated undertaking or of an undertaking operating under licence can also include an undertaking which produces the product according to the same recipe, with the consent of the right-holder. Is it relevant here whether the production process according to which the reference product and the parallel product which is to be introduced are manufactured is carried out by the same undertaking as far as the active substances are concerned?

6.

Is the mere changing of the location for the production of the reference product relevant to the assessment of whether the product is identical?

7.

If Questions 5 and/or 6 are/is answered in the affirmative, can the conclusion to be drawn therefrom (‘not identical’) be undermined by the fact that the competent authority has already established that, as regards its composition, the product has not undergone any change or has undergone only a slight change?

8.

On whom and to what extent does the burden of proof lie to show that Article 52(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 has been satisfied if the holders of the authorisation for the parallel product and for the reference product have a difference of opinion in that regard?

—

the deduction for risk capital is reduced by an amount in respect of deduction for risk capital calculated with reference to the positive difference between, on the one hand, the net book value of the assets of the permanent establishment, and, on the other hand, the total liabilities that do not form part of the company’s equity capital and that are attributable to the permanent establishment and

—

the aforementioned reduction is not applied in so far as the amount of the reduction is lower than the profits of that permanent establishment,

1.

Should the phrases ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 1 of Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (‘Regulation No 882/2004’) and ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 2 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 be interpreted as meaning that the (salary) costs that may be taken into account when calculating the fees for official controls, may only be the (salary) costs of official veterinarians and official auxiliaries who perform the official inspections, or can they also include the (salary) costs of other staff employed by the Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority; ‘NVWA’) or by the private company Kwaliteitskeuring Dierlijke Sector (‘KDS’)?

2.

If the answer to question 1 is that the phrases ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 1 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 and ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 2 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 may also include the (salary) costs of other staff employed by the NVWA or KDS, under what circumstances and within which limits is there then still such a relationship between the costs incurred for that other staff and the official controls, that the reimbursement of those (salary) costs can be based on Article 27(4) and Annex VI, points 1 and 2, of Regulation No 882/2004?

3.

4.

Should the provisions of Article 27(4)(a) and of Annex VI, points 1 and 2, of Regulation No 882/2004 be interpreted as meaning that the aforementioned Article 27(4) precludes the slaughterhouses from being charged an average rate for the activities for the purposes of official inspections performed by veterinarians employed by the NVWA and by (lower-salaried) contracted veterinary surgeons, so that slaughterhouses are charged a higher rate than is paid to the contracted veterinarians?

5.

Should the provisions of Article 26 and Article 27(4)(a), and of Annex VI, points 1 and 2, of Regulation No 882/2004 be interpreted as meaning that, when calculating the fees for official controls, costs may be taken into account for the purposes of building the buffer reserves of a private company (KDS) from which the competent authority contracts official auxiliaries, reserves which, in the event of a crisis, can be used to pay the salary and training costs of staff who actually perform the official controls as well as of staff who make it possible to perform the official controls?

6.

If the answer to the question formulated under [5] is in the affirmative: what is the maximum amount that can be accumulated in such buffer reserves and what is the length of the period which may be covered by such reserves?

1.

Should the phrases ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 1 of Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (‘Regulation No 882/2004’) and ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 2 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 be interpreted as meaning that the (salary) costs that may be taken into account when calculating the fees for official controls, may only be the (salary) costs of official veterinarians and official auxiliaries who perform the official inspections, or can they also include the (salary) costs of other staff employed by the Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority; ‘NVWA’) or by the private company Kwaliteitskeuring Dierlijke Sector (‘KDS’)?

2.

If the answer to question 1 is that the phrases ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 1 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 and ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 2 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 may also include the (salary) costs of other staff employed by the NVWA or KDS, under what circumstances and within which limits is there then still such a relationship between the costs incurred for that other staff and the official controls, that the reimbursement of those (salary) costs can be based on Article 27(4) and Annex VI, points 1 and 2, of Regulation No 882/2004?

3.

Should the provisions of Article 27(4)(a) and of Annex VI, points 1 and 2, of Regulation No 882/2004 be interpreted as meaning that the aforementioned Article 27(4)(a) and Annex VI, points 1 and 2, preclude slaughterhouses from being charged fees in relation to official controls for quarter-hours requested by those slaughterhouses from the competent authorities but not actually worked for the purposes of official controls?

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Mr Vincent Villeneuve to pay the costs.

—

Annul the decision of the EIB of 4 April 2018 dismissing the applicant;

—

Order the defendant to compensate the applicant for material harm amounting at present to EUR 2 240,31 and non-material harm evaluated at EUR 50 000, and

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs of the action.

1.

First plea in law, alleging disregard of the rights of the defence

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment

—

order the European Central Bank to provide compensation for their actual harm, as that is specified for each of them in the pleadings, amounting to EUR 83,77 per share in the company, multiplied by the number of shares of which each applicant, natural person or legal person, is the holder;

—

order the European Central Bank to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law: based on the facts, the criminal prosecutions that have been initiated, and national law.

2.

Second plea in law: based on Article 340 TFEU.

3.

Third plea in law: based on the case-law of the Court.

—

Declare the present action admissible and well founded. Consequently,

—

Annul Commission Decision C(2018) 2075 final of 10 April 2018 on Case SA.46897 (2018/NN) — France presumed aid — CACES [(Handling Equipment Safe Operation Certificate)];

—

Order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the concept of ‘causality assessment’ referred to in Article 107 TFEU, in that the reimbursement of costs of construction plant driving safety training by State-authorised collecting bodies (Organismes paritaires de collecte agréés, OPCAs) means a use of State resources, the result of a measure attributable to the State. Thus, the applicants argue that the decision of which they seek the annulment disregards the case-law in Pearle (judgment of 15 July 2004, Pearle and Others, C-345/02, EU:C:2004:448).

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the concept of ‘advantage’ referred to in Article 107 TFEU, since the measures taken by the French State in the present case give an advantage to undertakings which provides training called ‘CACES®’ (Handling Equipment Safe Operation Certificate), as opposed to those providing training called ‘PCE®’ (Machinery Driving Licence).

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the concept of ‘selectivity’ referred to in Article 107 TFEU, since the measures taken are selective in nature. This plea in law is divided into three parts:

—

annul the decisions of 6 November 2017 and 4 December 2017 informing the applicant that he was not entitled to certain allowances (household allowance, child allowances, education allowances and pre-school allowance);

—

accordingly, order the payment of the respective amounts from the requested dates onwards, increased by late interest (ECB rate + 2 points). It should be considered that corrective payments not related to the month during which they were paid should be subject to the tax to which they would have been subject had they been made at the proper time, in accordance with Regulation (EEC, EURATOM, ECSC) No 260/68; (1)

—

if need be, annul the decision of 5 June 2018 rejecting the applicant’s grievance procedure, lodged on 29 March 2018;

—

if need be, annul the decisions of 2 February 2018 rejecting the applicant’s request for administrative review of 15 December 2017;

—

order the defendant to pay all the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the ECB’s conditions of short-term employment and its rules for short-term employment are illegal (plea of illegality).

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a violation of collective rights, as a result of lack of proper consultation of the ECB Staff Committee in the adoption of the ECB’s conditions and rules for short-term employment.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal.

—

Infringement of Art. 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

annul the decision of the Opposition Division;

—

refuse the mark applied for;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Art. 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council

—

Declare the application admissible and well founded;

—

Annul the decision of 3 July 2018 adopted by [confidential] (1) the European Commission to maintain the refusal of access to the applicant to Commission premises;

—

Order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the author of the contested act did not have the power to adopt it.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 3 of Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 of 13 March 2015 on Security in the Commission (OJ 2015 L 72, p. 41; ‘Decision 2015/443’) and the absence of legal basis of the contested act.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the fundamental rights of the applicant, in particular breach of Article 67 TFEU, Article 6 TEU, Article 3 of Decision 2015/443 and Articles 6, 7, 8, 15, 27, 31, 41, 42, 47, 48 and 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This plea is divided into three parts:

4.

Fourth plea in law, raised in the alternative, alleging infringement of Article 296 TFEU, Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of the principles of the formal and material statement of reasons of unilateral acts. This plea is divided into two parts:

—

annul the contested decision;

—

in the alternative, alter the contested decision to state that the Opposition should be remitted to the Opposition Division for it to reconsider the Opposition;

—

order EUIPO to pay the Applicant’s costs of and occasioned by this Application and the costs before the Board. In the alternative, if the other party before the Board intervenes, then EUIPO and the intervener jointly and severally pay the Applicant’s costs of and occasioned by this Application and the costs before the Board.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the 2018 Measures insofar as they apply to Dr Kaddour; and

—

order the Council to pay Dr Kaddour’s costs of this application.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the 2018 Measures are vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the applicant is entitled to the benefit of Articles 27 and 28(2) of Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1836 (3) and Article 15(1b) of Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1828 (4).

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the 2018 Measures amount to a breach of the applicant’s fundamental rights as protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and/or the European Convention of Human Rights in regard to the applicant’s rights to respect for his reputation and peaceful enjoyment of his property and the principle of proportionality.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 4, in conjunction with Article 6(1) and Article 7, of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.