Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2018/C 268/01)

Last publication

OJ C 259, 23.7.2018.

Past publications

OJ C 249, 16.7.2018.

OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.

OJ C 221, 25.6.2018.

OJ C 211, 18.6.2018.

OJ C 200, 11.6.2018.

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad — Bulgaria) — Criminal proceedings against Nikolay Kolev, Milko Hristov, Stefan Kostadinov

(Case C-612/15) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 325 TFEU - Fraud or any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the European Union in customs matters - Effectiveness of prosecution - Closure of criminal proceedings - Reasonable time - Directive 2012/13/EU - Right of a person to be informed of the charges against him - Right of access to case materials - Directive 2013/48/EU - Right of access to a lawyer))

(2018/C 268/02)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Parties in the main proceedings

Nikolay Kolev, Milko Hristov, Stefan Kostadinov

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 325(1) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that establishes a procedure for the termination of criminal proceedings, such as that provided for in Articles 368 and 369 of the Nakazatelno protsesualen kodeks (Code of Criminal Procedure), in so far as that legislation is applicable in proceedings initiated with respect to cases of serious fraud or other serious illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the European Union in customs matters. It is for the national courts to give full effect to Article 325(1) TFEU, by disapplying that legislation, where necessary, while also ensuring respect for the fundamental rights of the persons accused.

2.

Article 6(3) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings must be interpreted as not precluding the disclosure of detailed information on the charges to the defence after the lodging before the court of the indictment that initiates the trial stage of proceedings, but before the court begins to examine the merits of the charges and before the commencement of any hearing of argument by the court, and after the commencement of that hearing but before the stage of deliberation, where the information thus disclosed is the subject of subsequent amendments, provided that all necessary measures are taken by the court in order to ensure respect for the rights of the defence and the fairness of the proceedings. Article 7(3) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that it is for the national court to be satisfied that the defence has been granted a genuine opportunity to have access to the case materials, such access being possible, in some cases, after the lodging before the court of the indictment that initiates the trial stage of the proceedings, but before that court begins to examine the merits of the charges and before the commencement of any hearing of argument by that court, and after the commencement of that hearing but before the stage of deliberation where new evidence is placed in the file in the course of proceedings, provided that all necessary measures are taken by the court in order to ensure respect for the rights of the defence and the fairness of the proceedings.

3.

Article 3(1) of Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation that requires a national court to dismiss the lawyer instructed by two accused persons, against their wishes, on the ground that there is a conflict of interest between those persons and, further, as not precluding the court from allowing those persons to instruct a new lawyer or, when necessary, itself naming two court-appointed lawyers, to replace the first lawyer.

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(1)  OJ C 48, 8.2.2016.

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht — Germany) — Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH

(Case C-210/16) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 95/46/EC - Personal data - Protection of natural persons with respect to the processing of that data - Order to deactivate a Facebook page (fan page) enabling the collection and processing of certain data of visitors to that page - Article 2(d) - Controller responsible for the processing of personal data - Article 4 - Applicable national law - Article 28 - National supervisory authorities - Powers of intervention of those authorities))

(2018/C 268/03)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein

Defendant: Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH

Interveners: Facebook Ireland Ltd, Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘controller’ within the meaning of that provision encompasses the administrator of a fan page hosted on a social network.

2.

Articles 4 and 28 of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, where an undertaking established outside the European Union has several establishments in different Member States, the supervisory authority of a Member State is entitled to exercise the powers conferred on it by Article 28(3) of that directive with respect to an establishment of that undertaking situated in the territory of that Member State even if, as a result of the division of tasks within the group, first, that establishment is responsible solely for the sale of advertising space and other marketing activities in the territory of that Member State and, second, exclusive responsibility for collecting and processing personal data belongs, for the entire territory of the European Union, to an establishment situated in another Member State.

3.

Article 4(1)(a) and Article 28(3) and (6) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, where the supervisory authority of a Member State intends to exercise with respect to an entity established in the territory of that Member State the powers of intervention referred to in Article 28(3) of that directive, on the ground of infringements of the rules on the protection of personal data committed by a third party responsible for the processing of that data whose seat is in another Member State, that supervisory authority is competent to assess, independently of the supervisory authority of the other Member State, the lawfulness of such data processing and may exercise its powers of intervention with respect to the entity established in its territory without first calling on the supervisory authority of the other Member State to intervene.

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(1)  OJ C 260, 18.7.2016.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — EP Agrarhandel GmbH v Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft

(Case C-554/16) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common agricultural policy - Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 - Support for farmers - Suckler-cow premium - Second paragraph of Article 117 - Transmission of information - Decision 2001/672/EC, as amended by Decision 2010/300/EU - Movements of bovine animals to summer grazing in mountain areas - Article 2(4) - Time limit for notification of the movement - Calculation - Notifications out of time - Eligibility for the payment of premiums - Condition - Taking account of the time limit for dispatch))

(2018/C 268/04)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: EP Agrarhandel GmbH

Defendant: Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(4) of Commission Decision 2001/672/EC of 20 August 2001 laying down special rules applicable to movements of bovine animals when put out to summer grazing in mountain areas, as amended by Commission Decision 2010/300/EU of 25 May 2010, must be interpreted as precluding a national provision under which, for the purpose of compliance with the time limit for notification of movements to summer grazing, the date of receipt of the notification is regarded as the determining factor.

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(1)  OJ C 46, 13.2.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia — Spain) — Grupo Norte Facility SA v Angel Manuel Moreira Gómez

(Case C-574/16) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Directive 1999/70/EC - Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP - Clause 4 - Principle of non-discrimination - Definition of ‘employment conditions’ - Comparability of situations - Justification - Definition of ‘objective grounds’ - Compensation in the event of termination of a permanent employment contract on objective grounds - Lesser amount of compensation paid on expiry of a fixed-term ‘relief’ employment contract))

(2018/C 268/05)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Grupo Norte Facility SA

Respondent: Angel Manuel Moreira Gómez

Operative part of the judgment

Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which the compensation paid to workers employed under fixed-term contracts entered into in order to cover working hours no longer covered as a result of a worker taking partial retirement, such as the relief contract at issue in the main proceedings, on expiry of the term for which those contracts were concluded, is less than the compensation awarded to permanent workers on termination of their employment contract on objective grounds.

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(1)  OJ C 30, 30.1.2017.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven — Netherlands) — M.N.J.P.W. Nooren, J.M.F.D.C. Nooren, the heirs of M.N.F.M. Nooren v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken

(Case C-667/16) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common agricultural policy - EAFRD financing - Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 - Support for rural development - Non-compliance with cross-compliance rules - Reductions and exclusions - Aggregation of reductions))

(2018/C 268/06)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: M.N.J.P.W. Nooren, J.M.F.D.C. Nooren, the heirs of M.N.F.M. Nooren

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken

Operative part of the judgment

Articles 70 to 72 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 of 30 November 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 as regards cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system, under the direct support schemes for farmers provided for by that Regulation, as well as for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards cross-compliance under the support scheme provided for the wine sector, read in conjunction with Articles 23 and 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which there have been found to be multiple instances of non-compliance within the same area, the reduction of the total amount of direct payments that have been, or are to be, granted that is applicable to instances of negligent non-compliance, on the one hand, and the reduction that is applicable to instances of intentional non-compliance, on the other hand, must be aggregated, with the total amount of reductions for one calendar year having to be fixed in compliance with the principle of proportionality and without exceeding the total amount referred to in Article 23(1) of Regulation No 73/2009.

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(1)  OJ C 78, 13.3.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — Belgium) — Inter-Environnement Bruxelles ASBL and Others v Brussels Capital Region

(Case C-671/16) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Directive 2001/42/EC - Article 2(a) - Concept of ‘plans and programmes’ - Article 3 - Assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment - Regional town planning regulations relating to the European Quarter, Brussels (Belgium)))

(2018/C 268/07)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Inter-Environnement Bruxelles ASBL, Groupe d’animation du quartier européen de la ville de Bruxelles ASBL, Association du quartier Léopold ASBL, Brusselse Raad voor het Leefmilieu ASBL, Pierre Picard, David Weytsman

Defendant: Brussels Capital Region

Operative part of the judgment

On a proper construction of Article 2(a), Article 3(1), and Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, regional town planning regulations, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, laying down certain requirements for the completion of building projects, fall under the definition of ‘plans and programmes’ which are likely to have significant environmental effects within the meaning of that directive and must, consequently, be subjected to an environmental impact assessment.

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(1)  OJ C 78, 13.3.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea Constituţională a României — Romania) — Relu Adrian Coman, Robert Clabourn Hamilton, Asociaţia Accept v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne

(Case C-673/16) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Citizenship of the Union - Article 21 TFEU - Right of Union citizens to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States - Directive 2004/38/EC - Article 3 - Beneficiaries - Family members of the Union citizen - Article 2(2)(a) - Definition of ‘spouse’ - Marriage between persons of the same sex - Article 7 - Right of residence for more than three months - Fundamental rights))

(2018/C 268/08)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea Constituţională a României

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Relu Adrian Coman, Robert Clabourn Hamilton, Asociaţia Accept

Defendants: Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne

Intervener: Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării

Operative part of the judgment

1.

In a situation in which a Union citizen has made use of his freedom of movement by moving to and taking up genuine residence, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, in a Member State other than that of which he is a national, and, whilst there, has created or strengthened a family life with a third-country national of the same sex to whom he is joined by a marriage lawfully concluded in the host Member State, Article 21(1) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the competent authorities of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national from refusing to grant that third-country national a right of residence in the territory of that Member State on the ground that the law of that Member State does not recognise marriage between persons of the same sex.

2.

Article 21(1) TFEU is to be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, a third-country national of the same sex as a Union citizen whose marriage to that citizen was concluded in a Member State in accordance with the law of that state has the right to reside in the territory of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national for more than three months. That derived right of residence cannot be made subject to stricter conditions than those laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2004/38.

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(1)  OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Madrid — Spain) — Lucía Montero Mateos v Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Consejería de Políticas Sociales y Familia de la Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid

(Case C-677/16) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Directive 1999/70/EC - Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP - Clause 4 - Principle of non-discrimination - Definition of ‘employment conditions’ - Comparability of situations - Justification - Definition of ‘objective grounds’ - Compensation in the event of termination of an employment contract of indefinite duration on objective grounds - No compensation on expiry of a fixed-term ‘interinidad’ contract))

(2018/C 268/09)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Madrid

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Lucía Montero Mateos

Defendant: Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Consejería de Políticas Sociales y Familia de la Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid

Operative part of the judgment

Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which does not provide for any compensation to be paid to workers employed under a fixed-term contract entered into in order to cover a post temporarily while the selection or promotion procedure to fill the post permanently takes place, such as the temporary replacement contract at issue in the main proceedings, on expiry of the term for which that contract was concluded, whereas compensation is payable to permanent workers where their employment contract is terminated on objective grounds.

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(1)  OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.

Judgment of the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias v European Commission

(Case C-6/17 P) (1)

((Appeal - Arbitration clauses - Perform and Oasis contracts concluded in the context of the Seventh framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) - Eligible costs - Reimbursement of sums paid - Counter-claim))

(2018/C 268/10)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias (represented by: S. Paliou, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal and A. Kyratsou, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 63, 27.2.2017.

Judgment of the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias v European Commission

(Case C-7/17 P) (1)

((Appeal - Arbitration clauses - Persona and Terregov contracts concluded in the context of the Sixth framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2002-2006) - Eligible costs - Reimbursement of sums paid - Counter-claim))

(2018/C 268/11)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias (represented by: S. Paliou, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal and A. Kyratsou, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 63, 27.2.2017

Judgment of the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) of 6 June 2018 — Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

(Case C-32/17 P) (1)

((Appeal - EU trade mark - Application for registration of the figurative and word marks PARKWAY - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - Article 7(1)(c)))

(2018/C 268/12)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH (represented by: A. Lohmann, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: A. Söder, acting as Agent)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 151, 15.5.2017

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Hamburg — Germany) — Scotch Whisky Association v Michael Klotz

(Case C-44/17) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks - Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 - Article 16(a) to (c) - Annex III - Registered geographical indication ‘Scotch Whisky’ - Whisky produced in Germany and marketed under the designation ‘Glen Buchenbach’))

(2018/C 268/13)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Scotch Whisky Association

Defendant: Michael Klotz

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 16(a) of Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1576/89 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is ‘indirect commercial use’ of a registered geographical indication, the disputed element must be used in a form that is either identical to that indication or phonetically and/or visually similar to it. Accordingly, it is not sufficient that that element is liable to evoke in the relevant public some kind of association with the indication concerned or the geographical area relating thereto.

2.

Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is an ‘evocation’ of a registered geographical indication, the referring court is required to determine whether, when the average European consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect is confronted with the disputed designation, the image triggered directly in his mind is that of the product whose geographical indication is protected. In making that determination, the referring court, in the absence of (i) any phonetic and/or visual similarity between the disputed designation and the protected geographical indication and (ii) any partial incorporation of that indication in that designation, must take account of the conceptual proximity, if any, between the designation and the indication. Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is an ‘evocation’ of a registered geographical indication, account is not to be taken either of the context surrounding the disputed element, or, in particular, of the fact that that element is accompanied by an indication of the true origin of the product concerned.

3.	Article 16(c) of Regulation No 110/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is a ‘false or misleading indication’, as prohibited by that provision, account is not be taken of the context in which the disputed element is used.

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(1)  OJ C 121, 18.4.2017.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret — Denmark) — Koppers Denmark ApS v Skatteministeriet

(Case C-49/17) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2003/96/EC - Taxation of energy products and electricity - Article 21(3) - Chargeable event giving rise to taxation - Consumption of energy products produced within the curtilage of an establishment producing energy products - Energy products used for purposes other than as motor fuels or as heating fuels - Consumption of solvent as fuel at the coal tar distillation plant))

(2018/C 268/14)

Language of the case: Danish

Referring court

Østre Landsret

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Koppers Denmark ApS

Defendant: Skatteministeriet

Operative part of the judgment

Article 21(3) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity must be interpreted as meaning that the consumption of energy products, within the curtilage of an establishment that has produced them, for the purpose of producing other energy products does not fall within the exception, laid down in that provision, concerning the chargeable event giving rise to taxation where, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the energy products produced by virtue of the main activity of that establishment are used for purposes other than as motor fuels or as heating fuels.

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(1)  OJ C 112, 10.4.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — KP v LO

(Case C-83/17) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in civil matters - 2007 Hague Protocol - Law applicable to maintenance obligations - Article 4(2) - Change in the habitual residence of the creditor - Possibility of the retroactive application of the law of the State of the creditor’s new habitual residence, that law coinciding with the law of the forum - Scope of the terms ‘if the creditor is unable … to obtain maintenance from the debtor’ - Situation where the creditor does not satisfy a formal legislative condition))

(2018/C 268/15)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: KP

Defendant: LO

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 4(2) of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2009/941/EC of 30 November 2009 must be interpreted as meaning that: — the fact that the State of the forum corresponds to the State of the creditor’s habitual residence does not preclude the application of that provision as long as the law designated by the ancillary connecting rule in that provision does not coincide with the one as the law designated by the main connecting rule in Article 3 of that Protocol; — in a situation in which the maintenance creditor, who has changed his usual residence, has brought before the courts of the State of his new habitual residence a maintenance claim against the debtor in respect of a period in the past during which the creditor resided in another Member State, the law of the forum, which is also the law of the State of the creditor’s new habitual residence, can apply provided the courts of the Member State of the forum had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the disputes concerning those parties as to the maintenance relating to that period.

2.

The phrase ‘is unable … to obtain maintenance’ in Article 4(2) of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 must be interpreted as also covering the situation in which the creditor is unable to obtain maintenance under the law of the State of his previous habitual residence on the ground that he does not meet certain conditions imposed by that law.

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(1)  OJ C 168, 29.5.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — Belgium) — Raoul Thybaut, Johnny De Coster, Frédéric Romain v Région wallonne

(Case C-160/17) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Directive 2001/42/EC - Article 2(a) - Concept of ‘plans and programmes’ - Article 3 - Assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment - Urban land consolidation area - Possibility of derogating from town planning requirements - Modification of the ‘plans and programmes’))

(2018/C 268/16)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Raoul Thybaut, Johnny De Coster, Frédéric Romain

Defendant: Région wallonne

Interveners: Commune d’Orp-Jauche, Bodymat SA

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(a), Article 3(1) and Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment must be interpreted as meaning that an order adopting an urban land consolidation area, the sole purpose of which is to determine a geographical area within which an urban development plan may be carried out with the objective of renovating and developing urban functions and requiring the creation, modification, removal or overhang of roads and public spaces in carrying out that plan, in respect of which it will be permissible to derogate from certain planning requirements, comes, because of that possibility of derogation, within the concept of ‘plans and programmes’ likely to have significant effects on the environment within the meaning of that directive, thereby necessitating an environmental assessment.

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(1)  OJ C 178, 6.6.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça — Portugal) — Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira v Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA

(Case C-250/17) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in civil matters - Insolvency proceedings - Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 - Article 15 - Effects of insolvency proceedings on lawsuits pending concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested - Concept of ‘lawsuit pending’ - Substantive proceedings for the recognition of the existence of a debt))

(2018/C 268/17)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal de Justiça

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira

Defendant: Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA

Operative part of the judgment

Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as applying to a lawsuit pending before a court of a Member State seeking an order that a debtor pay a sum of money due under a contract for the provision of services and pay monetary damages for failure to comply with that contractual obligation, in the event that (i) the debtor was declared insolvent in insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State; and (ii) the declaration of insolvency applies to all of the debtor’s assets.

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(1)  OJ C 239, 24.7.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — Equipolymers Srl, M&G Polimeri Italia SpA, Novapet SA v Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Manufacturers in Europe (CPME), Cepsa Química SA, Indorama Ventures Poland sp. z o.o., Lotte Chemical UK Ltd, Ottana Polimeri Srl, UAB Indorama Polymers Europe, UAB Neo Group, UAB Orion Global pet, Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Federation of Bottled Waters (EFBW), Caiba SA, Coca-Cola Enterprises Belgium (CCEB), Danone, Nestlé Waters Management & Technology, Pepsico International Ltd, Refresco Gerber BV

(Case C-363/17 P) (1)

((Appeal - Dumping - Imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate originating in India, Thailand and Taiwan - Implementing Decision 2013/226/EU - Decision to terminate the expiry review proceeding without imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty - Non-contractual liability - Causal link - Obligation to state reasons))

(2018/C 268/18)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Equipolymers Srl, M&G Polimeri Italia SpA, Novapet SA (represented by: L. Ruessmann, avocat, and J. Beck, Solicitor)

Other parties to the proceedings: Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Manufacturers in Europe (CPME), Cepsa Química SA, Indorama Ventures Poland sp. z o.o., Lotte Chemical UK Ltd, Ottana Polimeri Srl, UAB Indorama Polymers Europe, UAB Neo Group, UAB Orion Global pet, Council of the European Union (represented by H. Marcos Fraile, Agent, and B. O’Connor, Solicitor, and S. Gubel, avocat), European Commission, European Federation of Bottled Waters (EFBW), Caiba SA, Coca-Cola Enterprises Belgium (CCEB), Danone, Nestlé Waters Management & Technology, Pepsico International Ltd, Refresco Gerber BV

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Equipolymers Srl, M&G Polimeri Italia SpA and Novapet SA to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 283, 28.8.2017.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — Ori Martin SA v Court of Justice of the European Union

(Case C-463/17 P) (1)

((Appeal - Action for damages - Inadequate reasoning in a judgment of the Court of Justice in appeal proceedings - Distortion of the nature of a claim for damages))

(2018/C 268/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Ori Martin SA (represented by: G. Belotti, avvocato)

Other party to the proceedings: Court of Justice of the European Union (represented by: J. Inghelram and Á. M. Almendros Manzano, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Ori Martin SA to bear its own costs and those incurred by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

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(1)  OJ C 392, 20.11.2017.

Appeal brought on 20 December 2017 by Kevin Karp against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2017 in Case T-833/16: Karp v Parliament

(Case C-714/17 P)

(2018/C 268/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Kevin Karp (represented by: N. Lambers, avocat, R. Ben Ammar, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

By order of 19 June 2018 the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bezirksgericht Villach (Austria) lodged on 27 December 2017 — Norbert Reitbauer and Others v Enrico Casamassima

(Case C-722/17)

(2018/C 268/21)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bezirksgericht Villach

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Norbert Reitbauer, Dolinschek GmbH, B.T.S. Trendfloor Raumausstattungs-GmbH, Elektrounternehmen K. Maschke GmbH, Klaus Egger, Architekt DI Klaus Egger Ziviltechniker GmbH

Defendant: Enrico Casamassima

Questions referred

1.

Question 1: Must Article 24(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the recast Brussels Regulation 2012) be interpreted as meaning that the opposition proceedings provided for in Paragraph 232 of the Exekutionsordnung (Austrian Enforcement Code) in the event of a dispute regarding the distribution of proceeds from a judicially ordered auction come within the scope of application of that provision, even if the action brought by one pledgee against the other pledgee (a) is based on the objection that the latter’s claim arising from a loan agreement, which was secured by a pledge, no longer existed due to a counter-claim of the debtor for damages, and (b) is furthermore based on the objection — similar to an action for avoidance (Anfechtungsklage) — that the creation of the pledge for that claim under a loan agreement was invalid due to the preferential treatment of creditors?

2.

Question 2 (if Question 1 is answered in the negative): Must Article 24(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the recast Brussels Regulation 2012) be interpreted as meaning that the opposition proceedings provided for in Paragraph 232 of the Exekutionsordnung (Austrian Enforcement Code) in the event of a dispute regarding the distribution of proceeds from a judicially ordered auction come within the scope of application of that provision, even if the action brought by one pledgee against the other pledgee (a) is based on the objection that the latter’s claim arising from a loan agreement, which was secured by a pledge, no longer existed due to a counter-claim of the debtor for damages and (b) is furthermore based on the objection — similar to an action for avoidance — that the creation of the pledge for that claim under a loan agreement was invalid due to the preferential treatment of creditors?

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(1)  OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

Appeal brought on 30 January 2018 by Merck KGaA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 17 November 2017 in Case T-802/16: Endoceutics v EUIPO — Merck

(Case C-62/18 P)

(2018/C 268/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Merck KGaA (represented by: M. Best, U. Pfleghar, S. Schäffner, Rechtsanwälte, M. Giannakoulis, advocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Endoceutics, Inc.

By order of 31 May 2018 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 16 February 2018 — Criminal proceedings against Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu

(Case C-128/18)

(2018/C 268/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamburg

v

Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu

Questions referred

1.

In the context of the FDEAW, (1) what are the minimum standards for custodial conditions required under Article 4 of the Charter? a. Specifically, is there, under EU law, an ‘absolute’ minimum limit for the size of custody cells, pursuant to which the use of cells under that limit will always constitute an infringement of Article 4 of the Charter? i. When determining an individual’s portion of a custody cell, should the fact that a given cell is being used for single or multiple occupancy be taken into account? ii. When calculating the size of the custody cell, should areas covered by furniture (beds, wardrobes, etc.) be discounted? iii. What infrastructural requirements, if any, are relevant for the purposes of compliance of custodial conditions with EU law? Does direct (or only indirect) open access from the custody cell to, for example, sanitary facilities or other rooms, or the provision of hot and cold water, heating, lighting, etc. have any significance? b. To what extent do the various ‘prison regimes’, such as differing unlock times and varying degrees of freedom of movement within a penal institution, play a role in the assessment? c. Can legal and organisational improvements in the issuing Member State (introduction of an ombudsman system, establishment of courts of enforcement of penalties, etc.) also be taken into account, as the present Chamber did in its decisions on the permissibility of the extradition?

2.

What standards are to be used to assess whether custodial conditions comply with EU law? To what extent do those standards influence the interpretation of the term ‘real risk’ within the meaning of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Aranyosi and Căldăraru? a. In that regard, are the judicial authorities of the executing Member State authorised to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the custodial conditions in the issuing Member State, or are they limited to an ‘examination as to manifest errors’? b. To the extent that, in the context of its reply to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice concludes that there are ‘absolute’ requirements under EU law for custodial conditions, would a failure to meet those minimum standards be, in a sense, ‘unquestionable’, so that, as a result, such a failure would always immediately constitute a ‘real risk’, thereby prohibiting extradition, or can the executing Member State nevertheless carry out its own assessment? In that regard, can factors such as the maintenance of mutual legal assistance between Member States, the functioning of European criminal justice or the principles of mutual trust and recognition be taken into account?

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(1)  Council Framework Decision 2002/584 of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1)

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Dresden (Germany) lodged on 22 February 2018 — hapeg dresden gmbh v Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG

(Case C-137/18)

(2018/C 268/24)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Dresden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: hapeg dresden gmbh

Defendant: Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG

Question referred

Is EU law, in particular Article 15(3)(b) and (c) and the first, second and third sentences of Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of Directive 2006/123/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 (‘the Services Directive’) to be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that applicable in the main proceedings, which prohibits the agreement in contracts with architects and/or engineers of a fee that is lower than the minimum fee resulting from the Honorarordnung für Architekten und Ingenieure (Rules on Fees and Emoluments for Architects and Engineers)?

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(1)  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Wien (Austria) lodged on 19 March 2018 — Wasserleitungsverband Nördliches Burgenland and Others

(Case C-197/18)

(2018/C 268/25)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Wien

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Wasserleitungsverband Nördliches Burgenland, Robert Prandl, Gemeinde Zillingdorf

Defendant authority: Bundesministerin für Nachhaltigkeit und Tourismus, formerly Bundesminister für Land und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft

Questions referred

Is Article 288 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 5(4) or with Article 5(5) of, in conjunction with paragraph 2 of Annex I to, Council Directive 91/676/EEC (1) of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (‘the Nitrates Directive’), to be interpreted as meaning that:

(a)

a public water supplier, which provides water services and which in that regard, prior to delivering the drinking water to consumers (with compulsory connection), treats this water with high nitrate values taken from the wells available to it for that purpose in such a way as to attain a value of less than 50 mg/l nitrate concentration prior to delivery to consumers, and which is also required by law to supply water within a specified geographical area, is directly concerned within the meaning of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (in this case possibly by failure to implement Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991), in so far as it is concerned by what are claimed to be inadequate action plans (as the value of 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the water in this water supplier’s area is exceeded) and must for that reason take measures to treat the water and is therefore granted subjective rights under the Nitrates Directive (a.1) to amendment of an action programme already adopted nationally to implement the Nitrates Directive (pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Nitrates Directive) in such a way that stricter measures with the aim of attaining the objectives of Article 1 of the Nitrates Directive and specifically attaining a value of up to a maximum 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the groundwaters at individual intake points are thus adopted? (a.2) to the adoption of additional measures or reinforced actions (pursuant to Article 5(5) of the Nitrates Directive) with the aim of achieving the objectives laid down in Article 1(1) of the Nitrates Directive and specifically attaining a value of up to a maximum 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the groundwaters at individual intake points?

(b)

a consumer, who would be authorised by law to use the water from his own domestic well for his personal consumption and who does not use this water on account of high nitrate values (and who was unable to use it at the time of the application underlying the proceedings and who could, admittedly, use it at the time of the present application to the Court of Justice of the European Union, even though it is common ground that a further increase of the nitrate value to above 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the water is to be expected), but who rather receives the water from a public water supplier, is to that extent directly concerned within the meaning of the case-law of the European Union (in this case possibly by failure to implement Council Directive 91/676/EEC 12 December 1991), in so far as he is concerned by what are claimed to be inadequate action plans and the value of 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the water of his water intake (domestic well) is exceeded, with the result that he is unable to exercise his legal right to make limited use of the groundwaters on his property and is therefore granted subjective rights under the Nitrates Directive (b.1) to amendment of an action programme already adopted nationally to implement the Nitrates Directive (pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Nitrates Directive) in such a way that stricter measures with the aim of attaining the objectives of Article 1 of the Nitrates Directive and specifically attaining a value of up to a maximum 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the groundwaters at individual intake points are thus adopted? (b.2) to the adoption of addition measures or reinforced actions (pursuant to Article 5(5) of the Nitrates Directive) with the aim of achieving the objectives laid down in Article 1(1) of the Nitrates Directive and specifically attaining a value of up to a maximum 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the groundwaters at individual intake points?

(c)

a municipality, which, as a public body, uses or makes available a communal well, which it operates, only for non-drinking water on account of nitrate values of over 50 mg/l nitrate concentration — without this affecting the drinking water supply — is directly concerned within the meaning of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (in this case possibly by failure to implement Council Directive 91/676/EEC 12 December 1991 as a result of inadequate action plans in this regard) in so far as the value of 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the water at the source is exceeded and therefore a use as drinking water is not available, and is therefore granted subjective rights under the Nitrates Directive (c.1) to amendment of an action programme already adopted nationally to implement the Nitrates Directive (pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Nitrates Directive) in such a way that stricter measures with the aim of attaining the objectives of Article 1 of the Nitrates Directive and specifically attaining a value of up to a maximum 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the groundwaters at individual intake points are thus adopted? (c.2) to the adoption of additional measures or reinforced actions (pursuant to Article 5(5) of the Nitrates Directive) with the aim of achieving the objectives laid down in Article 1(1) of the Nitrates Directive and specifically attaining a value of up to a maximum 50 mg/l nitrate concentration in the groundwaters at individual intake points? In all three cases the protection of consumer health is safeguarded in any event either — in cases (b) and (c) — by taking the water from water suppliers providing it (with compulsory connection and a right to connection) or — in case (a) — by the corresponding treatment measures.

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(1)  Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (OJ 1991 L 375, p. 1).

Appeal brought on 18 March 2018 by Asociación de la pesca y acuicultura del entorno de Donana y del Bajo Guadalquivir (Pebagua) against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2018 in Case T-715/16 Pebagua v Commission

(Case C-204/18 P)

(2018/C 268/26)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Asociación de la pesca y acuicultura del entorno de Donana y del Bajo Guadalquivir (Pebagua) (represented by: A. J. Uceda Sosa, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant submits that the Court of Justice should:

—	Set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court under appeal;

—

Give final judgment in the matter, upholding in its entirety the form of order sought at first instance by the appellant and, therefore, set aside and cancel the effect of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 (1) or, alternatively, set aside and cancel the effect of the inclusion of the species Procambarus clarkii on the Union list approved by that regulation;

—	Order the Commission to pay the costs of both actions.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The order under appeal does not go into the substance of the case raised in the appeal, but finds it inadmissible on the ground that the applicant lacks standing, resulting in an infringement of the second test for standing laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, given that the contested regulation directly affects the undertakings represented by the applicant, without the need for implementing measures.

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(1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 of 13 July 2016 adopting a list of invasive alien species of Union concern pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2016 L 189, p. 4).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 29 March 2018 — Krohn & Schröder GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen

(Case C-226/18)

(2018/C 268/27)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Krohn & Schröder GmbH

Defendant: Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen

Questions referred

1.	Does Article 212a of the Customs Code (1) encompass the exemption from an anti-dumping and countervailing duty pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation 1238/2013 (2) or Article 2(1) of Regulation 1239/2013? (3)

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: In the application of Article 212a of the Customs Code to the case of the incurrence of a customs debt pursuant to Article 204(1) of the Customs Code for exceeding the time limit under Article 49(1) of the Customs Code, are the conditions laid down in Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation 1238/2013 and Article 2(1)(a) of Regulation 1239/2013 fulfilled when the company, which is affiliated with the company listed in the annex to Implementing Regulation 2013/707/EU, which manufactured, consigned and invoiced the goods concerned, but did not act as the importer of the goods concerned and also did not ensure the release of the goods into free circulation, but had the intention to do so and was the company to which the goods were actually delivered?

3.

If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative: When Article 212a of the Customs Code is applied to a case where a customs debt arises under Article 204(1) of the Customs Code, by failure to comply with the time limit pursuant to Article 49(1) of the Customs Code, may an undertaking invoice and an export undertaking certificate within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 1238/2013 and Article 2(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 1239/2013 also be submitted within a time limit set by the customs authorities pursuant to Article 53(1) of the Customs Code?

4.

If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative: Does an undertaking invoice pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation 1238/2013 and Article 2(1)(b) of Regulation 1239/2013, which refers to Decision 2013/423/EU instead of to Implementing Decision 2013/707/EU, under the conditions of the case in the main proceedings and in consideration of general legal principles, satisfy the conditions in paragraph 9 of Annex III to Regulation 1238/2013 and paragraph 9 of Annex 2 to Regulation 1239/2013?

5.

If the answer to the fourth question is in the negative: In the application of Article 212a of the Customs Code to the case when a customs debt arises under Article 204(1) of the Customs Code due to the failure to comply with the time limit pursuant to Article 49(1) of the Customs Code, may an undertaking invoice within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation 1238/2013 and Article 2(1)(b) of Regulation 1239/2013 also still be submitted in the appeal proceedings brought against the determination of customs debt?

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(1)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 82/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 (OJ 1997 L 17, p. 1).

(2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1238/2013 of 2 December 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China (OJ 2013 L 325, p. 1).

(3)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1239/2013 of 2 December 2013 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China (OJ 2013 L 325, p. 66).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 4 May 2018 — Associazione ‘Verdi Ambiente e Società — Aps Onlus’ and Others v Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others

(Case C-305/18)

(2018/C 268/28)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Associazione ‘Verdi Ambiente e Società — Aps Onlus’, VAS — Aps Onlus, Associazione di Promozione Sociale ‘Movimento Legge Rifiuti Zero per l’Economia Circolare’

Defendants: Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare, Regione Lazio, Regione Toscana, Regione Lombardia

Questions referred

1.

Do Articles 4 and 13 of Directive 2008/98/EC, (1) in conjunction with recitals 6, 8, 28 and 31 thereof, preclude national primary legislation and the related secondary implementing legislation — such as Article 35(1) of Decree-Law No 133/2014, as converted into law by Law No 164/2014, and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2016, published in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic, No 233 of 5 October 2016 — in so far as only incineration facilities covered by that legislation, in accordance with the indications set out in the annexes and tables of that decree, are classified as strategic infrastructure and installations of major national importance which establish an integrated, modern system for the management of municipal and similar waste and which ensure self-sufficiency, in the interests of national safety, given that the national legislature did not classify installations for the treatment of waste for recycling and re-use purposes in the same way, even though they are two of the leading methods in the waste hierarchy set out in the directive? In the alternative, if that is not the case, do Articles 4 and 13 of Directive 2008/98/EC preclude national primary legislation and the related secondary implementing legislation — such as Article 35(1) of Decree-Law No 133/2014, as converted into law by Law No 164/2014, and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2016, published in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic, No 233 of 5 October 2016 — in so far as municipal waste incineration facilities are classified as strategic infrastructure and installations of major national importance in order to deal effectively with and avert further infringement proceedings for failure to implement the rules of EU law governing the waste sector, as well as for the purpose of limiting the amount of waste being deposited in landfill?

2.

Do Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Directive 2001/42/EC, (2) also read together, preclude the application of national primary legislation and the related secondary implementing legislation — such as Article 35(1) of Decree-Law No 133/2014, as converted into law by Law No 164/2014, and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2016, published in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic, No 233 of 5 October 2016 — which provides that the President of the Council of Ministers may, by decree, revise upwards the capacity of existing incineration facilities and also determine the number, capacity and regional location of incineration installations with the capacity to recover energy from municipal and similar waste to be constructed to meet the revised residual demand, for the purpose of gradually restoring the socio-economic balance between the various parts of the national territory, in compliance with separate collection and recycling objectives, without that national legislation providing that, at the preparation stage of that plan as described in the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, the rules on strategic environmental assessment laid down in Directive 2001/42/EC are to apply?

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(1)  Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ 2008 L 312, p. 3).

(2)  Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (OJ 2001 L 197, p. 30).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 7 May 2018 — Lavorgna Srl v Comune di Montelanico and Others

(Case C-309/18)

(2018/C 268/29)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Lavorgna Srl

Defendants: Comune di Montelanico, Comune di Supino, Comune di Sgurgola, Comune di Trivigliano

Question referred

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(1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 11 May 2018 — Criminal proceedings against Еmil Milev

(Case C-310/18)

(2018/C 268/30)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Party to the main proceedings

Еmil Milev

Questions referred

(1)

Is national case-law according to which the continuation of a coercive measure of ‘remand in custody’ (four months after the accused’s arrest) is subject to the existence of ‘reasonable grounds’, understood as a mere ‘prima facie’ finding that the accused may have committed the criminal offence in question, compatible with Article 3, the second sentence of Article 4(1), Article 10, the fourth and fifth sentences of recital 16 and recital 48 of Directive 2016/343 (1) and with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]? Or, if it is not, is national case-law according to which the term ‘reasonable suspicion’ means a strong likelihood that the accused committed the criminal offence in question compatible with the abovementioned provisions?

(2)

Is national case-law according to which the court determining an application to vary a coercive measure of ‘remand in custody’ that has already been adopted is required to state the reasons for its decision without comparing the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, even if the accused’s lawyer has submitted arguments to that effect — the only reason for that restriction being that the judge must preserve his impartiality in case that case should be assigned to him for the purposes of the substantive examination —, compatible with the second sentence of Article 4(1), Article 10, the fourth and fifth sentences of recital 16 and recital 48 of Directive 2016/43 and with Article 47 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]? Or, if it is not, is national case-law according to which the court is to carry out a more detailed and specific examination of the evidence and to give a clear answer to the arguments put forward by the accused’s lawyer, even if it thus takes the risk that it will be unable to examine the case or deliver a final decision on guilt if the case is assigned to it for the purposes of the substantive examination, — which implies that another judge will examine the substance of the case — compatible with the abovementioned provisions?

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(1)  Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea hovrätt (Sweden) lodged on 9 May 2018 — Dacom Limited v IPM Informed Portfolio Management AB

(Case C-313/18)

(2018/C 268/31)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Svea hovrätt

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Dacom Limited

Respondent: IPM Informed Portfolio Management AB

Questions referred

1.1

What criteria are to determine whether material constitutes such preparatory design material as is referred to in Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/24/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs? Can documents which set out the requirements as to the functions which are to be performed by a computer program and the result which the computer program must achieve, for example detailed descriptions of investment principles or risk models for asset management including mathematical formulae to be applied in the computer program, constitute such preparatory design material?

1.2	Must material, in order to constitute preparatory design material within the meaning of the directive, be so complete and detailed that in practice it requires no independent choices on the part of the person who actually writes the code of a computer program?

1.3

Does the exclusive right to preparatory design material within the meaning of the directive mean that the computer program in which the preparatory design material subsequently results is to be regarded as an adaptation of the preparatory design material and therefore a dependent work for the purpose of copyright (Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2009/24/EC), or that the preparatory design material and software are to be regarded as different forms of expression of the same work, or that they are two independent works?

2.1

Can a consultant employed by another company, but who has been working for a number of years for the same client and, in the execution of his duties or following the instructions given by the client, has created a computer program, be deemed to be an employee [of the client company] for the purpose of Article 2(3) of Directive 2009/24/EC?

2.2	On the basis of which criteria should it be assessed whether someone is an employee for the purposes of that provision?

3.1

Does Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (2) mean that there must be a possibility of obtaining an injunction, even in a situation where the claimant holds the intellectual property right at issue jointly with the party against whom that injunction is directed?

3.2	If the answer to question 3.1 is in the affirmative, does that lead to any other conclusion if the exclusive right concerns a computer program and that computer program is not disseminated or made available to the public, but used only in a joint owner’s own business?

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(1)  OJ 2009 L 111, p. 16.

(2)  OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Faro (Portugal) lodged on 14 May 2018 — Cátia Correia Moreira v Município de Portimão

(Case C-317/18)

(2018/C 268/32)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Faro

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Cátia Correia Moreira

Defendant: Município de Portimão

Questions referred

a.

On the premiss that ‘worker’ must be taken to mean any person who, in the Member State in question, is protected as such by the national employment legislation, can a person who has a contract for a position of trust with the transferor be regarded as a ‘worker’ for the purposes of Article 2(1)(d) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC (1) of 12 March 2001 and can that person, accordingly, enjoy the protection which that legislation confers?

b.

Does EU legislation, in particular Directive 2001/23/EC, in conjunction with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, preclude a national rule which, even in the case of a transfer falling within the scope of that directive, requires that workers in all cases undergo a public selection procedure and become bound by a new relationship with the transferee where that transferee is a municipality?

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(1)  Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16).

Appeal brought on 14 May 2018 by Fred Olsen, S.A. against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 15 March 2018 in Case T-108/16 Naviera Armas, S.A. v European Commission

(Case C-319/18 P)

(2018/C 268/33)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Fred Olsen, S.A. (represented by: J.M. Rodríguez Cárcamo and A.M. Rodríguez Conde, abogados)

Other parties to the proceedings:

Naviera Armas, S.A.

European Commission

Form of order sought

Fred Olsen, S.A. respectfully requests the Court of Justice to:

—	Set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court of 15 March 2018 in Case T-108/16, Naviera Armas, S.A. v European Commission, supported by Fred Olsen, S.A. (EU:T:2018:145);

—	Dismiss in its entirety the form of order sought by Naviera Armas, S.A. seeking annulment of Decision (2015) 8655 final of the European Commission of 8 December 2015 on State aid SA.36628 (2015/NN) (ex 2013/CP — Spain — Fred Olsen); and

—	Order the parties challenging the appeal to pay the costs incurred by Fred Olsen, S.A. for the purposes of these proceedings, and Naviera Armas, S.A. to pay the costs incurred by Fred Olsen, S.A. at first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

1.   First ground of appeal

1.	By its first ground of appeal, Fred Olsen, S.A. alleges failure to state reasons in the judgment under appeal so far as concerns the selectivity of the measure, within the meaning required by the judgment Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck (C-524/14 P). (1)

2.

If the General Court had examined the selectivity of the measure in accordance with the criteria set out in that judgment, it would have had to examine (i) the general reference framework in which Fred Olsen pays port dues for using the infrastructure of the Puerto de la Nieves, which is to say, the dues applicable to all ports in the Canary Islands, as regulated under national law; (ii) whether the positions of Fred Olsen and other operators using that infrastructure, including Naviera Armas, are comparable with respect to the measure under examination; and (iii) possible discrimination in the payment of those port dues.

3.

The Commission considered, in the contested decision, that the fact that Fred Olsen is the sole user of the Puerto de las Nieves does not, as such, represent an advantage obtained with State resources, given that Fred Olsen pays the usual amount of the dues levied from all operators under the scheme applicable to all ports in the Canary Islands. The Commission was therefore not obliged to carry out an examination of the selectivity of the measure.

4.

On the contrary, in order to assess the existence of a difficulty for the purposes of Article 108(2) TFEU, the General Court should have carried out that examination, which would have allowed it to assess whether the port dues paid by Fred Olsen, in return for being the sole user of the port infrastructure of the Puerto de las Nieves, provided it with any type of advantage.

5.	Given that the reasons for the judgment are manifestly inadequate on this point, it is not possible to assess the existence of the alleged advantage, on which ground the judgment of the General Court should be set aside in its entirety.

2.   Second ground of appeal

6.	By its second ground of appeal, Fred Olsen alleges that sufficient reasons were stated for the Commission’s decision, which did not apply the private investor test.

7.	The General Court found the reasons stated for the decision to be insufficient because, in its judgment, the Commission must use the criterion of the private investor acting in a market economy.

8.

However, beyond the fact that Fred Olsen is the sole user of the Puerto de las Nieves, there is no indication in the judgment of the General Court that that position affords it any advantage with regard to the payment of port dues for the use of the infrastructure. In this particular case, there is no agreement or discount in the payment of dues by Fred Olsen, or a situation of discrimination towards other operators, such as Naviera Armas, with regard to the payment of dues.

9.	The judgments in Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sajonia-Anhalt v Commission (T-443/08 and T-455/08) (2), Ryanair v Commission (T-196/04) (3) and Aéroports de Paris v Commission (T-128/98) (4) are not applicable to this case.

10.	On that ground, the judgment of the General Court should be set aside in its entirety and the decision of the Commission maintained in its entirety.

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(1)  Judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, C-524/14 P, EU:C:2016:971.

(2)  Judgment of 24 March 2011, Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sajonia-Anhalt v Commission, T-443/08 and T-455/08, EU:T:2011:117.

(3)  Judgment of 17 December 2008, Ryanair v Commission, T-196/04, EU:T:2008:585.

(4)  Judgment of 12 December 2000, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, T-128/98, EU:T:2000:290.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — SAIGI Società Cooperativa Agricola a r.l., MA.GE.MA. Società Agricola Cooperativa v Regione Emilia-Romagna, A.U.S.L. Romagna

(Case C-343/18)

(2018/C 268/34)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: SAIGI Società Cooperativa Agricola a r.l., MA.GE.MA. Società Agricola Cooperativa

Respondents: Regione Emilia-Romagna, A.U.S.L. Romagna

Questions referred

1.

By providing that Member States must ensure the collection of fees for the activities referenced in Annex IV, Section A, and Annex V, Section A, must Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 be interpreted as placing an obligation to pay on all agricultural operators, even those which ‘carry out the activities of slaughtering and cutting of meat instrumental to and connected with the activity of rearing livestock’?

2.

Can a [Member] State make certain categories of undertaking exempt from payment of the veterinary fees in the case where it has set up a system for the collection of fees that, overall, guarantees coverage of the costs of the official controls, or may it apply charges that are lower than those provided for by Regulation (EC) No 8[8]2/2004? (1)

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ 2004 L 165, p. 1).

Appeal brought on 25 May 2018 by Rose Vision, S.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 8 March 2018 in Cases T-45/13 RENV and T-587/15 Rose Vision v Commission

(Case C-346/18 P)

(2018/C 268/35)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Rose Vision, S.L. (represented by: J.J. Marín López, abogado)

Other party: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 8 March 2018, Rose Vision v Commission, T-45/13 RENV and T-587/15, ECLI:EU:T:2018:124;

—	award Rose Vision damages as claimed under the tenth and eleventh grounds of appeal.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

1.	Error of law in so far as the oral part of the procedure in Case T-587/15 was reopened by means of the Order of the General Court of 10 October 2017 stating, mistakenly, that the reopening had been requested by the appellant;

2.	Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal distorted the evidence submitted by stating that the Commission replaced the W2 warning with a W1 warning in July 2012;

3.

Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal dismissed, in Case T-45/13 RENV, the request for a declaration of invalidity of the registering of Rose Vision in the Early Warning System (EWS) on the basis that the W2 warning was activated without the appellant being notified, without it being informed of the grounds for that registration, without it being given the opportunity to present its arguments in that regard and without it being able to appeal against that registration;

4.	Error of law in so far as no statement of reasons was given in relation to the allegations contained in the fourth plea in law relied upon in Case T-587/15, which were not at all examined in the judgment under appeal;

5.

Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal, despite rightly finding that the Commission had failed to comply with the two month time limit laid down in paragraph 5 of Article II.22 of General Conditions FP7 (paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal), that it had ‘greatly exceeded the time limit of two months’ and that the failure to comply with that time limit was ‘regrettable’ (paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal), failed to declare, as sought by the appellant, that final audit report 11-INFS-025 and audit report 11-BA119-016 are contractually null and void and have no validity or legal effect;

6.	Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal distorted the evidence submitted by finding that the Commission had established that Rose Vision had been paid for its participation in the sISI, 4NEM and SFERA projects;

7.

Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal, despite recognising that the Commission had breached the obligation of confidentiality laid down in paragraph 1 of Article II.22 of General Conditions FP7 by communicating to third parties information regarding audit 11-INFS-025 (paragraph 158 of the judgment under appeal), rejected, in paragraph 159 and 160 of the judgment under appeal, without providing a statement of reasons, the appellant’s form of order seeking a declaration that the Commission had breached the obligation of confidentiality in relation to audits 11-INFS-025 and 11-BA119-016 (paragraph 215 of the written observations of Rose Vision in Case T-45/13 RENV of 12 September 2016);

8.

Ground of appeal alleging breach of the contractual terms of General Conditions FP7 and the principle of contractual legal certainty by endorsing the application of new requirements contained in the 2011 Financial Guide to Rose Vision as regards audits 11-INFS-025 and 11-BA119-016, even though the relevant audit period in relation to audit 11-INFS-025 was between 1 November 2009 and 31 October 2010 for the FutureNEM project and between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2010 for the FIRST and sISI projects;

9.	Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the evidence, in particular as regards the Rose Vision document of 30 August 2012, which was not even mentioned in the judgment under appeal;

10.	Ground of appeal alleging that the judgment under appeal erroneously dismissed the appellant’s claim for compensation based on non-contractual liability;

11.

Ground of appeal alleging a failure to state reasons in relation to the claims contained in part XII of the application in Case T-587/15, under which, in paragraphs 112 to 117, the appellant claimed compensation based on contractual liability, which was not at all examined in the judgment under appeal.

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (Ireland) made on 7 June 2018 — Hampshire County Council v C.E., N.E.

(Case C-375/18)

(2018/C 268/36)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Court of Appeal

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hampshire County Council

Defendants: C.E., N.E.

Question referred

Is it compatible with EU law and, specifically, the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 (1), for the courts of one Member State to grant an interlocutory injunction (protective measures) directed in personam at the public body of another Member State preventing that body arranging for the adoption of children in the courts of that other Member State where the in personam injunction arises from the necessity to protect the rights of the parties in enforcement proceedings arising under Chapter III of the 2003 Regulation?

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003, L 338, p. 1).

Action brought on 13 June 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Croatia

(Case C-391/18)

(2018/C 268/37)

Language of the case: Croatian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Mataija and M. Patakia, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Croatia

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

declare that the Republic of Croatia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(4), read in conjunction with Article 13(1), of Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste (OJ 2011 L 199, p. 48) by failing to notify the Commission of its national programme for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste;

—	order the Republic of Croatia to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 13(1) of Directive 2011/70/Euratom, Member States are required to notify the Commission of their national programmes for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste and of any subsequent significant changes, and, under Article 15(4) of that directive, Member States were required, for the first time, to notify the Commission of the content of their national programme as soon as possible, but not later than 23 August 2015.

The Republic of Croatia has failed to adopt a national programme such as that referred to in the abovementioned provisions and, in any event, has failed to notify it to the Commission. Thus, the Republic of Croatia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(4), read in conjunction with Article 13(1), of Directive 2011/70/Euratom.

Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Tillotts Pharma v EUIPO — Ferring (XENASA)

(Case T-362/16) (1)

((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark XENASA - Earlier EU word mark PENTASA - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))

(2018/C 268/38)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Tillotts Pharma AG (Rheinfelden, Switzerland) (represented by: M. Douglas, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Ferring BV (Hoofddorp, Netherlands) (represented initially by: I. Fowler, Solicitor, and D. Slopek, lawyer, and subsequently by I. Fowler)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 April 2016 (Case R 3264/2014-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Ferring and Tillotts Pharma.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 29 April 2016 (Case R 3264/2014-4);

2.	Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Tillotts Pharma AG;

3.	Orders Ferring BV to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 314, 29.8.2016.

Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — HX v Council

(Case T-408/16) (1)

((Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures adopted against Syria - Freezing of funds - Principle of ne bis in idem - Rights of the defence - Right to a fair trial - Obligation to state reasons - Right to an effective remedy - Manifest error of assessment - Right to property - Proportionality - Right to a normal life - Damage to reputation))

(2018/C 268/39)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Parties

Applicant: HX (Damascus, Syria) (represented by: S. Koev and S. Klukowska, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: initially I. Gurov and G. Étienne, and subsequently I. Gurov and A. Vitro, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2016 L 141, p. 125), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/840 of 27 May 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2016 L 141, p. 30), of Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/917 of 29 May 2017 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ 2017 L 139, p. 62), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/907 of 29 May 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2017 L 139, p. 15), in so far as those measures apply to the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders HX to bear his own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the Council of the European Union.

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(1)  OJ C 419, 14.11.2016.

Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — MIP Metro v EUIPO — AFNOR (N & NF TRADING)

(Case T-807/16) (1)

((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - International registration designating the European Union - Word mark N & NF TRADING - Earlier EU figurative mark NF ENVIRONNEMENT - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Lack of enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))

(2018/C 268/40)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: MIP Metro Group Intellectual Property GmbH & Co. KG (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: J.-C. Plate and R. Kaase, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Association française de normalisation (AFNOR) (La Plaine Saint-Denis, France) (represented by: B. Fontaine, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 July 2016 (Case R 1109/2015-1), relating to opposition proceedings between AFNOR and MIP Metro Group Intellectual Property.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders MIP Metro Group Intellectual Property GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 22, 23.1.17.

Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Damm v EUIPO — Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz (EISKELLER)

(Case T-859/16) (1)

((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark EISKELLER - Earlier national word marks KELER and KELER 18 - Relative ground for refusal - No similarity between the signs - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))

(2018/C 268/41)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Sociedad Anónima Damm (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: P. González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón and C. Aguilera Montañez, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: I. Harrington, D. Hanf, V. Ruzek and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz GmbH & Co. KG (Au-Hallertau, Germany) (represented by: C. Thomas and V. Schwepler, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 September 2016 (Case R 2428/2015-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Sociedad Anónima Damm and Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Sociedad Anónima Damm to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 38, 6.2.2017.

Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Le Pen v Parliament

(Case T-86/17) (1)

((Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances of Members of the European Parliament - Parliamentary assistance allowance - Recovery of sums unduly paid - Power of the Secretary-General - Rights of the defence - Burden of proof - Obligation to state reasons - Equal treatment - Misuse of powers - Independence of the Members - Error of fact - Proportionality))

(2018/C 268/42)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Marion Le Pen (Saint-Cloud, France) (represented by: initially, M. Ceccaldi and J.-P. Le Moigne, subsequently, M. Ceccaldi and, finally, R. Bosselut, lawyers)

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: G. Corstens and S. Seyr, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: A. Jensen, M. Bauer and R. Meyer, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking annulment of the decision of the Secretary-General of the Parliament of 5 December 2016 concerning the recovery of a sum of EUR 298 497,87 wrongfully paid as parliamentary assistance allowance and of the debit note of 6 December 2016 relating thereto.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Marion Le Pen to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings;

3.	Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.

Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Erwin Müller v EUIPO — Novus Tablet Technology Finland (NOVUS)

(Case T-89/17) (1)

((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark NOVUS - Earlier EU word and figurative marks NOVUS and novus - Relative ground for refusal - Similarity of the goods - Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Evidence presented for the first time before the General Court))

(2018/C 268/43)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Erwin Müller GmbH (Lingen, Germany) (represented by: N. Grüger, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: V. Mensing and M. Fischer, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Novus Tablet Technology Finland Oy (Turku, Finland)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 November 2016 (Case R 2413/2015-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Erwin Müller and Novus Tablet Technology Finland.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 28 November 2016 (Case R 2413/2015-4) in so far as it concerns the ‘special holders for mobile phones’ referred to in the trade mark application;

2.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.	Orders Erwin Müller GmbH and EUIPO to bear their own respective costs.

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(1)  OJ C 112, 10.4.2017.

Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Lion’s Head Global Partners v EUIPO — Lion Capital (LION’S HEAD global partners)

(Case T-310/17) (1)

((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - International registration designating the European Union - Figurative mark LION’S HEAD global partners - Earlier EU word mark LION CAPITAL - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))

(2018/C 268/44)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Lion’s Head Global Partners LLP (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: R. Nöske, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Lion Capital LLP (London) (represented by D. Rose and J. Warner, Solicitors)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 February 2017 (Case R 1477/2016 4), relating to opposition proceedings between Lion Capital and Lion’s Head Global Partners.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Lion’s Head Global Partners LLP to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.

Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Karl Storz v EUIPO (3D)

(Case T-413/17) (1)

((EU trade mark - International registration designating the European Union - Figurative mark 3D - Absolute grounds for refusal - Descriptive character - Absence of any distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Obligation to state reasons - Article 75(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001)))

(2018/C 268/45)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Karl Storz GmbH & Co. KG (Tuttlingen, Germany) (represented by: S. Gruber and N. Siebertz, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 April 2017 (Case R 1502/2016 2), relating to the international registration designating the European Union in respect of the figurative mark 3D.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 April 2017 (Case R 1502/2016-2) in respect of ‘stationery’ goods which fall within Class 16 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended;

2.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.	Orders each party to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 277, 21.8.2017.

Order of the General Court of 8 June 2018 — Spychalski v Commission

(Case T-590/16) (1)

((Civil service - Recruitment - Notice of competition - Open Competition EPSO/AD 177/10-ECO2013 - Assessment of the main language - Decision not to include the applicant’s name on the reserve list - Manifest lack of jurisdiction - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law))

(2018/C 268/46)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Michał Spychalski (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: A. Żołyniak, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Herrmann and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of the selection board in Open Competition EPSO/AD 177/10-ECO2013, organised by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), not to include the applicant’s name on the reserve list and, secondly, that the appointing authority be required to add the applicant’s name to the reserve list established on the basis of the open competition in question, subject to the period of validity of the addition being equal to the period of validity of the list.

Operative part of the order

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action on the basis that it is in part manifestly lacking any basis in law and in part on the ground that the General Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it;

2.	Orders Michał Spychalski to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

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(1)  OJ C 383, 17.10.2016 (case initially registered before the European Union Civil Service Tribunal under number F-20/16 and transferred to the General Court of the European Union on 1.9.2016).

Action brought on 24 April 2018 — Front Polisario v Council

(Case T-275/18)

(2018/C 268/47)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Front populaire pour la libération de la Saguia el-Hamra et du Río de Oro (Front Polisario) (represented by: G. Devers, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	declare its action admissible;

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action against Council Decision (EU) 2018/146 of 22 January 2018 on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (OJ 2018 L 26, p. 4), the applicant relies on ten pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Council does not have the power to adopt the contested decision, in that the European Union and Kingdom of Morocco lack competence to enter into international agreements that include Western Sahara, instead of the people of that territory, as represented by the Front Polisario.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a failure to comply with the duty to consider all relevant aspects of the case at issue, in that the Council did not take into account the fact that the international agreement, entered into by means of the contested decision, applies on a provisional basis, for a period of 12 years, to the territory of Western Sahara, in breach of its separate and distinct status.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging a failure to comply with the duty to examine the question of respect for fundamental rights, in that, when it adopted the contested decision, the Council did not consider the question of respect for human rights in occupied Sahrawi territory.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of defence in that the Council did not initiate any discussion with the Front Polisario, sole representative of the people of the Western Sahara, before the adoption of the contested decision.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging, first, infringement of the core principles and values guiding the European Union’s action on the international scene, in that the international agreement, entered into by means of the contested decision, applies to the territory of Western Sahara, in the context of the Kingdom of Morocco’s policy of annexation, and, second, systematic breaches of fundamental rights required for the maintenance of that policy.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to self-determination, in that the international agreement, entered into by means of the contested decision, applies to the territory of Western Sahara, in breach of, first, the separate and distinct status of that territory and, second, the Sahrawi people’s right to respect for the territorial integrity of their territory.

7.	Seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of the relative effects of treaties, in that the people of Western Sahara, as represented by the Front Polisario, did not consent to the international agreement, entered into by means of the contested decision.

8.

Eighth plea in law, alleging violation of Western Sahara’s air space, in that the contested decision, by ratifying the illegal practice stemming from the provisional application of the international agreement entered into by means of that decision, results in the inclusion of Sahrawi airspace within the scope of application of that agreement.

9.

Ninth plea in law, alleging infringement of the law of international responsibility, in that, by the contested decision, the European Union fails to fulfil, first, its duty not to recognise the illegal occupation of Western Sahara and, second, renders aid and assistance to the maintenance of that situation.

10.

Tenth plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to ensure compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, in that compliance by the European Union with its international obligations towards the people of Western Sahara entails, as a minimum, that the Council should refrain from adopting the contested decision, inasmuch as it allows the entry into force of an international agreement applicable to the part of Western Sahara which is under Moroccan occupation.

Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Hungary v Commission

(Case T-306/18)

(2018/C 268/48)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér, G. Koós and G. Tornyai, acting as Agents)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

—	Annul Commission Decision (EU) 2018/262 of 14 February 2018 on the proposed citizens’ initiative entitled: ‘We are a welcoming Europe, let us help!’. (1)

—	Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 4(2)(b), (c) and (d), and Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative (2) The first and second parts of the European citizens’ initiative registered under the contested decision are manifestly outside the scope of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. For that reason, the registration of the initiative infringes Article 4(2)(b) and Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011. Furthermore, the first part of the initiative is abusive and, consequently, is also contrary to Article 4(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011. As regards the second part, it can be argued that it can lead to a result contrary to the values of the EU established in Article 2 TEU, and is therefore also contrary to Article 4(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union The contested decision does not satisfy the requirements relating to the obligation to state reasons, and therefore infringes the obligation to state reasons established in Article 296 TFEU and the right to good administration provided for in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In essence, the contested decision does not give any indication of the grounds on which the Commission found that, as regards the third part of the initiative, there is an appropriate legal basis and legislative power of the EU which meets the requirement established in Article 4(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 relating to the registration.

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(1)  OJ 2018 L 49, p. 64.

(2)  OJ 2011 L 65, p. 1; corrigendum in OJ 2011 L 330, p. 47, and in OJ 2012 L 94, p. 49.

Action brought on 28 May 2018 — VI.TO. v EUIPO — Bottega (Shape of a pink bottle)

(Case T-325/18)

(2018/C 268/49)

Language in which the application was lodged: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Vinicola Tombacco (VI.TO.) Srl (Trebaseleghe, Italy) (represented by: L. Giove, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Sandro Bottega (Colle Umberto, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: European Union three-dimensional mark (Shape of a pink bottle) – European Union trade mark No 12 309 795

Procedure before EUIPO: Proceedings for a declaration of invalidity

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 March 2018 in Case R 1037/2017-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

—	Incorrect assessment of the ground for refusal laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Incorrect assessment of the ground for refusal laid down in Article 7(1)(e)(i), (ii) and (iii) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 28 May 2018 — Gas Natural v Commission

(Case T-328/18)

(2018/C 268/50)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Gas Natural SDG, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: F. González Díaz and V. Romero Algarra, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

—	Declare admissible and well founded the grounds of annulment set out in this action.

—

In accordance with Article 263 TFEU, annul the Commission Decision of 27 November 2017 in file SA.47912 (2017/NN) opening the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU relating to the environmental investment incentive granted by the Kingdom of Spain to coal-fired power stations.

—	Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The contested decision in this case opened the formal investigation procedure, provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU, relating to the environmental investment incentive granted by the Kingdom of Spain to coal-fired power stations.

According to the applicant, it is apparent from the contested decision that the Commission harbours doubts as to whether the emission limit values imposed on plants that receive that environmental investment incentive are simply aimed at applying the protection levels required by EU law and, in particular, by Directive 2001/80/EC, which applies to coal-fired power stations. If that were the case, the environmental investment incentive would not provide any incentive at all. Furthermore, the environmental investment incentive would be contrary to the principle of EU law regarding State aid, according to which Member States cannot grant public aid to undertakings so that the latter can comply with binding EU laws.

In support of its action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons as regards the selective nature of the measure. — In that regard, it is submitted that the Commission provides no information that explains in a clear and unequivocal manner why the measure under investigation is selective in nature, for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. In particular, the Commission fails to explain whether the coal-fired power stations are in a comparable factual and legal situation with the rest of the power stations and, if that is the case, whether the incentive in this case can favour ‘certain undertakings or productions’, for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, in relation to other undertakings which are in a comparable factual and legal situation, in light of the objective pursued by the measure in question.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging, in the alternative, infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU, in relation to the selectivity of the measure. — In that regard, it is submitted that the payment granted to the coal-fired power stations in order to continue supporting the investments cannot in any way be selective in nature given that the payment in question is limited to putting all post-1998 significant investments on an equal footing, irrespective of the technology and/or the fact that the power stations in question are CCGTs or coal-fired power stations, thus altering the amount of the payment according to its significance. — In any event, and even assuming that the Commission’s conclusions in the contested decision are correct, quod non, the applicant submits that, in light of their economic circumstances and their legal situation, the coal-fired power stations were not in a factual and legal situation that was comparable with that of power stations which use a different type of energy. Coal-fired power stations were the only ones established prior to 1998 which were obliged to make very significant investments in order to continue operating and which, without the payment in question, would have been forced to close, putting at risk the security of supply of the Spanish electricity system.

Action brought on 30 May 2018 — Eagle IP v EUIPO — Consolidated Artists (LILLY e VIOLETTA)

(Case T-336/18)

(2018/C 268/51)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Eagle IP Ltd (Valletta, Malta) (represented by: M. Müller, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Consolidated Artists BV (Rotterdam, Netherlands)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark LILLY e VIOLETTA — Application for registration No 12 723 086

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 March 2018 in Case R 1489/2015-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order the other party to pay the costs incurred by the Applicant.

Plea in law

—	Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 30 May 2018 — Enterprise Holdings v EUIPO (E PLUS)

(Case T-339/18)

(2018/C 268/52)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Enterprise Holdings, Inc. (Saint Louis, Missouri, États-Unis) (represented by: D. Farnsworth, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark E PLUS — Application for registration No 16 377 079

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 March 2018 in Case R 2141/2017-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	accept the Application for publication;

—	order EUIPO to bear its own and pay the Applicant’s costs.

Plea in law

—	Infringement of Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 1 June 2018 — BNP Paribas v ECB

(Case T-345/18)

(2018/C 268/53)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: BNP Paribas (Paris, France) (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

annul in part the decision of the ECB No ECB-SSM-2018-FRBNP-17 of 26 April 2018 in so far as it imposes a deduction of the irrevocable payment commitments (‘IPCs’) taken out with the Single Resolution Fund (‘SRF’), national resolution funds and deposit guarantee schemes (‘DGS’) from Common Equity Tier 1 capital, on an individual, sub-consolidated or consolidated basis, and in particular paragraphs 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3;

—	order the ECB to pay all of the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging a lack of legal basis. In this regard, the applicant submits that the contested decision creates a new rule of general application which goes clearly beyond the legal framework governing the defendant’s exercise of its prudential supervision tasks. Furthermore, by adopting a decision taken without prior analysis of the solvency and liquidity risk and without regard for the applicant’s risk profile, the defendant exceeded the powers laid down in Articles 4(1)(f) and 16 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63) (‘the SSM Regulation’). Finally, the applicant submits that Article 16(1)(c) of the SSM Regulation does not authorise the ECB to act to ensure ‘better information on risks’ and that Articles 4(1)(f) and 16(2)(d) of the SSM Regulation do not authorise the adoption of prudential measures in respect of off-balance-sheet items.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an error of law in so far as the defendant misinterpreted the EU legislation establishing the possibility for credit institutions to make use of IPCs to fulfil part of their obligations vis-à-vis resolution funds and deposit guarantee schemes. The contested decision runs counter to the objectives and purpose of the applicable rules to the extent that it disregards the intention of the legislature manifested through the implementation of those instruments. By doing so, that decision renders the provisions at issue ineffective.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, in so far as the imposition of a deduction of IPCs from its own funds is inappropriate and unnecessary in respect of a risk which is purely hypothetical and already covered. According to the applicant, that measure is disproportionate in the light of the objective set by the ECB itself, which is to ‘provide adequate information on financial risks’.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment and failure to observe the principle of sound administration. The applicant claims that, by choosing to use an instrument (deduction from own funds) which is clearly unsuited to the objective that it purports to pursue (to provide adequate information on risks), the defendant has failed to observe the principle of sound administration, in so far as it has failed to draw the appropriate conclusions from its own assessments.

Action brought on 29 May 2018 — Advance Magazine Publishers v EUIPO — Enovation Brands (VOGUE)

(Case T-346/18)

(2018/C 268/54)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: T. Alkin, barrister)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Enovation Brands, Inc. (Aventura, Florida, United States).

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union trade mark — Application for registration No 12 010 039

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 March 2018 in Case R 259/2017-4.

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the part of the contested decision relating to Rule 20(7)(c) /Rule 50(1) CTMIR;

—	order the Other Party to pay the costs incurred by the Applicant.

Plea in law

—	Infringement of Rules 20(7)(c)/ 50(1) of the Regulation No 2868/95.

Action brought on 6 June 2018 — KID-Systeme v EUIPO — Sky (SKYFi)

(Case T-354/18)

(2018/C 268/55)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: KID-Systeme GmbH (Buxtehude, Germany) (represented by: R. Kunze, G. Würtenberger and T. Wittmann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Sky plc (Isleworth, United Kingdom)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark SKYFi — Application for registration No 12 189 502

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 March 2018 in Case R 106/2017-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Articles 8(1), 46, 47, 67, 70, 71, 94 and 95 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament;

—	Infringement of Articles 2(2), 7(2), 8(2), 8(9), 27 and 71 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625.

Action brought on 7 June 2018 — Volvo Trademark v EUIPO — Paalupaikka (V V-wheels)

(Case T-356/18)

(2018/C 268/56)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Volvo Trademark Holding AB (Göteborg, Sweden) (represented by: T. Dolde, lawyer and M. Hawkins, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Paalupaikka Oy (Iisalmi, Finland)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark V V-WHEELS — Application for registration No 14 439 053

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 March 2018 in Case R 1852/2017-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs incurred in the proceedings before the Opposition Division and the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of Article 72(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 8 June 2018 — Luz Saúde v EUIPO — Clínica La Luz (HOSPITAL DA LUZ)

(Case T-357/18)

(2018/C 268/57)

Language in which the application was lodged: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: Luz Saúde (Lisbon, Portugal) (represented by: G. Gentil Anastácio and P. Guerra e Andrade, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Clínica La Luz, SL (Madrid, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark ‘HOSPITAL DA LUZ’ — Application for registration No 14 791 495

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 April 2018 in Case R 2084/2017-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision refusing in part the registration of the applicant’s mark concerned by the procedure at issue, alter it and allow the registration;

—	order EUIPO to pay all the costs.

Plea in law

—	Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 11 June 2018 — Arçelik v EUIPO (MicroGarden)

(Case T-364/18)

(2018/C 268/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Arçelik AS (Istanbul, Turquie) (represented by: A. Franke, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark MicroGarden — Application for registration No 16 971 988

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 April 2018 in Case R 163/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

—	Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 19 June 2018 — ABB v EUIPO (FLEXLOADER)

(Case T-373/18)

(2018/C 268/59)

Language in which the application was brought: German

Parties

Applicant: ABB AB (Västerås, Sweden) (represented by: M. Hartmann and S. Fröhlich, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark FLEXLOADER — Application for registration No 17 099 474

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 March 2018 in Case R 93/2018-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision;

—	order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings and the costs incurred by the applicant.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Order of the General Court of 12 June 2018 — Capo d’Anzio v Commission

(Case T-425/17) (1)

(2018/C 268/60)

Language of the case: Italian

The President of the Ninth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 277, 21.8.2017.