7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/1

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/2

—

New Year’s Day,

—

Easter Monday,

—

1 May,

—

Ascension,

—

Whit Monday,

—

23 June,

—

15 August,

—

1 November,

—

25 December,

—

26 December.

—

Christmas 2018: from Monday 17 December 2018 to Sunday 6 January 2019 inclusive,

—

Easter 2019: from Monday 15 April 2019 to Sunday 28 April 2019 inclusive,

—

Summer 2019: from Tuesday 16 July 2019 to Saturday 31 August 2019 inclusive.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/4

—

Christmas 2018: from Monday 17 December 2018 to Sunday 6 January 2019 inclusive,

—

Easter 2019: from Monday 15 April 2019 to Sunday 28 April 2019 inclusive,

—

Summer 2019: from Tuesday 16 July 2019 to Saturday 31 August 2019 inclusive.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/5

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/6

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

2.

Orders SNCF Mobilités to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission and by Mory SA and Mory Team.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/6

1)

The second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as not applying to a defendant domiciled in a third State, such as the defendant in the main proceedings.

2)

Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’, for the purposes of that provision, covers a claim brought by air passengers for compensation for the long delay of a connecting flight, made under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, against an operating air carrier with which the passenger concerned does not have contractual relations.

3)

The second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001 and the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a connecting flight, the ‘place of performance’ of that flight, for the purposes of those provisions, is the place of arrival of the second leg, where the carriage on both flights was operated by two different air carriers and the action for compensation for the long delay of that connecting flight under Regulation No 261/2004 is based on an irregularity which took place on the first of those flights, operated by the air carrier with which the passengers concerned do not have contractual relations.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/7

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/8

(1)

Article 8(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs must be interpreted as meaning that in order to determine whether the features of appearance of a product are exclusively dictated by its technical function, it must be established that the technical function is the only factor which determined those features, the existence of alternative designs not being decisive in that regard.

(2)

Article 8(1) of Regulation No 6/2002 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine whether the relevant features of appearance of a product are solely dictated by its technical function, within the meaning of that provision, the national court must take account of all the objective circumstances relevant to each individual case. In that regard, there is no need to base those findings on the perception of an ‘objective observer’.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/9

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/9

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/10

1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of 15 September 2016, FIH Holding and FIH Erhvervsbank v Commission (T-386/14, EU:T:2016:474);

2.

Dismisses the first plea in the action before the General Court;

3.

Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union for it to give judgment on the second plea in law;

4.

Reserves the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/11

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/11

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/12

(1)

Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that, subject to the verifications to be made by the referring court, a jurisdiction clause, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, set out in the general conditions of sale mentioned in invoices issued by one of the contracting parties does not satisfy the requirements of that provision.

(2)

Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the court with jurisdiction, by virtue of that provision, to hear a claim for compensation relating to the termination of a commercial concession agreement concluded between two companies established and operating in two different Member States for the distribution of goods on the domestic market of a third Member State in which neither of those companies has a branch or establishment, is that of the Member State in which the place of the main supply of services, as is clear from the provisions of the contract and, in the absence of such provisions, the actual performance of that contract, and where it cannot be determined on that basis, the place where the agent is domiciled.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/13

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/14

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/14

—

annul the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 23 June 2016, notified on 6 July 2016, stating that ‘a sum of EUR 40 320 was wrongly paid to Ms Dominique Bilde’ and ordering the authorising officer responsible and the institution’s accounting officer to recover that sum;

—

annul also debit note No 2016-889 signed by the Director-General for Finance on 29 June 2016;

—

make an appropriate order as to the sum to be awarded to the appellant as compensation for the non-material harm that she has suffered as a result of the unfounded accusations made before the enquiry was finalised, the harm to her reputation, and the very significant disruption to her personal and political life caused by the contested decision;

—

make an appropriate order as to the sum to be awarded to the appellant in respect of the costs of the proceedings;

—

order the European Parliament to pay all costs.

1.

The first ground alleges lack of competence on the part of the author of the act:

2.

The second ground alleges infringement of the principle of ‘electa una via’:

3.

The third ground alleges infringement of the rights of defence:

4.

The fourth ground alleges reversal of the burden of proof:

5.

The fifth ground alleges failure to state adequate reasons:

6.

The sixth ground alleges infringement of the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations:

7.

The seventh ground alleges prejudice to the civil rights of parliamentary assistants:

8.

The eighth ground alleges discriminatory treatment, ‘Fumus persecutionis’, and misuse of power:

9.

The ninth ground alleges prejudice to the independence of members of the European Parliament:

10.

The tenth ground alleges a lack of factual basis:

11.

The eleventh ground alleges infringement of the principle of proportionality:

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/16

1.

2.

Must Article 7 of Decision No 2/76 and Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 be interpreted as meaning that a national rule does not constitute a restriction, within the meaning of those provisions, if the effect of that national rule on access to employment, as referred to in those provisions, is too uncertain and too indirect to be regarded as constituting an obstacle to such access?

3.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/17

1.-

Must Clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP approved by Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 (1) be interpreted as precluding a regional legislative provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which expressly excludes the award and payment to staff employed by the Public Administration of Navarre who are classified as ‘employed under an administrative contract’ (a fixed-term contract) of particular additional remuneration, on the grounds that the additional remuneration in question constitutes remuneration for promotion and development in a professional career that is open only to staff classified as ‘established public officials’ (with a contract of indefinite duration)?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/17

—

annul the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 24 June 2016, notified on 6 July 2016, stating that ‘a sum of EUR 77 276,42 was wrongly paid to Ms Sophie Montel’ and ordering the authorising officer responsible and the institution’s accounting officer to recover that sum;

—

annul also debit note No 2016-897 signed by the Director-General for Finance on 4 July 2016;

—

make an appropriate order as to the sum to be awarded to the appellant as compensation for the non-material harm that she has suffered as a result of the unfounded accusations made before the enquiry was finalised, the harm to her reputation, and the very significant disruption to her personal and political life occasioned by the contested decision;

—

make an appropriate order as to the sum to be awarded to the appellant in respect of the costs of the proceedings;

—

order the European Parliament to pay all costs.

1.

The first ground alleges lack of competence of the author of the act:

2.

The second ground alleges infringement of the principle of ‘electa una via’:

3.

The third ground alleges infringement of the rights of defence:

4.

The fourth ground alleges reversal of the burden of proof:

5.

The fifth ground alleges failure to state adequate reasons:

6.

The sixth ground alleges infringement of the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations:

7.

The seventh ground alleges prejudice to the civil rights of parliamentary assistants:

8.

The eighth ground alleges discriminatory treatment, ‘Fumus persecutionis’, and misuse of power:

9.

The ninth ground alleges prejudice to the independence of members of the European Parliament:

10.

The tenth ground alleges a lack of factual basis:

11.

The eleventh ground alleges infringement of the principle of proportionality:

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/19

—

Declare that, by failing to bring into force by 18 April 2016 at the latest the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 1) or, in any event, by failing to communicate to the Commission those provisions, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 51 of that directive;

—

Impose on the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU, a penalty payment of EUR 12 920 per day as of the date of delivery of the judgment in the present case for failure to fulfil its obligation to communicate to the Commission the measures transposing Directive 2014/23/EU;

—

Order the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to pay the costs.

1.

Under Article 51(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU, the Member States were required to bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with that directive by 18 April 2016 at the latest. Given that Luxembourg has not communicated the measures transposing the directive, the Commission has decided to refer the matter to the Court of Justice

2.

The Commission in its action proposes that a daily penalty payment of EUR 12 920 be imposed on Luxembourg. The amount of the penalty payment has been calculated to take into account the seriousness and the duration of the infringement and the penalty payment’s dissuasive effect, in the light of that Member State’s capacity to pay it.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/20

—

Declare that, by failing to bring into force by 18 April 2016 at the latest the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65) or, in any event, by failing to communicate to the Commission those provisions, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 90(1) of that directive;

—

Impose on the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU, a penalty payment of EUR 11 628 per day as of the date of delivery of the judgment in the present case for failure to fulfil its obligation to communicate to the Commission the measures transposing Directive 2014/24/EU;

—

Order the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to pay the costs.

1.

Under Article 90(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU, the Member States were required to bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with that directive by 18 April 2016 at the latest. Given that Luxembourg has not communicated the measures transposing the directive, the Commission has decided to refer the matter to the Court of Justice.

2.

The Commission in its action proposes that a daily penalty payment of EUR 11 628 be imposed on Luxembourg. The amount of the penalty payment has been calculated to take into account the seriousness and the duration of the infringement and the penalty payment’s dissuasive effect, in the light of that Member State’s capacity to pay it.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/20

—

Declare that, by failing to bring into force by 18 April 2016 at the latest the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 243) or, in any event, by failing to communicate to the Commission those provisions, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 106(1) of that directive;

—

Impose on the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, in accordance with Article 260(3) TFEU, a penalty payment of EUR 11 628 per day as of the date of delivery of the judgment in the present case for failure to fulfil its obligation to communicate to the Commission the measures transposing Directive 2014/25/EU;

—

Order the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to pay the costs.

1.

Under Article 106(1) of Directive 2014/25/EU, the Member States were required to bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with that directive by 18 April 2016 at the latest. Given that Luxembourg has not communicated the measures transposing the directive, the Commission has decided to refer the matter to the Court of Justice.

2.

The Commission in its action proposes that a daily penalty payment of EUR 11 628 be imposed on Luxembourg. The amount of the penalty payment has been calculated to take into account the seriousness and the duration of the infringement and the penalty payment’s dissuasive effect, in the light of that Member State’s capacity to pay it.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/21

1.

2.

For the purpose of the answer to Question 1, is it significant that the possibility existed for the parties concerned to take out voluntary insurance under the AOW, or that the possibility existed for them to request the Svb to conclude an agreement as referred to in Article 17 of Regulation No 1408/71?

3.

Does Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71 preclude someone such as Mr Giesen’s wife, who, prior to 1 January 1989, on the basis solely of the national legislation in her country of residence, the Netherlands, was insured under the AOW, from building an entitlement to old-age benefits on the basis of that insurance, in relation to periods during which, pursuant to that provision of the regulation, she was subject, by reason of work carried out in another Member State, to the legislation of that State of employment? Or must entitlement to a benefit under the AOW be regarded as an entitlement to a benefit which, under national legislation, is not subject to conditions relating to paid employment or to insurance within the meaning of the Bosmann  (3) judgment, with the result that the line of reasoning followed in that judgment can be applied in her case?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/22

1.

Must Articles 45 TFEU and 48 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that at issue here, those provisions preclude a national rule such as Article 6a, introductory sentence and (b), of the AKW? (1) That rule means that a resident of the Netherlands is not insured for purposes of the social security scheme of that State of residence if that resident works in another Member State and is subject to the social security legislation of the State of employment on the basis of Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71. (2) The present case is characterised by the fact that, on the basis of the legislation of the State of employment, the interested party does not qualify for child benefit because of the limited scope of her work there?

2.

For the purpose of the answer to Question 1, is it significant that the possibility existed for the interested party to request the Svb to conclude an agreement as referred to in Article 17 of Regulation No 1408/71?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/23

1.

Does Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, (1) preclude an interpretation that includes in the compulsory insurance cover the damage caused by a fire in a stationary vehicle when the fire has its origin in the mechanisms necessary to performing the transport function of the vehicle?

2.

If the answer to the question above is negative, does Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, preclude an interpretation that includes in the compulsory insurance cover the damage caused by a fire in a vehicle when the fire cannot be linked to previous motion, in such a way that no connection with a journey can be discerned?

3.

If the answer to the second question is negative, does Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, preclude an interpretation that includes in the compulsory insurance cover the damage caused by a fire in a vehicle when the vehicle is parked in a closed private garage?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/23

1.

Can a situation such as that described in the present case (in which the public-sector employer fails to observe the statutory time limits and thus either permits successive temporary contracts or preserves the temporary nature of the appointment by changing the nature of the appointment from occasional to interim or replacement) be considered an abusive use of successive appointments and therefore be regarded as a situation described in Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC? (1)

2.

Must the provisions in the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work in the Annex to Directive 1999/70/EC, in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, be interpreted as precluding national procedural rules that require a fixed-term worker actively to challenge or appeal against all the successive appointments and terminations of employment as the only way in which to benefit from the protection of the EU Directive and claim the rights conferred on him by EU law?

3.

In view of the fact that, in the public sector and in the provision of essential services, the necessity of providing cover for vacancies, sickness, holidays … is essentially ‘permanent’, and given that the concept of ‘objective reason’ justifying a fixed-term appointment has to be delimited:

4.

Is it compatible with the Framework Directive annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC to regard grounds of need, urgency or the development of programmes of a temporary, interim or extraordinary nature as an objective reason for appointing and successively reappointing IT specialists on temporary regulated terms where these public employees are performing the normal functions of permanent regulated employees on a permanent and regular basis, and the employing Administration neither establishes maximum limits to such appointments nor fulfils its legal obligations to use permanent staff to cover these posts and meet these needs, and no equivalent measure is established to prevent and avoid misuse of successive temporary appointments, with the result that IT specialists employed on temporary regulated terms continue to carry out these duties for periods that, in the present case, amount to an uninterrupted duration of 17 years?

5.

Are the provisions in the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work in the Annex to Directive 1999/70/EC and the interpretation of that Agreement by the CJEU compatible with the case-law of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain), insofar as it fixes the existence of an objective reason for an appointment by reference to the time limit to the appointment, without regard to other parameters, or finds that there can be no comparison made with a career public official because of the different legal rules covering them and different access routes or because career officials are permanently established but employees recruited to cover vacancies hold temporary appointments?

6.

If the national courts find that there is abuse arising from the use of successive appointments of temporary regulated staff to cover vacancies in the Madrid Health Service and that they are being used to cover permanent structural needs in the provision of services by permanent regulated employees, given that domestic law contains no effective measure to penalise such misuse and eliminate the consequences of the breach of EU legislation, must Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC be interpreted as requiring the national courts to adopt effective deterrent measures to ensure the effectiveness of the Framework Agreement, and therefore to penalise that misuse and eliminate the consequences of the breach of that EU legislation, disapplying the rule of domestic law that prevents it from being effective?

If the answer should be affirmative, as held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in paragraph 41 of its judgment of 14 September 2016 in Cases C 184/15 and C 197/15: (2)

As a measure to prevent and penalise the misuse of successive temporary contracts and to eliminate the consequence of the breach of EU law, would it be consistent with the objectives pursued by Directive 1999/70/EC to convert the temporary interim/occasional/replacement regulated relationship into a stable regulated relationship, the employee being classified as a permanent official or an official with an appointment of indefinite duration, with the same security of employment as comparable permanent regulated employees?

7.

If there is abuse of successive temporary contracts, can the conversion of the temporary regulated relationship into an indefinite or permanent relationship be regarded as satisfying the objectives of Directive 1999/70/EC and its Framework Agreement only if the temporary regulated employee who has been the victim of this misuse enjoys exactly the same working conditions as permanent regulated employees (as regards social security, promotion, opportunities to cover vacant posts, training, leave of absence, determination of administrative status, sick leave and other permitted absences, pension rights, termination of employment and participation in selection competitions to fill vacancies and obtain promotion) in accordance with the principles of permanence and security of employment, with all associated rights and obligations, on equal terms with permanent regulated IT specialists?

8.

In the circumstances described here, is there an obligation under EU law to review final judgments/administrative acts when the four conditions laid down in Kühne & Heitz NV (C 453/00 of 13 January 2004) (3) are met: (1) Under Spanish national law, the authorities and the courts may review decisions (even if the restrictions involved make it very difficult or even impossible); (2) The contested decisions have become final as a result of a judgment of a national court issued in sole or final instance; (3) That judgment is based on an interpretation of EU law inconsistent with the case-law of the CJEU and adopted without a question being referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling; and (4) The person concerned applied to the administrative body as soon as it knew of the relevant case-law?

9.

May and must national courts, as European courts that must give full effect to EU law in the Member States, require and order the internal administrative authority of a Member State — within its respective area of jurisdiction — to adopt the relevant measures in order to eliminate rules of domestic law incompatible with EU law in general, and with Directive 1999/70/EC and its Framework Agreement in particular?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/25

1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the levying of a hydraulic tax such as that at issue to the detriment of hydroelectricity producers operating within river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community constitutes prohibited State aid, in that it introduces an asymmetrical system of taxation within the same area of technology, depending on the plant’s location, and the tax is not levied on producers of energy from other sources?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/26

1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the levying of a hydraulic tax such as that at issue to the detriment of hydroelectricity producers operating within river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community constitutes prohibited State aid, in that it introduces an asymmetrical system of taxation within the same area of technology, depending on the plant’s location, and the tax is not levied on producers of energy from other sources?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/27

1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the levying of a hydraulic tax such as that at issue to the detriment of hydroelectricity producers operating within river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community constitutes prohibited State aid, in that it introduces an asymmetrical system of taxation within the same area of technology, depending on the plant’s location, and the tax is not levied on producers of energy from other sources?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/28

1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the levying of a hydraulic tax such as that at issue to the detriment of hydroelectricity producers operating within river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community constitutes prohibited State aid, in that it introduces an asymmetrical system of taxation within the same area of technology, depending on the plant’s location, and the tax is not levied on producers of energy from other sources?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/29

1.

Must Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the failure to levy the hydraulic tax on hydroelectric production operating within river basins encompassing a single autonomous community and also on the remaining [consumptive] uses of waters, with only the electricity production use being taxed, constitutes prohibited State aid?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/30

1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the levying of a hydraulic tax such as that at issue to the detriment of hydroelectricity producers operating within river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community constitutes prohibited State aid, in that it introduces an asymmetrical system of taxation within the same area of technology, depending on the plant’s location, and the tax is not levied on producers of energy from other sources?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/30

1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the levying of a hydraulic tax such as that at issue to the detriment of hydroelectricity producers operating within river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community constitutes prohibited State aid, in that it introduces an asymmetrical system of taxation within the same area of technology, depending on the plant’s location, and the tax is not levied on producers of energy from other sources?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/31

1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the levying of a hydraulic tax such as that at issue to the detriment of hydroelectricity producers operating within river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community constitutes prohibited State aid, in that it introduces an asymmetrical system of taxation within the same area of technology, depending on the plant’s location, and the tax is not levied on producers of energy from other sources?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/32

1.

Must the ‘the polluter pays’ environmental principle, provided for in Article 191(2) TFEU, and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000, (1) which lays down the principle of the recovery of costs for water services and also the appropriate economic balancing of water uses, be interpreted as precluding the introduction of a tax on the use of inland waters to produce energy, such as the tax at issue in the proceedings, which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being totally unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of producers?

2.

Is a tax such as the hydraulic tax the subject of the proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community, but not concession-holding producers in river basins encompassing a single autonomous community, and also producers using hydroelectric technology, but not energy producers using other technologies, compatible with the principle of non-discrimination between operators provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity? (2)

3.

Must Article 107(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the levying of a hydraulic tax such as that at issue to the detriment of hydroelectricity producers operating within river basins encompassing more than one autonomous community constitutes prohibited State aid, in that it introduces an asymmetrical system of taxation within the same area of technology, depending on the plant’s location, and the tax is not levied on producers of energy from other sources?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/33

—

set aside the contested order of the General Court of the European Union of 14 December 2017 in Case T-849/16 dismissing PGNiG Supply & Trading’s action as inadmissible;

—

rule on the admissibility of PGNiG Supply & Trading’s action in Case T-849/16 concerning an application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2016) 6950 final of 28 October 2016 on review of the exemption of the OPAL gas pipeline from the requirements on third-party access and tariff regulation granted under Directive 2003/55/EC, and declare that action admissible.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/34

1.

May Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (1) be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may levy on telecommunications operators an annual financial contribution such as that provided for in Article 5 of Ley 8/2009, de 28 de agosto, de financiación de la Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (Law 8/2009 of 28 August on the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española), for the purpose of contributing to the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española, in view of the positive impact on the telecommunications sector resulting from the new rules governing the television and audiovisual sector and, in particular, from the increase in fixed and mobile broadband services and from the fact that Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española no longer broadcasts advertisements or paid or conditional-access content, taking the following circumstances into account:

2.

Is the contribution levied on telecommunications undertakings operating in Spain in more than one Autonomous Community proportionate, as is required by Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/20/EC, in the light of the method of calculation laid down in Article 5 of Law 8/2009, to which reference has been made?

3.

Is the contribution levied under Article 5 of Law 8/2009 of 28 August on the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española transparent, as is required by Article 6(1) and the Annex of Directive 2002/20/EC, if it is not known what specific activity Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española provides by way of universal service or public service?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/35

1.

May Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (1) be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may levy on telecommunications operators an annual financial contribution such as that provided for in Article 5 of Ley 8/2009, de 28 de agosto, de financiación de la Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (Law 8/2009 of 28 August on the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española), for the purpose of contributing to the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española, in view of the positive impact on the telecommunications sector resulting from the new rules governing the television and audiovisual sector and, in particular, from the increase in fixed and mobile broadband services and from the fact that Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española no longer broadcasts advertisements or paid or conditional-access content, taking the following circumstances into account:

2.

Is the contribution levied on telecommunications undertakings operating in Spain in more than one Autonomous Community proportionate, as is required by Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/20/EC, in the light of the method of calculation laid down in Article 5 of Law 8/2009, to which reference has been made?

3.

Is the contribution levied under Article 5 of Law 8/2009 of 28 August on the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española transparent, as is required by Article 6(1) and the Annex of Directive 2002/20/EC, if it is not known what specific activity Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española provides by way of universal service or public service?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/36

1.

May Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (1) be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may levy on telecommunications operators an annual financial contribution such as that provided for in Article 5 of Ley 8/2009, de 28 de agosto, de financiación de la Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (Law 8/2009 of 28 August on the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española), for the purpose of contributing to the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española, in view of the positive impact on the telecommunications sector resulting from the new rules governing the television and audiovisual sector and, in particular, from the increase in fixed and mobile broadband services and from the fact that Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española no longer broadcasts advertisements or paid or conditional-access content, taking the following circumstances into account:

2.

Is the contribution levied on telecommunications undertakings operating in Spain in more than one Autonomous Community proportionate, as is required by Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/20/EC, in the light of the method of calculation laid down in Article 5 of Law 8/2009, to which reference has been made?

3.

Is the contribution levied under Article 5 of Law 8/2009 of 28 August on the funding of Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española transparent, as is required by Article 6(1) and the Annex of Directive 2002/20/EC, if it is not known what specific activity Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española provides by way of universal service or public service?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/37

1.

to pay to the appellant compensation in the amount of EUR 2 516 221,50 for material and non-material damage arising from the appellant’s inclusion in the list of persons, entities and bodies in Annex V to Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 (1) and in Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) No 961/2010; (2)

2.

to pay to the appellant default interest at the rate set by the European Central Bank for its main refinancing operations, increased by two percentage points, from 17 October 2015 until the abovementioned sum has been paid in full;

3.

to pay the costs of the proceedings, in particular the appellant’s expenses.

—

In taking into account, in the Council’s favour, circumstances and information which the Council did not submit until after the unlawful measures had been adopted, and in some cases only during the appeal proceedings, the General Court erred in law as regards the time relevant for the assessment.

—

The General Court erred in law in concluding that there was circumstantial evidence that it was at least probable that the appellant ‘is owned or controlled by another entity [in this case: IRISL]’. In particular, the General Court applied an incorrect assessment criterion, incorrectly factored in information from the Council which the Council did not even possess at the time of the assessment, failed to establish the level of the (alleged) ownership or the intensity of the control and assessed the circumstantial evidence incorrectly.

—

The General Court erred in law in assuming that Regulation No 668/2010 (3) was lawful in so far as it concerned the appellant.

—

The General Court erred in law in assuming that in principle the inadequate justification for the measures adopted against the appellant could not render the EU liable and improperly failed to examine whether there had been an infringement of the right to effective judicial protection.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/38

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 5 December 2017 in Case T-728/16, Tuerck v Commission;

—

dismiss the action at first instance;

—

order the respondent to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance;

—

order Ms Tuerck to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/39

1.

Must the definition of an electronic communications service laid down in Article 2(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, (1) as amended, be understood to mean that a voice-over IP service, made available via software, terminated on a public switched telephone network, to a fixed or mobile number covered by an (E.164) national numbering plan must be regarded as an electronic communications service, notwithstanding the fact that the internet service by means of which a user accesses that voice-over IP service already itself constitutes an electronic communications service, but where the provider of the software makes available that service for remuneration and enters into agreements with telecommunications service providers duly authorised to send and terminate calls to the public switched telephone network which allow the termination of calls to a fixed or mobile number covered by a national numbering plan?

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is yes, does the answer remain the same if account is taken of the fact that the software functionality which makes it possible to make voice calls is merely a feature of the software, which software can be used without that feature?

3.

If the answer to Questions 1 and 2 is yes, does the answer to Question 1 remain the same if account is taken of the fact that the service provider provides in its general terms that it does not accept any responsibility to the end-user for the conveyance of signals?

4.

If the answer to Questions 1, 2 and 3 is yes, does the answer to Question 1 remain the same if account is taken of the fact that the service provided also satisfies the definition of ‘information society service’?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/40

‘—

Must the provisions of Articles 103 and 311 of Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 (1) and paragraph 7 of part A in Annex IX thereto, be interpreted as meaning that they require only that the photographs are taken by their photographer, printed by him or under his supervision, signed and numbered up to a maximum of 30 copies, all sizes and mounts included, in order to be able to benefit from the reduced rate of VAT?

—

If the answer to the first question is yes, are Member States nevertheless permitted to exclude from the benefit of the reduced rate of VAT photographs that are not, in addition, artistic in character?

—

If the answer to the first question is no, what other conditions must the photographs satisfy in order to benefit from the reduced rate of VAT? In particular, must they show an artistic character?

—

Must those conditions be interpreted uniformly within the European Union, or do they refer to the law or each Member state, in particular in the field of intellectual property?’

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/41

1.

Must it be understood that the national legislation in force in Portugal prevails as an overriding, mandatory rule within the meaning of Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation? (1)

2.

Does that rule constitute a provision of Community law laying down a conflict-of-laws rule within the meaning of Article 27 of the Rome II Regulation?

3.

In the light of Article 28 of Directive 2009/103/EC, (2) must it be concluded that the limitation period set out in Article 498(3) of the Portuguese Civil Code is applicable where a Portuguese citizen suffers a traffic accident in Spain?

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/41

—

Set aside the judgment of 13 December 2017 (T-712/15) by which the General Court dismissed Crédit mutuel Arkéa’s application seeking annulment of the decision of the European Central Bank of 5 October 2015 (ECB/SSM/2015 — 9695000CG7B84NLR5984/28) setting the prudential requirements applicable to Groupe Crédit mutuel.

—

the General Court erred in law when it held that Article 2(21)(c) of the SSM Framework Regulation allowed the ECB to exercise prudential supervision on a consolidated basis in respect of institutions affiliated to a central body despite the fact that that body does not have credit institution status;

—

the General Court erred in its legal characterisation of the facts when it held that Crédit mutuel is a supervised group since it meets the criteria set out in Article 10(1) of Regulation No 575/2013. (1)

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/42

—

Set aside the judgment of 13 December 2017 (T-52/16) by which the General Court dismissed Crédit mutuel Arkéa’s application seeking annulment of the decision of the European Central Bank of 4 December 2015 (ECB/SSM/2015 — 9695000CG7B84NLR5984/40) setting the prudential requirements applicable to Groupe Crédit mutual.

—

the General Court erred in law when it held that Article 2(21)(c) of the SSM Framework Regulation allowed the ECB to exercise prudential supervision on a consolidated basis in respect of institutions affiliated to a central body despite the fact that that body does not have credit institution status;

—

the General Court erred in its legal characterisation of the facts when it held that Crédit mutuel is a supervised group since it meets the criteria set out in Article 10(1) of Regulation No 575/2013. (1)

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/43

—

declare that he was unlawfully removed from the office of Governor of the Bank of Latvia by the decision of 19 February 2018 adopted by the Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs (Office for the prevention and fight against corruption), in the name of the Republic of Latvia, on the implementation of security measures;

—

declare unlawful the security measure prohibiting the exercise of certain professional activities — on the basis of which the applicant was prohibited from performing the functions of Governor of the Bank of Latvia and from exercising the rights associated with that office — which was imposed on the applicant pursuant to the decision of 19 February 2018 adopted by the Office for the prevention and fight against corruption, in the name of the Republic of Latvia, on the implementation of security measures;

—

declare unlawful the restrictions on performing the functions of a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank and exercising the rights associated with that office, which were imposed on the applicant pursuant to the decision of 19 February 2018 adopted by the Office for the prevention and fight against corruption, in the name of the Republic of Latvia, on the implementation of security measures.

1.

The applicant challenges the unlawful decision of 19 February 2018 adopted by the investigating authority of the Latvian State (that is, the Office for the prevention and fight against corruption, which is part of the executive) on the basis of which he was removed, indefinitely, from his position as Governor of the Bank of Latvia. The decision to remove him was adopted in the name of the Latvian State. On being removed from the office of Governor of the Bank of Latvia, the applicant also lost, automatically, his position as member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.

2.

In removing the applicant from office, the following infringements at least were committed.

3.

In the first place, removing the applicant from his posts as Governor of the Bank of Latvia and member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank constituted a breach of Article 14.2 of Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, given that, at the time of his removal, none of the conditions specified in that provision for the removal of a governor of a national central bank were satisfied (namely, that the governor no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of his duties or have been guilty of serious misconduct).

4.

In the second place, removing the applicant from his post as Governor of the Bank of Latvia also breached Article 22 of the likums ‘Par Latvijas Banku’ (Law on the Bank of Latvia), the national measure implementing the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. At the time the decision at issue was adopted, none of the conditions set out in that article for the removal of the Governor of the Bank of Latvia were satisfied (first, voluntary resignation, secondly, the condition laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank relating to serious misconduct, in which case the Parliament may decide to remove the Governor of the Bank of Latvia from office once the conviction has become final, or, thirdly, the other conditions specified in Article 14.2 of that statute). In addition, although in accordance with the Law on the Bank of Latvia only the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia may lawfully remove the Governor of the Bank of Latvia from office, the applicant was not removed by that Parliament, but by the investigating authority of the Latvian State, which is part of the executive.

5.

In the third place, removing the applicant from his post as Governor of the Bank of Latvia was based on a misinterpretation of Union law by the Office for the prevention and fight against corruption in so far as it stated that the applicant did not perform his functions on the Governing Council of the European Central Bank independently and in the interest of the European Central Bank, but rather performed those functions as Governor of the Bank of Latvia and acted in the interest of the Bank of Latvia. However, Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that the European Central Bank is an institution of the European Union.

In the exercise of their functions, officials of EU institutions may exercise only the powers provided for in Union legislation and may act only in the interest of those institutions. It is not for national legislation to define the functions of officials of EU institutions and, accordingly, when performing the functions of an official of an EU institution, it is not possible to exercise powers conferred by national legal acts.

Under Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which guarantees the independence of the European Central Bank, the Governor of the Bank of Latvia is precluded, in exercising his functions as a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, from acting as a representative of the Bank of Latvia and acting (strictly) in the interest of the Bank of Latvia or the Republic of Latvia.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/44

—

request the Republic of Latvia, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 62 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, to provide all relevant information pertaining to the ongoing investigation by the Korupcijas novēršanas an apkarošanas birojs (Office for the prevention and fight against corruption) of the Governor of the Bank of Latvia;

—

declare, pursuant to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, that the Republic of Latvia has infringed the second paragraph of that provision:

—

order the Republic of Latvia to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/46

1.

Annuls Decision A(2015) 4931 of the European Parliament of 8 July 2015 in so far as it refuses to grant Mr Emilio De Capitani full access to documents LIBE-2013-0091-02 and LIBE-2013-0091-03;

2.

Orders the Parliament to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Mr De Capitani;

3.

Orders the Council of the European Union and the European Commission to bear their own costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/47

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Mr Edward Stavytskyi to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union;

3.

Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/47

1.

Dismisses the action on the ground of the Court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear and determine it;

2.

Orders Šroubárna Ždánice a.s. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union;

3.

Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/48

1)

Dismisses the action;

2)

Orders HJ to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/49

1.

Annuls the decision of the European Commission’s Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) dated 29 January 2016 by which the latter refused Ms Vassilia Argyraki’s request to have the periods of service she supplied as a member of the auxiliary staff validated as periods completed as a member of the temporary staff in the calculation of her pension rights;

2.

Orders the European Commission to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/50

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Safe Skies LLC to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/50

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Webgarden Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi Kft. to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/51

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.

Aurora Group Danmark A/S and Retail Distribution ApS shall bear their own respective costs and shall each pay half of the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/51

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.

Disney Enterprises, Inc., shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/52

1.

The General Court declines jurisdiction in Case T 46/18 in order to enable the Court of Justice to rule on the action.

2.

The decision on the applications to intervene submitted by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and by the Regione Lombardia (Lombardia Region, Italy) is reserved.

3.

The costs are reserved.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/53

—

as a preliminary matter, where appropriate, declare Article 90 of the Staff Regulation invalid and inapplicable in the present proceedings under Article 270 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

—

annul, first, the decision of 14 November 2017 of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), rejecting the applicant’s complaint lodged on 13 July 2017, including the rejection of the applicant’s request for 50 000 euros in compensation;

—

annul, second, the decision of 19 April 2017 of EPSO rejecting her request for review of the decision of the Selection Board not to admit her to the next phase of the competition;

—

annul, third, the decision of 6 February 2017 at the online EPSO account not to include the applicant in the draft list of officials selected for the purposes of the competition under the EPSO/AD/323/16;

—

annul, fourth, the open notice of competition EPSO/AD/323/16, published on 26 May 2016, and in its entirety the resulting draft list of officials selected to take part in the aforesaid competition;

—

award 50 000 euros in compensation to the applicant for the damaged incurred because of the above unlawful contested decisions; and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment by EPSO/Selection Board concerning the evaluation of the working experience of the applicant, including the breach of Annex III to the Notice of Competition at issue detailing the required working experience.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging breach of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and of the applicant’s right to be heard, and, further, breach of the duty to state reasons and of Article 296 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breach of Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Regulation No 1/58, (1) breach of Articles 1d and 28 of the Staff Regulations and of Article 1(1)(f) of Annex III to those Regulations and, further, breach of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/54

—

amend the contested decision by registering KINDERPRAMS as an EU trade mark;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/54

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs;

—

order Our Price Records Limited to pay the costs (if it intervenes in this case);

AND EITHER

—

allow HMV’s opposition in its entirety

OR

—

remit the case for consideration by EUIPO in light of the annulment of the contested decision.

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 2017/1001.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/55

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/56

—

annul Article 4 of ECB Decision No ECB/SSM/2017 — O2RNE8IBXP4R0TD8PU41/174 of 19 December 2017 and Article 3 of its Annex A, in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken regarding irrevocable payment commitments in respect of the deposit guarantee schemes or the resolution funds;

—

order the ECB to pay all the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging there is no legal basis for the adoption of the contested decision. According to the applicant, the ECB has no jurisdiction to impose a prudential requirement of general scope and has not conducted an individual and detailed assessment of the applicant’s situation as required by the applicable legislation.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by an error of law in that the ECB wrongly interpreted the EU legislation establishing the possibility for credit institutions to use irrevocable payment commitments and, consequently, rendered those provisions ineffective.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by a manifest error in the assessment of the risks allegedly posed by the irrevocable payment commitments having regard to Article 16 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p 63).

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons, in so far as the ECB is, it is claimed, subject to an enhanced obligation to state reasons and the contested decision was inadequately reasoned.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/57

—

annul Article 9 of ECB Decision No ECB/SSM/2017 — 969500TJ5KRTCJQWXH05/380 of 19 December 2017 and Article 3 of its Annex A, in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken regarding irrevocable payment commitments in respect of the deposit guarantee schemes or the resolution funds;

—

order the ECB to pay all the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/57

—

annul Article 8 of ECB Decision No ECB/SSM/2017 — 9695000CG7B84NLR5984/207 of 19 December 2017, in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken regarding irrevocable payment commitments in respect of the deposit guarantee schemes or the resolution funds;

—

order the ECB to pay all the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/58

—

annul Article 4 of ECB Decision No ECB/SSM/2017 — 9695005MSX1OYEMGDF46/338 (taken together with its annex) of 19 December 2017, in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken regarding irrevocable payment commitments in respect of the deposit guarantee schemes or the resolution funds;

—

order the ECB to pay all the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/58

—

annul Article 8 of ECB Decision No ECB/SSM/2017 — 9695000CG7B84NLR5984/207 of 19 December 2017, in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken regarding irrevocable payment commitments in respect of the deposit guarantee schemes or the resolution funds;

—

order the ECB to pay all the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/59

—

partially annul Article 9 of ECB Decision No ECB/SSM/2017 — R0MUWSFPU8MPRO8K5P83/248 of 19 December 2017 in so far as it imposes a deduction from the irrevocable payment commitments subscribed with the Single Resolution Fund, national resolution funds and national Common Equity Tier I deposit guarantee schemes, on an individual, sub-consolidated and consolidated basis, and in particular paragraphs 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3:

—

order the ECB to pay all the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision lacks a legal basis in that the ECB made use of its supervisory powers to impose a measure of general scope that falls within the competence of the legislature and exceeded its powers under Article 4(1)(f) and Article 16 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p 63).

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by an error of law in that the ECB made an interpretation contrary to the legislative intent of the EU legislation authorising credit institutions to use irrevocable payment commitments in order to fulfil part of their obligations vis-à-vis the national resolution funds, the Single Resolution Fund and the national deposit guarantee schemes, thus rendering the relevant provisions ineffective. The ECB, it is claimed, also based its decision on a misreading of the EU and national legal transposition framework applicable to irrevocable payment commitments.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is based on an error of assessment and infringes the principle of good administration.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/59

—

declare that the defendant has infringed Article 130 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Annex II to those Rules by failing to forward to the Council of the European Union a written question, submitted by Members of the European Parliament in the proceedings registered with the reference number P-003358/17;

—

declare that the European Parliament is required to forward the written question registered with the reference number P-003358/17 to the competent institution, which is the Council of the European Union;

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

—

Plea alleging a failure on the part of the European Parliament consisting in a failure to forward to the competent institution, as recommended by the applicants, a written question submitted on 16 May 2017 by Ryszard Legutko and Tomasz Poręba, Members of the European Parliament.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/60

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 2 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 2 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, including breach of the obligation to state reasons justifying the measures and ensuring effective judicial protection and breach of the right to be heard.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment as regards the involvement of the applicant in acts constituting serious human rights breaches in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to privacy, the right of property and the principle of proportionality.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Council Decision 2010/788/CFSP of 20 December 2010 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and repealing Common Position 2008/369/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 336, p. 30), as amended by Council Decision 2016/2231/CFSP of 12 December 2016 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP of 20 December 2010 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2016 L 336, p. 7), and 2b(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 of 18 July 2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2005 L 193, p. 1) are unlawful.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/61

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 1 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 1 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/61

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 7 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 7 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/62

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 3 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 3 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/63

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 4 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 4 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/63

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 5 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 5 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/64

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 6 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 6 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/64

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 10 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 10 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/65

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 8 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 8 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/65

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 13 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 13 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/66

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 15 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 15 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/67

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 16 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 16 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/67

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 14 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 14 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/68

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 12 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 12 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/68

—

Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2282 of 11 December 2017 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in so far as the applicant remains at No 11 in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP and No 11 in Annex Ia to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005;

—

Rule that the provisions of Articles 3(2)(b) of Decision 2010/788/CFSP, as amended by Decision 2016/2231/CFSP, and 2b(1)(b) of Regulation [No] 1183/2005/EC are unlawful;

—

Order the Council to pay the costs.

7.5.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/69

—

annul the calculation sheet forwarded to him by email of 22 June 2017 from the EEAS and, so far as necessary, the salary slip through which the payment of the education allowance for his children was/will be granted;

—

order the defendant to pay all the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, putting forward an objection of illegality, in so far as the contested decision, the note of 15 April 2016 on which it is based and the EEAS’s Guidelines infringe the Staff Regulations of Officials and Annex X thereto.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the illegality of the individual decision at issue. There are five parts to that plea.