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ISSN 1977-091X |
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Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385 |
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English edition |
Information and Notices |
Volume 60 |
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Notice No |
Contents |
page |
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II Information |
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INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
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European Commission |
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2017/C 385/01 |
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2017/C 385/02 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.8586 — TPC/JSR/UMG/UBE/MR) ( 1 ) |
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III Preparatory acts |
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European Central Bank |
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2017/C 385/03 CON/2017/39 |
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2017/C 385/04 CON/2017/42 |
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IV Notices |
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NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
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European Commission |
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2017/C 385/05 |
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2017/C 385/06 |
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V Announcements |
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PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
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European Commission |
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2017/C 385/07 |
Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.8639 — Cariparma/Caricesena, Carim, Carismi) — Candidate case for simplified procedure ( 1 ) |
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OTHER ACTS |
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European Commission |
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2017/C 385/08 |
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(1) Text with EEA relevance. |
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EN |
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II Information
INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES
European Commission
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15.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385/1 |
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Automatic increase of an autonomous tariff quota under Council Regulation (EU) 2015/2265
(2017/C 385/01)
Pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/2265 (1), the volume of the following tariff quota is increased as follows for the 2017 calendar year:
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Order No |
CN code |
TARIC code |
Description |
Annual amount of quota (tons) |
Quota duty |
Quota period |
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09.2759 |
ex 0302 51 10 |
20 |
Cod (Gadus morhua, Gadus ogac, Gadus macrocephalus) and fish of the species Boreogadus saida, excluding livers and roes, fresh, chilled or frozen, for processing (2) (3) |
90 000 |
0 % |
1.1.2017-31.12.2017 |
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ex 0302 51 90 |
10 |
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ex 0302 59 10 |
10 |
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ex 0303 63 10 |
10 |
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ex 0303 63 30 |
10 |
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ex 0303 63 90 |
10 |
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ex 0303 69 10 |
10 |
(1) OJ L 322, 8.12.2015, p. 4.
(2) The tariff quota is subject to the conditions laid down in Article 254 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1).
(3) The tariff quota is not available for products intended solely for one or more of the following operations:
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cleaning, gutting, tailing, heading, |
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cutting, |
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repacking of frozen IQF (individually quick frozen) fillets, |
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sampling, sorting, |
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labelling, |
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packing, |
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chilling, |
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freezing, |
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deep freezing, |
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glazing, |
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thawing, |
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separation. |
The tariff quota is not available for products intended, in addition, to undergo treatment or operations which give quota entitlement, where such treatment or operations are carried out at retail or catering level. The reduction of import duties shall apply only for products intended for human consumption.
The tariff quota is, however, available for materials intended for one or more of the following operations:
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dicing, |
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cutting into rings, cutting into strips for materials under CN codes 0307 49 59, 0307 99 11, 0307 99 17, |
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filleting, |
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production of flaps, |
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cutting of frozen blocks, |
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splitting of frozen interleaved fillet blocks, |
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slicing for materials under CN codes ex 0303 66 11, 0303 66 12, 0303 66 13, 0303 66 19, 0303 89 70, 0303 89 90. |
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15.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385/2 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration
(Case M.8586 — TPC/JSR/UMG/UBE/MR)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2017/C 385/02)
On 10 November 2017, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:
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in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
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in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32017M8586. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
III Preparatory acts
European Central Bank
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15.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385/3 |
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
of 4 October 2017
on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of CCPs and requirements for the recognition of third-country CCPs
(CON/2017/39)
(2017/C 385/03)
Introduction and legal basis
On 22 August 2017 and 15 September 2017 respectively, the European Central Bank (ECB) received requests from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament for an opinion on a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of central counterparties (CCPs) and requirements for the recognition of third-country CCPs (1) (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation’).
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union since the proposed regulation contains provisions affecting: (1) the basic tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to define and implement monetary policy and to promote the smooth operation of payment systems pursuant to the first and fourth indents of Article 127(2) of the Treaty; (2) the ESCB’s task to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system pursuant to Article 127(5) of the Treaty; and (3) the tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Articles 127(6) of the Treaty, within the limits of Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (2). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.
General observations
The ECB strongly supports the initiative set out in the Commission’s proposal to enhance the role of the relevant members of the ESCB, as central banks of issue of the currencies of financial instruments cleared by CCPs, in the process for the supervision of Union CCPs and the recognition of third-country CCPs. The ECB strongly welcomes and supports the proposal that the Eurosystem, as the central bank of issue of the euro, should play a more meaningful role with respect to Union and third-country CCPs. This is justified due to the risks that could potentially be posed by the malfunctioning of a CCP, or by certain actions taken by a CCP in the area of risk management, to the performance of the basic tasks to be carried out through the Eurosystem, in particular the definition and implementation of the monetary policy of the Union and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. These risks could ultimately impact upon the pursuit of the Eurosystem’s primary objective of maintaining price stability pursuant to Article 127(1) of the Treaty.
Disturbances affecting CCPs can have an impact on the Eurosystem’s primary objective through several channels. For example, such disturbances can affect the liquidity position of euro area credit institutions, potentially disrupting the smooth functioning of euro area payment systems. This could lead to increased demand for central bank liquidity and possible challenges in implementing the Eurosystem’s single monetary policy. In addition, such disturbances can impair the functioning of financial market segments that are key to the transmission of monetary policy, including euro-denominated markets for securities financing transactions and interest rate derivatives contracts.
Significant developments at both global and European level are expected to increase the risks posed by CCPs to the smooth operation of payment systems and implementation of the single monetary policy. First, central clearing has become increasingly cross-border in nature and systemically important. For this reason, the Commission has already brought forward its proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365 (3). Second, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the Union will have a major impact on the Eurosystem’s ability to carry out its tasks as central bank of issue for the euro. At present, certain CCPs established in the UK clear significant volumes of euro-denominated transactions. Thus, a significant disturbance affecting a major UK CCP could have severe consequences for the stability of the euro. The Eurosystem’s ability to monitor and manage the risks posed by UK CCPs will be adversely affected if UK CCPs are no longer subject to the regulatory and supervisory framework for Union CCPs under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4).
The proposed regulation envisages an enhanced role for the Eurosystem as central bank of issue for the euro in the framework under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. In order to ensure that the Eurosystem can carry out this role, it is of utmost importance that it has the relevant powers under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). For this reason, the ECB should be granted regulatory competence over clearing systems for financial instruments, in particular CCPs, by means of an amendment to Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB. The conferral of regulatory powers on the ECB is without prejudice to Article 12.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, which states that ‘to the extent deemed possible and appropriate and without prejudice to the provisions of this Article, the ECB shall have recourse to the national central banks (NCBs) to carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB’. This includes the tasks of the Eurosystem, as the central bank of issue of the euro. Therefore, the ECB adopted Recommendation ECB/2017/18 of the European Central Bank (5) on 22 June 2017.
Where the ECB recommends that the proposed regulation is amended, specific drafting proposals are set out in a separate technical working document accompanied by an explanatory text to this effect. The technical working document is available in English on the ECB’s website.
Specific observations
1. Voting arrangements in supervisory colleges
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1.1. |
As the ECB has noted previously with regard to colleges, where the Eurosystem central banks, which together form the ‘central bank of issue’ for the euro, are represented in the college by the ECB or an NCB, and the prudential supervision of credit institutions that are significant CCP clearing members is performed by the ECB, separate votes should be attached to these two functions. On the same occasion, the ECB also stressed that these two functions are distinct, as is reflected in the legal and operational separation between the ECB’s monetary policy and prudential supervisory roles (6). Thus, the ECB strongly welcomes the fact that the proposed regulation addresses this issue, ensuring that separate votes are attached to these two functions. |
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1.2. |
The ECB therefore welcomes the provisions of the proposed regulation amending the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. First, Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 is amended to set out that the college will, among others, comprise (a) the permanent members of the CCP Executive Session; (b) the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of the clearing members of the CCP which are established in the three Member States with the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP, including, where relevant, the ECB in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (7); and (c) the central banks of issue of the most relevant Union currencies of the financial instruments cleared. Second, Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 is amended to specify that where the ECB is a member of the college pursuant to the various points of Article 18(2) of the same Regulation, it will have a maximum of two votes in colleges up to and including 12 members; and a maximum of three votes for colleges with more than 12 members (8). |
2. The requirement to obtain the consent of the central bank of issue regarding certain draft decisions
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2.1. |
The proposed regulation requires that the competent authorities must submit draft decisions regarding Union CCPs to the relevant central banks of issue before adopting any decision regarding the granting and withdrawal of authorisation, extension of services, and prudential requirements for liquidity risk controls, collateral requirements, settlement, and approval of interoperability arrangements (9). Competent authorities must obtain the consent of the central bank of issue in respect of any aspect of those decisions relating to the carrying out of their monetary policy tasks. Where the central bank of issue proposes amendments, the competent authority may only adopt the decision as amended; and where the central bank of issue objects to a draft decision, the competent authority may not adopt that decision. Likewise, the proposed regulation requires that with regard to recognised Tier 2 third-country CCPs, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) must submit draft decisions to the central bank of issue before adopting any decisions regarding liquidity risk controls, collateral requirements, settlement, approval of interoperability arrangements, as well as margin requirements (10). ESMA must likewise obtain the consent of the central bank of issue in respect of any aspect of those decisions relating to the carrying out of their monetary policy tasks. Where the central bank of issue proposes amendments, ESMA may only adopt the decision as amended; and where the central bank of issue objects to a draft decision, ESMA may not adopt that decision. The ECB strongly welcomes the role envisaged for the central banks of issue under the proposed regulation, which will enable the members of the ESCB to have meaningful and effective involvement in decision-making on matters of direct relevance to the fulfilment of the basic tasks of the ESCB under the Treaties, and the achievement of its primary objective of maintaining price stability. The ECB has a number of comments in this regard. |
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First, where the proposed regulation clarifies that the consent of the central bank of issue must be obtained ‘in respect of any aspect of those decisions relating to the carrying out of their monetary policy tasks’, it should be emphasised that this phrase is intended to clarify the monetary policy context in which the central bank of issue carries out its role and the purpose the role fulfils. The same is true with regard to the reference to the compliance of third-country Tier 2 CCPs with any requirements of the central bank of issue ‘in the carrying out of their monetary policy tasks’ (11). This phrase should be read in conjunction with recital 7 of the proposed regulation. It should be emphasised that this phrase is not intended to grant discretion to the competent authorities or to ESMA to determine whether or not the consent of the central bank of issue should be sought on particular draft decisions, nor is it intended to grant discretion as to whether proposed amendments or objections to the draft decision by the central bank of issue are followed. In this respect, it should be noted that the Eurosystem enjoys broad discretion to define and implement monetary policy. This has been recognised by the Court of Justice of the European Union (12) and is imperative to ensure the independence of the ECB and NCBs, in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty. In the interests of clarity and legal certainty, a new recital should be added to the proposed regulation to reflect this point. |
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2.3. |
Second, with regard to which draft decisions should be subject to the consent of the central bank of issue, the ECB considers that the proposed regulation should ensure the involvement of the central bank of issue regarding certain further key aspects of CCP risk management. The ECB considers that in relation to both Union and third-country CCPs, the consent of the central bank of issue should also be required regarding draft decisions taken in respect of the CCP’s margin requirements (Article 41). This is important for the central bank of issue because of the crucial links between liquidity risk management, which is at the core of the central bank of issue’s focus, and the margin processes applied by a CCP. For example, the arrangements regarding intra-day margin collection have a significant effect on the CCP’s ability to obtain resources to meet its liquidity needs when they fall due. Margin processes and procedures, including rules regarding the adjustment of margin levels in times of market stress, can also have significant implications in terms of procyclicality: if improperly managed, they can create serious liquidity pressure on clearing members, potentially impairing the central bank of issue’s ability to implement its monetary policy objectives. Moreover, the proposed regulation should provide that the consent of the central bank of issue is required for decisions regarding the review of models, stress testing and back testing for the validation of the models and parameters adopted by the CCP to calculate its margin requirements, default fund contributions, collateral requirements and other risk control measures under Article 49 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. This is important for the central bank of issue, because decisions under Article 49 may have direct consequences for the CCP’s compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 in relation to which the central bank of issue must otherwise give its consent. For example, a change to the CCP’s methodology for stress testing the adequacy of its collateral requirements would have a direct impact on the CCP’s observance of the obligations in relation to collateral under Article 46 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. In the separate technical working document accompanying this opinion, the ECB sets out specific drafting proposals regarding the types of decisions on which the consent of the central bank of issue should be required. |
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2.4. |
Third, the ECB notes that the competent authorities have a certain margin of appreciation as to whether changes proposed by a CCP should be subject to decisions under Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, with regard to the extension of activities and services not covered by the initial authorisation, or decisions under Article 49 with regard to the review of models, stress testing and back testing. If the competent authority considers that the changes proposed by CCPs do not comprise the extension of business to ‘additional services or activities’ or are not ‘significant changes’ to the models and parameters, such changes are not subject to decisions under Articles 15 and 49 respectively. In order to build a common Union supervisory culture and ensure consistent supervisory practices, ESMA recently published an opinion (13) on the common indicators for additional products and services under Article 15 and for significant changes under Article 49. The ECB takes the view that observance of the criteria set out in the ESMA opinion will be essential in order to ensure the consent of the relevant central banks of issue is sought in all cases where such consent is required. Thus, the ECB proposes that the guidance provided by ESMA regarding the interpretation of these articles should be made binding. To this end, ESMA should develop it as draft regulatory technical standards, which the Commission should then adopt in the form of a delegated act. For this purpose, the ECB sets out specific drafting proposals in the separate technical working document accompanying this opinion. |
3. Review and evaluation
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3.1. |
The proposed regulation amends Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, to provide that the competent authorities, in cooperation with ESMA, will review the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by CCPs to comply with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, and evaluate the risks to which CCPs are, or might be, exposed. The amended Article 21 also provides that the CCPs will be subject to on-site inspections in which ESMA staff will be invited to participate. In addition, the competent authority is obliged to forward to ESMA any information received from the CCPs and to request from the relevant CCP any information sought by ESMA that it cannot provide. |
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3.2. |
The review and evaluation process, as amended by the proposed regulation, will serve the key purpose of ensuring that CCPs comply with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on an ongoing basis. The ECB considers that the consultation of the central bank of issue in the review and evaluation process, where deemed necessary by the competent authority to ensure that the central bank of issue can fulfil its role under the proposed regulation, would be an important corollary to the requirements under Article 21a(2). The ability to contribute to the review carried out by competent authorities, in cooperation with ESMA, would enable the central bank of issue to ensure CCPs are not generating risks for the fulfilment of the basic tasks of the Eurosystem under the Treaties, and the achievement of its primary objective of maintaining price stability. |
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3.3. |
In the separate technical working document accompanying this opinion, the ECB sets out specific drafting proposals regarding the consultation of the central bank of issue in the review and evaluation process under Article 21. |
4. The ECB’s advisory role regarding draft delegated and implementing acts
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4.1. |
It is worth recalling that Commission draft delegated and implementing acts qualify as ‘proposed Union acts’ within the meaning of Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty. Both delegated and implementing acts constitute Union legal acts. The ECB should be consulted in due time on any draft Union acts, including draft delegated and implementing acts, falling within its fields of competence. The obligation to consult the ECB was clarified by the European Court of Justice in Commission v ECB (14), with reference to the ECB’s functions and expertise. In light of the fact that safe and efficient financial market infrastructures, in particular clearing systems for financial instruments, are essential for the fulfilment of the basic tasks of the ESCB under Article 127(2) of the Treaty, and the pursuit of its primary objective of maintaining price stability under Article 127(1) of the Treaty, the ECB should be duly consulted on delegated and implementing acts adopted under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. While the obligation to consult the ECB derives directly from the Treaty, in order to ensure clarity, this requirement should also be reflected in a recital of the proposed regulation. Having regard to the importance of delegated and implementing acts as part of the development of Union financial services legislation, the ECB will exercise its advisory role on matters within the ECB’s competence taking fully into account the timelines for adoption of these acts and the need to ensure the smooth adoption of implementing legislation (15). |
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4.2. |
Moreover, in respect of a number of elements of the proposed regulation, in addition to the consultation of the ECB, the involvement, at an early stage, of the relevant members of the ESCB in the development of draft regulatory and implementing technical standards, delegated and implementing acts could be particularly useful, and should be specifically provided for. |
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4.3. |
First, several provisions of the proposed regulation refer to the role of the central bank of issue. As noted in paragraph 2, these include situations where the consent of the central bank of issue is required for certain decisions taken by the competent authorities or by ESMA. Moreover, reference is made to situations where the central bank of issue must provide ESMA with written confirmation that a Tier 2 third-country CCP complies with any requirements imposed by that central bank of issue (16), and to where ESMA concludes, in agreement with the relevant central bank of issue, that a CCP is of ‘substantial systemic importance’ (17). In order to determine which central bank of issue should participate, the proposed regulation contains cross-references to Article 18(2)(h) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, which specifies that the college will consist of ‘the central banks of issue of the most relevant Union currencies of the financial instruments cleared’. The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act, on the basis of draft regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA, specifying the conditions under which the Union currencies referred to in Article 18(2)(h) are to be considered as the most relevant. Accordingly, in 2013 it adopted Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 (18), which may now need to be revised and updated, to ensure the appropriate involvement of the central banks of issue of the currencies of the non-euro area Member States, taking into account the influence that disruptions in the functioning of CCPs may have on such currencies. The development of draft regulatory technical standards by ESMA for this purpose should be carried out in close cooperation with the relevant members of the ESCB. Furthermore, the delegated act should only be adopted after formal consultation of the ECB. The ECB also suggests that, in the interests of legal certainty, a cross-reference to Article 18(2)(h) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should also be introduced in the provisions of the proposed regulation that refer only to the ‘relevant central bank of issue’. |
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4.4. |
Second, the proposed regulation introduces a new Article 25(2a), which provides that ESMA will determine whether a third-country CCP is systemically important or likely to become systemically important for the financial stability of the Union or for one or more of its Member States, referred to as a ‘Tier 2 CCP’. It sets out the criteria that ESMA must take into account in making its determination and provides that the Commission will adopt a delegated act to further specify these criteria. In order to ensure the appropriate involvement of central banks of issue in the elaboration of the relevant criteria, the development of this delegated act by the Commission should be carried out in close cooperation with the relevant members of the ESCB. |
5. Third-country CCPs of ‘substantial systemic importance’
The proposed regulation introduces a new Article 25(2c), which sets out that ESMA, ‘in agreement’ with the relevant central banks of issue, may conclude that a CCP is of such substantial systemic importance that it should not be recognised. The ECB understands that ‘in agreement’ means that ESMA may not, without first having obtained the approval of the relevant central banks of issue, recommend that the Commission should adopt an implementing act confirming that that CCP should not be recognised.
6. Cooperation and exchange of information between the CCP Executive Session and the supervisory colleges
The ECB notes that the CCP Executive Session does not include all members of the supervisory colleges, and does not include the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The supervisory college consists not only of the competent authorities supervising the CCP, but also of the supervisors of the entities on which the operations of that CCP might have an impact, in particular selected clearing members, trading venues, interoperable CCPs and central securities depositories. The ESRB is responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the Union. In order to ensure that the ESRB and the supervisory college members which are not also members of the CCP Executive Session have all the relevant information necessary for the purpose of carrying out their tasks, it is crucial that there is an obligation to exchange information between the CCP Executive Session and the ESRB and the other supervisory college members which are not members of the CCP Executive Session. The information exchanged with the ESRB and the supervisory college should be complete, and should include the information available to the CCP Executive Session which is necessary for the ESRB and the supervisory college members to carry out their respective tasks. Likewise, information regarding third-country CCPs should be exchanged with the ESRB and the relevant competent authorities listed in Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, where this is necessary for the purpose of carrying out their tasks.
7. The ECB as a non-voting member of the ESMA Board of Supervisors
The ECB notes that the proposed regulation amends Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (19) to include the Head and Directors of the CCP Executive Session as non-voting members of the ESMA Board of Supervisors (20). The ECB strongly welcomes this arrangement, which ensures that the guidelines, recommendations and other practical instruments and convergence tools developed by the ESMA Board of Supervisors take into account the perspective and expertise of the Head and Directors of the CCP Executive Session. However, the ECB considers that it is also vital for the ECB be included as a non-voting member of the ESMA Board of Supervisors, to ensure effective cooperation, coordination and exchange of information between central banks and supervisory authorities, and to ensure that the guidelines, recommendations and other practical instruments and convergence tools developed by the ESMA Board of Supervisors take into account the ECB’s perspective and expertise (21). This is relevant not only with regard to CCPs, but with regard to other financial market participants, including central securities depositories and trade repositories. For this reason, the ECB recommends that it should also become a non-voting member of the ESMA Board of Supervisors.
8. Interaction with the proposed regulation on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties
The ECB fully supports the Commission’s assessment in the explanatory memorandum to the proposal that the adjustments and enhancements to supervision will also need to be appropriately reflected in the proposed regulation on a framework for the recovery and resolution of CCPs. The ECB agrees that targeted modifications may be necessary to take into account the new role of the CCP Executive Session in colleges under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and subsequently in resolution colleges. The ECB would see merit in promoting the consistency and effective interaction of recovery and resolution plans across CCPs, and in monitoring and mitigating their aggregate risk implications for financial stability in the Union. The ECB would support that during the finalisation of the proposed regulation, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament consider a potential role of the CCP Executive Session in this context (22).
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 4 October 2017.
The President of the ECB
Mario DRAGHI
(1) COM(2017)331 final.
(2) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
(3) COM(2016) 856 final.
(4) Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1).
(5) Recommendation ECB/2017/18 of 22 June 2017 for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (OJ C 212, 1.7.2017, p. 14).
(6) See paragraph 2.1.2 of Opinion CON/2017/38 of the European Central Bank of 20 September 2017 on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365, not yet published in the Official Journal. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at: www.ecb.europa.eu See also the ECB response to the Commission consultation on the review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) dated 2 September 2015, available on the ECB’s website at: www.ecb.europa.eu
(7) See Article 2(3) of the proposed regulation.
(8) See Article 2(4) of the proposed regulation.
(9) Article 2(7) of the proposed regulation adds a new Article 21a(2).
(10) Article 2(10) of the proposed regulation adds a new Article 25b(2).
(11) Article 2(9) of the proposed regulation introduces a new Article 25(2b)(b).
(12) Paragraph 68 of Gauweiler and others, C-62/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400; and paragraph 68 of Accorinti and Others v ECB, T-79/13, ECLI:EU:T:2015:756.
(13) ESMA Opinion of 15 November 2016 on common indicators for new products and services under Article 15 and for significant changes under Article 49 of EMIR (ESMA/2016/1574), available on ESMA’s website at www.esma.europa.eu
(14) Commission v ECB, C-11/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, in particular paragraphs 110 and 111. In paragraph 110, the Court of Justice clarified that the obligation to consult the ECB is intended ‘essentially to ensure that the legislature adopts the act only when the body has been heard, which, by virtue of the specific functions that it exercises in the Community framework in the area concerned and by virtue of the high degree of expertise that it enjoys, is particularly well placed to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged’.
(15) See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2015/10, paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2012/77, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2012/5, paragraph 8 of Opinion CON/2011/44, and paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2011/42.
(16) Article 2(9) of the proposed regulation introduces a new Article 25(2b)(b).
(17) Article 2(9) of the proposed regulation introduces a new Article 25(2c).
(18) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 of 28 May 2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on colleges for central counterparties (OJ L 244, 13.9.2013, p. 19).
(19) Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84).
(20) Article 1(4) of the proposed regulation adds a new point (f) to Article 40(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
(21) See Opinion CON/2010/5. See also the ECB contribution to the European Commission’s consultation on the operations of the European Supervisory Authorities, published on 7 July 2017, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu
(22) See paragraph 1.4 of Opinion CON/2017/38.
|
15.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385/10 |
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
of 11 October 2017
on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the clearing obligation, the suspension of the clearing obligation, the reporting requirements, the risk-mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a central counterparty, the registration and supervision of trade repositories and the requirements for trade repositories
(CON/2017/42)
(2017/C 385/04)
Introduction and legal basis
On 6 and 9 June 2017, respectively, the European Central Bank (ECB) received requests from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament for an opinion on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the clearing obligation, the suspension of the clearing obligation, the reporting requirements, the risk-mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a central counterparty, the registration and supervision of trade repositories and the requirements for trade repositories (1) (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation’).
The ECB's competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union since the proposed regulation contains provisions affecting the basic tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to define and implement monetary policy and to promote the smooth operation of payment systems pursuant to the first and fourth indents of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, the ESCB's contribution to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the stability of the financial system, as referred to in Article 127(5) of the Treaty, and the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions, as referred to in Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.
General observations
The ECB generally supports the Commission's initiative to introduce a number of targeted modifications to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) with a view to simplifying the applicable rules and eliminating disproportionate burdens.
Specific observations
1. Exemption of central bank transactions
|
1.1 |
Article 1(4) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 exempts members of the ESCB, but not their counterparties, from the reporting obligation. As a result, where a derivative contract is concluded with a member of the ESCB, its counterparty needs to report the details of the transaction to a trade repository. In this context it may be noted that relevant central bank transactions are exempted from reporting under Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3). Moreover, central bank transactions in relation to the performance of monetary, foreign exchange and financial stability policy are exempted from disclosure under Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). |
|
1.2 |
The ECB has concerns regarding the risks that may emerge if, in spite of confidentiality regimes applied by counterparties, information arising out of ESCB policy operations were to be leaked to the public and if market participants could identify the transactions of ESCB national central banks (NCBs). Indeed, this could have an adverse impact on the performance by NCBs of their tasks in respect of those central bank transactions, particularly in the field of monetary policy or foreign exchange operations, where confidentiality is required (6). Requiring the counterparties of the members of the ESCB to report all data on their transactions to trade repositories has the unintended consequence of establishing an indirect reporting obligation for central bank transactions, thus limiting the effectiveness of the exemption granted to the members of the ESCB. It is therefore important that the books of ESCB members are protected and that signalling based on central bank operations remains effective (7). |
|
1.3 |
The ECB therefore takes the view that in order to ensure that NCBs continue to perform their statutory tasks effectively it is important that central bank transactions are fully exempted from reporting requirements. |
2. Reporting obligation
|
2.1 |
With regard to the proposed amendment of Article 9(1), the ECB takes note of the results of the Commission's impact assessment and understands the need to reduce the reporting burden for small non-financial counterparties. In this regard, the ECB welcomes the solution proposed by the Commission that in some specific cases the responsibility for reporting should be undertaken by central counterparties (CCPs), financial counterparties, management companies of undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities, and managers of alternative investment funds (8). This proposal appears to strike a good balance between ensuring the completeness of data, minimising reporting burdens and, at the same time, aligning the structure of the reporting obligations under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and Regulation (EU) 2015/2365. |
|
2.2 |
The proposed regulation also introduces a reporting exemption for all intragroup trades involving a non-financial counterparty (9). The ECB is concerned by this proposed amendment for the reasons set out in paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3. |
|
2.2.1 |
Based on analyses of existing data, the confirmation that an over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contract is an intragroup transaction pursuant to the current reporting framework under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (10) is often unreliable, when cross-checked with other data sources. In the context of still evolving data quality, therefore, the unconditional exemption of intragroup reporting for non-financial counterparties gives rise to the risk of regulatory arbitrage by reporting agents. |
|
2.2.2 |
Intragroup transactions involving non-financial counterparties are exempted from collateralisation only if certain conditions are met, and subject to authorisation of the competent authorities (11). The ECB is concerned that if those conditions are not met and counterparties exchange collateral for their intragroup transactions, then, in the absence of any reporting obligation, risks associated with margins and collateral pro-cyclicality may remain unmonitored. This asymmetry would break the complementarity between transparency and risk mitigation that lies at the core of the policy framework under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. |
|
2.2.3 |
The proposed exemption may potentially lead to sophisticated forms of circumvention of reporting requirements under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, as trades may be channelled through non-financial subsidiaries of larger financial groups. Due to the higher participation rate of non-financial counterparties in foreign exchange derivatives transactions, the impact of the amendment could be particularly relevant for currency derivatives reporting. |
|
2.3 |
The ECB considers that financial counterparties' obligation to report on behalf of non-financial counterparties (12) already addresses the excessive reporting burden for small non-financial counterparties, also in the case of intragroup trades. The marginal cost of additional reports for non-financial counterparties that should already have appropriate IT infrastructures in place should be negligible. The ECB therefore recommends that intragroup trades between financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties should not be exempted from reporting. Among intragroup trades between non-financial counterparties, only trades concluded by small non-financial counterparties that pose no systemic risk should be exempted. In the light of this, the ECB recommends that intragroup trades between non-financial counterparties are exempted from reporting provided that these non-financial counterparties are not subject to the clearing obligation. As a corollary, non-financial counterparties that are subject to the clearing obligation have to report on behalf of other non-financial counterparties in the event of intragroup trades between them. |
|
2.4 |
The ECB notes that intragroup trades involving a counterparty from a third country that is not granted an equivalence decision by the Commission will still be subject to the reporting obligation and that the current exemption (13) does not therefore apply to such trades. |
|
2.5 |
The ECB welcomes the amendments to Article 9(6). The implementation of standards for counterparty, trade and securities identification, operationalised by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/105 (14), is a key step towards improving the quality of data collected pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. The alignment of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 with Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 is also important to guarantee comparability and ensure a global view on financial markets' structures and activities. |
3. Amendments to ensure the quality of data
|
3.1 |
The ECB considers the proposed amendments to Article 78 (15) and Article 81(5) (16) to be valuable steps forward as they will facilitate harmonisation of trade repositories' procedures and policies and the conditions under which they provide data to competent authorities. |
|
3.2 |
The ECB also welcomes the mandate granted to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to report on the implementation of the reporting obligation under the new Article 85(3)(d) (17) and would welcome the involvement of the ESCB in preparing the report to the Commission pursuant to the new Article 85(3)(d). |
4. Credit institutions' compliance with risk-management procedures, intragroup exemptions and capital requirements
|
4.1 |
The ECB supports the proposal that there should be supervisory procedures to ensure initial and ongoing validation of risk-management procedures requiring the timely, accurate and appropriately segregated exchange of collateral with respect to OTC derivative contracts (18). |
|
4.2 |
The ECB notes that within the framework of Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (19) the tasks of ensuring that credit institutions comply with the risk management requirements set out in Article 11(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 regarding procedures concerning timely, accurate and appropriately segregated exchange of collateral, including the connected intragroup exemptions (20), and with the requirement in the area of own funds set out in Article 11(4) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to hold an appropriate and proportionate amount of capital to manage the risks not covered by appropriate exchange of collateral, are of a prudential nature, and thus fall within the scope of the tasks conferred on the ECB by Article 4(1)(e) and (d) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. |
5. CCPs' transparency
|
5.1 |
The ECB supports the proposal that CCPs should provide their clearing members with a tool to simulate their initial margin requirements and with a detailed overview of the initial margin models that they use (21). This will increase the transparency and predictability of initial margin requirements, thus improving clearing participants' understanding of the risks and costs involved in participation in a CCP. |
|
5.2 |
In addition, the ECB proposes the inclusion of macroprudential intervention tools, in order to prevent the build-up of systemic risk resulting, in particular, from excessive leverage, and to further limit the pro-cyclicality of margins and haircuts. The ECB proposes that the relevant principles for macroprudential tools are established in the Level 1 act. Macroprudential policy tools would be applied to counterparties at transaction level. In this way, all relevant transactions would be affected, including those contracted by non-banks, regardless of whether these transactions have been concluded in the centrally cleared market, the non-centrally cleared market, or by Union counterparties clearing their trades via a third country CCP (22). The requisite principles and requirements for such macroprudential tools should be included if not in the current proposal then at the next appropriate time, such as at the occasion of the next review of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 in 2020. |
|
5.3 |
Moreover, as pointed out in a recently published ESRB report on the review of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (23), the ECB considers that CCPs operating in the Union should be required to publish quantitative and qualitative information consistent with the CPMI-IOSCO public disclosure principles (24). Having a stronger legal basis for making CCPs publish data consistent with these principles would help the financial industry and the public at large better understand the complex environment in which CCPs operate. |
6. Classification of securitisation special purpose entities as financial counterparties
|
6.1 |
The ECB notes that securitisation special purpose entities (SSPEs) are proposed to be classified as financial counterparties (25). However, Article 27 of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common rules on securitisation and creating a European framework for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisation and amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012 (26) proposes to amend Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and exempt STS SSPEs from the clearing obligation, provided that counterparty credit risk is adequately mitigated. The ECB reiterates its position (27) that STS SSPEs should be fully exempted both from the clearing obligation and from the legislative requirements to provide collateral (28). |
|
6.2 |
Accordingly, the ECB supports the provisions of Article 27 of the proposal mentioned in paragraph 6.1, including the mandate for the European Supervisory Authorities to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying criteria for establishing which arrangements under covered bonds or securitisations adequately mitigate counterparty credit risk to be adopted by the Commission (29), as well as other necessary amendments that exempt STS SSPEs from both clearing obligations and from obligations to provide margin. Such treatment is necessary to achieve a level playing field with respect to qualifying covered bonds and can be justified on prudential grounds in respect of STS SSPEs. |
7. Changes to methodology for calculating counterparties' positions in OTC derivative contracts
The ECB notes that the proposed introduction of a methodology for calculating the positions in OTC derivative contracts relevant for determining whether a financial counterparty or a non-financial counterparty is subject to the clearing obligation, which is based on end-of-period data instead of a rolling average position in OTC derivative contracts over 30 working days (30), may create an incentive for ‘window dressing’ to avoid the clearing obligation. The ECB therefore proposes to add to the new Articles 4a(2) (31) and 10(2) (32) introduced by the proposed regulation a requirement that a financial counterparty and a non-financial counterparty shall be able to demonstrate to the relevant competent authority that the calculation of the aggregate month-end position in OTC derivative contracts does not lead to a systematic underestimation of the overall position.
8. The ECB's advisory role regarding draft delegated and implementing acts
|
8.1 |
It is worth recalling that Commission draft delegated and implementing acts qualify as ‘proposed Union acts’ within the meaning of Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty. Both delegated and implementing acts constitute Union legal acts. The ECB should be consulted in due time on any draft Union acts, including draft delegated and implementing acts, falling within its fields of competence. The obligation to consult the ECB was clarified by the European Court of Justice in Commission v ECB (33) with reference to the ECB's functions and expertise. In the light of the fact that safe and efficient financial market infrastructures, in particular clearing systems, are essential for the fulfilment of the basic tasks of the ESCB under Article 127(2) of the Treaty, and the pursuit of its primary objective of maintaining price stability under Article 127(1) of the Treaty, the ECB should be duly consulted on delegated and implementing acts adopted under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. While the obligation to consult the ECB derives directly from the Treaty, in order to ensure clarity, this requirement should also be reflected in a recital of the proposed regulation. Having regard to the importance of delegated and implementing acts as part of the development of Union financial services legislation, the ECB will exercise its advisory role on matters within its competence taking fully into account the timelines for adoption of these acts and the need to ensure the smooth adoption of implementing legislation (34). |
|
8.2 |
Moreover, in respect of a number of elements of the proposed regulation, not only the consultation of the ECB, but also the involvement, at an early stage, of the relevant members of the ESCB, in the development of draft regulatory and implementing technical standards, delegated and implementing acts could be particularly useful, and should be specifically provided for. |
|
8.3 |
First, the Commission is empowered to adopt implementing technical standards, on the basis of draft implementing technical standards developed by ESMA specifying the data standards and formats of information to be reported, the methods and arrangements for reporting, the frequency of the reports and the date by which derivative contracts are to be reported (35). The ESCB is increasingly using data collected pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 in the fulfilment of its mandates. In order to leverage the insights gained by the ESCB on the quality of data reported under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, the development of draft implementing technical standards by ESMA should be carried out in close cooperation with the relevant members of the ESCB. |
|
8.4 |
Second, the Commission is empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards, on the basis of draft regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA, specifying the procedures for the reconciliation of data between trade repositories and the procedures for the verification of data as to its completeness and accuracy and of compliance with the reporting requirements (36). Authorities with direct and immediate access to trade repositories' data, including the relevant members of the ESCB, have developed significant expertise in this field. Ensuring that such expertise is leveraged in the development of the regulatory technical standards is therefore important. For this purpose the development of draft regulatory technical standards by ESMA should be carried out in close cooperation with the relevant members of the ESCB. Where the ECB recommends that the proposed regulation is amended, specific drafting proposals are set out in the separate technical working document accompanied by explanatory text to that effect. The technical working document is available on the ECB's website. |
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 October 2017.
The President of the ECB
Mario DRAGHI
(1) COM(2017) 208 final.
(2) Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1).
(3) Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities financing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 1).
(4) Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349).
(5) Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 84).
(6) See paragraph 7 of Opinion CON/2012/21. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu
(7) See pages 2 and 13 to 14 of the ECB response to the European Commission's consultation on the review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) dated 2 September 2015, available on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu
(8) See Article 1(7)(b) of the proposed regulation.
(9) See Article 1(7)(a) of the proposed regulation.
(10) See Article 3(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
(11) See Article 11(7) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
(12) See Article 1(7)(b) of the proposed regulation.
(13) See Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
(14) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/105 of 26 October 2016 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1247/2012 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to the format and frequency of trade reports to trade repositories according to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 17, 21.1.2017, p. 17).
(15) See Article 1(16) of the proposed regulation.
(16) See Article 1(17)(c) of the proposed regulation.
(17) See Article 1(19)(c) of the proposed regulation.
(18) See Article 1(9)(a) of the proposed regulation.
(19) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
(20) See Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
(21) See Article 1(10) of the proposed regulation.
(22) This is in line with the ECB's position in the ECB response to the European Commission's consultation on the review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) dated 2 September 2015, available on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu
(23) The Revision of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation, ESRB, April 2017. Available at https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/20170421_esrb_emir.en.pdf
(24) Final report of the CPMI-IOSCO Board on Public quantitative disclosure standards for central counterparties, February 2015. Available at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d125.pdf
(25) See Article 1(1) of the proposed regulation.
(26) COM(2015) 472 final.
(27) See the Joint response from the Bank of England and the European Central Bank to the Consultation Document of the European Commission: ‘An EU framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation’, available on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu
(28) On the exemption from the requirement to provide collateral, see paragraphs 2.2 and 5.5 of Opinion CON/2016/11.
(29) See Article 27(2) of COM(2015) 472.
(30) See Article 1(3) and (8) of the proposed regulation.
(31) See Article 1(3) of the proposed regulation.
(32) See Article 1(8) of the proposed regulation.
(33) Commission v ECB, C-11/00, ECLI: EU:C:2003:395, in particular paragraphs 110 and 111. In paragraph 110, the Court of Justice clarified that the obligation to consult the ECB is intended ‘essentially to ensure that the legislature adopts the act only when the body has been heard, which, by virtue of the specific functions that it exercises in the Community framework in the area concerned and by virtue of the high degree of expertise that it enjoys, is particularly well placed to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged’.
(34) See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2015/10, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2012/5, paragraph 8 of Opinion CON/2011/44, and paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2011/42.
(35) See Article 1(7)(c) of the proposed regulation.
(36) See Article 1(16) of the proposed regulation.
IV Notices
NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES
European Commission
|
15.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385/16 |
Euro exchange rates (1)
14 November 2017
(2017/C 385/05)
1 euro =
|
|
Currency |
Exchange rate |
|
USD |
US dollar |
1,1745 |
|
JPY |
Japanese yen |
133,29 |
|
DKK |
Danish krone |
7,4414 |
|
GBP |
Pound sterling |
0,89585 |
|
SEK |
Swedish krona |
9,8905 |
|
CHF |
Swiss franc |
1,1643 |
|
ISK |
Iceland króna |
|
|
NOK |
Norwegian krone |
9,5923 |
|
BGN |
Bulgarian lev |
1,9558 |
|
CZK |
Czech koruna |
25,566 |
|
HUF |
Hungarian forint |
311,97 |
|
PLN |
Polish zloty |
4,2381 |
|
RON |
Romanian leu |
4,6493 |
|
TRY |
Turkish lira |
4,5477 |
|
AUD |
Australian dollar |
1,5361 |
|
CAD |
Canadian dollar |
1,4933 |
|
HKD |
Hong Kong dollar |
9,1645 |
|
NZD |
New Zealand dollar |
1,7092 |
|
SGD |
Singapore dollar |
1,5978 |
|
KRW |
South Korean won |
1 309,46 |
|
ZAR |
South African rand |
16,8932 |
|
CNY |
Chinese yuan renminbi |
7,7950 |
|
HRK |
Croatian kuna |
7,5520 |
|
IDR |
Indonesian rupiah |
15 918,59 |
|
MYR |
Malaysian ringgit |
4,9259 |
|
PHP |
Philippine peso |
60,070 |
|
RUB |
Russian rouble |
70,1633 |
|
THB |
Thai baht |
38,829 |
|
BRL |
Brazilian real |
3,8488 |
|
MXN |
Mexican peso |
22,4266 |
|
INR |
Indian rupee |
76,8150 |
(1) Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.
|
15.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385/17 |
Commission notice on current State aid recovery interest rates and reference/discount rates for 28 Member States applicable as from 1 December 2017
(Published in accordance with Article 10 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 (OJ L 140, 30.4.2004, p. 1))
(2017/C 385/06)
Base rates calculated in accordance with the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates (OJ C 14, 19.1.2008, p. 6). Depending on the use of the reference rate, the appropriate margins have still to be added as defined in this communication. For the discount rate this means that a margin of 100 basis points has to be added. The Commission Regulation (EC) No 271/2008 of 30 January 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 foresees that, unless otherwise provided for in a specific decision, the recovery rate will also be calculated by adding 100 basis points to the base rate.
Modified rates are indicated in bold.
Previous table published in OJ C 346, 14.10.2017, p. 5.
|
From |
To |
AT |
BE |
BG |
CY |
CZ |
DE |
DK |
EE |
EL |
ES |
FI |
FR |
HR |
HU |
IE |
IT |
LT |
LU |
LV |
MT |
NL |
PL |
PT |
RO |
SE |
SI |
SK |
UK |
|
1.12.2017 |
31.12.2017 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,76 |
-0,15 |
0,57 |
-0,15 |
0,03 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,59 |
0,19 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
1,83 |
-0,15 |
1,55 |
-0,36 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,65 |
|
1.11.2017 |
30.11.2017 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,76 |
-0,15 |
0,57 |
-0,15 |
0,06 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,59 |
0,25 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
1,83 |
-0,15 |
1,28 |
-0,36 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,65 |
|
1.10.2017 |
31.10.2017 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,76 |
-0,15 |
0,45 |
-0,15 |
0,09 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,59 |
0,30 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
1,83 |
-0,15 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,15 |
-0,15 |
0,65 |
|
1.9.2017 |
30.9.2017 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
0,76 |
-0,13 |
0,45 |
-0,13 |
0,12 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
0,59 |
0,30 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
1,83 |
-0,13 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
0,65 |
|
1.8.2017 |
31.8.2017 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
0,76 |
-0,13 |
0,45 |
-0,13 |
0,12 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
0,59 |
0,30 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
1,83 |
-0,13 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,13 |
-0,13 |
0,78 |
|
1.6.2017 |
31.7.2017 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,76 |
-0,10 |
0,45 |
-0,10 |
0,12 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,70 |
0,37 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
1,83 |
-0,10 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,78 |
|
1.5.2017 |
31.5.2017 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,76 |
-0,10 |
0,45 |
-0,10 |
0,12 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,70 |
0,44 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
1,83 |
-0,10 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,78 |
|
1.4.2017 |
30.4.2017 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,76 |
-0,08 |
0,45 |
-0,08 |
0,16 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,83 |
0,44 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
1,83 |
-0,08 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,78 |
|
1.3.2017 |
31.3.2017 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,76 |
-0,08 |
0,45 |
-0,08 |
0,16 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
1,05 |
0,53 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
1,83 |
-0,08 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,78 |
|
1.1.2017 |
28.2.2017 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
0,76 |
-0,07 |
0,45 |
-0,07 |
0,16 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
1,05 |
0,75 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
1,83 |
-0,07 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
0,78 |
V Announcements
PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY
European Commission
|
15.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385/18 |
Prior notification of a concentration
(Case M.8639 — Cariparma/Caricesena, Carim, Carismi)
Candidate case for simplified procedure
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2017/C 385/07)
|
1. |
On 8 November 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). This notification concerns the following undertakings:
Crédit Agricole Cariparma S.p.A. acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of Cassa di Risparmio di Cesena S.p.A., Cassa di Risparmio di Rimini S.p.A. and Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato S.p.A. The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares. |
|
2. |
The business activities of the undertakings concerned are: — for Cariparma: a subsidiary of Crédit Agricole SA (‘Crédit Agricole’, France) which is the first bancassurer and asset manager in Europe. The Group Crédit Agricole is present in Italy with a complete range of financial services. — for Caricesena: active in all areas relating to financial intermediation credit, in northern and central Italy. — for Carim: active in the retail banking sector in Italy, in particular in the Italian regions of Emilia Romagna, Marche, Umbria and Lazio — for Carismi: mainly active in the retail banking sector, in particular in northern and central Italy, in the region of Tuscany. |
|
3. |
On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice. |
|
4. |
The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified: M.8639 — Cariparma/Caricesena, Carim, Carismi Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below:
|
(1) OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).
(2) OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.
OTHER ACTS
European Commission
|
15.11.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 385/20 |
Publication of an application for approval of a minor amendment in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs
(2017/C 385/08)
The European Commission has approved this minor amendment in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 664/2014 (1).
APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF A MINOR AMENDMENT
Application for approval of a minor amendment in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2)
‘FINOCCHIONA’
EU No: PGI-IT-01120-AM01 — 25.7.2017
PDO ( ) PGI ( X ) TSG ( )
1. Applicant group and legitimate interest
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Consorzio di Tutela della Finocchiona |
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Via Carlo del Prete, 49/r |
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50127 Firenze (FI) |
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ITALIA |
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Tel. +39 0554221769 |
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E-mail: info@finocchionaigp.it |
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Certified e-mail: finocchionaigp@pec.it |
The Finocchiona Protection Association is entitled to submit an amendment application in accordance with Article 13(1) of Decree No 12511 of the Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policy of 14 October 2013.
2. Member State or Third Country
Italy
3. Heading in the product specification affected by the amendment(s)
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☒ |
Description of product |
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— |
☐ |
Proof of origin |
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— |
☐ |
Method of production |
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— |
☐ |
Link |
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— |
☐ |
Labelling |
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— |
☐ |
Other [to be specified] |
4. Type of amendment(s)
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— |
☐ |
Amendment to product specification of registered PDO or PGI to be qualified as minor in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, that requires no amendment to the published single document |
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— |
☒ |
Amendment to product specification of registered PDO or PGI to be qualified as minor in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, that requires an amendment to the published single document |
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— |
☐ |
Amendment to product specification of registered PDO or PGI to be qualified as minor in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, for which a single document (or equivalent) has not been published. |
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— |
☐ |
Amendment to product specification of registered TSG to be qualified as minor in accordance with the fourth subparagraph of Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012. |
5. Amendment(s)
Description of product
The requirement under point 2.1.3 of Article 2 (‘Chemical properties’) of the specification and point 3.2 of the single document that water activity (aw) be ‘not more than 0,92’ has been modified.
Rather than ‘Water activity (aw): not more than 0,92’, these provisions now read as follows: ‘Water activity (aw): not more than 0,945’.
The aim behind increasing the ‘aw’ value is to achieve a moister product than was possible under the previous specification. This guarantees and preserves the soft texture of ‘Finocchiona’ PGI slices, a key feature that sets it apart from other similar products on the market.
We believe that this change meets the conditions laid down in Article 53(2)(a)-(e) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 and can therefore be classed as a minor amendment.
SINGLE DOCUMENT
‘FINOCCHIONA’
EU No: PGI-IT-01120-AM01 — 25.7.2017
PDO ( ) PGI ( X )
1. Name(s)
‘Finocchiona’
2. Member State or Third Country
Italy
3. Description of the agricultural product or foodstuff
3.1. Type of product
Class 1.2. Meat products (cooked, salted, smoked, etc.)
3.2. Description of product to which the name in (1) applies
‘Finocchiona’ PGI salami is characterised by the aroma of the fennel contained as seeds and/or flowers in the mixture, and the soft texture of the slices, which sometimes tend to crumble. The colour of the slices ranges from meat red in the lean parts to white/pinkish white in the fatty parts, the parts being well mixed together with indistinct boundaries. Fennel seeds and/or flowers may also be visible. The pronounced aroma of fennel and slight aroma of garlic give the salami its characteristic pleasant smell. It has a fresh and appetising taste, which is never acidic. The product has the following chemical properties: total proteins: not less than 20 %; total fats: not more than 35 %; pH: between 5 and 6; water activity (aw): not more than 0,945; salt: not more than 6 %.
The product is a cylindrical sausage, coated with the characteristic feathery mould that develops during maturation. The size varies from small salamis weighing from 0,5 kg at the time of casing to larger ones weighing up to 25 kg at casing. The salami is released for consumption loose, vacuum packed or packed in a protective atmosphere, whole or in thick slices, or vacuum packed or packed in a protective atmosphere in thin slices.
3.3. Feed (for products of animal origin only) and raw materials (for processed products only)
The feed ration of the heavy pigs varies as regards both its composition and the method used. It is divided into two stages and is predominantly based on the by-products of cheesemaking and on cereals. The feed authorised during the first stage (up to 80 kg live weight) is the same, in a suitable concentration, as that authorised in the second stage, together with soybean meal, corn silage, corn gluten feed, deseeded carob, distiller’s grains, lipids with a melting point of over 36 °C, fish meal, protein lysates and buttermilk, with the requirement that dry matter from cereals accounts for not less than 45 % of the total. The feed authorised in the second, fattening stage, when the dry matter from cereals must account for not less than 55 % of the total, is: cereals and minor cereals, brans and other wheat processing by-products, dehydrated potato, pressed and ensiled beet pulp, soybean meal, sunflower meal, manioc, molasses, coconut meal, maize-germ meal, field peas and/or other legume seeds, dried beet pulp, sesame meal, linseed cake, apple and pear residue, grape and tomato skins used to deliver supplements, dried lucerne meal, beer yeast and/or torula yeast, lipids with a melting point of over 40 °C, whey and buttermilk. Pigs of the Cinta Senese breed, reared in the open or using a mixed system, feed by grazing in woods and/or on bare land sown with forage and cereal plants. Daily feed supplements may be given to pigs over four months of age but must not amount to more than 3 % of the animal’s live weight.
To prepare ‘Finocchiona’ PGI fresh meat is typically used, which must not have been frozen, obtained from carcases of:
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heavy pigs, raised for at least nine months until they achieve a heavy weight and their meat is ideal for producing ‘Finocchiona’ PGI, which have specific genetic properties (the breeds usually used are the Italian Large White, the Italian Landrace and the Italian Duroc, or boars of those breeds, boars of other breeds or selected hybrid boars with the same genetic properties). Use of these breeds ensures the maintenance, distribution and qualitative composition of the fats in the meat, the production of carcases graded as heavy within the limits of the corresponding central classes and a heavy slaughter weight and high slaughter age. All the above, along with a specific feed regime for the animals based mainly on cereals, constitute essential requirements for the correct maturation and organoleptic profile of ‘Finocchiona’; |
|
— |
pigs of the Cinta Senese breed, entered in the breed register, reared and slaughtered within the area and fed according to tradition. |
3.4. Specific steps in production that must take place in the identified geographical area
The steps in the production of ‘Finocchiona’ PGI that must take place in the geographical area defined in point 4 are cleaning and trimming of the authorised cuts of meat; mincing; kneading, filling the casings, drying and maturation.
The Cinta Senese meat comes from animals reared in the geographical area defined in point 4.
3.5. Specific rules concerning slicing, grating, packaging, etc. of the product the registered name refers to
For packed, sliced ‘Finocchiona’ to be released for consumption, both slicing and packing, including in a vacuum or in a protective atmosphere, must be carried out exclusively in the production area defined in point 4 under the control of the authorised inspection body in order to guarantee product quality and, in particular, to prevent any deterioration in the characteristics described in point 3.2.
The mixing of finely minced pieces of lean meat and fat makes the slices particularly delicate, during both slicing and handling. Preparing the product for slicing involves removing the casing, directly exposing the edible part to the external environment. Exposure to uncontrolled environmental conditions for an indeterminate period causes a deterioration in the characteristics of the product, giving rise to oxidation, changes in colour and an excessive loss of moisture, with a degradation in the specific texture of the slices and the pronounced aroma that should characterise this salami. In order to guarantee and maintain the product’s original characteristics it is essential that those doing the slicing are in contact with the product under specific conditions and for a limited amount of time.
If the product intended for slicing is stored for an indeterminate period under conditions other than those laid down, undesirable characteristics inconsistent with those for which the product is known could develop, such as rancidity, drying, the formation of abnormal mould, swelling or browning, that could generate tastes, aromas and a consistency other than those the product should exhibit.
3.6. Specific rules concerning labelling of the product the registered name refers to
The name ‘Finocchiona’ must be in distinct, indelible lettering of a colour that strongly contrasts with that of the label and that is clearly distinguishable from and larger than any other writing on the label and of a minimum of 3 mm and must be followed immediately by the words ‘Protected Geographical Indication’ or the letters ‘P.G.I.’. The label must always bear the EU PGI logo, possibly together with wordings complying with Commission Regulation (EC) No 628/2008 (3). The use of indications referring to companies, names, business names, private trademarks and consortia is also permitted on the label, provided they have no laudatory purport and are not such as to mislead the purchaser or consumer. Reference to the name of the pig farms on which the pigs from which the product comes were raised is allowed only if the raw material comes solely from those farms.
4. Concise definition of the geographical area
The production area of ‘Finocchiona’ PGI covers the entire territory of mainland Tuscany, excluding the islands, which is the area in which the production of this typical product has become established over time.
5. Link with the geographical area
The production area of ‘Finocchiona’ PGI has a mountainous area in the north and east, marking its boundaries, and an extensive upland area, with vineyards, woodlands and pasture land for livestock rearing in the open, sloping down to the coastal plains in the west.
Until the 1970s, agricultural holdings were organised on the basis of ‘mezzadria’ (sharecropping), now replaced in large part by farmer-proprietors. This preserved the farming of pigs of the historical Cinta Senese breed, which has in the meantime also faced and overcome the risk of extinction, and white breeds of pigs, from which the raw material for Tuscany charcuterie comes, and handed down the specialised know-how and craft processing methods used for ‘Finocchiona’. Meat, wine and the widespread presence of wild fennel have helped develop the taste of charcuterie producers, who are the custodians of expert, craft production methods, a heritage of age-old techniques and customs that have come down to today’s processing undertakings, located throughout the production area.
The main characteristic that marks out ‘Finocchiona’ and makes it unique in the world of charcuterie is the pronounced and unmistakable aroma of the fennel seed and/or flowers used in the mixture and the tenderness of the slices, which sometimes tend to crumble on cutting. It has a fresh and appetising taste, which is never acidic.
The pieces of fat are distributed in the slice in such a way that they surround the pieces of muscle tissue so that the product remains tender even after a lengthy maturation period. The fatty and lean parts, in medium-sized pieces, have no distinct boundaries. The colour of the slices ranges from meat red in the lean parts to white/pinkish white in the fatty parts. Fennel seeds and/or flowers may also be visible.
The historical reputation of ‘Finocchiona’ is evidenced by numerous documents such as Rigutini and Fanfani’s Vocabolario della lingua parlata of 1875, the 1889 edition of the Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca, which demonstrates the link between ‘Finocchiona’ and Tuscany, and the work of Professor Italo Ghinelli, who in 1977 confirmed the Tuscan origin of the product. ‘Finocchiona’ is one of the most widely available forms of charcuterie in Tuscany and is regularly referred to in the weekly charcuterie product bulletins published by an authoritative nationally distributed specialised magazine.
‘Finocchiona’ owes its characteristics to the interactions over the centuries between the Tuscan environment in which it originated and human factors, which have given rise to the production method. The original choice of ingredients, particularly fennel, which is typical of so much of the regional cuisine and which is endemic in the production area, an established tradition of charcuterie production, the specialised know-how of qualified workers with manual and craft skills, who know how to select and trim the best cuts and ensure the correct balance between fat and lean meat and understand when the ‘Finocchiona’ has the right consistency and tenderness, contribute to producing a unique and unequalled product, whose reputation is now firmly established. The addition of wine to the ‘Finocchiona’ mixture, in accordance with the historical production method, is proof of the strong link with the local area, whose wines are known throughout the world. The production of quality meat from the Cinta Senese breed has allowed processing undertakings to establish themselves throughout the region, helping to further affirm the character of the product and consolidating its reputation and the link between ‘Finocchiona’ and Tuscany in the minds of consumers.
A plate of Tuscan cold cuts is unthinkable without ‘Finocchiona’, which has also spread beyond national borders and is now found in many countries of Central Europe and countries outside the European Union.
Reference to publication of the specification
(the second subparagraph of Article 6(1) of this Regulation)
http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335
(1) OJ L 179, 19.6.2014, p. 17.
(2) OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.