30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/1

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32017M8346. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/1

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32017M8466. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/2

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32017M8411. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/3

Council of the European Union (Attn: COMET designations)

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/4

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG C 1C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/5

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG C 1C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/6

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG C 1C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/7

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG C 1C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/8

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/9

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/10

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/11

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (the IUU Regulation) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

(2)

Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures.

(3)

Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

(4)

Prior to identifying third countries as non-cooperating under Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to first notify third countries of the possibility of being identified as non-cooperating countries in accordance with Article 32 of that Regulation. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take into account all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation.

(5)

The identification of non-cooperating third countries under Article 31 of the IUU Regulation is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of that Regulation.

(6)

In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries.

(7)

Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries.

(8)

In accordance with Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation.

(9)

The Republic of Liberia (hereafter ‘Liberia’) has not submitted its notification as a flag State pursuant to Article 20 of the IUU Regulation to the Commission.

(10)

From 5 February 2014 to present the Commission cooperated administratively with the authorities of Liberia in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation. This cooperation covered issues pertaining to the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures by Liberia. It entailed exchange of oral and written comments as well as a visit to Liberia between 19 and 23 October 2015, where the Commission sought and verified all information deemed necessary concerning the measures taken by Liberia in order to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing.

(11)

Liberia is a contracting party of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT); a Cooperating Non-Contracting Party of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO); and a Cooperating Non-Member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) as well as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). Liberia has ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) (2).

(12)

In order to evaluate the compliance of Liberia with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State as set out in the international agreements referred to in recital 11 and established by the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), the Commission sought, collected and analysed all necessary information required for the purpose of this exercise.

(13)

Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Liberia as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of this review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation.

(14)

The Liberian national fisheries legal framework (‘the 2010 Fisheries Regulations’ defines fishing vessels as ‘any vessel used for fishing or related activities’. The scope of the 2010 Fisheries Regulations covers all fishing and fishing related activities in waters under the jurisdiction of Liberia as well as the activities of all Liberian vessels and persons in any area beyond the jurisdiction of Liberia, in so far as this is not in conflict with the jurisdiction of another State.

(15)

While the Liberian national authority in charge of national vessel registration consults with the fisheries authorities about the registration of new fishing vessels that will operate in national waters, the entity in charge of the international vessel registry (Liberian Maritime Authority) (3) does not consult the national fisheries authorities (4) before registering any fishing vessel which will operate outside Liberia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This prevents the establishment of a consolidated list containing all fishing vessels flying the flag of Liberia. It appears that the national fisheries authority does not have any information on Liberian fishing vessels operating beyond the Liberian EEZ. The apparent lack of cooperation between Liberian Maritime Authority and the national fisheries authorities could be considered as a situation compromising Liberia's ability to monitor the size and activities of its fleet, potentially allowing illegal operators to use the flag of Liberia without proper control.

(16)

The Commission established that there are over 100 Liberian flagged fishing vessels operating beyond Liberia's EEZ without authorisation from the relevant Liberian fisheries authorities. The Liberian fisheries authorities acknowledged that while the Liberian Maritime Authority does monitor the international Liberian flagged fleet, the fishing vessels operating beyond the EEZ are not subject to monitoring, control and surveillance by the fisheries authority. They do not report their geographic position to Liberia's fisheries monitoring centre or share information with Liberia's fisheries authorities on catch data, landings or transhipments.

(17)

Pursuant to Article 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation the Commission examined the measures taken by Liberia in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market.

(18)

Liberian vessels operating beyond the EEZ of Liberia are not subject to any form of control by Liberia's fisheries authorities. These vessels do not report or transmit any information regarding their activities, landings and transhipments to the Liberian fisheries authorities. Therefore it is unlikely that the traceability of fish or fish products stemming from these vessels can be guaranteed.

(19)

The performance of Liberia described in recitals 15 to 17 is not in line with Articles 94(1) and (2) of UNCLOS which provide that every State shall effectively ensure its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag. It is also not in line with point 24 of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations' (FAO) International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IPOA IUU) (5) that provides for the obligation to undertake comprehensive and effective control of fishing activities and with point 35 of the IPOA IUU that provides that a flag State should ensure that, before it registers a vessel, it can exercise its responsibility to ensure that the vessel does not engage in IUU fishing. It also contravenes point 36 of the IPOA IUU, that provides that flag States should avoid flagging vessels with a history of non-compliance and point 42 of IPOA IUU which provides that every State shall maintain a register of ships containing the names and particulars of ships flying its flag. It also fails to comply with point 71 of the IPOA IUU which advises States to take steps to improve the transparency of their markets in order to ensure the traceability of fish or fish products. Equally, it fails to comply with Article 11 of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Code of Conduct) which sets good practices for post-harvest activities and responsible international trade.

(20)

In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3), (4)(a) and (4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, that Liberia failed to discharge its duties under international law as a flag, port, coastal and market State in respect of IUU vessels and IUU fishing carried out or supported by vessels flying its flag or by its nationals and to prevent access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market.

(21)

While the fisheries authorities of Liberia were generally cooperative with the Commission and responded to requests for information and provided feedback, their capacity to reply to certain requests was limited by the status of the international vessel registry and the lack of cooperation between the Liberian Maritime Authority and the national fisheries authorities, as established in Section 3.1.

(22)

Liberia is a significant flag State, operating the second largest international registry in the world attracting vessels from third countries with no direct link to the country. As explained in recital 16, these vessels operate beyond the EEZ of Liberia, on the high seas and in the waters of third countries. Liberia is also a member or party to six RFMOs and cooperates with other countries at sub-regional level through the Fishery Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC). However, the Commission found that the Liberian fisheries authorities do not appear to cooperate or to be in a position to cooperate with third countries in all regions where Liberian fishing vessels operate except in the east Atlantic. This apparent lack of cooperation subsists despite the fact Liberia is a member or party to six RFMOs, and may result from the fact that Liberia's fisheries authorities seem to have no information about vessels flying the flag of Liberia operating outside the national EEZ and the area under the responsibility of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, due to the lack of internal administrative coordination with the Liberian Maritime Authority registered vessels.

(23)

The 2010 Fisheries Regulations are outdated, and need to be revised to ensure consistency between national law and international and regional applicable rules. The definition of fishing activities provided by the 2010 Fisheries Regulations includes searching for, catching, taking and harvesting fish as well as any activity in support of or preparation of these activities, including through the use of aircraft. The definition of fishing vessels includes vessels conducting fishing related activities. Fishing related activities include transhipment, storage, processing, transportation and refuelling and supplying fishing vessels. The sanctioning system is categorised in terms of severity of the offence reflected by the amount of the fine for each type of offence and sanctions may be deterrent and proportionate as required by international obligations. However, these texts do not specifically define IUU fishing activities or serious infringements in line with international law.

(24)

The Liberian Bureau of National Fisheries operates a Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC) to comply with fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) duties. The FMC is equipped to carry out MCS functions. However, only vessels licensed to operate in the national EEZ are monitored by the FMC; Liberian flagged vessels operating in the high seas or in the waters of third countries are not monitored by the FMC. Furthermore, due to limited funding, in particular for aerial surveillance, certain MCS functions appear to be constrained. This impedes Liberia from ensuring an effective and comprehensive MCS system for fishing vessels flying its flag. Therefore, Liberia seems to lack or fails to allocate adequate resources to fight IUU fishing.

(25)

The Liberian legal framework and enforcement measures appear not to comply with the basic requirements in Articles 61, 62 and 117 to 119 of UNCLOS. The facts described in recitals 20 to 23 indicate that Liberia fails to fulfil the conditions of Article 94 of UNCLOS, which requires the flag State to assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master, officers and crew, and breaches Article 18(3) of UNFSA, which specifies the measures to be taken by a State in respect of vessels flying its flag. Liberia appears to fail to take into consideration the recommendations in point 24 of the IPOA IUU which advises flag States to ensure comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing, from the catch to the point of landing, to final destination, including through the use of Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) on board fishing vessels in accordance with the relevant national, regional and international standards.

(26)

In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (5) of the IUU Regulation, that Liberia failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to cooperation and enforcement.

(27)

The Commission analysed all information deemed relevant with respect to the status of Liberia as a contracting party of UNCLOS, UNFSA and ICCAT; as a Cooperating Non-Contracting Party of NEAFC, SPRFMO and IOTC and as a Cooperating Non-Member of WCPFC and IATTC.

(28)

Between 2014 and 2016 Liberia became cooperating party, cooperating non-contracting party or cooperating non-member of six RFMOs (6). However, during the evaluation mission to Monrovia between the 19 and 23 October 2015 it transpired that it was the Liberian Maritime Authority that had taken the steps to join all these RFMOs, except ICCAT, without consulting the national fisheries authorities. The national fisheries authorities were responsible for joining ICCAT. This situation risks to impede Liberia's ability to meet their compliance commitments in each RFMO and has resulted in late report submission (ICCAT) or failure to report (SPRFMO) in breach of their obligations under the respective RFMO.

(29)

Liberia has ratified two international legal instruments related to fisheries management: UNCLOS and UNFSA. The performance of Liberia in implementing international instruments is not in accordance with the recommendations of point 11 of the IPOA IUU which encourages States, as a matter of priority, to ratify, accept or accede not only to UNCLOS and UNFSA, but also to the FAO Agreement to promote compliance with international conservation and management measures by fishing vessels on the high seas. It also contravenes point 14 of the IPOA IUU which provides that States should fully and effectively implement the Code of Conduct and its associated International Plans of Action.

(30)

Liberia has not ratified the 2009 FAO Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA). While direct landings of fisheries products in Liberia are not frequent at present, some landings do occur and Liberia is developing landing facilities under an international project. They will then need to be able to carry out their port State obligations.

(31)

Contrary to the recommendations in points 25 to 27 of the IPOA IUU, Liberia has not developed a national plan of action against IUU fishing.

(32)

Furthermore, the Liberian authorities explained to the Commission during the evaluation meeting held on 24 March 2015 that the management of Liberia's international registry is carried out by a private company located outside of Liberia. During this meeting and subsequent exchanges Liberia failed to demonstrate how it ensures that fishing vessels flying its flag have a genuine link with the country. This contravenes Article 91 of UNCLOS which provides that a genuine link must exist between the flag State and its ships.

(33)

In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Liberia failed to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures.

(34)

According to the United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI) (7), in 2015 Liberia was considered to be a low human development country ranked 177 out of 188 countries.

(35)

Although specific capacity constraints may exist with respect to monitoring, control and surveillance, the specific constraints of Liberia derived from its level of development do not justify all the deficiencies identified in the previous sections. This concerns especially the lack of internal coordination regarding registration of fishing vessels under the Liberian international registry and the lack of consolidated information on the identity of these vessels, with the consequent inability to exercise effective control.

(36)

It appears that the shortcomings identified result primarily from an inadequate administrative environment to ensure the effective performance by Liberia of its duties as flag, coastal, port and market State. Liberia has received support from regional initiatives which aim to strengthen governance and fight IUU fishing including through improved MCS, as well as sectoral support under the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) concluded with the European Union. It also received support for aerial surveillance through the United Nations Mission in Liberia. However, the drawdown of that Mission has brought an end to that support and no national support has been provided to maintain this MCS activity, thereby impeding Liberian MCS from operating effectively.

(37)

In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status and overall performance of Liberia with respect to fisheries management may be impaired by its level of development. However, account taken of the nature of the established shortcomings of Liberia, the development level of Liberia cannot fully excuse or otherwise justify its overall performance as flag, port, coastal or market State with respect to fisheries and the insufficiency of its actions to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

(38)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to the failure of Liberia to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, Liberia should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting IUU fishing.

(39)

The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to Liberia. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation.

(40)

Furthermore, the notification to Liberia of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be a non-cooperating third country for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating third countries,

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/17

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the anticompetitive behaviour covered by the draft decision constitutes four separate agreements and/or concerted practices between undertakings which amount to four infringements within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU.

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment of the product and geographic scope for each of the four infringements contained in the draft decision.

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the undertakings concerned by the draft decision have participated in the four single and continuous infringements of Article 101 TFEU, as spelled out in the draft decision.

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the object of the four infringements was to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, either in the form of price coordination or in the form of market coordination.

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the four infringements were capable of appreciably affecting trade between the Member States of the EU.

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment as regards the duration of the four infringements.

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s draft decision as regards the addressees in respect of each of the four infringements.

8.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on the addressees of the draft decision for each of the four infringements in which they were involved.

9.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the application of the 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

10.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amounts of the fines.

11.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the determination of the duration for the purpose of calculating the fines.

12.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are no aggravating and no mitigating circumstances applicable in this case.

13.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a multiplier for deterrence should be applied to two undertakings concerned by the draft decision.

14.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the reduction of the fines based on the 2006 Leniency Notice.

15.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the reduction of the fines based on the 2008 Settlement Notice.

16.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amounts of the fines.

17.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/18

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/19

(1)

On 8 March 2017, the Commission adopted a Decision relating to four single and continuous infringements of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. The infringements consisted of price coordination or market sharing in respect of sales of air conditioning and engine cooling products for passenger cars to a number of car manufacturers in the EEA.

(2)

Climate control (or air conditioning or A/C) systems built into cars serve to protect passengers from outside temperatures and allow them to regulate inside temperatures. The three main functions of a climate control system are: heating, ventilation and air conditioning. Climate control systems are composed of three main elements:

(3)

Engine cooling modules (ECMs) serve to remove the waste heat released by internal combustion from the engine. They mainly consist of a radiator, cooling fans, intercoolers and oil coolers.

(4)

This Decision is addressed to Denso (2), Valeo (3), Behr (4), Sanden (5), Panasonic (6) and Calsonic (7) (the ‘Parties’).

(5)

Following the immunity applications of Panasonic (only concerning sales of e-compressors to Nissan/Renault) and of Denso under the terms of the 2006 Leniency Notice, the Commission sent out requests for information to some undertakings active in the industry on 22 July 2011. On 8 August 2011, VALEO submitted a leniency application. On 12 October 2011, CALSONIC submitted a leniency application. On 31 January 2012, SANDEN submitted a leniency application. Between 22 and 25 May 2012 the Commission carried out unannounced inspections under Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 at the premises of VALEO and BEHR. On 25 May 2012, BEHR submitted a leniency application.

(6)

On 21 December 2015, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 against the Parties with a view to engaging in settlement discussions with them. Settlement meetings took place between January and November 2016. Subsequently, the Parties submitted their formal requests to settle to the Commission pursuant to Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 (8).

(7)

On 16 January 2017, the Commission adopted a statement of objections addressed to the Parties. All Parties replied to the statement of objections by confirming that it reflected the contents of their settlement submissions and that they remained committed to following the settlement procedure.

(8)

The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 27 February 2017.

(9)

The Commission adopted this Decision on 8 March 2017.

(10)

The four separate infringements all concern the supply of thermal system components for passenger cars in the EEA. The scope of the infringements is as follows:

(11)

DENSO, VALEO and BEHR had collusive contacts concerning supplies of HVAC to VW, Daimler and BMW in(to) the EEA. They held trilateral meetings and had bilateral contacts with each other in parallel, with the overall aim to coordinate their pricing strategy vis-à-vis those customers. They discussed those customers and exchanged sensitive information.

(12)

DENSO, VALEO and SANDEN had collusive contacts with each other concerning supplies of compressors to VW and PAG in(to) the EEA. The contacts were bilateral in nature except for one trilateral meeting in November 2004 and had the common objective of price coordination.

(13)

PANASONIC and DENSO had collusive bilateral contacts concerning supplies of e-compressors with regard to a request for quotation (RFQ) of Nissan/Renault for the Nissan Leaf model and the Renault EV model. They agreed that DENSO would supply e-compressors covered by the RFQ to Renault and that PANASONIC would supply e-compressors covered by the RFQ to Nissan. E-compressors are used in electric or hybrid cars.

(14)

DENSO, CALSONIC and SANDEN had collusive bilateral contacts concerning supplies in(to) the EEA of HVAC for the third generation Suzuki Swift and, together with VALEO, for the second generation Suzuki SX4. DENSO and CALSONIC also had contacts concerning supplies of radiators and fans for the third generation Suzuki Swift. The Parties exchanged price information and considered allocating business geographically.

(15)

The duration of the participation of each party in the infringements was as follows:

Table 1

(16)

Liability for the infringements is imputed to DENSO as follows:

(17)

Liability for the infringements is imputed to VALEO as follows:

(18)

Liability for Infringement 1 is imputed to MAHLE Behr GmbH & Co. KG.

(19)

Liability for the infringements is imputed to SANDEN as follows:

(20)

Liability for Infringement 3 is imputed to Panasonic Corporation.

(21)

Liability for Infringement 4 is imputed to Calsonic Kansei Corporation.

(22)

The Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on fines (9).

(23)

In Infringement 1, the value of sales is calculated on the basis of the yearly average of sales of HVAC-units in the EEA to VW, Daimler and BMW during the infringement period.

(24)

In Infringement 2, the value of sales is calculated on the basis of the yearly average of sales of compressors in the EEA to VW and PAG during the infringement period.

(25)

In Infringement 3, the value of sales is calculated on the basis of the yearly average of sales of e-compressors to Nissan/Renault in the EEA during the period of the contract with Nissan/Renault concerned by the infringement. As Panasonic had no direct sales into the EEA, its value of sales is calculated as a percentage of Denso's sales in the EEA on the basis of Panasonic's worldwide share for the relevant e-compressor sales.

(26)

In Infringement 4, the value of sales is calculated on the basis of the sales of HVAC-units and radiators and fans to Suzuki for the models concerned by the infringement in 2008. As only Denso had relevant sales in the EEA for the car models concerned and some parties did not have any sales for the car models concerned, the value of sales of the other parties is calculated on the basis of equal shares of the value of sales of Denso in the EEA, to the extent that those other parties participated in the infringement.

(27)

Considering the nature of the infringements and their geographic scope, the percentage for the variable amount of the fines as well as the additional amount (‘entry fee’) is set at 16 % of the value of sales for the infringements.

(28)

The variable amount is multiplied by the number of years or by fractions of the year respectively of the Parties' individual participation in the infringement(s). The increase for duration is calculated on the basis of days.

(29)

There are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in this case.

(30)

A deterrence multiplier of 1,2 is applied to PANASONIC and of 1,1 to DENSO to take account of the comparatively large size of those undertakings.

(31)

None of the fines calculated exceed 10 % of the respective undertaking's total turnover in 2015/16 or in 2016, as applicable.

(32)

DENSO was the first to submit information and evidence meeting the conditions of point 8(a) of the 2006 Leniency Notice in Infringements 1, 2 and 4. DENSO is thus granted immunity from fines for Infringements 1, 2 and 4.

(33)

Moreover, DENSO was the first undertaking to meet the requirements of points 24 and 25 of the 2006 Leniency Notice as regards Infringement 3. DENSO is therefore granted a reduction of 40 % of the fine for Infringement 3.

(34)

PANASONIC was the first to submit information and evidence meeting the conditions of point 8(a) of the 2006 Leniency Notice in Infringement 3. PANASONIC is thus granted immunity from fines for Infringement 3.

(35)

VALEO was the first undertaking to meet the requirements of points 24 and 25 of the 2006 Leniency Notice as regards Infringements 1, 2 and 4. VALEO is therefore granted a reduction of the fine of 40 % for Infringement 1, of 45 % for Infringement 2 and of 50 % for Infringement 4.

(36)

VALEO was the first party to submit compelling evidence in the sense of point 25 of the 2006 Leniency Notice that enabled the Commission to include sales to a customer in Infringement 1 and sales to a customer in Infringement 2. In accordance with point 26 of the 2006 Leniency Notice, the value of sales to these customers is not taken into account when setting the fine for VALEO for Infringement 1 and Infringement 2, respectively.

(37)

BEHR was the second undertaking to meet the requirements of points 24 and 25 of the Leniency Notice as regards Infringement 1. BEHR is therefore granted a reduction of 30 % of the fine for Infringement 1.

(38)

SANDEN was the second undertaking to meet the requirements of points 24 and 25 of the 2006 Leniency Notice as regards Infringement 2 and the third undertaking to meet the requirements of points 24 and 25 of the 2006 Leniency Notice as regards Infringement 4. SANDEN is therefore granted a reduction of the fine of 25 % for Infringement 2 and of 15 % for Infringement 4.

(39)

CALSONIC was the second undertaking to meet the requirements of points 24 and 25 of the 2006 Leniency Notice as regards Infringement 4. CALSONIC is therefore granted a reduction of 30 % of the fine for Infringement 4.

(40)

As a result of the application of the Settlement Notice, the amount of the fines to be imposed on each Party was reduced by 10 %. The reduction was added to their leniency reward.

(41)

The following fines were imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:

For Infringement 1:

For Infringement 2:

For Infringement 3:

For Infringement 4:

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/25

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/26

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/50

1.

On 18 May 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which HNA Group Co., Ltd (‘HNA Group’, China) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control over CWT Limited (‘CWT’, Singapore), by way of a voluntary conditional offer.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   HNA Group: conglomerate with investments in airlines, real estate and hodings, hotels, shipping, logistics, capital management, ecological technology and leasing companies. The core focus of HNA Group is China and the Asia region, and with activities in the European Union.

—   CWT: is a corporation listed on the Mainboard of the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited that provides integrated logistics solutions and related services ancilliary to its core logistics business. The majority of its activities are in Asia Pacific. In the European Union, CWT’s activities relate mainly to logistics services and commodity marketing.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8474 — HNA/CWT, to the following address:

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/51

1.

On 18 May 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which Chrysaor Holdings Limited (‘CHL’, United Kingdom) controlled by EIG Global Energy Partners (‘EIG’, United States) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of a portfolio of Northern North Sea assets (‘Target Assets’) currently owned by the Shell Group (Netherlands) by way of a purchase of shares and assets.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   for CHL: the development and commercialisation of oil and gas incremental reserves. CHL is indirectly controlled by EIG, global investment fund specialising in energy and energy-related infrastructure.

—   for the Target Assets: the exploration of crude oil and natural gas and the development, production and sale of crude oil.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8461 — Chrysaor (Harbour Energy Group)/Target Assets, to the following address:

30.5.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 169/52

1.

On 17 May 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which SoftBank Group Corp. (SoftBank, Japan), Bharti Overseas Private Limited (Bharti, India) and Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. (Hon Hai, Taiwan) acquire, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, joint control over SB Energy Holdings Limited (SB Energy), currently solely controlled by SoftBank.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8502 — SoftBank/Bharti/Hon Hai/SB Energy, to the following address: