2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/1

Rapporteur:

Mr Petr ZAHRADNÍK

1.1.

In the EESC’s view, the EU budget can constitute an essential tool in dealing with the EU’s existing challenges and structural changes. However, there needs to be a thorough analysis and evaluation of where its funds are spent, how they are spent, how the performance of the funds thus spent is evaluated and how the results achieved are communicated  (1). If this is done, the EU budget can take on the EU’s key challenges and help to restore the European population’s faith in the EU, as well as reducing its volume in both absolute and relative terms.

1.2.

At the same time, a prerequisite for boosting the EU budget’s performance is the establishment of clearly defined priority objectives for the benefit of EU citizens, corresponding aggregated indicators and a robust reporting system with regard to the actual activities financed by the EU budget, which would maximise value for money. Some options could be, for example, ex-ante conditionalities, financial instruments, or flexibility and the capacity to cope with unexpected challenges (2). First and foremost, the quantitative aspect of the EU budget, which the EESC also considers to be so important for defining the essential priorities and their corresponding policies, must also be complemented by its qualitative dimension.

1.3.

The EESC endorses an approach that recognises that not only must EU budget expenditure comply with the rules of legality and regularity, but there must also be a targeted and systematic focus on the results and performance the budget delivers in addressing the EU’s priority areas.

1.4.

The EESC agrees that adopting performance culture rules in relation to the EU budget requires maintaining close linkage between the scope and nature of expenditure, on the one hand, and a comprehensive set of aggregate performance indicators for measuring results and performance, on the other hand.

1.5.

At the same time, the EESC takes the view that such a performance culture is not acquired in a single step, but through a process of development that presupposes both the appropriate legal environment and the selection of tools for encouraging key actors to adopt the desired behaviour. Forthcoming discussions and implementation of a performance-based EU budget must also specify in greater detail its substance.

1.6.

The EESC is convinced that a budget conceived in these terms is able to guarantee the delivery of real results and impacts in EU priority areas that bring a clearly quantifiable added value. This means that any discussion of a performance-based EU budget is also a discussion of EU political priorities capable of bringing about the necessary structural changes.

1.7.

So far, pilot tests have been carried out that measure what impact the EU budget has on how the priorities and quantified objectives of Europe 2020 are met. The EESC sees this initiative as a step in the right direction, but it needs to be taken forward in a systematic and much more comprehensive manner. Tests have revealed a high degree of inconsistency between the aims envisaged and the corresponding results, as well as numerous examples of inefficient use of EU resources and the accompanying procedural failures.

1.8.

The EESC supports further, better and closer integration and linkage — through impact analysis indicators and their interpretation — of the Europe 2020 strategy and the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework or the EU budgets for the years it covers. At the same time, the question of whether the Europe 2020 strategy does actually continue to target the EU’s real development aims in the second half of this decade needs to be examined.

1.9.

The EESC also supports a move to ensure that the partnership agreements and operational programmes can effectively convey the EU’s objectives and priorities into Member State operational objectives, in the form either of improvements in shared management or of procedural improvements in the programmes managed directly by the European Commission in the Member States.

1.10.

The EESC recommends encouraging Member States to ensure that their partnership agreements and operational programmes include a comparable set of quantifiable results that can be achieved with support from the EU budget and can be subsequently evaluated. All partnership agreements and programmes should include common result indicators on a cross-cutting/horizontal basis, clearly identifying the contribution of each fund and the ESIF as a whole, and designed so as to enable monitoring of progress at the level of the EU, the Member States and their various regions.

1.11.

The EESC views the forthcoming mid-term revision of the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework as an opportunity for greater deployment of a performance and results-oriented approach, which should then be fully evident in the shape of the multiannual financial framework starting in 2021.

1.12.

The EESC believes that the post-2020 multiannual financial framework should act, together with a new competitiveness and development strategy and the social rights pillar currently in preparation, as a crucial medium-term strategic platform (with the same time-scale as the competitiveness strategy), with the structure and weighting of individual expenditure items adjusted to real-life needs and priorities. At the same time, it should allow for greater flexibility in addressing newly emerging needs. The EESC would also welcome an amendment to the method of handling EU budgetary resources, with the aim of achieving greater effectiveness via the wider use of repayable instruments and seeking complementarity with subsidy funds. In addition, there is still significant scope for improvement in the methods of assessing the EU budget and its effectiveness. Budgetary flexibility is an essential parameter from the point of view of the EU budget’s ability to respond to new initiatives, threats and opportunities, as well as maintaining the EU’s ability to take action (examples include the migration crisis, the need to manage economic shocks or changes to the number of EU members and the resulting effect on budget flows, and an adequate resource base for solidarity funds in the event of natural disasters). This not only concerns the volume and structure of EU budget expenditure, but also the revenue side.

1.13.

The EESC recommends that identifying the corresponding EU budget revenues and their composition (finding a balanced link, based on solidarity, between Member State contributions and own budgetary resources) should also be reflected in EU budgetary policy after 2020.

1.14.

The EESC agrees with further expanding the options for an active fiscal policy, such as the possibility of issuing EU bonds. To that end, the fiscal framework and procedures of the EU budget should ideally be improved, and the issue of the scope of EU fiscal policy in Eurozone countries, on the one hand, and other EU Member States, on the other, should be satisfactorily resolved.

2.1.1.

The EU budget constitutes a major and key tool for financing the EU’s priorities, accounting for approximately 1 % of EU GDP, and amounting to EUR 145,3 billion in 2015. The EU budget plays a fairly significant role in underpinning economic policies in individual Member States, accounting for an average 1,9 % of their public expenditure, and considerably more than 10 % in some cases.

2.2.1.

Given the volume of funds involved, it is important to make sure they are allocated not only legally and regularly, but also, while respecting these rules, in such a way as to above all achieve the aims and corresponding results and to comply with the principles of sound financial management and a performance culture. Identifying the real effects of the EU budget, as measured by relevant macroeconomic indicators and benchmarks, is an issue that today features in all political thinking about EU budget policy.

2.2.2.

The EU budget and how it is used should adhere to the following priorities:

2.2.3.

The EU budget includes some new elements related to the working of the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework which are relevant from the perspective of a more performance-based and results-driven approach:

2.2.4.

The aim here is for the EU to ensure that its fiscal policy and the practical operation of its budget are better aligned with its needs by establishing a more meaningful balance between the formal and procedural sides of EU budget expenditure, on the one hand, and performance-based and results-driven approaches, on the other hand. A common perception and a common understanding of this concept are also extremely necessary with regard to performance and results.

2.2.5.

Non-compliance with formal rules has long been measured by the error rate indicator. This hovers around the 4 % level (i.e. about 4 % of the EU budget is not spent in accordance with the formal rules; while this is not a bad result, it nevertheless amounts to around EUR 6 billion in absolute terms). The table below tracks the overall error rate in recent years:

2.2.6.

The key principle for the EU budget is the soundness of financial flows and the actual programmes and projects funded by them, which makes it possible to gauge whether optimal use is being made of every aspect of EU resources. The EESC agrees with the current trend towards greater emphasis on performance and results, as demonstrated by the work of the European Commission (Budget Focused on Results Initiative (4)) and the European Court of Auditors (the structure of its annual report for 2014 (5) and the special chapter on performance; the passages on shared management include the initial results of the performance evaluation programme carried out as a pilot exercise).

2.2.7.

The EESC supports the approach adopted during the pilot test, which is aimed at analysing the relationship and interconnection between the 2020 strategy and partnership agreements (or operational programmes), since these are key tools for implementing EU cohesion policy, itself an important component of EU budget expenditure. This test can be regarded as the germ of a comprehensive approach to evaluating the performance and results of the EU budget (6).

2.2.8.

It is vital to have a process for handling, managing and sharing data and information between bodies and institutions of the EU (mainly the European Commission) and Member States if we are to achieve a rounded monitoring of the formal and performance-related characteristics of the EU budget. The process of EU budget expenditure generates huge amounts of data and information, but this is little used in practice to ensure an objective evaluation of both the error rate and, in particular, the actual results achieved by the EU budget, and establishing procedures to improve the situation.

3.1.

The EESC takes the view that the main purpose of the EU budget is to benefit the people of the EU while protecting the financial interests of the EU itself; the benefits take the form of support provided in line with development and operational priorities and which is compatible with the economic policy framework and actual and expected economic performance; protecting the EU’s financial interests means using its budget appropriately in accordance with the rules and without errors or fraud. The current policy approach should help to achieve full compliance and a balance between these factors.

3.2.

The EESC believes that the switch to a performance-driven EU budget cannot be achieved in one go. It is crucial that the basic legal standards and objectives of the EU budget are designed with the intention of respecting quality indicators and achieving measurable results.

3.3.

A performance-driven EU budget would also be helped considerably if the budget period (the current seven-year financial framework) and that of the EU’s key development strategy (the current ten-year Europe 2020 strategy) could be made to coincide. From this perspective, 2021 will offer a unique opportunity to actually achieve this and create the conditions for optimal operation of a performance-based and results-driven EU budget.

3.4.

The EESC notes and respects the findings of the European Court of Auditors’ annual report for 2014, which revealed a number of problem areas where the link between the Europe 2020 strategy and partnership agreements or operational programmes does not work as well as it might. This report states that the various tools are not designed in a way that would enable the policy objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy to be systematically translated into practical operational objectives (defined by partnership agreements and operational programmes) (7).

3.5.

The EESC takes the view that the potential benefits of achieving synergies between the five European structural and investment funds (ESIF) under one regulatory and management framework and the partnership agreement in each Member State have so far not materialised, while the practice of different rules applying to individual funds continues. This leads to the fragmentation of programming (rather than the necessary achievement of synergies between them).

3.6.

In the EESC’s view, considerable scope for improving the performance-based and results-driven approach is offered by the existence of two new elements in the use of EU funds in the 2014-2020 period, namely conditionalities and performance reserves. It is precisely the application of macroeconomic conditionalities that should ensure that EU budget expenditure is allocated in Member States in an adequately sound macroeconomic environment, so that those that do not make efforts to remedy their macroeconomic problems are unable to make full use of these funds. The existence of the performance reserve should also adequately motivate Member States to work towards fulfilling the EU’s strategic objectives, supported by the EU budget.

3.7.

The EESC believes that the pilot to test the performance-based and results-driven EU budget through links to the Europe 2020 strategy priorities should go further by adding other relevant areas to make the evaluation of such a budget truly coherent and comprehensive — attention should be paid, for instance, to the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) and their consistency with indicators based on the implementation of the European semester.

3.8.

When considering the way that the EU budget operates, the EESC recommends that consideration be given to the notion of market failure, the eradication of which should be a target for EU budgetary resources; signs of market imperfections or failures can include, for example, information asymmetry or financial institutions making a commercial evaluation of return on investment that discourages financing for certain types of projects because it ignores positive externalities and wider social benefits since these are not relevant to the commercial case in question, though they are important in terms of the support given under EU funding.

3.9.

The EESC agrees with the need for fundamental improvements in the areas of shared management between EU bodies and institutions (mainly the European Commission) and Member States. 76 % of all EU budget expenditure is allocated via shared management. The more Member States meet the quantified objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, the more the EU budget will be linked to the strategy’s objectives and the better these objectives reflect the real economic, social, territorial and environmental needs of the EU, the more favourable will be the sound financial management environment we create for a seamless connection between the European Commission and the Member States.

3.10.

The EESC believes that a significant indication of the increasing importance of a performance-based and results-driven EU budget is the emphasis on greater use of financial engineering instruments (FEI) — i.e. innovative financial instruments whose very essence fundamentally alters the way public resources are used in the EU and what is expected of them. Despite the undoubted potential of FEIs, only about 65 % of these funds reached final beneficiaries over the 2007-2013 period (the remaining funds were only ‘parked’ in FEIs so their use could be formally documented). The importance of this issue will increase still further after 2020, not least in connection with the need for greater complementarity with the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). This is a key strategic consideration with regard to the focus on joint EU budgetary funds from 2021 onwards.

3.11.

At the same time, the EESC feels that a sharper focus on performance and results does not mean paying less attention to the legality and regularity of procedures. The importance of compliance with legal and procedural rules must not be sidelined. Given that there is a rate of error in all cases where funds should not have been released because they were not used in accordance with the rules, it is somehow automatically assumed that these rules are correct and free from internal inconsistencies or undesirable elements. This is one reason why a procedure that obeys the rules of sound financial management should include a verification of the impact of these regulations in order to test their compatibility and consistency with EU needs and objectives (8).

3.12.

The EESC agrees that the practical procedures involved in EU budget expenditure are highly complex. The efforts currently being made to simplify all activities associated with the EU budget, which apply both to procedural matters and to matters of substance, also help to satisfy the requirement of sound financial management; these simplification efforts should bring about a reduction in the excessive administrative burden and limit the practice of gold-plating in individual Member States.

3.13.

The EESC believes that the proposals referred to in section 1 of this opinion, leading to final conclusions and recommendations (section 1), are key elements of the considerations regarding the EU’s future budgetary policy. They can be partially applied in relation to the mid-term revision process of the 2014-2020 multiannual financial plan, but will only be fully reflected in the budgetary rules from 2021 onwards. The conceptual framework for forward planning and reform needs in relation to the budget and multiannual financial framework after 2020 can draw on — or build on — recent EESC opinions (9).

2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/8

Rapporteur:

José Antonio MORENO DÍAZ

Co-rapporteur:

Ákos TOPOLÁNSZKY

1.1.

The European Union is not only a common market; it is a union of common values, as stated in Article 2 of the Treaty. Furthermore, it recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. These values on which the European Union is founded form the basis of integration and are part of the European identity. As well as being criteria for accession, they must be respected in practice by the Member States, thereafter. It is therefore essential that the Treaty procedures be applied when these values come under attack. The EESC considers that the European institutions should take a proactive and preventive approach in their political activities, in order to anticipate and avoid problems.

1.2.

Like many European civil society organisations, the EESC is alarmed by the deterioration in human rights, the populist and authoritarian drift that is spreading and by the risk this poses to the quality of democracy and the protection of fundamental rights, rights that are guaranteed by both the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union and constitute general principles of EU law (1).

1.3.

The values referred to above are coming under attack all across Europe. Many civil society organisations are condemning the situation in several Member States and are hoping that the EESC will adopt new initiatives so that the EU institutions respond decisively. Not only is the European Union in danger but also citizens’ confidence in national and European democratic institutions. The EESC considers the risk to be very serious and systemic in nature.

1.4.

The specific content of the principles and standards that derive from the rule of law may vary at national level, depending on each Member State’s constitutional system. However, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, as well as documents drawn up by the Council of Europe, in particular the Venice Commission, set out these principles and EU values. These principles include legality, which implies a transparent, responsible, democratic and pluralistic legislative process; the prohibition of arbitrariness on the part of the executive powers; independent and impartial courts; effective judicial review, including respect for fundamental rights; equality before the law; and the protection of human rights, including those of persons belonging to minorities.

1.5.

Both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights have confirmed that these principles are not purely formal and procedural requirements, but instead constitute the means to ensure compliance with and respect for democracy and human rights. The rule of law is a constitutional principle with both procedural and substantive components.

1.6.

Respect for the rule of law is intrinsically linked to respect for democracy and fundamental rights: there can be no democracy and protection of fundamental rights without respect for the rule of law, and vice versa: fundamental rights are only effective if they are justiciable. Democracy is protected through the fundamental role of the judiciary, including the constitutional courts. It is worth adding that these are the rights of people, not of Member States or governments. Urgent priority should therefore be given to defending them.

1.7.

In light of the work of the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs and taking into account the Commission reports and the European Parliament’s resolution of 27 February 2014 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union, the EESC believes that — in due course — Article 51 (2) of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights should be amended so as to extend its scope and make sure all provisions of the Charter are applicable in the Member States (3).

1.8.

There is regular dialogue between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights; such dialogue could be reinforced if the EU signs up to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The EESC proposes that the Commission submit, in the first half of 2017, a proposal for the EU to sign up to this convention, which is specified in Article 6(2) of the Treaty.

1.9.

The obligations incumbent on candidate countries under the Copenhagen criteria must continue to apply in the Member States after joining the EU by virtue of Article 2 of the Treaty and as such the EESC believes that all Member States should be assessed on a regular basis, in order to verify their continued compliance with the EU’s fundamental values and to avoid the mutual trust breaking down.

1.10.

The EESC believes that the EU institutions must strengthen the procedures and mechanisms to protect and defend democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in all Member States. In recent years and especially before 2014, we have noted with concern that the Commission, despite having launched infringement procedures in some cases, has failed to carry out its role as guardian of the Treaties effectively and has been unable to provide an adequate response to violations of the European principles and values that have occurred in several Member States.

1.11.

The EESC encourages the Commission to take an active approach in protecting and defending the EU’s values and principles, as set out in Article 2 TEU, in all Member States and use the existing 2014 framework to the fullest extent.

1.12.

The EESC proposes the adoption of a shared approach by the three main EU institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament). Dialogue and cooperation between the institutions are essential for such an important issue. The EESC recommends that the Council supports the existing Commission framework by adopting a Council decision reinforcing the framework and supporting further strengthening of the rule of law.

1.13.

Civil society organisations play a key role in the promotion of democratic values, in the proper functioning of the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights. Given the shrinking democratic space and constraints NGOs face in the Member States, the positive grass-roots role played by NGOs is admirable. The Committee is working very actively with the social partners and NGOs on the protection of fundamental rights and the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants.

1.14.

The EESC, as a body representing European organised civil society, wishes to open a dialogue with the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, in order to improve governance and strengthen policy coordination between the EU institutions and the Member States, and to put in place an early warning system.

1.15.

The EESC considers it vital to create a legally binding European mechanism, a framework actively involving the Commission, the Parliament and the Council and in which the EESC plays an important role representing civil society. This mechanism will complement the Commission’s framework and the intergovernmental dialogue launched by the Council. This mechanism could be called the ‘new Copenhagen mechanism’ (4) and would be subject to democratic and judicial oversight (5).

That mechanism should, among other things, examine aspects such as legality, the hierarchy of norms, legal certainty, equality, non-discrimination, free access to justice and due process, prevention of abuse of the law and arbitrariness on the part of public authorities, separation of powers, respect and protection for political pluralism, minorities and social and sexual diversity, etc., respect for freedom of expression and of the press, with a view to identifying current shortcomings and calling for them to be remedied.

1.16.

The Committee wishes the draft report being debated by the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament to be adopted and an interinstitutional agreement to be reached on the implementation of European Union Pact on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. In general, the EESC supports the proposal as it contains the basis for the implementation of an interinstitutional agreement that is legally binding and that strengthens European governance and policy coordination between the EU institutions and the Member States. The EESC should be included in this pact, enabling a civil society debate at the EESC and the EESC should have a role in the proposed DRF semester.

1.17.

The mechanism should be based on indicators that are themselves based on quantitative and qualitative data:

1.18.

The Committee stresses the importance of Titles I, II, III and IV of the Charter for drawing up indicators, taking into account that fundamental economic, social and cultural rights are ‘indivisible’ from civil and political rights.

1.19.

It is important that both Member States and the institutions, bodies and agencies of the EU respect fundamental rights, including social rights, especially in times of crisis. This should also apply to relations and agreements with third countries, not only in terms of complying with these rights but also ensuring that they are enforced.

1.20.

The mechanism requires the launch of a monitoring and evaluation system using transparent procedures. The FRA should explicitly be given the mandate to assist such a mechanism. The EESC supports the Parliament’s proposal to create a group of independent experts (6) chaired by the Scientific Committee of the FRA.

1.21.

The Committee proposes that it form part of this group. It also proposes that the experts appointed by the respective governments are the ombudsmen of each Member State.

1.22.

On the basis of the indicators and using transparent procedures, the group of experts will review and assess the situation in each Member State. Here, the EESC can contribute by organising missions to the Member States to review the situation in cooperation with local civil society and draw up reports.

1.23.

The EESC supports the implementation of the DRF semester. Based on the experts’ reports, each year the Commission will draw up country-specific reports, including recommendations; the Parliament will hold an interparliamentary debate and will draw up a resolution; the Council will hold the annual dialogue and will adopt conclusions. The mechanism must function in the context of a new annual policy cycle with the aim of ensuring a common and coherent approach in the EU.

1.24.

The Committee would like to participate in the preparation of the interinstitutional agreement, and might consider setting up a permanent group to organise hearings with civil society and draft opinions and reports in this regard.

1.25.

As part of the DRF semester, in cooperation with civil society organisations it could organise an annual forum to review the situation of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, and could draw up proposals and recommendations to be forwarded to the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. The Committee could also cooperate with the other institutions in the drafting of impact assessments.

2.1.

The last few years have highlighted the lack of appropriate mechanisms to protect the values set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which states that ‘the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’.

2.2.

The Union is founded on these values, which include respect for democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. The EU has the opportunity to verify compliance with these values in the run-up to the State’s accession to the EU under what are known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ or ‘accession criteria’ (7). Membership requires that the applicant country ensures the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities.

2.3.

However, there is no similar mechanism applicable after Member States’ accession. The lack of a mechanism for monitoring democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights has been referred to as the ‘Copenhagen dilemma’.

2.4.

The proper functioning of the EU is based on ‘mutual trust’ between the European institutions and Member States, as well as between the Member States themselves; trust that the laws and policy decisions adopted respect the same principles in respect of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. This creates a level playing-field between Member States in respect of the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. It also allows governments to cooperate in matters of justice and home affairs, including criminal law, asylum and immigration.

2.5.

The European Union was created to ensure peace and prosperity across its Member States and improve the wellbeing of its peoples; it depends not only on the existence of free trade but also on the protection of the EU’s fundamental values. These fundamental values ensure that EU citizens can live free from oppression and intolerance with democratically elected and responsible governments that act in accordance with the rule of law.

2.6.

In recent years, political and legislative decisions taken in various Member States have given rise to debates and disputes with the European institutions and with other Member States and the ‘mutual trust’ has been broken. In many cases, due regard has not been shown for the rules of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, and the European Union has not been able to provide an adequate response.

2.7.

The EESC notes with great alarm that in various Member States legislation is being adopted and policies implemented that suggest a serious deterioration in the quality of democracy: violation of human rights, especially those of minorities; lack of independence of the judiciary and constitutional courts; restrictions on the separation of powers; limitations on the freedom of the press, freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly, limitations on freedom of association, freedom of information, collective consultation and bargaining, and limitations on other fundamental civil and social rights. On several occasions, the European Union has been confronted by crises in some Member States due to specific issues relating to the rule of law, and the Commission has dealt with these events by exerting political pressure and opening infringement procedures.

2.8.

To date, no use has been made of the preventive and penalty-based mechanisms contained in Article 7 TEU, which is the only article in the Treaties for dealing with breaches of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in areas outside EU legislative competence. There are two approaches, one preventive and one penalty-based. However, in practice these have never been used due to the political impact and the strict requirements governing their implementation: only in case of a ‘clear risk’ of a ‘serious and persistent breach’.

2.9.

The Commission and the Parliament can intervene in the preventive phase. In the second stage, the Council may sanction the Member State by suspending certain rights, including the voting rights of its representatives in the Council.

2.10.

However, the Council enjoys a wide margin of discretion in applying this as it does not have specific and transparent criteria for activating the procedure, for the indicators it will use or what the evaluation procedures will be. The European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have a very limited mandate in these situations (8); similarly there is no provision made for consulting the EESC.

3.1.

The European Commission adopted a Communication on ‘A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ (COM(2014) 158) in March 2014. The framework will be activated in cases where Member States are taking measures or are tolerating situations which are systematic and are likely to adversely affect the integrity, stability or the proper functioning of the institutions and the safeguard mechanisms established at national level to secure the rule of law. This would include issues relating to their constitutional structures, the separation of powers, the independence or impartiality of the judiciary, or their system of judicial control, including constitutional justice.

3.2.

The Commission’s framework aims to address threats to the rule of law in Member States before the conditions for activating the mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU would be met. It is the responsibility of the Commission and is designed to bridge a gap. It is not an alternative to but a mechanism that precedes and complements the Article 7 mechanisms. In cases where there is clear evidence of the existence of a systemic threat to the rule of law in a Member State, this framework would facilitate a structured dialogue between the European Commission and the Member State. The process of the exchange would entail three main stages: a Commission opinion, a Commission recommendation and a follow-up to the recommendation. The Commission may consult experts when carrying out its evaluation (9).

3.3.

The Committee welcomes the Framework to strengthen the rule of law adopted by the European Commission. However, this framework presents a set of limitations.

3.3.1.

The evaluation does not provide for periodical comparative analyses of the problems and disputes produced by the Member States in relation to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. By definition, the framework can only be activated when the problem has become ‘systemic’, which is a high threshold. A ‘systemic’ threat can occur when the judiciary is no longer able to make sure that the government acts within the limits of the law, which is already rather late in the game.

3.3.2.

The way in which the Commission analyses the information must be transparent with specific indicators or objective procedures; it must also establish protocols for consulting civil society and the EESC.

3.3.3.

The framework does not include any specific role for the European Parliament although the parliament is launching its own political initiatives in this regard.

3.3.4.

Nor does it provide for any model for closer interinstitutional cooperation.

3.4.

The EESC is concerned about the lack of follow-up in the Council to the framework to strengthen the rule of law.

3.4.1.

At its meeting of 16 December 2014, the General Affairs Council adopted Conclusions on the role of the Council in ensuring respect for the rule of law. The Council undertook to establish an annual dialogue between Member States, to take place in the General Affairs Council, and to be prepared by Coreper. The Luxembourg Presidency launched this dialogue in November 2015, and it is intended to cover various specific topics which have not been made public: governments were asked to speak on any aspect of the rule of law that they wanted and to give one example of where they were doing well and one example of a challenge. The result was a series of monologues, rather than a dialogue. States did not engage with each other by providing support, help or criticism, no recommendations were issued or received and there was no commitment to take follow up steps to improve on the challenges identified. At the end of 2016, under the Slovak Presidency, the Council will carry out an evaluation of the experience.

3.4.2.

The Council’s Conclusions did not take into account or refer to the Commission’s rule of law framework. The Conclusions do not provide a clear picture of the precise role that the Commission, the Parliament and the EESC will play in this dialogue.

3.5.

The Juncker Commission has identified the rule of law as one of its priorities and has appointed Mr Timmermans vice-president responsible for the rule of law and fundamental rights. It is not known, however, whether the Commission will develop criteria and indicators for implementing the rule of law framework.

3.6.

The Commission has, for the first time, activated this framework by opening a procedure in the case of Poland for infringing EU rules, taking into consideration a critical evaluation of the situation by the Venice Commission, a body of the Council of Europe (10).

3.7.

The LIBE Committee of the European Parliament is currently debating a draft own-initiative report (11) on ‘Recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights’ (2015/2254 (INL) — Rapporteur: Sophia in ‘t Veld), which among other issues ‘requests the Commission to submit, by the end of 2016, on the basis of Article 295 TFEU, a proposal for the conclusion of an EU Pact for Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (DRF) in the form of an interinstitutional agreement laying down arrangements facilitating the cooperation of institutions of the Union and its Member States in the framework of Article 7 TEU, integrating, aligning and complementing existing mechanisms, following the detailed recommendations set out in the Annex thereto’.

3.7.1.

The annex contains the DRAFT INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT: EUROPEAN UNION PACT ON DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS which must be agreed between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission.

3.7.2.

The pact includes a scoreboard, an annual interparliamentary debate, and arrangements for remedying possible risks and breaches and for the activation of the preventative or corrective arms of Article 7.

3.7.3.

The Parliament proposes launching an interinstitutional democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights (DRF) semester, to include the Commission framework, the Council’s annual dialogue and the interparliamentary debate. The European semester shall be assisted by a secretariat and a group of experts, chaired by the chairperson of the Scientific Committee of the FRA, who will to draw up indicators and assess the situation in the Member States and the recommendations.

3.7.4.

The DRF policy cycle will include the annual reports of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, and an interinstitutional working group on impact assessments will be set up.

2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/15

Rapporteur:

Ioannis VARDAKASTANIS

1.1.

The ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) by the European Union is a landmark for disability rights, for the EU and its Member States. The review of the EU, by the UN CRPD Committee in 2015, concludes the first period of implementation of the CRPD. The UN CRPD committee’s concluding observations (COs) requires the EU institutions to meet their obligations since they should organise and coordinate the implementation of the UN CRPD according to the COs. The COs have reconfirmed that the EU policy making on the ground of disability requires a profound transformation in the way policies have been made up to now. So far, the EU has not really undertaken a real adaptation of its policy making to this new transformation required by the UN CRPD.

1.2.

The EESC calls on the EU institutions to mainstream the COs into existing and future EU law and policy making. It also asks the European Commission (EC) to report to the UN CRPD Committee by autumn 2016.

1.3.

The EESC considers the UN CRPD and the committee’s COs to be a unique opportunity for the EC to present an EU overarching strategy on the rights of persons with disabilities (PWDs). The COs have created momentum that should be capitalised by the EU institutions, and which should lead to disability rights being included systematically in all EU legislation, policies and programmes.

1.4.

The EESC underlines that in order to mainstream disability rights, the EC needs to undertake a cross-cutting and comprehensive mapping exercise across all its law, policies and programmes to ensure full harmonisation with the UN CRPD provisions and actively involve representative organisations of PWDs (DPOs) in this process. This mapping exercise should be accompanied by a gap analysis assessing the gaps among the current law, policy making and disability rights mainstreaming and the UN CRDP. The mapping exercise and gap analysis should be explicitly included in the revised European Disability Strategy (EDS).

1.5.

The EESC reminds the EC of its obligation to proceed immediately with the revision and update of the Declaration of Competences and its list of instruments. It should also introduce a self-commitment to review and revise the Declaration of Competences at least once during its term of office.

1.6.

The EESC acknowledges that the review of the EU by the CRPD Committee took place in the middle of the 2014-2020 programming period, and recognises the difficulties in mainstreaming the new disability rights agenda arising from the COs for the EU in the mid-term reviews of strategies, policies, programmes and funding instruments. However, it recommends that the EC make the utmost efforts to mainstream and include the COs in these review processes and allocate the necessary resources for the implementation of their obligations under the UN CRPD.

1.7.

The UN CRPD provides explicitly that the representative DPOs must be consulted and involved in the process of the Convention’s implementation and monitoring. The EESC calls on the EC to carry out a genuine and meaningful structured dialogue with the European Disability Movement (under Articles 4.3 and 33.3). In addition, the EC should establish a capacity building programme for DPOs to empower them to fulfil their fundamental duties.

1.8.

The EESC considers that the cooperation and partnership of the EU institutions in the implementation of the UN CRPD is of utmost importance. Therefore, it recommends that an interinstitutional coordination mechanism should be put in place to facilitate the swift and smooth implementation of the COs and UN CRPD, including DPOs’ consultation and involvement.

1.9.

The COs require the EDS to be profoundly reviewed and revised. Therefore, the EESC asks the EC to take stock of developments in disability rights and broaden the scope of the EDS by introducing more areas of action and linking it to the review and revision of policies, programmes and funding instruments (e.g. Europe 2020, the Gender Equality Strategy, the Children Rights Strategy, EU external action commitments) with a clear implementation timeframe, budget and specific and precise benchmarks and indicators.

1.10.

The EU has committed itself to implement fully the Sustainable Development Goals that are set out in the UN 2030 Agenda and needs to ensure that the COs and the UN CRPD provisions are fully taken into account by the EU, both internally and externally. Therefore, the EESC strongly recommends that the EC should include the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in the revised EDS by establishing European targets and actions in order to achieve all SDGs inside the EU also for PWDs.

1.11.

The EESC strongly believes that the EU should prevent EU funding from being uses for either the creation or the continuity of operation of institutionalisation structures. The EESC fully supports the use of EU funding to create community based services for PWDs in order for them to live independently in their communities. Institutionalisation of PWDs is a violation of their rights and the EESC urges the EC to promote deinstitutionalisation more systematically and effectively through specific policies, programmes and funding instruments.

1.12.

The EESC calls on the EC to proceed immediately with the ratification of the optional protocol to the UN CRPD, the Marrakesh Treaty and the Istanbul Convention of the Council of Europe.

1.13.

The EESC strongly proposes to the EC to establish focal points in all EC DGs, agencies and bodies, fully including and involving DPOs in the policy making process, in order to create horizontal and vertical structures that promote the full inclusion and mainstreaming of disability rights in EU law, policies and programmes.

1.14.

The EESC believes that the EC should initiate the process in cooperation with other EU institutions, agencies and bodies to carefully prepare and develop the new 2020-2030 Global Disability Rights Agenda, which should be fully integrated and mainstreamed in the global social and macroeconomic strategies (e.g. the Europe 2020 and its implementing mechanisms), and recommends that a working group should be set up with the participation of all stakeholders and DPOs to carry out and implement this initiative. The EESC proposes that the EC should start the implementation of the 2020-2030 Global Disability Rights Agenda with the European Year of Disability Rights 2021.

1.15.

The EESC acknowledges the EC’s positive initiatives in the field of accessibility, particularly the trilogue agreement on the Directive on the accessibility of public sectors bodies’ websites and the EC’s proposal on the European Accessibility Act (EAA), and urges the EU institutions to conclude negotiations. However, the EESC is concerned about the horizontal equal treatment directive and calls for the negotiations to be unblocked and for the COs and the UN CRPD to be taken into account in this new phase.

1.16.

The EESC calls on all EU institutions to ensure that austerity measures do not affect the capacity of persons with disabilities to exercise their rights as enshrined in the CRPD, and therefore asks the EC to create the necessary social protection floors to achieve this goal and respect their right to an adequate standard of living and social protection as well.

1.17.

The EESC asks the EC and Eurostat to develop statistical tools to measure the impact of the implementation of the UN CRPD on PWDs, at European and national level. It also considers that the collection of data based on a human rights approach to disability and disaggregated by disability, age and gender will have a positive influence on the development and implementation of EU law, policies and programmes.

1.18.

The EESC acknowledges that the EU has competences to accompany national measures to ensure that all EU citizens are equal before the law, that not only are they not deprived of their legal capacity and rights but they are also able to take part in the European elections and all elections throughout the EU on an equal basis with others. Therefore, it calls on the EC and specifically on DG Justice to adopt a programme based on the Open Method of Coordination to facilitate the Member States’ convergence towards the principle of equal recognition before the law.

1.19.

The EESC engages itself to lead by example in the implementation of the specific obligations, highlighted by the UNCRPD Committee, to be fulfilled by the EU as a Public administration by ensuring that its human resources, EESC members’ rights and communication facilities are in compliance with the UN CRPD.

2.1.

The EESC welcomes the COs issued by the UN CRPD (1) Committee, as they provide a comprehensive programme for the EU to shift its policy making towards a people-centred and human rights based approach to disability.

2.2.

The EESC recalls that the draft proposal for an Equal Treatment Directive was submitted by the EC before the conclusion of the UN CPRD. Moreover, the negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU have progressively introduced amendments that are not in compliance with the UN CRPD obligations. Therefore, the EESC asks the EC to introduce, in the current interinstitutional negotiations, a proposal to adapt the draft proposed directive to comply with the UN CRPD and of course with the COs on the ground of disability, and include the prohibition of multiple and intersectional discrimination, and discrimination by association.

2.3.

The EESC underlines that the austerity measures have had a negative impact on the living conditions of PWDs and their families. The levels of poverty, exclusion, discrimination and inequalities have been increased as a result of the economic crisis, which has become in many Member States a human rights crisis, leaving a large number of PWDs and their families completely unprotected. Therefore, the EESC calls on the EU to establish minimum social protection floors in order to protect the rights of PWDs and their adequate standard of living and social protection. This mechanism should be included in the European Semester process.

2.4.

Furthermore, the UN CRPD Committee has recommended that the EU should create an overarching UN CRPD strategy applicable to all EU institutions with specific budget allocations integrated in the Multiannual Financial Framework. The EESC therefore considers that a high-level meeting of the leaders of EU institutions and bodies is needed to initiate the process of preparing and adopting an interinstitutional UN CRPD agenda with specific goals to be achieved and targets to be met. The overarching strategy should identity responsibilities for each EU institution for CRPD implementation.

2.5.

There is a need for the EU to set up a genuine and meaningful structured dialogue with European representative organisations of PWDs (DPOs), ensuring both their capacity to effectively and meaningfully participate in EU law and policy making and also to proactively carry out their advocacy CRPD campaigns. Moreover, the EU needs to ensure that the DPOs have the financial capacity to support their work. Therefore, a budget line for DPOs’ capacity building needs to be specifically established.

2.6.

Overarching and transversal mainstreaming and implementation of the UN CRPD provisions by the EU and the development of a new EU CRPD agenda requires the creation of a participatory governance and partnership framework through which all main actors and stakeholders will be able to take part fully in policy making, together with the EU institutions, in an inclusive manner.

2.7.

The European Commission should immediately and urgently undertake a mapping exercise and a gap analysis of all EU internal and external policies and programmes, ensuring that they comply with the CRPD provisions. In addition, all EU global strategies and policies need to comply with the COs, including the 2020 Strategy and the European Semester, European Pillar of Social Rights, the UN 2030 Agenda and funding instruments such as the ESIF.

2.8.

It is of paramount importance that the implementation of the COs by the EU should be addressed at the highest political level. More specifically, the EC should include in its 2017 work programme a policy initiative specifically dedicated to this purpose. The full mainstreaming and integration of the COs in the EU policies and programmes requires that the EC draw up an overarching CRPD strategy. The EESC calls on the European Commission to initiate the process to achieve the overarching CRPD strategy as a matter of urgency with the full consultation and involvement of DPOs.

2.9.

2021 will be the 10th anniversary of the conclusion of the UN CRPD by the EU. The EESC considers that this will be an appropriate year to be the second European Year of PWDs. The EESC notes that the first European Year of PWDs was organised by the EC in 2003. Therefore, the EESC proposes that the EU institutions begin preparing immediately and take the necessary steps to declare 2021 the second European Year of Disability Rights.

3.1.1.

Although the EU has ratified the UN CRPD, the EU has still not undertaken a cross-cutting and comprehensive review of EU legislation, policies and programmes. The EESC calls on the EC to carry out this review urgently. In addition, the EC should appoint a UN CRPD focal point in each Directorate-General, mandating to carry out this task.

3.1.2.

It is regrettable that the EU has not ratified yet the Optional Protocol to the Convention. Therefore, the EESC calls on the EU to proceed without any further delay with the ratification of the optional protocol, paving the way for PWDs to make a complaint to the UN CRPD Committee in case of violation of their rights as enshrined in the Convention.

3.1.3.

The human rights’ approach to disability should be fully embraced and integrated in EU law and policy making. The EESC calls on the EU institutions’ legal service to carry out a comprehensive study on the implications for the EU legal system of the ratification of the UN CRPD in order to place it as an adequate framework of law and policy making. The EU legal services are not taking sufficient account of EU obligations towards the UN CRPD.

3.1.4.

The EESC calls on the EC Secretary-General to review the impact assessment guidelines and modify them to include a more comprehensive list of issues and questions in order to better assess compliance with the Convention.

3.1.5.

The UN CRPD Committee has asked the EU to submit a review of the Declaration of Competences and its list of instruments by autumn 2016 taking into account the comprehensive view established in the Concluding Observation 17. The revision of the aforementioned declaration should take place at least once per term of office.

3.2.1.

The EC has not put in place an EU non-discrimination and equality strategy for PWDs which complies with the UN CRPD provisions and the COs, therefore the EESC calls on the EC to take immediate action regarding the horizontal equal treatment directive (see point 2.2) and also proceed to a review of the employment equal treatment directive 2000/78/EC.

3.2.2.

The EC should include the perspective of women and girls with disabilities in its gender equality policy, including the data collection efforts of the European Gender Equality Institute. Moreover, the EC’s strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019 and its legislative and policy work on work-life balance should fully integrate the rights of women and girl with disabilities. The EESC calls on the EU to swiftly ratify the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention.

3.2.3.

The EU should include and integrate in the renewed EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child a comprehensive rights-based strategy for boys and girls with disabilities, and mainstream the rights of children with disabilities in all EU disability policy. Children with disabilities and their families should also be involved in all EU decision-making in compliance with Article 4.3 of the UN CRPD.

3.2.4.

The EU should also recognise the specific situation of young people with disabilities and the fact that they often face multiple forms of discrimination in their daily lives, specifically regarding equal opportunities for young people in the labour market and active participation by young people with disabilities in society at large. The EU should therefore assess the specific situation of young people with disabilities living in the EU and suggest relevant improvements (2). Furthermore, the EU should make sure that this perspective is included in the next EU Youth Strategy.

3.2.5.

The EU should organise and carry out a comprehensive campaign to raise awareness about the Convention in cooperation with public media (including social media) in order to combat prejudice against PWDs. It is of paramount importance that PWDs themselves participate, through their representative organisations, in this campaign.

3.2.6.

The EU should promote, facilitate and finance the training for transport and tourism staff in awareness and disability equality, and encourage the collaboration and the exchange of good practice among the European organisations working in the disability field and public and private bodies responsible for transport. All materials related to capacity-building, training, awareness-raising and public statements, among others, should be made available in accessible formats.

3.2.7.

The EESC welcomes the EC’s proposal for the European Accessibility Act (EAA), which needs to comply fully with Article 9 and other provisions of the UN CRPD, together with effective and accessible national enforcement and complaint mechanisms. It calls on the EU institutions to take on board the conclusions and recommendations of the EESC opinion (3) on the EAA and ensure the participation of PWDs, through their representative organisations, in the adoption process.

3.2.8.

The EESC welcomes the interinstitutional agreement in the trilogue on the proposal for a directive on the accessibility of public sector bodies’ websites and urges the institutions to convert this into a decision and the national governments to transpose the provisions of the proposal as a matter of urgency. The EESC is also welcomes that a substantial number of recommendations adopted in its opinion (4) have been incorporated in the final text of the Directive.

3.2.9.

The EU has not yet substantially included sufficient measures for PWDs in the disaster risk reduction strategies. Therefore, the EESC calls for a framework for disaster risk reduction for PWDs in Europe to be adopted by the Council of the EU.

3.2.10.

The EU should put in place all the necessary measures to make the 112 emergency number accessible to all. The EESC highlights the need that equally appropriate measures guaranteeing accessibility at national emergency points should be urgently taken.

3.2.11.

The EESC calls on the EU and its Member States to adopt a human rights approach to migration and refugee policies, as regards PWDs. In addition, the EESC underlines that disability can quite often be a reason for persecution and discrimination in some countries and therefore it calls on the EU authorities to develop guidelines and carry out information campaigns (accessible to PWDs) for its agencies and Member States on disability, migration and asylum and systematically mainstream disability in EU migration and refugee policies.

3.2.12.

The EU should embrace a human-rights-based approach to disability in situations of risk and emergency, by adopting an implementation plan in line with the Council’s conclusions of February 2015 on disability-inclusive disaster management and the Sendai Framework. In addition, there is a need for the raising of awareness and the provision of information to PWDs and officials of emergency and civil protection services on disaster-risk reduction initiatives.

3.2.13.

The EC should play a leading role in the area of justice and human rights of PWDs. The EESC calls for a European conference to be held by DG Justice, targeting all justice services in the EU, including a reflection on the rights to accessing justice of PWDs and the way these rights are connected with other rights, such as legal capacity and equal recognition before the law.

3.2.14.

The EC should provide the necessary funding for training the EU and national justice officials in EU legislation and UN CRPD. In addition, the EESC urges the EU and national courts to apply their internal rules and instructions in a way that facilitate access to justice for PWDs. The General Recommendations of the UN CRPD Committee should also be taken into account in the administration of justice at both EU and national level. Moreover, the EESC recommends that the DG Justice should utilise the Open Method of Coordination in order to achieve a balanced and coordinated approach by the Member States to this very important issue, thus paving the way for a European response to equal recognition before the law. The EC should create European standards and promote benchmarking in access to justice.

3.2.15.

The EESC calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to abolish discriminatory guardianship laws enabling all PWDs to exercise their political rights on an equal footing with others. It notes that reasonable accommodation and accessibility in respect to voting procedures, facilities and materials is indispensable.

3.2.16.

Unfortunately, an unknown number of Europeans with disabilities are deprived of their liberty and security, and are subjected to forced treatment and detention, including forced sterilisation. The EESC calls on the EC to take effective measures to stop this unbearable situation, produce through Eurostat reliable data, and put in place an efficient assessment mechanism.

3.2.17.

The EESC appeals to the EU to review its ethics guidelines regarding research, and in particular to set good practice examples by developing consent forms in accessible and easy-to-read formats and to prevent substituted decision-making in this area.

3.2.18.

The EU should adopt legislation to harmonise protection and combat violence, abuse and exploitation, and to ratify the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating domestic violence against women (5). The EU needs to take European legislative and policy action against cross-border activities in EU countries involving trafficking of women and children with disabilities, and calls for the EU to combat violence against children with disabilities by means of specific measures and accessible support services.

3.2.19.

The EC initiative on the European Pillar of Social Rights should fully integrate and mainstream the CRPD provisions and create the necessary social protection floor, and effective mechanisms to prevent and alleviate poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion among PWDs and their families, with special regard to women, children and older PWDs.

3.2.20.

There is a clear need for the development of an EU social security benefits coordination system in the EU, including a clear framework for portability of rights with a maximum number of days for the disability recognition procedure.

3.2.21.

The EU should elaborate and implement the long awaited and much wanted European Deinstitutionalisation (6) strategy that should first and foremost include a very strict monitoring of the use of the ESIF funding to ensure that they are used strictly for the development of support services for PWDs to live independently in local communities. The EESC also calls for the creation of a self-sustained European De-institutionalisation Fund.

3.2.22.

The EESC regrets that the EC has not yet produced an analysis of the impact of the ESIF on PWDs, in line with the obligation laid down by the European Social Fund regulation regarding annual reporting on the measures taken in the area of disability. It should include strengthening of the EC’s monitoring of the use of the ESIF in line with the UN CRPD and in consultation with organisations representing PWDs, infringement procedures (suspension, withdrawal, recovery) launched by the EU for non-compliance with ex-ante conditionalities.

3.2.23.

There is a need for more effective national enforcement bodies: their powers need to be harmonised and enhanced to facilitate the enforcement of passengers’ rights on all modes of transport and the complaints procedure needs to be simplified. Furthermore, the EESC calls on the EC to guarantee free travel for carers in all modes of transport, including air travel, as is already the case under Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 (7) and Regulation (EC) No 1177/2010 (8).

3.2.24.

The EC should give full and immediate official recognition to sign language and Braille, and undertake an assessment of its communication channels and internal processes in order to produce and present information in an accessible manner for PWDs. This should include various accessible formats such as sign language, Braille and augmentative and alternative communication, including easy-to-read format. The EU should ensure that all PWDs, regardless of their financial capacity have access to inclusive education.

3.2.25.

The EU should adopt a compulsory inclusive education exchange quality framework, establishing minimum accessible criteria to ensure mobility of all students, especially young students, with disabilities in the EU for secondary, tertiary and vocational training. All partner universities in the Erasmus student exchange programme should include accessibility to education programmes and facilities ensuring the full participation of all students, especially young students, with disabilities.

3.2.26.

The EU should ratify the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Marrakesh Treaty, facilitate and encourage its ratification at national level by Member States, thus allowing the free flow of accessible versions of printed material for persons with visual impairments and print disabilities.

3.2.27.

The EESC calls on the EC to elaborate and implement a specific initiative on the application of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals for PWDs within the EU, and in its external policies including development cooperation and international trade.

3.3.1.

The EESC urges Eurostat to organise a conference in order to agree on a unified mechanism for all EU Member States’ statistical offices, providing follow up to CO 71. There is a need to create a European disability statistical human rights mechanism, disaggregated by disability, gender and age to collect operational information for European and national policies targeting PWDs.

3.3.2.

The EC should systematically mainstream the rights of PWDs in all the EU’s international cooperation policies and programmes. The EESC welcomes the EU pilot project ‘Bridging the gap’ and calls for the adoption of a disability EU funding programme for the rights of PWDs. This funding programme should be implemented, as is the case in some European countries, in close cooperation with European DPOs as intermediate bodies, being responsible for directing, managing and defining policy and funding priorities. It is important to make sure that European funding is not provided for projects which do not comply with the UN CRPD provisions.

3.3.3.

The EC needs to fully comply with the CO 75 by creating and establishing focal points in all Directorates-General, agencies and bodies. All focal points should hold at least three meetings every year, and representatives of DPOs should attend and fully participate. On 3 December every year, the EC should issue its annual report on the implementation of the UN CRPD by the EU and its Member States.

3.3.4.

The EESC welcomes the EC’s decision to withdraw from the independent monitoring framework, paving the way for the creation of a truly independent mechanism under the supervision of a governing body made up of the members of the independent framework. However, in order for the EU framework to be able to carry out its tasks effectively, financial and human resources should be allocated as a matter of urgency.

3.4.1.

There is a very clear need for the EU institutions to revise their human resources policies and align them with the UN CRPD provisions in order to ensure that PWDs and workers with relatives with disabilities receive reasonable accommodation and support to be able to strike a proper balance between work and family obligations. The EESC calls on the EU to revise its joint sickness and insurance scheme, the pension system and the disability-related social security and social protection measures in order to ensure non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all PWDs, inter alia, by recognising disability-related health needs as being distinct from an illness and promoting independent living and working through the provision of full reimbursement of the additional cost of the necessary equipment or service.

3.4.2.

It is crucial that all EU institutions proactively undertake initiatives to comply with the accessibility provisions of the Directive on access to public sector bodies’ websites with a concrete deadline, setting a good example in this fundamental area of disability rights.

3.4.3.

The EESC calls on the EC and the Board of Governors of the European schools to adopt a plan and allocate the necessary financial and human resources to developing and implementing an inclusive quality education system at all levels in the European schools, ensuring reasonable accommodation, support and a non-rejection policy for all students with disabilities in primary and secondary education.

3.4.4.

Since the employment of PWDs in the EU is at a low level, the EESC calls on the EU institutions to put in place a positive action employment scheme (including specific competitions) to increase the number of PWDs employed in their services by providing reasonable accommodation and support. The implementation of this policy needs to be reviewed every two years in order to evaluate whether correction measures are needed.

3.4.5.

The EESC asks the EU institutions, agencies and bodies to ensure that the existing staff regulations are fully and effectively implemented in line with the UNCRPD and that internal rules and implementing provisions are developed in full compliance with the Convention’s provisions.

3.4.6.

The EESC commits itself to developing a structure to implement the COs in-house, with regard to human resources policy, communication facilities with citizens and EESC members, and full inclusion and equality for EESC members with disabilities. It will also make sure that this is promoted in its relationships with the business community, trade unions and civil society. This new policy will be developed in close cooperation with its Permanent Study Group on Disability Rights.

2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/24

Rapporteur:

Mr Antonello PEZZINI

Co-rapporteur:

Mr Enrico GIBELLIERI

1.1.

The EESC considers that public-private partnerships (1) in research and innovation are a formula for excellence and a powerful tool to address the main issues affecting Europe’s competitiveness, and have the capacity to respond effectively to major socioeconomic, employment and environmental sustainability challenges.

1.2.

R&I is not a one-way, linear process. The EESC believes that if the technological, environmental and social dimensions are to be fully taken on board in Horizon 2020 (H2020) public-private partnerships, a new approach is needed, based on greater transparency concerning the results and socioeconomic impact achieved.

1.3.

The EESC is of the view that partnerships should adopt a broader vision of innovation, taking account of innovation in services, social innovations and the necessary upgrading of SMEs and the social economy so they can be brought in more effectively at every stage of demonstrating and developing applications.

1.4.

The social legitimacy of innovation should be fostered in JTIs and cPPPs by increasing the involvement of the weaker stakeholders (trade unions, SMEs and NGOs) in the overall direction and strategic programming of R&I work, in keeping with the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2012/1025 on standardisation, particularly where strategies and the selection of projects and their social value are concerned.

1.5.

The EESC considers that PPPs need to be more market-driven, focusing attention on aspects such as interoperability, standardisation, harmonisation and transnational technology transfer, so that results are sustainable at regional level and can be disseminated across the EU.

1.6.

The EESC urges that JTIs and cPPPs be put in place in order to:

1.7.

The EESC recommends that JTIs and cPPPs launch new innovative measures to boost interaction with leading investors by devising innovative business measures and progressive occupational profiles, by fostering forums that include the social partners, and by targeting support on the speedy exploitation of post-project markets.

1.8.

The EESC attaches importance to more robust monitoring of JTI and cPPP capacity and coherence of action using more flexible tools that meet market requirements; and to more dynamic approaches to ensuring quality, including a full set of Key Dynamic Performance Indicators (KDPI), comparable across different initiatives, so that an annual synoptic assessment of all JTIs and cPPPs can be submitted to the European and national institutions and to European taxpayers.

1.9.

The EESC calls for greater efforts to ensure internal coherence between the objectives and priorities of the EU’s FP9 and industry’s R&I strategies reflected in JTIs and cPPPs in coordination with all other forms of partnership for innovation to be found in other regional national and European policies.

1.10.

The EESC proposes setting up a European Innovation Council with strong representation of industry and society, with pan-European infrastructure networks to support innovation, as a useful instrument for closer coordination of initiatives, not least with the courses of action of other European and international R&I organisations, and with comparable international partnerships (2).

1.11.

The EESC urges regional and local authorities to give high priority to relevant JTI and cPPP innovation when planning and implementing measures such as smart specialisation strategies, cohesion policy operational and cooperation programmes, research and innovation programmes and projects to implement climate change adaptation plans.

1.12.

The EESC is convinced that strategic, smart and timely investment in appropriate, environmental-friendly innovative solutions and in green infrastructure provide a launchpad for a sound and effective reindustrialisation process based on research and innovation and on their market applications.

1.13.

The EESC draws attention to the need to ‘align research and innovation instruments and agendas in Europe’ with those under the forthcoming FP in order to ‘ensure continued investment in those sectors where Europe has a leading position in the world’ (3), based on a stable outlook, which depends on regular efficiency checks.

1.14.

The EESC calls upon the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to work together to hold an interinstitutional conference as soon as possible on the role of public-private technology partnerships in European reindustrialisation, with a view to the next R&I Framework Programme after 2020.

2.1.

Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs) are public-private partnerships in key areas of European R&I established under Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (4). As far back as the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) onwards, traditional instruments had proved unable to increase and improve the European economy’s competitiveness. Industrial partnerships are geared to R&I and have clearly identified industrial market objectives, better financial and human resource concentration and sufficient leveraging to provide a decisive push to accelerate the transformation of scientific and technological breakthroughs into market innovations.

2.2.

The current H2020 FP has introduced substantial innovations with respect to structure, leaving more space for influence and synergies with industry and Member States through various forms of PPP to support sectors that:

2.3.

A range of initiatives have been set up to support different types of partnerships that are either geared to the industrial sector, supported by the scientific community, or steered by public authorities.

2.4.

The EU institutions have given strong support to the European Technology Platforms (ETPs) set up at the initiative of industries in order to establish a bottom-up process for defining common strategic objectives and priorities.

2.5.

The current 38 ETPs — plus three cross-cutting initiatives — have a strategy, mobilisation and dissemination function. In order to fulfil their role, their main activities cover:

2.6.

JTIs bring together the European Commission, Member States, academia and industry around scientific and technological sectors of high value to society, mainly by supporting cooperative research and innovation in Europe where common technological and economic objectives have been clearly identified.

2.7.

The main objective of JTIs is to increase the impact of public and private investment in research activities and consolidate the European research and innovation area by helping to foster cutting-edge scientific and technological innovation in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy.

2.8.

The idea behind JTIs is to be open to new participants and be able to communicate with a wide public, and to have a leveraging effect, with European economic contributions, in a clear structure that can encourage industry, SMEs, the social economy and Member States to increase their participation and their investment.

2.9.

JTIs initially emerged from the work of the European Technology Platforms , on which the EESC drew up an own-initiative opinion (5), and which were able to define common, shared views on sectoral development, identifying problems for resolution.

2.10.

The criteria for identifying the sectors for which JTIs need to be set up have been defined as follows: the strategic relevance of the sector and clear objectives; high European added value; capacity to leverage substantial, long-term investment; and appropriate and quick responses to the growth, sustainability and climate challenges.

2.11.

In order to determine levels of innovation it is not sufficient to consider only the funds invested, we must also have economic performance and market indicators on this expenditure. cPPPs are required to submit annual reports on the activities undertaken, the European added value gained in real terms, the effectiveness of innovative financial leverage instruments and the qualitative and quantitative attainment of socioeconomic objectives.

2.12.

The purpose of this opinion is to highlight the influence that industry’s direct participation in R&I, funded by the EU through institutional JTIs and cPPPs, has on industrial policy and industrial change and propose improvements.

3.1.

The EU’s R&I framework programmes have had difficulty in addressing the real needs of European industry, which often risk being overlooked during the preparation of the general objectives and in the work programmes, thereby consolidating the European paradox, which can be summed up as Europe’s high science output and low capacity to transform this output into market innovation, as compared with its competitors.

3.2.

The work and action of ETPs have gradually altered this approach. European industry has managed to set targets and priorities for the major manufacturing sectors, which have largely been incorporated into the structure and objectives of H2020.

3.3.

There has been a shift from a top-down to a bottom-up approach spanning the whole innovation cycle and aiming to achieve higher Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) in order to develop new production technologies, new products, and new skills.

3.4.

JTIs and cPPPs should be key tools for ensuring that industry plays an active role in multiannual programming and in implementing the H2020 Community measures. The private sector is committed to investing some EUR 10 billion in Joint Technology Initiatives to stimulate innovation in seven sectors, helping to reverse the decline in the European manufacturing industry’s role.

4.1.

The Committee is firmly convinced that the various forms of R&I partnerships are a formula for excellence with regard to development and a powerful tool to address the main issues affecting the EU’s competitiveness.

4.2.

The Committee considers that JTIs and cPPPs are positive experiences for the creation of EU-wide partnerships, if they can provide a multiannual framework for combining EU and national resources with private resources, know-how and research and innovation capacities in order to share knowledge and disseminate key innovations in sectors that are crucial to success on the global market.

4.3.

In the EESC’s view JTIs and cPPPs must meet their responsibilities effectively in terms of:

The development of new technologies and innovation on the part of industry must lead to high-quality training for human resources and new, advanced occupational skills, with closer and more systematic involvement of the social partners and local authorities in defining and applying the sector’s broad strategies.

4.4.

According to the most recent reports published by the EC in 2016 (6), initial survey results (7) show that while H2020 seems to respond adequately to the need to open up to PPPs, these approaches do not always fully meet the requirements for openness and stimulation to bring in newcomers. There is no general agreement on their capacity to support jobs, growth, investment and rapid development on the digital single market, although views are more positive regarding the capacity to meet energy and climate changes.

4.5.

Similarly, the ability of JTIs and cPPPs to interact successfully with other EU financial instruments such as the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) and the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) is perceived as very limited, although some JTIs have signed relevant protocols. It is important in the EESC’s view that synergies be generated to promote the involvement of regional and local actors, facilitating alignment with common operating standards.

4.6.

Given that the rate of rejection of project proposals appears to be running at 7 to 1 in H2020 — a higher rate than under FP7 where it was 5 to 1 — it would seem advisable to rebalance the pool of independent expert evaluators to whom project applications are submitted. More than 50 % of project applications in the first H2020 cPPP calls for proposals were from industry, but at the same time more than half the expert evaluators had an academic background compared to just over one fifth with private sector expertise.

4.7.

The tables available for JTIs and cPPPs reveal significant positive features for the sustainability and competitiveness of European industry. Activities are formulated by private partners through a broad and open system of consultations on preparing work programmes and the associated calls for proposals in response to, and reflecting, industry’s real needs, with high mobilisation rates and a powerful leverage effect of 3 to 9.

4.8.

With regard to the partial table of JTI calls in 2014, this type of partnership should provide greater clarity concerning its institutional status and levels of governance, in response to European taxpayers and the EU institutions.

4.9.

The EESC believes that JTIs and cPPPs, including the tools for opening up and participatory access, must meet urgent requirements in line with a strong growth policy, including the full contribution of the social partners.

4.10.

JTIs and cPPPs are in fact competing in a global race to be the frontrunners in the development and marketing of the new technologies of the future. They therefore require the development and implementation of clear industrial strategy objectives:

4.11.

The EESC emphasises the need to involve all stakeholders in Europe’s key industrial sectors — spanning all types of goods, sizes of enterprises, human resources and their training, development and representatives — in order to improve the integration of the social aspects and SMEs and the stakeholder participation in R&I projects.

4.12.

The EESC therefore considers it important to introduce appropriate social and training instruments to be important, and to use key performance dynamic indicators (KPDI) to monitor not only patents and scientific publications but also, and most importantly, the evolving impact on social and economic aspects and on training for new occupational profiles.

4.13.

The EESC sees mobilising private sector investment, successfully building on public funding and with a powerful leverage effect, as a key factor in reaching the Europe 2020 growth and employment targets, and, in particular, the 3 % investment in R&I.

4.14.

Innovation activities with higher TRLs should continue to benefit from investment support plans for industrial infrastructure and plants, which are based on a stable outlook and subject to regular efficiency checks, along the lines of Commission President Juncker’s European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI).

4.15.

The EESC believes that members of industry should be more involved in R&I programmes and the programme committees, which are crucial to the development of broad-based industrial involvement in each Member State.

4.16.

Lastly, the EESC considers that the Member States and the EC should review and harmonise — where possible and appropriate — the regulatory framework for industrial sectors, including JTIs and cPPPs, which are required to maximise added value in terms of environmental, economic, social and employment benefits, smart business models and solutions in integrated territories, new skills and social innovations (8).

4.17.

The EESC considers that the development of different types of R&I partnerships under a wide range of EU policies, and not only under H2020, should be marked by greater coherence and better coordination in R&I actions, as part of an overall EU view encompassing the internal and external dimensions. Setting up a European Innovation Council with strong representation of industry and society, flanked by pan-European infrastructure networks to support innovation, could help foster a more efficient framework.

4.18.

With a view to FP9 (9), the EESC advocates devising a transparent framework for the qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the success or failure, in economic, innovative, social and environmental terms, of the work of current JTIs and cPPPs. This should involve industrial end users, the social partners, SME representatives and civil society in evaluating strategic priorities and reshaping the future partnerships on which efforts should focus as 2030 approaches.

2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/31

Rapporteur:

Ms Madi SHARMA

Co-rapporteur:

Mr Dirk JARRÉ

1.1.

Europe has always played a key role in the production, innovation and development of personal care, body hygiene and beauty products. More recently, its leading position in this sector has progressively been eroded in the process of global competition and conditions which fail to recognise the innovatory technological pressure and commercial reality of remaining competitive.

1.2.

This opinion considers strengthening the European personal care, body hygiene and beauty products industrial sector, specifically those products covered by the Cosmetics Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009. A ‘cosmetic product’ is any substance or mixture intended to be placed in contact with the external parts of the human body (epidermis, hair system, nails, lips and external genital organs) or with the teeth and the mucous membranes of the oral cavity with a view exclusively or mainly to cleaning them, perfuming them, changing their appearance, protecting them, keeping them in good condition or correcting body odours; a substance or mixture intended to be ingested, inhaled, injected or implanted into the human body shall not be considered to be a cosmetic product.

1.3.

The hygiene paper, tissue and sanitary wear sectors are outside the scope of the Cosmetics Regulation but can be considered in many of the recommendations due to the added value of this sector in personal hygiene.

1.4.

The opinion does not include pharmaceuticals, tattoos, permanent makeup, beauty care services nor products administered via surgery or instruments, nor skin care products for animals. However, the EESC recommends that all of the above should be considered in a separate document due to rising consumer concerns regarding harmful chemicals.

1.5.

While the innovative capacity of Europe’s specialised enterprises is impressive, innovation itself and thus production and commercialisation of EU inventions, have shifted to other parts of the world, bringing serious economic and social consequences. Creating an enabling environment, to move beyond Industry 4.0 by considering advanced bio-technological progress, through appropriate strategies, will lead to major contributions to industrial reshoring and new product development (NPD).

1.6.

The EESC makes the following sector specific recommendations accepting that the sector is already well regulated to ensure consumer protection and safety; additional legislation is considered unnecessary but increased transparency should be considered:

2.1.

Cosmetics and personal care products are daily essentials for over 500 million European consumers, across all age segments. Products range from everyday hygiene products such as soap, shampoo, deodorants and toothpaste to luxury beauty items such as perfumes and make-up. The sector itself is worth EUR 77 billion (2015) and was one of the few sectors untouched by the global financial crisis. Europe is established as a world leader in the sector and a dominant exporter of cosmetics. Trade outside Europe amounted to EUR 17,2 billion in 2015.

2.2.

Brand recognition in the cosmetic industry is important due to the high degree of competition. Customer loyalty is based on reliable advertising, quality, safety and new product development (NPD), and can be compared with the fashion industry with seasonal shifting trends.

2.3.

The sector is made up of all sized companies with over 4 600 SMEs in the cosmetics industry in Europe. The SME segment is estimated to be 30 % of the market but in some EU States this can be up to 98 %. The product portfolio ranges from 20 000+ products for large companies to around 160 for smaller companies. A large cosmetic manufacturer has a portfolio of around 2 000 ingredients, 600 for SMEs, with each adding around 4 % of new ingredients annually. These new ingredients have a significant effect on profitability and growth.

2.4.

At least 2 million people are employed throughout the value chain across Europe from manufacturing to retail. Manufacturing itself employed 152 000 workers in 2015 (1) with slightly more female workers (56 %) than males (44 %). Over the past five years, the industry has grown its direct and indirect employment by 2,3 %, more than 39 000 jobs (2).

2.5.

In 2015, the expenditure on R & D is estimated at EUR 1,27 bn. This varies considerably per country. The industry employs over 26 000 scientists researching new areas of science, working with new ingredients, developing formulations and carrying out safety assessments, leading to an impressive number of patents in the EU each year.

2.6.

The European paper industry, in particular the tissue industry, is worth over EUR 10 bn. annually and represents 25 % of the global tissue market. The increased use of quality tissue products such as paper towels, handkerchiefs, toilet paper, etc. is an important element of improved life quality and overall hygiene conditions both, at home and away from home and thus an important contributor to the personal care sector.

2.7.

The European cosmetic sector is credited with taking the lead on a complete ban on animal testing, whilst still promoting innovation and competitiveness. Today’s market is driven by safety and innovation equally, with new colour palettes, skin-specific treatments, anti-ageing products and unique formulas. Consumers constantly demand more choice, better personalisation and even greater efficacy. In order to respond more effectively to user’s preferences and expectations, consumer groups and organisations are regularly engaged at the earliest stages of development

3.1.

The monitoring of ingredients and testing criteria, including the ban on animal testing, environmental protection and labelling, are all subject to EU legislation and guidelines. The regulatory framework for market access, international trade relations and regulatory convergence are monitored by the European Commission.

3.2.

The Cosmetics Regulation, Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009, has applied since 2013, replacing Directive 76/768/EEC, adopted in 1976. Its goal is to harmonise rules to achieve an internal market for cosmetic products and a high level of protection for human health.

3.3.

Regardless of manufacturing processes or channels of distribution, cosmetic products placed on the EU market must be safe. The Cosmetics Regulation (including its Annexes) and its amendments provide the regulatory requirements and restrictions for all substances used in cosmetics. A cosmetic product’s ‘Responsible Person’ is liable for the safety of the product and must ensure that it undergoes an expert scientific safety assessment before it is sold. A database with information on cosmetic substances and ingredients, CosIng, enables easy access to data on these substances. Ensuring a high-level of protection for human health and consumer safety, also implies that the responsible scientific committees should take particular account of the potential health risks to particular professional groups (e.g. hairdressers and beauticians) who use cosmetic products on a daily basis, in the line of their professional activities, and are therefore subject to higher levels of exposure than the general public.

4.1.

To remain competitive, manufacturers are constantly innovating to discover new ingredients, utilising existing ingredients in new applications and creating more personalised products. However, they cannot work in isolation and thus the EU Commission, national governments and stakeholders, especially consumer and employee representatives, need to work together to create an environment conducive to growth.

4.2.

The EESC recognises that the main challenges for growth in the sector are comparable to those of all industry sectors and makes the following recommendations specifically for the personal care and cosmetic sectors:

4.2.1.

Greater convergence of the life-science engineering sector, including between genome research and the beauty and care sector, would better support product diversification. Skin is the largest organ of the human body but the distinction between the dermal application of cosmetics and treatments by medical products tends to disappear. Certain effects like irritations, allergies and skin cancers need to be taken into account. Initiatives such as EIT Health (3) spanning key areas of healthcare including pharma, MedTech, BioTech, and Digital Health are good examples of collaboration. Cosmetic products bring increased personal hygiene, well-being benefits and/or lifestyle factors (positive effects that are not recognised in regulations such as reducing stress, confidence building or enhancing sleep). Whilst cosmetics are not medicinal products, cosmetics are based on sophisticated science of the skin and its function. Development of cosmetics can therefore benefit from advances in other fields of biological science, in particular in the pharmaceutical industry. Research collaboration should be encouraged to focus on individualisation considering tailored lifestyle and wellbeing products.

4.2.2.

Better collaboration between large and small companies, alongside the development of sector specific incubators (4) or clustering, could increase competitiveness and enhance growth. All cosmetic products undergo an expert scientific safety assessment before they are launched which can be administratively and financially restrictive for smaller companies. Although it is essential the safety assessment remains in place, smaller innovative companies should utilise a range of business support measures that could assist the development period between the innovation and NPD process and the successful commercialisation of the final product, thereby reducing the risk of failure. Such measures would include better intelligence sharing, through technology and knowledge transfer; cooperation for investment opportunities; costs reduction analysis and accessibility to funding streams (5). Additionally, governments should shift their mind-sets on manufacturing towards supporting local production and job creation in Europe.

4.2.3.

Greater market intelligence and data provision from academia, industry and consumers will enhance growth through knowledge transfer. Personal care trends have moved towards organic, natural, sunscreen UVB and UVA, pro-aging and anti-ageing products expanding the scope of innovation. Currently menopause and aging innovation offers an area of development for the beauty segment, targeting a substantial number of people with products that help them to look and feel their best. With scientific and technological advancement in sequencing of the human genome, and progress made in understanding its diverse functions and its absolute individuality, the future of the cosmetics industry lies in extremely advanced personalisation of the products. Research and investment in this approach, in cooperation with the medical professions and academia, constitute a key issue for the sector.

4.2.4.

Encourage greater engagement of employees. Employees are at the forefront of product innovation, as they experience the overview of the sector from the development process to consumer feedback. Hence increased consultation, including the promotion of intrapreneurship, could support company growth. The sector is diverse in its employment opportunities and improved communication to showcase skills and competences required for current and future development will make the sector more attractive. Over 514 000 life sciences students are engaged in Europe (6) creating new research and opportunities for increased collaboration across sectors. Again, greater collaboration between academia and industry would help attract a wider spectrum of employees.

4.2.5.

Research and Development provision, investment, R & D expenditure and safety provisions are needed to sustain growth. Funding mechanisms, public and private, for R & D, patent registrations and NPD in manufacturing within the EU could be considered.

4.2.6.

Patent infringements and counterfeit goods pose a serious risk to profitability for large and small EU companies, as well as to consumer health. In 2006, counterfeit perfumes and cosmetics cost the EU EUR 3.0 bn. in lost revenue. Greater IP protection for brands could be ensured by including the country of manufacture on the product.

4.2.7.

Commitment to ‘risk based’ regulation: Currently substances are not regulated based on their intrinsic properties (e.g. irritant) but on the basis of whether the property of the substance will actually occur under the real use conditions (e.g. used at a concentration below the irritation threshold). This approach is possible because the use of cosmetic products is well defined and full risk assessments are possible. This is different to chemicals legislation (without defined use), where the intrinsic properties ‘hazard’ drive the legislation. It is crucial to the future ability of the industry to innovate and grow, that an appropriate distinction between hazard and risk is maintained in EU legislation and policy.

4.2.8.

Promotion of territory specific ingredients. Facilitating the research and certification of regionally specific natural products through Protected Geographical Indication (7) (i.e.: Corsican Immortelle) would allow for the promotion of EU regional products enhancing a focus on local commodities and artisanal products. Currently the costs of isotope tracing, or laboratory analysis of natural products is prohibitive for entrepreneurs and SMEs.

4.2.9.

Animal testing ban: The Cosmetics Regulation has established testing bans (prohibition on testing finished cosmetic products and cosmetic ingredients on animals) and marketing bans (prohibition on marketing finished cosmetic products and ingredients in the EU which were tested on animals). There is no desire to lift this ban. However, the following challenges are faced by manufacturers in innovation, NPD and exports:

4.2.10.

Resource and waste management: Population growth, consumption increase and the depletion of resources, particularly water, are issues for consumers’ and industry alike in respect of sustainable consumption and CSR. Producing environment-friendly products which consider waste and resource management is a sector priority. The Commission’s Circular Economy package and Cosmetics Europe’s ‘Guidelines for Cosmetic Companies, especially SMEs (2012)’ are valuable but much more needs to be done as significant challenges remain. The protection of resources for the sector goes hand in hand with the need to protect biodiversity, which is of shared benefit for current and future generations. The search for new products should not be at the expense of indigenous people and their intellectual property. The widespread application of fair trade principles and environmental codes of conduct among businesses in the sector is both beneficial and much needed. No less important is the attitude of consumers, who should reject products manufactured using methods at odds with sustainable development principles.

4.2.11.

Increased transparency: Market surveillance is key to ensuring consumer protection. Increased collaboration between National Consumer Authorities, Consumer organisations, users and health professionals at a national level would enhance consumer trust and transparency. The consultations with stakeholders should take place throughout the process of product development and innovation. Product notification on the RAPEX system empowers consumers to demand improved safety throughout the supply chain but they insist that notification of serious risk should be at the earliest opportunity. Consumer’s state greater transparency is needed towards:

4.2.12.

Opportunities in new markets including those geared towards changing consumer shopping habits, such as e-commerce and direct sales, offer new sales models alongside trading cross borders. Initial findings of the e-commerce sector inquiry found that half of companies surveyed in the EU cosmetics and health sector did not sell cross-border. Whilst cosmetics companies embrace the digital era they remain limited by regulatory requirements which are often country-specific: including national language labelling; animal testing laws; cosmétovigilance requirements.

4.2.13.

Trade barriers: The EU has a good trade surplus in cosmetic products however the European Commission should continue to press for convergence in fora such as International Cooperation on Cosmetics Regulation and in trade negotiations where the EU regulation becomes an international standard. The EU Cosmetics Regulation remains the model of inspiration for consumer safety for emerging regions (ASEAN, Russia, Latin America, China). This provides an opportunity for EU regulators and industry to contribute to regulatory systems in the main export markets that are highly compatible with the EU system.

2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/38

Rapporteur:

Mr Martin SIECKER

Co-rapporteur:

Mr Richard ADAMS

1.1.

EU Ship owners control around 40 % of the world’s merchant fleet. They also account for around one third of the end-of-life tonnage beached in sub-standard yards in South Asia. The EU is the largest market sending end-of-life ships for dangerous and polluting shipbreaking. As home to the biggest ship owner community, the EU also has a particular responsibility for regulating ship recycling.

1.2.

The EESC argues that there is a powerful social and moral case for eliminating the abuses of irresponsible ship dismantling through a system which creates added value in an end-of-life ship that is sufficient to pay for the higher costs of responsible recycling. The majority of ship recycling would probably continue in countries with low labour costs, but with improved working and environmental conditions. At the same time this will also make it possible for EU dismantling yards to be more competitive.

1.3.

Action by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has had little effect to date, although every effort should continue to be made to reach a universal legally binding instrument through this forum. The EU’s role in this process can be influential and dynamic. The search for an effective solution to irresponsible shipbreaking has been on the EU’s agenda for many years, resulting so far in the EU Ship Recycling Regulation (EU SRR) which will become fully applicable no later than 31 December 2018. However, a fundamental weakness is that ship owners could easily avoid the EU SRR by simply ‘flagging out’ to a non-EU country.

1.4.

What is lacking in the Regulation is an economic instrument the Commission could use to guide developments in the desired direction. A highly detailed report has now developed a blueprint for such an instrument via the introduction of a ‘ship recycling license (SRL) scheme’. By the end of this year, the Commission will present a proposal based on this idea, which will incentivise ship owners to have their vessels that are reaching the end of their useful lives dismantled in EU-approved facilities in ways that are both socially and environmentally acceptable.

1.5.

An advantage of the proposed financial mechanism is the synergy it would bring about with the existing regulatory framework. Control mechanisms would not interfere with those of the EU SRR. Existing EU institutions are already in place to administer and implement such a licence. However, the EESC urges the Commission to also assess any risk for EU trading partners to see the proposal as anti-competitive interference into the conduct of international shipping.

1.6.

Only by recognising the responsibility of the ship owner through the ‘polluter pays principle’ and building the cost of responsible recycling into ship operating costs, can current harmful practices be eliminated. The operators and users of bulk, freight and passenger shipping all have a part to play. Firstly by acknowledging that there is a serious problem and secondly by supporting a progressive, enforceable financial mechanism such as the SRL which is capable of global extension under the auspices of the IMO and with an information campaign extending outside the EU.

1.7.

The EESC supports the European Commission in this endeavour. Apart from the fact that it fits very well within the recycling society policy of the EU it can also be a major step forward in reforming the dangerous and polluting ship-dismantling industry in South Asia and in preventing it from being re-established elsewhere. The EESC recognises the potential of the HKC provided it incorporates the principles of the EU SRR, and also stresses that a financial instrument is necessary. We encourage the EU to provide technical assistance to yards around the world to meet these requirements.

2.1.

Without shipping, the global economy would not function. Every year, approximately 1 000 large ocean-going vessels (tankers and container, cargo and passenger ships) are sold for dismantling. More than 70 % of those end-of-life ships end up on beaches in India, Bangladesh or Pakistan for hazardous breaking operations. The remainder are mainly dismantled in China and Turkey, where proper infrastructure is more conducive to cleaner and safer practices, provided that adequate procedures are applied (1).

2.2.

Most decommissioned ships are scrapped in an unacceptable way using the ‘beaching’ method. That method involves grounding the ships on sandy beaches, where they are taken apart by mostly unskilled workers, (including reported instances of child labour in Bangladesh), without fully appropriate equipment and with little or no protection against the large quantities of hazardous substances released (2).

2.3.

The ship-recycling industry moved to East Asia (China and Taiwan) in the 1970s, when stricter environmental and occupational health standards were introduced in Europe. In the 1980s, the industry also faced stricter regulation in East Asia and consequently moved to South Asia. In the last 30 years, 470 deaths have been reported in India. In 2014, 25 deaths and 50 serious injuries were reported in South Asian yards. Last year, 16 workers lost their lives in yards in Bangladesh and so far this year, twelve workers have died there. Many more workers are seriously injured or made ill by toxic fumes and suffer painful deaths due to cancers caused by exposure to hazardous materials such as asbestos. The natural environments around these beaching facilities are severely degraded (3).

3.1.

At the heart of the ship-recycling problem is the lack of effective international governance to achieve a global solution. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO), an agency of the UN, has produced the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (HKC) which remains unratified and uncertain in effect. As in many other areas, the EU, by promoting good practice and practical solutions, can offer a regulatory and legal framework capable of yielding positive results worldwide and effective in dealing with the particular set of extra-territorial issues prevalent in the shipping industry.

3.2.

International law requires that every merchant ship be registered in a country. Unctad (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) has reported that almost 73 % of the world shipping fleet is registered or ‘flagged’ in a country other than the one where the beneficial owner of the vessel is registered. The reasons for flagging one’s ship outside one’s country include tax avoidance, the ability to avoid national labour and environmental regulations and the ability to hire crews from lower-wage countries. Many of these open registers are also termed FOCs (Flag of Convenience) or FONCs (Flag of Non-Compliance). These are flags from countries that have a very weak record of enforcing international law. Approximately 40 % of all end-of-life ships beached in South Asia were imported under FOCs or FONCs such as the flags of St Kitts and Nevis, Comoros and Tuvalu. These ‘end-of-life’ flags are hardly used during the operational life of any ship and offer special discount rates for last voyages and quick and easy short-term registration without any nationality requirements.

3.3.

Only a small number of ship owners have taken voluntary measures to ensure clean and safe recycling of their obsolete vessels. Less than 8 % of the ships sold for breaking still have a European flag and these are mostly dismantled in a safe and sustainable way. Most vessels that reach the end of their service are sold to so-called cash buyers who bring the vessel to its final destination in South Asia. The majority of ship owners do not deal with recycling facilities themselves: they conveniently distance themselves from final disposal and leave it to these cash buyers who specialise in end-of-life ships and act as a middleman between ship owners and shipbreaking yards. Their service includes moving and crewing a ship on its last voyage and dealing with the required paperwork and authorities at the breaking destination.

Both private and public ship owners resort to these practices.

3.4.

This business is profitable to:

3.5.

Whilst voluntary coordinated actions by ship owners have existed since 2009, such as a set of guidelines on the preparation of hazardous materials inventories and other end-of-life measures in 2015, Bangladesh, where conditions are known to be the worst, was the preferred destination of end-of-life ships (4).

4.1.

In 2009, the IMO adopted a particular instrument for shipping, the HKC, which sets up a framework of regulations with the ultimate goal of delivering the required sustainable level playing field in ship recycling activities worldwide. In reality this claim does not stand up to scrutiny. While this is a small step forward, the implementation and enforcement provisions are weak and open to a wide range of interpretations, there is no independent certification or auditing stipulated and beaching is, in practice, still allowed.

4.2.

The HKC will only enter into force 24 months after ratification by 15 States representing 40 % of global tonnage and whose annual ship recycling capacity accounts for at least 3 % of the combined tonnage of the signatories. So far only five countries, with Panama as the only major flag state, have ratified the HKC, but none comply with the required ship recycling capacity for entry-into-force of the Convention. Entry into force of the Convention is thus not expected any time soon.

4.3.

Another initiative by the IMO, the International Ship Recycling Trust Fund, has not been internationally supported. Although the IMO has delivered positive maritime reform in several areas, effective action on ship dismantling is not one of them. The ship-recycling industry has tended to locate or relocate to countries with low labour costs and where environmental and health and safety standards are both low and unenforced. The ‘facilitating’ role of such states can be eliminated only by attaching a significant, independently held financial fund to every individual ship that is reclaimable, provided that it is recycled responsibly. Shipping is a global industry, while shipbreaking — with 70 % of all ships dismantled on three beaches in South Asia — is a regional scandal and deserves an effective solution.

4.4.

Within the EU, decommissioned ships are regarded as hazardous waste and fall within the scope of the Basel Convention which regulates all kinds of transport of hazardous waste and is transposed at EU level through the Waste Shipment Regulation. This should in theory have prevented EU-owned ships from being disposed of irresponsibly. The rules of the Convention and of the Waste Shipment Regulation are also being systematically circumvented by ship owners by the sale of vessels approaching end-of-life to cash buyers as soon as these vessels leave EU waters for their last trip. However, following entry into force of the Ship Recycling Regulation (SRR) within the EU, decommissioned ships that sail under the flag of an EU Member State will be excluded from the application of the EU Waste Shipment Regulation and the Basel Convention — which regulates all kinds of transports of hazardous waste — from 2019.

4.5.

After analysis, the EU and its Member States concluded that both the Hong Kong and Basel Conventions appeared to provide an equivalent level of control and enforcement for ships classified as waste. NGOs globally, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Toxic Waste as well as the European Parliament and the EESC have denounced the HKC for not providing proper solutions.

4.6.

The search for an effective solution has been on the EU’s agenda for many years. In 2007 the European Commission produced a green paper (5) on the subject, followed by a communication in 2008 (6) and finally a proposal for the EU Ship Recycling Regulation (EU SRR) (7) in 2012. The Regulation entered into force on 30 December 2013 but is only required to become fully applicable by 31 December 2018. The Regulation brings a number of the requirements of the HKC into force early. In addition, the EU SRR establishes a European List of approved recycling facilities where EU-flagged vessels will have to be scrapped. These facilities need to be independently certified and audited. The EU SRR also goes beyond the HKC by setting more stringent standards for recycling facilities and looking at downstream waste management as well as labour rights.

4.7.

The EU SRR is, however, a rather pale reflection of the previous green paper and the communication on the same subject. These two documents provided an impeccable analysis of ship recycling problems in South Asia and expressed the view that robust measures were needed to tackle the unacceptable conditions in these countries. The measures in the EU SRR do not, however, solve these problems. Whilst the EU SRR sets high standards for ship recycling facilities that effectively exclude the sub-standard beaching method, it is very easy for ship owners to circumvent these standards by transfer of ownership or simply by flagging out to a non-EU flag. As the EESC concluded, the political will to hold the shipping industry responsible was manifestly absent and it was felt that the Commission should have produced a better, more creative and audacious proposal, richer in initiatives and in line with the level of ambition of previous Commission documents (8).

5.1.

What is lacking in the Regulation is an economic instrument the Commission could use to guide developments in the desired direction. The fundamental weakness that ship owners can easily avoid the EU SRR by simply flagging out to a non-EU country was recognised by the Commission in its 2012 initial proposal which included a clause on ‘penultimate ownership responsibility’. Whilst this clause was rejected during tripartite negotiations, the EP ensured an article was included in the Regulation that asked the Commission to look into possible alternative financial mechanisms.

5.2.

In July of this year the Commission published a new study, conducted by Ecorys, DNV-GL and the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, on a ‘ship recycling licence’ (SRL) aimed at incentivising ship owners to finally shoulder their responsibility when it comes to clean and safe ship dismantling.

5.3.

The SRL would create a dedicated fund specific to each ship, held in escrow by a major financial institution that would build up capital to finance safe and sustainable recycling. The amount of the licence would be determined by a combination of tonnage, type of transport, frequency of calling at EU ports, design based on the cradle-to-cradle principle and the presence of toxic materials on board. The capital is created by ship owners who, every time one of their vessels calls at an EU port, pay the appropriate charge to the fund that is linked to that specific vessel.

5.4.

At end-of-life this fund could be reclaimed if the ship was indeed recycled in an EU-approved yard and thus used to make up for the loss of revenue stemming from going for responsible dismantling. By the end of this year, the Commission will put forward a formal position on this study.

5.5.

A major advantage of the proposed financial mechanism is the synergy it would bring about with the existing regulatory framework. In particular, control mechanisms under the proposed financial mechanism would work very well with existing control mechanisms under the EU SRR, such as the site inspections of facilities to take place prior to and after their inclusion on the European list. The licences could also be included on the list of certificates which are to be checked regularly by port state control as part of pre-existing obligations. Similarly, the already existing European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) appears to be best suited to fulfil the tasks of inspection and the issuing of licences, whereas one of the European financial institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) or the European Investment Fund (EIF) would appear to be best placed to administer the income from a possible SRL. The EESC urges the Commission to also assess any risk for EU trading partners to see the proposal as anti-competitive interference into the conduct of international shipping.

5.6.

Such a fund would go some way towards the EESC proposal supporting a more extensive and viable ship recycling industry in Europe. There is sufficient capacity in the EU which is no longer used for building and repairing ships but which is suitable for the decommissioning and recycling of ships. This fits in with the EU’s goal of developing into a sustainable recycling society with a circular economy in which waste is turned into raw materials by means of a sophisticated and fine-meshed recycling system. In view of alternately volatile and steadily rising raw material prices and high unemployment in a number of European Member States and the fact that a number of oil rigs in EU waters are reaching the end of their economically viable life, this could be highly profitable for Europe as a whole. Moreover, an industry specialising in recycling end-of-life ships would be an opportunity for the development of maritime areas and training of both young people and the unemployed in emerging skills.

5.7.

On 12 April 2016 the Commission published technical guidance for ship recycling facilities seeking approval under the EU SRR. Facilities wishing to be listed as EU-approved need to ensure healthy and safe working conditions, pollution control — including proper downstream waste management — and enforcement of international labour rights. Facilities within and outside the EU can apply to be on the list. Apart from EU facilities, the better yards in China and Turkey will most likely feature on the list, which will be published by the end of this year. Recycling facilities using the beaching method have already applied to be on the EU list. The EESC agrees with Parliament and the Commission that the current beaching method should not be accepted on the EU list.

5.8.

If Europe wants its ships to be scrapped in a responsible way, it is reasonable that it should ensure that the cost of doing so is integrated into the operating cost of the vessel. In a market economy nothing is for free, a price has to be paid for everything. The price for responsible scrapping of ships is paid in money. When ships are scrapped in an irresponsible way the price is paid in other currencies, such as destruction of the local environment and the loss of human lives. As the EU does not wish to accept these values as a legal means of payment, it should not accept their use as a legitimate currency in its payment traffic with developing countries outside Europe.

5.9.

In a period of over-capacity and low profit in the industry there are strong indications that the great majority of ship owners are resistant to any measures which will involve higher charges. Yet the impact on ship owners will be modest. To change the behaviour of 42 % of ship owners, it is estimated that the measures required to achieve that goal will add 0,5 % to the operating costs of smaller ships and around 2 % to those of the largest categories of ships. If the licence-fee rates are increased and/or if the duration of capital accumulation is shortened, the percentage of ships sold for sustainable ship recycling will increase to up to 68 %. In the long run, the report estimates that up to 97 % of ships operating in European ports will be able to accumulate sufficient funds to cover the gap of sound recycling (9).

5.10.

The revenue fund from the SRL must however demonstrate that it meets the cost of responsible recycling and that it will be applied and levied equitably upon all operators calling at EU ports. However, a regional (continent-wide) measure such as the EU SRL cannot be effectively implemented worldwide without the cooperation of ship owners and the IMO. An EU financial instrument, applicable to any ship that calls at an EU port, might very well trigger that solution at a global level, which could be extended through the IMO. Governments of Member States with significant resident fleet owners need to make considerable efforts to take forward relevant legislation in line with fraud policies and consistent with WTO guidelines.

5.11.

Political resolve can also be generated and supported by informed public opinion. Going public on the outrageous conditions in most of the South Asian recycling facilities is having some effect but at present there is no way that concerned members of the public can directly influence the shipping industry by purchasing or boycotting relevant ship services. This needs to be changed by encouraging major corporate users of sea freight services to demand that their goods are shipped on vessels where responsible and irrevocable end-of-life policies are in place.

5.12.

As in many other areas, the EU, by promoting good practice and practical solutions, has a role to play and can offer a supportive regulatory framework capable of yielding positive results worldwide and effective in dealing with the particular set of extra territorial issues prevalent in the shipping industry.

2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/44

Rapporteur:

Janusz PIETKIEWICZ

1.1.

The EESC takes the view that the general development of distributed prosumer energy should form an important and sustainable part of the European Union’s energy policy. Such an approach would be beneficial and might even be necessary from the point of view of energy security and in light of environmental and social concerns.

1.2.

The extent to which prosumer energy contributes to overall energy generation should be tailored to the specific circumstances of each Member State. The EESC therefore proposes that the European Commission develop a framework for prosumer energy, while the detailed regulation in this field should remain a matter for the individual Member States.

1.3.

A wide range of renewable energy sources can be used to generate prosumer energy, which is suitable for any area regardless of climatic conditions.

1.4.

The wide-scale arrival of prosumers on the energy market has been made possible thanks to new technologies, the digital revolution and the expectations of consumers that they should be able to participate directly in economic processes.

1.5.

To ensure that the concept of the prosumer is better understood in the Member States, it is suggested that the Commission draw up a framework definition of the prosumer covering essential common elements, such as: size of the installation, individual and collective power generation, ownership of the installation and the issue of power generation surpluses.

1.6.

Anyone can become a prosumer regardless of whether they own property, installations or facilities used to generate prosumer energy. For example, both the owner of a family house and the tenant of an apartment in an apartment block can become a prosumer.

1.7.

The economic advantages of prosumer energy, which are mainly associated with lower energy transmission costs, better use of local energy sources and the economic activation of local communities, should in the not too distant future enable this kind of energy to be generated without the need for additional support mechanisms.

1.8.

The savings and social benefits of a more informed and active consumption, the decentralised use of renewable energy sources, the reduction of network losses and efficiencies resulting from cooperation can rapidly result in a positive return on the investment in prosumer energy generating facilities, the development of transmission, distribution and local networks and their management system, as well as the development of energy storage.

1.9.

On no account should the systems used to support prosumers distort competition on the energy market or eliminate other operators. They must also take into account that there are energy consumers in this market who cannot or do not wish to become prosumers.

1.10.

Financial solutions which are likely to have an impact on prosumers, such as taxes, tariffs and other charges, should be favourable to them. Under no circumstances should they discriminate against prosumers on the energy market.

1.11.

The dynamic growth of prosumer energy depends on the creation of good partnerships between prosumers, other energy producers and companies working in the field of energy transmission and distribution. Conditions need to be put in place that enable all energy market stakeholders to reap the benefits of the growth of prosumerism. The EESC suggests that the Commission carry out tests to find solutions in this area.

1.12.

Solutions are required to protect prosumers from the monopolistic practices of energy transmission and distribution companies, and of large energy producers.

1.13.

In general, prosumers generate energy for their own needs (individual and those of groups of individuals, private households, farms and small businesses). A perfect match between the capacity of energy installations and own energy needs is not achievable. It is therefore crucial to find a solution to the problem of surplus energy. The issue is all the more important if we wish to encourage prosumers to lower their energy consumption — something we should do as a matter of routine.

1.14.

Smart living systems should be used to support optimal energy consumption by prosumers. The EESC calls for this to be included in the system solutions currently being drawn up by the European Commission.

1.15.

Given the small scale of the power generated by individual prosumers, prosumers should not be restricted in their access to the network.

1.16.

Distribution and transmission networks, and the way in which they operate, must be adapted to take account of the growth in prosumer energy. Prosumers should contribute to the costs arising in this connection, but transparent rules should be drawn up for contributing to these costs.

1.17.

If the necessary development of prosumer energy is to be achieved, smart local networks also need to be developed. The EESC sees the roll-out of smart meters as part of the network infrastructure, and the related financing costs should not therefore be directly borne by consumers. The EESC draws attention to the need to ensure the protection of any data that is collected.

1.18.

The benefits of prosumer energy will increase sharply as a result of the development of small-scale energy storage facilities. The Committee suggests that scientific research should continue to focus on improving existing energy storage technologies and looking for new ones.

1.19.

One way of stepping up development of prosumer energy is to create power cooperatives or other forms of prosumer groups. Groups of prosumers are more effective. Among other things, they benefit from lower energy generation costs, have a stronger position in the energy market and assume a direct role in improving local energy security.

1.20.

Groups of prosumers are better able to balance the energy they generate with their own energy needs. This in turn further reduces the transmission of energy, meaning lower energy costs for members of the group. As a result of smaller fluctuations in supply and demand, prosumer groups are more effective at influencing the distribution and transmission network than individual prosumers.

1.21.

The EESC suggests that the Commission attach the utmost importance to the development of prosumer energy in activities relating to the construction of nearly zero energy buildings.

1.22.

The Committee proposes that the Commission take account of prosumer energy issues in the current Electricity Market Design and Renewables Package review initiatives.

1.23.

The EESC believes that the benefits of prosumer energy should be applied in an active policy of reducing energy poverty and protecting particularly socially vulnerable groups, as well in addressing issues connected with the silver economy and the ageing society. The involvement of civil society organisations will be key in this respect.

1.24.

The widespread development of prosumerism is also an opportunity to activate local businesses, thereby creating new jobs linked to the establishment of key facilities and services.

1.25.

The involvement of local and regional authorities will have a huge impact on the further development of prosumer energy. The EESC recommends that the Commission take account of this issue in its Covenant of Mayors activities.

1.26.

Given that prosumer energy is at a different stage of development in the Member States, it would be a good idea to organise various exchanges of experience. The EESC suggests that the Commission monitor the development of prosumerism in the Member States as part of the annual Energy Union reporting. The data collected will be extremely helpful for the activities carried out by the Member States.

1.27.

The widespread introduction of prosumerism is a complex, multi-faceted and lengthy process. It is therefore important that solutions to encourage development of prosumer energy are sustainable over the long term.

2.1.

Access to energy sources, security of supply and pricing policies that take into account the interests of vulnerable social groups and consumers in difficult situations are a major challenge for societies, all political administrations and individual consumers.

2.2.

Until recently, we were unable to effectively obtain energy in any other way than through combustion, with the possible exception of hydroelectric power. Technological developments have made it possible for energy to be widely produced without having to burn anything. We have learned to produce energy in its cleanest form from sunlight, without polluting the environment. Furthermore, this energy source is both free and inexhaustible and the only costs incurred are those of the installations.

2.3.

It is equally effective to generate electricity from wind power, i.e. from the same source, the sun, which, in the process of warming the Earth, causes movements of air masses. This also includes biomass, as photosynthesis is the principal reason for its renewal.

2.4.

The development of renewable energy is inevitable in the face of the reduced availability of fossil fuels arising from the fact that they are being progressively exhausted, the dependence of many countries on imports and global warming and air pollution. These problems have meant that Europe, and with it the majority of the largest economies, have begun to invest in RES.

2.5.

At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, fundamental socioeconomic principles were adopted requiring environmental protection, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

2.6.

In September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). One of them (SDG 7) is to ensure access to sustainable energy for all. Today, 1,2 billion people in the world have no access to electricity.

2.7.

More than 120 million EU citizens are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. 10 % of Europeans live in households where no-one has a job; the number of homeless is rising. These figures also mean energy poverty.

2.8.

Civil societies are showing overwhelming support for RES. This was confirmed in 2015 by Pope Francis’ Environmental Encyclical and declarations on climate change by Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist religious leaders. They called on faith communities to commit to a zero- or low-carbon future.

2.9.

The need to move away from fossil fuels was reinforced at the 2015 COP21 conference in Paris in which 200 countries took part. This was, above all, about ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 oC above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1,5 oC’.

3.1.

Over the last half century the Earth’s population has tripled. The fragility of the global financial system has posed the threat of long-term stagnation in the world economy. The high level of unemployment and rising energy costs have caused instability in many countries: the costs of doing business and the burden on consumers have risen.

3.2.

The world has been faced with the need for an economic paradigm shift and transformation of business models, also in the social sphere. Instruments for the new system have emerged as a result of the digital revolution and the internet of Things.

3.3.

By 2020 there will be more than 50 billion devices connected to the network on the market, i.e. seven times more than there are people in the world. A smartphone, rather than a PC, has already become the most important window for communication with the world. In 2020, there will be around 6,1 billion of them on the market.

3.4.

The internet of Things has made it possible for millions of people to participate in social networks. The sharing economy model has emerged, which is better adapted to an organisation of society focused on social cohesion. The economy is beginning to move from centralised institutions managed in a top-down way to the idea of sharing, and many excluded social groups are being given the chance to participate actively in economic life.

3.5.

Online platforms can make consumers into producers, creating and disseminating information and products made using 3D printers. Platforms make it possible to share cars, homes, clothes and other items. The consumer/producer can undertake training on the internet, obtain medical advice or find a craftsman for home renovation. Social entrepreneurs, avoiding the banking establishment and using crowd-funding, can fund their economic activities in the young sharing economy.

3.6.

In a world of digital opportunities social capital becomes just as important as financial capital, access becomes more important than ownership, and ‘exchange value’ on capitalist markets is increasingly replaced by ‘sharing value’ in the cooperative community.

3.7.

The development of digital technology and new business models in the energy sector, including the distributed energy model, make it possible to regard rural areas, suburbs of conurbations, residential areas consisting of single-family houses, single-building communities and housing associations as large power plants with enormous potential. The same applies to the cloud of distributed sources which give rise to the new doctrine of energy security, built from the bottom-up — from households, farms, small businesses and micro-cooperatives.

3.8.

In the energy sector, the internet has made it possible — in the framework of the sharing economy — for millions of people to participate in social networks, producing electricity in their homes, office buildings, on the roofs of warehouses, and then sharing it by means of the internet of Energy, just as today we create and exchange information on the network. Elements of that system which still need to be significantly developed include energy storage, the ‘internetisation’ of energy networks and electric cars.

4.1.

Producing clean energy to supplement the market and replacing fossil fuels have made it necessary to transform energy systems and introduce rules on the participation of new players in the market.

4.2.

In accordance with the Article 2(3) of the Lisbon Treaty, sustainable development in Europe takes place in a social market economy. The civil society partners play an important role in this and public acceptance of the transformation of our energy systems, especially at the local level, is crucial.

4.3.

The European Union has drawn up targets on the Energy Union and transforming the EU into an energy-efficient, low-carbon economy by 2030. Two of the main targets are to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40 % and increase the share of renewable energy sources to 27 % without setting country-specific indicators. A low-energy economy will ensure energy security and economic growth with low levels of CO2 emissions and, in the longer term, an increase in the production and consumption of locally produced energy. According to the most recent available data, in 2014 RES made it possible to reduce global CO2 emissions by 380 Mt.

4.4.

One of the individual 2030 targets outlined by the EU is to cut spending on energy by private consumers and businesses. They will be able to actively enter the energy market as a result of the possibilities created by new technologies.

4.5.

The EU energy balance is dependent on trade. More than half the EU’s internal annual gross domestic energy consumption, amounting to EUR 400 billion, comes from imports. Some studies show that by 2030 the EU’s dependency on external energy supplies may reach 70 %. It has been estimated that RES made it possible to reduce global fossil fuel use by 114 Mtoe in 2014.

4.6.

It is key for the EU to improve its energy balance. One solution is for energy to be produced from many local sources directly by individual consumers. Without broad grassroots support for renewable energy production to satisfy local needs, many countries may have difficulties in ensuring that their systems are secure.

4.7.

Technological developments in energy production in home installations, increasingly efficient energy storage solutions, transmission of energy over smart grids, use of smart meters and local demand management mean that consumer installations can have a significant effect on the energy basket of each country.

4.8.

The renewable energy sector is a strong factor in technological innovation. It is essential to the fundamental transformation of Europe’s energy system in the framework of the Digital Single Market strategy.

4.9.

The transformation of passive consumers into active ‘prosumers’ in various sectors and the possibility of integrating micro-entrepreneurs and the single market strategy into the digital era of the internet of Things are described in the European Commission’s May 2016 Digital Single Market Strategy (COM(2015) 192 final), which is built on three pillars: 1) better access to online goods and services, 2) the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish, and 3) the growth potential of the European Digital Economy. This could bring the EU economy EUR 415 billion per year and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs, including in the renewable energy sector.

4.10.

The market, which is dominated by major energy producers and distributors, must be opened up to individual players and become more distributed. Electricity will no longer flow ‘top-down’ in a centrally regulated way from large power plants to consumers. It will be produced from many decentralised renewable energy sources.

4.11.

The degree of distribution of electricity generation needs to be adapted to the specificities of energy consumers. Differences in this area may be associated above all with the operation of energy-intensive industries in a given country.

4.12.

Currently energy security increasingly depends on the resilience of the energy system to terrorist attacks. By developing distributed generation we also increase energy security, as decentralised generation is less vulnerable to terrorist threats.

4.13.

Distributed energy sources make it possible to look at the problem of continuity of energy supply to operators whose activities are highly dependent on electrical current (e.g. poultry-breeding farms, processing plants, cold stores). There are EU countries where power cuts average no more than twenty minutes per year, but there are others where cuts in supply vary from 450 to 500 minutes. Prosumer micro-installations ensure business continuity for producers of this kind.

4.14.

The opportunities created by the general development of distributed prosumer energy can be exploited in the socially important areas of the EU identified in the Europe 2020 strategy in connection with the solution of the demographic problems associated with an ageing society and combating poverty and social exclusion.

4.14.1.

One of the objectives of the strategy is to reduce by at least 20 million the enormous number of 122 million people at risk of poverty and social exclusion. Support will be provided by operational support programmes, active labour market instruments and targeted funds, including at least 20 % of the European Social Fund budget. Logistical and financial support for these people to set up energy micro-cooperatives and/or to join existing local internet of Things businesses could facilitate their occupational and social integration and help them to escape from the risk of poverty.

4.14.2.

Similar challenges exist in relation to the silver economy. The EU faces a historic challenge of a kind which no society has ever before faced, namely sharply rising longevity and the simultaneous general digitalisation of life, which call for the introduction of unconventional economic solutions as well as new social strategies.

4.14.3.

In 2060 there will be two senior citizens for every young person (1). The elderly population and older workers should be viewed not as a threat and a burden on society but as an opportunity in the age of the digital revolution for the creation of a job-rich economy, building on the extensive experience and leisure time of senior citizens and their financial capital — even if modest — for investing safely in digital-age enterprises. One possibility would be the involvement of older people as e-seniors in energy generation activities, for example through cooperative power plants located in housing estates or blocks of flats.

5.1.

The distinguishing feature of modern capitalism was a definition of the concept of consumption in relation to production and marketing processes, consumption no longer being the privilege of a wealthy elite but rather a mass phenomenon.

5.2.

The term ‘prosumer’ was first introduced in 1980 by the writer and futurist, Alvin Toffler. In ‘The Third Wave’, he defined prosumption as the blurring of the distinction between production and consumption in the market. The third wave was a process involving the participation of individuals or organised groups of prosumers in the production of products intended for personal use, which, in turn, shifted the boundaries between producers and consumers.

5.3.

The concept of a market in which consumers, including households, were perceived exclusively as passive market participants was not in line with the challenges brought about by technological developments. As early as 1972, Marshall McLuhan and Barrington Nevitt predicted that, as electrical technology developed, the consumer would be able to become the producer.

5.4.

The backbone of a modern economy is the secure and affordable supply of energy to consumers, taking into account the need to protect vulnerable social groups as part of the fight against energy poverty.

5.5.

Prosumers are individuals, groups of individuals, households or farms able to operate in an organised way, e.g. through associations, foundations or cooperatives, that are both producers and consumers of energy produced in small installations located in back yards or on residential or commercial buildings (e.g. mini wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, solar collectors and heat pumps). Prosumers can also be small businesses, including social enterprises and local authorities.

5.6.

The concept of prosumerism includes, in addition to electricity generation, heating and cooling.

5.7.

In principle, prosumers produce energy for their own private use. They become the co-producer of the goods consumed. Individuals who produce an amount of energy similar to what they consume are also considered prosumers, even if the two processes are not simultaneous. For instance, this is the case when they produce energy mainly during the day, but consume relatively little for their own needs, selling off any surplus to other consumers and consuming most of their energy at times when they themselves are producing much less of it.

5.8.

Individual prosumption requires life to be organised differently. It can, to a large extent, be linked to a dissatisfaction with mass, standardised production. Modern consumers in the digital age want to be treated as individuals and see an opportunity to meet their individual needs and aspirations. They are consciously getting involved in projects related to environmental protection and combatting greenhouse gas emissions.

5.9.

Prosumers associate the transition to a modern energy system with development, the need for creativity and independence. The most active group of prosumers on this market is the net generation. This generation is distinctive in that it does not see the world from the perspective of consumption but through production. It aspires to meet needs related to freedom, credibility in society, a fast-paced life and innovativeness.

5.10.

The first prosumer processes originated in simple self-service operations and e-commerce and in the process of making consumption less market-orientated. Other causes of prosumption are changes in the job market, computerisation of everyday activities, the possibility of working from home (teleworking), more free time and the need to make use of it in the best way possible.

5.11.

The market-based reason for the rise of prosumption, not only in the energy sector, is the fall in household incomes during the crisis, rising prices of goods and services, the need to save on an everyday basis and the production of goods and services by individuals for personal use for economic reasons.

5.12.

Many countries see benefits from the simultaneous development of distributed energy sources, including micro-installations. The upper limit on their power is usually 50-100 kW. This applies to prosumer installations, in particular.

5.13.

Prosumer energy can be regarded as an essential element of the transition to distributed generation, i.e. a solution that is generally desirable from the point of view of energy security, and bearing in mind environmental and social considerations.

5.14.

The broad implementation of prosumerism should significantly facilitate the accomplishment of the tasks arising from COP 21 in Paris.

5.15.

The EU has put consumers at the heart of its energy policy, making it possible for them to make active use of new technologies. In recent years new RES technologies have emerged, for both large-scale industrial installations and smaller-scale projects, with significant reductions in the cost of underlying investments. For example, the cost of solar PV modules fell by 80 % between 2008 and 2012. As a result, businesses and households have been able to start producing and consuming their own electricity profitably.

5.16.

Bearing in mind the advantages of the development of prosumer energy, it makes sense to encourage potential prosumers to become active in this field. This support could include the removal of barriers and the simplification of administrative procedures, easier network connections and favourable conditions for the sale of surplus electricity.

6.1.

An energy cooperative is a voluntary association with an unlimited number of members and legal personality. The objective of an energy cooperative is to meet the energy needs of its members.

6.2.

A prosumer can act individually or together with neighbours in an apartment block housing several families. We speak of a cooperative when several people invest in the installations. They may consist of entire groups of residents on a particular site. The idea is to produce electricity or heat using renewable energy sources to meet personal needs and possibly to sell any surplus to the grid. Three natural persons are required for this in Germany, in Poland ten natural persons or three legal persons.

6.3.

The German experience of recent years shows that the aim of cooperatives is not to maximise profits but, above all, to provide economic assistance and support to their members. Every fourth cooperative out of nearly a thousand was financed solely from members’ contributions. In the case of the remaining cooperatives, two thirds of the funding was obtained from cooperative banks. Every member has one vote, regardless of the amount of his/her financial contribution. Generally, this is not a large amount, and it is laid down in the cooperative’s statutes. If a cooperative makes losses, members’ liability is limited to the amount of their investment.

6.3.1.

Cooperatives have to function effectively in economic terms, like any business. The advantage of cooperatives was the negligible proportion of bankruptcies in this sector (about 0,1 % of all bankruptcies in Germany). Initially dividends averaging 5-6 % were paid; currently they average 2-3 %.

6.3.2.

Municipalities in Germany are very important partners for energy cooperatives, and not just by making roofs and municipal buildings available for investment. Often mayors have taken the initiative for the formation of energy cooperatives and have tried to win over local people to this idea.

6.4.

One notable effect of the formation of energy cooperatives is the opportunity of obtaining energy at a lower cost than would otherwise be possible for individuals.

6.5.

Energy cooperatives very significantly strengthen the position of prosumers compared to large players in the energy market.

6.6.

Energy cooperatives also directly involve local people in the process of increasing energy security in their area. This is essential for optimising solutions tailored to the needs and conditions of local communities.

6.7.

The cooperative movement, particularly in the old EU countries, played a significant role in driving growth and boosting economic competitiveness, as well as fostering European values such as solidarity, autonomy and democracy. The economic potential of cooperatives in the old EU countries is still huge. For the central and eastern European countries from the former socialist bloc, the socialist origins of the cooperative movement as well as the policy of that time of bringing cooperatives under the control of central and regional authorities are today acting as a hindrance to prosumer cooperatives and having a negative effect on attitudes towards them.

6.8.

The self-consumption model has opened up the possibility of reducing energy costs, especially for SMEs, for which high electricity prices constituted a serious burden. Among residential consumers new models have emerged, ranging from PV panels on roofs, owned either by the household or third parties, to projects implemented by civic renewable energy cooperatives.

2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/53

Rapporteur:

Stéphane BUFFETAUT

1.1.

Scientists and engineers have been working for many years to harness the energy of the oceans. Currents, tides and the force exerted by swells contain indefinitely renewable reserves of energy. In France, EDF’s Rance tidal power station, inaugurated in 1966 by General de Gaulle, generates a capacity of 240 MW, its 24 turbines each generating 10 MW. The latest wind turbines generate at most 8 MW. Thus this technology is effective, even if the Rance barrage was for a long time the only such facility in the entire world. There is now another example of a similar installation in Lake Sihwa, South Korea, with a capacity of up to 254 MW. There were projects in the UK, but they have been blocked or suspended due to objections on ecological grounds.

1.2.

The fact remains that such investments are worthwhile when installed in favourable geographical locations with strong tidal coefficients, and should be given more consideration in the national energy mix.

1.3.

The first industrial applications have been implemented, showing that these techniques should not be seen as risky experiments but as clean energy sources to be developed.

1.4.

The EESC is therefore of the view that this type of renewable energy production should be developed and that there should not be an exclusive focus on wind turbine and solar technologies. Of course, marine energy cannot be harnessed everywhere, but it would be detrimental to disregard a predictable source of renewable energy with a minor — or manageable — impact on the environment. It is universally acknowledged that the future of energy will be based on a variety of sources of supply.

1.5.

On 6 June 2016, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden decided to strengthen their cooperation on offshore wind energy. Along with the European commissioners for Energy Union and the climate, they signed an action plan tailored to Europe’s northern waters. Specifically, this cooperation will involve harmonising regulations and the subsidy system for offshore wind energy, as well as interlinking electricity networks.

1.5.1.

The EESC strongly recommends adopting a similar approach regarding marine energy — whether water turbines or tidal barrages — that promotes cooperation between Member States or neighbouring countries of the European Union that have suitable sites for this type of facility (mainly those with Atlantic or North Sea coastlines).

1.6.

It is also of the view that techniques that have yet to be fully developed — such as wave power and ocean thermal energy — should not be neglected; however, at a time when public funds are scarce, funding should be allocated according to efficiency criteria. Therefore, priority should be given to the technologies that offer the fastest progress.

1.7.

It emphasises that investing in this field would enable the European Union to eventually take its place at the forefront of new renewable energy sources. European companies already hold 40 % of renewable energy patents. The EESC recommends keeping up research and development efforts in the area of marine energy, but also with regard to storing energy produced from intermittent sources, so the production of renewable energy can be smoothed out.

1.8.

It warns against the temptation to restrict subsidies to the classic forms of renewable energy, an approach that would reduce the number of options and distort the renewable energy economy in favour of technologies promoted by an effective lobby.

2.1.

Most of our planet is covered by oceans, and it would be more accurate to call it ‘planet sea’ rather than ‘planet earth’. Humans have always fished for food. Recently, we have managed to exploit the resources that lie in or under the sea floor (polymetallic nodules, oil, etc.). Meanwhile, the energy generated by the oceans has been used for centuries, but on a small scale, by means of tide mills on some coastlines.

2.2.

The current need to combat all kinds of pollution and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should encourage us to look into the energy potential of the sea. Indeed, how could the European Union and Member States with access to the sea not take an interest in the energy opportunities that the oceans could offer?

2.3.

While Europe has an extensive maritime domain, making use of the renewable energy resources of these vast expanses is still in its infancy. However, the European Union and Member States could help innovative companies and industrial groups within the energy sector to promote the implementation of new techniques to harness sea energy. This is what the marine energy forum hopes to do.

2.4.

The sea offers various renewable energy sources: swells, waves, currents, tides, temperature differences between surface waters, wind. Each technique and method has its own geographical and ecological requirements, meaning that these innovative techniques are only feasible if the constraints and the consequences involved are taken into account.

3.1.

Anyone who has ever contemplated a calm or raging sea knows that there are forces at work in the vastness of the oceans, and that they are constantly moving. It is therefore natural to wonder whether it would be possible to harness or harvest the energy produced by the sea.

3.2.

In practice, what techniques have been studied and put in place?

3.3.

In practice, harnessing tidal currents seems to be the most promising technique. However, location has a large impact on the potential of these techniques. The most promising areas of the Atlantic and the North Sea are those with the biggest tidal coefficients, for the most effective areas are those with a large tidal range. The great advantage of this type of power generation is that it is predictable and regular, as tides are constant and their range is well known in advance.

According to EDF, the European Union could generate around 5 GW of power (2,5 GW of which would come from the French coastline) — the equivalent of twelve 10 800 MW nuclear reactors. Nevertheless, aside from the Rance barrage, harnessing tidal currents is in the technological research phase and is not yet operational.

3.4.

What water turbine technologies are being tested?

4.1.

There is a vast array of wave power solutions: submerged, surface, onshore and offshore prototypes. Energy is captured differently from one prototype to another: mechanical energy is captured at the surface (undulations) or under water (translational or orbital motion), pressure variations between waves are captured (variations in water level) or an amount of water is physically captured by means of a reservoir.

4.2.

The main drawback is that wave power is not easy to predict, unlike tidal currents. Harnessing the energy of swells and waves is currently at the technological research stage and is not yet operational. However, six different techniques are being tested:

5.1.

This involves making use of the temperature difference between surface water and deep water in the oceans. A frequently used acronym is OTEC, which stands for ocean thermal energy conversion. European Union texts use the term ‘hydrothermal energy’ to mean ‘energy stored in the form of heat in surface water’.

5.2.

Solar energy raises the water temperature at the surface — it may exceed 25 oC between the tropics — while deeper down, starved of solar radiation, the water is cold, at around 2 oC to 4 oC, except in enclosed seas such as the Mediterranean. Moreover, the cold layers do not mix with the warm layers. This temperature difference can be harnessed by means of a heat engine. To produce power, a heat engine needs a cold and a warm source, and uses deep water and surface water as these cold and warm sources.

5.3.

But to be able to function optimally and profitably, this type of OTEC must operate in specific areas with surface water at a certain temperature and with water of a certain depth. The necessary pipes can be sunk to a depth of around one thousand metres at reasonable cost and using current technology. It would be senseless, therefore, to install OTEC facilities kilometres offshore, as this would require longer pipes, incurring additional costs. In practice, the optimal area is between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn, i.e. between a latitude of 30 oN and 30 oS — in the European Union’s ‘outermost regions’.

6.1.

Although they do not, strictly speaking, fall under the category of marine energy, wind turbines that are attached to the sea floor or floating (while anchored, of course) should also be mentioned. They are by far the most developed offshore technique and seem almost conventional compared to those explored above. However, they have an undeniable visual and environmental impact. The question of conflicting use with fishermen has often been raised. In practice, wind farms that are attached to the sea floor act as marine reserves in which fish proliferate. As a result, they indirectly benefit fishermen by rebuilding stocks in areas closed to fishing, where mast foundations perform the function of artificial reefs.

6.2.

This is the most frequently used method in Europe, and it is booming. To date, almost one hundred wind farms have been installed, mainly in the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean (United Kingdom) and the Baltic Sea. There are few installations or plans in the Mediterranean, which is a deep sea with little or no continental shelf.

6.3.

The major milestones in implementing these techniques can be summarised as follows:

6.4.

There are also two significant projects off the French coast, one in Brittany, and the other between the islands of Noirmoutier and Yeu. The calls for tender have been issued and the operating consortia have been chosen.

6.5.

The economic return of offshore wind farms is affected by their location, in particular by the strength and regularity of the wind. It can thus vary by a factor of two. During periods of slack demand, surplus power supplied by wind has occasionally been sold on spot markets at negative prices. Thus the considerable boom of this type of electricity production can lead to surpluses that are very difficult to make use of, because they are linked to one-off, random weather events (see Professor Wolf’s opinion on intermittent energy sources).

6.6.

The development of this method and technological advances linked to the use of wind turbines over the last 20 years are making them cheaper to invest in and to operate. In the early 2000s, the cost per megawatt hour was EUR 190; now it is between EUR 140 and EUR 160. In comparison, a modern EPR nuclear reactor generates one megawatt hour at a cost of EUR 130, although it does so stably and predictably.

6.7.

Clearly, the other techniques for generating offshore power will have to confront competition from offshore wind turbines if they are to be able to expand to an industrial scale, and will have to prove that they have a competitive edge over offshore wind turbines, which incur not insignificant monitoring and maintenance costs. Water turbines and estuary barrages currently seem to be the most effective and most profitable systems. One of their advantages is that they provide predictable and regular power.

7.1.

As it is a type of green energy, offshore renewable energy is eligible for various European or national support schemes, including preferential purchase terms. However, apart from offshore wind turbines, these technologies — particularly water turbines — still need to be tested ‘in real life’. Hopefully, a certain strain of ecological conservatism will not impede the new techniques being tested. It is well known that fierce opposition from environmentalists and fishermen, in particular, has prevented estuary barrages from being developed. Any installation has environmental impacts. We therefore need to be able to measure these impacts as accurately as possible so as to assess the real balance between costs and benefits.

7.2.

The first water turbine array was recently submerged between Paimpol and the island of Bréhat. The currents created by the rising and falling tides drive the turbines’ rotors; each device can generate 1 MW and these water turbines will be able to meet the energy needs of 3 000 homes.

7.3.

Finally, these techniques for generating marine power all depend on their location to be effective. Therefore, they are not a universally effective source of power. We will therefore need to be more sensible in this area than in the case of some other subsidised renewable energies, such as solar panels, which are sometimes installed more due to tax advantages than because they are effective. It should also be noted that taxing CO2 will help to make renewable energy production techniques, currently at an embryonic stage, economically worthwhile.

2.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/58

Rapporteur:

Ioannis VARDAKASTANIS

1.1.

The EESC welcomes the 2030 Agenda as it includes an ambitious set of goals and targets to transform our world and marks a historic shift in the way that economic, social and environmental disparities are addressed worldwide. As the European Union (EU) plays an important international role in terms of diplomacy, the promotion of human rights, trade, development and humanitarian aid, as well as working with multilateral organisations and bilaterally with third countries, it can have a huge influence on the process of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at global level. However, the voluntary reporting may undermine the coherent, effective and measurable implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The EESC calls on the EU to approach the implementation of the 2030 Agenda as an obligation and opportunity to shape future EU policies and programmes. The EESC also points out that the EU should embrace the 2030 Agenda as it offers and provides a new forward looking narrative for making the EU a Sustainable Development Union and accordingly presents to EU citizens and the rest of the world a new vision for inclusive human development.

1.2.

The 2030 Agenda fully reflects the European values of prosperity for all, human rights, social justice, combating poverty, democratic governance, the social market economy and environmental protection. Therefore, the EU is expected to play a leading role in implementing the 2030 Agenda and to contribute to achieving the SDGs at global level. The EU will thus be acknowledged to be a leading actor in the promotion of environmentally, socially and economically responsible and sustainable development, as well as respect for human rights, gender equality, non-discrimination and support for vulnerable groups. The eradication of poverty should be an overarching priority in the EU’s policies and programmes. Furthermore, the principles of climate justice and ‘just transition’ should be fully and effectively mainstreamed and integrated into the EU’s overarching strategy for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

1.3.

The EESC points out that the EU will only be able to meet its commitment to sustainable development at global level and therefore to substantially and effectively promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda if it makes the necessary changes in order to adapt its policies and programmes to the three pillars of the SDGs in a balanced and inclusive way. The EU and the Member States have a moral and political obligation to both EU citizens and the rest of the world to address the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in a politically coherent and coordinated way. The EU institutions and the Member States urgently need to agree on the way forward at the highest political level through an interinstitutional agreement between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament in order to establish a robust basis for further political action (1). This agreement on the implementation of the SDGs should form the basis for an overarching strategy to mainstream the 2030 Agenda with the aim of making the EU a Sustainable Development Union.

1.4.

As it had done in an earlier opinion (2), the EESC calls for the establishment of a Sustainable Development Civil Society Forum to promote and monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in order to ensure consistency in the EU’s internal and external policies and programmes. In this Forum all stakeholders, including the Council, Commission, Parliament and civil society, should participate fully as key actors, making the Forum’s work transparent and accountable to European citizens. The EESC is ready to facilitate this process.

1.5.

The EU itself should proactively present a periodic voluntary review to the Session of the UN High Level Political Forum on its internal and external policies and programmes, starting in 2017. The EU will be the first regional organisation to do so. In addition, the EU should prepare annual thematic reports in line with the annual thematic reviews of the UN HLPF. Civil society should be fully included in this reporting process through the European Sustainable Development Forum. The EESC is ready to facilitate this process (3).

1.6.

The EU has an obligation to comply fully with international and European treaties and agreements safeguarding the environment, human rights and economic, social and cultural rights. Therefore, international and European legislation should underpin the EU’s approach to the implementation, monitoring and review of the 2030 Agenda. The voluntary character of the 2030 Agenda should not undermine the obligation to fully and effectively mainstream and integrate its obligation to international and European law into the EU’s overarching strategy for the implementation of the SDGs. This The EU’s international obligations should be applicable to all EU’s policies and programmes.

1.7.

The European Commission needs to address the way in which the instruments of external action factor in the 2030 Agenda. The mapping exercise of external policies is the first step, but this is not enough and needs to be flanked by a detailed and comprehensive gap analysis and assessment in order to identify the real gaps that exist between current external policies and programmes and the future ones that should fully include, mainstream and integrate, in a balanced and fair way, the economic, social and environmental pillars of the 2030 Agenda. Therefore, the EESC calls on the Commission to take specific action to include this in the forthcoming communication on the implementation of the SDGs.

1.8.

The European Commission needs to fully integrate and mainstream the 2030 Agenda into the external action of the European Union. The EU is a major actor in the world, interacting with other stakeholders (public, intergovernmental, private and non-governmental) through its external action and instruments. Therefore, the European Commission should fully utilise key areas, such as trade and development policies, neighbourhood policy, environment policies and climate action, foreign and security policy, social and solidarity economy, human rights promotion, humanitarian aid, disaster risk reduction and technology transfers, to proactively push forward the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The European Commission needs to fully integrate and utilise the 2030 Agenda in the European Consensus on Development, and the EESC regrets that it has not been sufficiently included in the EU’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (4). The European Commission should include in the long awaited and much delayed Communication on the 2030 Agenda a meaningful programme to achieve policy coherence and policy coordination in its external actions and programmes in order to guarantee a sustainable development approach which is mainstreamed into all external policies.

1.9.

The European Commission and more particularly the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy should establish effective mechanisms to coordinate official development assistance and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda in a coherent way, so as to ensure that ODA goes to partnerships and specific programmes and projects that are developed in accordance with the three pillars of the 2030 Agenda, fully taking into account the principles of poverty eradication, ‘no one is left behind’, climate justice, just transition, inclusive growth and development, promoting modernisation, infrastructure development and sustainable businesses, combating inequality and ensuring respect for human rights.

1.10.

The EESC recommends that the European Commission utilise the conditionality approach of the European Structural and Investment Funds during the process of mainstreaming the 2030 Agenda into instruments for external action and therefore a similar 2030 Agenda conditionality approach should be applied to all SDG-related policies and programmes.

1.11.

The EU delegations in third countries should conduct surveys in order to measure public awareness and understanding of the Sustainable Development Goals. The European Commission should organise and carry out awareness-raising activities and campaigns to make the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development a European Agenda. The European Commission should undertake periodic Eurobarometer surveys in order to measure awareness and understanding of the Sustainable Development Goals among EU citizens. Civil society organisations have a crucial role to play in this process.

1.12.

The EESC calls on the European Commission to issue an annual report on the implementation of external action and funds in regard to the 2030 Agenda. This should be part of the planned annual EU reports on the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. The European Commission should also draw up and include a set of 2030 Agenda indicators and benchmarks in its external policies and programmes in order to facilitate evaluation, assessment and reporting on how effectively the EU external instruments channel funding towards SDG-related projects and programmes, and specifically how the economic, social and environmental pillars of the 2030 Agenda are taken on board in the EU’s external action instruments.

1.13.

The European Commission should promote the multi-stakeholder-led governance model in its external policies and programmes, making civil society organisations in third countries real partners in the implementation of the SDGs. Transparency, accountability and partnership should underpin this new approach to consultation and participatory decision making. The democratic implementation of the 2030 Agenda requires full inclusion of civil society organisations at all stages, including monitoring and review.

1.14.

The EESC calls on the European Commission to mainstream capacity building of civil society organisations in its funding instruments and in its external policies and programmes. The Commission should set up a specific programme and funding line to support the capacity building of civil society organisations (CSOs) so that they can participate fully in this process. Existing capacity-building programmes need to be more explicitly opened to CSOs that are building bridges between local issues and governance issues (5).

1.15.

As the EESC interacts with a wide range of partners in many countries around the world, the EESC is ready to facilitate the real and meaningful involvement of all partners (mainly from civil society) in the implementation and monitoring of the SDGs and to this end it undertakes to facilitate the participation of civil society in implementation at national level.

2.1.

The EESC welcomes the commitment entitled ‘Transforming our world’ made by the world’s leaders on 25 September 2015 to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which establishes a set of goals to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all. Each goal has specific targets to be achieved over the next 15 years. Therefore, the 2030 Agenda is expected to promote the creation and establishment of strong and inclusive partnerships between all stakeholders and so to strongly support the delivery of a new governance model at global level.

2.2.

The 2030 Agenda is characterised by its universal, indivisible and integrated approach to the economic, social and environmental pillars, thus striking a unique balance between the three dimensions of sustainable development. That is why the 2030 Agenda constitutes a historic change in the way that economic, social and environmental disparities around the world are addressed.

2.3.

The 2030 Agenda is a plan of action for people, the planet and prosperity. It sets out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets equally addressing the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development in order to ensure prosperity for all, build on the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals, address the MDGs’ deficits and shortcomings, and offer to the world a new vision for sustainable development and inclusive growth which will benefit all parts of the population. The 2030 Agenda also aims to protect, promote and deliver human rights and equality for all, with more emphasis on gender equality (Goal 5).

2.4.

The EESC embraces and fully supports the importance of the principle ‘no one is left behind’, which applies to all SDGs and targets and which therefore should be fully mainstreamed when developing partnerships, policies and action to implement and monitor the 2030 Agenda.

2.5.

The 2030 Agenda established a high-level governance structure at the UN level called the High Level Political Forum (HLPF), a multi-stakeholder platform mandated to carry out systematic reviews and follow up on the 2030 Agenda’s implementation. The first meeting of the HLPF, after the signing of the 2030 Agenda, took place in July 2016 and 22 governments, including four EU Member States, submitted the first ever Voluntary National Reviews (NVR), reporting on efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in their countries (the countries were Estonia, Finland, France and Germany as well as China, Colombia, Egypt, Georgia, Madagascar, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Uganda and Venezuela).

2.6.

During the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, more focus should be placed on action, policies, programmes and the creation of multi-stakeholder, transparent and participatory partnerships aiming to eradicate the economic, social and environmental disparities around the world based on the principles of universality, indivisibility, transparency, accountability and human rights.

2.7.

The universal and indivisible nature of the 2030 Agenda applies equally to developing and developed countries and its implementation requires transformational economic, social and environmental changes on all sides. As the EU is expected to lead by example in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the EU and the Member States should align all policies and programmes to meet the objectives of combating poverty and inequality, preserving the planet and creating inclusive economic growth in a balanced and coherent way, benefitting all parts of the population equally, and integrating and mainstreaming the three pillars of the SDGs.

2.8.

The EU institutions will need to initiate high-level processes that will result in high-level political decisions to make the EU a Sustainable Development Union. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that an overarching strategy for the implementation of the SDGs be developed to promote, deliver and mainstream coherence and coordination in the EU’s policies and programmes in a balanced way, taking equally into account the three pillars of the 2030 Agenda.

3.1.

The greatest challenge of the 2030 Agenda’s implementation is the eradication of poverty in all its forms, including extreme poverty. This is also a key cross-cutting principle and value enshrined in the Treaties of the European Union, and is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable development (Goal 1). The EU has a strong global presence and thus de facto has become a major actor with a heavy influence on economic growth and development policies worldwide. Therefore, it has a unique opportunity to gear its external policies and programmes towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda at global level by ensuring that the three pillars of the 2030 Agenda are integrated in a balanced way in all EU external action instruments. Given the universality and indivisibility of the 2030 Agenda, the EU should expect to be strongly scrutinised, first and foremost on how well it deals with this challenge.

3.2.

The EU should look for mechanisms to share the burdens and benefits of climate change as it has an impact on human rights, poverty and equality. One such mechanism is ‘climate justice’, which is used to frame global warming as an ethical and political issue, rather than solely as an environmental or physical one. This is done by relating the effects of climate change to concepts of justice, particularly environmental justice and social justice, and by examining issues such as equality, human rights, collective rights and the historical responsibilities for climate change. A fundamental proposition of climate justice is that those who are least responsible for climate change are hit hardest by it.

3.3.

It is equally crucial to mainstream and integrate into external and internal EU policies and programmes the concept of ‘just transition’ that helps safeguard people’s and workers’ rights (e.g. decent work), while modernising and making national economies and business actors environmentally friendly and socially responsible through EU external instruments.

3.4.

The fair implementation of the economic, social and environmental pillars of the 2030 Agenda through the EU’s external action should include strategies to promote the low-carbon, circular and collaborative economies, sustainable food production and consumption, investing in innovation and long-term infrastructure modernisation and encouraging sustainable businesses (6).

3.5.

The 2030 Agenda is based on the volunteering principle and approach and this may hamper its full and swift implementation. However, the EU should make the implementation of the 2030 Agenda both internally and externally a mandatory process; its 17 Goals are fully compatible with the principles and values of the EU as they are enshrined in its Treaties and therefore need to be mainstreamed and implemented by means of the EU’s policies and programmes. The external action of the EU should be rooted in these principles and values.

3.6.

The full implementation of the 2030 Agenda by the EU requires real commitment at the highest political level by the EU institutions and the Member States in order to effectively and swiftly mainstream, integrate and include the SDGs in all EU policies and programmes.

3.7.

The universal nature of the 2030 Agenda and the commitments made by countries around the world, regardless of their level of economic and social development and their living standards, pose a very significant challenge to the EU to provide leadership and guidance for the progressive implementation of the 2030 Agenda at global level. However, in order to achieve this and make the EU a 2030 enabler, it needs to take the necessary decisions and make the needed changes in its policies and programmes.

3.8.

It should be noted that a year has passed since the 2030 Agenda was agreed, with the European Commission dealing with the implementation of this Agenda in a very incoherent and uncoordinated way. The first session of the HLPF took place in July 2016 at the UN, where four Member States (Estonia, Finland, France and Germany) presented their voluntary reviews. The EESC regrets that the European Commission did not present a coherent and coordinated strategy to the first session of the HLPF in order to facilitate better coordination and delivery of synergies both between EU Member States and between Member States and the EU institutions.

3.9.

This lack of coordination is also reflected in the consultation documents for both the Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and the new Consensus on Development which reflects the limited integration and mainstreaming of the 2030 Agenda. At the beginning of the year, the European Commission initiated consultation on the European Pillar of Social Rights with no reference to the 2030 Agenda and more specifically to its Social Pillar. It should be noted that the EESC is currently preparing an opinion on the European Pillar of Social Rights which sets out the Committee’s views. The EESC strongly underlines that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development cannot, and should not, be implemented by the EU in silos.

3.10.

Development aid from the EU and the Member States goes to around 150 countries; they are the largest donors of official development assistance (ODA) which amounts to more than 50 % of the total global ODA donated every year. Preliminary figures show that total EU ODA (EU institutions and Member States) increased to EUR 68 billion in 2015 — growing for the third year in a row, increasing 15 % from 2014 and reaching its highest level to date. The EESC calls on the EU and the Member States to increase total ODA: in 2015, this came to 0,47 % of the EU’s Gross National Income (GNI), and needs to achieve the target of 0,7 %.

3.11.

The Eurobarometer survey shows that ‘almost nine out of ten EU citizens support development aid (89 % — a 4 percentage point increase since 2014). More than half say that promised levels of aid should be delivered by the EU’ (7). European citizens expect the EU to meet its commitments to sustainable development goals, providing a new vision for a sustainable Europe, and to fulfil its implementation obligations.

3.12.

The European Commission should undertake the review of policies and programmes focusing on third countries to ensure that they are compatible with the 2030 Agenda. The mapping exercise that the European Commission is carrying out should be flanked by a comprehensive and detailed gap analysis in order to identify shortcomings and inconsistencies between EU policies and programmes geared to third countries and with the Sustainable Development Goals.

3.13.

There is a lack of reliable and disaggregated data on the situation of vulnerable people in the world. Therefore, the European Commission should support the work of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators. Eurostat needs to enhance its capacity to measure the impact of the 2030 Agenda on vulnerable groups inside the EU. The EESC calls for an annual report to be issued on the implementation of actions and funds in regard to the 2030 Agenda. This should be part of the planned annual Eurostat reports on the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals for Europe.

3.14.

The EU institutions should take the necessary steps to be able to meet the challenge of putting the principle of ‘No one is left behind’ into effect and fully integrate this principle into its policies and programmes. In order to achieve this, a significant level of disaggregated, reliable and accessible data is required.

3.15.

The European Commission should always involve and consult civil society when conducting the comprehensive review or establishing processes to monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. However, the EESC considers that the European Commission should mainstream capacity-building activities for civil society into all of its policies and programmes and thus make civil society a real partner in the implementation of the SDGs by providing funding for international cooperation for EU-based civil society and other regions’ civil society organisations. To this end, the EESC calls on the European Commission to endorse the establishment of the European Sustainable Development Forum as recommended in the EESC opinion on A European Sustainable Development Civil Society Forum  (8).

3.16.

The EU institutions should establish an inter-institutional coordination mechanism to effectively, swiftly and coherently mainstream and integrate the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda into all EU external action policies and programmes. Comprehensive engagement in the SDGs’ implementation at global level by the EU requires strategic planning for the future of the EU’s external policies and programmes. The EESC therefore calls on:

3.16.1.

the European Commission to present in the forthcoming Communication on the 2030 Agenda a meaningful programme to achieve policy coherence and coordination in its external action and programmes. A Communication without a meaningful plan to transform EU external policies into 2030-driven policies will fall short of the expectations of people around the world. This plan should be part of an overarching EU strategy covering the necessary measures and making the needed changes in order to implement the 2030 Agenda coherently in EU policies and programmes at global level. The multi-stakeholder governance model should be a basic component of the overarching strategy, ensuring the full involvement of civil society organisations in the implementation of the SDGs (9);

3.16.2.

the European Commission to ensure that the EU’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy is a broader mechanism, so as to embrace the 2030 Agenda in areas such as trade, development, democracy, human rights, humanitarian aid, disaster risk reduction, technology transfers and climate action;

3.16.3.

the European Commission to ensure that the proposal for the future Consensus on Development establishes real coordination between EU institutions and Member States, providing assistance to third countries. This coordination should include pooling resources. The Consensus should include effective bilateral coordination between EU and Member States on their national priorities, partnerships with the EU and inclusion of other public and private donors. This is expected to have a multiplier effect for achieving the 2030 Agenda and will diminish the negative impact of fragmentation and overlapping of aid, as is currently the case;

3.16.4.

the European Commission to promote the social and solidarity economy through its external policies and programmes. The EESC considers that the social and solidarity economy is fully aligned with achieving the SDGs and therefore this sector of the economy can be instrumental in the balanced implementation of the economic, social and environmental pillars of the 2030 Agenda.

3.16.5.

the European Commission to clarify and specify the means to be used to implement the 2030 Agenda, while looking for strong synergies with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Financing for Development Forum.

3.17.

The new holistic approach of the 2030 Agenda, with the universal and indivisible nature of the three interrelated pillars, points to a more comprehensive model of human development and therefore the results of the 2030 Agenda implementation cannot be measured in the traditional way, using exclusively GDP to measure economic growth and inclusive development.

3.18.

The European Union should devise and implement specific policies and programmes, with the aim of fully implementing the 2030 Agenda, with a particular focus on promoting democracy, human rights, environmental policies, the rule of law and inclusive growth with real improvement of the living conditions of vulnerable groups. These should be basic components of the EU’s external action, policies and programmes, with an emphasis on promoting the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the 2030 Agenda.

3.19.

The External Action Service should also devise and implement a coherent plan to include measurable action and initiatives. The aim should be that by playing a leading role in mainstreaming the 2030 Agenda consistently in its action, policies and programmes, the EU will be regarded by the rest of the world as paving the way towards balanced and fair implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

3.20.

The European Commission should establish a 2030 Agenda conditionality to be shaped by the 17 goals, and this conditionality should be included in all policies and programmes funded by the EU through its external action. The recipients of these programmes should be responsible for meeting this conditionality when implementing them. Undoubtedly, the 2030 Agenda conditionality needs to be equally and fully applicable to all EU policies and programmes. The conditionality principle has already been included in the regulatory framework of the EU Structural and Investment Funds (10).

3.21.

It is widely accepted that the 2030 Agenda brings a paradigm shift to the development agenda and that this should be fully reflected in EU Development Cooperation programmes. Therefore, the 17 goals of the 2030 Agenda should be fully mainstreamed, integrated and included in the EU Development Cooperation Agenda. The EU should also fully respect and take into account international treaties, including environmental and human rights treaties, when developing and implementing external action (11).

3.22.

The European Commission should include in its external policies and programmes measures to gauge people’s understanding and perception of the impact of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Therefore, the European Commission should carry out a Eurobarometer survey in the EU Member States and relevant surveys in the partner countries. It should be noted and underlined that according to Eurobarometer, only ‘one third of Europeans have heard or read about the Sustainable Development Goals (36 %)’.

4.1.

The 2030 Agenda calls on the world to move towards a multi-stakeholder governance model, with a greater role for civil society. This entails new, more collaborative and inclusive ways of working, built around participatory decision making.

4.2.

The process of negotiating the 2030 Agenda has mobilised and attracted new actors from civil society and therefore this involvement of civil society needs to be capitalised on, reinforced and formalised during the implementation process. In fact, the positive and effective contributions of civil society organisations during the negotiations on the 2030 Agenda have made civil society’s role in the implementation of this Agenda indispensable, thus making civil society a de facto partner in this process.

4.3.

Civil society has to play a crucial role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda at global, regional and national level. It must be ensured that civil society also plays an effective role at national level in the EU Member States and in the partner countries. In order to make this participation and partnership a reality, the EESC calls on the European Commission to mainstream, integrate and include civil society capacity-building activities in its policies and programmes.

4.4.

The EESC is aware of the restrictions, barriers and obstacles facing civil society organisations in many parts of the world and that this regrettable situation hampers their real and effective participation in this process. Therefore, it calls on the European Commission to make it obligatory for the partner countries to facilitate the real participation of civil society through systematic consultation and involvement in the planning, implementing and monitoring of the 2030 Agenda related to projects and programmes, especially those funded by the EU. To achieve this, the EU delegation in partner countries should closely monitor this and report to the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The UN delegations in partner countries should also organise consultation meetings with civil society organisations concerning EU funding programmes.

4.5.

However, civil society should proactively seek to adapt to the requirements of the 2030 Agenda in order to effectively influence its implementation. It is clear that the 2030 Agenda calls on civil society organisations to become a real propelling force for its implementation and this means that civil society should approach this process as a paradigm shift in the way it is organised and works. This can be achieved only if civil society prepares and restructures itself so as to be capable of participating fully in the decision-making process. Civil society organisations should be representative, democratic, transparent and accountable.

4.6.

The future establishment of the Sustainable Development Forum in the EU is a good model of a platform which could be replicated in other regions and countries of the world, tailored to local conditions (12).

4.7.

The EESC is ready to facilitate the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations in the implementation, monitoring and review of the 2030 Agenda at global level. The EESC can support this by fully utilising its wide network of contacts, partners and stakeholders in many regions of the world. It also calls on the European Commission to integrate and mainstream structural and meaningful support in its external policies and programmes in order to enable civil society organisations in third countries to participate as full partners in the 2030 Agenda’s implementation process.