21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/1

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/2

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/2

1.

Is a provision of national law under which the user of a railway infrastructure against whom an action has been brought by the infrastructure manager before a civil court for payment of a user charge, or who seeks before that court to secure repayment of user charges already paid, may argue that the charge set by the infrastructure manager is not fair and reasonable compatible with the provisions of the directive (1) concerning the independence of the management of the infrastructure undertaking (Article 4(1), (4) and (5)), the principles governing the fixing of charges (Articles 7 to 12) and the tasks of the regulatory body (Article 30)?

2.

If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: is a provision of national law compatible with the abovementioned provisions of the directive where, under that provision of national law, the court is entitled and obliged, should it conclude that the charge set is not fair, to determine by judicial decision what charge will instead be payable?

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/3

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 10 May 2016 in case T-806/14

—

annul the decision of the Board of Appeal in case R0644/2014-5, alternatively remit the case back to the General Court, if necessary

—

order EUIPO to pay its own costs and those of the appellant before the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Board of Appeal.

I.

First Ground of Appeal: Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No. 207/2009 (1) — Application of wrong Criteria

II.

Second Ground of Appeal: Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No. 207/2009 Non-application of the Principle of Speciality

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/4

—

annul the decision of the General Court of 1 June 2016 in case T-34/15

—

order the EUIPO and the intervener at first instance to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by Wolf Oil.

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/5

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/5

1.

Is Article 5(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (1) of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’ also covers a claim for compensation made under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 which is brought against an operating air carrier which is not a party to the contract with the passenger concerned?

2.

Insofar as Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 is applicable:

Where passengers are transported on two flights without any significant stopover at the connecting airports, is the passenger’s final destination to be regarded as the place where the services were provided under the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 even when the claim advanced in the application for compensation under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 is based on a disruption to the first leg of the journey and the action is brought against the operating air carrier of the first flight, which is not party to the contract of carriage?

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/6

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/7

i.

in the context of a national legal system where the legislature has not expressly and definitively stated at what stage of the process a decision is to be challenged and where this falls for judicial determination in the context of each specific application on a-case-by-case basis in accordance with common law rules, whether the entitlement under art. 11(4) of Directive 2011/92/EU (1) to a ‘not prohibitively expensive’ procedure applies to the process before a national court whereby it is determined as to whether the particular application in question has been brought at the correct stage;

ii.

whether the requirement that a procedure be ‘not prohibitively expensive’ pursuant to art. 11(4) of Directive 2011/92/EU applies to all elements of a judicial procedure by which the legality (in national or EU law) of a decision, act or omission subject to the public participation provisions of the directive are challenged, or merely to the EU law elements of such a challenge (or in particular, merely to the elements of the challenge related to issues regarding the public participation provisions of the directive);

iii.

whether the phrase ‘decisions, acts or omissions’ in art. 11(1) of Directive 2011/92/EU includes administrative decisions in the course of determining an application for development consent, whether or not such administrative decisions irreversibly and finally determine the legal rights of the parties;

iv.

whether a national court, in order to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU environmental law, should interpret its national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent with the objectives laid down in art. 9(3) of the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 25th June, 1998 (a) in a procedure challenging the validity of a development consent process involving a project of common interest that has been designated under Regulation No. 347/2013 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17th April, 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, and/or (b) in a procedure challenging the validity of a development consent process where the development affects a European site designated under Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21st May, 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora;

v.

whether, if the answer to question (iv)(a) and/or (b) is in the affirmative, the stipulation that applicants must ‘meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law’ precludes the Convention being regarded as directly effective, in circumstances where the applicants have not failed to meet any criteria in national law for making an application and/or are clearly entitled to make the application (a) in a procedure challenging the validity of a development consent process involving a project of common interest that has been designated under Regulation No. 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 1th April, 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, and/or (b) in a procedure challenging the validity of a development consent process where the development affects a European site designated under Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21st May, 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora;

vi.

whether it is open to a member state to provide in legislation for exceptions to the rule that environmental proceedings should not be prohibitively expensive, where no such exception is provided for in Directive 2011/92/EU or the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 25th June, 1998; and

vii.

in particular, whether a requirement in national law for a causative link between the alleged unlawful act or decision and damage to the environment as a condition for the application of national legislation giving effect to art. 9(4) of the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 25th June, 1998 to ensure that environmental proceedings are not prohibitively expensive is compatible with the Convention.

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/8

1.

Pursuant to Articles 19 TEU and 263, 266 and 267 TFEU and the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) under which Member States and their competent authorities are obliged to take all general and specific measures to remedy an infringement of EU law, as well as to comply with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular concerning the validity of erga omnes acts of EU institutions, are Member States required to repeal or amend accordingly a legislative measure incorporating a directive which has been annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union on the grounds that it is contrary to the provisions of the Treaties and the Charter, in order to ensure the implementation of the judgment of the Court of Justice, and thus to address and prevent any future infringement of the Treaties and the Charter?

2.

With reference to the previous question, can Article 266 TFEU (formerly Article 233 EC) be interpreted in such a way that the concept of ‘institution or body’ also includes (on a broad or analogous interpretation) the Member State which has incorporated a directive into its national law that was annulled because it is contrary to the Treaties and the Charter or, in such a case, is it possible that Article 260(1) TFEU be applied by analogy?

3.

If the answer to the above is essentially affirmative, i.e. if there is an obligation on Member States to take all general and specific measures to remedy the infringement of EU primary law by repealing or amending accordingly the legislative measure incorporating a directive which has been annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union, because it is contrary to the Charter or the Treaties, does this obligation extend to national courts, i.e. are they obliged not to apply the legislative measure incorporating the annulled directive, in this case, Directive 2006/24/EC (1) (at least in part) that is contrary to the Charter or the Treaties, and therefore not to take into account evidence obtained under the latter (the directive and a national measure of transposition)?

4.

Does the national legislation transposing Directive 2006/24/EC, which was annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment in Digital Rights Ireland and Others  (2) (C-293/12 and C-594/12, EU:C:2014:238), as being contrary to the Charter, fall within the scope of EU law, as required by Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, from the mere fact that the national legislation transposes Directive 2006/24/EC, irrespective of the subsequent annulment of this directive by the Court of Justice of the European Union?

5.

Since Directive 2006/24/EC, which has been annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union, was introduced in order to implement a harmonised framework at the European level under Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC on data retention by service providers for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, so that no obstacles are put in the way of the internal market for electronic communications, is the national legislation transposing Directive 2006/24/EC within the framework of Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, in order to fall within the scope of EU law, as required by Article 51(1) of the Charter?

6.

Given that, were an EU Member State national to be convicted of a criminal offence, as in this case, that would inevitably entail restrictions on the exercise of the rights of free movement granted under EU law, although justified in principle, does this sufficiently justify the relevant criminal proceedings in their entirety being regarded as falling within the scope of EU law, as required by Article 51(1) of the Charter?

If the answer to the above is essentially that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is applicable, under Article 51(1), then:

7.

Is it compatible with Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter that data retained under Directive 2006/24/EC and/or Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC is accessed and used by the police in the course of criminal investigations in cases of urgency — in particular, in cases of crimes where offenders are apprehended in the act — without prior approval by a judicial body [or independent administrative body] on the basis of specific substantive and procedural requirements?

8.

Under Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter, in the course of criminal investigations by the police or other not purely judicial authorities, which seek to obtain access to and make use of data retained under Directive 2006/24/EC and/or Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, particularly when investigations are not intended to prevent, detect and prosecute precisely defined crimes categorised by the national legislature as serious, does the consent of the person to whom the data relates remove the requirement for prior authorisation of access to and use of such data by a court [or independent administrative body] on the basis of specific substantive and procedural requirements, given also that the requested data inevitably include data of a third party (e.g. person calling/being called)?

9.

Is a prosecutor’s permission, only with respect to the access to and use of data retained under Directive 2006/24/EC and/or Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC during criminal investigations, compatible with Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter, when given without prior approval by a court [or independent administrative body], which is granted on the basis of specific substantive and procedural conditions, particularly when investigations are not intended to prevent, detect, and prosecute precisely defined crimes categorised by the national legislature as serious?

10.

Having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland and Others, paragraphs 60 and 61, and the term ‘serious crime’ contained in Article 1(1) of Directive 2006/24/EC, is that term an autonomous concept of EU law and, if so, what is its essential content on the basis of which a specific crime must be considered serious enough to justify the access to and use of data retained under Directive 2006/24/EC?

11.

Having regard to the judgment of the Court in Digital Rights Ireland and Others, paragraphs 60 and 61, and irrespective of whether the term ‘serious crime’ in Article 1(1) of Directive 2006/24/EC is autonomous or not, do Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter outline general criteria based on which a specific crime must be considered serious enough to justify the access to and use of data retained under Directive 2006/24/EC and/or Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, and if so, what are these criteria?

12.

If the answer to the previous question is essentially affirmative, then should such a review of proportionality consist ultimately of an assessment of the characteristics of the investigated offence, (a) by the Court of Justice of the European Union, alone or (b) by the national court, under the general criteria laid down by the Court of Justice of the European Union?

13.

Having regard to the judgment of the Court in Digital Rights Ireland and Others, paragraphs 58-68 and the operative part, is access to and use of retained data which takes place in the course of criminal proceedings under a general data retention scheme established pursuant to Directive 2006/24/EC and/or Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, which meets the requirements of paragraphs 60, 61, 62, 67 and 68 of the above judgment, but not the requirements of paragraphs 58, 59, 63 and 64 of the same, compatible with Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter?

[Namely, when the retention status, first, requires prior approval by the court based on specific substantive and procedural conditions and, in particular, for the prevention, detection and prosecution of precisely defined crimes contained in the list drawn up by the national legislature and categorised by the latter as serious, and ensures the effective protection of retained data from the risk of abuse and against any unauthorised access and use (see paragraphs 60, 61, 62, 67 and 68 of the above judgment) and, secondly, allows data retention (a) without distinction to all persons who make use of electronic communications services, without previous evidence showing that the person (defendant or suspect) whose retained data are requested might have been involved, even indirectly, in a serious crime before the incident upon the occurrence of which the data were requested from the communications services providers, (b) without the requested data being relevant prior to the occurrence of the investigated event (i) to a specific time period and/or a geographical area and/or a group of specific persons who might be involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) to persons who might, for other reasons, contribute to, by retaining their data, the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious offences, (c) based on a time period (12 months in this case) specified without any distinction between the categories of data specified in Article 5 of that Directive, based on their probable usefulness for the intended purpose or in accordance with the persons concerned; see paragraphs 58, 59, 63 and 64 of the above judgment]

14.

If the answer to the above question is essentially that access to and use of such data does not comply with Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter, then should the national court disapply the national measure for the incorporation of Directive 2006/24/EC annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union or the measure that is based on Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, as being contrary to the Charter and, accordingly, take no account of the data retained and acquired on that basis?

15.

Having regard to Directive 2006/24/EC, and, in particular, its sixth recital that ‘legal […] differences between national provisions concerning the retention of data for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences present obstacles to the internal market’ and the purpose of Article 1(1), which is to ‘harmonise Member States’ provisions’, the remaining recitals, especially [3, 4, 5, 11 and 21], and the judgment in Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-301/06, EU:C:2009:68, paragraphs 70 to 72, does maintaining the law transposing Directive 2006/24/EC into national law constitute an obstacle to the establishment and functioning of the internal market, even after its annulment by the Court of Justice of the European Union, where a later measure of EU law on the harmonisation of the relevant field has not yet entered into force?

16.

In particular, does maintaining the law that transposes Directive 2006/24/EC into national law, even after its annulment by the Court of Justice of the European Union or the national law referred to in Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC constitute an obstacle to the establishment and functioning of the internal market, for the reasons that, cumulatively or alternatively:

17.

If the answer to at least one of the above questions is affirmative, should the national court, in accordance with EU law, disapply the national measure for the transposition of Directive 2006/24/EC, which has been annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union, as being contrary to the establishment and functioning of the internal market and consequently take no account of the data retained and accessed on the basis of Directive 2006/24/EC or national law under Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC?

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/11

1.

Is EU law as it currently stands, in particular the general principle in EU law of equal treatment, the general principle of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age within the meaning of Article 6(3) TEU and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the prohibition of discrimination in connection with freedom of movement for workers under Article 45 TFEU and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, (1) to be interpreted as precluding a national rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which for the removal of discrimination on grounds of age identified by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the judgment in Gotthard Starjakob  (2) (namely the failure to take into account previous periods of service completed before the age of 18 for ÖBB (Austrian Federal Railways) employees) takes into account a small number of ÖBB employees discriminated against under the old rules with a period of service completed before the age of 18 (but only those employees who actually worked for the ÖBB or for similar public railway infrastructure undertakings or railway undertakings in the EU, in the EEA and in those countries connected with the EU by association or free movement arrangements), but does not take into account, for the vast majority of ÖBB employees originally discriminated against, all other periods of service occurring before the age of 18, in particular including those not taken into account which enabled the ÖBB employees concerned better to perform their duties, such as, for example, previous periods of service with private and other public transport companies or infrastructure companies by which the infrastructure used by the employer (rolling stock, rail construction, line construction, electrical and electronic equipment, signal boxes, station construction and the like) is produced, distributed or maintained, or similar undertakings, and therefore in reality ultimately maintains a difference in treatment based on age for the vast majority of the ÖBB employees discriminated against under the old rules?

2.

Does the conduct of a Member State, which is the sole shareholder of a rail transport undertaking and the de facto employer of persons employed by that undertaking, where the rights of those employees founded on EU law to additional pay on account of discrimination, inter alia, on the basis of age, which has been recognised by several judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (David Hütter, (3) Siegfried Pohl, (4) Gotthard Starjakob), as well as by a number of national court rulings, including the (Austrian) Supreme Court (Case 8 ObA 11/15y) and which the Member State sought to remove for purely fiscal reasons through retroactive changes to the law in the years 2011 and 2015, meet the conditions recognised in the case-law of the Court of Justice governing the liability of that Member State under EU law, in particular the condition that there be a sufficiently serious breach of EU law, in particular of Article 2(1), read in conjunction with Article 1, of Directive 2000/78/EC as interpreted in a number of judgments of the Court of Justice (David Hütter, Siegfried Pohl, Gotthard Starjakob)?

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/12

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/12

—

set aside the judgment, and annul the decision, (1) for the reasons set out in the second ground of appeal, declaring that Telefónica’s conduct did not constitute a restriction by object;

—

in the alternative, set aside the judgment for the reasons set out in the first ground of appeal, remitting the case to the General Court so that it may examine the rejected witness evidence and rule on the merits of Telefónica’s action for annulment before the General Court having regard to the evidence examined;

—

in the further alternative, and for the reasons set out in the third ground of appeal:

—

order the Commission to pay the costs incurred by Telefónica both at first instance and in the present proceedings before the Court of Justice;

—

allow the length of this appeal, which is slightly greater than the length recommended in the Court’s Practice Directions, in view of the financial impact of the case on the applicant and the complexity of the arguments set out.

1.

Infringement of Articles 47 and 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and of Article 68 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court by rejecting the requested hearing of witnesses. — The General Court’s rejection of the requested witness evidence placed Telefónica in a situation in which it was unable to defend itself, since that evidence was essential and decisive for the proper adjudication of the case. The approach taken by the General Court warrants four fundamental objections: (i) the teleological contradiction objection; (ii) the disproportionate burden of proof objection; (iii) the objection relating to the prejudging of the outcome of the witness evidence; and (iv) the imbalanced weighting objection.

2.

Infringement of Article 101 TFEU as a result of the erroneous application of the case-law relating to the restrictions by object and of the duty to state reasons and the presumption of innocence.

3.

Error in the assessment of the lesser gravity of the infringement and in the existence of mitigating circumstances in Telefónica’s conduct. — Telefónica submits that the General Court failed to take into consideration in its assessment additional factors that showed the lesser gravity of Telefónica’s conduct and which would have given rise to a greater reduction of the fine than that applied by the Commission.

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/14

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Søndagsavisen A/S to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

3.

Orders the Kingdom of Denmark to bear its own costs

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/14

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Perry Ellis International Group Holdings Ltd to pay the costs.

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/15

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Guccio Gucci SpA to pay the costs, including the costs incurred by Guess? IP Holder LP before the Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/16

1.

Dismisses the action;

2.

Orders Guccio Gucci SpA to pay the costs, including the costs incurred by Guess? IP Holder LP before the Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/16

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

2.

There is no need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene from the European Crop Protection Association (ECPA), Dow AgroSciences Ltd and Dow AgroSciences Iberica SA.

3.

Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe), Bee Life European Beekeeping Coordination (Bee Life) and Unione nazionale associazioni apicoltori italiani (Unaapi) shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.

4.

PAN Europe, Bee Life, Unaapi, the Commission, ECPA, Dow AgroSciences and Dow AgroSciences Iberica shall each bear their own costs in relation to the applications to intervene.

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/17

—

annul the debit notes of 28 June 2016 Nos. 3241608864, in the amount of EUR 63 653,58, and 3241608865, in the amount of EUR 9 690,30, issued by the defendant.

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/18

—

annul the Commission’s decision dated 13 July 2016, delivered pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, (1) relating to a request for access to documents registered under the reference GESTDEM 2015/5711;

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging a failure to abide by the procedural time-limits stipulated in Regulation No 1049/2001;

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the wrongful treatment of a request for access to documents as a fresh application;

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the unlawful extension of the scope of the application for access to documents at the confirmatory stage;

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging the inclusion by the defendant in the contested decision of documents for release to a third party whose disclosure would breach Article 113 of Regulation No 1224/2009. (2)

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/19

—

annul Commission Implementing Decision C(2016) 2136 of 11 July 2016, rejecting a request for a partial interim review limited to dumping aspects with regard to the definitive anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People's Republic of China by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011;

—

order the Commission to bear the applicant’s costs

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/19

—

set aside the order of the Civil Service Tribunal of 18 July 2016 dismissing his action;

—

grant the claims sought at first instance;

—

order the other party to the proceedings to pay all of the costs.

1.

First ground of appeal, divided into two limbs, alleging infringement of Article 11(4), (5) and (6) of the decision of the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’) of 27 August 2009 establishing the staff appraisal procedure (‘decision of 27 August 2009’), interpreted in the light of Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

2.

Second ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 2(2) of the decision of 27 August 2009 by failing to have regard for the difference in role between evaluator and validator as established within Frontex.

21.11.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 428/20

—

declare the instruction of the president of the Commission of the European Union communicated electronically by letter dated 28 June 2016 to the Members of the College of Commissioners of the EU, and identified in a speech by President Juncker to the plenary session of the European Parliament in Brussels on 28 June 2016 (SPEECH/16/2356), forbidding any negotiations by the Commission, formal or informal, with the UK government before its notification of withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 TEU, on the one hand, and, the statement of the President of the Commission of the European Union that he had given the instruction above to the Members of the College of Commissioners of the EU by way of ‘Presidential order’, as he expressly stated in that speech to the plenary session of the European Parliament in Brussels on 28 June 2016 and as recorded on both the English and French language Commission Press Releases of that speech (SPEECH/16/2353), on the other hand, void pursuant to Article 264(1) TFEU; and

—

order the Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the disputed measures have no, or no proper, legal basis.

The applicants put forward that:

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the disputed measures discriminate against the UK and its citizens on the grounds of nationality contrary to Article 18 TFEU.

The applicants put forward that:

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the disputed measures are contrary to the applicants’ fundamental rights in EU law.

The applicants put forward that:

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the disputed measures have been adopted contrary to the principle of sincere co-operation under Article 4(3) TEU.

The applicants put forward that the disputed measures expressly forbid the Commission and its staff from complying with the principle of sincere co-operation by giving assistance to the UK and other EU Institutions in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that, to the extent the disputed measures have been adopted wholly or partly to deter or discourage the citizens of other EU Member States from the free expression of their opinions (regarding membership of the EU) as protected by Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, they are unlawful.