8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/1

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/2

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/3

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/3

1)

The concept of ‘reference medicinal product’ within the meaning of Article 10(2)(a) of Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007, must be interpreted as encompassing a medicinal product for which the marketing authorisation was granted on the basis of Article 10(a) of the directive.

2)

On a proper construction of Article 10 of Directive 2001/83, as amended by Regulation No 1394/2007, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the holder of a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product used as a reference product in an application for a marketing authorisation under Article 10 of the directive for a generic product of another manufacturer has the right to a judicial remedy enabling him to challenge the decision of the competent authority which granted the marketing authorisation for the generic product, provided that that holder is seeking judicial protection of a right conferred on him by Article 10. Such a judicial remedy exists, inter alia, where the holder demands that his medicinal product is not to be used for the purpose of obtaining, under Article 10, a marketing authorisation for another medicinal product in relation to which his own product cannot be regarded as a reference product within the meaning of Article 10(2)(a) of the directive.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/4

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/5

1)

Dismisses the action;

2)

Orders the European Commission to pay the costs.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/5

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/6

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/7

1)

Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action such as that in the main proceedings, seeking legal redress for damage resulting from alleged infringements of European Union competition law, comes within the notion of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of that provision and, therefore, falls within the scope of that regulation.

2)

Article 22(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that an action such as that in the main proceedings, seeking legal redress for damage resulting from alleged infringements of European Union competition law, does not constitute proceedings having as their object the validity of the decisions of organs of companies within the meaning of that provision.

3)

Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that neither the detailed rules for determining the amount of the sums which are the subject of the provisional and protective measures granted by a judgment in respect of which recognition and enforcement are requested, in the case where it is possible to follow the line of reasoning which led to the determination of the amount of those sums, and even where legal remedies were available which were used to challenge such methods of calculation, nor the mere invocation of serious economic consequences constitute grounds establishing the infringement of public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought which would permit the refusal of recognition and enforcement in that Member State of such a judgment given in another Member State.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/8

1.

The last sentence of Article 4(4) of the Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980, must be interpreted as applying to a commission contract for the carriage of goods solely when the main purpose of the contract consists in the actual transport of the goods concerned, which it is for the referring court to verify.

2.

Article 4(4) of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that, where the law applicable to a contract for the carriage of goods cannot be fixed under the second sentence of that provision, it must be determined in accordance with the general rule laid down in Article 4(1), that is to say, the law governing that contract is that of the country with which it is most closely connected.

3.

Article 4(2) of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that, where it is argued that a contract has a closer connection with a country other than that the law of which is designated by the presumption laid down therein, the national court must compare the connections existing between that contract and, on the one hand, the country whose law is designated by the presumption and, on the other, the other country concerned. In so doing, the national court must take account of the circumstances as a whole, including the existence of other contracts connected with the contract in question.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/8

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/9

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/10

1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Spain v Commission (T-384/10, EU:T:2013:277);

2.

Annuls Commission Decision C(2010) 4147 of 30 June 2010, reducing the assistance granted from the Cohesion Fund to the following (groups of) projects: ‘Water supply to settlements in the Guadiana basin: Andévalo area’ (2000.ES.16.C.PE.133), ‘Drainage and water treatment in the Guadalquivir basin: Guadaira, Aljarafe and the areas of natural protection of the Guadalquivir’ (2000.ES.16.C.PE.066) and ‘Water supply to multi-municipal systems in the provinces of Granada and Malaga’ (2002.ES.16.C.PE.061);

3.

Orders the European Commission to pay the costs of the Kingdom of Spain and to bear its own costs of both the proceedings at first instance and of the present appeal proceedings.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/10

1.

Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as not precluding proof of origin of imported goods adduced by the customs authorities on the basis of national procedural rules resting on the results of an examination carried out by a third party, with regard to which that third party refuses to disclose further information either to the customs authorities or to the customs declarant, as a result of which it is made difficult or impossible to verify or disprove the correctness of the conclusions reached, provided that the principles of effectiveness and equivalence are upheld. It is for the national court to ascertain whether that is so in the main proceedings.

2.

In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, and when the customs authorities cannot disclose further information in respect of the examination carried out, whether the customs authorities must grant the request of the party concerned that it conducts, at its own expense, an examination in the country declared as the country of origin and whether it matters that portions of the samples of the goods, to which the party concerned could have obtained access with a view to having an examination carried out by another laboratory, were still available for a limited period and, if so, whether the customs authorities must inform the party concerned that portions of the samples of the goods are still available and that it may request those samples for purposes of such an examination must be assessed on the basis of national procedural law.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/11

1)

Articles 138(1) and 139(1), second subparagraph, of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2010/88/EU of 7 December 2010, must be interpreted as precluding, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, the tax authorities of a Member State from refusing to grant an exemption from value added tax in respect of an intra-Community supply of goods on the ground that the purchaser was not registered for value added tax purposes in another Member State and the supplier has proven neither the authenticity of the signature on the documents submitted in support of its declaration in respect of a supply it claims to be exempt from value added tax nor that the person who signed those documents on behalf of the purchaser had the authority to represent the purchaser, where the evidence establishing entitlement to the exemption submitted by the supplier in support of its declaration is consistent with the list of documents to be submitted to those authorities under national law and has been accepted by them, initially, as supporting evidence, which is a matter for the referring court to verify.

2)

Article 138(1) of Directive 2006/112, as amended by Directive 2010/88, must be interpreted as having direct effect, so that it may be relied upon by taxable persons before national courts against the State in order to obtain an exemption from value added tax in respect of an intra-Community supply of goods.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/12

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/12

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/13

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/13

1)

Dismisses the appeal;

2)

Orders British Telecommunications plc and BT Pension Scheme Trustees Ltd to pay the costs.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/14

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

2.

Orders the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/14

1)

Articles 2(11) and 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that where the removal of a child has taken place in accordance with a judgment which was provisionally enforceable and which was thereafter overturned by a judgment which fixed the residence of the child at the home of the parent living in the Member State of origin, the court of the Member State to which the child was removed, seised of an application for the return of the child, must determine, by undertaking an assessment of all the circumstances of fact specific to the individual case, whether the child was still habitually resident in the Member State of origin immediately before the alleged wrongful retention. As part of that assessment, it is important that account be taken of the fact that the judgment authorising the removal could be provisionally enforced and that an appeal had been brought against it.

2)

Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where the removal of a child has taken place in accordance with a court judgment which was provisionally enforceable and which was thereafter overturned by a court judgment fixing the child’s residence at the home of the parent living in the Member State of origin, the failure to return the child to that Member State following the latter judgment is wrongful and Article 11 of the Regulation is applicable if it is held that the child was still habitually resident in that Member State immediately before the retention. If it is held, conversely, that the child was at that time no longer habitually resident in the Member State of origin, a decision dismissing the application for return based on that provision is without prejudice to the application of the rules established in Chapter III of the Regulation relating to the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in a Member State.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/15

1)

Must Articles 2(1) and 3(a) of, and Annexes IA and IB to, Directive 2002/96/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on waste electrical and electronic equipment and/or Articles 2(1)(a) and 3(1)(a) of, and Annexes I and II to, Directive 2012/19/EU (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on waste electrical and electronic equipment be interpreted as meaning that operating devices for (garage) doors with an electric voltage of approximately 220 to 240 volts, which are designed to be incorporated into the building structure together with the (garage) door, come within the concept of electrical and electronic equipment, in particular the concept of electrical and electronic tools?

2)

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:

Must Annex IA, No 6, and Annex IB, No 6, to Directive 2002/96/EC and/or Article 3(1)(b) of, and Annex I, No 6, and Annex II, No 6, to, Directive 2012/19/EU be interpreted as meaning that (garage-door) operating devices, as referred to in Question (1), are to be regarded as components of large-scale stationary industrial tools within the meaning of those provisions?

3)

If the answer to Question (1) is in the affirmative and the answer to Question (2) is in the negative:

Must Article 2(1) of Directive 2002/96/EC and/or Article 2(3)(b) of Directive 2012/19/EU be interpreted as meaning that (garage-door) operating devices, as referred to in Question (1), are to be regarded as part of another type of equipment which does not fall within the scope of those directives?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/16

1.

Must the extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 (1) relate directly to the booked flight?

2.

If the first question is to be answered in the negative, how many earlier flights involving the aircraft to be used for the scheduled flight are relevant to the existence of an extraordinary circumstance? Is there a time-limit to the consideration of extraordinary circumstances which occur during earlier flights? If so, how is that time-limit to be calculated?

3.

If extraordinary circumstances which occur during earlier flights are also relevant to a later flight, must the reasonable measures to be taken by the operating air carrier, in accordance with Article 5(3) of the regulation, relate only to preventing the extraordinary circumstance or also to avoiding a long delay?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/16

1.

Must the description of customs goods as ‘Light air-cured tobacco’ in accordance with heading CN 2401 10 35 of Chapter 24 ‘TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO SUBSTITUTES’ in Commission Regulation (EU) No 861/2010 (1) of 5 October 2010 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff be interpreted as meaning that it includes only air cured tobacco, not stemmed/stripped:

2.

Must the concept of ‘suspensive customs procedure’ in Article 4(6) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC be interpreted as meaning that it also covers the case of customs goods (excise goods) in external transit, in temporary storage or in customs storage under accompanying documents in which the tariff heading is incorrectly stated (CN 2401 10 35 instead of CN 2403 10 9000), but the relevant chapter (Chapter 24 — tobacco) and all the other data in those documents (container number, quantity, net weight) are correct and the seals are not broken?

(In other words, it must be determined whether particular products can be under a suspensive customs procedure when the Chapter of the Common Customs Code is indicated correctly in its accompanying documents but the specific tariff heading is incorrect?)

3.

Must the concept of ‘importation’ in Article 2(b) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC (2) of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC and the concept of ‘importation of excise goods’ in Article 4(8) of that directive as meaning that they also cover the case where the tariff heading of the actual goods in external transit and the tariff heading stated in the accompanying documents is different, while, apart from that disparity, both the indication of the Chapter (in the present case, Chapter 24 — tobacco) and the quantity and net weight of the actual goods correspond to the data given in the accompanying documents?

4.

Do the irregularities referred to in Article 38 of Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC include a situation where goods are under a suspensive customs arrangement and there is an incorrect CN code under Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 861/2010, in the accompanying documents?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/17

1.

Under Articles 2(1)(c), 24(1) and 43 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (‘the VAT Directive’), in order to identify the person supplying the service for the purposes of VAT, when examining whether the transaction is fictitious, has no real financial or commercial content and is intended only to secure a tax advantage, is it relevant for the purposes of interpretation that, in the circumstances of the main proceedings, the managing director and 100 % owner of the commercial company which grants the licence is the natural person who created the know-how transferred by means of the licensing agreement?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, when applying Articles 2(1)(c), 24(1) and 43 of the VAT Directive and assessing whether there is an abusive practice, is it relevant that this natural person exercises or may exercise influence informally over the running of the commercial company which acquired the licence and over the decisions of that company? For the purposes of that interpretation, might it be relevant that the creator of the know-how participates or may participate directly or indirectly, by advising professionally or offering advice on the development and exploitation of the know-how, in taking business decisions relating to the supply of the service based on that know-how?

3.

In the circumstances of the main proceedings and in the light of the considerations set out in the second question, in order to identify the person supplying the service for the purposes of VAT is it relevant, in addition to the analysis of the underlying contractual transaction, that the creator of the know-how, as a natural person, exercises influence, or decisive influence, or issues directions regarding the way the service based on that know-how is supplied?

4.

If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative, when determining the extent of that influence and those directions, what circumstances can be taken into account, or, more specifically, on the basis of what criteria may it be found that a decisive influence is exercised over the supply of the service and that the real financial content of the underlying transaction was for the benefit of the undertaking which grants the licence?

5.

In the circumstances of the main proceedings, in considering whether a tax advantage has been gained, is it relevant when analysing the relations between the traders and the persons involved in the transaction that the taxable persons who took part in the contested contractual transaction, which is intended to avoid tax, are legal persons, when the tax authority of a Member State attributes the adoption of strategic and operational decisions on exploitation to a natural person? If so, must account be taken of the Member State in which that natural person took those decisions? In circumstances such as those obtaining in the present case, if it can be found that the contractual position of the parties is not decisive, is it relevant for the purpose of interpretation that subcontractors carry out the management of the technical instruments, human resources and financial transactions necessary for the supply of the internet-based service at issue here?

6.

If it can be established that the terms of the licensing agreement do not reflect real financial content does the reclassification of the contract terms and the restoration of the situation which would have obtained if the transaction involving the abusive practice had not taken place imply that the tax authority of the Member State may make a different decision as to the Member State of supply and, therefore, the place where the tax is payable, even though the company which acquired the licence paid the tax payable in the Member State where it is established and in accordance with the legal requirements laid down in that Member State?

7.

Must Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that a contractual arrangement such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which a company which is a taxable person in a Member State, transfers by means of a licensing agreement the know-how for the supply of services providing adult content through interactive communication technology to an undertaking which is a taxable person in another Member State, in circumstances where the burden of VAT of the Member State of residence of the company which acquired the licence is more advantageous as regards the service transferred, is contrary to those articles and may represent a abuse of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to supply services.

8.

In circumstances such as those obtaining in the present case, what significance must be attached to the tax advantage which may be presumed to arise and to the commercial considerations taken into account by the company which grants the licence? In that connection and more specifically, is it relevant for the purposes of interpretation that the 100 % owner and manager of the commercial company which grants the licence is the natural person who originally created the know-how?

9.

In analysing abusive conduct may circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, for instance the technical and infrastructure data relating to the setting up and performance of the service which is the subject of the transaction at issue and the preparation and human resources available to the company which grants the licence to supply the service in question, be taken into account and, if so, what significance do they have?

10.

In the situation analysed in the present case, must Articles 2(1)(c), 24(1), 43 and 273 of the VAT Directive, in conjunction with Articles 4(3) and 325 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that, in the interests of the proper observance of the obligation of the Member States of the Union to collect the total amount of VAT effectively and punctually and prevent the loss to the public coffers entailed by tax evasion and avoidance across the borders of the Member States, in the case of a transaction for the supply of services and in order to identify the person supplying the service, the tax authority of the Member State, at the evidence-gathering stage of the administrative tax procedure and in order to clarify the facts, is entitled to admit data, information and evidence, and, therefore, records of intercepted communication, obtained without the knowledge of the taxable person by the investigating body of the tax authority in the context of a criminal procedure and to use them as a basis for its assessment of the tax implications, and that, for its part, the administrative court hearing the action brought against the administrative decision of the tax authority of the Member State is entitled to carry out an assessment of those matters as evidence, while examining the legality of that evidence?

11.

In the situation analysed in the present case, must Articles 2(1)(c), 24(1), 43 and 273 of the VAT Directive, in conjunction with Articles 4(3) and 325 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that, in the interests of the proper observance of the obligation of the Member States of the Union to collect the total amount of VAT effectively and punctually and compliance with the obligation of the Member States to guarantee observance of the obligations imposed on the taxable person, the discretion with regard to the means available to the tax authority of the Member State includes the option for that Member State to use evidence obtained initially for the purpose of criminal proceedings to prevent tax avoidance, including where national law itself does not allow information to be obtained without the knowledge of the person concerned in the context of an administrative procedure to prevent tax avoidance, or subjects it in the context of criminal proceedings to guarantees which are not provided in the administrative tax proceedings, recognizing at the same time the right of the administrative authority to act in accordance with the principle of the freedom of evidence?

12.

Does Article 8(2) of the ECHR, in conjunction with Article 52(2) of the Charter, prevent recognition that the tax authority of the Member State has the authority described in questions 10 and 11, or in the circumstances of the present case, can it be considered justified, in order to combat tax avoidance, to use in the context of an administrative tax procedure, conclusions drawn from information obtained without the knowledge of the person concerned, with a view to the effective collection of tax and for the sake of the financial well-being of the country?

13.

If the answer to questions 10 and 12 is that the tax authority of the Member State may use such evidence in the administrative procedure, is the tax authority of the Member State required, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to good administration and the rights of the defence pursuant to Articles 7, 8, 41 and 48 of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 51(1) of the Charter, to hear the taxable person in the course of the administrative procedure, to guarantee him access to the conclusions suggested by the information obtained without his knowledge and to respect the purpose for which the data appearing in the evidence were obtained, or, in that context, does the fact that the information collected without the knowledge of the person concerned is intended solely for an investigation of a criminal nature prevent from the outset the use of such evidence?

14.

In the event that evidence is obtained in breach of Articles 7, 8, 41 and 48 of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, does national legislation under which the challenging in judicial proceedings of the procedural legality of decisions given in tax matters can only succeed and result in the setting aside of the decision if, according to the circumstances of the case, there is the possibility in practice that the contested decision would have been different if the procedural error had not occurred and if, moreover, that defect affected the substantive legal position of the applicant, or do the procedural errors made in that way have to be taken into account in a wider context, regardless of the influence the procedural error which infringes the Charter has on the outcome of the proceedings?

15.

Does the effectiveness of Article 47 of the Charter require that, in a procedural situation such as the present, the administrative court hearing the action against the administrative decision of the tax authority of the Member State may review the legality of the obtaining of evidence collected for the purpose of criminal proceedings without the knowledge of the person concerned in the context of criminal proceedings, in particular when the taxable person against whom the criminal proceedings have been brought in parallel has no knowledge of that documentation and has been unable to contest its legality before a court?

16.

Also having regard to question 6, must Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 (2) of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax, in the light, in particular, of its seventh recital, according to which, for the purposes of collecting the tax owed, Member States should cooperate to help ensure that VAT is correctly assessed and, in order to do so, they must not only monitor the correct application of tax owed in their own territory, but should also provide assistance to other Member States for ensuring the correct application of tax relating to activity carried out on their own territory but owed in another Member State, be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation where the facts are as in the present case, the tax authority of the Member State which discovers the tax debt must make a request to the tax authority of the Member State in which the taxable person was subject to a tax inspection and complied with its obligation to pay tax?

17.

If the answer to question 16 is in the affirmative and the decisions adopted by the tax authority of the Member State are challenged before a court and are found to be unlawful in procedural terms on that ground, in other words, on the basis of failure to obtain information and the absence of a request, what action should the court hearing the action against the administrative decisions adopted by the tax authority of the Member State take, having regard also to the considerations set out in question 14?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/20

1.

Does EU law, and in particular the provisions of Article 78(a) of Directive 2006/112/EC (1), preclude ... the land use tax paid by the gas distributor from being passed on to the final consumer, without interest or other charges and regardless of the price that the consumer pays for the gas consumed, that is, without being incorporated in that price?

If the answer to that question is negative, the following question is referred for a preliminary ruling:

2.

Does EU law, and in particular the provisions of Articles 73 to 79 of Directive 2006/112/EC, preclude ... the land use tax paid by the gas distributor, when it is passed on to the final consumer, without interest or other charges and regardless of the price that the consumer pays for the gas consumed, from being considered as a taxable amount [for the purposes of VAT]?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/21

1.

Does the obligation to register laid down in Articles 213(1) and 214(1) of the VAT Directive (1) preclude the national practice in Hungary of mandatorily requiring the registration of individuals — under the threshold for the personal exemption from VAT — who do not wish to pursue an activity subject to VAT?

2.

When carrying out an ex post inspection, is the tax authority permitted to penalise the failure to register where the threshold for the personal exemption has not been exceeded?

3.

When carrying out an ex post inspection, is the tax authority permitted to be subrogated in the individual’s right of option, and is it permitted to exclude the possibility of the individual opting for the personal exemption in breach of the principle of procedural fairness?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/21

1.

Does the condition requiring residence to be taken up in a geographically limited area (municipality, district, region) of a Member State constitute a restriction of freedom of movement within the meaning of Article 33 of Directive 2011/95/EU (1), where the foreign national can otherwise move and reside freely in the territory of that Member State?

2.

Is a place of residence condition imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status compatible with Article 33 and/or Article 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU, where it is based on the objective of achieving a reasonable distribution of social assistance burdens among the relevant institutions within the territory of the State?

3.

Is a place of residence condition imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status compatible with Article 33 and/or Article 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU, where it is based on grounds of migration or integration policy, for instance to prevent points of social tension as a result of the accumulated settlement of foreign nationals in certain municipalities or districts? Are abstract migration or integration policy grounds sufficient in this regard or must such grounds be specifically ascertained?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/22

1.

Does the condition requiring residence to be taken up in a geographically limited area (municipality, district, region) of a Member State constitute a restriction of freedom of movement within the meaning of Article 33 of Directive 2011/95/EU (1), where the foreign national can otherwise move and reside freely in the territory of that Member State?

2.

Is a place of residence condition imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status compatible with Article 33 and/or Article 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU, where it is based on the objective of achieving a reasonable distribution of social assistance burdens among the relevant institutions within the territory of the State?

3.

Is a place of residence condition imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status compatible with Article 33 and/or Article 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU, where it is based on grounds of migration or integration policy, for instance to prevent points of social tension as a result of the accumulated settlement of foreign nationals in certain municipalities or districts? Are abstract migration or integration policy grounds sufficient in this regard or must such grounds be specifically ascertained?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/23

1.

Does the condition requiring residence to be taken up in a geographically limited area (municipality, district, region) of a Member State constitute a restriction of freedom of movement within the meaning of Article 33 of Directive 2011/95/EU (1), where the foreign national can otherwise move and reside freely in the territory of that Member State?

2.

Is a place of residence condition imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status compatible with Article 33 and/or Article 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU, where it is based on the objective of achieving a reasonable distribution of social assistance burdens among the relevant institutions within the territory of the State?

3.

Is a place of residence condition imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status compatible with Article 33 and/or Article 29 of Directive 2011/95/EU, where it is based on grounds of migration or integration policy, for instance to prevent points of social tension as a result of the accumulated settlement of foreign nationals in certain municipalities or districts? Are abstract migration or integration policy grounds sufficient in this regard or must such grounds be specifically ascertained?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/23

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/24

1)

Are Article 49 et seq. TFEU and Article 56 et seq. TFEU and the principles laid down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in [Joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10 Costa and Cifone [2012] ECR I-0000] to be interpreted as precluding a call for tenders for the award of licences with a period of validity shorter than that of licences awarded in the past, where that tendering procedure has been launched in order to remedy the consequences of the unlawful exclusion of a certain number of operators from earlier tendering procedures?

2)

Are Article 49 et seq. TFEU and Article 56 et seq. TFEU and the principles laid down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Costa and Cifone to be interpreted as precluding the possibility that sufficient justification for the shorter period of validity of licences offered for tender, as compared with licences awarded in the past, can be found in the requirement for the licensing system to be reorganised through the alignment of licence expiry dates?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/24

1.

Should Article 24(1) and point (b) of Article 25 of Directive 2006/112/EC (1) be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘supply of services’ also covers cases involving subscription contracts for the supply of consulting services such as those at issue in the main proceedings, namely where a supplier, having qualified personnel available for supplying the services, has agreed to be on call for the customer during the term of the contract and has undertaken to refrain from entering into similar contracts with the customer’s competitors?

2.

Should Articles 64(1) and 63 of Directive 2006/112/EC be interpreted as meaning that, for subscribed consulting services, the chargeable event occurs on expiry of the period for which the payment was agreed, irrespective of whether and how often the customer makes use of the supplier’s on-call services?

3.

Should Article 62(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC be interpreted as meaning that a person supplying services in connection with a subscription consulting contract is obligated to charge value added tax for the services on expiry of the period for which the subscription fee was agreed, or does this obligation arise only if the customer has made use of the consultant’s services?

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/25

—

Declare that, by maintaining a legal situation in which the sale of loose snuff is permitted contrary to Article 8, read in conjunction with Article 2(4) of Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products (1), the Kingdom of Denmark has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

—

the order Kingdom of Denmark to pay the costs.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/26

1.

Declares that Ms H’s staffing costs, amounting to EUR 56,76, her travel expenses, amounting to EUR 1  354,08, and the service costs amounting to EUR 351,82 incurred by Technische Universität Dresden in performing Contract No 203114 (SI2.377438) concerning the funding of the project ‘Collection of European Data on Lifestyle Health Determinants — Coordinating Party (LiS)’ conducted under the programme of Community action in the field of public health (2003-2008) are eligible and, consequently, dismisses the European Commission’s claim regarding those amounts, set out in Debit Note No 3241011712 of 4 November 2010, as unfounded;

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3.

Orders Technische Universität Dresden to pay the costs.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/27

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 11 October 2012 (Joined Cases R 274/2011-4 and R 520/2011-4);

2.

Declares that OHIM is to bear its own costs and orders it to pay the costs incurred by Mr Xavier Grau Ferrer;

3.

Declares that Juan Cándido Rubio Ferrer and Alberto Rubio Ferrer are to bear their own costs.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/27

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.

Costs are reserved.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/28

—

declare that the defendants failed to legislate so that the general principles of EU law, and in particular the directive on fixed-term work, apply fully upon their dismissal from the former Olimpiaki Aeroporia that was imposed by decision of the European Commission and incorporated into Greek law by Law No 3717/2008;

—

grant the applicants and all the dismissed employees of the former Olimpiaki Aeroporia by a directly applicable Community measure, directive, regulation or other Community legislative act the ability to receive the compensation to which they would have been entitled as permanent employees upon their compulsory dismissal/departure from Olimpiaki Aeroporia;

—

grant compensation of EUR 3 00  000 by a directly applicable Community measure, directive, regulation or other Community legislative act to each of the applicants for the hardship and distress that they have suffered, the gross breach of their fundamental rights and the premature cessation of their working life.

1.

First plea: Law No 3717/2008, which provided for the closure of Olimpiaki Aeroporia and the dismissal of all its temporary employees, is a purely Community measure that in essence was imposed by the institutions of the European Union, in particular the ECB and the European Commission, and all the legislative measures of the Greek Government were adopted on the recommendation and, to be more precise, after decision of the Eurogroup, ECOFIN, the ECB and the European Commission.

2.

Second plea: the failure to equate the dismissed temporary employees/workers of the former Olimpiaki Aeroporia with the other, permanent, employees of Olimpiaki Aeroporia and the failure to compensate them expressly on their departure from that company has caused them direct, personal and serious harm and denied them enjoyment of their fundamental rights.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/29

—

declare that the defendants failed to legislate in order that the bonds which the applicants purchased from the Hellenic Republic are expressly exempt from the compulsory participation of holders of Greek State bonds governed by Greek law in P.S.I. (private sector involvement in debt relief);

—

grant the applicants by a directly applicable Community measure, directive, regulation or other Community legislative act the ability to receive 100 % of the value of the bonds which were included in P.S.I. without their being asked and without their agreement;

—

grant compensation of EUR 5 00  000 by a directly applicable Community measure, directive, regulation or other Community legislative act to each of the applicants for the hardship, distress and gross breach of fundamental rights that they have suffered.

1.

First plea: The legislative and other acts which led Greece to the compulsory participation of the holders of Greek State bonds governed by Greek law in P.S.I. are in reality Community measures.

2.

Second plea: The measures which the Greek Government adopted to deal with Greek public debt were in reality imposed by the institutions of the European Union, in particular the ECB and the European Commission.

3.

Third plea: The defendants failed to legislate, and to explicitly exempt the applicants’ bonds governed by Greek law by means of the acts of the Council of Ministers by which the terms governing the application of P.S.I. in Greece were specified.

4.

Fourth plea: The failure to exempt the applicants and their express compensation from P.S.I. have caused them direct, personal and serious harm and denied them enjoyment of their fundamental rights.

5.

Fifth plea: All the legislative measures of the Greek Government were adopted on the recommendation and, to be more precise, after decision of the Eurogroup, ΕCOFIN, the ECB and the European Commission.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/29

—

annul the decision C(2014) 3192 final of 26 May 2014 issued in Case State aid SA.38517 (2014/NN) — Micula v Romania (ICSID arbitration award) ordering Romania to suspend any action which may lead to the execution or implementation of the award of 11 December 2013 rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal established under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in the case Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20), as the Commission considers that the execution of the award constitutes unlawful State aid, until the Commission has taken a final decision on the compatibility of that State aid with the internal market;

—

award the applicants the costs of the action.

1.

First plea in law, alleging a lack of competence.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a manifest error of law and assessment.

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/30

—

annul, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, the decision of 9 July 2014 in case SA.32009 (2011/C) in so far as it declares the amount by which the aid claimed of EUR 4 5 2 57  273 exceeds EUR 17 million (EUR 2 8 2 57  273) to be incompatible with the internal market;

—

in the alternative: annul, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, the decision of 9 July 2014 in case SA.32009 (2011/C) in so far as it declares the amount of EUR 22,5 million which is exempt from notification in accordance with Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 (1) to be incompatible with the internal market;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings in accordance with Article 87 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

1.

First plea in law: Infringement of Article 108(3) TFEU

2.

Second plea in law: Infringement of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU

3.

Alternative plea in law: Infringement of Article 108(3) TFEU and Regulation No 800/2008

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/31

—

annul Commission Implementing Decision C(2014) 6030 final of 19 August 2014 concerning, in the framework of Article 31 of Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, the marketing authorisations for high concentration of estradiol containing human medicinal products for topical use in so far as it requires Member States to comply with the obligations imposed in the implementing decision for the medicinal products listed in Annex I to the implementing decision and those not listed with 0,01 % estradiol by weight for topical use, with the exception of the restriction that the medicinal products named in Annex I to the implementing decision with 0,01 % estradiol by weight for topical use may be administered only intravaginally;

—

order the European Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law: Infringement of Article 31 et seq. of Directive 2001/83/EC (1)

2.

Second plea in law: Infringement of the first sentence of Article 116 and the first sentence of Article 126 of Directive 2001/83/EC

3.

Third plea in law: Infringement of the principles of proportionality and equal treatment

8.12.2014   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 439/33

—

declare the Decision void insofar as it finds that Lupin infringed Article 101 TFEU; and/or

—

set aside or reduce the fine imposed on Lupin; and

—

require the Commission to pay Lupin’s costs of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law insofar as it found that the applicant had committed an infringement by object of Article 101 TFEU. The applicant submits that:

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law insofar as it found that the applicant had committed an infringement by effect of Article 101 TFEU. The applicant considers that the Commission’s approach to determining whether a patent settlement agreement was an infringement by effect suffered from the same flaws as its approach to object infringements.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission was wrong to impose any fine upon the applicant, alternatively the fine imposed was too high and should be reduced. The applicant contends that: