21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/1

1.1

This opinion sets out an argument that an effective way of strengthening civil society partnerships in delivering the Baltic Sea Region Strategy is through the implementation of the partnership principle as set out in the Commission's code of conduct partnership.

1.2

The code of conduct partnership enjoys the support of the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the EESC but is not yet endorsed by the Council. This remains a significant challenge for supporters of the partnership principle.

1.3

The EESC acknowledges that there is incomplete political support for the code of conduct among Baltic Member States and that the culture of partnership needs to be strengthened.

1.4

The EESC recommends that the Baltic Sea Region Strategy could informally embrace the process outlined in the code of conduct and apply it to the ongoing evolution and implementation of the Baltic Sea Region Strategy.

1.5

There is sufficient organisational experience and competence in the Baltic Sea Region to build upon to undertake the enhanced monitoring role envisaged under the code of conduct.

1.6

The Baltic could also emulate the Danube Strategy by establishing a Baltic Civil Society Forum. The EESC played a prominent role in the formation of the Danube Civil Society Forum and stand ready to play a similar coordinating role in the Baltic.

2.1

The concept of a macro-region first entered the vocabulary of the EU in 2007 as part of the political debate about appropriate forms of territorial governance. Subsequently macro-regional cooperation strategies were adopted for the Baltic Sea region (2009) and the Danube region (2011).

2.2

The Baltic Sea Region Strategy, as the first attempt at cooperation at macro-regional level, was initially a test case for this new model of regional cooperation. At its heart is a simple view that in a region such as the Baltic Sea serious problem such as maritime safety, environmental pollution and access ability can only be tackled and overcome through effective cooperation. In addition the precise geography of a macro-region can vary according to the definition and nature of the problem to be tackled. A former Commissioner for regional policy put this point succinctly when he stated that a macro-regional strategy is defined "on the basis of the challenges and transnational opportunities that require collective action".

2.3

The Baltic Sea Region Strategy has three main objectives: to save the sea, to connect the region and to increase prosperity. In order to achieve this, the Member States and the Commission have agreed on an Action Plan with 15 Priority Areas and about 80 different Flagship Projects.

2.4

The Baltic Sea Region Strategy has built upon existing levels of cooperation in the region and has been underway for four years. It has engendered a high level of cooperation between participating countries and regions. Multilevel governance has operated to coordinate national and regional authorities to improve maritime safety and to achieve a reduction in eutrophication levels in the Baltic. The EU has organised annual Civil Society Forums in the context of EUSBSR, since its establishment in 2009.

2.5

The economic performance of the region has not been hindered by the outworking of the strategy. The Baltic Sea region recovered in 2010 more quickly than other parts of Europe and retained solid growth rates throughout 2011. In 2012 the pace of growth slowed to 1,5 %, still well above the EU average. The outlook for 2013 remains muted but the region should still outperform its European peers, according to the Baltic Development Forum.

3.1

The EESC has long held the view that genuine partnership is necessary for the overall effectiveness of EU cohesion policy. Partnership is a means of achieving sustainable economic and social development. It is enshrined in the mechanism for delivering cohesion policy and formally set out in Article 11 of the general regulation.

3.2

The interpretation of article 11 by Member States has been problematic with some countries paying only lip service while others fully embraced the partnership principle. In April 2012 the Commission proposed a code of conduct partnership in the implementation of the common strategic framework in an attempt to set out a formal mechanism for the effective participation of all stakeholders in cohesion policy.

3.3

The Commission's proposed code of conduct partnership contains a set of minimum requirements which are necessary to attain a high quality partnership in the implementation of the funds while maintaining ample flexibility to Member States in ways they organise the participation of the different partners. The European code of conduct on partnership states that "public authorities, economic and social partners, and bodies representing civil society may establish, in their respective area of intervention, platforms or umbrella organisations to facilitate their involvement in the partnership. They may nominate a single representative to present the views of the platform or the umbrella organisation in the partnership. Principles to consider when partners nominate their representatives would include: competence, capacity to participate actively, and appropriate level of representation".

3.4

The Commission’s proposals are supported by the European Parliament, the EESC and the Committee of the Regions. The European Council however deleted the code of conduct from the Commission's overall set of proposals. This stand-off is unfortunate and demands concerted action from all supporters of the partnership principle to overcome it.

3.5

The code of conduct identifies three categories of partners constituting the partnership in cohesion policy:

3.6

It also sets out a set of principles for involvement of different categories of partners in the preparation of programmes, the information to be provided on their involvement as well as at the various stages of implementation. According to the Commission, partners should be involved in:

3.7

In terms of the preparation programmes, partners should be involved in:

3.7.1

The code also contains detailed set of principles for the rules of membership and governance of partnerships and monitoring committees.

3.7.2

In order for many of the smaller NGOs and other civil society organisations to take part effectively in this new partnership process, consideration should be given to providing them with adequate technical and financial assistance.

3.8

Although the Baltic Sea region strategy resulted from an unprecedented level of stakeholder consultation, it is fair to say that the partnership principle as outlined in the code of conduct is largely absent in the Baltic. Political "buy in" to the partnership principle remains to be achieved in some Member States.

3.9

There are several bodies and organisations operating successfully across the Baltic Sea Region with broad representation of civil society stakeholders. These could form the basis of a Baltic Partnership or umbrella organisation as envisaged in the code of conduct. There is no need to duplicate what is already in place.

3.10

In terms of cooperative relations with Russia, just as the new North West Federal District strategy has been influenced by the Baltic Sea Region strategy, a new partnership approach among the members of the Council of the Baltic States (CBSS) could have similar demonstration effects.

3.11

If the code of conduct could be broadly supported, it would help to galvanise stakeholder support once more for the Baltic Sea Strategy even during this very difficult period and in the period ahead. Just as the Baltic Sea Region Strategy was viewed as a test of macro-regional cooperation, the implementation of the partnership principle would be another first for the Baltic.

3.12

The appendix below sets out the partnership multilevel governance agreement between the Council and the European Parliament which could form the basis of the delegated act to give effect to a modified code of conduct partnership.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/6

1.1

Female employment should no longer be raised as another debate on gender equality, but instead as an economic imperative to bring prosperity and jobs to the European Union – a social necessity to face the challenges of demographics, social and environmental concerns to ensure sustainable growth.

1.2

The increase in the employment rate of women has already significantly contributed to growth over the last 50 years. Yet, in order to fully use the potential of women’s contribution to growth, more focused measures have to be implemented at both EU and national levels. It is nonetheless important to ensure that such policies are comprehensive and encompass not only the most obvious economic obstacles, but also tackle the domains of tax, benefit and pension systems, labour rights, decision-making, entrepreneurship, education, stereotypes and violence. It is also clear that both women and men must play their part if such multifaceted issues are to be solved. Women and men should also be involved in dialogue and cooperation among the relevant stakeholders and in the application of successful practices.

1.3

Alongside the specific recommendations below and throughout the text, key prerequisites for achieving more female participation in employment and contribution to growth are:

2.1

The Committee strongly believes that economic growth alone is no longer enough to ensure real progress of societies, unless it is inclusive and sustainable. Gender equality thus becomes an important condition for achieving such progress. At the same time, the measurement of GDP should no longer be exclusively based on the production/consumption paradigm, but should include indicators such as wellbeing and sustainability (in economic, social and environmental terms) in order to move "towards a more balanced policy" (3).

2.2

Gender equality is often viewed as a constraint or cost. It is necessary to recognise the cost of non-equality and the positive economic contribution of gender equality as an investment and a productive factor.

2.3

The Europe 2020 targets – in particular increasing the employment rate of 20-64 year-olds up to 75 % by 2020 and reducing the number of people in or at risk of poverty by at least 20 million people – are impossible to reach without stronger involvement of women in the labour market and in public life. Moreover, reaching full convergence in participation rates would represent an increase of around 12 % in GDP per capita by 2030 (4).

2.4

In the light of a shrinking working age population (5), Europe will not reach the intended growth without increasing the labour market potential of women. In 2012, the employment rate for men (20-64) was 74,6 %, whilst it was only 62,4 % for women. When employment is measured in full-time equivalent, the situation is even worse, as the current level of employment of women is equal to 53,5 % of the total female workforce working full-time (6).

2.5

The increase in the employment rate of women has already largely contributed to growth over the last 50 years. Yet it is important to note that the family work done by women without pay is not taken into account as a contribution to the economy. Developing jobs to provide services to the families would contribute to the transformation of this invisible form of work into paid work and would create tax revenues, contributions to pensions, etc.

2.6

The Committee draws attention to the fact that unemployed women are not always included in statistics and are not registered as unemployed but are in effect untapped potential. The lower level of female employment does not directly translate into unemployment but, rather, into inactivity or undeclared work, owing to the low supply of female work that results from the "disincentive" effect. Therefore, the statistical data at national and European level cannot accurately depict the actual situation. The EESC calls for greater disaggregation of statistical data on female employment gathered and drawn up at European level, in relation to the private service sectors.

2.7

The EESC notes that the Annual Growth Survey should establish targets for women's employment (7) as focused policies can close gender gaps and promote inclusion, significantly increasing the growth potential of the EU economy (8). Such policies – including (but not limited to) provision of care services for dependent family members and removing financial disincentives to work for second earners – are essential to enhance women's participation in the labour market. Member States should use such policies to improve employability and to support access to jobs and a return to work.

2.8

Strict austerity leads to cuts in the public sector and services and women are more likely to lose their jobs as they form the majority of public sector workers. The groups suffering the greatest reduction in their standard of living due to cuts in public services are lone parents, the majority of whom are also women. At the same time, women are the majority of those providing unpaid care, so they are likely to be the ones picking up the pieces as social care services are cut (9). The Commission should prepare a comprehensive study on the impact of austerity on equal opportunities to envisage more qualitative solutions, and should research the way in which the austerity measures have impacted on the quantity and quality of female employment in both the public and private service sectors.

2.9

It is noteworthy that EU policy makers focus on general employability but do not identify measures to engage the potential of economically inactive women, who could be making substantial contributions to EU growth.

2.10

The EESC recommends allocating the EU funds in a more gender sensitive manner and encourages both the EU institutions and the Member States to implement the recommendations set out in the Evaluation of the European Social Fund’s support to Gender Equality (10).

3.1

Increases in educational attainment account for about 50 % of GDP growth in EU countries between 1960 and 2008; about half of this increase was due to improvements in women’s educational attainment (11).

3.2

EIGE (12) and OECD reports show that women are presented with less employment opportunities than men for a variety of reasons and face reduced earnings for the same work even though women today have higher educational attainment than men in most EU countries.

3.3

Systematic gender disparities (13) in subject choices prevent economies from making full use of their talent pool and therefore imply a misallocation of human capital and a loss in potential innovation and economic growth. The EU institutions and Member States should address gender disparities in education by promoting a change of attitude among students, teachers, parents and society at large. Such intervention should start early on in a student's life, before stereotypical perceptions and attitudes set in towards what boys and girls excel in and enjoy doing.

3.4

The Committee recommends paying special attention to initiatives and projects funded by EU instruments (ESF funding, LLL programmes, etc.). These instruments could be used to enhance the possibilities of women returners to regain skills and access employment and/or for women's career development.

4.1

Most EU Member States face the dual problem of an ageing population and low fertility rates. These factors will imply a shrinking labour force over the next 20 years if the male and female labour force participation rates remain constant (14).

4.2

There is a need to sustainably change predominant gender inequalities in European societies. Supporting a better work-family balance for men is an important step to achieve a more equal distribution of paid and unpaid work between women and men. More equal sharing of parental leave between both parents would reduce the disincentives for employers to hire women of childbearing age.

4.3

Changes in labour demand – with, for example, the emergence of new production methods and different working conditions and, especially, switching from manufacturing and agriculture to services – are important drivers for expanding female labour force participation and accounts for the growing demand for female workers.

4.4

Although part-time work has encouraged more women to join the formal labour force, in the long term, working part-time can reduce training possibilities, career prospects, affect the pension benefits of retirees and increase the risk of poverty both in the short term and in old age. This is particularly evident in the "involuntary" part-time work that has increased in recent years (15): in the wake of the crisis, women are offered part-time work and are obliged to accept it as they have no choice in terms of contract or do not want to lose their job. Attention should be paid to the large imbalance of women and men in part-time work (31,6 % and 8 % respectively). Any barriers to move from part-time to full-time employment should be removed.

4.5

The Committee notes that policies that encourage two-earner households and help working adults to cope with their family commitments are important factors for boosting female participation. An appropriate mix of both in-cash and in-kind support also plays an important role.

4.6

Higher tax rates on the second earner in a family can reduce female labour force participation as they discourage women’s participation in the labour market (16). Thus the tax and benefit systems need to be adjusted so as not to discourage second earners.

4.7

Particular attention should be given to informal, precarious work, including pseudo self-employment. This affects women more than men, which makes them more prone to be exploited. EU Member States should ratify without delay the 189th ILO Convention on Decent Work for Domestic Workers (17), which sets labour standards for domestic workers.

5.1

The EESC urges policymakers to reduce gender inequalities by closing the gender pay gap (which is 16,2 % on average) as equal pay will bring benefits not only to women but also to the whole society – according to the European Added Value Assessment, one percentage point decrease in the gender pay gap increases economic growth by 0,1 % (18).

5.2

The EESC also voices its concern at the extremely wide gender gap in pensions – the EU-27 average is 39 % (19) – which is more than twice the figure of the gender pay gap. Especially unsettling is the lack of visibility of the problem. Not only do wide gaps exist in most EU countries, but they are also overwhelmingly complex as they depend on employment histories (in particular, gaps in pay, hours worked and years worked), on pension systems and, in particular, on the impact of career earnings on pension benefits and on the extent to which pension systems compensate for career interruptions to care for children or dependent relatives.

5.3

The EESC therefore believes that both closing the gender pay gap and adding the "family time" – child and elderly care, assisting a family member during a short and/or long illness, etc. – in the pension accumulation systems for both men and women (while ensuring the possibility for employees to obtain a family leave for care and assistance) would reduce the gender gap in pensions (20).

6.1

A recent OECD study (21) highlights that gender gaps in entrepreneurship are large and resilient across many dimensions, including subjective preferences for entrepreneurship, business size and financial performance, access to and use of financial capital. Women entrepreneurs have additional objectives to profit maximisation, and their wider measures of performance highlight their contribution to social and economic development.

6.2

Helping more women to start a business and supporting the growth of existing female-led firms can contribute (22) to more job creation, more innovation, increased competitiveness and economic growth, and reduce social exclusion. Significant measures are needed to capitalise on the full potential of enterprises for sustainable economic growth and job creation in Europe, especially following the crisis.

6.3

The EESC has already proposed the following steps to be taken for the promotion of female entrepreneurship on the EU level (23):

7.1

International studies (24) confirm that women in management positions have a positive impact on corporate financial performance, corporate culture, management style and resilience to the crisis. Women take fewer risks and prioritise the sustainable development, but the barriers to achieving gender equality in decision-making are far deeper than openly admitted.

7.2

The EESC hopes that a minimum standard of equal participation in decision-making is adopted by all public and private decision-making bodies in the spirit of self-regulation. Listed companies and all public-sector bodies should promote transparent application and appointment procedures and a culture of inclusion and freedom of choice. Yet, little will ever be achieved without the willingness of both men and women to take positive action.

7.3

The EESC would recommend that policymakers and companies review the following issues to ensure that gender balance on all decision-making bodies is achieved:

7.4

In order to implement the Strategy for Equality between Women and Men (2010-2015) (25), the EESC encourages the equal representation of men and women in public life and, especially, in politics, as current under-representation limits women's participation rights (26). The EU institutions and Member States, as well as the social partner organisations, should lead by example and introduce gender equality targets in their political and administrative bodies, especially at the highest levels.

8.1

An important factor influencing the participation of women in the labour market is access to full-time childcare facilities in particular for young children. Increases in public spending on childcare services are directly linked to increases in the full-time employment of women (27).

8.2

Achieving the Barcelona targets is therefore a necessity. However, according to a recent report from the Commission, in 2010 only 10 Member States had achieved the Barcelona target for children under 3. In the same year, in the category of children between 3 and the compulsory school age only 11 Member States achieved the objective of 90 % (28).

8.3

As Member States with the highest birth rates are also those which have done the most to facilitate the work-life balance for parents and which have high rates of female employment (29), Member States should provide more effective, affordable, accessible and qualitative support for families with children through policies (30), such as:

9.1

Although the increase in girls' educational attainment over recent decades has boosted female earning potential, society's attitudes to women's work and the clash between family values and equality remain an obstacle to gender balance in the labour market.

9.2

The EESC is particularly concerned with discrimination against women who happen to be disabled, migrant, or belong to an ethnic minority. In this sense, it calls for speedy implementation of the equal treatment directive (31).

9.3

Violence against women is not only an unjustifiable social issue, but also has a high economic cost. It is estimated that violence against women has an annual cost of at least EUR 32 billion in the 47 member states of the Council of Europe (32). Public policies to counter gender-based violence have an important role to play; the traditional image of women's role in society will only change when women have access to power on an equal footing with men.

9.4

The role of the media industry is crucial for the promotion of gender equality. Media not only reflects but also creates sociocultural patterns and norms and is a powerful actor in shaping public opinion and culture. Also, it is precisely media content that fosters a broad understanding of the complexities of gender equality across all players in society, including policymakers and the public, thus it is urgent to tackle the persistent inequalities in the form of under-representation (especially at higher levels), barriers to advancement and low pay (compared to men) within the media sector (33).

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/11

1.1

The EESC advocates that the EU institutions and the "open working group" established by the 67th UN General Assembly on 17 December 2012 apply and insist on the method of ex ante economic, social and environmental impact assessment, both for the phase of defining the sustainable development goals, and during the global negotiation of universally applicable goals, so that means are available to offset favourable or unfavourable differences that may arise or co-exist between geographical areas and sectors of activity.

1.2

All social programmes that are essential to achieving sustainable development goals, in the areas of education, health, and those targeting unemployed youth, should be protected from budgetary cuts as a matter of priority.

1.3

The Committee supports the EU's commitment to adhering to the plan to implement its 2020 strategy by means of the European semester, seizing the opportunity to make it meaningful by proposing a "decompartmentalised" social, economic and environmental strategy, as well as through the EU strategy for integrated sustainable development.

1.4

It proposes that European civil society be involved in this through CSOs, the social partners and national ESCs and similar institutions.

1.5

It urges the Member States and the EU institutions to:

1.6

The Committee encourages the EU to:

2.1

The decision to launch a process leading to the establishment of sustainable development goals was one of the major decisions of the Rio+20 conference. The process was launched in January 2013 with the setting-up of an intergovernmental open working group mandated to provide a report with a proposal to the UN General Assembly at some point between September 2013 and September 2014. According to the Rio+20 outcome document, this process needs to be coordinated and coherent with the processes to consider the post-2015 development agenda.

2.2

This opinion should be seen in conjunction with the NAT own-initiative opinion adopted by the EESC in June 2013 on The green economy – promoting sustainable development in Europe  (1) and the REX opinion on the Commission communication A decent life for all – ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future  (2). With a view to Europe's sustainable development, the European social model – which is inextricably linked to making a successful transition to a green economy – should be safeguarded and consolidated. The wait for an international agreement on the definition of the SDGs must not serve as a pretext for delaying or reducing development-aid and cooperation policy commitments made by industrialised countries.

2.3

In the referral letter for this exploratory opinion, the Commission makes the link between sustainable development goals, an inclusive green economy and poverty eradication. It asks the Committee to explore how the economic, environmental and social dimension might be successfully integrated into a future framework of universal SDGs. The Commission would like the views of the EESC's international counterparts to be brought into the discussion.

2.4

Over the course of two meetings of its Sustainable Development Observatory, the Committee held a hearing of representatives of the so-called major groups recognised by the UN at the Rio+20 conference.

2.5

For its part, the UN set up a high-level group of government representatives with a view to putting forward an initial report in September 2013. Achim Steiner, the UN under-secretary-general and executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme, addressed the EESC on 14 May, along with other representatives of civil society, on the topic of Advancing sustainable development post-Rio+20. He stressed the need for a fully inclusive consultation process on the SDGs that must involve governments, civil society and the private sector. Kitty van der Heijden, the Netherlands' ambassador for sustainable development, and member of the "open working group", shared her experience of that UN group.

—

be based on Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation;

—

build upon commitments already made;

—

focus on priority areas for the achievement of sustainable development, being guided by the outcome document;

—

address and incorporate in a balanced way all three dimensions of sustainable development and their interlinkages;

—

be coherent with and integrated into the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015;

—

not divert focus or effort from the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals; and

—

include active involvement of all relevant stakeholders, as appropriate, in the process.

3.3.1

According to Oxfam International (Oxfam, Post-2015 Development Goals: Oxfam International Position, January 2013), for example, the post-2015 framework should support this vision, set goals and objectives in line with it and demonstrate progress toward achieving it. Achieving well-being for all within the means of the planet would require a fundamental re-orientation of economic, social and political development.

3.3.2

Oxfam believes that post-2015 debates lack clarity on what the role of a framework is and how it can lead to real change for people living in poverty. Reaching a shared view on the "how" is crucial to informing the "what". The purpose of goals should be to galvanise political will and government-led action to end poverty and inequality, and protect the planet, by:

3.4.1

Any lasting recovery of the real economy would necessarily take the shape of a more resource-efficient production model. While endorsing a more ambitious and comprehensive European climate policy framework for delivering the broader 2050 climate targets, Europe should support its industrial base and its related sectors and competences.

3.4.2

How the objective of a resource-efficient low-carbon economy is to be reached and how the transition is managed are the key issues to be addressed. The two main focuses should be industrial policy and employment prospects on the road to a green economy that retains its industrial base (Béla Galgóczi, Greening industries and creating jobs, European Trade Union Institue, 2012).

3.4.3

Industry plays a leading role in research and development, trade and, to a lesser extent, in investment. The transition towards a low-carbon form of development, whereby energy efficiency is enhanced, sustainable work is valued more highly and health protected, has become crucial.

3.4.4

Europe is experiencing one of the lowest growth rates in its history since 1929. But there are two crucial factors that hold the key to achieving future goals for sustainable and lasting development: 1) low CO2 emissions; and 2) democracy.

3.4.5

The EU should forge ahead with its efforts on research and development so as to create the number of jobs needed for its workforce, and also meet the future development needs generated by stronger growth on other continents, in areas as varied as services, education, health, the environment, transport, energy, housing, urbanisation, agriculture and food, etc.

3.5.1

The IMF has recognised that the austerity medication was more potent than it first thought. The right lesson to draw is that the dosage must be reduced. All key social programmes, in the areas of education, health, and those targeting unemployed youth, should be protected from budgetary cuts. The need for funding in the EU Member States is critical following the global financial crisis, and the refinancing of the real economy is insufficiently covered by the agreement reached by the European Council on the EU's multiannual financial framework. The measures advocated by the troika of the World Bank, the IMF and the Council of the EU are not conducive to creating the conditions necessary for the economy to return to lasting, sustainable growth.

3.5.2

Smart social policies – such as programmes that help the unemployed find jobs or systems that provide social security to vulnerable members of our society – cannot just be considered a cost. They are an investment in our future.

3.5.3

Young people have been particularly hard hit in the euro zone as a whole, where youth unemployment has topped 22 per cent, with rates exceeding 50 per cent in certain countries like Greece and Spain. In 2010, the rate of employment in temporary work among young people aged 15 to 24 exceeded 50 % to reach almost 70 % (Eurofound, Third European Quality of Life Survey, 2012).

3.5.4

Everywhere, people have paid a high price for cleaning up the devastating consequences of practices in the financial sector that proved to be irresponsible.

3.5.5

The EU must bring real substance to the social dimension, including social dialogue, as announced in the roadmap for completing the European economic and monetary union. It should help Member States implement youth guarantee schemes, improve industrial diversification and innovation, boost effectiveness of labour market services, increase job creation and strengthen social investment (ILO, Guy Ryder, Jobs, social inclusion and growth should top EU agenda, 14 February 2013).

4.1

It has emerged from the initial hearings held by the Committee that the correlation between the contributions of civil society gathered by the EU and those being gathered by the UN system through direct consultation is not being met with the understanding and transparency that European citizens are entitled to expect. The contributions of organisations representing civil society sit alongside those of private-interest pressure groups, at the same level as those of governments, under a timetable that leaves little room for holding debates with due regard for the independence of the organisations and the autonomy of social dialogue. Moreover, the impression that has emerged over the course of following the work of the Rio +20 conference, and of the "open" working group, is of a scenario aimed at adding impetus to a pre-determined approach, as though the die were already cast elsewhere.

4.2

Fortunately, the EU has decided to implement the whole approach by means of greening the Europe 2020 strategy and the European semester, in order to make a harmonised contribution in which Europe implements and speaks with one voice on the world stage.

4.3

It is important today to have sustainability as a thread running through key policy areas. That currently means the Europe 2020 strategy and the European semester as its central governance pillar.

The Committee has been very interested to learn from the Commission and the Council that the EU intends to implement and push forward the outcomes and processes agreed at the Rio+20 conference through the Europe 2020 strategy. The Committee will therefore be keeping a careful watch as to whether this is actually happening (Council of the European Union, Rio+20: Outcome and follow-up to the UNCSD 2012 Summit – Council conclusions, 25 October 2012, 15477/12).

4.4

The Committee has watched attentively as the circle of those involved in the European semester process has been expanding. DG Environment is involved this year even more heavily than before, and the EU Environment Council discussed the annual growth survey for the first time last December. The Committee will play its part in ensuring that civil society, too, is able to bring a sustainability dimension to bear in the process, namely through the national economic and social councils, some of which now have specific competences in this area, and also through the national sustainability councils.

4.5

As regards the annual growth survey, it should be pointed out that the connection between the various crises (the financial, economic, social, but especially the environmental crisis) is, in our view, not seen clearly enough, nor is the urgent need to get serious about transforming our entire economy to make it greener – not just in spite of, but precisely because of the crisis. Carrying on as before will not do any more.

4.6

In the context of the annual growth survey, the EU needs to speak with one voice. The EU cannot engage in international negotiations and advocate the greening of the world economy and then neglect the issue in its own most important economic policy documents.

4.7

The absence of any mention of a qualified concept of growth is also a bit strange in this context. How is it possible that the EU is, at international level, in the vanguard of the "beyond GDP" debate, but is fixated on GDP in its growth survey? That said, whilst the report does deal with social problems, the aim of living well within the limits of our planet's resources (which is, by the way, also the title of the 7th Environment Action Programme) does not jump out of the pages.

4.8

There is, fortunately, much material available to guide the debate on the advisability of establishing additional indicators and this must now lead to implementation based on face-to-face meetings between institutional actors and representatives of civil society, as part of an approach that ensures the involvement in the decision-making process of all the interests at stake.

4.9

The Committee notes that the abolition of environmentally-damaging subsidies and the introduction of environmental taxes are now firmly embedded in the annual growth survey and the country-specific recommendations and that, this year, waste and water treatment and improved recycling get a mention.

5.1.1

Poverty reduction is a question of equity and justice and concerns access to services such as healthcare and education and employment. The MDG development was too donor driven. The future framework requires:

5.1.2

Using a time-bound and outcome-oriented approach, the eight MDGs have had a deep effect on international development policies. By focusing on a limited set of measurable targets, they have helped to increase and channel development aid more efficiently. However, as we are coming closer to the 2015-deadline, it is clear that the Goals will deliver mixed results, with successes and setbacks.

5.1.3

The current set of millennium goals need to be complemented by sustainable development goals. SDGs have two notable differences compared to MDGs: they would have a global reach (as opposed to MDGs which mainly focus on the South) and include dimensions beyond the meta-norm of poverty reduction (natural resources, consumption, production, energy, human rights, etc.).

5.1.4

The next two years will be critical in defining the next development Agenda. Both processes – the revision of MDGs and the formalisation of SDGs – must provide crucial guidelines for the post-2015 sustainable development architecture.

These guidelines should include budgeting for gender equality as a cross-cutting dimension of public policies, as the primary factor in combating poverty and inequality (4).

The task ahead is huge and must be rooted in a greater emphasis on human rights, and on civil society organisation participation in decision-making, as part of an approach centred on the economy and services as a means of human development (5).

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/16

1.1

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) believes that the issue of food security should be placed at the heart of the EU's policies as a prerequisite for a strategy for global stability.

1.2

In the "food vs fuel" debate, while agreeing with the EU on the need to reduce our dependency on imports of fossil fuels, the Committee urges the Commission to prioritise the issues of security of food supply, land protection, the competitiveness of European agriculture and land use (1), making a close correlation between food security and bioenergy production (2).

1.3

The Committee believes that the future of the EU should be based on social, economic and environmental sustainability and that the production of renewable energy should be closely linked to achieving those objectives.

1.4

The Committee agrees with the Commission's decision to include binding provisions on land-use change in Directives 98/70/EC and 2009/28/EC, as current biofuels are produced from agricultural crops.

1.5

Reaffirming the view expressed in opinion TEN/502 (3), the Committee disagrees with the decision made by the Commission to assess indirect land-use change (ILUC) on the basis of a comparison of fossil-based and biogenic energy sources, looking exclusively at greenhouse gas emissions and downplaying issues such as security of supply and the impact of fossil fuels.

1.6

The Committee endorses the Commission's proposal to limit the production of biofuels derived from food crops – while taking account of investments already made – and to incentivise "advanced" biofuels. It believes, however, that the production of second-generation biofuels that use wood and straw could remove carbon sinks and thus increase CO2 levels (4).

1.7

The Committee feels that its assessment would be different if microalgae were also used as a feedstock for the production of biofuels; even if this is not yet a commercial reality, it would, in comparison to first-generation biofuels, give less cause for concern regarding competition for land and water resources.

1.8

The Committee fully reaffirms the conclusion regarding biofuels that emerged from the EESC food security conference in 2011: "biofuel production should comply with shared principles and be subject to impact assessment studies in which the local community is closely involved, making sure careful attention is paid to the right to food".

1.9

In line with this assessment, the Committee recommends that the Commission adopt at European level tools such as operator-level indicators to assess the potential impact of bioenergy projects on food security at individual Member State level.

2.1.1

The energy system at international level is currently going through a very difficult period. This is due in part to the global economic crisis, but above all to the geopolitical situation in North Africa and the Middle East.

2.1.2

OECD figures for 2009 show a fall in energy consumption of 4,4 % at global level, 5 % in the USA and 5,5 % in the EU, while in non-OECD countries demand rose by 2 %. To this equation must be added the nuclear plant accident in Fukushima, Japan, which has prompted a number of countries, including Germany, to abandon the use of nuclear fuel to produce energy.

2.1.3

Europe currently imports 80 % of the oil, 60 % of the natural gas and 40 % of the coal needed to cover its energy needs, estimated at 1 583,3 Mtoe (Nomisma). The share of non-renewable energy is 91 % (oil 36,6 %, natural gas 24,5 %, coal 15,7 %, nuclear energy 13,6 %) and the renewable share 9 % (6,1 % biomass, biogas, municipal waste, 1,7 % hydro power, 0,7 % wind energy, 0,3 % geothermal energy, 0,1 % photovoltaic and solar).

2.1.4

Europe is increasingly dependent on energy imports. It is projected that in 2030, the EU-28 will import 84 % of the natural gas, 59 % of the coal and 94 % of the oil that it needs (EREC). Figures for 2009 show that transport is the sector that accounts for the greatest share of energy consumption, at 33 %; the residential sector accounts for 26,5 %; industry for 24,2 %; and services for 14 %; while agriculture accounts for the smallest share, at 2,3 %.

2.1.5

The goals that the EU is seeking to achieve can be summed up as follows:

2.2.1

In recent years, the fossil-fuel-based energy system has displayed many shortcomings that put its future sustainability and supply security in doubt, with the need to target secure energy sources in a controlled system of energy imports.

As demand for energy continues to grow (IEA), the impending, unstoppable depletion of fossil fuels will jeopardise Europe's ability to meet its increasing energy needs. This depletion arises from the non-renewable nature of those fossil fuels; the transformation process involved takes an extremely long time, which is incompatible with the energy needs of contemporary society.

2.2.2

The main types of renewable energy are:

This is not necessarily the full picture, especially with regard to the results of scientific research.

2.2.3

Bioenergy can be defined as energy obtained from biomass; biomass is classified according to its physical state and is divided into:

2.2.4

Biomass is a renewable source that has already become an efficient source of energy. Biomass is any organic material that captures solar energy directly or indirectly during the process of chlorophyll photosynthesis. It is derived from energy crops or organic residues from forest products and the technical processing of agricultural products.

2.2.5

At global level, some 50 % of the potentially available residues derive from forestry. The other 50 % come from agriculture, where installations fuelled by biomass from agriculture and livestock are of particular importance (IEA).

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The Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force on 21 March 1994;

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The Altener programme for the promotion of renewable energy sources (Council Decision 93/500/EEC);

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The Green Paper on renewable energy sources (1996);

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The White Paper setting the objective of 12 % of energy used coming from renewables by 2010;

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Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources;

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Directive 2003/30/EC on the promotion of the use of biofuels;

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Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity;

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COM(2005) 628 final — Biomass action plan;

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COM(2006) 34 final — An EU strategy for biofuels;

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The Green Paper — A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy (2006);

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The Climate-energy package (20-20-20), European Council, 9 March 2007;

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Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (Text with EEA relevance);

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Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Renewable Energy Road Map - Renewable energies in the 21st century: building a more sustainable future, COM(2006) 848 final;

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Communication from the Commission - The support of electricity from renewable energy sources, SEC(2005) 1571 - COM(2005) 627 final.

3.1.1

The socio-economic impact of bioenergy is largely contingent on its costs (incentives, structural deficiencies) and benefits (linked activities, effects on GDP, CO2 reduction, employment effects, reduction of fuel risk, elimination of waste-disposal costs, production of fertilisers and other by-products) (Althesys). Furthermore, when the price of oil exceeds USD 70 a barrel, the production of bioenergy becomes competitive.

3.1.2

The current system of biomass production has an impact on the land, on the economy, on prices and on society as a whole. The Committee believes that these effects should be assessed in order to rectify inefficiencies and distortions.

3.1.3

The Committee believes that the development of bioenergy has repercussions on food security for reasons closely linked to prices and local factors. The main direct effect on prices derives from the demand for biofuels, as energy markets are larger than agricultural ones in value terms. Energy prices determine the agricultural prices of energy crops insofar as the increase in demand for energy linked to agricultural products determines the minimum price of sugar, corn, and rape and their maximum price, which if exceeded would render uncompetitive the use of agricultural crops in comparison with other energy sources such as wind, solar or geothermal. It is also worth noting the general problem that higher energy prices increase the cost of agricultural production inputs.

3.1.4

Bioenergy has emerged as a possible solution which can revitalise areas that are economically depressed and under-used agriculturally, in particular in developing sectors in the various stages of production, harvesting, transport and processing. From an economic and employment point of view, positive objectives can also be achieved: according to Commission communication COM(2005) 628 final, Biomass action plan, direct employment in 2010 was calculated at 300 000 new workers, mostly in rural areas.

3.1.5

The use of wooded areas for energy purposes can help rehabilitate local agri-forestry communities through greater stewardship of the land and protection of forested areas. Moreover, there is the potential to boost the capacity of forest ecosystems to perform their primary functions, namely to produce wood biomass and protect natural heritage and soil fertility.

3.2.1

The Committee regrets the fact that, as happened in the past with oil, some rich countries with insufficient arable land to ensure a secure energy supply for their people, as well as multinationals and sovereign wealth funds, are making substantial investments in third countries in order to exploit the land. Thus we are faced with a land-grabbing situation, which is likely to disrupt established rural communities and damage the agricultural and forestry resources of local populations. In the Committee's view, this situation is far from being an example of sustainable development in economic, social and environmental terms.

3.2.2

Land-use conflict is an explosive issue, especially in the case of developing countries or large, sparsely populated countries (e.g. Brazil or the US state of Iowa). Although land-use conflict is to be expected, the concept can be conveyed more clearly bearing in mind that the amount of corn it takes to produce 25 gallons of bioethanol will feed one person for a whole year (Worldwatch Institute).

3.2.3

Land-use conflict is a problem linked to the importation of biofuels by the EU and the food supply in developing countries, especially in Africa and South-East Asia, given the tensions there over land ownership in the absence of land registers and customary law.

3.2.4

The Committee endorses the EU strategy on biofuels, COM(2006) 34 final, primarily where it states that it is essential that appropriate minimum environmental standards apply to feedstock production for biofuels, and highlights concerns raised over the use of set-aside land because of the potential impact on biodiversity and soil.

3.3.1

In an ever more developed world, the unchecked use of water resources is steadily increasing. The causes of this lie in the growing global population and its distribution, changing food trends and the impact of biofuels. The current strategy for developing biofuels will definitely exacerbate the water crisis, and access to water could be a limiting factor for the production of feedstock such as corn and sugar cane.

3.3.2

The Committee believes that as regards crops grown for biofuel, there should be a shift towards non-irrigated crops, which can also grow in inland and disadvantaged areas, as in order to produce one litre of biodiesel it takes 4 000 litres of water for the irrigation of the crops and the chemical conversion process.

3.4.1

Distorted use of the soil, particularly of farmland designated for production of both food and bioenergy, brings potential risks such as:

3.4.2

However, the Committee thinks that rational use of the soil tying in closely with the good farming practices employed in the EU, based on crops linked to the production of the various types of bioenergy, may actually increase biodiversity and reduce the homogenisation of the landscape. The Committee believes that there is no turning back for Europe here.

3.4.3

In this respect, there should be a focus on second-generation biofuels, even though, as these fuels lend themselves to being treated as an intensive industry, farmers would be relegated to the sole role of supplying the feedstock, without any guarantee of financial reward. The Committee considers it necessary to rebalance the role of farmers in relation to the production and marketing of energy crops in order to foster producer organisations throughout the supply chain; such organisations can thus play a key role in the negotiation of balanced, endorsed contracts.

3.5.1

With large-scale terrestrial energy crop growing comes the need for sustainable management of forests and farmland. Biomass production for energy purposes can have a positive impact on the environment only if done properly. For instance, the abandonment of rural areas has led to destabilising natural factors. Land not maintained by positive human activities is exposed to a higher risk of landslides, desertification and fires.

3.5.2

The Committee believes that to promote the integrated development of bioenergy on the ground, a model of distributed generation and short energy chains needs to be developed, involving small-scale plants processing locally-produced biomass and thus bringing benefits in terms of environmental impact and the real possibility of directly involving farmers in the production chain (as individuals or groups).

3.5.3

The Committee endorses the good practice guidelines to be applied to the various bioenergy crops put forward by the European Environment Agency, including:

3.5.4

The Committee believes that, if properly managed, the development of energy-orientated farming could help ensure a constant human presence on the land and thus secure its stewardship and harness its resources, particularly forest resources.

3.5.5

Furthermore, in the agricultural sector, bioenergy production can mesh with agri-food production in a controlled way, helping to diversify market channels, easing the transition to an increasingly competitive agricultural sector and providing non-conflictual solutions regarding the allocation of agricultural products by the new Member States.

3.6.1

A highly diverse range of methods are used to study the environmental effects of bioenergy. Among these, the Committee would highlight:

3.6.2

In assessing environmental impact, life cycle assessments (LCAs) can be used to determine and quantify the actual or potential environmental and energy burdens present in the various phases of the cycle of production and consumption of bioenergy. This technique allows a comparison of the environmental profile of the various forms of bioenergy with that of fossil fuels that perform similar functions.

3.6.3

The Committee deems to be consistent with the principles set out above the position of the countries participating in the Global Energy Partnership, including the USA and China, which have signed an international agreement on controlling the use of biofuels and on their impact on the environment and the food balance. Any country can measure the environmental sustainability of bioenergy by means of 24 voluntary criteria and indicators.

3.6.4

Against this backdrop, the Committee believes that when using surplus land to produce feedstock for bioenergy there is a need not only to identify the environmental, economic and social constraints involved but also to ascertain, with reference to the ILUC factor, whether the land to be used for energy crops could actually give rise to an increase in CO2.

3.6.5

The Committee agrees with the Commission's decision to monitor the risks associated with biofuels in the transport sector (Directive 28/2009), to limit the contribution of biofuels and bioliquids produced from food crops in line with the level of maturity of the various technologies, and to encourage the production of bioenergy from products that do not generate further demand for land, such as the burning of municipal waste.

3.6.6

The Committee feels that the use of first-generation biofuels should not impede the EU from investing in research into new sources of clean energy (5).

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/21

1.1

The price of electricity, gas, oil and other fuels is rising sharply and the situation has been seriously exacerbated by the socio-economic crisis affecting a growing number of people. This opinion does not seek to identify the reasons for these price increases, but aims to look at proposals for encouraging coordinated European measures, in compliance with the subsidiarity principle, to prevent and combat energy poverty, encourage solidarity in this area and offer greater protection to the vulnerable (European and others).

1.2

Faced with this major political challenge, the EESC calls for a European energy security and solidarity commitment within the framework of a European energy community which the EESC would welcome.

1.3

This European energy security and solidarity commitment would drive forward a truly European policy for combating energy poverty and encouraging solidarity based on the recognition of a universal right of access to energy, which the EESC considers to be an essential common good, so that everyone can lead a decent life. The commitment would aim in both the short and the long term:

1.4

The EESC calls for European energy poverty indicators to be established and for statistics to be harmonised in order to identify, prevent and tackle the problem more effectively at European level and to generate solidarity in this area.

1.5

The EESC recommends setting up a European poverty observatory, whose main focus would be on energy poverty and which would bring together all the stakeholders to help define European energy poverty indicators (in conjunction with Eurostat), make an inventory of the situation, identify best practices and draw up recommendations for preventing and addressing the problem more effectively and establishing European solidarity in this sphere.

1.6

The EESC recommends that the European Citizens' Energy Forum (the so-called London forum) include representatives from the EESC and work closely with national economic and social councils and similar institutions in the Member States.

1.7

The EESC would like to see an energy market more focused on consumers and more broadly on citizens (European or others), particularly the most vulnerable. The EESC welcomes any mechanism allowing the latter to take back control of their energy affairs. The EESC recommends that the European Commission include in the report requested by the European Council (by the end of 2013) an analysis of energy poverty in the Union, including the vulnerability factors, propose a European strategy and a roadmap for preventing and eradicating it. The most important issue to prevent any increase in costs that could be avoided by having a harmonised, effective European energy policy (see opinion TEN/508 The economic effects from electricity systems created by increased and intermittent supply from renewable sources – CESE 2599/2012) (1).

1.8

The EESC recommends that before the main measures of EU and Member States' energy policy are adopted they should be analysed in terms of the extent of their economic impact on the various categories of consumers (for example, according to income, household composition or type of heating). The aim would be to update those categories of consumers who might see disproportionate increases in their energy bill compared to the average for the population and to propose, where necessary, compensatory measures (adapting the rules, improving the energy efficiency of dwellings, etc.) in favour of the most vulnerable consumers.

1.9

The EESC calls on the European Commission to consider setting up a European energy solidarity fund to be a cross-cutting tool for all European measures on this issue in order to bring European solidarity to bear in this area in a targeted manner.

1.10

The EESC would like to promote an annual meeting of civil society organisations to discuss energy poverty and solidarity in Europe, talk about local, national and European initiatives and put forward practical recommendations to European, national, local, institutional, voluntary and industrial decision makers in conjunction with the European observatory on poverty in Europe.

1.11

Because combating poverty and building solidarity in this area is of general European interest, the EESC would like the European Commission to make a proposal to the Parliament and to the Council for this specific topic to be the subject of a European year ("of energy solidarity"). The aim would be to raise the public's awareness and draw decision makers' attention to this problem of major European concern.

1.12

With this in mind, the Committee advocates that the European Commission organise a European energy information campaign organised at national and local level on combating energy poverty and building solidarity in this sphere to promote, in particular, education on energy efficiency, the active energy consumer and the responsibility and involvement of industry, etc.

2.1

Because of its indispensable role in all daily activities, energy is an essential common commodity that enables everyone to live a decent life. Being without it leads to disaster. Energy poverty kills, in both physical and social terms. More than 50 million people in Europe are affected (European Fuel Poverty and Energy Efficiency Project - 2009). This is an intolerable situation that must not continue. The EESC advocates urgent measures at European level and calls for a European energy security and solidarity commitment to promote an effective European policy for combating energy poverty and generating solidarity in this sphere. Its goal would be to:

2.2

Such a European commitment would make it possible to pursue a joint and coordinated approach at European level to reduce the energy divide and would be based on the recognition of a universal right of access to energy (so that everyone can enjoy decent living conditions) which the EESC would like to see included in the Treaty of Lisbon; the EESC aims for all European policies, and particularly the energy policy, to include combating energy poverty and encouraging solidarity in this context in their goals. The EESC points out that, as an essential common commodity, energy must be managed as such with the resulting public service obligations. Moreover, the supply of energy by undertakings comes under services of general economic interest whose role in terms of European territorial and social cohesion is recognised by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 14 TFEU/Protocol 26). The European Charter of Fundamental Rights recognises the right to social and housing assistance to ensure a decent existence (Article 34), the obligation to ensure a high level of consumer protection (Article 38) and the fundamental right of access to public services (Article 36).

2.3

The Union would thus breathe new life into the principle of solidarity that underpins its project and give added meaning to the construction of Europe for citizens who are becoming increasingly disillusioned and sceptical. Furthermore, the EESC points out that 81 % of Europeans questioned support combating energy poverty (European Parliament Eurobarometer, 2011).

2.4

The Committee welcomes the interest the European Council of 22 May 2013 showed in questions of energy costs and prices and the impact on households, particularly the most vulnerable. These questions are very costly politically; in Bulgaria for example, the government resigned on 20 February following demonstrations by its citizens for whom the steep and exceptional electricity price increases (more than 20 % between December 2012 and January 2013) in the wake of national measures for opening up the market became a focus for discontent, given that average salaries are less than EUR 400 (17,3 % of Bulgarians' income is spent on electricity bills – National Statistics Institute).

2.5

The EESC draws attention to the fact that energy prices are constantly increasing: between 2011 and 2012, the price of electricity rose by 6,6 % in the EU, particularly in Cyprus (+ 21 %), Greece (+ 15 %), Italy (+ 11 %), Ireland and Portugal (+ 10 %), Bulgaria, Spain and Poland (+ 9 %). Household gas prices increased by 10,3 % in the EU, particularly in Lithuania (+ 21 %), Estonia (+ 19 %) and Bulgaria (+ 18 %) (Eurostat, May 2013).

3.1

In Europe the former problems of access to energy have largely been solved but globally 1,2 billion individuals still have no access to electricity, and 2,8 billion still use wood or other kinds of biomass for heating or cooking (World Bank/IDA, May 2013). This problem of access to modern energy services is so great that the UN declared 2012 "The International Year of Sustainable Energy for All" (Resolution 65/151), mainly to promote universal access and has just proposed that 'Sustainable, secure energy' is one of the 12 global sustainable development goals (SDGs) which, for the first time, are aimed at the developing AND the developed world.

3.2

Energy poverty in Europe is reflected in the growing numbers of people (more than 50 million according to the European Fuel Poverty and Energy Efficiency Project - 2009) who have difficulty paying their energy bills or have limited access to energy because of low incomes, uninsulated homes, inefficient appliances (for heating, cooking, hot water), high energy costs. Mobility is also an issue that affects the budgets of households often living far away from city centres and for whom transport dictates where they work. This affects the elderly, single parent families, the unemployed, those on welfare benefits, etc. It has a number of consequences: limited mobility has repercussions on employment, the lack of heating affects hygiene, health (the "heat or eat" dilemma, respiratory conditions, etc.) and often leads to excess mortality, over-indebtedness and social and geographic isolation.

3.3

Energy poverty is a debilitating factor that combines with others, creating difficulties that interact to form a worsening spiral that weighs down on individuals in situations of general poverty. The risk of poverty is in the meantime increasing (Eurostat, December 2012): 119,6 million people were threatened with social exclusion in the EU27 in 2011 because of the risk of poverty, severe material deprivation or because they were living in households with very low work intensity. The EESC points out that the Europe 2020 strategy aims to reduce the number of people affected by poverty and social exclusion by at least 20 million.

3.4

Combating energy poverty and building solidarity in this area straddles social, public health, environmental, economic and political issues and, now more than ever, should be made a political priority.

4.1

Energy poverty/precariousness: precariousness means a situation of serious, temporary vulnerability. Energy poverty is a social condition aggravated by factors that are both external (energy prices, energy rating of homes, etc.) and individual (ageing, income, etc.). The EESC will use the term energy poverty to encompass both aspects.

4.2

Only France, Slovakia, the United Kingdom and Ireland have a definition for energy poverty

4.3

The United Kingdom has an objective definition of "fuel poverty": the situation of a household obliged to spend more than 10 % of its income to have a satisfactory level of heating in the home (21 °C in living-rooms and 18 °C in other rooms according to the World Health Organisation). Three aspects are taken into consideration: household income, the price of energy and energy consumption. This definition does not take account of other domestic energy requirements and is currently being revised by the government.

4.4

In France, the "Grenelle II" Act defines energy poverty as a situation in which a person has difficulty obtaining the necessary energy in their home to meet their basic needs because of inadequate resources or living conditions (Article 11(4)).

4.5

Despite not having a definition, some states have laid down specific provisions. Belgium has introduced the status of "protected customer", which enables all recipients of social assistance or welfare benefits to enjoy subsidised energy tariffs and special free amenities (e.g. "budget meters", guaranteed supply). Italy and Spain have the "bonus elettrico" and "bono social" respectively. In Germany, the local subsidised tariffs introduced by the regional governments (Länder) are supported by the local or regional energy companies. In Sweden, the universal social protection system picks up unpaid bills. More than half of the Member States provide protection against energy supply disconnections based on legislation or energy suppliers' codes of conduct (2009 ERGEG report).

4.6

The European Union has neither a definition nor indicator of energy poverty, nor a specific European policy for addressing this problem which is dealt with in piecemeal fashion.

4.7

Through the European platform against poverty and social exclusion, a specific tool under the 2020 Strategy, the European Commission is targeting energy poverty "which risks depriving households not only from heating or cooling but also from hot water, lights and other essential domestic necessities" as being another manifestation of severe deprivation.

4.8

The directives on the internal energy market (July 2009) recognise energy poverty but contain no European definition or obligation and call on the Member States to provide "adequate safeguards to protect vulnerable customers" and to "define the concept of vulnerable consumers which may refer to energy poverty and, inter alia, to the prohibition of disconnection of [electricity/gas] to such customers in difficult times". In its communication on Making the internal energy market work (15 November 2012) the Commission plans to support Member States "in defining what is meant by and what causes energy consumers' vulnerability by providing guidance and facilitating the exchange of best practice".

4.9

The European Parliament only defines the vulnerable consumer by going beyond the traditional concept (endogenous vulnerability) to include "consumers in a situation of vulnerability" because "they are placed in a state of temporary powerlessness resulting from a gap between their individual state and characteristics", "and their external environment" because "all consumers at some point in their life can become vulnerable because of external factors and their interactions with the market (…) and therefore need special protection" (Resolution of 22 May 2012). The Parliament calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt "a broad and coherent political and legislative strategy to tackle vulnerability tacking into account the diversity and complexity of all the situations involved", particularly in the energy sector (Resolution of 22 May 2012); it is also calling for specific measures against energy poverty (Resolution of 14 March 2013 on the Energy Roadmap 2050). In its resolution of 11 June 2013 on a new agenda for European consumer policy, the European Parliament urges the Union and Member States to provide adequate guarantees for the protection of those [vulnerable] consumers particularly with regard to energy. In its resolution of 11 June 2013 on social housing in the European Union, the European Parliament urges the Member States to define energy poverty "based on common parameters but adjusted for each Member State to take into account specific national circumstances".

4.10

The EESC considers it essential to establish common European indices and indicators for energy poverty that include the vulnerability aspect, in order to identify and analyse the causes more accurately, to go beyond merely acknowledging the symptoms and to develop a European strategy for tackling the problem more effectively. The EESC suggests that the definition suggested in opinion TEN/420, "the difficulty or inability to ensure adequate heating in the dwelling and to have access to other essential energy services at a reasonable price", should form a basis to be further developed (taking account of the universal right of access to energy as an essential commodity) by the European poverty observatory it would like to establish. The latter could determine common European indices and indicators which would serve as parameters for the Member States in defining energy poverty so that their national characteristics are taken into account. EUROSTAT and the national statistics institutes should adopt standard methodologies to quantify the problem at national European levels in order to harmonise the existing statistics more effectively.

5.1

The EESC suggests creating a European poverty observatory whose main focus would be energy poverty and would include all the stakeholders: national observatories, ombudsmen, regulators, energy suppliers, various associations (health, construction, energy, consumers, combating exclusion, local authorities, etc.), social partners, etc. It would provide a report on the impact of energy market liberalisation on vulnerable individuals, propose energy poverty indicators and put forward recommendations, methodologies and options to be explored at European level on the basis of best practices identified at local and national levels. Its task would be to cooperate with the London Forum. The EESC would also like the London Forum to include Committee members and work closely with the national economic and social councils or similar to combat energy poverty.

6.1

The opening up of energy markets has not led to a reduction in energy prices for Europe's citizens. 60 % of consumers have seen prices increased by their energy suppliers, 3-4 % have seen prices reduced. 7 % of consumers have changed their gas supplier and 8 % their electricity supplier. Energy is the sector consumers spend most on (5,7 % of their budget), mainly on electricity (2,1 %). (2nd Consumer Markets Scoreboard 2009). These percentages have increased in recent years.

6.2

The decisions of the European Council of 22 May 2013 are a step in the right direction: re-focusing European energy policy on consumers to guarantee them a secure supply at an affordable and competitive price; strengthening the role and rights of consumers and providing better protection for vulnerable consumers; transposing the 3rd energy package as a matter of urgency. By the end of 2013, the Commission is due to present an analysis of the energy price and cost structure with an emphasis on the impact on households. The most important issue to prevent any increase in costs that could be avoided by having a harmonised, effective European energy policy (see opinion TEN/508 The economic effects from electricity systems created by increased and intermittent supply from renewable sources – CESE 2599/2012) (2).

6.3

The EESC recommends that before the main measures of EU and Member States' energy policy are adopted they should be analysed in terms of the extent of their economic impact on the various categories of consumers (for example, according to income, household composition or type of heating). The aim would be to update those categories of consumers who might see disproportionate increases in their energy bill compared to the average for the population and to propose, where necessary, compensatory measures (adapting the rules, improving the energy efficiency of dwellings, etc.) in favour of the most vulnerable consumers.

6.4

The EESC reiterates the need to fully transpose the aforementioned directives and guarantee a universal service, compliance with public service obligations, protection of vulnerable people and reasonable, comparable and transparent prices. The EESC would like the European Commission to include in its future report for the end of 2013 an inventory and analysis of energy poverty in the Union, put forward a European strategy for combating energy poverty and encouraging energy solidarity in this area, together with the funding to make it operational.

6.5

The EESC would like the European Commission to make this issue a cross-cutting priority in all European policies and to feature it more prominently in its forthcoming initiatives (for example, the guidelines on the internal market, those on implementing the 2012 energy efficiency directive, consumer rights, etc.).

6.6

The EESC advocates that the policy on energy solidarity and combating energy poverty should form an integral part of the EU's energy policy on the transition to a low-carbon society. The EESC recommends that the Commission strictly ensure Member States' compliance with the European rules that could help reduce energy poverty. The EESC would like the Treaty to include the universal right of access to energy (which must be considered and managed as an essential common good) and European policies, particularly energy policy, to include combating energy poverty and encouraging solidarity in this area among their goals. The EESC recommends that the European semester include combating energy poverty and solidarity in this area in its work so that this topic can be reflected in the Member States' national reform programmes.

6.7

The EESC considers it essential to encourage at European level any mechanisms that can make vulnerable consumers play an active role in their own energy matters, by consuming less and better (in terms of constant energy services) to improve their quality of life and by encouraging the decentralised production of renewable energy where this is reasonable from an economic and technical viewpoint. Information, training and education can increase households' awareness and encourage the appropriate attitude (switching off appliances on stand-by, choosing energy-efficient appliances, timely renewal, etc.). The EESC would like the Union to support any transnational project to this effect, particularly by establishing the European energy solidarity Fund, encouraging any exchanges of know-how between civil society organisations, linking up a transnational network, making more widely available the production and dissemination of information and training in this area and of good practices resulting particularly from EU-funded transnational projects.

6.8

The EESC calls for European research programmes to encourage innovative tools focused on optimum usage by all consumers, particularly the most vulnerable. The EESC therefore recommends that for smart meters to be fully effective and useful for consumers, they should provide, for example, clear and transparent information on energy consumption, in real time, at no additional cost. In this way, they would act as a useful preventative tool to help consumers be more aware of their consumption level and to act on this information, thereby enabling them to be active energy consumers.

6.9

The EESC advocates setting up local one-stop energy solidarity shops to develop synergies and consultation between all the stakeholders, including energy operators, to provide greater coordination, and thus prevent and address problems more effectively, give better advice, guidance and support for the public, especially the vulnerable. The EESC advocates training the staff of these one-stop shops (but also of the administrative and banking services, industrial operators, etc.) to make them aware of the problems facing this vulnerable public, to manage the latter's affairs more efficiently and to help them flag up those at risk at an early stage. These one-stop shops would adopt a holistic and integrated approach to the preventative and problem-solving options offered by associations, local authorities, business, etc. It would enable everyone to become active energy consumers without creating dependency or social stigma.

6.10

The EESC advocates additional and more widely-available measures (particularly those closely involving energy suppliers) such as guaranteeing supply to vulnerable households at critical times of the year ("winter truce") and ensuring that suppliers do not disconnect supplies because of difficulties meeting payments, preventing situations where bills cannot be settled, etc. The EESC thus advocates involving energy industry operators and others more closely in action strategies to combat energy poverty (as regards both preventing and resolving problems) and to build solidarity, in order to go beyond the codes of good conduct.

6.11

The EESC advocates tighter regulation of energy suppliers' practices so that low-income consumers do not suffer from the poverty premium, that is to say a higher unit cost for the same service. For example, pre-payment systems could be set up so as not to risk penalising the most vulnerable consumers.

6.12

The EESC is calling on the European Commission to schedule a European Energy Solidarity Year which would make it possible to conduct a European information campaign (delivered at national and local level) and labelled projects to raise the awareness of all stakeholders concerning the importance of eradicating energy poverty, encouraging consumers to be more active in relation to energy and enhancing energy solidarity.

7.1

The EESC suggests that the European Commission look into setting up a European energy solidarity Fund to support the measures proposed by the EESC, particularly information/training for members of the public, integrating local projects into European networks, supporting exchanges, transfers and making good practices emanating from EU-funded transnational projects or developed at local and national level more widely available at European level. This would include, for example, the financial support mechanisms put in place by states or local authorities for paying bills (subsidised rates, energy cheques, etc.), a "winter truce", setting up one-stop shops, training energy efficiency advisers (e.g. the European Achieve project), re-developing neighbourhoods, bringing in funding or technical assistance for energy efficiency work (e.g. the European CEB-ELENA project "European Local Energy Assistance Facility") or for the micro-production of renewable energy, as well as financing arrangements set up for vulnerable households (e.g. the European FinSH project - Financial and Support Instruments for Fuel Poverty in Social Housing).

8.1

The EESC points out that, in 2007, the Union fixed the 3×20 % targets for 2020, which included cutting energy consumption by 20 %. The October 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive sets out a long-term strategy (2050) for mobilising investment in renovating public and private housing and residential and commercial premises. Member States are required to submit their national action plans for implementing this strategy by 30 April 2014. The EESC points out how important implementing energy efficiency measures is for reducing carbon dioxide emissions, creating jobs, and also for effectively addressing energy poverty.

8.2

One of the main causes of energy poverty is effectively vulnerable households often paying exorbitant rents for badly insulated homes. A well-insulated home cuts consumption and hence the bill (combined with the proper approach to energy use). Households with modest incomes, be they tenants or owners, do not have the means to improve insulation or replace heating installations, either because they lack savings, or they have difficulty accessing bank credit.

8.3

The EESC suggests setting up a mechanism that would make it possible to both strongly encourage landlords (for example making the amount of rent dependent on the thermal rating level, etc.) to undertake work to renovate thermal insulation and to provide additional help for them in doing this, and at the same time to gradually withdraw from the rental market in Europe any dwellings falling below a standard thermal insulation threshold. The EESC recommends that States include energy performance in the definitions and criteria used to determine whether properties for rent are decent and acceptable or substandard.

8.4

The EESC would like the European Commission to contemplate innovative financing methods and tools to help States support the poorest households in their efforts to become more energy efficient by taking account of their financial constraints.

8.5

Improving the insulation in the homes of vulnerable households must become a priority in all European programmes. The Commission must ensure that the national energy efficiency plans prioritise investments in the homes of the most vulnerable households.

8.6

The EESC recommends that the Structural Funds should take greater account of combating energy poverty and encouraging energy solidarity in the 2014-2020 programming period and that there is more funding for energy efficiency and renewables to reflect the scale of the challenge.

8.7

Furthermore, the EESC recommends supporting the decentralised production of renewable energy in so far as it can solve the problem of access to energy, particularly in the case of the most vulnerable.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/27

1.1

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) takes note of the Commission's proposal amending Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, which aims to increase payments by putting up the co-financing rate for the priority axis for Member States affected by the crisis and in receipt of financial aid from the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or Balance of Payments mechanism by ten percentage points for the period in question. However, the total funds allocated under EU cohesion policy for the 2007-13 programming period are not being increased, but effectiveness is maintained through co-financing.

1.2

The EESC notes the Commission's proposal to amend Regulation (EC) 1083/2006 such that Romania and Slovakia can submit applications for payment by the end of 2014 rather than by the end of 2013 (for funds committed in 2011) and by the end of the programme rather than by the end of 2014 (for funds committed in 2012), whilst not increasing the total funds allocated under EU cohesion policy for the programming period 2007-13. This reduces the danger of automatic decommitment of funds for the years 2011 and 2012.

1.3

The EESC, in line with its previous opinions, supports this proposal provided that consistency and efficacy in the use of budgetary resources are preserved.

2.1

Under the Commission proposal, lower contributions to projects co-financed under EU cohesion policy would be required from seven Member States that come under the EFSM or the Balance of Payments mechanism. This would mean that Member States would not have to look for the necessary funding exclusively from their own resources. At a time when state budgets are under heavy strain, this would make a significant contribution to putting their crisis-hit economies back on the path to growth. Co-financing enhances the efficacy of aid. Less co-financing brings with it the risk of making the aid less effective. However, this risk should be mitigated to the greatest possible extent with all available resources. The EESC agrees with the Commission proposal, which is in line with its earlier opinions (1).

2.2

This extension of the deadline for submitting applications for payment until the end of 2014 gives Slovakia and Romania extra room for manoeuvre so that they can better implement projects that are co-financed under EU cohesion policy. The extension of the deadline for automatic decommitment is also proportionate in that it is restricted to those Member States whose funds allocated during the period 2014-2020 were capped at a certain level by agreement of the European Council. The extension of the deadline for decommitment is based on a suggestion from the European Council, which, in its conclusions of 8 February 2013, invited the Commission to explore practical solutions to reduce the risk of automatic de-commitment of funds from the 2007-2013 national envelope in the case of Romania and Slovakia, possibly also via the amendment of Regulation (EC) 1083/2006.

2.3

The EESC also takes the view that it is important to boost prosperity and competitiveness in those Member States worst affected by the crisis and therefore supports this proposal.

2.4

The EESC agrees that the total budget appropriations from the funds to the affected countries and programmes will remain unchanged in the specified period.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/29

1.1

The EESC highly welcomes an EU Industrial policy in the Space sector (1). It endorses also the provided budget of EUR 11 billion for Galileo, Copernicus, and R&D in Horizon 2020 for 2014–2020, in addition to the existing annual budget of EUR 4 billion of the European Space Agency (ESA). These decisions are in line with standing views of the EESC (2).

1.2

EU space policy, sustained by political commitment throughout Europe, should ensure independent European access to space along the whole value chain, i.e. from the conception phase to development, launching and exploitation. Long-term and high-risk activities ask for predictability, certainty, and continuous commitments.

1.3

The EU needs critical mass. An internal market for space requires dealing with a well-defined notion of a European level playing field, both for internal and external reasons.

1.4

Pro-active industrial policy is needed in response to large institutional markets around the world which have an increasingly strategic and technological impact. Competitiveness of European industry must be enhanced. Still substantial internal barriers must progressively be overcome.

1.5

EU Industrial policy should bring different strategies of Member States (MS) under one umbrella and streamline national preferences into one framework.

1.6

All parties have to work in the same direction. ESA has a special place. Its performances are very successful and undisputed. In the new set-up ESA will, in addition to its traditional role, become facilitator of space projects under EU rules. New methods and relationships will be put in place. They require well-developed coordination and fine-tuning between all players, i.e. the services of the Commission, ESA, and the MS.

1.7

Formal arrangements for consultation of industry are needed, especially with regard to SMEs. A sufficient part of the budget of Copernicus must be earmarked for new services and applications.

1.8

The space sector asks for a very qualified workforce, on the basis of appropriate contracts. Continuous attention is needed for appropriate skills, ensured by up-to-date education and training, facilitating mobility.

1.9

Strategic security and defence considerations are the driving forces for space policy in all countries. New space EU policies and actions are based on Article 173 and, notably, Article 189 of the TFEU. They must be embedded in a closer agreement between MS regarding security and defence, and, thus, in a broader perspective of EU foreign policy. On the other hand experiences in space policy may, in some well-defined areas, be exemplary for European defence. These should be taken into account in the forthcoming debate on European defence.

1.10

EU's space industrial policy can indeed give a boost to a competitive, solid, efficient and balanced industrial base in Europe, being supportive for governmental services as well as for business and citizens. The sector is still fragile. The crisis adds new uncertainties. It now comes to implementation!

1.11

Against this backdrop the EESC fully endorses the five objectives, defined by the Commission: a coherent and stable regulatory framework, a strong industrial base, including SMEs, competitiveness and cost-efficiency, markets for application and services, and technological non-dependence and independent access to space (3).

1.12

Europe's position in the world must be consolidated and strengthened in the world by enhancing performance and competitiveness of European industry, keeping pace with ambitions with other space-faring nations and world-class technology, promoting cost-efficiency along value-chains, and developing markets for space applications and services.

2.1

Due to security and defence considerations space policy developed outside the framework of the EU Treaty. MS had their own space strategies. Common European interests were to a certain extent channelled via R&D and industrial projects of ESA.

2.2

In 2003 a new phase was initiated by the Framework Agreement between ESA and the EU. FP7 got involved in research projects and an EU sector-based industrial policy came within reach. Upstream and downstream investments intensified, competition increased, specialised private business developed new applications and services.

2.3

The EESC strongly endorsed the EU strategy of combining the ESA concept with closer involvement of the European Institutions as well as concrete proposals and decisions to that end (4).

2.4

In subsequent opinions the EESC emphasised the significance of EU space policies for public services, business and, notably, citizens. It endorsed the steps forward in several specific areas as there are the European Earth Observation Programme (GMES), the GMES – Space Component, and A Space Strategy that benefits its Citizens (5).

2.5

In 2012 the EESC advocated to bring the financing of GMES within the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (6). On 8 February 2013 the Council decided accordingly in allocating EUR 3,78 million for GMES – from now on named Copernicus – EUR 6,3 billion for Galileo, and EUR 1,7 billion for R&D within Horizon 2020. The decision must still be approved by the EP.

2.6

The recent EC Communication on Industrial policy in the space sector is a further step, needed as "Europe in Space is currently losing ground to most, if not all other space faring nations" (7).

3.1

Circumstances have changed drastically. Worldwide investments by new space-faring nations are rising fast. The US remains the strongest player. The American turnover in the sector is about ten times higher than in Europe. China and India are becoming robust competitors. Recently Russia has announced to step up its space budget substantially.

3.2

Strategic considerations of autonomy and self-reliance are leading. All market in China, India, Japan, and almost in Russia, is 100 % institutional. In the US it is more than 70 %. This is clearly opposite to Europe where 50 % of the market depends on the private sector. It must be noted that in terms of volume the 20 % market share of the private sector in the US represents more than the 50 % private market share in Europe.

3.3

The global market is growing whilst competition intensifies due to the arrival of the new space-faring nations. This threatens the hard-won position of European industry as barriers form even whilst the new entrants conduct aggressive export policies. Due to reductions in the defence budget the American space sector is also shifting to exports worldwide.

3.4

Against this backdrop the EESC fully supports the objective of maintaining European independent access to space as put forward in a series of Council Conclusions and in EC Communications. More than previously Council and Commission rightly stress the need of European autonomy in strategic areas of the space sector, promoting and safeguarding independent European access to space.

3.5

Europe is currently still substantially dependent on American technologies. Efforts to reduce this dependence ensuring certainty of uninterrupted deliveries of knowledge and high tech material require major efforts from governments, ESA and the EU.

3.6

In response to long-term and high-risk activities predictability, certainty and continuous commitments are indispensable. On its way to full maturity the sector is still fragile, especially where SMEs, crucial for the development of applications, are concerned. The current crisis adds to vulnerability.

4.1

In this challenging climate the Commission has presented its proposal for an active EU industrial policy, based on Articles 173 and 189 of the TFEU.

4.2

For the first time the Commission has carried out an in-depth analysis of the challenges as a result of consultations with a range of public and private parties. This widely accepted analysis is a major building block for the leap, from the approximately current EUR 4 billion budget of ESA, to the additional EUR 11 billion space budget 2014–2020. Given the aggressive policies by other space faring nations, this is a decisive step forward.

4.3

This extra funding is also a good starting point in a sector which is tending to grow considerably in the coming decade for two reasons:

4.4

An increasing number of activities benefit from space services: security, agriculture, transport, regional development, ocean monitoring, meteorology, telecommunications, broadcasting, bridging digital divides.

4.5

Additionally, space will be supportive to a number of global issues such as climate change, food security, fisheries, deforestation, monitoring natural resources, catastrophe monitoring. Europe should be equipped with its own global system to play its full role in line with its economic position in the world. Awareness among the public has to be raised.

4.6

The EESC fully supports the decision that the EU, in putting the right conditions in place, makes use of the opportunities of a pro-active industrial policy. It sees this as a concrete elaboration of the larger concept of EU Industrial policy as laid down in the EC Communications on Industrial policy of 2010 and 2012.

4.7

It should ensure an independent European access – and related technologies – to space in conceiving and developing space systems as well as in launching and exploitation programmes. Self-reliance and independent verification of data is indispensable, certainly with respect to China, but even to befriended nations, like the US, with which Europe is necessarily in competition.

4.8

The main body of industrial policies, driven by national strategies, remains still in the MS. These strategies are part of the larger domain of security and defence policy which explains also the narrow link between governments, national research and industries. This leads to internal barriers and, thus, to fragmentation and patchwork as well as to a European staying behind.

4.9

This underlines that the need for a level playing field is a prerequisite for any EU industrial policy. The Commission should elaborate clear criteria to precisely define the notion of "level playing field". Such well-defined notion is also indispensable for any "reciprocity" measure in mutually opening international markets with third countries.

4.10

The EESC insists that a level playing field and transparent internal competition within the Union must be the ultimate goal. It will help considerably to keep pace with the rest of the world.

4.11

Regarding the Commission's R&D policy the EESC mentions two major concerns that have to be met:

4.12

These concerns must be seen in conjunction shrinking R&D budgets in MS. The overall expenditure remains more or less equal due to compensating financial participation of the Commission. The only exception is Germany that recently has raised its R&D space budget with 10 %.

4.13

As the EESC has pointed out at various occasions, a successful industrial policy is transverse: coordination must be ensured among the various EC General Directorates in order to reach all objectives elaborated by DG Enterprise, for instance with DG Connect regarding SatComs and with DG Trade regarding opening of markets and the guarantee of "security of supply" of critical components.

5.1

Science and technology is basic. The EESC underlines once more the great significance of ESA for European space policy. Given the hurdles that have to be overcome in any intergovernmental framework, previous and current performances of ESA are unquestioned. From the start it has contributed significantly to European space activities as they are. ESA has had an indispensable role in space R&D and, to a certain extent, also in industrial activities, not least due to positive cost-quality ratios of the products.

5.2

ESA is a well-equipped partner for national governments and industries. Accordingly, its achievements are a highly qualified part of the chain that builds and reinforces the basis for European industry. Moreover, the ongoing system of "fair return" has encouraged governments to keep an eye on the overall performance in R&D and subsequent activities in the respective countries.

5.3

However, gradually it became manifest that new avenues had to be opened if the EU really wanted to be a competitive global player. The Framework Agreement of 2003 between ESA and the EU started to add EU policies and financial resources as well as to enhance competition and competitiveness. A successful partnership between ESA and the EU took off. A continuing commitment of ESA will be a firm building block for any EU Space industrial policy.

5.4

This being said, the fast changing circumstances ask for an accurate assessment of the procedures and proceedings and for an optimal utilisation of financial resources to support continuing competitiveness and resilience of European companies.

5.5

ESA's role in creating a sound basis for the exploitation of Europe's own space systems through focused and integrated applications is recognised yet the support can provide to EU policies is still to be fully realised. The closer EU/ESA cooperation should generate strong momentum in this respect.

5.6

New approaches and mechanisms are required to sustain a deliberate policy of successful deployment and sustainable exploitation of operational space systems. Equally, an effective Europeanisation of resources must be put in place to sustain three objectives:

5.7

The recent decisions are in line with the modernisation the EESC advocated in its opinion of 2008 (8). At the time the EESC emphasised that the increasing maturity of the space market asks for more flexibility which, in a time of ever faster technological cycles and increasing synergies and applications, is, as a rule, not guaranteed by fixed patterns of relationships that result from the principle of fair return as practiced by ESA (9).

5.8

Sudden changes have to be avoided. Therefore the EESC advocated an analysis and dialogue on Europe's desirable performance in ten years' time: "the dialogue should include the way ESA is financed, the dynamic contribution of medium-sized companies, and the maintenance of the highest level of competition" (10).

5.9

The EESC considers the Council Resolution of last November regarding the relationship between the EU and ESA (11) in conjunction with the new financial framework, adopted on 8 February, as one concrete application of its recommendation in 2008. The EU is entering a new phase.

5.10

In implementing the decisions, ESA, benefitting from its long-lasting experience, will be made responsible for the executive management, but doing so on the basis of EU rules. If implemented well, an optimal balance will be struck between competences of ESA and usual market mechanism of the EU.

5.11

It is not yet to foresee how the agreed work methods will function, certainly not in the first phase. Despite slight changes during the last couple of years in which market approaches were pushed forward, a new relationship with science and research in space has to come into being. The Committee therefore welcomes the development of workable boundaries between the principle of fair return conventionally applied in the ESA (the purpose of which is to foster and exploit a versatile space industry in Europe) and the rules of the EU's internal market, which the Commission is bound by, in order to expand the fruitful cooperation between the Commission and the ESA and further strengthen the European space industry.

5.12

This dimension was also addressed in the CCMI's supplementary opinion on this topic. It has since been possible to provide satisfactory answers to some of the critical questions raised there.

6.1

In drawing up space policy according to Article 189 parallel competences of Commission and MS should be applied as much as possible. MS should also take the initiative to cooperate on specific issues among themselves. Such processes can be monitored by the Commission.

6.2

The right conditions must be defined in a changing competitive and dynamic environment in support of a firm competitive basis for EU industry. Therefore the EESC insists that, from now on, industry is given a formal place in the consultative bodies, especially when it comes to areas in which smaller companies are active. Requirements must be defined in an open and transparent way.

6.3

Among the issues to be discussed are a free and open data policy, quality, standards, and certification. Services are supplied both by public sector bodies (PSBs) and private actors, which makes effective monitoring necessary.

6.4

Well-established consultative arrangements will sustain the huge potentialities of SMEs. A sufficient part of the budget for Copernicus and Galileo must be used to develop new services and applications.

6.5

Due to technology-intensity the workforce is, on average, highly qualified. Worldwide space employs 800 000 employees, of which 25 % in the US, and 4 % (!) in Europe. There is a growing need for graduated employees to enhance European potentialities and to generate beneficial synergies. Decent labour contracts should be the rule in order to enhance the attractiveness of the sector.

6.6

Space feeds the imagination of youngsters. The EESC insists on an active labour policy, based on up-to-date education and training, and promoted in technical higher education, including a close relationship with research and innovation. This will also foster desirable and appropriate mobility.

6.7

Given the overwhelming significance of the institutional market, industrial policy in the space sector is intimately related to procurement policies. These should meet high requirements of quality and transparency. The EESC underlines that industry would highly welcome the preparation of a specific Space Procurement policy, where the EU is directly involved, once its scope has been defined between the Commission and the MS.

6.8

Such policy will pave the way for the EU to assume its role of owner of European Space infrastructures and that of customer for space based services to fulfil a wide range of public policies.

6.9

The EESC underlines the major role regions and regional engagement have to play to foster the developing activities of the space industry. The role of regions is underestimated. They must be informed and equipped adequately in order to benefit from a possible positive impact of making efficiently use of space services.

6.10

Satisfactory quantitative market measurements are lacking, which results in a lack of reliable data about the final effect of space research in downstream application. The analytical knowledge of up- and downstream must be deepened.

6.11

A Euroconsult analysis that, among others, argues that in the US upstream investments generate twice as much profitable downstream activities than in Europe, is contested, but is never analytically refuted (12). For the EU another interesting model, singular in its kind, is an updated analysis on the economic impact of the various segments of the UK space industry (13).

6.12

The EESC encourages the Commission, ESA, and the MS to pursue joint analyses of the various segments of the sector and to put these in worldwide perspective. Consolidated figures on (new) employment, growth rates, and applications will enhance the relevance of the sector and sustain ongoing public support.

7.1

Similar to space policies of Europe's competitors, an EU space policy would, in the EESC's view, bear more fruits, if it is embedded in a growing agreement between MS regarding strategic issues in defence and security and, thus, in a broader perspective of EU foreign policy. This link should also be taken on board in the forthcoming debate on European defence, where appropriate.

7.2

European cooperation in space is considerably further developed than in any sector of defence. Defence-related space activities may be also related to the elaboration of EU defence policy as pilots or examples for common defence projects. The EESC notes that such a proposal has already been made as long ago as 1987! It has never been given a follow-up.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/35

1.1

The EESC welcomes the Commission's decision to publish, for the second year in a row, a report on the state of the Innovation Union, in which it notes considerable progress, namely that 80 % of the commitments under the flagship initiative are being implemented according to plan. The EESC agrees that progress has been made, particularly as regards the framework policy, which relates to the implementation of concrete commitments. It therefore expects that by the end of 2014 all 34 commitments will have been implemented.

1.2

Despite the progress achieved in 2012 in several important areas, such as the single patent and the new rules on venture capital funds, there is no reason for complacency. The Innovation Union is not yet bringing about results in terms of economic growth and creating jobs. Nor can we see major progress in the global competitiveness of the European Research Area.

1.3

The EESC notes with particularly deep concern the trend of diminishing R&D expenditure in the majority of Member State budgets for the second year running. Equally concerning is the widening innovation gap between Member States and between individual regions. There will need to be a rethink of the effectiveness of regional cohesion policy and the Structural Funds in relation to the Innovation Union, especially as regards the brain drain from Europe's less favoured regions to established research centres.

1.4

The crisis has already forced Europe to deepen integration for the purposes of ensuring macroeconomic stability and the functioning of monetary union. The EESC is convinced that greater and deeper integration is also needed in the area of R&I if we really want the Innovation Union project to result in greater competitiveness of European knowledge, economic growth and the creation of jobs. The EESC calls on the European Council to support deepening of the Innovation Union concept in the conclusions of its October summit.

1.5

The EESC is convinced that the Innovation Union, even if all 34 commitments are met, needs to go deeper, and in this connection supports the ERIAB (1) recommendations and the Commission's response to them. At the same time, it calls on the Commission to draw up, as soon as possible, a list of measures and areas in which deepening is possible and urgent. The Committee sees opportunities for deepening particularly in further improving the environment for fast-growing innovative enterprises, in innovation in the public sector, in social innovation and in new, innovative business models, which could radically change the mindset and existing approaches to innovative solutions.

1.6

A functioning European Research Area is an indispensable component of the Innovation Union. Despite the full support of the European Council, the EESC doubts that it will be completed by the end of 2014, as it does not see sufficient progress in the key areas: mobility of researchers, the effectiveness of national research systems, optimisation of use of research infrastructure, the competitive use of national research funds, the completion of the market in intellectual property rights, etc. The EESC therefore calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure, as soon as possible, that all the conditions for the development of the ERA are fulfilled as suggested by the Commission in its communication (2).

1.7

The EESC welcomes the progress in building top-quality research infrastructure at pan-European level and the encouraging initial results of the European Innovation Partnerships. It considers that the latter are in some cases still unverified and unfinished models, and calls on the Commission, on the basis of experience to date, to prepare a comprehensive analysis of their effectiveness along with uniform conditions for their operation and financing.

1.8

The system of support for research and innovation in Europe is still too complex, which puts micro and small enterprises in particular off EU research projects. Besides complicated and time-consuming administrative requirements, there are also significant disparities in procedures between programmes at regional, national and European level.

1.9

The Committee sees considerable potential for stimulating innovation through more innovative targeting of public procurement. It therefore calls on the Member States to increase the use of pre-commercial procurement and share experiences and models of innovation-friendly procurement. This should also apply to public procurement financed by the Structural Funds.

1.10

The reform of education systems should, amongst other things, provide Europe with many more highly qualified scientists and engineers (3). The EESC thinks that it would be good to include entrepreneurial training and management skills in their study programmes; these are essential to the effective transformation of good ideas into successful projects. The Committee calls for businesses and the social partners to be included in preparing curricula and running doctoral programmes.

1.11

The EESC would once again like to highlight the specific role of social innovation, which could play an important role in tackling the crisis and the other challenges of modern society. Therefore, those support mechanisms that are also accessible to potential social innovators in civil society and the social economy sector should be developed. The EESC calls on the Commission to put in place support for the creation of incubators for innovative social projects as soon as possible.

2.1

The Innovation Union is one of the seven flagship initiatives announced in the Europe 2020 Strategy. Its aim is to create a more innovation-friendly environment in Europe and thus ensure that innovative ideas are turned into products and services that will create growth and jobs. Analyses show that countries that have invested more in R&I in the past recover considerably more quickly and have higher levels of employment (4).

2.2

In its communication on the State of the Innovation Union 2012 (5), the European Commission for the second year in a row summarises the achievements at Member State and European level in terms of implementing the Innovation Union, one of the key flagship initiatives of the EU 2020 strategy.

2.3

In general terms, the Commission reports considerable progress in the implementation of the Innovation Union. More than 80 % of the initiatives are on track. The Member States are focusing more and more on creating a business environment that is favourable to innovation: they are cutting taxes on investment in research, lowering taxes on profits from patents, making it easier to access risk capital, etc.

2.4

However, the communication mentions a number of worrying trends, most of which are a consequence of the economic crisis and large budget deficits:

2.5

A key finding of the communication is that Europe has to step up its commitment to deliver innovation-based growth. To achieve this aim, the Innovation Union must be further developed as a matter of urgency. At present, it is not yet clear in what areas, with what measures and by what means such development and deepening will take place.

3.1

The EESC welcomes the Commission's decision to draw up an analysis of the state of the Innovation Union every year. It is one of the flagship initiatives of the EU 2020 strategy. A timely analysis of the results facilitates corrective measures in areas where things are not going in the right direction.

3.2

A period of two years is, given the usual practice when it comes to implementing new EU legislation, too short for a real evaluation of the results achieved (6). Nonetheless, the EESC appreciates that the policy framework for the Innovation Union is more or less in place, though results in terms of economic growth and new jobs are not yet apparent.

3.3

In the context of the overwhelming, all-engulfing debate on public budget deficits, unpopular austerity measures and an overall fall in confidence in the European project, the Innovation Union is one of the more positive and successful stories. Most of the commitments under the Innovation Union are more or less on track. The EESC therefore reasonably expects that all 34 commitments will be fulfilled by the end of 2014.

3.4

The EESC welcomes the progress in the area of building pan-European research infrastructure thanks to the efficient role and activity of the ESFRI (7). Of a total of 48 projects on the ESFRI list, 27 projects are already in the implementation phase, which augurs well for achieving the aim of constructing 60 % of the priority European research infrastructure by 2015 (8). In the Committee's view, Europe is still doing too little to coordinate and optimise the use of its research infrastructure.

3.5

The new concept of European Innovation Partnerships, the initial pilot projects of which are aimed at tackling key societal challenges (9), is so far showing an encouraging picture. They aim to bring together stakeholders at all levels, to overcome fragmentation and to provide a critical mass. Despite these positive signs, European partnerships are in some cases still unverified and unfinished models. The EESC therefore calls on the Commission, on the basis of experience to date, to draw up a comprehensive analysis of their effectiveness as soon as possible and to draw up uniform conditions for their operation and financing in the future.

3.6

Despite the undoubted progress in some areas, there is no room for complacency. Below, the EESC will set out the areas where improvements have not yet been sufficient and where rapid and effective action is needed.

3.7

The system of support for research and development is still much too complex in Europe. Potential beneficiaries are faced with a daunting multitude of existing instruments (national and regional programs, intergovernmental initiatives and EU funding procedures). The amount of red tape has not been significantly cut back either. This hampers cross-border cooperation and puts SMEs and micro-enterprises, in particular, off EU research projects. Besides the administrative burden, there are also significant divergences in procedures.

3.8

The starting point for the Innovation Union must be to build an excellent, modern education system in all Member States, including reform of higher education. Businesses still have very little involvement in the preparation of curricula and in running doctoral programmes. The EESC therefore once again calls for the social partners to be allowed to participate actively in planning the education systems of the future.

The EESC also calls for managerial and entrepreneurial skills to be included in the education of future engineers and scientists so as to facilitate and promote the transformation of good ideas into successful marketable projects.

3.9

The EESC supports a broad definition of innovation, which can extend to numerous fields. In its previous opinions, it has repeatedly highlighted the specific role of social innovation  (10), which often comes directly from civil society organisations. Many aspects of European welfare systems are the fruit of innovative ideas from civil society and social economy actors. Therefore, support for innovation must include all areas of society, and financing mechanisms must reflect the extraordinary diversity of innovation.

3.10

We are still not effective when it comes to commercialising innovative ideas: access to finance, especially for small, innovative enterprises, is still difficult (shortage of risk capital funds due to the financial crisis). Entrepreneurship and innovation often go hand in hand. In Europe, we are traditionally less tolerant of the possibility of business failure. We are even more reticent about risky, innovative projects. The single market in capital (especially risk capital) still is not working. New forms of financing innovative businesses such as "crowd funding" and "business angels" are emerging too slowly. The Risk-Sharing Finance Facility has been a very good experience, but sadly it cannot meet demand.

3.11

The completion of the single market in innovation depends in large measure on the proper functioning of the European single market. This still faces numerous obstacles and deficiencies, especially in the area of free movement of services and capital (11). The EESC once again suggests to the Commission that it think about establishing a pan-European electronic database (in the form of a search engine) containing specific knowledge from individual businesses and research institutes to facilitate faster networking of businesses and other organisations to link them up to innovative projects (perhaps within the context of the existing European Enterprise Network) (12).

3.11.1

Obstacles to the completion of the single market in intellectual property rights fall within the same category. Whilst the single European patent has finally seen the light of day, which is an important achievement, the procedures are not yet operational.

3.12

Europe is also lagging behind in completing innovative procurement markets, especially as regards public procurement mechanisms (13). In the EU, there are far too few public tenders designed to foster innovation. The EESC therefore calls on the Member States to substantially increase the use of pre-commercial procurement, which the Commission estimates would allow the procurement market to grow by EUR 10 billion. In this connection, the Committee also points to the European Parliament's proposals for modernising public procurement (14). More use should also be made of public procurement co-financed by the Structural Funds to increase demand for innovative products and services.

3.13

A functioning European research area, which is synonymous with the single market in research and innovation, is one of the key conditions for putting the concept of the Innovation Union fully into practice. The European Council has set 2014 as the deadline for its completion (15). This means that by then all of the key obstacles to mobility and cross-border cooperation should be removed, including by means of an open labour market for researchers, the establishment of additional pension funds, an optimal flow of knowledge and research findings, and a more competitive use of national research resources. The EESC has set out its views on the completion of the ERA in more detail in an opinion (16), in which it expressed the concern that 2014 was too ambitious a deadline.

3.14

The priority for financing and stimulating innovation should be reflected right across all EU funding programmes, including the cohesion funds, and not just within the competitiveness and innovation programme. The EESC therefore calls on the Member States to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the new Structural Funds Regulation (17).

3.15

For the Innovation Union to function properly, sustained efforts and effective cooperation at all levels – EU, national and local – are needed. Greater focus is needed on the role of regional innovation policy, which could make a significant contribution to stemming the brain drain from regions with limited capacity to established European research centres.

4.1

In the EESC's view, the fulfilment of the 34 commitments in the flagship initiative is merely the first step in achieving a genuine Innovation Union. If we want it to make a substantial contribution to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, deepening will be necessary in the next phase, meaning much more integration and coordination of national R&I policy with the EU's policies and activities. The EESC calls on the Commission to produce, without delay, a list of specific measures and areas where deepening is not just possible but is necessary.

4.2

The EESC considers that there is much room for deepening in numerous areas, of which it would like to list just a few:

4.3

The EESC supports the findings and recommendations of ERIAB, which has carried out the first "stress test" of the Innovation Union (18). In this report, it expresses the need for a radical rethink of the future European growth strategy, based more on knowledge and innovation. Amongst the key challenges, it mentions:

4.4

The EESC suggests to the Commission that it give some thought to specific instruments aimed at promoting the development of new, innovative business models. One possible idea would be to use so-called "innovation vouchers".

4.5

The EESC was invited in the flagship initiatives to encourage the businesses, social partners and NGOs it represents to support the Innovation Union and to help spread best practices. We propose that the Committee, particularly through its EU 2020 Steering Committee, draw up a concrete list of initiatives and activities with which, via the social partners, national economic and social councils and other civil society organisations, it could make a greater contribution than hitherto to building confidence in the Innovation Union.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/40

1.1

The EESC welcomes the Commission proposal, which aims to give all European citizens access to a bank account and to improve the comparability of fees and mobility, in order to combat financial exclusion and to make it easier for consumers to join the internal market.

1.2

It considers that the adoption of a directive is the most suitable way of implementing these measures which are beneficial both to consumers and to payment service providers. They will contribute to the completion of the single market in financial services and will help to remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. However, the exercise of this right will need to be subject to EU rules on money laundering and the financing of terrorism and it must not encourage tax avoidance. Furthermore, the Committee considers that the utmost regard should be paid to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

1.3

The Committee regrets, however, the restricted scope of some of the measures. It would like to see the harmonisation of terminology cover all charges and thinks that the information document should not only include a list of the most representative transactions. It believes that it is only possible to make an informed choice by comparing the charges applicable to all common transactions, each consumer having different needs.

1.4

It welcomes the provisions which aim to improve transparency, particularly regarding packaged accounts, as the consumer must be able to compare the various options offered by payment service providers and decide which is the most advantageous and suitable for his or her circumstances.

1.5

It supports the introduction of a requirement for the provision of a statement of fees and would like this to be supplemented by a requirement to inform consumers in advance of the debiting of unusual fees to their account in order to give them the opportunity to take appropriate steps or to contest the fees.

1.6

Also in the interests of transparency, it favours the establishment of independent comparison web sites and calls for the register of existing sites to enable consumers to have access to information on financial institutions located in all the Member States.

1.7

The EESC also welcomes the proposals on banking mobility. However, it considers that the feasibility of a "portable" account number should be studied and that a system for the automatic redirection of transactions should be systematically established (1). An independent study should be carried out before these measures are introduced.

1.8

It also draws attention to the importance of training staff of payment service providers, information being essential but insufficient. Similarly, it reiterates the need for financial education, provided in particular by independent consumer associations (2).

1.9

The EESC can only support the provisions aiming to give all Europeans access to a bank account with basic features, banking inclusion been a necessity in the modern world.

1.10

It has reservations about limiting the requirement to "at least one payment service provider" per Member State; if there is no competition, this could effectively deny the consumer any choice.

1.11

It considers that the real costs should be taken into account in determining whether charges are "reasonable" in cases where owning and operating the account is not free, and it stresses the need to limit non-compliance charges.

1.12

The EESC shares the Commission's view on the need to provide for checks and dissuasive sanctions in the event of non-compliance with the provisions of the directive. It stresses that the effectiveness of checks depends on sufficient resources being made available to perform the necessary tasks.

1.13

It reiterates its support for alternative dispute resolution systems, providing that they are independent.

2.1

On 8 May 2013 the Commission submitted a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features.

2.2

This proposal follows on from initiatives taken in recent years aimed at continuing the establishment of a single market in payment services, which is essential for Europe's growth and competitiveness.

2.3

The proposal is based on Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which aims to remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital.

2.4

The Commission notes that, according to World Bank estimates, about 58 million EU consumers do not have a payment account and approximately 25 million of them would like to open one.

2.5

It points out that the economy is moving towards wider use of non-cash, dematerialised payments by companies, consumers and government, but it does not propose any measures to broaden the use of non-monetary transactions.

2.6

In the light of this, it considers that having a bank account and access to financial services is essential if consumers are to be able to benefit from all the advantages of the single market as well as financial and social inclusion.

2.7

It also points out that current conditions on the single market could dissuade certain payment service providers from investing in new markets.

2.8

The Commission wishes to remove these obstacles, and to this end proposes:

2.9

The Commission maintains that these measures will help to make the single market in financial services fully operational and to develop it. Consumers will be able to compare services offered in the Union and move around the EU more easily. Payment service providers will be placed on an equal footing and will be able to benefit from the simplification of procedures and harmonisation of rules in seeking new markets.

3.1

The EESC endorses the Commission's analysis of the obstacles and of the need to complete the single market in financial services. It considers that every consumer must be able to open a bank account and be able to use it, banking inclusion being an essential precondition for achieving the desired objective.

3.2

It also supports the proposals aimed at tackling the lack of transparency of bank charges and improving mobility. It considers that they will help to encourage competition, to the benefit of consumers and payment service providers.

3.3

It considers the adoption of a directive to be the most suitable method, the Commission having correctly pointed out that the recommendation had not had the desired effect and that voluntary initiatives had proved highly inadequate

4.1.1

Terminology. The EESC fully endorses the Commission's proposal to harmonise the terminology used for fees. This harmonisation is essential in order to improve consumers' understanding and comparability. The Committee has doubts about the limited scope of the measure, however, and recommends that the harmonisation of terminology extend to all fees.

4.1.1.1

It notes that the competent authorities in each Member State will be responsible for drawing up provisional lists to be forwarded to the Commission. It considers that the consumer associations and payment service providers, as well as consumers themselves, should be involved in drawing up these lists in order to ensure that the terms adopted are readily comprehensible for all.

4.1.1.2

It points out that the term used must cover identical services at each financial institution.

4.1.2

Fee information document and glossary. The EESC welcomes the requirement for payment service providers to provide consumers with a fee information document containing a list of the most representative services before the contract is concluded, and approves the provision requiring free access to this document at any time, inter alia by its publication on financial institutions' website. It suggests that the presentation of the list should be harmonised. It also proposes that these arrangements should be supplemented by a requirement to send consumers a new information document when any changes are made to fees.

4.1.2.1

It considers, however, that the information document should cover all charges. Limiting it to the most representative charges will not enable consumers to compare the offers of different financial institutions effectively on the basis of their needs. Every consumer has specific needs, which are not necessarily those appearing in the list.

4.1.2.2

Assuming that the information document were to cover all charges, the Committee would be in favour of harmonising the presentation of all the headings. It also recommends harmonising the presentation of information by type of transaction (by month, year and transaction) to facilitate comparison.

4.1.2.3

In the interests of transparency and considering that the consumer must be able to assess the desirability of subscribing to a package of financial services, in line with his or her needs, the Committee welcomes the requirement to provide details of these services in the information document.

4.1.2.4

It also welcomes the requirement to use harmonised terminology in the information document and the account statement, in the interests of readability.

4.1.2.5

Finally, the EESC notes the availability of glossaries. However, it considers that the priority must be to use clear and readily understandable terms in the information documents.

4.1.3

Statement of fees. The EESC endorses the requirement to send consumers a statement of all fees charged at least once a year. This information enables consumers to assess the cost of services sold to them and to choose suitable products. It considers that this is an absolute minimum and that this statement should be provided free of charge.

4.1.3.1

Committee considers, however, that it would be appropriate to supplement this measure by a requirement to inform consumers in advance before any unusual charges are debited to the account by the payment services provider, enabling consumers to take any necessary steps before the charges are debited, e.g. to fund the account or contest the charges.

4.1.4

Comparison websites. The EESC supports the provision of information on bank charges via authorised or public national websites. This measure will help ensure better consumer information, providing that the information provided is independent and complete. The Committee considers that thought should be given to the financing of these sites. The Committee also has questions about the implementation of these tools, particularly concerning the nature of the data to be provided, e.g. will it only cover the unit cost of transactions and services or will it be possible to carry out a personalised calculation?

4.1.4.1

The Committee points out that particular vigilance is required regarding the conditions for accreditation of private operators. It considers that these authorisations should be granted by the competent authorities of the Member States.

4.1.4.2

The Committee also considers it essential that the terms used by comparison websites should be the same as those used in the harmonised terminology.

4.1.4.3

Finally, the Committee recommends that the register list or contain links to the registers of other Member States so that consumers have easy access to the charges of all financial institutions operating in the Union, which will be particularly useful for "migrant" populations.

4.2.1

The EESC supports the Commission's proposals, which will help to improve banking mobility, which is essential in view of the psychological and technical barriers to mobility.

4.2.2

It considers, however, that an independent study should be carried out into the possibility of establishing a portable account number, which would be the most effective way of making mobility fully operational.

4.2.3

It considers that, as a minimum, all financial institutions should operate a system of automatic redirection for 15 months to take account of any annual payments.

4.2.4

The Committee welcomes the fact that the Commission lays down conditions for the billing of fees connected with the switching service in order to prevent these fees being dissuasive.

4.2.5

It stresses that other obstacles exist, in particular the cost of transferring certain savings products or the holding of a mortgage.

4.2.6

It notes that information on the existence of these provisions for supporting mobility is crucial. It considers that the bank selected by the consumer should the only party he or she deals with.

4.2.7

The Committee believes that the staff of payment services providers, including reception staff in branches, should be trained in banking mobility and that financial education should be provided, primarily by consumer associations.

4.3.1

The EESC can only support the Commission's initiative. It considers that every consumer must have access to a payment account with basic features in order to access all the banking services needed in everyday life, where dematerialisation is making itself increasingly felt. It stresses the importance of information provided by banks on the existence of the service.

4.3.2

It has reservations, however, about the proposal to limit the offer to "at least one payment service provider" in each Member State. If one single institution were to offer the service, this would impose a heavy burden on it and would stigmatise both the institution and the consumers who were its customers. Also, the absence of competition would deprive consumers of any choice and would oblige them to accept the conditions, in particular the charges, offered.

4.3.3

The Committee considers that the list of basic services referred to in Article 16 should be a minimum, with each Member State being free to include additional services, in particular services linked to national conditions.

4.3.4

The Committee considers that it is up to the bank to decide whether or not it grants an appropriate overdraft facility.

4.3.5

The Committee welcomes the fact that the basic services will be free or will carry limited charges.

4.4.1

The EESC shares the Commission's view on the need to provide for checks and dissuasive sanctions in the event of non-compliance with the provisions of the directive and stresses that the checks will be effective only if the national authorities have sufficient resources to carry out tasks entrusted to them.

4.4.2

It reiterates its support for alternative dispute resolution systems, providing that they are independent.

4.5.1

The EESC approves the delegation of powers to the Commission, provided that the arrangements are clearly defined and transparency ensured.

4.5.2

The Committee supports the Commission's evaluation policy.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/44

1.1

The European Commission's proposal helps to improve substantially the practical application from 1 September 2013 of the new Biocidal Products Regulation, clarifies the arrangements for the transitional rules and provides greater legal certainty for operators.

1.2

The EESC regrets that, during the long and complex process of adopting the new European legislation on biocidal products, the Commission, the Council and Parliament have not given prior consideration to the distortions that confused and unclear transitional rules could create.

1.3

The EESC agrees that changes need to be made to the Biocidal Products Regulation before it enters into force (1), so as to facilitate the transition from Directive 98/8/EC. In order to ensure that the system runs smoothly, a coherent framework of transitional measures enabling the system to change gradually for operators and Member States is crucial.

1.4

The EESC welcomes the changes made to the transitional measures concerning treated articles, and the evaluation of existing active substance and biocidal products. These modifications will prevent the de facto freezing of the placing on the market of many new treated articles, to allow them on the market provided that a complete dossier to assess the active substance(s) contained in these treated articles has been submitted by 1 September 2016 (2). These modifications will also allow a better transition to the harmonised authorisation system for existing biocidal products (3).

1.5

With regard to the innovative provision on the mandatory sharing of studies on environmental fate and behaviour relating to Annex II of Regulation (EC) No 1451/2007, the EESC calls on the Commission to ensure that the new obligation does not distort competition or have a detrimental impact on companies' innovation capacity.

1.6

The EESC is in favour of dealing with other important matters in the context of this legislative modification, such as access to information, the definition of products of the biocidal products family and the obligation to share data.

2.1

A biocidal product is any active substance or mixture containing one or more active substances, put up in the form in which they are supplied to the user, intended to destroy, deter, render harmless, prevent the action of, or otherwise exert a controlling effect on any harmful organism by chemical or biological means; all substances, mixtures and products placed on the market with the intention to generate active substances shall also be considered biocidal products (4). Biocidal products are present in our daily lives, preventing the spread of diseases and promoting a high degree of hygiene in areas with high population densities.

2.2

Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council laid down rules concerning the placing of biocidal products on the market within the Community (5). This Directive harmonises at European level the legislation on these products, establishing common principles for the evaluation and authorisation of biocidal products, thus preventing economic or administrative barriers.

2.3

On 16 May 2013, the European Commission presented a new proposal amending Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products with regard to certain conditions for access to the market (6). This "Biocidal Products Regulation" was approved on 22 May 2012 (7) and is due to enter into force on 1 September 2013. The new legislation will replace Directive 98/8/EC and is the result of an intense public consultation and a detailed impact assessment drawn up by the European Commission (8).

2.4

The purpose of this Regulation is to improve the free movement of biocidal products within the Union while ensuring a high level of protection of both human and animal health and the environment. The Regulation, which maintains the structure of Directive 98/8, is underpinned by the precautionary principle to ensure that the manufacturing and making available on the market of active substances and biocidal products do not have harmful effects on health or the environment.

2.5

This legislation is intended to fill the gaps found in the previous legislative framework and to streamline the functioning of the authorisation system through simplification, the removal of obstacles to trade in biocidal products and the harmonisation of certain provisions.

2.6

The Commission has decided to present a formal modification, before its entry into force, of the Biocidal Products Regulation, No 528/2012, having detected that some of its provisions could lead to distortions in its operation. The fundamental purposes of this modification are:

3.1

In 2010, the EESC adopted its opinion on Regulation (EU) No 267/2009 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (9). The Committee expressed its support for replacing the Directive with a Biocidal Products Regulation with a view to achieving simplification and harmonisation of the legislation.

3.2

Despite the impact assessment, the public consultation and the various reports drawn up in the context of the approval of the Biocidal Products Regulation, the criticisms of mainly small and medium-sized suppliers regarding the possibility of significant restrictions and dysfunctions on the market as a result of the implementation of the Regulation have required the European Commission to react urgently by presenting a series of modifications to remove the possible harmful effects of the European biocidal products legislation, in particular its transitional provisions.

3.3

The EESC is pleased that the Commission has amended certain articles with a view to the more rational application of the legislation. However, the EESC believes that, once the procedure to revise the Regulation had been launched, certain gaps in the original legislation should have been dealt with more fully and systematically, regarding access to information, the obligation to share data and the definition of products of the biocidal products family.

3.4

The modifications to the transitional rules, in particular Articles 86, 89 and 94 of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, will prevent the market-freezing of certain existing active substances and a de facto prohibition of new treated articles, between 1 September 2013 and the approval of the last active substance contained in the articles. The EESC believes that these changes to the transitional rules prevent significant collateral damage which the original wording of the said articles would have produced.

4.1

Article 89(4) and Article 93(2) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 provide for phase-out periods for biocidal products for which no authorisation is granted. The new text proposes that the same periods should apply for phasing out biocidal products already on the market, where an authorisation is granted but the conditions of the authorisation require the product to be changed. The EESC considers that, in such cases, there should be a derogation from the periods laid down by the general rule in the event that a request is rejected. The EESC suggests that, when a product is approved with changes, the phase-out period should be extended so that it can be used and made available on the market until it has run out.

4.2

The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) must ensure that the list it publishes (Article 95) only contains information on the corresponding suppliers supporting the renewal of a certain active substance.

4.3

With regard to access to information in accordance with Article 66(3), the EESC believes that a correct balance should be struck between public interest and legitimate private interests. The automatic and systematic disclosure of information regarding the name and address of the manufacturer of an active substance to any third party requesting it could undermine the protection of the commercial interest of the holder of the authorisation.

4.4

In its opinion on the Biocidal Products Regulation, the EESC welcomed the mandatory sharing of data on animal tests. In fact, one of the most positive aspects of the new regulation is that it prevents the unnecessary suffering of vertebrates through the continuous repetition of toxicological studies. In any event, the Commission should assess whether the obligation to share data, in addition to toxicological and ecotoxicological data, is balanced and favours the development of new active substances, particularly studies on environmental fate and behaviour relating to substances in Annex II of Regulation (EC) No 1451/2007. Effective compensation and protection of data until 2025 are crucial in order to prevent improper use of work.

4.5

The EESC is in favour of extending from 2 to 3 years the time limit for Member States to decide on the authorisation of a biocidal product following a decision to approve a particular active substance for a specific product-type (Article 89, Regulation (EU) No 528/2012). If the change had not been made, due to the different stages of the authorisation process, there would have been a risk of systematic non-compliance with time limits, thus paralysing the process.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/47

1.1

The Committee notes 28 000 persons were killed and 1,5 million were injured on EU roads in 2012. The Committee believes strongly that reducing the number of road fatalities to is extremely important for society and endorses the Commission's ambitious goal of reducing the figure to half of 2010 levels during the period 2011 to 2020.

1.2

The Committee welcomes the proposed Decision and Regulation from the Commission on the implementation of eCall, to ensure that from October 2015 all new models of passenger cars and light duty vehicles would be fitted with 112 eCall, and that the necessary infrastructure would be created for the proper receipt and handling of eCalls in emergency call response centres (Public Safety Answering Points: PSAPs), thus ensuring the compatibility, interoperability and continuity of the EU-wide eCall service.

1.3

The EESC agrees with the conclusions of the eCall Impact Assessment which showed that the mandatory introduction of eCall was the only way to bring eCall's benefits to the Union's citizens. The Committee had advised the Commission in numerous opinions that a voluntary approach would not be successful.

1.4

The EESC notes that the proposals will only apply to new types of vehicles first registered on or after 1 October 2015 and that existing models can continue to be manufactured and sold without eCall after that date. While appreciating the possible financial cost on automotive manufacturers, the Committee calls on manufacturers to also install eCall technology as soon as possible on existing types of vehicles to be manufactured after October 2015.

1.5

The Committee notes that the proposals do not include the provision of eCall technology on motorcycles and other powered two-wheel vehicles. As the risk of death and injury to drivers and passengers on these types of vehicles is a significant problem, the EESC urges manufacturers and Member States to extend the eCall system to powered two wheelers as soon as possible.

1.6

The Committee also calls again on the Commission to submit proposals as soon as possible on explicitly improving the active and passive safety of powered two-wheel vehicles.

1.7

The EESC is impressed by the success of road safety authorities established in a number of Member States to provide oversight on the implementation of national road safety strategy, to advise on road safety policy and to promote road safety best practices. The Committee believes that a European road safety agency should be set up to help harmonise and drive the implementation of road safety across the EU, including the implementation of eCall. This body would include road safety experts appointed by the Member States.

1.8

The Committee directs the Commission's attention to the previous opinions of the EESC that has discussed the topic of road safety, and which commented on the need for the mandatory introduction of eCall (1).

2.5.1

Manufacturers of passenger cars and light goods must ensure that new types of these vehicles are manufactured and approved with compliant eCall systems from October 2015.

2.5.2

Member States would have to ensure that from 1 October 2015 new types of vehicles covered by the proposed Regulation receive European Community Whole Vehicle Type Approval.

2.5.3

The type approval authorities must ensure that these vehicles meet the prescribed standards before issuing a type approval certificate.

2.5.4

Manufacturers must ensure that eCall technology does not allow the vehicles to be subject to constant tracking.

2.5.5

Sufficient safeguards against surveillance are required and users must be provided with information about how the data used by the system will be processed.

2.5.6

The Commission is empowered to adopt Delegated Acts to establish the technical requirements of in-vehicle systems, to define the requirements in relation to the privacy of users and, on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis, to exempt certain classes of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles.

3.1

The Committee notes that 28 000 persons were killed and 1,5 million were injured on EU roads last year. When emergency services are called to a road accident, every minute is critical to save lives and reduce the severity of injuries. However, people injured in an accident do not always have the physical ability to call emergency services.

3.2

eCall technology addresses this problem by alerting emergency services immediately even if the driver or passenger is unconscious or otherwise unable to call. The EESC also notes that eCall technology is expected to speed up the arrival of emergency teams by an estimated 40 % in urban areas and 50 % in rural areas, and that once widely deployed, eCall will save several hundred lives in Europe every year, reducing the severity of injuries and trauma in tens of thousands of cases.

3.3

A number of Member States have established road safety authorities with a national mandate to evaluate road safety strategy and advise their governments on priority actions. A European Road Safety Agency with a clear mandate for all road safety domains (infrastructure, vehicles and road users) across the Union could help to improve the implementation of a harmonised EU road safety strategy. Such an Agency could have specific tasks in terms of the identification, specification, establishment and promotion of best practices, as well as the enhancement of cross-border information exchange and collaboration.

4.1

The proposal applies only to the type approval of new passenger cars and light goods vehicles and would not impose a requirement to ensure that eCall be fitted prior to first registration, which means that existing types of those vehicles can continue to be manufactured and sold without eCall. The Committee notes that because of this policy, it will be 2033 before there is full penetration of the eCall service. While understanding the need to take account of the financial impact and design problems that might be caused for automotive manufacturers, the EESC would like manufacturers to also install eCall technology as soon as possible on existing types of vehicles to be manufactured after October 2015.

4.2

The Regulation concerning type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system will not apply to powered two-wheel vehicles (motorcycles etc.). Drivers of powered two-wheel vehicles are 18 to 20 times more at risk of suffering a serious injury on the road than car drivers. Special attention is needed to address the road safety issues of this high-risk vehicle class. In addition to the fitting of eCall technology, proposals are needed as soon as possible on improving the active and passive safety of powered two-wheelers.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/50

1.1

The Committee welcomes the European Commission's initiative and considers that it is necessary to recast the two directives with a view to tackling the demographic and economic challenges facing the EU.

1.2

The EU urgently needs a smart and solid migration policy if it wishes to achieve the goals it has set under the Europe 2020 strategy and other major initiatives. If the EU wishes to remain an innovation hub and a strong centre of industry, it needs to attract talented people and ensure effective "brain circulation".

1.3

The Committee believes that the policy of encouraging migration and mobility should be firmly anchored in the fundamental human rights system. The principles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be implemented at all levels.

1.4

The Committee encourages the European Commission and the Fundamental Rights Agency to assess the vulnerabilities that third-country nationals face here and put forward to the Member States active measures aimed at removing them. Determined efforts should be made at all levels to tackle discriminatory situations.

1.5

The Committee strongly supports the Commission in its efforts to develop bilateral "mobility partnerships" which offer a framework for cooperation between the EU and non-EU countries (notably in the EU neighbourhood).

1.6

The Committee encourages the European Commission and the Member States to take into account the gender aspect and to configure their programmes so as to facilitate the participation of more women.

1.7

An in-depth analysis of the obstacles that hinder visa procedures is needed, irrespective of their nature, and measures to eliminate them should be identified. The process for granting visas should be simple, fair, accessible and non-discriminatory.

1.8

The Committee stresses the importance of the principle of third-country nationals being treated on a par with nationals of the host Member State as regards access to goods and services.

1.9

The Committee draws attention to the need to ensure appropriate protection for students, researchers, volunteers and au pairs where they are engaged in paid work or active in the labour market. Such paid work often obscures working relationships and abuses that may result from this situation should be avoided by ensuring equal treatment for all of these categories. Special attention should be given to people engaged in domestic work as au pairs, particularly women.

1.10

The Committee welcomes Article 24, which allows third-country nationals to stay in the Member State for 12 months upon completion of their research or studies in order to look for work. However, the equal-treatment provisions in Directive 2011/98/EU include derogations that seem to run counter to the objectives of the proposal to recast the two directives.

1.11

The Committee thinks that the communication aspect is crucial to the success of this policy. The Member States and the EU institutions should communicate with third-country nationals and give them access to high-quality information.

2.1

The EU is facing major structural challenges both demographically and economically. The working-age population is shrinking, and companies are struggling to find skilled staff.

2.2

The EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility sets the overarching framework of the EU’s migration policy. It also defines how the EU organises its dialogue and cooperation with non-EU countries.

2.3

The EU is also facing a situation of "innovation emergency". The Europe 2020 strategy and its Innovation Union flagship initiative have set the goal of increasing investment in research and innovation, requiring an estimated one million extra research jobs. Immigration from outside the EU is one source of highly skilled and talented people who the Member States can and should attract.

2.4

Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) entrusts the EU with the task of developing a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring efficient management of migration flows and fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in the Member States.

2.5

Directive 2004/114/EC lays down mandatory provisions for the admission of students who are third-country nationals. The application of the directive to school pupils, volunteers and unremunerated trainees was left optional for Member States. Directive 2005/71/EC provides for a fast-track procedure for admitting researchers from third countries who have signed a hosting agreement with a research organisation approved by the Member State.

2.6

In 2011, the Commission presented reports on the implementation of the two directives to the European Parliament and the Council. The reports revealed a number of shortcomings in the directives.

2.7

The biggest problem identified in the two directives relates to authorisations for third-country nationals to enter and stay in the EU (long-term visas and/or residence permits). The legal provisions here are often complex and unclear. The procedures are lengthy and are not always applied fairly and consistently. Current provisions on immigration are not sufficiently supportive of EU programmes including mobility measures such as Erasmus Mundus or Marie Curie.

2.8

In terms of the labour market, there is a lack of opportunities for graduates from third countries to identify work opportunities after they graduate, and for researchers to do so after finishing their research project. In some cases, third-country nationals cannot be employed by universities because they are considered to be public-sector institutions. Priority should be given to encouraging women to access the scientific professions by removing all forms of direct and indirect discrimination or other barriers that hinder their access to highly-skilled scientific positions.

3.1

The Committee welcomes the European Commission's initiative and considers that it is necessary to recast the two directives.

3.2

Being open to the outside world remains a priority for the EU and in the current climate this goal is difficult to pursue. The EU should facilitate mobility and make use of all the tools at its disposal to improve access for third-country nationals to educational and research activities in the EU and to its labour market.

3.3

The EU needs to take a new approach to economic migration, one that would allow third-country nationals to acquire knowledge and skills. Cooperation with third countries should encourage "brain circulation", which benefits both the receiving and the sending countries.

3.4

In October 2010, the European Commission adopted an initiative setting out an ambitious set of actions and policies needed to transform the EU into an "Innovation Union". To that end, the EU should ease entry and residence rules for third-country nationals.

3.5

Third-country nationals can bring dynamism and diversity to Europe's educational, scientific, cultural and economic activities. The Committee believes that facilitating the mobility of third-country nationals is one of the answers to the demographic and economic-development challenges facing the EU. At the same time, it believes that this policy should be firmly anchored in the fundamental human rights system.

3.6

The Committee welcomes the commitment to unifying and simplifying the procedures involved in accessing the EU's territory. The current economic and political conditions may lead to the fragmentation of systems, policies and national legislation regarding third-country nationals.

3.7

The EU's role here is to encourage discussion, find common solutions, promote certain practices and support the efforts of its Member States and of third countries and their nationals.

3.8

The Committee also welcomes the fact that there has been clarification of the particular groups of third-country nationals that are the beneficiaries of easier access to the EU. This brings clarity and predictability for both the Member States and the third-county nationals. Although their conditions of entry and residence are differentiated, the inclusion of all the groups in the new directive helps promote certain essential cross-cutting aspects such as respect of fundamental human rights.

3.9

Third-country nationals have both rights and obligations, which they should be aware of and duly exercise.

3.10

The Committee appreciates the attempt to more efficiently link third-country nationals’ access with the major policy areas regarding migration, education and research, in particular in relation to recognised programmes such as Erasmus Mundus and Marie Curie.

3.11

The Committee also welcomes the emphasis on the fundamental rights of third-country nationals. However, greater attention needs to be given to active measures to ensure their fair treatment. In practice, third-country nationals are often in vulnerable situations, especially students and au pairs. The Committee encourages the European Commission and the Fundamental Rights Agency to assess the vulnerabilities that third-country nationals face here and put forward to the Member States active measures aimed at removing them.

3.12

The Committee is concerned about the spread of racist and xenophobic attitudes targeting third-country nationals. If we facilitate their mobility but fail to put a stop to these attitudes, all of the policy objectives will be undermined.

3.13

The Committee notes that the proposal contains practical measures for integrating third-country nationals into the European research and education areas and into the labour market.

3.14

Access for third-country nationals to forms of employment that combine work with education and training should be encouraged. It is important to reinforce the principle of equal treatment with regard to the employment and conditions of employment of people whose situation is governed by these directives.

3.15

The Committee encourages the European Commission and the Member States to take into account the gender aspect and to configure their programmes so as to facilitate the participation of more women. This objective should be pursued as a priority when it comes to the mobility of students, and, in particular, of researchers.

3.16

The Committee would encourage the Member States and EU institutions to give consideration to a broader sphere of interaction, including research, education and the labour market. Europe is a space in which artistic production and the creative industries constitute a driver for both integration and social progress and economic development.

3.17

In the case of third-country nationals admitted as researchers, students or au pairs, the Committee encourages the Commission, the Member States and the European Parliament to strengthen their protection in the workplace or where they participate in the labour market. In particular, the Committee thinks that the derogations from the equal-treatment provisions of Directive 2011/98/EU should be removed for students, researchers and au pairs.

4.1

The Committee considers it appropriate to extend the scope of the directive to include remunerated trainees and au pairs.

4.2

The Committee believes that, in practice, a huge number of procedural and institutional obstacles continue to stand in the way of mobility. These obstacles mainly concern visa procedures. These procedures are lengthy, unpredictable and even arbitrary. They entail very high, almost-prohibitive costs for applicants. Access to embassies and consular offices is often limited. An in-depth analysis of these obstacles is needed, irrespective of their nature, and measures to eliminate them should be identified. The process for granting visas should be simple, fair, accessible and non-discriminatory.

4.3

The private sector is very important for achieving the objectives related to funding and developing research. Companies should be encouraged to adopt a pro-active attitude to attracting researchers. Specific measures must also be devised by the Member State authorities, in cooperation with institutions and private companies, aimed at removing practical barriers to the integration of third-country nationals. For instance, the procedure involved in opening a bank account can be complicated and lengthy.

4.4

The Committee notes the procedural difficulties involved in granting visas to people seeking to work on a voluntary basis. Volunteering is a special activity that constitutes neither employment nor education, but involves both to a certain extent. Volunteering should be formally recognised as an activity that warrants the issuing of visas.

4.5

In this context, the EESC would welcome the involvement of local and regional authorities.

4.6

As regards the provision that Member States may grant more favourable conditions to the persons to whom the proposal for a directive applies, the Committee endorses this as it allows the individual states to develop their own policies for attracting third-country nationals. Although this does not come under the scope of the directive, the Member States’ policies should not discriminate against certain groups of nationals or individual nationals.

4.7

The Committee supports the development of mobility partnerships under this policy and underlines the need to enhance cooperation between the EU and third countries to ensure effective "brain circulation". Developing education and research in the EU should not be done by depriving third countries of the skills of their own citizens. It is not clear from the Commission proposal what specific activities are envisaged in this regard.

4.8

Regarding the situation of students and the new group of remunerated trainees, the Committee endorses the proposal to allow them to stay in a second Member State for periods of between three and six months, provided that they fulfil the general conditions laid down in the directive.

4.9

The Committee agrees with enhancing students’ access to the labour market, under the conditions set out in the directive, by enabling them to work a minimum of 20 hours per week. It is up to each Member State, within the framework of social dialogue with the social partners, to determine the maximum number of hours per week or days or months per year allowed for such an activity, which is not to be less than 20 hours per week, or the equivalent in days or months per year. However, given that completion of studies is the primary objective, the permitted working time should be limited to a level conducive to this goal. Proof of progress with studies should be provided at regular intervals.

4.10

The Committee stresses the importance of the principle of third-country nationals being treated on a par with nationals of the host Member State as regards access to goods and services.

4.11

In its opinions on the Green Paper on economic migration, adopted in 2006 (1), and on the single permit, adopted in 2008 (2), the Committee advocated granting legal migrants the right to education and vocational training, in addition to equal treatment in the workplace (working conditions, pay and dismissal, health and safety in the workplace, freedom of association, etc.).

4.12

The Member States should ensure that the fundamental rights of third-country nationals are respected in practice.

4.13

The Committee thinks that the communication aspect is crucial to the success of this policy. The Member States and the EU institutions should communicate with third-country nationals and give them access to high-quality information.

4.14

The Committee will continue to act as a bridge between organised civil society and the EU institutions and aims to continue promoting best practice in the area of immigration and integration.

21.11.2013   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 341/54

1.1

The Committee notes that, of the four freedoms enshrined in the Treaty, the free movement of workers is the one that continues to encounter the greatest obstacles in practice.

1.2

The Committee considers that exercise of the free movement of workers, without obstacles or discrimination, will help to safeguard fundamental rights and will improve the EU's competitiveness, business productivity and the quality of employment for workers, being a pillar of the Europe 2020 strategy.

1.3

The free movement of workers in Europe must continue to be a political priority for the EU. The Committee considers that the directive will contribute to fair and balanced mobility.

1.4

The EESC supports the Commission's proposal for a directive, which will facilitate equal treatment and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality for European workers exercising the right to free movement. Other obstacles to mobility persist, however, as the Committee has pointed out in other opinions.

1.5

In order to further reduce the existing barriers to mobility, additional measures should be adopted to make easily understandable information on labour and social law available to mobile workers in their respective national languages. Workers should also have a specific right to advice. The relevant advice facilities should work closely with the social partners and EURES, ensuring that mobile workers are informed about social and legal conditions in the host countries before they leave their countries of origin.

1.6

The EESC supports the objectives which the Commission is seeking to achieve through the directive, such as the defence of rights derived from the principle of equal treatment of workers and members of their families in terms of employment and various social rights by means of administrative and judicial procedures; the activity of associations, organisations and other legal entities; the establishment of support and supervisory structures at national level; social dialogue; the improvement of information provided to businesses and workers. The Committee appreciates the fact that the implementation of the directive in national law will respect national legal procedures and practices.

1.7

The Committee is in favour of the establishment of information and advice services on the exercise of freedom of movement and mobility to assist workers. It would also be necessary to keep employers properly informed.

1.8

The EESC supports the Commission's efforts to modify and expand the role of EURES in order to facilitate mobility and improve the match between skills and labour market needs.

2.1

The May 2010 report by Mario Monti entitled A new strategy for the single market stressed that free movement of workers has been a success from the legal point of view but that it is the least used of the four single market freedoms. The gap between theory and practice is also reflected in the 2010-2014 political guidelines presented by the European Commission president, Mr Barroso.

2.2

The Commission proposes a directive aimed at improving the application of EU legislation and facilitating the exercise of the rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement. The Treaty and the applicable European legislation grant all European citizens the right to move freely to another Member State to work and live, protect them from discrimination on the grounds of nationality when seeking employment, and guarantee them equal treatment.

2.3

In recent years three action plans for worker mobility (1) have been implemented, in 1997, 2002 and 2007 respectively. However, this right to EU mobility is being exercised by 3 % of European workers. The Commission, the Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, the EESC and the social partners have indicated the obstacles to the practical exercise of this right:

2.4

As a result of these problems, discrimination on grounds of nationality often continues to be a major obstacle for EU migrant workers

2.5

The Commission has carried out wide-ranging consultations with the Member States, the social partners, civil society and specialist bodies, and has concluded that the most appropriate legal instrument to facilitate exercise of workers' rights to free movement is a directive, ensuring uniform respect of the rights conferred by Article 45 (TFEU) and Articles 1 to 10 of Regulation No 492/2011.

2.6

The scope of the directive will include aspects which, with regard to free movement of workers, are covered by Regulation 492/2011, which guarantees equal treatment and non-discrimination in:

2.7

The directive will require Member States to:

3.1