ISSN 1725-2423 doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2010.352.eng |
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Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352 |
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English edition |
Information and Notices |
Volume 53 |
Notice No |
Contents |
page |
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II Information |
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INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
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European Commission |
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2010/C 352/01 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6003 — Renco Group/Body Systems) ( 1 ) |
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2010/C 352/02 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6065 — Axa Private Equity/CIR/KOS) ( 1 ) |
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2010/C 352/03 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6030 — Bollore/CMA CGM/Terminal du Grand Ouest) ( 1 ) |
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2010/C 352/04 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5934 — Veolia Water UK and Veolia Voda/Subsidiaries of United Utilities Group) ( 1 ) |
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2010/C 352/05 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5992 — Sud-Chemie/Ashland/ASK JV) ( 1 ) |
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2010/C 352/06 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5962 — SSI/QP/Oryx) ( 1 ) |
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IV Notices |
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NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
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European Commission |
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2010/C 352/07 |
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2010/C 352/08 |
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2010/C 352/09 |
Final report of the Hearing Officer — Case COMP/39.315 — ENI |
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2010/C 352/10 |
Summary of Commission Decision of 29 September 2010 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.315 — ENI) (notified under document C(2010) 6701) ( 1 ) |
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NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
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2010/C 352/11 |
Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General Block Exemption Regulation) ( 1 ) |
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V Announcements |
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
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European Commission |
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2010/C 352/12 |
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2010/C 352/13 |
Call for applications under the work programme of the Eurostars Joint Programme |
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PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY |
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European Commission |
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2010/C 352/14 |
Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures |
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PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
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European Commission |
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2010/C 352/15 |
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2010/C 352/16 |
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2010/C 352/17 |
State aid — Sweden — State aid C 29/10 (ex NN 42/10) — Alleged sale of public property below market price by the Municipality of Vänersborg — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( 1 ) |
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OTHER ACTS |
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European Commission |
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2010/C 352/18 |
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(1) Text with EEA relevance |
EN |
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II Information
INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES
European Commission
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/1 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration
(Case COMP/M.6003 — Renco Group/Body Systems)
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/01
On 30 November 2010, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:
— |
in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
— |
in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32010M6003. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/1 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration
(Case COMP/M.6065 — Axa Private Equity/CIR/KOS)
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/02
On 14 December 2010, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:
— |
in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
— |
in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32010M6065. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/2 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration
(Case COMP/M.6030 — Bollore/CMA CGM/Terminal du Grand Ouest)
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/03
On 15 December 2010, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in French and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:
— |
in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
— |
in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32010M6030. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/2 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration
(Case COMP/M.5934 — Veolia Water UK and Veolia Voda/Subsidiaries of United Utilities Group)
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/04
On 28 October 2010, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:
— |
in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
— |
in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32010M5934. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/3 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration
(Case COMP/M.5992 — Sud-Chemie/Ashland/ASK JV)
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/05
On 29 November 2010, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:
— |
in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
— |
in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32010M5992. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/3 |
Non-opposition to a notified concentration
(Case COMP/M.5962 — SSI/QP/Oryx)
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/06
On 15 December 2010, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:
— |
in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
— |
in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32010M5962. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
IV Notices
NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES
European Commission
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/4 |
Euro exchange rates (1)
22 December 2010
2010/C 352/07
1 euro =
|
Currency |
Exchange rate |
USD |
US dollar |
1,3112 |
JPY |
Japanese yen |
109,68 |
DKK |
Danish krone |
7,4521 |
GBP |
Pound sterling |
0,84920 |
SEK |
Swedish krona |
8,9812 |
CHF |
Swiss franc |
1,2502 |
ISK |
Iceland króna |
|
NOK |
Norwegian krone |
7,8715 |
BGN |
Bulgarian lev |
1,9558 |
CZK |
Czech koruna |
25,280 |
EEK |
Estonian kroon |
15,6466 |
HUF |
Hungarian forint |
276,20 |
LTL |
Lithuanian litas |
3,4528 |
LVL |
Latvian lats |
0,7098 |
PLN |
Polish zloty |
3,9928 |
RON |
Romanian leu |
4,2853 |
TRY |
Turkish lira |
2,0355 |
AUD |
Australian dollar |
1,3143 |
CAD |
Canadian dollar |
1,3322 |
HKD |
Hong Kong dollar |
10,1980 |
NZD |
New Zealand dollar |
1,7650 |
SGD |
Singapore dollar |
1,7168 |
KRW |
South Korean won |
1 510,27 |
ZAR |
South African rand |
8,9211 |
CNY |
Chinese yuan renminbi |
8,7144 |
HRK |
Croatian kuna |
7,3914 |
IDR |
Indonesian rupiah |
11 856,37 |
MYR |
Malaysian ringgit |
4,0985 |
PHP |
Philippine peso |
57,958 |
RUB |
Russian rouble |
40,2825 |
THB |
Thai baht |
39,552 |
BRL |
Brazilian real |
2,2246 |
MXN |
Mexican peso |
16,1933 |
INR |
Indian rupee |
59,1315 |
(1) Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/5 |
Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant position given at its meeting of 9 September 2010 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/39.315 — ENI
Rapporteur: Hungary
2010/C 352/08
1. |
The Advisory Committee shares the Commission's concerns expressed in its draft decision as communicated to the Advisory Committee on 9 September 2010 under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. |
2. |
The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the proceedings can be concluded by means of a decision pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
3. |
The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the commitments offered by ENI are suitable, necessary and proportionate. |
4. |
The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, in light of the commitments offered by ENI, there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission, without prejudice to Article 9(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
5. |
The Advisory Committee asks the Commission to take into account any other points raised during the discussion. |
6. |
The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/6 |
Final report of the Hearing Officer (1)
Case COMP/39.315 — ENI
2010/C 352/09
Background
This case concerns the conduct of ENI Spa (‘ENI’) on the gas transportation market to Italy and on the gas supply markets in Italy. According to the Commission’s preliminary conclusions, ENI may have abused its dominant position under Article 102 TFEU through a complex strategy amounting to a refusal to grant access to the gas transport infrastructure leading into Italy, namely the TAG, TENP and Transitgas pipelines, jointly controlled with third companies. This strategy may have been implemented by way of refusing to grant competitors access to capacity available on the transport network (capacity hoarding), granting access in an impractical manner (capacity degradation) and strategically limiting investment (strategic underinvestment) in ENI's international transmission pipelines.
Procedure
The Commission opened the investigation in this case ex officio. Following an inspection and further investigative steps, the Commission initiated proceedings in 2007. A Statement of Objections (‘SO’) was adopted on 6 March 2009 and subsequently notified to ENI.
Following the notification of the SO, ENI was given access to the file in the form of DVDs. ENI then raised a number of procedural issues concerning access to the file. Notably, ENI complained about the treatment of confidential information in the file, claiming that excessive redactions of documents or uninformative summaries made it impossible to fully understand their content. As a consequence, ENI made between April and September 2009 numerous and repeated requests for additional access to documents, particularly documents originating from the abovementioned jointly controlled transportation companies. While some of these requests were accepted, the majority of them were rejected. Nevertheless, in order to provide ENI with fuller access to the redacted information originating from the jointly controlled companies, a data room procedure was organised with the companies that consented to it.
Closely related to ENI's requests for additional access to the file were its recurrent demands for the extension of the time limit to reply to the SO, which I granted, inter alia, to organise the data room procedure and to address all ENI's requests to disclose redacted information.
Three days before the Oral Hearing, I admitted, upon request, one company active in the gas transportation business as interested third party.
The Oral Hearing took place on 27 November 2009. The only third party admitted to the proceedings did not attend.
The commitments and the draft decision
In its reply to the SO and at the Oral Hearing ENI contested that the alleged practices raised competition concerns. Nonetheless, following the Oral Hearing ENI entered into discussions with the Commission services on possible commitments to address the concerns expressed in the SO. On 4 February 2010, ENI submitted commitments to the Commission in response to such concerns. In the commitments, ENI offered to divest its shareholdings in the companies related to the TAG, TENP and Transitgas pipelines to a suitable purchaser that is independent of and unconnected to ENI and does not raise prima facie competition concerns. With respect to TAG, the commitments foresee the divestiture to a public entity controlled by the Italian Government first.
On 5 March 2010, the Commission published a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union pursuant to Article 27(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (2), summarising the concerns and the commitments and inviting interested third parties to submit observations within one month of this publication. A total of 14 responses were received, namely from shippers, some vertically integrated transportation companies and two regulators.
The Commission informed ENI of the result of the market test. On 10 May 2010, ENI sent some clarifications in response to the observations of third parties. Following further exchanges with the Commission, ENI submitted a modified version of the commitments on 8 July 2010.
In view of the modified commitments the Commission has now come to the conclusion that the proceedings should be brought to an end by way of a decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
ENI has declared to the Commission that it has received sufficient access to the information it considered necessary to propose commitments in order to meet the competition concerns expressed by the Commission.
No additional queries or submissions have been made to the Hearing Officer in connection with the present case by the party or any third parties.
In the light of the above, I consider that the right to be heard has been respected in this case.
Brussels, 13 September 2010.
Michael ALBERS
(1) Pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21).
(2) In the following all Articles referred relate to Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/8 |
Summary of Commission Decision
of 29 September 2010
relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement
(Case COMP/39.315 — ENI)
(notified under document C(2010) 6701)
(Only the Italian text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/10
On 29 September 2010, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (1). In accordance with Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (2), the Commission is here publishing the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. A non-confidential version of the decision is available on the Directorate-General for Competition’ website at the following address:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39315
1. INTRODUCTION
(1) |
This Decision is addressed to ENI SpA (hereafter referred to as ENI). ENI offered commitments to meet the competition concerns expressed by the Commission in a Statement of Objections, and this Decision makes the commitments binding. |
2. PROCEDURE
(2) |
The case arose out of surprise inspections carried out on 5 May 2006 at the premises of ENI, its subsidiaries and the companies controlled by ENI active in the transmission of gas in and into Italy. On 20 April 2007, the Commission initiated proceedings under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (3) and Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 (4). On 6 March 2009, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (SO) setting out its competition concerns (5). The SO was notified to ENI by letter of 9 March 2009. On 1 October 2009, ENI replied, disagreeing with the findings of the SO. On 27 November 2009 an Oral Hearing took place. On 4 February 2010, ENI submitted commitments to the Commission in response to the concerns raised in the SO (6). On 5 March 2010, a notice was published in the Official Journal of the European Union pursuant to Article 27(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 summarising the Commission's concerns and the proposed commitments, and inviting interested third parties to give their observations on the commitments within one month following publication (7). On 27 April 2010, the Commission informed ENI of the observations received from interested third parties following the publication of the notice. On 10 May 2010, ENI sent some clarifications on the observations of third parties. Additional information requested pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 was submitted by the undertaking on 24 May 2010. |
(3) |
On 8 July 2010, ENI sent an amended version of the commitments in order to take the replies to the market test into account (hereafter the final commitments). |
(4) |
The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 9 September 2010 (8). The Hearing Officer presented his final report on 13 September 2010 (9). |
3. CONCERNS IDENTIFIED IN THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS
(5) |
The Commission's Statement of Objection took the view that ENI may have abused its dominant position according to Article 102 TFEU by implementing a systematic and constructive refusal to supply strategy on its international pipelines transporting gas into Italy, specifically on the TENP (10), Transitgas (11) and on the TAG (12) pipelines. |
(6) |
The systematic and constructive refusal to supply strategy might have reduced ENI's competitors' opportunities to transport gas into Italy in its international network (by hording capacity, by offering it in a less attractive manner and by strategically limiting investments in additional capacity). The foreclosure of access to the import pipelines would therefore restrict competitors’ ability and incentives to develop an effective competition on the downstream gas supply markets in Italy. The Commission concluded that ENI may have embarked upon a strategy of deliberately keeping international transport capacity tight in order to limit gas imports by third parties into Italy and protect its profits in the downstream gas supply markets. The Commission's view is that, in this case as laid out in the Statement of Objections, this refusal to supply strategy would have derived from the inherent conflict of interest a dominant operator such as ENI, faces in controlling both, the transmission and at the same time the supply of gas. This practice would then be at the detriment of third party transport customers, competition and ultimately the end customers in the downstream supply markets in Italy. |
4. COMMITMENTS
(7) |
ENI committed to divest its current shareholdings in companies related to international gas transmission pipelines (TENP, Transitgas and TAG) (13) to a suitable purchaser independent from and unconnected to ENI who does not raise prima facie competition concerns. |
(8) |
With respect to TAG, ENI will divest its share to a public entity directly or indirectly controlled by the Italian Government (14). |
(9) |
ENI also commits, for the period comprises between 22 December 2009 and the closing of the divestitures, not to prolong or renew any transport contract or enter into any new transport contract for its benefit as shipper on the TAG, TENP and Transitgas pipelines, except for possible future auctions and other public allocation procedures for reverse flow transportation capacity towards markets other than the Italian one. |
(10) |
ENI's final commitments are sufficient to effectively remove the competition concerns identified in the SO. The concerns are removed as ENI's anticompetitive behaviour emanated from its interest in protecting its supply margins while neglecting transportation revenues. In this respect, provided that the pipeline participations will be divested to suitable purchasers independent from and unconnected to ENI, and which do not raise prima facie competition concerns, the remedies proposed are adequate to solve this structural conflict of interest resulting from the vertical integration of the company. |
(11) |
The commitments in their final form are also necessary because no behavioural measure would be as effective as the divestment of ENI stakes in the TSO's to remove the concerns expressed. ENI's commitment to divest its shareholdings in international gas transmission pipelines (TENP, Transitgas and TAG) is a structural measure of the type envisaged in the SO. Absent this structural remedy, the incentives for a vertically integrated gas company to further adopt the alleged anti-competitive behaviour would not have been removed, resulting in a risk of not effectively bringing the alleged infringement to an end. |
(12) |
Not least given the large number of gas customers in the Italian downstream markets and the important potential harm for these customers, the commitments must be regarded as adequate and proportionate. |
5. CONCLUSION
(13) |
In the light of the commitments offered, the Decision finds that there are no longer grounds for action on the part of the Commission and, without prejudice to Article 9(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the proceedings in this case should therefore be brought to an end. |
(1) With effect from 1 December 2009, Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty have become Articles 101 and 102 respectively of the TFEU. The substance of the two Articles has not changed. For the purposes of this Decision, references to Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU should be understood as references to Articles 81 and 82 respectively of the EC Treaty, where appropriate.
(4) OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18.
(5) Pursuant to Article 27(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 read in conjunction with Article 10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004. The Statement of Objections also constitutes a preliminary assessment within the meaning of Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
(6) Pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
(8) See page 5 of this Official Journal.
(9) See page 6 of this Official Journal.
(10) The TENP/Transitgas pipelines allows to import North European gas to Italy through Germany and Switzerland. As for the TENP pipeline, ENI (together with E.ON) jointly controls the pipeline. Namely, ENI controls Gas Transport GmbH, which in turn holds a controlling participation of 49 % in Trans Europa Naturgas Pipeline GmbH & Co, which owns and operates the TENP pipeline. ENI exclusively controls the TSO — Eni Gas Transport Deutschland SpA — which operates the TENP for the part of transportation rights held to ENI (i.e. on the […] % of the TENP capacity).
(11) As for the Transitgas pipeline, ENI (together with Swissgas) jointly controls the pipeline. ENI holds 46 % of the Transitgas AG. ENI also exclusively controls the TSO, Eni Gas Transport International SA (ENI GTI), that manages and operates part of the Transitgas according to the capacity rights held by ENI on that pipeline (i.e. provides natural gas transportation services including the marketing of the approximately […] % of transport capacity held by ENI).
(12) The TAG pipeline allows to import gas from Russia to Italy. ENI (together with OMV) jointly controls the TSO (Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH) that holds the entirety of the capacity rights for the transport of natural gas on the TAG pipeline. ENI is entitled to approximately […] % of the transport rights of the existing capacity on the TAG.
(13) Specifically, ENI committed to divest its stakes in the transmission system operators (the TSO’s), and when applicable the vehicle companies that hold the TSO's shareholding and owns the assets.
(14) The Commission took the view that Cassa Depositi e Prestiti Spa (hereafter CDP) can be considered a suitable buyer for TAG.
NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/11 |
Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General Block Exemption Regulation)
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/11
Reference number of the State Aid |
SA. 31834 |
|||||||||
Member State |
Italy |
|||||||||
Member State reference number |
— |
|||||||||
Name of the Region (NUTS) |
Gorizia Mixed |
|||||||||
Granting authority |
|
|||||||||
Title of the aid measure |
«Norme di attuazione del Regolamento per la gestione del Fondo Gorizia di cui alla legge 700 del 1975» |
|||||||||
National legal basis (Reference to the relevant national official publication) |
|
|||||||||
Type of measure |
Scheme |
|||||||||
Amendment of an existing aid measure |
Modification X 368/09 |
|||||||||
Duration |
1.10.2010-31.12.2013 |
|||||||||
Economic sector(s) concerned |
Growing of perennial crops, Growing of non-perennial crops, Forestry and logging, Repair of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, Freshwater aquaculture, Waste collection, Photographic activities, Packaging activities, Travel agency activities, Service activities incidental to land transportation, Advertising agencies, Mixed farming, Wholesale and retail trade, Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, Animal production, Data processing, hosting and related activities, Plant propagation, Support activities to agriculture and post-harvest crop activities, Technical testing and analysis, Cleaning activities, Repair of computers and personal and household goods, Washing and (dry-)cleaning of textile and fur products, Other personal service activities n.e.c., Hairdressing and other beauty treatment, Computer programming, consultancy and related activities, Specialised design activities, Landscape service activities, Accommodation and food service activities |
|||||||||
Type of beneficiary |
SME, large enterprise |
|||||||||
Annual overall amount of the budget planned under the scheme |
EUR 8,00 (in millions) |
|||||||||
For guarantees |
— |
|||||||||
Aid Instrument (Article 5) |
Direct grant, Soft loan (including details of how the loan is secured), Interest subsidy |
|||||||||
Reference to the Commission Decision |
— |
|||||||||
If co-financed by Community funds |
— |
|||||||||
Objectives |
Maximum aid intensity in % or maximum aid amount in national currency |
SME-bonuses in % |
||||||||
Aid in the form of risk capital (Articles 28-29) |
EUR 1 500 000 |
— |
||||||||
Scheme |
EUR 15 |
20 % |
||||||||
SME investment and employment aid (Article 15) |
EUR 20 |
— |
||||||||
Aid for newly created small enterprises (Article 14) |
EUR 25 |
— |
||||||||
General training (Article 38(2)) |
EUR 60 |
20 % |
||||||||
Environmental investment aid for energy saving measures (Article 21) |
EUR 20 |
20 % |
||||||||
Aid for the acquisition of new transport vehicles which go beyond Community standards or which increase the level of environmental protection in the absence of Community standards (Article 19) |
EUR 35 |
20 % |
||||||||
Specific training (Article 38(1)) |
EUR 25 |
20 % |
||||||||
Aid for SME participation in fairs (Article 27) |
EUR 50 |
— |
||||||||
Environmental investment aid for the promotion of energy from renewable energy sources (Article 23) |
EUR 45 |
20 % |
||||||||
Aid for consultancy in favour of SMEs (Article 26) |
EUR 50 |
— |
Web link to the full text of the aid measure:
http://www.go.camcom.gov.it/allegati/pdf/fondogorizia/norme_attuaz_L700_comm_servizi.pdf
V Announcements
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
European Commission
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/13 |
Call for proposals under the annual work programme for grants in the field of the Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-E) for 2011
(Commission Decision C(2010) 9395)
2010/C 352/12
The European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, is hereby launching a call for proposals in order to award grants to projects in accordance with the priorities and objectives defined in the annual work programme for grants in the field of the Trans-European Energy Network for 2011.
The maximum amount available under this call for proposals, for 2011, is EUR 24 150 000.
The call is closing on 28 February 2011.
The complete text of the call for proposals is available on:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/grants/index_en.htm
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/14 |
Call for applications under the work programme of the Eurostars Joint Programme
2010/C 352/13
Notice is hereby given of the launch of a call for applications under the work programme of the Eurostars Joint Programme.
Applications are invited for the following call: Eurostars-2011-CO6
Call documentation, including deadline, is published on the following website:
http://www.eurostars-eureka.eu/
PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY
European Commission
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/15 |
Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures
2010/C 352/14
1. As provided for in Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 (1) on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, the European Commission gives notice that, unless a review is initiated in accordance with the following procedure, the anti-dumping measures mentioned below will expire on the date mentioned in the table below.
2. Procedure
Union producers may lodge a written request for a review. This request must contain sufficient evidence that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
Should the Commission decide to review the measures concerned, importers, exporters, representatives of the exporting country and Union producers will then be provided with the opportunity to amplify, rebut or comment on the matters set out in the review request.
3. Time limit
Union producers may submit a written request for a review on the above basis, to reach the European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade (Unit H-1), N-105 4/92, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË (2) at any time from the date of the publication of the present notice but no later than three months before the date mentioned in the table below.
4. This notice is published in accordance with Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009.
Product |
Country(ies) of origin or exportation |
Measures |
Reference |
Date of expiry |
Potassium chloride |
Belarus Russia |
Anti-dumping duty Undertaking |
Council Regulation (EC) No 1050/2006 (OJ L 191, 12.7.2006, p. 1) |
13.7.2011 |
(1) OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.
(2) Fax +32 22956505.
PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY
European Commission
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/16 |
DECISION No 717
of 4 October 2010
opening a procedure for granting authorisation for the prospection and exploration of oil and natural gas, being underground natural resources as defined in Article 2(1)(3) of the Underground Natural Resources Act, in ‘Block 1 Novi Pazar’, located in Razgrad, Silistra, Dobrich, Shumen and Varna provinces, and announcing that authorisation will be granted on the basis of a competitive procedure
2010/C 352/15
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Pursuant to Article 5, subparagraph 2, Article 42(1)(1) and Article 44(3) of the Underground Natural Resources Act, in conjunction with Article 4(2)(16) and Section 1(24a) of the Energy Act,
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
1. |
A procedure shall be opened for granting authorisation for the prospection and exploration of crude oil and natural gas in ‘Block 1 Novi Pazar’, located in the provinces of Razgrad, Silistra, Dobrich, Shumen and Varna, covering an area of 4 398 km2 and delimited by coordinates 1 to 12, as specified in the Annex. |
2. |
The authorisation referred to in point 1 shall be granted on the basis of a competitive procedure. |
3. |
The authorisation period for prospection and exploration shall be set at five years from the date on which the prospection and exploration agreement enters into force, with a right to extend this period pursuant to Article 31(3) of the Underground Natural Resources Act. |
4. |
The deadline for purchasing the competitive procedure dossier shall be 17.00 on the 120th day following the publication of this Decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
5. |
The deadline for submitting applications to take part in the competitive procedure shall be 17.00 on the 130th day following the publication of this Decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
6. |
The deadline for submitting bids in accordance with the competitive procedure dossier shall be 17.00 on the 144th day following the publication of this Decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
7. |
Bidders shall not be present when bids are considered. |
8. |
The price of the competitive procedure dossier shall be set at BGN 15 000. The dossier is to be purchased from Room 813 at the Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism building at ul. Triaditsa 8, Sofia, BULGARIA, by the deadline specified in point 4. |
9. |
Applicants wishing to take part in the competitive procedure must comply with the requirements of Article 23(1) of the Underground Natural Resources Act. |
10. |
Applicants’ bids shall be evaluated on the basis of the proposed work programmes, resources devoted to environmental protection, bonuses, training, and managerial and financial capacities, as provided for in the competitive procedure dossier. |
11. |
The deposit for participation in the competitive procedure shall be set at BGN 20 000, payable by the deadline specified in point 5 into the bank account of the Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism indicated in the competitive procedure dossier. |
12. |
Applicants who are not admitted to the competitive procedure shall have their deposits reimbursed within 14 days after being informed that they have not been admitted. |
13. |
The successful bidder’s deposit shall be reimbursed after the agreement has been signed, and the other bidders’ deposits shall be reimbursed within 14 days following the publication in the State Gazette of the Council of Ministers’ decision to grant authorisation for prospection and exploration. |
14. |
Applications to take part in the competitive procedure and bids under the competitive procedure shall be submitted to the Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism building at ul. Triaditsa 8, Sofia, BULGARIA, in Bulgarian, in accordance with the requirements of Article 46 of the Underground Natural Resources Act. |
15. |
Bids shall comply with the requirements and conditions specified in the competitive procedure dossier. |
16. |
The competitive procedure shall be conducted even if only one applicant is admitted to take part in it. |
17. |
The Minister for the Economy, Energy and Tourism is authorised to:
|
18. |
Appeals against this Decision may be lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court within 14 days following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
Prime Minister
Boyko BORISOV
Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers
Rosen ZHELYAZKOV
For the Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism
Ivanka RAICHKOVA
Director,
Legal Affairs Directorate,
Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism
Veselin DRAGNEV
ANNEX
LIST OF COORDINATES
WGS 84 coordinate system
No |
Longitude |
Latitude |
1 |
27.000000 |
43.765300 |
2 |
28.000000 |
43.761200 |
3 |
28.000000 |
43.743499 |
4 |
27.969000 |
43.736500 |
5 |
28.002442 |
43.448378 |
6 |
28.000000 |
43.256597 |
7 |
27.601900 |
43.256600 |
8 |
27.601867 |
43.276767 |
9 |
27.159606 |
43.277669 |
10 |
27.159558 |
43.259661 |
11 |
27.011711 |
43.259581 |
12 |
27.011717 |
43.295597 |
Total area — S = 4 398 km2 |
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/19 |
DECISION No 767
of 22 October 2010
opening a procedure for granting authorisation for the prospection and exploration of oil and natural gas, being underground natural resources as defined in Article 2(1)(3) of the Underground Natural Resources Act, in ‘Block 2 Silistra’, located in the provinces of Silistra and Dobrich, and announcing that authorisation will be granted on the basis of a competitive procedure
2010/C 352/16
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Pursuant to Article 5, subparagraph 2, Article 42(1)(1) and Article 44(3) of the Underground Natural Resources Act, in conjunction with Article 4(2)(16) and Section 1(24a) of the Energy Act,
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
1. |
A procedure shall be opened for granting authorisation for the prospection and exploration of oil and natural gas in ‘Block 2 Silistra’, located in Silistra and Dobrich provinces, covering an area of 2 652 km2 and delimited by coordinates 1 to 10, as specified in the Annex. |
2. |
The authorisation referred to in point 1 shall be granted on the basis of a competitive procedure. |
3. |
The authorisation period for prospection and exploration shall be set at five years from the date on which the prospection and exploration agreement enters into force, with a right to extend this period pursuant to Article 31(3) of the Underground Natural Resources Act. |
4. |
The deadline for purchasing the competitive procedure dossier shall be 17.00 on the 120th day following the publication of this Decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
5. |
The deadline for submitting applications to take part in the competitive procedure shall be 17.00 on the 130th day following the publication of this Decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
6. |
The deadline for submitting bids in accordance with the competitive procedure dossier shall be 17.00 on the 144th day following the publication of this Decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
7. |
The competitive procedure shall be non-presential. |
8. |
The price of the competitive procedure dossier shall be set at BGN 15 000. The dossier is to be purchased from Room 813 at the Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism building at ul. Triaditsa 8, Sofia, BULGARIA, by the deadline specified in point 4. |
9. |
Applicants wishing to take part in the competitive procedure must comply with the requirements of Article 23(1) of the Underground Natural Resources Act. |
10. |
Applicants’ bids shall be evaluated on the basis of the proposed work programmes, resources devoted to environmental protection, bonuses, training, and managerial and financial capacities, as provided for in the competitive procedure dossier. |
11. |
The deposit for participation in the competitive procedure shall be set at BGN 20 000, payable by the deadline specified in point 5 into the bank account of the Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism indicated in the competitive procedure dossier. |
12. |
Applicants who are not admitted to the competitive procedure shall have their deposits reimbursed within 14 days after being informed that they have not been admitted. |
13. |
The successful bidder’s deposit shall be reimbursed after the agreement has been signed, and the other bidders’ deposits shall be reimbursed within 14 days following the publication in the State Gazette of the Council of Ministers’ decision to grant authorisation for prospection and exploration. |
14. |
Applications to take part in the competitive procedure and bids under the competitive procedure shall be submitted to the Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism building at ul. Triaditsa 8, Sofia, BULGARIA in Bulgarian, in accordance with the requirements of Article 46 of the Underground Natural Resources Act. |
15. |
Bids shall comply with the requirements and conditions specified in the competitive procedure dossier. |
16. |
The competitive procedure shall be conducted even if only one applicant is admitted to take part in it. |
17. |
The Minister for the Economy, Energy and Tourism is authorised to:
|
18. |
Appeals against this Decision may be lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court within 14 days following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
Prime Minister
Boyko BORISOV
Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers
Rosen ZHELYAZKOV
Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism
Vladimir TUDZHAROV
Director,
Legal Affairs Directorate,
Ministry of the Economy, Energy and Tourism
Veselin DRAGNEV
ANNEX
LIST OF COORDINATES
WGS 84 coordinate system
No |
Longitude |
Latitude |
1 |
27.000000 |
44.132600 |
State border |
||
2 |
28.577300 |
43.739000 |
3 |
28.574400 |
43.732600 |
4 |
28.571800 |
43.722600 |
5 |
28.435000 |
43.722000 |
6 |
28.426500 |
43.687300 |
7 |
28.075700 |
43.760500 |
8 |
28.000000 |
43.743700 |
9 |
28.000000 |
43.761200 |
10 |
27.000000 |
43.765300 |
Total area — S = 2 652 km2 |
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/22 |
STATE AID — SWEDEN
State aid C 29/10 (ex NN 42/10) — Alleged sale of public property below market price by the Municipality of Vänersborg
Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(Text with EEA relevance)
2010/C 352/17
By means of the letter dated 27 October 2010 reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified Sweden of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning the abovementioned measure.
Interested parties may submit their comments on the measure in respect of which the Commission is initiating the procedure within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:
European Commission |
Directorate-General for Competition |
State Aid Greffe |
Rue Joseph II 70 |
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
Fax +32 22961242 |
These comments will be communicated to Sweden. Confidential treatment of the identity of the interested party submitting the comments may be requested in writing, stating the reasons for the request.
TEXT OF SUMMARY
I. PROCEDURE
On 26 May 2010, the Commission received a compliant alleging that Sweden had granted State aid in the form of real estate transactions not in line with their estimated market price.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE
Sweden has confirmed that two main transactions were indeed concluded by the Municipality of Vänersborg through its wholly-owned real estate company Fastighets Aktiebolag Vänersborg AB (hereinafter ‘FABV’), namely:
1. Transaction A: On 13 February 2008, FABV purchased from the Chips AB the production facility of its subsidiary Topp Livsmedel, located in Vänersborg (hereinafter ‘the Facility’) for SEK 17 million (EUR 1,7 million).
2. Transaction B: Following an agreement of the same date, giving an option to the real estate company Hammar to buy the Facility for a fixed price, on 11 August 2008 FABV sold the Facility to Hammar for the agreed price of SEK 8 million (EUR 0,8 million).
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURE
Both these transactions — should the Commission ascertain that they were not concluded at market conditions, i.e. (i) if the price paid by FABV to buy the Facility from Chips AB was higher than its market value and/or (ii) FABV sold the Facility to Hammar at a price below market value — would in principle qualify as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
As far as the existence of an advantage to the potential beneficiaries is concerned, the preliminary findings of the Commission are the following:
|
As to Transaction A, the Commission notes that the price paid by FABV in order to purchase the Facility does not appear to be higher than the market value, as indicated by independent third party consultants. Therefore, it can be excluded that Transaction A contains an aid element and it does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
|
As to Transaction B, by contrast, the Commission seriously doubts that the price at which the Facility was sold by FABV to Hammar, i.e. SEK 8 million (EUR 0,8 million), was in line with its market value. The market value is not known at this stage, since no bidding procedure has been organised before the sale, nor did FABV request an independent study on the value of the Facility. Nevertheless, the fact that, after only a few months, Hammar re-sold the Facility to private local entrepreneurs for SEK 40 million (EUR 4 million) suggests that in Transaction B there might be a State aid element, to be quantified as the difference between the price paid by Hammar for the Facility and the actual market value thereof. |
|
Should Transaction B be considered as State aid, the Commission doubts that such State aid would be compatible with the internal market on the ground of any objective of common interest. |
|
Finally, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, all unlawful aid can be subject to recovery from the recipient. |
TEXT OF LETTER
‘Kommissionen önskar genom denna skrivelse informera Sverige om att den, efter granskning av de upplysningar som tillhandahållits av Era myndigheter angående stödet i fråga, har beslutat att inleda förfarandet enligt artikel 108.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (nedan kallat EUF-fördraget).
I. FÖRFARANDE
(1) |
Genom en skrivelse av den 26 maj 2009, registrerad den 16 juni 2009, mottog kommissionen ett klagomål rörande ett påstått statligt stöd genom försäljning av offentlig egendom under marknadspris. |
(2) |
Den 27 oktober 2009 vidarebefordrade kommissionen en icke-konfidentiell version av klagomålet till de nationella myndigheterna. Sverige lämnade svar genom en skrivelse av den 30 november 2010, registrerad samma dag. |
(3) |
Den 9 mars 2010 begärde kommissionen ytterligare upplysningar som Sverige tillhandahöll genom en skrivelse av den 20 april 2010. |
(4) |
Den 11 maj 2010 mottog kommissionen upplysningar som lämnats av Chips AB. |
II. BESKRIVNING
Berörda parter
(5) |
Vänersborg (nedan kallat Vänersborg eller kommunen) ligger i Västra Götalands län, nära norska gränsen. I enlighet med Sveriges regionala stödkarta 2007–2013 (1) är detta inte något stödområde, eftersom inkomster och sysselsättningsgrad överensstämmer med det nationella genomsnittet. |
(6) |
Chips AB, en tillverkare av potatischips med säte i Mariehamn i Finland, är verksamt i Norden och Baltikum och har en konsoliderad omsättning på ungefär 2,6 miljarder SEK (260 miljoner EUR (2)) per år och omkring 800 anställda. År 2005 förvärvades Chips av den norska gruppen Orkla ASA, vars verksamheter innefattar märkesvaror, specialmaterial och investeringsverksamhet. |
(7) |
Topp Livsmedel (nedan kallat Topp) var ett dotterbolag till Chips AB som tillverkade djupfrysta grönsaker i Vänersborg och hade omkring 30 anställda (som mest sysselsatte företaget 86 personer). I slutet av 2007 aviserade Chips AB en nedläggning av produktionen vid Topp och inledde försäljningen av produktionsanläggningen. |
(8) |
Hammar Nordic AB är ett privat fastighetsbolag med säte i Trollhättan i Västra Götalands län. Det sysselsätter för närvarande 14 personer och hade år 2009 en omsättning på ungefär 10 miljoner SEK (omkring 1 miljon EUR), varför det motsvarar definitionen av småföretag i bilaga I i kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 70/2001 om tillämpningen av artiklarna 87 och 88 i EG-fördraget på statligt stöd till små och medelstora företag (3). Hammar Nordic Plugg AB är ett dotterbolag till Hammar Nordic AB. Såvitt kommissionen förstår bildades Hammar Nordic Plugg Ab enkom med anledning av de transaktioner som detta beslut avser. Det är driftsmässigt avhängigt sitt moderbolag, förefaller inte ha verksamhet eller tillgångar förutom de som avses i detta beslut, vilket gör att det kan antas att eventuella ekonomiska fördelar som beviljas Hammar Nordic Plugg AB också ytterst gynnar Hammar Nordic AB. Kommissionen kommer följaktligen att i detta beslut betrakta båda bolagen som en ekonomisk enhet och kommer i det följande att gemensamt beteckna dem Hammar. |
(9) |
Fastighets Aktiebolag Vänersborg AB (nedan kallat FABV) är ett fastighetsbolag som helt ägs av kommunen. |
III. ÅTGÄRDERNA
(10) |
Beslutet avser två transaktioner: |
Transaktion A
(11) |
Den 13 februari 2008 köpte kommunen Topps produktionsanläggning (nedan kallad anläggningen (4)) av Chips AB för 17 miljoner SEK (1,7 miljoner EUR) via FABV. |
(12) |
Samma dag ingick FABV två överenskommelser med Hammar. Den första överenskommelsen var ett hyresavtal enligt vilket FABV skulle hyra ut hela anläggningen till Hammar (varefter Hammar hyrde ut anläggningen i andra hand till lokala företagare som fortsatte produktionen på platsen). Den andra överenskommelsen bestod i en option som gav Hammar möjlighet att köpa anläggningen av FABV till ett förutbestämt pris av 8 miljoner SEK (0,8 miljoner EUR) när som helst under perioden mellan den 1 mars 2008 och den 28 februari 2010. |
Transaktion B
(13) |
Transaktion B ägde rum den 11 augusti 2008 när Hammar utnyttjade sin option och förvärvade anläggningen av FABV till det överenskomna priset av 8 miljoner SEK (0,8 miljoner EUR). |
(14) |
Den 30 juli 2008 (dvs. innan optionen utnyttjades) undertecknade Hammar ett preliminärt avtal med de lokala företagare som redan hyrde anläggningen i andra hand om att sälja anläggningen till dem för 40 miljoner SEK (4 miljoner EUR). Överlåtelsen genomfördes den 2 september 2008. |
IV. SYNPUNKTER SOM FRAMFÖRTS AV KLAGANDEN, SVERIGE SAMT CHIPS AB
(15) |
Klaganden hävdar att anläggningen (som FABV köpte för 17 miljoner SEK och sex månader senare sålde till Hammar för 8 miljoner SEK) såldes av kommunen till Hammar under marknadsvärde och – eftersom FABV:s beslut om försäljning kan tillskrivas kommunen – utgör detta olagligt och oförenligt statligt stöd till Hammar. |
(16) |
Sverige har anfört att kommunens enda mål med att köpa anläggningen via FABV var att säkra produktionen och arbetstillfällena. Eftersom företaget inte avsåg att driva verksamheten själv valde kommunen den lösning som föreslogs av Hammar, dvs. uthyrning med köpoption. Sverige har medgivit att den option som Hammar beviljades krävde ett kapitaltillskott på 9 miljoner SEK (0,9 miljoner EUR) från kommunens budget till FABV för att täcka den förlust som skulle uppstå om Hammar utnyttjade optionen. |
(17) |
Sverige har medgivit att försäljningen till Hammar inte gjordes genom ett öppet anbudsförfarande och att det inte förekommit någon sakkunnig värdering av anläggningen. |
(18) |
Sverige anser att både priset vid tiden för köpet av anläggningen och det pris som den därefter såldes för till Hammar kan sägas ha varit kommersiellt motiverat eftersom kommunens huvudsyfte å ena sidan var att göra fastigheten tillgänglig för affärsverksamhet och därigenom säkra arbetstillfällen och å andra sidan att det framförhandlade priset förväntades öka med tiden, vilket sedermera bevisades genom att Hammar sålde anläggningen för 40 miljoner SEK. Sverige anför att det sanna marknadsvärdet på anläggningen snarare är lika med de 8 miljoner SEK som den såldes för till Hammar än de 17 miljoner SEK som betalades till Chips AB. |
(19) |
I sin inlaga hävdar Chips AB att anläggningens verkliga marknadsvärde under inga omständigheter kunde anses vara mindre än 17 miljoner SEK. När Chips AB beslöt att avyttra de aktuella tillgångarna uppdrog företaget åt fastighetskonsulten Colliers International att göra en uppskattning av försäljningspriset. Efter en försiktig beräkning, bl.a. på grundval av gängse normer för värdering av affärsfastigheter, uppskattades det lägsta skäliga försäljningspriset (för bara fastigheterna) vara 27 miljoner SEK (2,7 miljoner EUR). Denna uppskattning bestyrktes av att flera intressenter under försäljningsprocessen – som initierades av Chips AB och som ledde till att FABV köpte anläggningen – angav att priset skulle kunna överstiga 30 miljoner SEK (3 miljoner EUR). Chips AB godtog FABV:s lägre anbud på 17 miljoner SEK av tre skäl: a) de räddade arbetstillfällena skulle gynna Chips AB:s och Orklas anseende, b) de eventuella köparna var beredda att köpa anläggningen ’i befintligt skick’ dvs. utan några garantier från Chips AB med avseende på ersättningsansvar för miljöskador etc. och c) eftersom en uppgörelse med FABV kunde genomföras snabbt. |
(20) |
Chips AB anser att det pris som det fick av FABV för anläggningen inte var högre än marknadsvärdet och att försäljningen följaktligen inte kan ha innehållit några inslag av statligt stöd till förmån för Chips AB. |
V. PRELIMINÄR BEDÖMNING
(21) |
Kommissionen har vid första anblick skäl att tro att transaktion B kan ha inbegripit statligt stöd i den mening som avses i artikel 107.1 i EUF-fördraget och, om så är fallet, att ifrågasätta huruvida detta stöd är förenligt med den inre marknaden i enlighet med artikel 107.3 c i EUF-fördraget. |
1. Förekomst av statligt stöd
(22) |
Enligt artikel 107.1 i EUF-fördraget ’är stöd som ges av en medlemsstat eller med hjälp av statliga medel, av vilket slag det än är, som snedvrider eller hotar att snedvrida konkurrensen genom att gynna vissa företag eller viss produktion, oförenligt med den inre marknaden i den utsträckning som det påverkar handeln mellan medlemsstaterna’. I samband härmed bör noteras att det enligt EU:s regler för statligt stöd föreligger överföring av statliga medel både när staten köper en tillgång över marknadsvärdet (eftersom säljaren får mer av staten än vad tillgången är värd) och när staten säljer en tillgång under marknadsvärdet (eftersom köparen får en tillgång som är värd mer än det betalade priset). |
(23) |
För det första kan båda de potentiella stödmottagarna av det föregivna statliga stödet, dvs. Chips AB och Hammar, betraktas som företag eftersom de bedriver ekonomiska verksamheter och erbjuder varor och tjänster på marknaden (5). |
(24) |
För det andra genomfördes båda transaktionerna av kommunen via FABV. FABV ägs helt av kommunen, som måste täcka företagets potentiella förluster, och dess styrelse består av personer som ingår i kommunledningen. Vidare var kommunen tvungen att tillföra FABV kapital så att företaget skulle kunna genomföra transaktionen och Sverige har medgivit att kommunen via FABV drev sina egna mål att bevara arbetstillfällen och produktion inom kommunen (se skäl 16 ovan). Därför kan FABV:s beslut tillskrivas staten (6) (dvs. kommunen) och i den utsträckning de får ekonomiska följder innebär de användning av statliga medel. |
(25) |
För det tredje måste de aktuella transaktionerna betraktas som selektiva åtgärder eftersom de gynnade ett specifikt företag, dvs. Hammar och/eller Chips AB. |
(26) |
För det fjärde skulle det föregivna statliga stödet kunna snedvrida konkurrensen och påverka handeln inom gemenskapen (och EES). Chips AB en del av Orkla, en grupp som är verksam i flera medlemsstater och har verksamheter inom sektorer som exempelvis livsmedelsprodukter och specialmaterial med livlig konkurrens och handel inom gemenskapen (och EES. Hammar är, trots sin huvudsakligen lokala verksamhet, aktivt på fastighetsmarknaden där effekter på handeln inom gemenskapen (och EES) och konkurrensen inte kan uteslutas, i synnerhet med tanke på att kommunen ligger nära den norska gränsen och att en bred definition av dessa kriterier är tillämplig inom statsstödsreglerna (7). |
(27) |
Slutligen måste kommissionen förvissa sig om huruvida transaktionerna, eller någon av dem, uppfyller det fjärde kriteriet för statligt stöd, dvs. om den ena eller båda transaktionerna gynnar mottagaren av stödet. Konkret återstår att klargöra om i) det pris som FABV betalade för att köpa anläggningen från Chips AB var högre än marknadsvärdet och/eller ii) om FABV sålde anläggningen till Hammar till ett pris under marknadsvärdet (således en överföring av statliga medel till Chips AB alternativt Hammar). |
i)
(28) |
I fråga om transaktion A noterar kommissionen att Chips AB före försäljningsförhandlingarna uppdrog åt konsulten Colliers International att göra en värdering av Topps anläggning. I denna studie, som har överlämnats till kommissionen, rekommenderades ett lägsta försäljningspris på 27 miljoner SEK bara för fastigheterna. Kommissionen noterar att studien utförts av tredje man (som var oberoende både i förhållande till säljaren och köparen) med bred erfarenhet av fastighetssektorn. Den beställdes av Chips i samband med försäljningen av anläggningen, dvs. i ett sammanhang där Chips rimligen inte hade några andra intressen än att få en korrekt uppskattning av anläggningens marknadsvärde. På denna grundval har kommissionen inget uppenbart skäl att ifrågasätta tillförlitligheten hos Colliers Internationals värdering. |
(29) |
Chips AB har lämnat förklaringar angående sitt godtagande av FABV:s anbud på 17 miljoner SEK för hela anläggningen, trots expertutvärderingen och trots ett annat anbud på 30 miljoner SEK som det fick för bara fastigheten. Chips AB hävdar att dess agerande, i egenskap av en stor internationell grupp, främst motiverades av prioriteten att avyttra Topps lilla och förlustbringande verksamhet än att maximera ett relativt obetydligt försäljningspris, och att Chips var berett att godta ett lägre anbud för att undvika den försämring av företagets anseende som skulle kunna uppstå vid en fabriksnedläggning med åtföljande förslut av arbetstillfällen (anbudet på 30 miljoner SEK skulle bara ge upphov till omkring 8 arbetstillfällen medan många fler skulle ha räddats genom en försäljning av hela anläggningen under antagande om fortlevnad). Chips AB tillägger också att det nominellt högre anbudet bara för fastigheten skulle innebära högre transaktionskostnader eftersom maskiner samt immateriella rättigheter skulle behöva säljas separat. |
(30) |
Med ledning av ovanstående information förefaller det inte som om det pris som FABV betalade för att köpa anläggningen av Chips AB var högre än marknadsvärdet. Kommissionen finner därför inga skäl till att anse att transaktion A utgör statligt stöd i den mening som avses i artikel 107.1 i EUF-fördraget. |
ii)
(31) |
I punkt 1 i kommissionens meddelande om inslag av stöd vid statliga myndigheters försäljning av mark och byggnader (8) (nedan kallat meddelandet) utesluts förekomsten av statligt stöd till förmån för köparen när försäljningen följer på ’ett vederbörligen offentliggjort, öppet och villkorslöst anbudsförfarande […] där det bästa eller det enda anbudet antas’. |
(32) |
Enligt de av Sverige lämnade upplysningarna förefaller FABV inte ha anordnat något anbudsförfarande inför försäljningen av anläggningen, varför det inte går att göra någon preliminär bedömning av den särskilda karaktär som ett sådant förfarande har. |
(33) |
Enligt punkt 2 i meddelandet bör, om överlåtelsen sker utan villkorslöst anbudsförfarande, en ’oberoende värdering genomföras av en eller flera oberoende värderingsmän före förhandlingarna om överlåtelsen för att fastställa marknadsvärdet på grundval av allmänt accepterade marknadsindikatorer och värderingsstandarder’. |
(34) |
I det fall överlåtelsen inte sker på grundval av ett öppet och villkorslöst anbudsförfarande eller om den äger rum utan ett sådant förfarande eller till ett pris som ligger under marknadsvärdet sådant det fastställts av oberoende värderingsmän, framgår vidare följande av punkt 3 i meddelandet: ’Utan att det påverkar tillämpningen av regeln om försumbart stöd skall medlemsstaterna således till kommissionen göra anmälan om följande transaktioner för att göra det möjligt för den att fastställa om statligt stöd förekommer och, om så är fallet, att göra en bedömning av dess förenlighet med den gemensamma marknaden’. |
(35) |
På grundval av den informationen som står till dess förfogande noterar kommissionen att FABV, i avsaknad av ett öppet och villkorslöst anbudsförfarande, inte begärde någon oberoende värdering av anläggningen före försäljningsförhandlingarna. |
(36) |
Trots att någon oberoende värdering inte beställdes av FABV före försäljningsförhandlingarna finns det – eftersom FABV sålde anläggningen till Hammar – viss information som gör det möjligt att sluta sig till anläggningens möjliga marknadsvärde. |
(37) |
Med hänsyn till att avtalet om försäljning till de lokala företagarna ingicks redan före transaktion B, och alltså slöts mellan privata aktörer som förmodligen utgick från rent affärsmässiga överväganden och att värdet på 40 miljoner SEK sannolikt torde utgöra en försiktig uppskattning eftersom försäljningen inte avsåg hela den fast egendomen och eventuellt också uteslöt varumärket, samt med tanke på att en tidigare oberoende utvärdering som beställts av Chips angivit ett försäljningspris på 27 miljoner SEK bara för fastigheterna, betvivlar kommissionen att det pris (8 miljoner SEK) till vilket FABV sålde anläggningen till Hammar avspeglar marknadsvärdet. Kommissionen anser därför preliminärt att det finns goda skäl att anse att 40 miljoner SEK är en mer rättvisande återspegling av anläggningens marknadsvärde. Om FABV hade sålt anläggningen i ett öppet och icke-diskriminerande förfarande skulle det med all sannolikhet ha fått samma pris av denna köpare. |
(38) |
Kommissionen har vidare inte några uppgifter som tillåter den att bedöma marknadsmässigheten av det hyresavtal som slöts mellan FABV och Hammar den 13 februari 2008 och av priset på den option som Hammar beviljades för att köpa anläggningen (se skäl 11–12) vilka, med hänsyn till de omständigheter under vilka dessa avtal ingicks, också kan inbegripa statligt stöd. Kommissionen uppmanar sålunda de svenska myndigheterna att lämna kommentarer också på dessa punkter. |
(39) |
Det ovan anförda leder till den preliminära slutsatsen att FABV:s försäljning av anläggningen gav Hammar en fördel – och följaktligen statligt stöd – vilket preliminärt uppskattas till skillnaden mellan det pris som Hammar betalade till FABV och det pris som Hammar sålde anläggningen för enligt avtalet av den 30 juli 2008. |
2. Det statliga stödets förenlighet med den inre marknaden
(40) |
Enligt artikel 107.3 c i EUF-fördraget kan stöd för att underlätta utveckling av vissa näringsverksamheter eller vissa regioner anses vara förenligt med den inre marknaden, när det inte påverkar handeln i negativ riktning i en omfattning som strider mot det gemensamma intresset. |
(41) |
När kommissionen tillämpar denna fördragsbestämmelse måste den förvissa sig om att det föreslagna stödet bidrar till uppnåendet av gemenskapens mål och är nödvändigt och proportionerligt för att förverkliga dessa mål. |
(42) |
Det enda mål som de svenska myndigheterna uppgivit för de aktuella transaktionerna var den politiska avsikten att bevara företagets fortlevnad och att samtidigt rädda sysselsättning i Vänersborg, även om denna kommun inte ligger i något stödområde (se skäl 5 ovan). |
(43) |
I nuvarande skede noterar kommissionen att detta mål endast vore relevant med avseende på transaktion A, som enligt de svenska myndigheterna gjorde att 30 arbetstillfällen kunde räddas, och kommissionen har för närvarande inga skäl att anse att denna transaktion har inslag av statligt stöd (se skäl 28-30). Under alla omständigheter beaktas denna typ av mål i meddelandet från kommissionen – Gemenskapens riktlinjer för statligt stöd till undsättning och omstrukturering av företag i svårigheter (9) och varken Sverige eller Hammer har hittills lämnat några uppgifter som kan visa att de villkor som fastställs genom riktlinjerna är uppfyllda. |
(44) |
Vad beträffar möjliga mål av gemensamt intresse som särskilt avser transaktion B, i det fall den skulle fastslås vara statligt stöd som gynnar Hammar, har några andra skäl för förenlighet inte åberopats av de svenska myndigheterna. |
(45) |
Det har under alla omständigheter hittills inte i tillräckligt hög grad visats att transaktion B var nödvändig och proportionerlig för att uppnå eventuella mål av gemensamt intresse. Utan att åsidosätta eventuella väsentliga argument som framförts av medlemsstaten eller berörda parter hyser kommissionen därför i detta skede allvarliga tvivel om det föreligger giltiga skäl till att förklara dem förenliga med den inre marknaden enligt artikel 107.3 i EUF-fördraget, i det fall transaktionerna befinns utgöra statligt stöd i den mening som avses i artikel 107.1 i EUF-fördraget. |
VI. SLUTSATSER
(46) |
I ljuset av vad som ovan anförts har kommissionen anledning att ifrågasätta om transaktion B (enligt ovanstående beskrivning) utgör statligt stöd och, om så är fallet, huruvida detta stöd är förenligt med den inre marknaden enligt artikel 107.3 c i EUF-fördraget. Av ovan anförda skäl uppmanar kommissionen, i enlighet med det förfarande som anges i artikel 108.2 i EUF-fördraget, Sverige att inom en månad efter mottagandet av denna skrivelse inkomma med synpunkter och tillhandahålla alla upplysningar som kan bidra till bedömningen av stödet. Kommissionen uppmanar Era myndigheter att omedelbart översända en kopia av denna skrivelse till den potentiella stödmottagaren. Kommissionen påminner Sverige om att artikel 108.3 i EUF-fördraget har uppskjutande verkan och hänvisar till artikel 14 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 659/1999, som föreskriver att allt olagligt stöd kan återkrävas från mottagaren. Kommissionen meddelar Sverige att alla berörda parter kommer att underrättas genom ett offentliggörande av denna skrivelse och en sammanfattning av den i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning. Kommissionen kommer även att underrätta berörda parter i de Eftaländer som är avtalsslutande parter i EES-avtalet genom att offentliggöra ett tillkännagivande i EES-supplementet till Europeiska unionens officiella tidning, samt Eftas övervakningsmyndighet som tillställs en kopia av denna skrivelse. De berörda parterna kommer att uppmanas att inkomma med synpunkter inom en månad från dagen för offentliggörandet.’ |
(1) EUT C 34, 16.2.2007, s. 2.
(2) Uppgifterna i euro är rent indikativa. I beslutet utgås från kursen 1 EUR = 10 SEK.
(3) EGT L 10, 13.1.2001, s. 33.
(4) Anläggningen består av två fastigheter, lös egendom samt immateriella tillgångar (t.ex. varumärket). Fastigheterna har beteckningarna Vänersborg Esslingetorp 1:49 respektive Vänersborg Esslingetorp 1:57. Alla byggnader och andra fasta tillgångar fanns på den första tomten.
(5) Jfr mål C-35/96 kommissionen mot Italien, REG 1998, punkt 36.
(6) Jfr mål C-482/99 Stardust Marine, REG 2002, s. I-04397.
(7) Jfr kommissionens beslut av den 30 januari 2008 om det statliga stöd C 35/2006 som Sverige genomfört till förmån för Konsum Jämtland Ekonomisk Förening (EUT L 126, 14.5.2008, s. 3), enligt vilket ’[k]onkurrensen påverkades genom snedvridningen av allokeringen av egendom mellan konkurrerande företag. […] Snedvridningen av konkurrensen förefaller vara av tämligen lokal karaktär och påverkan på handeln mellan medlemsstaterna torde vara tämligen begränsad’. Därtill kommer att kommissionen har uppgifter som tyder på att norska köpare tidigare har visat intresse för att förvärva anläggningen.
(8) EGT C 209, 10.7.1997, s. 5.
(9) EUT C 244, 16.2.2004, s. 2.
OTHER ACTS
European Commission
23.12.2010 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 352/27 |
Notice for the attention of the persons and entities added to the list referred to in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by virtue of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1250/2010
2010/C 352/18
1. |
Common Position 2008/369/CFSP (1) calls upon the Community to freeze the funds and economic resources of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as referred to in the list drawn up pursuant to UNSR 1533(2004), 1596(2005), 1807(2008) and 1857(2008) to be updated regularly by the UN Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1533(2004). The list drawn up by this UN Committee comprises:
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2. |
The UN Committee decided on 1 December 2010 to add four natural persons to the relevant list. The natural persons concerned may submit at any time a request to the UN Committee, together with any supporting documentation, for the decision to include them in the UN list referred to above, to be reconsidered. Such request should be sent to the following address:
See for information at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml |
3. |
Further to the UN decisions referred to at point 2, the Commission has adopted Regulation (EU) No 1250/2010 (2), which amends Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (3). Therefore, the following measures of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 apply to the natural persons concerned:
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4. |
The natural persons added to Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005, by means of Regulation (EU) No 1250/2010, and further to the UN decision of 1 December 2010, may make their views on their listing known to the Commission. This communication should be sent to:
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5. |
The attention of the natural persons concerned is also drawn to the possibility of challenging Regulation (EU) No 1250/2010 before the General Court of the EU, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 263 (4) and (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. |
6. |
Personal data of the natural persons concerned by the listings of Regulation (EU) No 1250/2010 will be handled in accordance with the rules of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (4). Any request, e.g. for further information or in order to exercise the rights under Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 (e.g. access or rectification of personal data), should be sent to the Commission, under the same address mentioned under point 4 above. |
7. |
For good order, the attention of the natural persons listed in Annex I is drawn to the possibility of making an application to the competent authorities of the relevant Member State(s), as listed in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005, in order to obtain an authorisation to use frozen funds and economic resources for basic expenses or specific payments in accordance with Article 3 of that Regulation. |
(1) OJ L 127, 15.5.2008, p. 84.
(2) OJ L 341, 23.12.2010, p. 11.
(3) OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 1.