18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/1

(1)

On 7 July 2009 the Council examined the updated stability programme of Belgium, which covers the period 2008 to 2013.

(2)

In 2008, the ongoing deceleration of the Belgian economy intensified as a result of the global economic and financial crisis. In particular, the collapse of world trade together with decreasing confidence, wealth effects and tighter credit conditions led to a sharp contraction of the economy in the last quarter of 2008 and the first of 2009. Also for 2009 as a whole, GDP is expected to contract sharply. This is projected to lead to a sharp increase in the unemployment rate, to above 10 % in 2010 according to the Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast. The main policy challenges in the downturn are to restore the normal functioning of the financial sector, restore confidence to support domestic demand and improve competitiveness. The downturn will have a significant adverse impact on public finances, with the general government deficit set to deteriorate from 1,2 % of GDP in 2008 to above 6 % of GDP in 2010 according to the Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast. This is due both to the normal functioning of automatic stabilisers and the impact of the recovery plans adopted by the federal and regional governments at the end of 2008 (0,5 % of GDP in 2009 and 0,4 % of GDP in 2010). These plans come on top of other measures of about 0,4 % of GDP already included in the budget for 2009. The main measures of the recovery plans are a reduction of the tax wedge on labour, a reduction of the VAT rate for residential construction, a frontloading of public investment and the provision of liquidity support to corporations. The government has implemented a limited number of structural reforms, i.a. to improve the functioning of the labour market.

(3)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages that, after expanding by 1,1 % in 2008, real GDP will fall by 1,9 % in 2009, before recovering to a 0,6 % growth rate in 2010 and to an average rate of around 2 1/4 % over the rest of the programme period. Assessed against currently available information (2), this scenario appears to be markedly favourable. Projected growth for 2009 and also 2010 appears to be on the high side in view of the rapidly deteriorating international environment, the year-on-year GDP growth estimate of – 3,1 % for the first quarter of 2009 and continued low confidence indicators.

(4)

The Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast expects GDP to contract by 3,5 % in 2009 and by 0,2 % in 2010. The projected evolution of growth in the medium term could also be considered optimistic compared to the significantly lower average potential growth figures, both as recalculated on the basis of the programme and in the Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast. The programme’s projections for inflation of 0,7 % and 1,8 % for 2009 and 2010 appear to be relatively high but can be considered realistic afterwards.

(5)

In 2008, the general government deficit amounted to 1,2 % of GDP, against a balanced budget target set in the previous update of the stability programme. Revenue turned out to be 0,4 % of GDP lower than expected while expenditure was 0,8 % of GDP higher than expected. The worse outturn results from lower-than-expected nominal GDP growth (2,9 % instead of the projected 4,6 % in the April 2008 update of the programme), and an accelerated payment of public invoices at the end of the year as part of the recovery plans.

(6)

The update contains a deficit target for 2009 of 3,4 % of GDP, against a projection of 4,5 % in the Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast. The deterioration in the 2009 deficit reflects the impact of the automatic stabilisers (around 2 1/2 % of GDP), the expansionary measures included in the 2009 budget (0,4 % of GDP) and the fiscal stimulus packages set up by the regional and federal governments (0,5 % of GDP). The structural deficit (i.e. the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and other temporary measures) on the basis of the information provided in the updated stability programme, and recalculated by the Commission services according to the commonly agreed methodology, is projected to rise to 2 1/2 % of GDP in 2009 from 2 % in 2008. The Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast expects a more pronounced worsening of the structural balance (by 1 percentage point) in 2009. The fiscal stance in 2009 can thus be considered as expansionary, in line with the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). In addition to the fiscal impulse associated with the EERP (0,5 % of GDP), the fiscal expansion is explained by previously decided measures to increase households’ purchasing power (0,4 % of GDP). Therefore, the net impact amounts to around 0,9 % of GDP.

(7)

The programme does not present a well-founded medium term-budgetary strategy and does not meet important requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. In particular, Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, Article 3(2c), asks for ‘a detailed and quantitative assessment of the budgetary and other economic policy measures taken’. Moreover, the code of conduct explicitly refers to the need to include information ‘on the expenditure and revenue ratios and on their components separately identified’, as well as a ‘(breakdown) by subsector of general government’. This information was not provided. The programme contains a budgetary path with decreasing headline deficits from 2011 onwards, but it does not provide information on the measures foreseen to achieve the targets, nor on the planned development of the broad revenue and expenditure components and the targets for the different government tiers. The headline deficit is set to increase further to 4 % in 2010 before declining to 1,5 % by the end of the programme period. The primary balance broadly follows the same path. The recalculated structural deficit is set to deteriorate by a further 0,2 percentage points in 2010 before gradually improving thereafter, in particular in 2012 and 2013. The programme does not foresee the Medium Term Objective (a surplus of 0,5 % of GDP in cyclically-adjusted terms and net of one-off and other temporary measures) to be reached within the programme period. According to the programme, the achievement of these deficit targets will require corrective action, especially as measures decided in previous years as well as the fiscal stimulus package continue to have an expansionary effect throughout most of the programme period. The updated programme estimates government debt at 89,6 % of GDP in 2008, compared to 84 % in 2007. Apart from the rise in the deficit and the decline in GDP growth, a significant stock-flow adjustment mainly reflecting bank rescue operations (6 % of GDP) contributes to the rise in the debt ratio. The programme expects the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise further to 95 % in 2010, to stabilise in 2011 and to slightly decline thereafter. According to the Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast, the debt ratio would reach around 96 % of GDP in 2009 and just exceed 100 % of GDP in 2010, the difference with the updated programme being explained by the divergent growth and general government deficit figures.

(8)

While the lack of key information in the programme as well as the breach of several points of the code of conduct, as mentioned above, makes it very difficult to assess the programme, it is clear that the budgetary targets are subject to significant downside risks throughout the programme period. First, the macroeconomic environment is likely to be worse than envisaged in the programme over the entire programme period. Second, the (structural) targets can only be achieved by taking sizeable additional measures. However, the programme does not provide any information on those measures nor on the planned development of the broad revenue and expenditure components underpinning the targets and thus the latter are clearly not backed by a medium-term budgetary strategy. The fact that measures in the recovery package of a permanent nature are not offset by future savings further adds to this risk and is contrary to the guidelines in the European Economic Recovery Plan, agreed by the European Council on 11 December 2008. Moreover, the Belgian authorities have a mixed track record in achieving budgetary targets (see paragraph 9). Finally, the government offered sizeable guarantees to the banking sector which might drive up future deficits and debt to the extent that they are called. In view of considerable downward risks to the budgetary targets, the evolution of the debt ratio is also likely to be less favourable than projected in the programme.

(9)

The long-term budgetary impact of ageing is above the EU average, mainly as a result of a relatively high increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming decades. This i.a. reflects that Belgium did not yet introduce sufficient reforms of the pension system in order to increase the effective retirement age and to reduce its cost. The budgetary position in 2008 as estimated in the programme worsened from the estimated starting position of the previous programme, slightly reducing the mitigating impact of the initial budgetary position on the sustainability gap. If the 2009 budgetary position as projected by the Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast was taken as the starting point, the sustainability gap would worsen substantially. Moreover, the current level of gross debt in terms of GDP is well above the Treaty reference value. Reforms of the labour market and the social security system, would increase potential growth and, together with high primary surpluses, contribute to reducing the risks to the sustainability of public finances, which are currently at a medium level. The policy response to the financial crisis could lead to a steeper rise of the debt ratio than projected in the programme if costs are not recouped in the future.

(10)

Up to 2007, Belgium has succeeded in maintaining broadly balanced budgets (3). However, budgetary targets have been repeatedly relaxed in consecutive updates of the stability programme, even under relatively benign macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, the results have been partly achieved through deficit-decreasing one-off measures which negatively affect future budgets and in a context of declining interest expenditure. Now that more substantial consolidation efforts will be required to correct the stimulus measures and bring the debt back to a downward path, a more stringent budgetary framework may be needed, in particular encompassing multi-annual and binding expenditure ceilings and budgetary agreements among the different government tiers, including the establishment of enforcement mechanisms to ensure the respect of the fiscal targets.

(11)

In response to the financial crisis, the Belgian government undertook a number of measures to ensure the stability of the financial sector. First, it provided capital injections to four major financial institutions, amounting to around 6 % of GDP. Second, it provided guarantees on specified portfolios of risky assets of certain systemic banks. Third, the government also guaranteed, upon demand and under certain conditions, wholesale and interbank debt issued by banks. These guarantees, amounting to over one third of GDP maximum, are granted in return for a fee and do not have an impact on the deficit unless they are called. Finally, the Belgian government offered a guarantee for all private bank deposits up to EUR 100 000 and extended it to certain insurance products, also in exchange for a fee.

(12)

In response to the economic crisis, Belgium has adopted a set of recovery measures. The federal government’s package, with a budgetary impact of 0,5 % of GDP in 2009 and 0,4 % of GDP in 2010 aims at (i) providing (liquidity) support to corporations through a more rapid payment of government invoices and payment facilities, (ii) ensuring the purchasing power of households through higher unemployment benefits, (iii) supporting employment through a reduction of the tax wedge on labour and (iv) stimulating investment through a targeted reduction of the VAT rate for residential construction and additional public investment, mainly in infrastructure. The regional governments’ packages focus on ensuring the access to financing of corporations, in particular SMEs and start-ups, and on the acceleration of public investment. In view of limited fiscal room for manoeuvre, the fiscal stimulus package appears to be an adequate response to the downturn. Most of the measures are broadly in line with the EERP and the package is well balanced between revenue and expenditure. However, the reduction of the tax wedge on labour, of which a considerable part is granted to all workers, and the heating subsidy, which is provided to all households, do not appear sufficiently targeted. In addition, part of the stimulus, including the investment packages and the labour cost reductions, may come rather late to cushion the immediate impact of the crisis. Finally, no compensatory measures are foreseen, even for future years, for the part of the stimulus which is of a permanent nature (0,1 % of GDP in 2009 and 0,3 % of GDP in 2010), in particular regarding the reduction of the tax wedge on labour. The packages include limited structural measures, such as the improvement of active labour market policies, a further reduction of the tax wedge on labour and support to R&D, which should somewhat mitigate the reduction of potential growth and thus, together with product market reforms, address long-term challenges of the economy. These measures are related to the Lisbon structural reform agenda and the country specific recommendation proposed by the Commission on 28 January 2009 under the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and adopted by the Council on 28 April. The structural measures in the recovery packages are welcome but do not appear to be sufficiently comprehensive in order to effectively tackle the longer term challenges, for instance regarding the sustainability of public finances and the efficiency of the labour market.

(13)

The fiscal stance, as measured by the change in the structural balance and taking into account the risks to the budgetary projects, is expansionary in 2009, in line with the EERP. This partly reflects the response of the Belgian government to the EERP. Thereafter, the programme foresees a broadly neutral fiscal stance in 2010 and 2011 and a restrictive stance as from 2012. While the assessment of the stance as from 2010 was considerably hampered by the lack of information in the programme, it appears that considerable downward risks to the budgetary targets exist, implied among other things by the fact that the targets are not backed by a medium-term budgetary strategy in the sense of the Stability and Growth Pact. As a result, the fiscal stance is likely to remain expansionary until 2011 and turn at best neutral thereafter. The programme foresees a return of the headline deficit below the reference value only in 2012. Moreover, such a path does not seem appropriate in view of the risks related to the long-term sustainability of public finances, including the very high level of government debt which is moreover not sufficiently diminishing towards the reference value over the programme period, and considerable contingent liabilities following the measures to stabilise the financial system.

(14)

As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the updated programme has substantial gaps in the required and optional data (4), despite a delayed submission by four months compared to the official deadline. These gaps severely hampered the Council in assessing the programme, in particular the medium-term budgetary strategy.

(15)

The overall conclusion is that public finances in Belgium, starting from a relatively unfavourable position in view of the high government debt ratio, will be affected by the economic downturn. The fiscal stance in 2009 is appropriately expansionary, in line with the EERP. It notably reflects the fiscal stimulus whose size had to be limited given the high debt level. The government balance will exceed the 3 % of GDP deficit reference value in 2009. At the same time, the government gross debt-to-GDP ratio, which started to rise again in 2008 as a result of the measures to stabilise the financial system, is expected to continue its upward movement. This comes after an impressive decline, from 134 % in 1993 to 84 % in 2007. The consolidation path in the updated programme aims at gradually reducing the headline deficits and thereby ensuring the long-term sustainability of public finances. The absence of crucial information in the programme, such as the expenditure and revenue ratios, has severely hampered the possibility to assess the credibility of the deficit and debt targets in the programme. The absence of underpinning of these targets suggests that they are not backed by a well-founded medium-term budgetary strategy in the meaning of the Stability and Growth Pact. The path is clearly subject to considerable downside risk over the entire programme period, stemming from the favourable macroeconomic assumptions and the lack of underlying measures. Moreover, also in the light of the debt dynamics and the long-term sustainability of public finances, it lacks ambition regarding the decisive correction of the deficit as the economic situation improves.

(i)

submit, by 20 September at the latest, a complement of the programme including a well founded medium-term budgetary strategy and improve compliance with the data requirements of the code of conduct especially regarding compulsory data;

(ii)

implement the stimulus measures in line with the EERP as planned while avoiding a further deterioration of the structural balance in 2009 and resume fiscal consolidation as from 2010 when the economy is expected to improve and speed up the structural consolidation effort in 2011;

(iii)

improve the quality of public finances by adopting a more stringent budgetary framework, encompassing binding, multi-annual expenditure ceilings and budgetary agreements among the different government tiers, including the establishment of enforcement mechanisms to ensure the respect of the fiscal targets;

(iv)

in addition to the budgetary consolidation efforts, undertake structural reforms of the social security system, the labour market and product markets to enhance potential growth, increase the employment rate and reduce the budgetary impact of ageing, in order to improve the long-term sustainability of public finances.

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/7

(1)

On 7 July 2009 the Council examined the updated stability programme of Austria, which covers the period 2008 to 2013.

(2)

The direct impact of the global financial crisis on the Austrian economy has been relatively contained, although the financial sector suffered from a massive slump in profits especially from banks’ foreign activities in Central and Eastern Europe in 2008. As a small and strongly export-oriented economy, Austria is affected by the global recession mainly via the contraction in international trade resulting in a setback in foreign demand in 2009. The manufacturing sector is expected to suffer most, as goods exports are expected to fall sharply, dragging down also private fixed investment. The Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast projects real GDP to shrink by 4 % in 2009, followed by stagnation in 2010. The rise in unemployment has so far been kept in check by the reduction in overtime and recourse to short-time work, but in the wake of the economy sliding into a recession, the jobless rate is set to increase sharply from 3,8 % in 2008 to 7 % in 2010. As a consequence, sizeable government revenue losses and additional expenditure due to automatic stabilisers (estimated at 2¼ % of GDP in 2009) and discretionary measures (estimated at 1¼ % of GDP in 2009) to sustain business activity and household income and stabilise financial markets will weigh significantly on Austria's public finances.

(3)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the April 2009 stability programme envisages that real GDP growth will fall from 1,8 % in 2008 to - 2,2 % in 2009 before recovering to an average rate of 1,6 % until the end of the programme period in 2013. Assessed against currently available information (2), this scenario appears to be based on markedly favourable growth assumptions. Most notably, the programme assumptions for exports and gross fixed capital formation in 2009 are considered to be decidedly optimistic. From 2010, a swift recovery is projected to bring real GDP growth back to potential already in 2011. The programme’s projections for inflation of 0,6 % in 2009 and 1,1 % in 2010 appear realistic.

(4)

In 2008, the general government deficit of 0,4 % of GDP was slightly below the target of 0,6 % set in the previous update of the stability programme. A higher-than-anticipated revenue outturn was mainly owed to a carry-over effect from 2007. These extra revenues more than offset the cost of new policy measures taken to curb the loss in household purchasing power due to higher inflation, such as reduced social contribution rates for low-income earners and increased social payments, including measures such as higher outlays for pension benefits and energy cost allowances. As a consequence, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio was about ½ percentage point above expectations. Overall, the budget balance for 2008 was only moderately affected by the dramatic changes in the economic environment — both the revenue shortfalls and the government's stabilisation measures will essentially take effect from 2009 onwards.

(5)

The updated stability programme targets a general government deficit of 3,5 % of GDP for 2009, which compares with a projected deficit of 4,2 % of GDP in the Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast. The government has taken sizeable discretionary fiscal counter-action to the tune of about 1,4 to 1,7 % of GDP (3). Some of these measures were already taken in 2008 to protect households’ purchasing power in the face of rising inflation, but will largely remain effective in 2009 and 2010 (0,4 % of GDP). In addition to discretionary measures, automatic stabilisers will operate, yielding an expansionary impact of 1 ¾ % and ¼ % of GDP (4) in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Furthermore, the front-loading of off-budget construction projects by state-owned enterprises may account for another ¼ % of GDP. Judging by the decline of the structural balance, the fiscal stance is expansionary.

(6)

Austria's medium-term objective (MTO) is to achieve a balanced budget, which is part of a more comprehensive three-pillar budgetary strategy including also public investment schemes and structural reform in public administration. The programme update foresees the general government deficit to widen further to 4,7 % of GDP in 2010 and remain at that level until 2012. In 2013, the deficit is to narrow slightly to 3,9 % of GDP. Hence, the MTO will not be achieved within the programme period. Driven by the fiscal stimulus measures in response to the crisis, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio will increase by 2,6 percentage points between 2008 and 2010. At the same time, the revenue-to-GDP ratio is expected to fall by 1,7 percentage points as a result of discretionary tax cuts and the cyclical erosion of tax bases. The structural deficit (i.e. the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and other temporary measures, recalculated by Commission services on the basis of the information provided in the programme using the commonly agreed methodology) is projected to widen to 3 % of GDP in 2009 and further to around 4 % from 2010 to 2012. A substantial part of the measures included in the recovery programme will be permanent, thus the reversibility of policies adopted in response to the crisis is not ensured. Starting from 62,5 % of GDP in 2008, the government gross debt ratio is projected to increase by 16 percentage points until 2013. Further to the rise in the government deficit and the decline in GDP growth, a significant stock-flow adjustment largely reflecting financial sector stabilisation measures contributes to the rise in the debt ratio.

(7)

The budgetary outcomes are subject to significant downside risks. First, the markedly favourable growth assumptions of the underlying macroeconomic scenario are surrounded by considerable uncertainty with respect to the duration, extent and macroeconomic impact of the financial crisis. Revenue projections therefore appear optimistic. Moreover, the government financial sector and financial market interventions also carry a risk of higher deficit and/or debt levels than foreseen in the programme.

(8)

The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Austria is lower than the EU average, with pension expenditure projected to increase only slightly as a share of GDP over the long-term. The budgetary position in 2008, as estimated in the programme, is weaker than the starting position of the previous programme, compounding the budgetary impact of population ageing on the sustainability gap. If the 2009 budgetary position as projected by the Commission services Spring 2009 forecast were taken as the starting point, the sustainability gap would widen substantially. Moreover, the current level of gross debt is above the Treaty reference value. The long-term sustainability of public finances would be further undermined if the above-mentioned risks from financial sector stabilisation schemes materialise, to the extent that costs of the government support are not recouped in the future. Achieving high primary surpluses over the medium term and measures to raise the effective retirement age, would contribute to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances, which are currently at a medium level.

(9)

Despite the overall sound quality of public finances and fiscal rules, there is still room for improvement of Austria’s institutional budgetary framework. Austria’s federal fiscal relations — governed by the Fiscal Equalisation Law 2008-2013 and the Domestic Stability Pact 2008 — are rather complex and lack transparency due to overlapping responsibilities, co-administration and co-financing at all three levels of government. The resulting scope for efficiency gains in several areas of public spending should be used, in particular in health care and education. In this context, the 2009 programme update cites the formation of working groups on further reforms of the fiscal equalisation act as well as health and elderly care system. However, tangible proposals are not expected before 2011. At the federal level, Austria embarked on a far-reaching reform of budgetary legislation as a new multi-annual expenditure framework with fixed ceilings set for four consecutive years entered into force as of 1 January 2009 (Federal Budgetary Framework Act — Bundesfinanzrahmengesetz). It is expected to help prevent pro-cyclical spending and enhance the effectiveness of the automatic stabilisers. Starting as of 2013, the introduction of output-based budgeting (‘performance budgeting’) and the modernisation of the accounting system of public finances are foreseen.

(10)

To stabilize financial markets, the Austrian authorities have adopted several measures, including guarantees of bank deposits held by individual persons (unlimited until end of 2009, thereafter up to EUR 100 000; for deposits held by small and medium sized enterprises the upper ceiling is EUR 50 000). Further incentives have been provided for private household saving through savings and loan associations (Bausparförderung), aimed at safeguarding mortgage loan home financing. For interbank loans and bond issues by the newly funded Austrian Clearing Bank (OeCAG) and for commercial paper issues by commercial banks, the Austrian government provided guarantees up to EUR 75 billion (27 % of GDP). Finally, the government has allocated up to EUR 15 billion (5 ½ % of GDP) for capital injections to financial institutions, of which EUR 6,4 billon have been agreed upon by the mid-May, but only EUR 4,7 billion were demanded so far.

(11)

In view of a fiscal position almost close-to-balance in 2008 and the absence of external imbalances, the fiscal stimulus for 2009 and 2010 adopted by the Austrian government is deemed an adequate response to the economic downturn. In line with the European Economic Recovery Programme agreed in December by the European Council, Austria's recovery packages were introduced timely, since a large part of the measures took effect in the first quarter of 2009. The labour market measures adopted are intended to rein in lay-offs and improve vocational training. Support to credit-constrained enterprises comes mainly in off-budget form as guarantees and subsidised loans. Most of the stimulus is provided via private income support, with revenue concessions (1 to 1 ½ % of GDP) dominating additional expenditure (around ½ % of GDP). The net budgetary impact of the fiscal measures is estimated to be 1,4 % and 1,7 % of GDP in 2009 and 2010, respectively. As the major part of the recovery measures will be permanent (85 %), the reversibility of the fiscal stimulus is a concern. Although the reduction in direct taxes and social contributions (especially for low income groups) comply with the government's long-term objective of reducing the high tax burden on labour and providing stronger incentives to work, the gap in public finances remains to be addressed, as the updated stability programme does not foresee any significant consolidation before 2013. Some of the stimulus measures are related to the medium-term reform agenda and the country-specific recommendations proposed by the Commission on 28 January 2009 under the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and endorsed by the Spring European Council on 19 March. They aim at strengthening the growth potential (infrastructure and R&D investment) and address long-term challenges such as climate change with a focus on energy efficiency and reduced CO2 emissions.

(12)

Following fiscal expansion in 2009 and 2010, the fiscal stance is considered to be broadly neutral in the outer years, as the structural balance is planned to change only marginally in 2011/2012 and to improve by ½ % of GDP in 2013. The deficit is expected to exceed the 3 % of GDP reference value by a sizeable margin between 2009 and 2013, with consolidation to be resumed only at the end of the programme period. The programme announces that ‘the Austrian government will take all measures needed to achieve a correction until 2012’ in order to avoid lasting excess of the 3 % of GDP reference value. However, there is no clearly defined action to ensure deficit reduction before 2013. Similarly, the debt ratio is projected to exceed the Treaty reference value throughout the programme period, with the rising trend reflecting the expansionary stance in 2009 and 2010 and the budgetary effects of the stabilisation measures undertaken.

(13)

As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme provides nearly all of the compulsory data and has some gaps the optional data (5).

(i)

implement the 2009 and 2010 fiscal policy as planned including the stimulus measures in line with the EERP, and within the framework of the SGP reverse the fiscal stimulus in order to support significant budgetary consolidation towards the MTO, starting in 2011 at the latest;

(ii)

substantiate the measures deemed necessary to achieve a general government deficit below the 3 % of GDP reference value;

(iii)

further improve the budgetary framework to strengthen fiscal discipline at all levels of government through enhanced transparency and accountability notably by aligning legislative, administrative and financing responsibilities between the different levels of government.

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/12

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in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5517. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/13

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/14

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the WSPP Pricing Principles appropriately reflect the rationale of the Decision of 24 March 2004 in Case COMP/C-3/37.792 and can therefore serve as a basis to assess the reasonableness of the remuneration schemes established by Microsoft for the purposes of the present Decision.

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the interpretation provided in the Decision of the three criteria contained in the WSPP Pricing Principles (i.e., Microsoft's own creation, innovation and comparison with similar technologies) reflects adequately the value of Microsoft's interoperability Information for its users, to the exclusion of the ‘strategic value’ stemming from Microsoft's market power in the client PC operating system market or in the work group server operating system market.

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Microsoft's remuneration schemes for the ‘No Patent’ Agreement prior to 22 October 2007 were not ‘reasonable’, in the meaning of Article 5(a) of the Decision of 24 March 2004 in case COMP/C-3/37.792.

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with that Commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment for Microsoft's non-compliance with Article 5(a) of the Decision of 24 March 2004 pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees on ‘the relevant period’ of non-compliance concerned by the Decision.

6.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official journal of the European Union.

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/15

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment to be imposed on Microsoft for failure to comply with its obligation to make Interoperability Information available to interested undertakings on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, pursuant to Article 5(a) of Commission Decision 2007/53/EC of 24 March 2004.

2.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of it's Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/16

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/20

1.

On 24 March 2004, the Commission adopted a decision 2007/53/EC in a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) addressed to Microsoft Corporation (‘Microsoft’) (2). In this decision (‘the Decision’), the Commission found, inter alia, that Microsoft had infringed Article 82 of the EC Treaty (‘Article 82 EC’) and Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘Article 54 EEA’) by refusing, from October 1998 until the date of the Decision, to disclose certain specified ‘Interoperability Information’ (3) to vendors of work group server operating system products, so that they could develop and distribute interoperable products.

2.

Article 5(a) and (c) of the operative part of the Decision reads as follows:

3.

In view of Microsoft’s continuous non-compliance with the Decision after more than one year after the adoption of the Decision, on 10 November 2005, the Commission adopted a decision imposing a periodic penalty payment pursuant to Article 24(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on Microsoft (‘the Article 24(1) Decision’). Article 1 of the Article 24(1) Decision reads as follows:

‘Microsoft Corporation shall ensure that, by 15 December 2005, it fully complies with the obligations set out in Article 5(a) and (c) of Commission Decision (C(2004) 900) of 24 March 2004.

In the absence of such compliance, a periodic penalty payment of EUR 2 million per day, calculated from that date, shall be imposed on Microsoft Corporation.’

4.

The Article 24(1) Decision preliminarily identified two aspects of Microsoft's non-compliance with its obligations under Article 5(a) and (c) of the 2004 Decision. First, Microsoft had failed to provide complete and accurate technical documentation embodying the interoperability information. Second, the remuneration levels charged by Microsoft at that time for access to or use of the interoperability information were considered unreasonable.

5.

Following the adoption of the Article 24(1) Decision Microsoft provided a revised technical description of the protocols relevant to communication between Windows PCs and work group servers (the ‘Technical Documentation’) (4). The review undertaken of the different versions of Technical Documentation supplied by Microsoft led to the conclusion that the documentation still did not provide complete and accurate interoperability information to interested undertakings as required by the 2004 Decision.

6.

On 12 July 2006, the Commission adopted a decision pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 fixing at EUR 280,5 million the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment imposed by the Article 24(1) Decision for the period between 16 December 2005 and 20 June 2006 with respect to the first aspect of non-compliance identified in the Article 24(1) Decision, namely Microsoft's failure to provide complete and accurate technical documentation embodying the interoperability information.

7.

The decision of 12 July 2006 also amended Article 1 of the Article 24(1) Decision insofar as it increased the periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft for non-compliance with its obligations under Article 5(a) and (c) of the 2004 Decision to EUR 3 million per day as from 1 August 2006.

8.

While work on the Technical Documentation continued, the Commission addressed the second aspect of non-compliance identified in the Article 24(1) Decision, namely Microsoft's failure to make interoperability information available on reasonable terms.

9.

After a Statement of Objections was addressed to Microsoft on 1 March 2007, Microsoft, on 21 May 2007, submitted revised Work Group Server Protocol Program (‘WSPP’) Agreements governing access to and use of the interoperability information. These agreements included a royalty table with lower rates compared to what had previously been offered. Microsoft stated that it would apply these lower rates with a ‘retroactive’ date of application from the date of the adoption of the 2004 Decision. Microsoft had at various earlier occasions submitted revised versions of its WSPP remuneration schemes, the first version of which dated back to 29 October 2004, and had lowered the applicable remuneration rates on several occasions.

10.

On 1 March 2007, a Statement of Objections was addressed to Microsoft (‘the Statement of Objections’) outlining the preliminary conclusion that Microsoft had not yet complied with its obligation to make Interoperability Information available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.

11.

On 23 April 2007 Microsoft submitted its response to the Statement of Objections and declined the possibility to have an oral hearing.

12.

On 21 May 2007, Microsoft submitted revised Work Group Server Protocol Program (‘WSPP’) Agreements governing access to and use of the Interoperability Information. These agreements included a Revised Royalty Table (‘the 21 May 2007 remuneration scheme’). Microsoft stated that it ‘will now officially roll out the lower rates’ with a retroactive date of application from the date of the adoption of the Decision. Microsoft had at various earlier occasions submitted revised versions of its WSPP remuneration schemes, the first version of which dates back to 29 October 2004, and after discussions lowered the applicable remuneration rates on various occasions. All of these remuneration schemes had to be considered unreasonable under the pricing criteria underlying the Decision as reflected by WSPP Pricing Principles agreed with Microsoft. These principles rely on three criteria to reflect the value of Microsoft's Interoperability Information for its users to the exclusion of the ‘strategic value’ stemming from Microsoft's market power in the client PC operating system market or in the work group server operating system market (i.e., Microsoft's own creation, innovation and comparison with similar technologies).

13.

On 24 July 2007, the a Letter of Facts was sent to Microsoft assessing revisions to Microsoft's remuneration scheme introduced after the adoption of the Statement of Objections and invited the undertaking to submit comments, which it did on 31 August 2007.

14.

On 22 October 2007 Microsoft introduced a new remuneration scheme for the WSPP Agreements. This new scheme foresees a No Patent Agreement under which access to and use of the interoperability information is permitted for a one-time payment of EUR 10 000. A Patent Agreement providing for a patent licence to those parts of the interoperability information that Microsoft claims to be covered by patents is available either worldwide for royalties of 0,4 % of the licensee's net revenues or for a split price foreseeing royalties of 0,25 % in the EEA and 3,87 % elsewhere in the world. When adopting the decision of 27 February 2008, the Commission considered that the 22 October 2007 remuneration scheme no longer gives rise to objections as to the reasonableness and non-discriminatory nature of the remuneration rates.

15.

Microsoft is a software company based in Redmond, state of Washington, USA. Microsoft’s turnover for the fiscal year July 2006 to June 2007 was USD 51 120 million. Microsoft employs 78 500 people around the world. Microsoft is present in all countries within the EEA.

16.

The products concerned by the present procedure are the ‘Windows Work Group Server Operating Systems’ as defined in Article 1(9) of the Decision.

17.

As set out in recital 1003 of the Decision, the objective of the Decision ‘is to ensure that Microsoft’s competitors can develop products that interoperate with the Windows domain architecture natively supported in the dominant Windows client PC operating system and hence viably compete with Microsoft’s work group server operating system’.

18.

As set out in recital 1008 of the Decision, the ‘requirement for the terms imposed by Microsoft to be reasonable and non-discriminatory applies in particular […] (ii) to any remuneration that Microsoft might charge for supply; such a remuneration should not reflect the “strategic value” stemming from Microsoft’s market power in the client PC operating system market or in the work group server operating system market’.

19.

The February 2008 Decision assesses Microsoft’s compliance with Article 5(a) of the Decision on the basis of an evaluation of the revised WSPP Agreements as sent by Microsoft on 21 May 2007 together with the WSPP remuneration scheme applied therein. As this remuneration scheme provides for lower remuneration rates than previous versions of the WSPP Agreements, the assessment applies, a fortiori, also to the remuneration schemes of these previous versions. Under the scheme a rate of 0,5 % of the recipient’s net revenues is charged for all the WSPP protocols under the WSPP No Patent Agreement and a rate of 0,7 % of the recipient’s net revenues is charged for all the patent licences covering the WSPP protocols under the WSPP Patent Only Agreement.

20.

The February 2008 Decision focuses on Microsoft's obligation pursuant to Article 5(a) of the 2004 Decision to make non-patented Interoperability Information available for a reasonable remuneration.

21.

In the February 2008 Decision the Commission outlines that the WSPP Pricing Principles properly reflect the rationale of the 2004 Decision as expressed in its Recitals 1003 and 1008(ii). The decision of 27 February 2008 concludes that in the absence of convincing evidence as to the innovative character of almost all of Microsoft's non-patented protocol technologies disclosed with the technical documentation of the Interoperability Information and in view of the market valuation of comparable technologies (cf. the summary of the WSPP pricing principles in paragraph 12 above), Microsoft's remuneration schemes prior to 22 October 2007 must be considered unreasonable under Article 5(a) of the Decision. This assessment is backed by reports of the Monitoring Trustee as well as by external technical experts, TAEUS.

22.

This February 2008 Decision concerns the period from 21 June 2006 to 21 October 2007 (‘the relevant period’).

23.

The decision of 27 February 2008 fixes the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft at EUR 899 million for the relevant period.

24.

According to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, where the undertaking concerned has satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce, the Commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment at a figure lower than that which would arise under the original decision.

25.

When calculating the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment, inter alia, the following considerations were taken into account:

26.

For the period between 21 June 2006 and 21 October 2007, the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft Corporation by Commission Decision C(2005) 4420 final of 10 November 2005 for failure to comply with its obligation to make Interoperability Information available to interested undertakings on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms pursuant to Article 5(a) of Commission Decision is fixed at EUR 899 million in the February 2008 Decision.

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/24

MANIL V.

Rue du Tambour 2

6838 Corbion

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

TABACS COUVERT

Rue des Abattis 49

6838 Corbion

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

TABAC MARTIN

Rue de France 176

5550 Bohan

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

BELFEPAC nv

R. Klingstraat 110

8940 Wervik

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

VEYS TABAK nv

Repetstraat 110

8940 Wervik

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

MASQUELIN J.

Wahistraat 146

8930 Menen

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

VANDERCRUYSSEN P.

Kaaistraat 6

9800 Deinze

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

NOLLET bvba

Lagestraat 9

8610 Wevelgem

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

„Asenovgrad — Tabak“ AD

Street „Aleksandar Stamboliyski“ 22

4230 Asenovgrad

BULGARIA

„Blagoevgrad BT“ AD

Street Pokrovnishko Shosse 1

2700 Blagoevgrad

BULGARIA

„Missirian Bulgaria“ AD

Blvd. „Madara“ 25, entr. A, app. 36

9700 Shumen

BULGARIA

„Topolovgrad — BT“ AD

Street „Hristo Botev“ 10

8760 Topolovgrad

BULGARIA

„Bulgartabak Holding“ AD

Street „Graf Ignatiev“ 62

1000 Sofia

BULGARIA

„Pleven — BT“ AD

District Pleven

5850 Yasen

BULGARIA

„Cigarette factory“ EAD

Street „Avksentiy Veleshki“ 23

4000 Plovdiv

BULGARIA

„Gotse Delchev — Tabak“ AD

Street „Tsaritsa Yoana“ 12

2900 Gotse Delchev

BULGARIA

„Dulovo — BT“ AD

„Zona Sever“ 1

7650 Dulovo

BULGARIA

„Dupnitsa — Tabak“ AD

Street „Yahinsko Shose“ 1

2600 Dupnitsa

BULGARIA

„Kardzhali — Tabak“ AD

Street „Republikanska“ 1

6600 Kardzhali

BULGARIA

„Pazardzhik — BT“ AD

Street „Dr. Nikola Lambrev“ 24

4400 Pazardzhik

BULGARIA

„Parvomay — BT“ AD

Street „Omurtag“ 1

4270 Parvomay

BULGARIA

„Sandanski — BT“ AD

Street „Svoboda“ 38

2800 Sandanski

BULGARIA

„Smolyan Tabak“ AD

Street „Trakiya“ 1

4701 Smolyan

BULGARIA

„Yambol — Tabak“ AD

Street „Yambolen“ 7

8600 Yambol

BULGARIA

„Isperih — BT“ AD

Street „Vasil Levski“ 3

7400 Isperih

BULGARIA

VK „Mladost-95“

Street „9-ti septembri“ 2

6800 Momchilgrad

BULGARIA

ZPK „Tyutyun“

Stara Zagora District

6295 Glavan

BULGARIA

„Alliance One Tobacco Bulgaria“ EOOD

Blvd. Saedinenie 62

6300 Haskovo

BULGARIA

„Nord Tabak — Nikotiana“ AD

Blvd. „Madara“ 25, entr. A, 3rd floor, app. 18

9700 Shumen

BULGARIA

„Mehanika“ AD

Street „P. Tsikalov“ 10

4550 Peshtera

BULGARIA

„Leaf Tobacco — A. Mihaylidis“ AD

Promishlena zona 1

2800 Sandanski

BULGARIA

„Trakia — tabak“ EOOD

Street George Papazov 7

8600 Yambol

BULGARIA

„Socotab — Bulgaria“ EOOD

Street Saborna 2A

1000 Sofia

BULGARIA

ET „Zaara — Yancho Ivanov“

Street „Aleksandar Ekzarh“ 7, ap. 4, 4th floor

6000 Stara Zagora

BULGARIA

„Sofia — BT“ AD

Ovcha kupel

Blvd. „Tsar Boris III“ 134

1618 Sofia

BULGARIA

„Balgarski tyutyuni“ AD

Street „Yaldaram“ 1

6850 Dzhebel

BULGARIA

ET „Prominvest — Milcho Yanudov“

Industrial zone, Zelendolsko shosse

P.O. Box 119

Blagoevgrad District

2700 Blagoevgrad

BULGARIA

ET „Nesho Miranov“

Vratsa District

Street „Vasil Levski“ 90

3200 Byala Slatina

BULGARIA

ET „Barbaros — Myumyun Ahmed“

Street „Sini vrah“ 40

4230 Asenovgrad

BULGARIA

ET „Nuri Hadzhiyusein“

Asenovgrad district

4264 Zlatovrah

BULGARIA

„Slantse — K. Belchev“ OOD

Street „Hristo Botev“ 117, vh. G, et. 5, ap. 10

6000 Stara Zagora

BULGARIA

Tyutyuneva kooperatsiya „Zlaten list“

Street „Polkovnik Drangov“ 10

2850 Petrich

BULGARIA

„Prominvest“ EOOD

Street „T. Aleksandrov“ 16

2700 Blagoevgrad

BULGARIA

ET „Mitko Chaushev — Virzhiniya 94“

Municipality Parvomay

4280 Dalbok Izvor

BULGARIA

„Valtabak“ EOOD

Maritza municipality

Plovdiv district

Tobacco storehouse or Tyutyuneva baza

4173 Manole

BULGARIA

ET „Tobacco Trade — Rashko Mechtanov“

Pazardzhik District

Street Vtora 9

4452 Krali Marko

BULGARIA

„Silvarsan Bulgaria“ EOOD

ploshtad „Gradska Bolnitsa“ 1

Biznestsentar-21 vek

et. 4, ofis-apartament 3

6300 Haskovo

BULGARIA

„Slantse Stara Zagora — BT“ AD

Street „Stamo Pulev“ 1

6000 Stara Zagora

BULGARIA

„Shumen BT“ AD

Street „Madara“ 38

9700 Shumen

BULGARIA

„Dzambaz“ OOD

District Yambol, Straldzha municipality

Street P. Penev 2A

8690 Zimnica

BULGARIA

„Tobacco Leaf House“ OOD

Blvd. „Hristo Botev“ 92 V, sector C, et. 3

4000 Plovdiv

BULGARIA

ALLIANCE ONE ROTAG AG

Hardeckstraße 2a

76185 Karlsruhe

DEUTSCHLAND

JAKOB METZ KG

Hauptstraße 75

76863 Herxheim-Hayna

DEUTSCHLAND

AGROEXPANSIÓN, S.A.

C/Suero de Quiñones, 42, 2a planta

28002 Madrid

ESPAÑA

COMPAÑÍA ESPAÑOLA DE TABACO EN RAMA S.A. (CETARSA)

Avda. de las Angustias, no 20

10300 Navalmoral de la Mata (Cáceres)

ESPAÑA

WORLD WIDE TOBACCO ESPAÑA, SA

Paseo de la Castellana, 110, piso 12

28046 Madrid

ESPAÑA

UNION DES COOPÉRATIVES AGRICOLES DES PLANTEURS DE TABAC (UCAPT)

Z.I. de Madrazès

24200 Sarlat

FRANCE

Tiberina Tabacchi SRL

Località San Croce 45

52037 Sansepolcro

ITALIA

Tabacchi Poiana — Società Cooperativa Agricola a mutualità prevalente

Largo Europa 101

36026 Pojana Maggiore

ITALIA

Contab sud SRL

Via Dominutti 20

37135 Verona

ITALIA

CO.VE.TAB. Cooperativa Veneta Tabacchi Società Cooperativa Agricola

Via XXV Aprile 17/b

37053 Cerea

ITALIA

MELLA SRL.

Via Signoria 2

35010 San Giorgio delle Pertiche

ITALIA

Consorzio Tabacchicoltori Monte Grappa di Bassano del Grappa

Via Divisione Julia 2

36061 Bassano del Grappa

ITALIA

Cooperativa Tabacchi Verona Società Agricola

Via Canove 15

37056 Salizzole

ITALIA

A.T.I. SRL

Corso Trieste 24

81100 Caserta

ITALIA

Manifatture Sigaro Toscano SRL

L.go Toniolo 6

00186 Roma

ITALIA

CECAS — Coop.va Agr.

Contrada Olivola

82100 Benevento

ITALIA

CO.SV.A.S.C. ARL

Via Macchioni 7

83025 Montoro Inferiore

ITALIA

Comatab SRL

Via Torre 1

83012 Cervinara

ITALIA

Cons. Bright Italia S.C. ARL

Via G. Garibaldi 87

06034 Foligno

ITALIA

PROTAB S.C. ARL

Fraz. Cerbara Via C. Marx 4

06012 Città di Castello

ITALIA

COOP. Agricola Int. Prov. le. — C.A.I.

Via Paduli — Buonalbergo

82020 Paduli

ITALIA

Deltafina SPA

Via Monte Fiorino 4

05919 Orvieto Scalo

ITALIA

Domenico De Lucia SPA

Via Maddaloni 3

81027 San Felice a Cancello

ITALIA

Eurotabac S.C. ARL

C. da Mascanfroni

82100 Benevento

ITALIA

MPM Tabacchi Sud SRL

Via Giardino 9

82010 San Nicola Manfredi

ITALIA

Phonix International Tobacco SRL

Fraz S.M. Ingrisone V. Capocas

82010 San Nicola Manfredi

ITALIA

TAB Trade SRL

Via S. Gioacchino 52

80011 Acerra

ITALIA

SA. Tab. Sannio Tabacchi

C. da Festola

82010 San Leucio del Sannio

ITALIA

SACIT SUD SRL

Contrada San Giovanni

82018 San Giorgio del Sannio

ITALIA

Tobacco Products and Blenders SR

Piazza Euclide 2

00197 Roma

ITALIA

USAG TABACCHI SRL

Piazza Vanvitelli 33

81100 Caserta

ITALIA

Trestina AZ Tab.

Via Fortebraccio 32

06018 Città di Castello

ITALIA

Alliance One Rotag AG

Hardeckstrasse 2a

76185 Karlsruhe

ÖSTERREICH

Universal Leaf Tobacco Poland Sp. z o.o.

Street Przemysłowa 20

28-300 Jędrzejów

POLSKA/POLAND

FTK Spółka z o.o.

Street Leśna 2

22-300 Krasnystaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Philip Morris Polska Tobacco Sp. z o.o.

Jana Pawła II 196

31-982 Kraków

POLSKA/POLAND

Luxor Sp. z o.o.

Mała Wieś 10

05-622 Belsk Duży

POLSKA/POLAND

Tabak Polen Sp. z o.o.

Al. Solidarności 129/131

00-898 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Fábrica de Tabaco Estrela

Empresa Madeirense — Tabacos S.A.

Rua de Santa Catarina

9500-240 Ponta Delgada

PORTUGAL

SC Integrado SRL

Street Aleea Trandafirilor nr. 1

Zimnicea, jud. Teleorman

ROMÂNIA

SC Investrom Farm SRL

B-dul Burebista 4, Bl. D3, Sc. 3, Et. 07, ap. 99

Sector 3, București

ROMÂNIA

Ult Hungary ZRT

Dugonics u. 2. sz.

4400 Nyíregyháza

MAGYARORSZÁG/HUNGARY

SC Itália Tobacco Production SRL

Comuna Mogoșoaia nr. 42 B

Judetul Ilfov

ROMÂNIA

Doffer Dohanyfermentalo Hungaria SA – sucursula Arad România

Street Calea Vanatori nr. 55/c

Judetul Arad

ROMÂNIA

Aris Tobacco spol. s r. o.

Kálnická cesta 8

934 01 Levice

SLOVENSKO/SLOVAKIA

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/29

Agentschap voor Landbouw en Visserij

Markt en Inkomensbeheer

Ellipsgebouw 3de verdieping

Koning Albert II-laan 35 bus 41

1030 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Service public de Wallonie

Direction générale de l'Agriculture, des Ressources naturelles et de l'Environnement

Département des aides

Direction des Surfaces agricoles

Chaussée de Louvain 14

5000 Namur

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Tobacco Fund Regional Unit

bul. Bulgaria 14, office 504

4700 Smolyan

BULGARIA

Tobacco Fund Regional Unit

Street Vasil Levski 67, et. 1, st. 9

7400 Isperih

BULGARIA

Tobacco Fund Regional Unit

Street Petar Beron 2

8500 Aytos

BULGARIA

Tobacco Fund Regional Unit

Street Tsar Osvoboditel 4, office 2

6300 Haskovo

BULGARIA

Tobacco Fund Regional Unit

Street Hristo Botev 15

2900 Gotse Delchev

BULGARIA

Tobacco Fund Regional Unit

Street Minyorska 1

6600 Kardzhali

BULGARIA

Tobacco Fund Regional Unit

(Institute on tobacco and tobacco products)

4108 Markovo

BULGARIA

Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas

Süderstraße 63

20097 Hamburg

DEUTSCHLAND

Junta de Castilla y León

Consejería de Agricultura y Ganadería

Dirección General de Política Agraria Comunitaria

C/Rigoberto Cortejoso, 14, 3a planta

47014 Valladolid

ESPAÑA

Junta de Extremadura

Consejería de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural

Dirección General de Política Agraria Comunitaria

Avenida de Portugal s/n

06800 Mérida

ESPAÑA

Agence Unique de Paiement

12 rue Henri Rol-Tanguy-TSA 10001

93555 Montreuil-sous-Bois Cedex

FRANCE

AGEA

Via Torino 45

00184 Roma

ITALIA

AVEPA

Centro Tommaseo

Via N. Tommaseo 67 C

35131 Padova

ITALIA

ARTEA

Via San Donato 42/1

50127 Firenze

ITALIA

Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas

Süderstraße 63

20097 Hamburg

DEUTSCHLAND

Agencja Rynku Rolnego

ul. Nowy Świat 6/12

00-400 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

IFAP

Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas

Rua Fernando Curado Ribeiro n.o 4 G

1600 Lisboa

PORTUGAL

DADR Alba

Str. Vasile Goldiș nr. 8B

Alba-Iulia

ROMÂNIA

DADR Arad

Str. Cloșca nr. 46

Arad

ROMÂNIA

DADR Argeș

Str. Armand Călinescu nr. 44

Pitești

ROMÂNIA

DADR Bihor

Str. Dimitrie Cantemir nr. 24-26

Oradea

ROMÂNIA

DADR Bistrița Năsăud

Str. Piața Petru Rareș nr. 2

Bistrița

ROMÂNIA

DADR Botoșani

Str. Calea Națională nr. 81

Botoșani

ROMÂNIA

DADR Brăila

Str. Călărași nr. 58

Brăila

ROMÂNIA

DADR Buzău

Str. Victoriei nr. 1

Buzău

ROMÂNIA

DADR Caraș Severin

Str. Piața Republicii nr. 28

Reșița

ROMÂNIA

DADR Călărași

Str. Prel. București nr. 26 B1.D3

Călărași

ROMÂNIA

DADR Cluj

Str. Piața Avram Iancu nr. 15

Cluj

ROMÂNIA

DADR Constanța

Str. Revoluția din 22 dec. 1989 nr. 17-19

Constanța

ROMÂNIA

DADR Dâmbovița

Str. Tudor Vladimirescu nr. 175

Tărgoviște

ROMÂNIA

DADR Dolj

Str. Păltiniș nr. 2

Craiova

ROMÂNIA

DADR Galați

Str. Domnească nr. 96

Galați

ROMÂNIA

DADR Giurgiu

Str. Ghizdarului nr. 2

Giurgiu

ROMÂNIA

DADR Gorj

Str. Victoriei nr. 2

Târgu Jiu

ROMÂNIA

DADR Ialomița

Str. B-dul Chimiei nr. 19

Slobozia

ROMÂNIA

DADR Iași

Str. Ștefan cel Mare nr. 47-49

Iași

ROMÂNIA

DADR Mehedinți

Str. Crișan nr. 87

Turnu Severin

ROMÂNIA

DADR Mureș

Str. B-dul Gheorghe Doja nr. 9

Târgu Mureș

ROMÂNIA

DADR Olt

Str. Arcului nr. 20

Slatina

ROMÂNIA

DADR Prahova

Str. Anton Pann nr. 7

Ploiești

ROMÂNIA

DADR Satu Mare

Str. 1 Decembrie 1918 nr. 15

Satu Mare

ROMÂNIA

DADR Teleorman

Str. C. Brâncoveanu nr. 73

Alexandria

ROMÂNIA

DADR Timiș

Str. Libertății nr. 1

Timișoara

ROMÂNIA

DADR Tulcea

Str. Mahmudiei nr. 10bis

Tulcea

ROMÂNIA

DADR Vaslui

Str. Eternității nr. 1

Vaslui

ROMÂNIA

DADR Vrancea

Str. Republicii nr. 5

Focșani

ROMÂNIA

DADR Ilfov

Șos. Berceni nr. 104

București

ROMÂNIA

Pôdohospodárska platobná agentúra

Dobrovičova 12

815 26 Bratislava

SLOVENSKO/SLOVAKIA

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/32

1.

On 9 July 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Barclays Group (‘Barclays’, UK) and CNP Assurances (‘CNP’, France) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation joint control of Barclays Vida y Pensiones Compañía de Seguros S.A. (‘BVP’, Spain), currently under sole control of Barclays, by way of purchase of shares.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 2 2964301 or 2967244) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.5572 — Barclays/CNP/Barclays Vida y Pensiones, to the following address:

18.7.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/33