ISSN 1725-2423 |
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Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167 |
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English edition |
Information and Notices |
Volume 51 |
Notice No |
Contents |
page |
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II Information |
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INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
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Commission |
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2008/C 167/01 |
Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases ( 1 ) |
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IV Notices |
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NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
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Commission |
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2008/C 167/02 |
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NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
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2008/C 167/03 |
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2008/C 167/04 |
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V Announcements |
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
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Commission |
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2008/C 167/05 |
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PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY |
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Commission |
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2008/C 167/06 |
State aid — Slovak Republic — State aid C 12/08 (ex NN 74/07) — Alleged unlawful State aid: Agreement between Bratislava airport and Ryanair — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty ( 1 ) |
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2008/C 167/07 |
Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.5211 — Outokumpu/Sogepar) ( 1 ) |
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2008/C 167/08 |
Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.5198 — Ramius/Morgan Stanley/Phoenix Dichtungstechnik) — Candidate case for simplified procedure ( 1 ) |
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(1) Text with EEA relevance |
EN |
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II Information
INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES
Commission
2.7.2008 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167/1 |
Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2008/C 167/01)
1. INTRODUCTION
1. |
This Notice sets out the framework for rewarding cooperation in the conduct of proceedings commenced in view of the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty (1) to cartel cases (2). The settlement procedure may allow the Commission to handle more cases with the same resources, thereby fostering the public interest in the Commission's delivery of effective and timely punishment, while increasing overall deterrence. The cooperation covered by this Notice is different from the voluntary production of evidence to trigger or advance the Commission's investigation, which is covered by the Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (3) (the Leniency Notice). Provided that the cooperation offered by an undertaking qualifies under both Commission Notices, it can be cumulatively rewarded accordingly (4). |
2. |
When parties to the proceedings are prepared to acknowledge their participation in a cartel violating Article 81 of the Treaty and their liability therefore, they may also contribute to expediting the proceedings leading to the adoption of the corresponding decision pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (5) in the way and with the safeguards specified in this Notice. Whilst the Commission, as the investigative authority and the guardian of the Treaty empowered to adopt enforcement decisions subject to judicial control by the Community Courts, does not negotiate the question of the existence of an infringement of Community law and the appropriate sanction, it can reward the cooperation described in this Notice. |
3. |
Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (6) lays down the core practical rules concerning the conduct of proceedings in antitrust cases including those applicable in the variant for settlement. In this regard, Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 bestows on the Commission the discretion whether to explore the settlement procedure or not in cartel cases, while ensuring that the choice of the settlement procedure cannot be imposed on the parties. |
4. |
Effective enforcement of Community competition law is compatible with full respect of the parties' rights of defence, which constitutes a fundamental principle of Community law to be respected in all circumstances, and in particular in antitrust procedures which may give rise to penalties. It follows that the rules established to conduct the Commission proceedings to enforce Article 81 of the Treaty should ensure that the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned are afforded the opportunity effectively to make known their views on the truth and relevance of the facts, objections and circumstances put forward by the Commission (7), throughout the administrative procedure. |
2. PROCEDURE
5. |
The Commission retains a broad margin of discretion to determine which cases may be suitable to explore the parties' interest to engage in settlement discussions, as well as to decide to engage in them or discontinue them or to definitely settle. In this regard, account may be taken of the probability of reaching a common understanding regarding the scope of the potential objections with the parties involved within a reasonable timeframe, in view of factors such as number of parties involved, foreseeable conflicting positions on the attribution of liability, extent of contestation of the facts. The prospect of achieving procedural efficiencies in view of the progress made overall in the settlement procedure, including the scale of burden involved in providing access to non-confidential versions of documents from the file, will be considered. Other concerns such as the possibility of setting a precedent might apply. The Commission may also decide to discontinue settlement discussions if the parties to the proceedings coordinate to distort or destroy any evidence relevant to the establishment of the infringement or any part thereof or to the calculation of the applicable fine. Distortion or destruction of evidence relevant to the establishment of the infringement or any part thereof may also constitute an aggravating circumstance within the meaning of point 28 of the Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (8) (the Guidelines on fines), and may be regarded as lack of cooperation within the meaning of points 12 and 27 of the Leniency Notice. The Commission may only engage in settlement discussions upon the written request of the parties concerned. |
6. |
While parties to the proceedings do not have a right to settle, should the Commission consider that a case may, in principle, be suitable for settlement, it will explore the interest in settlement of all parties to the same proceedings. |
7. |
The parties to the proceedings may not disclose to any third party in any jurisdiction the contents of the discussions or of the documents which they have had access to in view of settlement, unless they have a prior explicit authorization by the Commission. Any breach in this regard may lead the Commission to disregard the undertaking's request to follow the settlement procedure. Such disclosure may also constitute an aggravating circumstance, within the meaning of point 28 of the Guidelines on fines and may be regarded as lack of cooperation within the meaning of points 12 and 27 of the Leniency Notice. |
2.1. Initiation of proceedings and exploratory steps regarding settlement
8. |
Where the Commission contemplates the adoption of a decision pursuant to Article 7 and/or Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, it is required in advance to identify and recognize as parties to the proceedings the legal persons on whom a penalty may be imposed for an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty. |
9. |
To this end, the initiation of proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in view of adopting such a decision can take place at any point in time, but no later than the date on which the Commission issues a statement of objections against the parties concerned. Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 further specifies that, should the Commission consider it suitable to explore the parties' interest in engaging in settlement discussions, it will initiate proceedings no later than the date on which it either issues a statement of objections or requests the parties to express in writing their interest to engage in settlement discussions, whichever is the earlier. |
10. |
After the initiation of proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission becomes the only competition authority competent to apply Article 81 of the Treaty to the case in point. |
11. |
Should the Commission consider it suitable to explore the parties' interest to engage in settlement discussions, it will set a time-limit of no less than two weeks pursuant to Articles 10a(1) and 17(3) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 within which parties to the same proceedings should declare in writing whether they envisage engaging in settlement discussions in view of possibly introducing settlement submissions at a later stage. This written declaration does not imply an admission by the parties of having participated in an infringement or of being liable for it. |
12. |
Whenever the Commission initiates proceedings against two or more parties within the same undertaking, the Commission will inform each of them of the other legal entities which it identifies within the same undertaking and which are also concerned by the proceedings. In such a case, should the concerned parties wish to engage in settlement discussions, they must appoint joint representatives duly empowered to act on their behalf by the end of the time-limit referred to in point 11. The appointment of joint representatives aims solely to facilitate the settlement discussions and it does not prejudge in any way the attribution of liability for the infringement amongst the different parties. |
13. |
The Commission may disregard any application for immunity from fines or reduction of fines on the ground that it has been submitted after the expiry of the time-limit referred to in point 11. |
2.2. Commencing the settlement procedure: settlement discussions
14. |
Should some of the parties to the proceedings request settlement discussions and comply with the requirements referred to in points 11 and 12, the Commission may decide to pursue the settlement procedure by means of bilateral contacts between the Commission Directorate-General for Competition and the settlement candidates. |
15. |
The Commission retains discretion to determine the appropriateness and the pace of the bilateral settlement discussions with each undertaking. In line with Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, this includes determining, in view of the progress made overall in the settlement procedure, the order and sequence of the bilateral settlement discussions as well as the timing of the disclosure of information, including the evidence in the Commission file used to establish the envisaged objections and the potential fine (9). Information will be disclosed in a timely manner as settlement discussions progress. |
16. |
Such an early disclosure in the context of settlement discussions pursuant to Article 10a(2) and Article 15(1a) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 will allow the parties to be informed of the essential elements taken into consideration so far, such as the facts alleged, the classification of those facts, the gravity and duration of the alleged cartel, the attribution of liability, an estimation of the range of likely fines, as well as the evidence used to establish the potential objections. This will enable the parties effectively to assert their views on the potential objections against them and will allow them to make an informed decision on whether or not to settle. Upon request by a party, the Commission services will also grant it access to non-confidential versions of any specified accessible document listed in the case file at that point in time, in so far as this is justified for the purpose of enabling the party to ascertain its position regarding a time period or any other aspect of the cartel (10). |
17. |
When the progress made during the settlement discussions leads to a common understanding regarding the scope of the potential objections and the estimation of the range of likely fines to be imposed by the Commission, and the Commission takes the preliminary view that procedural efficiencies are likely to be achieved in view of the progress made overall, the Commission may grant a final time-limit of at least 15 working days for an undertaking to introduce a final settlement submission pursuant to Articles 10a(2) and 17(3) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004. The time-limit can be extended following a reasoned request. Before granting such time-limit, the parties will be entitled to have the information specified in point 16 disclosed to them upon request. |
18. |
The parties may call upon the Hearing Officer at any time during the settlement procedure in relation to issues that might arise relating to due process. The Hearing Officer's duty is to ensure that the effective exercise of the rights of defence is respected. |
19. |
Should the parties concerned fail to introduce a settlement submission, the procedure leading to the final decision in their regard will follow the general provisions, in particular Articles 10(2), 12(1) and 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, instead of those regulating the settlement procedure. |
2.3. Settlement submissions
20. |
Parties opting for a settlement procedure must introduce a formal request to settle in the form of a settlement submission. The settlement submission provided for in Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 should contain:
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21. |
The acknowledgments and confirmations provided by the parties in view of settlement constitute the expression of their commitment to cooperate in the expeditious handling of the case following the settlement procedure. However, those acknowledgments and confirmations are conditional upon the Commission meeting their settlement request, including the anticipated maximum amount of the fine. |
22. |
Settlement requests cannot be revoked unilaterally by the parties which have provided them unless the Commission does not meet the settlement requests by reflecting the settlement submissions first in a statement of objections and ultimately, in a final decision (see in this regard points 27 and 29). The statement of objections would be deemed to have endorsed the settlement submissions if it reflects their contents on the issues mentioned in point 20(a). Additionally, for a final decision to be deemed to have reflected the settlement submissions, it should also impose a fine which does not exceed the maximum amount indicated therein. |
2.4. Statement of objections and reply
23. |
Pursuant to Article 10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, the notification of a written statement of objections to each of the parties against whom objections are raised is a mandatory preparatory step before adopting any final decision. Therefore, the Commission will issue a statement of objections also in a settlement procedure (12). |
24. |
For the parties' rights of defence to be exercised effectively, the Commission should hear their views on the objections against them and supporting evidence before adopting a final decision and take them into account by amending its preliminary analysis, where appropriate (13). The Commission must be able not only to accept or reject the parties' relevant arguments expressed during the administrative procedure, but also to make its own analysis of the matters put forward by them in order to either abandon such objections because they have been shown to be unfounded or to supplement and reassess its arguments both in fact and in law, in support of the objections which it maintains. |
25. |
By introducing a formal settlement request in the form of a settlement submission prior to the notification of the statement of objections, the parties concerned enable the Commission to effectively take their views into account (14) already when drafting the statement of objections, rather than only before the consultation of the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions (hereinafter the ‘Advisory Committee’) or before the adoption of the final decision (15). |
26. |
Should the statement of objections reflect the parties' settlement submissions, the parties concerned should within a time-limit of at least two weeks set by the Commission in accordance with Articles 10a(3) and 17(3) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, reply to it by simply confirming (in unequivocal terms) that the statement of objections corresponds to the contents of their settlement submissions and that they therefore remain committed to follow the settlement procedure. In the absence of such a reply, the Commission will take note of the party's breach of its commitment and may also disregard the party's request to follow the settlement procedure. |
27. |
The Commission retains the right to adopt a statement of objections which does not reflect the parties' settlement submission. If so, the general provisions in Articles 10(2), 12(1) and 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 will apply. The acknowledgements provided by the parties in the settlement submission would be deemed to be withdrawn and could not be used in evidence against any of the parties to the proceedings. Hence, the parties concerned would no longer be bound by their settlement submissions and would be granted a time-limit allowing them, upon request, to present their defence anew, including the possibility to access the file and to request an oral hearing. |
2.5. Commission decision and settlement reward
28. |
Upon the parties' replies to the statement of objections confirming their commitment to settle, Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 allows the Commission to proceed, without any other procedural step, to the adoption of the subsequent final decision pursuant to Articles 7 and/or 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, after consultation of the Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. In particular, this implies that no oral hearing or access to the file may be requested by those parties once their settlement submissions have been reflected by the statement of objections, in line with Articles 12(2) and 15(1a) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004. |
29. |
The Commission retains the right to adopt a final position which departs from its preliminary position expressed in a statement of objections endorsing the parties' settlement submissions, either in view of the opinion provided by the Advisory Committee or for other appropriate considerations in view of the ultimate decisional autonomy of the Commission to this effect. However, should the Commission opt to follow that course, it will inform the parties and notify to them a new statement of objections in order to allow for the exercise of their rights of defence in accordance with the applicable general rules of procedure. It follows that the parties would then be entitled to have access to the file, to request an oral hearing and to reply to the statement of objections. The acknowledgments provided by the parties in the settlement submissions would be deemed to have been withdrawn and could not be used in evidence against any of the parties to the proceedings. |
30. |
The final amount of the fine in a particular case is determined in the decision finding an infringement pursuant to Article 7 and imposing a fine pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
31. |
In line with the Commission's practice, the fact that an undertaking cooperated with the Commission under this Notice during the administrative procedure will be indicated in the final decision, so as to explain the reason for the level of the fine. |
32. |
Should the Commission decide to reward a party for settlement in the framework of this Notice, it will reduce by 10 % the amount of the fine to be imposed after the 10 % cap has been applied having regard to the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (8). Any specific increase for deterrence (16) used in their regard will not exceed a multiplication by two. |
33. |
When settled cases involve also leniency applicants, the reduction of the fine granted to them for settlement will be added to their leniency reward. |
3. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
34. |
This Notice applies to any case pending before the Commission at the time of or after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
35. |
Access to settlement submissions is only granted to those addressees of a statement of objections who have not requested settlement, provided that they commit — together with the legal counsels getting access on their behalf — not to make any copy by mechanical or electronic means of any information in the settlement submissions to which access is being granted and to ensure that the information to be obtained from the settlement submission will solely be used for the purposes of judicial or administrative proceedings for the application of the Community competition rules at issue in the related proceedings. Other parties such as complainants will not be granted access to settlement submissions. |
36. |
The use of such information for a different purpose during the proceeding may be regarded as lack of cooperation within the meaning of points 12 and 27 of the Leniency Notice. Moreover, if any such use is made after the Commission has already adopted a prohibition decision in the proceedings, the Commission may, in any legal proceedings before the Community Courts, ask the Court to increase the fine in respect of the responsible undertaking. Should the information be used for a different purpose, at any point in time, with the involvement of an outside counsel, the Commission may report the incident to the bar of that counsel, with a view to disciplinary action. |
37. |
Settlement submissions made under this Notice will only be transmitted to the competition authorities of the Member States pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, provided that the conditions set out in the Network Notice (17) are met and provided that the level of protection against disclosure awarded by the receiving competition authority is equivalent to the one conferred by the Commission. |
38. |
Upon the applicant's request, the Commission may accept that settlement submissions be provided orally. Oral settlement submissions will be recorded and transcribed at the Commission's premises. In accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and Articles 3(3) and 17(3) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 undertakings making oral settlement submissions will be granted the opportunity to check the technical accuracy of the recording, which will be available at the Commission's premises and to correct the substance of their oral settlement submissions and the accuracy of the transcript without delay. |
39. |
The Commission will not transmit settlement submissions to national courts without the consent of the relevant applicants, in line with the provisions in the Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC (18). |
40. |
The Commission considers that normally public disclosure of documents and written or recorded statements (including settlement submissions) received in the context of this Notice would undermine certain public or private interests, for example the protection of the purpose of inspections and investigations, within the meaning of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (19), even after the decision has been taken. |
41. |
Final decisions taken by the Commission under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 are subject to judicial review in accordance with Article 230 of the Treaty. Moreover, as provided in Article 229 of the Treaty and Article 31 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Court of Justice has unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions on fines adopted pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
Overview of the procedure leading to the adoption of a (settlement) Decision pursuant to Articles 7 and 23 of Regulation No (EC) 1/2003
I. Investigation as usual
— |
Parties may express their interest in a hypothetical settlement. |
II. Exploratory steps regarding settlement
— |
Letter to all companies (and MS) informing of the decision to initiate proceedings in view of settlement (Article 11(6)) and requesting them to express their interest in settlement. |
III. Bilateral rounds of settlement discussions
— |
Disclosure and exchange of arguments on potential objections, liability, fines range. |
— |
Disclosure of evidence used to establish potential objections, liability, fines. |
— |
Disclosure of other non-confidential versions of documents in the file, when justified. |
IV. Settlement
— |
Conditional settlement submissions by the companies, jointly represented where applicable. |
— |
DG COMP sends acknowledgement of receipt. |
V. ‘Settled’ statement of objections
— |
Notification of streamlined SO endorsing company's settlement submissions, where appropriate. |
— |
Company's reply to SO confirming clearly that it reflects its settlement submission. |
VI. ‘Settlement’ Decision pursuant to Articles 7 and 23 of Regulation No (EC) 1/2003
— |
Advisory Committee on a draft streamlined final decision. |
If College of Commissioners agrees:
— |
Adoption of streamlined final decision. |
(1) References in this text to Article 81 also cover Article 53 EEA when applied by the Commission in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 56 of the EEA Agreement.
(2) Cartels are agreements and/or concerted practices between two or more competitors aimed at coordinating their competitive behaviour on the market and/or influencing the relevant parameters of competition through practices such as the fixing of purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions, the allocation of production or sales quotas, the sharing of markets including bid-rigging, restrictions of imports or exports and/or anti-competitive actions against other competitors. Such practices are among the most serious violations of Article 81 EC.
(3) OJ C 298, 8.12.2006, p. 17.
(4) See point 33.
(5) OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 (OJ L 269, 28.9.2006, p. 1).
(6) OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 (OJ L 171, 1.7.2008, p. 3).
(7) Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, at paragraphs 9 and 11.
(9) Reference to the ‘potential fine’ in Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 affords the Commission services the possibility to inform the parties concerned by settlement discussions of an estimate of their potential fine in view of the guidance contained in the Guidelines on fines, the provisions of this Notice and the Leniency Notice, where applicable.
(10) For that purpose, the parties will be provided with a list of all accessible documents in the case file at that point in time.
(11) This would result from the discussions as set out in points 16 and 17.
(12) In the context of settlement procedures, statements of objections should contain the information necessary to enable the parties to corroborate that it reflects their settlement submissions.
(13) In line with settled case-law, the Commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which the parties concerned have been able to comment and, to this end, they shall be entitled to have access to the Commission's file, subject to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.
(14) In this regard, recital 2 of Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 states: ‘(…) Such early disclosure should enable the parties concerned to put forward their views on the objections which the Commission intends to raise against them as well as on their potential liability’.
(15) As required by Article 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 and Article 27(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, respectively.
(16) Point 30 of the Guidelines on fines.
(17) Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 43).
(18) OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 54; point 26.
(19) OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43.
IV Notices
NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES
Commission
2.7.2008 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167/7 |
Interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its main refinancing operations (1):
4,07 % on 1 July 2008
Euro exchange rates (2)
1 July 2008
(2008/C 167/02)
1 euro=
|
Currency |
Exchange rate |
USD |
US dollar |
1,5775 |
JPY |
Japanese yen |
166,57 |
DKK |
Danish krone |
7,4574 |
GBP |
Pound sterling |
0,79090 |
SEK |
Swedish krona |
9,4578 |
CHF |
Swiss franc |
1,6055 |
ISK |
Iceland króna |
125,64 |
NOK |
Norwegian krone |
8,0040 |
BGN |
Bulgarian lev |
1,9558 |
CZK |
Czech koruna |
23,825 |
EEK |
Estonian kroon |
15,6466 |
HUF |
Hungarian forint |
235,96 |
LTL |
Lithuanian litas |
3,4528 |
LVL |
Latvian lats |
0,7051 |
PLN |
Polish zloty |
3,3611 |
RON |
Romanian leu |
3,6476 |
SKK |
Slovak koruna |
30,196 |
TRY |
Turkish lira |
1,9569 |
AUD |
Australian dollar |
1,6519 |
CAD |
Canadian dollar |
1,6063 |
HKD |
Hong Kong dollar |
12,3023 |
NZD |
New Zealand dollar |
2,0740 |
SGD |
Singapore dollar |
2,1466 |
KRW |
South Korean won |
1 661,03 |
ZAR |
South African rand |
12,4690 |
CNY |
Chinese yuan renminbi |
10,8155 |
HRK |
Croatian kuna |
7,2388 |
IDR |
Indonesian rupiah |
14 544,55 |
MYR |
Malaysian ringgit |
5,1529 |
PHP |
Philippine peso |
71,153 |
RUB |
Russian rouble |
36,9910 |
THB |
Thai baht |
52,830 |
BRL |
Brazilian real |
2,5371 |
MXN |
Mexican peso |
16,3177 |
Rate applied to the most recent operation carried out before the indicated day. In the case of a variable rate tender, the interest rate is the marginal rate.
(2) Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.
NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES
2.7.2008 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167/8 |
Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises
(2008/C 167/03)
Aid No |
XA 7008/08 |
|||
Member State |
Federal Republic of Germany |
|||
Region |
Freistaat Sachsen |
|||
Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving individual aid |
Förderrichtlinie des Freistaates Sachsen zur Absatzförderung der Land- und Ernährungswirtschaft (RL AbsLE) |
|||
Legal basis |
Förderrichtlinie des Freistaates Sachsen zur Absatzförderung der Land- und Ernährungswirtschaft (RL AbsLE) in Verbindung mit der Haushaltsordnung des Freistaates Sachsen (Sächsische Haushaltsordnung — SäHO) |
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Annual expenditure planned or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company |
Aid scheme |
Annual overall amount |
EUR 0,84 million |
|
Loans guaranteed |
— |
|||
Individual aid |
Overall aid amount |
— |
||
Loans guaranteed |
— |
|||
Maximum aid intensity |
In conformity with Articles 4(2)-(6) and 5 of the Regulation |
Yes |
||
Date of implementation |
1.1.2008 |
|||
Duration of scheme or individual aid award |
31.12.2013 |
|||
Objective of aid |
Aid to SMEs |
Yes |
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Economic sectors concerned |
All sectors eligible for aid to SMEs |
No |
||
Limited to specific sectors |
Yes |
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
or |
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
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|||
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Yes |
|||
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|||
or |
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|||
|
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|||
|
|
|||
Name and address of the granting authority |
Sächsische Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft |
|||
|
||||
Large individual aid grants |
In conformity with Article 6 of the Regulation |
Yes |
Aid No |
XA 7010/08 |
|||
Member State |
Federal Republic of Germany |
|||
Region |
Freistaat Sachsen |
|||
Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving individual aid |
Allgemeine Teilnahmebedingungen für vom Sächsischen Staatsministerium für Umwelt und Landwirtschaft geförderte Gemeinschaftsbeteiligungen in den Bereichen Verkaufsförderung und Messen als Anlage zum Rahmenvertrag |
|||
Legal basis |
Haushaltsordnung des Freistaates Sachsen (Sächsische Haushaltsordnung — SäHO) Allgemeine Teilnahmebedingungen für vom Sächsischen Staatsministerium für Umwelt und Landwirtschaft geförderte Gemeinschaftsbeteiligungen in den Bereichen Verkaufsförderung und Messen als Anlage zum Rahmenvertrag |
|||
Annual expenditure planned or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company |
Aid scheme |
Annual overall amount |
EUR 1,9 million |
|
Loans guaranteed |
— |
|||
Individual aid |
Overall aid amount |
— |
||
Loans guaranteed |
— |
|||
Maximum aid intensity |
In conformity with Articles 4(2)-(6) and 5 of the Regulation |
Yes |
||
Date of implementation |
1.3.2008 |
|||
Duration of scheme or individual aid award |
31.12.2013 |
|||
Objective of aid |
Aid to SMEs |
Yes |
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Economic sectors concerned |
All sectors eligible for aid to SMEs |
No |
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Limited to specific sectors |
Yes |
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or |
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Yes |
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or |
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Name and address of the granting authority |
Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Umwelt und Landwirtschaft |
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Large individual aid grants |
In conformity with Article 6 of the Regulation |
Yes |
2.7.2008 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167/10 |
Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001
(2008/C 167/04)
Aid No: XA 111/08
Member State: Italy
Region: Provincia autonoma di Trento
Title of aid scheme: Realizzazione manifestazioni zootecniche
Legal basis: L.P. 4 del 28 marzo 2003«Sostegno dell'economia agricola, disciplina dell'agricoltura biologica e della contrassegnazione di prodotti geneticamente non modificati» articolo 43, lettera b).
Deliberazione della Giunta provinciale di Trento n. 214 del 1o febbraio 2008 criteri attuativi dell'articolo 43, lettera b), della L.P.4/2003
Planned annual expenditure under the scheme: The annual amount committed totals EUR 150 000
Maximum aid intensity: The provincial contribution will be 100 % of the eligible expenditure
Date of implementation: The scheme will be implemented once the aid has been declared compatible with the Treaty by the Commission
Duration of scheme: Aid will be granted until 31.12.2013 at the latest
Objective of aid: To promote and support the activity and image of livestock farmers through local, provincial, national and international exhibitions to promote the various species and breeds farmed. Other types of assemblies are area meetings and evaluation meetings. Events that are commercial in nature are excluded from this initiative.
Article 15(2)(d) of Regulation (EC) 1857/2006 provides the legal basis for the application of this aid scheme.
The following expenditure is eligible:
staff costs, the cost of employing external expertise and services and setting up the events funded by this initiative and any costs incurred preparing the programme of events,
organisational costs for the event equal to 15 % of the costs specified under point (a).
The organisational costs allowed for livestock exhibitions refer to the overall costs of the Provincial Stockbreeders Federation, not broken down into individual cost centres and exclude expenditure for: income tax, depreciation relative to shares in goods financed with public funds, provisions, tax amnesties and redemptions, payments to charities and donations, losses, representation expenses and any revenue to cover eligible cost items
Sector(s) concerned: The livestock sector
Name and address of the granting authority:
Provincia autonoma di Trento |
Dipartimento agricoltura e alimentazione |
Servizio vigilanza e promozione delle attività agricole |
Via G.B. Trener, 3 |
I-38100 Trento |
Website: http://www.delibere.provincia.tn.it/scripts/gethtmlDeli.asp?Item=0&Type=FulView
Aid No: XA 116/08
Member State: Italy
Title of aid scheme: Decreto del direttore generale dello sviluppo rurale del Ministero delle Politiche agricole alimentari e forestali prot. 2063 del 13 febbraio 2008 recante «Concessione di borse di studio per la frequenza di master universitari da parte di giovani imprenditori agricoli»
Legal Basis: Legge 15 dicembre 1998, n. 441, recante «Norme per la diffusione e la valorizzazione dell'imprenditoria in agricoltura».
Legge 27 dicembre 2006, n. 296 (legge finanziaria 2007), articolo 1, comma 1068 e comma 1074
Annual expenditure planned: EUR 500 000
Maximum aid intensity: The aid paid will be in accordance with the maximum intensity provided for in Article 15(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 (OJ L 358, 16.12.2006, p. 3)
Date of implementation: The scheme will enter into force on the date of the publication of the registration number of the exemption request on the website of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development
Duration of scheme or individual aid award: Five years
Objective of aid: To provide study grants to enable young farmers, including family workers as defined in Article 230a of the Civil Code, to attend university masters courses pursuant to Article 15(2)(a) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 (OJ L 358, 16.12.2006, p. 3)
Sector concerned: Young farmers
Name and address of the granting authority:
Ministero delle Politiche agricole alimentari e forestali |
Dipartimento delle Politiche di sviluppo — Direzione generale dello sviluppo rurale |
Via XX Settembre n. 20 |
I-00187 Roma |
Website: http://www.politicheagricole.it/SviluppoRurale/AiutiStato/DisposizioniNazionali/05-20080213_BandoC_2063_SR_OIGA.htm
Il Direttore generale
Salvatore PETROLI
Aid No: XA 117/08
Member State: Italy
Title of aid scheme: Decreto del direttore generale dello sviluppo rurale del Ministero delle Politiche agricole alimentari e forestali prot. 2066 del 13 febbraio 2008 recante «Concessione di contributi a copertura delle spese sostenute da giovani imprenditori agricoli per i servizi di sostituzione»
Legal basis: Legge 15 dicembre 1998, n. 441, recante «Norme per la diffusione e la valorizzazione dell'imprenditoria in agricoltura»
Legge 27 dicembre 2006, n. 296 (legge finanziaria 2007), articolo 1, comma 1068 e comma 1074
Annual expenditure planned: EUR 4 000 000
Maximum aid intensity: This aid will be calculated in compliance with the maximum intensity provided for by Article 15(3) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 (OJ L 358, 16.12.2006, p. 3)
Date of implementation: The scheme will enter into force from the date of publication of the registration number of the exemption request on the website of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development
Duration of scheme or individual aid award: Five years
Objective of aid: To grant aid to cover the actual costs of providing farmers with replacement services in the event of their participation in training courses or in case of illness, within the meaning of Article 15(2)(a)(iii) and (b) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 (OJ L 358, 16.12.2006, p. 3)
Sector concerned: Young farmers
Name and address of the granting authority:
Ministero delle Politiche agricole alimentari e forestali |
Dipartimento delle politiche di sviluppo — Direzione Generale dello sviluppo rurale |
Via XX Settembre n. 20 |
I-00187 Roma |
Website: http://www.politicheagricole.it/SviluppoRurale/AiutiStato/DisposizioniNazionali/08-20080213_BandoC_2066_SR_OIGA.htm
Il Direttore generale
Salvatore PETROLI
Aid No: XA 119/08
Member State: Federal Republic of Germany
Region: Nordrhein-Westfalen
Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving individual aid: Gewährung von Beihilfen und finanziellen Unterstützungen der Tierseuchenkasse Nordrhein-Westfalen
Legal basis: §§ 66 ff. Tierseuchengesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (analog)
§§ 11 ff. Ausführungsgesetz zum Tierseuchengesetz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen
§§ 2, 2a Durchführungsverordnung zum Tierseuchengesetz und Ausführungsgesetz zum Tierseuchengesetz
Beihilferichtlinien der Tierseuchenkasse Nordrhein-Westfalen
Annual expenditure planned under the scheme or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company: Aid totalling approximately EUR 6 million per year
Maximum aid intensity: 100 %. The aid granted under indents 2 and 3 is to be paid in kind
Date of implementation:
Duration of scheme or individual aid award: December 2013
Objective of aid: Aid to combat animal diseases under Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006:
aid to compensate for livestock losses resulting from infectious diseases and their treatment,
aid for measures to prevent, detect and combat animal diseases,
aid in the form of payment of the costs of laboratory tests to detect animal diseases
Sector(s) concerned: All holdings in North Rhine-Westphalia with horses, cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, poultry, bees or farmed game
Name and address of the granting authority:
Landwirtschaftskammer Nordrhein-Westfalen–Tierseuchenkasse |
Nevinghoff 6 |
D-48147 Münster |
Website: http://www.landwirtschaftskammer.de/fachangebot/tierseuchenkasse/leistungen/beihilfen/index.htm
Other information: E-mail address of the North Rhine-Westphalia Animal Diseases Fund:
tierseuchenkasse@lwk.nrw.de
Annette VOM SCHLOSS
Geschäftsführerin
Tierseuchenkasse Nordrhein-Westfalen
V Announcements
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Commission
2.7.2008 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167/13 |
Call for applications ‘Consumer policy’
(2008/C 167/05)
The call for applications for financial support to European consumer organisations in 2008 has been published on the Commission's website at the following address:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/tenders/information/grants/support_en.htm
PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY
Commission
2.7.2008 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167/14 |
STATE AID — SLOVAK REPUBLIC
State aid C 12/08 (ex NN 74/07) — Alleged unlawful State aid: Agreement between Bratislava airport and Ryanair
Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2008/C 167/06)
By means of the letter dated 11 March 2008 reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified the Slovak Republic of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the abovementioned State aid.
Interested parties may submit their comments on the State aid in respect of which the Commission is initiating the procedure within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:
European Commission |
Directorate-General for Energy and Transport |
Directorate A — General Affairs and Resources |
Unit A2: Internal Market and Competition |
Rue de Mot 28 |
B-1040 Brussels |
Fax (32-2) 296 41 04 |
These comments will be communicated to the Slovak Republic. Confidential treatment of the identity of the interested party submitting the comments may be requested in writing, stating the reasons for the request.
TEXT OF SUMMARY
PROCEDURE
In December 2006, the Commission received a complaint alleging unlawful State aid provided by the Slovak Republic to the Irish airline Ryanair.
DESCRIPTION OF THE AID
Subject of the complaint
According to the information submitted by the complainant and presented by the media (1), Bratislava Airport provided Ryanair, on the basis of the above mentioned Agreement, with a reduction of the airport charges for new scheduled and existing destinations. The Agreement was concluded in December 2005 and it is valid until 2016.
Bratislava Airport is the principal international airport of the Slovak Republic. In 2006, the airport handled 1 937 642 passengers. It is operated by the joint-stock company Letisko M.R. Štefánika — Airport Bratislava, a.s. (hereinafter ‘BTS’or the ‘Airport’). The shareholders of BTS are Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications of the Slovak Republic (34 %) and National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter the ‘National Property Fund’) (66 %).
Alleged discounts of airport charges
According to the information provided by the complainant and published in the media (2), the Airport provides Ryanair with all Airport services in one ‘package’ price. This price allegedly includes aircraft-handling and related services, passenger services, ramp services, load control, communications and flight operations, support services and terminal and infrastructure services for which Ryanair has to pay ‘Service charge’.
The amount of the Service charge allegedly differs depending on whether the airline operates a new scheduled destination or an existing destination. According to the information in the possession of the Commission, when defining a new scheduled destination, the Agreement refers to the airport, rather than to the city. The total discounts allegedly provided for Ryanair in comparison to the charges under the AIP during the first year of the Agreement's validity amount to:
— |
EUR 1 460 per flight (i.e. 48 % discount) for the new scheduled destinations, and |
— |
EUR 960 per flight (i.e. 31 % discount) for the existing destinations. |
This discount does not include benefits resulting from the parking charge being included in the agreed Service charge. An eventual introduction of new charges in the future, which Ryanair would not be required to pay, would further increase the gap between the discounted tariff and the AIP tariff. This discount does not include benefits resulting from the parking charge being included in the agreed Service charge. An eventual introduction of new charges in the future, which Ryanair would not be required to pay, would further increase the gap between the discounted tariff and the AIP tariff.
Observations of the Slovak authorities
The Slovak authorities admit the Agreement between the Airport and Ryanair exists. However, they refuse to provide the Commission with the terms of the Agreement. The Slovak authorities argue that BTS, as the Airport operator, acts like any other undertaking on the market, i.e. it determines the charges for services provided to air carriers at the Airport for each carrier individually, on the basis of negotiations, i.e. by means of an agreement between the parties and in accordance with its commercial policy. The Ministry does not expect the Agreement would have any impact on operations of other air carriers at the Airport.
The Slovak authorities argue that the AIP published by Air Traffic Services of the Slovak Republic does not constitute in this context generally binding legislation, and it is therefore not binding on BTS and can provide only recommendations.
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURE
State resources
The Commission observes that:
— |
the Fund, as the majority shareholder in BTS, was established under an Act of National Council of the Slovak Republic. The National Council of the Slovak Republic approves the budget of the Fund. The President, Vice-President and other seven members of the Presidium (the principal body of the Fund) are nominated upon the proposal of the Government of the Slovak Republic or the Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, by the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The members of Supervisory Board of the Fund are equally nominated by the National Council of the Slovak Republic (3), |
— |
as mentioned in its Statutes, there is a ‘mutual co-operation between the Fund, the Ministry, the founders and the Government related to the activities of the Fund concerning the founding of companies under the Privatisation Awards as well as other activities’ (4), |
— |
on 22 October 2007, shareholders of BTS, nominated, upon the proposal of the Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications of the Slovak Republic, new President of the Managing Board of BTS. In the press release published on the web pages of the Airport it is stated that (5): ‘The objective of such changes is principally to increase the decision-making power of main shareholders — Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications of the Slovak Republic and of National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic, as well as to separate activities related to normal operation of the airport and management of development processes’, |
— |
as regards the operation of an airport, these are activities that play a fundamental role in several policies: transport policy, regional or national economic development policy or town and country planning policy. The public authorities are in general not ‘absent’ when the manager of an airport takes decisions that determine the long term development of such infrastructure. |
In the light of the above considerations the Commission cannot exclude at this stage that the decision concerning the conclusion of the Agreement is imputable to the public authorities and constitutes State resources.
Selective economic advantage
The Commission has to asses if the Airport, when concluding the contract, was guided by prospects of profitability. The Commission observes that:
— |
it appears that the Agreement was concluded during the privatisation process of the Airport, more specifically allegedly on the last day for the submission of the bid proposals. The successful bidders reported to media that they were not informed about the Agreement (2). Therefore, when preparing their bid for privatisation, they had not factored the obligations under the Agreement into their business models. It can be therefore concluded that if the terms of the Agreement were favourable to the Airport, they would have provided a justification for higher prices in the privatisation, |
— |
moreover, the discount system is not allegedly conditional on the generation of additional passengers' volume, |
— |
furthermore, in the Annual Report of 2006, published on the web pages of the Airport, it has been stated that: ‘The management of the company, in the period before concluding the contract for sale of shares, had not tried to resolve on long-term basis serious impacts of contracts concluded with air carriers (with SkyEurope) and had concluded new contracts (with Ryanair) without an analysis of services or without analysis of them from the point of view of competition (6)’, |
— |
moreover, Slovak media reported that Ryanair expressed its very negative view on the privatisation of the Airport (7). Some media made allegedly a link between this negative attitude of Ryanair to the privatisation and it's Agreement with the Airport. It appears as an indication that the conclusion of the Agreement was only possible with a State-owned Airport and would not have been possible had the Airport been privately owned. |
Therefore, the Commission doubts whether the behaviour of BTS was guided by prospects of profitability. Thus, it cannot be excluded that the conclusion of the Agreement provided Ryanair with an advantage it would not benefit under normal market conditions.
Effect on trade and competition between Member States
In the present case, the market for provision of airport services is open and therefore, the measure at stake is susceptible of having an effect on competition and trade between Member States.
Conclusion
In view of the above and as the Slovak authorities did not provide the Commission either with the terms of the Agreement nor with the details on circumstances under which the deal was concluded, it considers, on the basis of the information at its disposal, that Ryanair benefited from a State aid in the form of discounts of airport charges that it would not have benefited under normal market conditions.
Thus, unless the Slovak authorities provide an economic justification of the contract or any other information that would exclude the presence of such aid to Ryanair, the Commission has to assess the measure in order to determine its compatibility with the common market.
COMPATIBILITY OF THE MEASURE WITH THE COMMON MARKET
The Commission considers that the Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and the Communication from the Commission on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airports (hereinafter the ‘2005 guidelines’) (8) constitute the legal basis for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure at stake. The 2005 aviation guidelines set out a number of conditions (in point 79 thereof) to be complied with in order for start-up aid of this type to be found compatible with the common market. In the present case, the Commission has doubts, notably because it does not have at its disposal the information about the terms of the Agreement, as regards the following points:
— |
it appears that the preferential airport charges relate allegedly to a new airport rather than to a new destination. The Slovak authorities are required to provide the information on the routes considered as a ‘new destination’. They are required as well to provide the list of routes operated by other airlines operating to/from Bratislava, |
— |
it appears that the discounts provided to Ryanair for the existing destinations remain valid for the period of ten years (which corresponds to the duration of the contract). For the new scheduled destinations, the airport charge is foreseen to increase every year in order to achieve the level of the airport charge for the existing destination in six years. The Slovak authorities haven't provided information on the profitability of the routes, |
— |
it does not appear whether the alleged discount of the airport charges relate to compensation of additional costs linked with an opening of the new routes. Moreover, it appears that the discounts also apply to existing destinations, |
— |
the alleged aid does not appear to be in line with the maximum percentages and the maximum aid duration set up in the paragraph 79(f), |
— |
it appears that no other air carriers have been proposed to neither benefit the same charges nor have been informed about the process of concluding the Agreement, |
— |
despite the fact that the Slovak authorities argue that when concluding the Agreement, the company operating the Airport behaved like a market investor, it did not provide the Commission with a business plan demonstrating the viability of the routes in question. The Slovak authorities did not present any analysis demonstrating the impact of the new routes on competing routes, |
— |
the Commission does not have evidence that the information on alleged State aid foreseen for routes to/from Bratislava Airport is publicly available. It appears that aid recipient is chosen without using any open procedure. The Commission is not aware of any penalty mechanism. |
Consequently, the Commission doubts whether the conditions for compatibility as set out in the 2005 guidelines have been complied with in the present case.
CONCLUSION
In the light of the compatibility assessment carried out above, the Commission has doubts as to whether the State aid measure can be declared compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty. Therefore, the Commission has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, according to the Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, and according to Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, the Commission enjoins the Slovak republic to submit, within one month of receipt of this letter, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the of the aid/measure and in particular the terms of the Agreement Bratislava airport concluded with the air carrier Ryanair. Otherwise the Commission will adopt a decision on the basis of the information in its possession. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.
The Commission wishes to remind the Slovak Republic that Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.
The Commission warns the Slovak Republic that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.
TEXT OF LETTER
‘1. |
Komisia oznamuje Slovenskej republike, že po preskúmaní informácií o uvedenom opatrení, ktoré poskytli slovenské orgány, sa rozhodla začať konanie stanovené v článku 88 ods. 2 Zmluvy o ES. |
2. |
Komisia ukladá Slovenskej republike, aby poskytla informácie, o ktoré Komisia požiadala listom z 9. januára 2007, na ktorý, napriek upomienke zo 6. júna 2007, nedostala uspokojivú odpoveď. |
1. POSTUP
3. |
Komisia dostala listom z 11. decembra 2006, ktorý zaevidovala 13. decembra 2006, sťažnosť na údajnú nezákonnú štátnu pomoc, ktorú poskytla Slovenská republika írskej leteckej spoločnosti Ryanair. Sťažnosť bola pôvodne zaevidovaná pod referenčným označením CP22/2007. |
4. |
Komisia požiadala listom z 9. januára 2007 o objasnenia údajnej nezákonnej pomoci, najmä pokiaľ ide o podmienky zmluvy v súvislosti s poplatkami za poskytovanie letiskových služieb uzatvorenej medzi bratislavským letiskom a spoločnosťou Ryanair (ďalej len ‚zmluva‘). Slovenské orgány listom z 3. januára 2007, ktorý Komisia zaevidovala 9. januára 2007, odmietli Komisii poskytnúť podmienky zmluvy. |
5. |
Komisia zaslala listom zo 6. júna 2007 slovenským orgánom upomienku, pričom upriamila ich pozornosť na ustanovenia článku 10 ods. 3 (‚príkaz na poskytnutie informácie‘) a na ustanovenia článku 6 ods. 1 (‚konanie vo veci formálneho zisťovania‘) nariadenia (ES) č. 659/1999 (9). |
6. |
Slovenské orgány listom z 3. júla 2007 požiadali o predĺženie mesačnej lehoty na odpoveď do 15. augusta 2007. Komisia listom z 12. júla 2007 s predĺžením lehoty súhlasila. |
7. |
Slovenské orgány listom zo 17. augusta 2007, ktorý Komisia zaevidovala 21. augusta 2007, potvrdili svoje odmietnutie poskytnúť požadované informácie na základe toho, že Ryanair nesúhlasí so sprístupnením obsahu zmluvy. Slovenské orgány zároveň informovali, že ‚vyvíjajú ďalšie úsilie o bezodkladné zabezpečenie … informácií‘. Komisia dosiaľ žiadne informácie nedostala. |
2. OPIS OPATRENIA
2.1. Úvod
8. |
Na základe informácií, ktoré predložil sťažovateľ a ktoré uviedli médiá (10), bratislavské letisko poskytlo spoločnosti Ryanair na základe uvedenej zmluvy zníženie letiskových poplatkov na nové plánované a existujúce destinácie. Zmluva bola uzatvorená v decembri 2005 a platí do roku 2016. |
2.2. Informácie o bratislavskom letisku
9. |
Bratislavské letisko je hlavným medzinárodným letiskom Slovenskej republiky. V roku 2006 letisko vybavilo 1 937 642 cestujúcich. |
10. |
Prevádzkuje ho akciová spoločnosť Letisko M. R. Štefánika – Airport Bratislava, a.s. (ďalej len ‚BTS‘ alebo ‚letisko‘). Akcionármi BTS sú:
|
11. |
Fond národného majetku je právnickou osobou a bol zriadený v roku 1991 zákonom Slovenskej národnej rady č. 253/1991 Zb. o pôsobnosti orgánov Slovenskej republiky vo veciach prevodov majetku štátu na iné osoby a o Fonde národného majetku Slovenskej republiky (11). Účelom jeho existencie a jeho hlavnou činnosťou je prevod štátneho majetku určeného na privatizáciu na neštátne subjekty. |
12. |
Fond je pod priamym dohľadom Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky, ktorej sa predkladá na schválenie rozpočet Fondu spolu s návrhmi na použitie majetku Fondu v zmysle par. 28 ods. 3 písm. b) zákona, ročná účtovná závierka a výročná správa o činnosti Fondu (12). |
13. |
Proces plánovanej privatizácie letiska sa neukončil. Konzorcium TwoOne pozostávajúce zo subjektov Flughafen Wien AG (prevádzkovateľ viedenského letiska Schwechat), Austrian Raiffeisen Zentralbank a slovenskej skupiny Penta Investments podnikajúcej v oblasti private equity zvíťazilo vo februári 2006 vo výberovom ponukovom konaní na 66-percentný podiel prevádzkovateľa letiska. Transakcia však v polovici augusta 2006 nezískala súhlas Protimonopolného úradu Slovenskej republiky s odôvodnením, že by sa tým vytvoril regionálny monopol a negatívne by to ovplyvnilo ceny a kvalitu služieb na letisku. |
14. |
Za posledné tri roky sa objem cestujúcich na letisku zvýšil o 400 %. Očakáva sa, že za rok 2007 tento počet vzrastie o 20 %. Z týchto dôvodov letisko plánuje rozvoj svojej infraštruktúry s cieľom reagovať na zvýšenie prepravy. |
15. |
Kým projektová štúdia o ‚rozšírení kapacity bratislavského letiska s prihliadnutím na zákony a iné právne predpisy Európskej únie, ako aj na zvýšené bezpečnostné požiadavky Európskej únie‘ bola spolufinancovaná z grantu TEN-T (13), v súčasnosti nie je jasné, z akých zdrojov sa táto plánovaná investícia do infraštruktúry bude financovať. |
2.3. Podmienky zmluvy medzi letiskom a spoločnosťou Ryanair
2.3.1. Informácie, ktoré poskytli sťažovateľ a médiá
16. |
Na základe informácií, ktoré poskytol sťažovateľ a ktoré uverejnili médiá (14), letisko poskytuje spoločnosti Ryanair všetky letiskové služby za cenu v jednom ‚balíku‘. Táto cena údajne zahŕňa vybavenie lietadla (handling) a súvisiace služby, použitie letiska cestujúcimi, služby na vybavovacej ploche, riadenie uloženia nákladu, komunikáciu a letové činnosti, podporné služby, terminálové a infraštruktúrne služby, za ktoré musí Ryanair platiť ‚odplatu za služby‘. |
17. |
Výška odplaty za služby sa údajne líši v závislosti od toho, či letecká spoločnosť prevádzkuje novú plánovanú destináciu alebo existujúcu destináciu. Na základe informácií, ktoré má Komisia, sa zmluva vo vymedzení pojmu nová plánovaná destinácia odvoláva na letisko, a nie na mesto (t. j. let na letisko, na ktoré predtým nelietal iný dopravca, sa bude posudzovať ako nová plánovaná destinácia, a to aj v prípade, ak iný dopravca už prevádzkuje lety do toho istého mesta, ale na iné letisko). |
18. |
Uplatňované odplaty sú údajne výrazne nižšie ako v sadzobníku odplát uverejnenom v leteckej informačnej príručke (ďalej len ‚AIP‘). Sťažovateľ poskytol Komisii sadzobník odplát uverejnený v AIP a platný od decembra 2005 (15):
|
19. |
Ak by sa spoločnosti Ryanair vyrubili odplaty podľa AIP, musela by letisku platiť tieto odplaty (16) na jednu obrátku lietadla:
|
20. |
Celková suma odplát, ktoré by Ryanair musel zaplatiť, by predstavovala približne 3 060 EUR na jednu obrátku lietadla. |
21. |
Podľa sťažovateľa však zmluva údajne poskytuje výrazné zníženie odplát – s daným percentuálnym využitím kapacity lietadla (157 cestujúcich) Ryanair platí letisku celkový poplatok […] (17) EUR na jedného cestujúceho ([…] EUR/157) (odlet + prílet) (18) na novej plánovanej destinácii. |
22. |
Podľa sťažovateľa sa bude táto odplata za služby uplatňovať počas prvých 12 mesiacov trvania zmluvy. Za každý nasledujúci rok sa odplata za služby pre nové plánované destinácie zvýši o […] EUR. Po prvých šiestich rokoch trvania zmluvy sa odplata za služby platná pre nové plánované destinácie bude rovnať odplate za služby platnej pre existujúce destinácie. Odplata za služby pre existujúce destinácie predstavuje údajne […] EUR/na jeden Boeing 737-800 (odlet + prílet). |
23. |
Celkové zľavy poskytnuté spoločnosti Ryanair v porovnaní s odplatami podľa AIP počas prvého roku platnosti zmluvy potom predstavujú:
|
24. |
Táto zľava nezahŕňa výhody vyplývajúce z toho, že odplata za parkovanie lietadla je zahrnutá v dohodnutej odplate za služby. Prípadné zavedenie nových odplát v budúcnosti, ktoré by Ryanair nemusel platiť, by ešte viac zväčšili rozdiel medzi zľavnenou sadzbou a sadzbou podľa AIP. |
2.3.2. Informácie uverejnené na internetovej stránke spoločnosti Ryanair
25. |
Na základe informácií uverejnených na internetovej stránke (www.ryanair.com) sa ukazuje, že Ryanair vyberá od všetkých cestujúcich s odletom z Bratislavy tieto poplatky:
|
26. |
Poplatky sú totožné pre všetkých deväť destinácií, ktoré Ryanair v súčasnosti prevádzkuje do/z Bratislavy – Štokholm (Skavsta), Miláno, Londýn (Stansted), Gerona, Hahn, East Midlands, Dublin, Bristol a Brémy. |
2.3.3. Pripomienky slovenských orgánov
27. |
Slovenské orgány pripúšťajú, že zmluva medzi letiskom a spoločnosťou Ryanair existuje. Odmietajú však poskytnúť Komisii podmienky zmluvy. |
28. |
Po prvé, slovenské orgány argumentujú, že väčšinový akcionár, Fond, nie je orgánom štátnej správy. Po druhé, argumentujú, že ‚zmluva obsahuje dojednania zmluvných strán, podľa ktorých celý obsah zmluvy je prísne dôverný‘ a nemôžu ‚bez súhlasu spoločností BTS a Ryanair detailne odpovedať na otázku týkajúcu sa konkretizácie poplatkov‘ (19). Vo svojom liste zo 17. augusta 2007 objasnili, že podmienky zmluvy nemožno poskytnúť ‚vzhľadom na stanovisko spoločnosti Ryanair, ktorá nesúhlasí so sprístupnením obsahu zmluvy vzhľadom na jej dôvernosť‘. |
29. |
Z týchto dôvodov slovenské orgány odmietli sprístupniť podmienky zmluvy a uvádzajú, že ministerstvu ako akcionárovi spoločnosti BTS ‚nie je známe, že by leteckej spoločnosti Ryanair bola v porovnaní s jej konkurentmi poskytnutá značná zľava pri letiskových poplatkoch na nové plánované a existujúce destinácie pre spoje na bratislavské letisko a z bratislavského letiska‘ (20). |
30. |
Slovenské orgány argumentujú, že BTS sa ako prevádzkovateľ letiska správa ako každý iný podnikateľ na trhu, t. j. odplaty za služby poskytované leteckým prepravcom na letisku určuje vo vzťahu ku každému leteckému prepravcovi individuálne na základe negociácie, t. j. dohodou strán a v súlade so svojou obchodnou politikou. V súvislosti s týmito odplatami nevykonáva ministerstvo, ako menšinový akcionár prevádzkovateľa letiska, voči prevádzkovateľovi letiska žiadnu priamu ani nepriamu regulačnú kompetenciu z pozície verejnej autority. Domnievajú sa, že poskytovanie zliav vo všeobecnosti je vo vzťahu k všetkým leteckým spoločnostiam bežnou praktikou, keďže zľavy ‚motivujú leteckých prepravcov na letisko privádzať vyšší objem pasažierov, čím umožňujú prevádzkovateľovi letiska – BTS, generovať vyššie príjmy, a to jednak z odplát za služby poskytované leteckým prepravcom a jednak z iných komerčných činností BTS na letisku nesúvisiacich s leteckou prepravou a smerujúcich k zatraktívneniu letiska pre cestujúcich, t. j. podpora činností leteckých prepravcov prináša priamo podporu pre rozvoj samotného letiska‘. |
31. |
Slovenské orgány argumentujú, že letecká informačná príručka AIP, ktorú vydávajú Letové prevádzkové služby Slovenskej republiky, nemá v tejto súvislosti povahu všeobecne záväzného právneho predpisu, a preto nie je pre BTS záväzná a môže mať len odporúčajúci charakter. |
32. |
Avšak slovenské orgány tiež uvádzajú, že ministerstvo ako akcionár BTS očakáva prínos zo zmluvy v nasledovnom:
|
33. |
Ministerstvo neočakáva, že by zmluva mala akýkoľvek dosah na prevádzku iných leteckých prepravcov na letisku. |
3. POSÚDENIE
3.1. Existencia pomoci
34. |
V zmysle článku 87 ods. 1 Zmluvy o ES ‚pomoc poskytovaná členským štátom alebo akoukoľvek formou zo štátnych prostriedkov, ktorá narúša hospodársku súťaž alebo hrozí narušením hospodárskej súťaže tým, že zvýhodňuje určitých podnikateľov alebo výrobu určitých druhov tovaru, je nezlučiteľná so spoločným trhom, pokiaľ ovplyvňuje obchod medzi členskými štátmi‘. |
35. |
Kritériá ustanovené v článku 87 ods. 1 sú kumulatívne. Preto na určenie toho, či oznámené opatrenia predstavujú štátnu pomoc v zmysle článku 87 ods. 1 Zmluvy o ES, musia byť splnené všetky nasledujúce podmienky. Konkrétne, finančná podpora:
|
3.1.1. Štátne zdroje
36. |
Pojem štátna pomoc sa vzťahuje na každú výhodu, ktorá sa udeľuje priamo či nepriamo, je financovaná zo štátnych zdrojov, udeľuje ju samotný štát alebo akýkoľvek sprostredkovateľský subjekt konajúci na základe právomocí, ktoré mu boli zverené. |
37. |
Po prvé, slovenské orgány argumentujú, že FNM nie je orgánom štátnej správy a že Ministerstvo dopravy, pôšt a telekomunikácií je iba menšinovým akcionárom BTS. Zastávajú preto názor, že ‚orgány štátnej správy nie sú priamo zainteresované na zmluvách uzavieraných medzi BTS a leteckými prepravcami‘ (19). |
38. |
Súdny dvor však uviedol, že ‚existencia pravidiel zabezpečujúcich, že verejný orgán zostáva nezávislý od iných orgánov, nespochybňuje samotnú zásadu verejného charakteru tohto orgánu. Právne predpisy Spoločenstva nepripúšťajú, aby samotný fakt vytvorenia samostatných inštitúcií poverených prideľovaním pomoci umožňoval obchádzanie pravidiel štátnej pomoci‘ (21). |
39. |
V súvislosti s charakterom činností Fondu (ktorý vlastní 66 % podiel v BTS) Komisia podotýka, že:
|
40. |
Dá sa preto vyvodiť, že Fond má verejnú povahu a jeho zdroje je možné považovať za verejné zdroje. |
41. |
Po druhé, slovenské orgány argumentujú, že letisko nie je prevádzkované orgánom štátnej správy, ale akciovou spoločnosťou BTS a.s. konajúcou podľa obchodného zákonníka. |
42. |
V rozsudku v prípade Stardust Marine Súdny dvor uviedol, že: ‚samotný fakt, že verejný podnik bol zriadený vo forme kapitálovej spoločnosti v zmysle súkromného práva, sa nemôže, so zreteľom na autonómiu, ktorú by mu táto právna forma mohla zverovať, považovať za dostatočný na to, aby sa vylúčila možnosť, že opatrenie pomoci, ktoré takáto spoločnosť prijme, by bolo pripísateľné štátu‘ (24). |
43. |
Avšak ‚… samotný fakt, že verejný podnik je pod kontrolou štátu, nepostačuje na to, aby sa opatrenia, ktoré tento podnik prijíma, ako napríklad predmetné opatrenia finančnej pomoci, pripisovali štátu. Je tiež potrebné preskúmať, či sa verejné orgány majú považovať za zaangažované akýmkoľvek spôsobom do schvaľovania týchto opatrení …‘ (25). |
44. |
Súdny dvor uviedol, že: ‚pripísateľnosť opatrenia pomoci, ktoré prijal verejný podnik, štátu, možno dedukovať zo súboru ukazovateľov vyplývajúcich z okolností prípadu a z kontextu, v ktorom sa dané opatrenie prijalo‘, ako napríklad: ‚jeho začlenenie do štruktúr verejnej správy, charakter jeho činností a ich vykonávanie na trhu v bežných podmienkach hospodárskej súťaže so súkromnými prevádzkovateľmi, právny štatút podniku (v zmysle jeho podliehania verejnému právu alebo súkromnému právu obchodných spoločností), intenzita dohľadu verejných orgánov nad riadením podniku, alebo akýkoľvek iný ukazovateľ, ktorý by v konkrétnom prípade poukazoval na zaangažovanie verejných orgánov alebo nepravdepodobnosť ich nezaangažovania do prijímania opatrenia, aj so zreteľom na jeho rozsah, obsah alebo podmienky, ktoré obsahuje‘ (26). |
45. |
Pokiaľ ide o činnosť samotnej BTS, Komisia podotýka, že 22. októbra 2007 akcionári BTS vymenovali na návrh Ministerstva dopravy, pôšt a telekomunikácií Slovenskej republiky nového predsedu predstavenstva BTS. V tlačovej správe uverejnenej na internetovej stránke letiska sa uvádza, že (27): ‚Cieľom týchto zmien je najmä zvýšiť priechodnosť kľúčových rozhodnutí akcionárov – Ministerstva dopravy, pôšt a telekomunikácií SR (MDPT) a Fondu národného majetku SR (FNM) – ako i oddeliť riadenie bežnej prevádzky letiska od riadenia rozvojových procesov‘. |
46. |
Pokiaľ ide vo všeobecnosti o prevádzku letiska, sú to činnosti, ktoré zohrávajú základnú úlohu vo viacerých politikách: v dopravnej politike, politike regionálneho alebo celoštátneho hospodárskeho rozvoja či politike územného plánovania. Verejné orgány vo všeobecnosti ‚nechýbajú‘, keď manažér letiska prijíma rozhodnutia, ktoré určujú dlhodobý rozvoj takejto infraštruktúry. |
47. |
Na základe týchto skutočností sa zdá, že štát je schopný kontrolovať činnosť BTS. V tomto štádiu preto Komisia nemôže vylúčiť, že rozhodnutie týkajúce sa uzavretia uvedenej zmluvy je pripísateľné verejným orgánom a predstavuje štátne zdroje. |
3.1.2. Selektívna ekonomická výhoda
48. |
V tomto prípade nie je verejné financovanie všeobecným opatrením, keďže je nasmerované jedinému podniku – leteckej spoločnosti Ryanair. Iné letecké spoločnosti prevádzkujúce lety z bratislavského letiska a na bratislavské letisko podľa všetkého nemajú tie isté podmienky. |
49. |
Slovenské orgány argumentujú, že BTS ‚sa správa ako každý iný podnikateľ na trhu, t. j. odplaty za služby poskytované leteckým prepravcom na letisku určuje vo vzťahu ku každému leteckému prepravcovi individuálne na základe negociácie, t. j. dohodou strán a v súlade so svojou obchodnou politikou‘ (28). |
50. |
Komisia preto musí preskúmať, či v tomto konkrétnom prípade bolo správanie BTS a.s. správaním subjektu verejného sektora, alebo správaním investora v trhovej ekonomike. |
Zásada investora v trhovom hospodárstve
51. |
Súdny dvor uviedol vo svojom rozsudku, že: ‚V tejto súvislosti by sa malo zdôrazniť, že podľa ustálenej judikatúry môžu investície verejných orgánov do kapitálu podnikov, nech majú akúkoľvek podobu, predstavovať štátnu pomoc, pokiaľ sú splnené podmienky stanovené v článku 87 (predtým článok 92)‘ (29). |
52. |
V tom istom rozsudku Súdny dvor uviedol, že ‚S cieľom určiť, či majú takéto opatrenia povahu štátnej pomoci, je potrebné posúdiť, či by za podobných okolností súkromný investor, ktorý má veľkosť porovnateľnú s veľkosťou orgánov spravujúcich verejný sektor, mohol poskytnúť kapitál v tejto výške‘. Súdny dvor dodal, že: ‚Je potrebné dodať, že hoci správanie súkromného investora, s ktorým treba porovnať intervenciu verejného investora sledujúceho ciele hospodárskej politiky, nemusí zodpovedať správaniu bežného investora, ktorý umiestňuje svoj kapitál s cieľom realizácie zisku v pomerne krátkom čase, musí zodpovedať aspoň správaniu súkromnej holdingovej spoločnosti alebo súkromnej skupiny podnikov, ktorá sleduje štrukturálnu politiku, či už všeobecnú alebo sektorovú, a riadi sa perspektívou rentability z dlhodobého hľadiska‘ (30). |
53. |
Komisia preto musí preskúmať, či sa v tomto danom prípade správanie bratislavského letiska riadilo perspektívou rentability a či výhoda, ktorú údajne spoločnosť Ryanair využíva, predstavuje výhodu, ktorú by za normálnych trhových podmienok nemohla využívať. |
54. |
Zdá sa, že zmluva bola uzavretá v čase privatizácie letiska, a to údajne v posledný deň lehoty na predkladanie ponúk. Úspešní uchádzači informovali médiá, že neboli o zmluve informovaní (31). Z uvedeného dôvodu počas prípravy svojich ponúk na privatizáciu nezohľadnili vo svojich podnikateľských plánoch záväzky vyplývajúce zo zmluvy. |
55. |
V ročnej správe z roku 2006 uverejnenej na internetovej stránke letiska sa okrem toho uvádza, že: ‚Manažment spoločnosti v období pred ukončením zmluvy o predaji akcií dlhodobo neriešil závažné dopady vyplývajúce zo zmlúv s leteckými spoločnosťami (SkyEurope) a uzatváral nové zmluvy (Ryanair) bez náležitého rozboru služieb, alebo posúdenia ich postavenia z hľadiska súťaže‘ (32). |
56. |
Slovenské médiá okrem toho informovali, že Ryanair zaujal veľmi negatívny postoj k privatizácii letiska (33). Niektoré médiá údajne spájali tento negatívny postoj spoločnosti Ryanair k privatizácii s jeho zmluvou s letiskom. Existujú náznaky, že uzavretie zmluvy bolo možné iba s letiskom v štátnom vlastníctve a nebolo by možné, keby bolo letisko v súkromnom vlastníctve. |
57. |
Samotné slovenské orgány uvádzajú hľadisko ‚ekonomického rozvoja regiónu a možného prílevu investícií‘ a ‚iných sekundárnych a terciárnych ekonomických efektov‘ ako jednu z výhod plynúcich zo zmluvy (pozri odsek 32 rozhodnutia). |
58. |
Komisia preto pochybuje o tom, či sa správanie BTS riadilo perspektívami rentability. Nemožno tak vylúčiť, že uzavretím zmluvy bola spoločnosti Ryanair poskytnutá výhoda, ktorú by za normálnych trhových podmienok nemohla využívať. |
3.1.3. Vplyv na hospodársku súťaž a obchod medzi členskými štátmi
59. |
Ak pomoc, ktorú poskytne členský štát podniku, posilní jeho postavenie v porovnaní s ostatnými podnikmi konkurujúcimi si v obchodovaní v rámci Spoločenstva, takéto podniky sa musia považovať za podniky ovplyvnené touto pomocou. Podľa ustálenej judikatúry (34) na to, aby opatrenie narušilo hospodársku súťaž, stačí, aby príjemca pomoci súťažil s inými podnikmi na trhoch, ktoré sú otvorené hospodárskej súťaži (35). |
60. |
Súbor liberalizačných opatrení známy ako ‚tretí balík‘, ktorý je v platnosti od roku 1993, umožnil všetkým leteckým dopravcom s licenciou Spoločenstva, aby mali od apríla 1997 prístup na vnútorný trh Spoločenstva bez akýchkoľvek obmedzení vrátane tarifných (36). |
61. |
Komisia uviedla v usmerneniach z roku 2005, že ‚Finančná pomoc vyplatená na začatie činnosti poskytuje … leteckej spoločnosti výhody, a môže mať teda za následok porušenie rovnováhy medzi spoločnosťami, pretože príjemcovi pomoci umožňuje znížiť jeho prevádzkové náklady. Pomoc rovnako môže nepriamo narušiť hospodársku súťaž medzi letiskami tým, že podporuje rozvoj určitých letísk a prípadne tým, že nabáda určitú spoločnosť »premiestniť sa« z jedného letiska na druhé letisko a premiestniť linku z letiska Spoločenstva na regionálne letisko. V takomto prípade predstavuje daná pomoc obvykle štátnu pomoc a musí byť oznámená Komisii‘ (odseky 77 a 78). |
62. |
Je preto pravdepodobné, že dané opatrenie má vplyv na hospodársku súťaž a obchod medzi členskými štátmi. |
3.1.4. Záver
63. |
Komisia vzhľadom na vyššie uvedené skutočnosti a vzhľadom na to, že jej slovenské orgány neposkytli podmienky zmluvy, ani podrobné informácie o okolnostiach, za ktorých sa obchod uzatvoril, usúdila na základe informácií, ktoré má k dispozícii, že spoločnosť Ryanair bola zvýhodnená štátnou pomocou v podobe zliav na letiskových poplatkoch, ktoré by jej za normálnych trhových podmienok neboli poskytnuté. |
64. |
Pokiaľ slovenské orgány neposkytnú ekonomické zdôvodnenie zmluvy alebo akékoľvek iné informácie, ktoré by vylučovali poskytnutie takejto pomoci spoločnosti Ryanair, Komisia musí posúdiť opatrenie s cieľom určiť, či je zlučiteľné so spoločným trhom. |
3.2. Právny základ hodnotenia
65. |
Komisia usudzuje, že článok 87 ods. 3 písm. c) Zmluvy o ES a Oznámenie Komisie týkajúce sa financovania letísk a štátnej pomoci na začatie činnosti pre letecké spoločnosti s odletom z regionálnych letísk (ďalej len ‚usmernenia z roku 2005‘) (37) tvoria právny základ pre posúdenie zlučiteľnosti daného opatrenia. |
3.3. Zlučiteľnosť pomoci
3.3.1. Ciele pomoci na začatie činnosti
66. |
Malé letiská obvykle nemajú taký počet cestujúcich, ktorý je nutný na dosiahnutie kritického objemu a prahu ziskovosti. |
67. |
Aj keď sa určitým regionálnym letiskám môže dariť celkom dobre, pokiaľ im letecké spoločnosti, ktoré plnia záväzok služby vo verejnom záujme, zabezpečujú dostatočný počet cestujúcich, alebo ak štátne orgány uplatňujú programy pomoci sociálnej povahy, letecké spoločnosti uprednostňujú overené a vhodne situované centrálne letiská, ktoré umožňujú rýchle spojenia, majú ustálenú základňu cestujúcich a na ktorých letecké spoločnosti disponujú prevádzkovými intervalmi, ktoré nechcú stratiť. Okrem toho letiskové a letové politiky a investície sústreďovali po dlhé roky dopravu do významných národných metropol. |
68. |
Letecké spoločnosti preto často nie sú pripravené, aby bez náležitých stimulov riskovali otvorenie nových leteckých trás s odletom z neznámych a nevyskúšaných letísk. Z tohto dôvodu Komisia môže akceptovať, aby sa leteckým spoločnostiam za istých podmienok dočasne vyplácala verejná pomoc, ak ich táto pomoc motivuje otvoriť nové dopravné trasy alebo zaviesť nové termíny odletov z regionálnych letísk a prilákať väčší počet cestujúcich, čo by malo v stanovenom časovom horizonte umožniť dosiahnuť prah rentability. Komisia zabezpečí, aby takáto pomoc nezvýhodňovala veľké letiská, ktoré sú už z veľkej časti otvorené medzinárodnej doprave a hospodárskej súťaži (odseky 71 a 74 usmernení z roku 2005). |
69. |
V usmerneniach o letectve z roku 2005 sa stanuje súbor podmienok (v odseku 79), ktoré treba splniť, aby bola pomoc na začatie činnosti považovaná za zlučiteľnú so spoločným trhom podľa článku 87 ods. 3 písm. c). |
3.3.2. Podmienky posúdenia zlučiteľnosti
70. |
Vzhľadom na podmienky stanovené v odseku 79 usmernení z roku 2005 Komisia podotýka, že:
|
71. |
Komisia preto pochybuje o tom, či podmienky zlučiteľnosti stanovené v usmerneniach z roku 2005 boli v danom prípade splnené. |
3.3.3. Záver
72. |
Na základe vyššie uvedeného posúdenia zlučiteľnosti Komisia pochybuje o tom, či možno opatrenie štátnej pomoci vyhlásiť za zlučiteľné so spoločným trhom podľa článku 87 ods. 3 písm. c) Zmluvy o ES. |
4. ROZHODNUTIE
Na základe uvedených skutočností sa Komisia rozhodla začať konanie ustanovené v článku 88 ods. 2 Zmluvy o ES v súlade s článkom 6 nariadenia (ES) č. 659/1999.
V súlade s článkom 10 nariadenia (ES) č. 659/1999, Komisia nariaďuje Slovenskej republike, aby do jedného mesiaca od prijatia tohto listu predložila všetky dokumenty, informácie a údaje potrebné na posúdenie pomoci/opatrenia a najmä:
— |
podmienky zmluvy, ktorú bratislavské letisko uzavrelo s leteckým prepravcom Ryanair, |
— |
štúdie, interné dokumenty alebo iné písomnosti, na základe ktorých sa dojednala zmluva so spoločnosťou Ryanair, |
— |
podnikateľský plán letiska a všetky ostatné strategické dokumenty spolu s podnikateľskou stratégiou voči spoločnosti Ryanair, |
— |
pravidlá/okolnosti, na základe ktorých sú/boli dojednané poplatky s inými leteckými spoločnosťami a politika, na základe ktorej sa uplatňovali poplatky na iné spoločnosti prevádzkujúce lety na bratislavské letisko a z bratislavského letiska (Air Slovakia, ČSA, Lufthansa, SkyEurope), |
— |
akékoľvek existujúce zmluvy akcionárov medzi Fondom národného majetku a Slovenskou republikou týkajúce sa bratislavského letiska, |
— |
informácie požadované v odseku 70 tohto rozhodnutia. |
V opačnom prípade Komisia prijme rozhodnutie na základe informácií, ktoré má k dispozícii. Komisia vyzýva slovenské orgány, aby bezodkladne predložili kópiu tohto listu potenciálnemu príjemcovi pomoci.
Komisia si dovoľuje pripomenúť Slovenskej republike, že článok 88 ods. 3 Zmluvy o ES má odkladný účinok, a upozorňuje na článok 14 nariadenia (ES) č. 659/1999, ktorý stanovuje, že akúkoľvek neoprávnenú pomoc možno od príjemcu vymáhať.
Komisia upozorňuje Slovenskú republiku, že bude informovať zainteresované strany prostredníctvom uverejnenia tohto listu a jeho zmysluplného zhrnutia v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie. Komisia bude tiež informovať zainteresované strany v krajinách EZVO, ktoré sú signatármi dohody o EHP, uverejnením oznamu v dodatku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskej únie, ako aj Dozorný orgán EZVO zaslaním kópie tohto listu. Všetky tieto zainteresované strany Komisia vyzve, aby predložili svoje pripomienky do jedného mesiaca od dátumu uverejnenia uvedených informácií.’
(1) ETREND, 31 March 2006,
http://relax.etrend.sk/65787/cestovanie/ryanair-si-poistil-bratislavu; Pravda.sk.
(2) http://relax.etrend.sk/65787/cestovanie/ryanair-si-poistil-bratislavu
(3) http://www.natfund.gov.sk/english/index.html
(4) Act 92/1991, paragraph 27(4).
(5) http://www.airportbratislava.sk/63/44.html
(6) http://www.airportbratislava.sk/files/docs/VS%20BTS%202006.pdf
(7) http://www.tvojepeniaze.sk/urad-neodsuhlasi-predaj-letisk-dmm-/sk_pludia.asp?c=A060813_194625_sk_pludia_p04
(8) OJ C 312, 9.12.2005, p. 1.
(9) Nariadenie Rady (ES) č. 659/1999 z 22. marca 1999 ustanovujúce podrobné pravidlá na uplatňovanie článku 93 Zmluvy o ES (Ú. v. ES L 83, 27.3.1999, s. 1).
(10) ETREND, 31. marec 2006,
http://relax.etrend.sk/65787/cestovanie/ryanair-si-poistil-bratislavu; Pravda.sk.
(11) Podrobné informácie o FNM sa nachádzajú na stránke:
http://www.natfund.gov.sk/
(12) Výročná správa za rok 2006 je uverejnená na stránke:
http://www.natfund.gov.sk/index.html
(13) Projekt 2004-SK-92801. Celkové náklady 2,2 milióna EUR, grant TEN-T 1,1 milióna EUR.
(14) http://relax.etrend.sk/65787/cestovanie/ryanair-si-poistil-bratislavu
(15) Odplata za pristátie, odplata za parkovanie lietadiel a odplata za použitie letiska cestujúcimi sa platí letisku. Odplaty za približovacie a letiskové riadenie vyberajú Letové prevádzkové služby Slovenskej republiky.
(16) Dôverné obchodné tajomstvo. Pri výpočtoch sa použil príklad lietadla Boeing 737-800 so 189 sedadlami, MTOM – 69,9 s percentuálnym využitím kapacity lietadla 83 %.
(17) Dôverné informácie.
(18) Odlet + prílet.
(19) List z 9. marca 2007.
(20) Tamtiež.
(21) Rozsudok súdu z 12. decembra 1996, T-358/94, Air France/Komisia, Zb. s. II-2109, ods. 62.
(22) http://www.natfund.gov.sk/
(23) Zákon č. 92/1991, par. 27 ods. 4.
(24) Rozsudok súdu zo 16. mája 2002, C-482/99, Francúzsko/Komisia, Zb. 2002, s. I-04397, ods. 57.
(25) Tamtiež, ods. 52.
(26) Tamtiež, ods. 55 a 56.
(27) http://www.airportbratislava.sk/63/44.html
(28) List zo 7. marca 2007.
(29) Rozsudok Súdu prvého stupňa zo 6. marca 2003 v spojených veciach T-228/99 a T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale a Land Nordrhein-Westfalen/Komisia Európskych spoločenstiev, C-305/89, ods. 18.
(30) Tamtiež, ods. 19 – 20.
(31) http://relax.etrend.sk/65787/cestovanie/ryanair-si-poistil-bratislavu
(32) http://www.airportbratislava.sk/files/docs/VS %20BTS %202006.pdf
(33) http://www.tvojepeniaze.sk/urad-neodsuhlasi-predaj-letisk-dmm-/sk_pludia.asp?c=A060813_194625_sk_pludia_p04
(34) Rozsudok Súdu prvého stupňa z 30. apríla 1998 vo veci T-214/95 Het Vlaamse Gewest/Komisia, Zb. 1998, s. II-717.
(35) V usmerneniach z roku 2005 Komisia uznala, že verejné financie poskytnuté letisku sa môžu použiť na udržanie letiskových poplatkov na umelo nízkej úrovni s cieľom zatraktívniť dopravu a môžu výrazne narušiť hospodársku súťaž (odsek 38).
(36) Nariadenie Rady (EHS) č. 2407/92 z 23. júla 1992 o licenciách leteckých dopravcov (Ú. v. ES L 240, 24.8.1992, s. 1), nariadenie Rady (EHS) č. 2408/92 z 23. júla 1992 o prístupe leteckých dopravcov Spoločenstva k letovým trasám v rámci Spoločenstva (Ú. v. ES L 240, 24.8.1992, s. 8) a nariadenie Rady (EHS) č. 2409/92 z 23. júla 1992 o cestovnom a sadzbách v leteckých dopravných službách (Ú. v. ES L 240, 24.8.1992, s. 15).
(37) Ú. v. EÚ C 312, 9.12.2005, s. 1.
(38) Nariadenie Rady (EHS) č. 2407/92 z 23. júla 1992 o licenciách leteckých dopravcov (Ú. v. ES L 240, 24.8.1992).
(39) Nariadenie Rady (EHS) č. 2408/92 o prístupe leteckých dopravcov Spoločenstva k letovým trasám v rámci Spoločenstva (Ú. v. ES L 240, 24.8.1992, s. 8).
(40) V zmysle článku 2 písm. m) nariadenia Rady (EHS) č. 2408/92 o prístupe leteckých dopravcov Spoločenstva k letovým trasám v rámci Spoločenstva (Ú. v. ES L 240, 24.8.1992, s. 8).
(41) Smernica Rady 89/665/EHS z 21. decembra 1989 o koordinácii zákonov, iných právnych predpisov a správnych opatrení týkajúcich sa uplatňovania postupov preskúmavania v rámci verejného obstarávania tovarov a prác (Ú. v. ES L 395, 30.12.1989, s. 33). Smernica Rady 92/13/EHS z 25. februára 1992, ktorou sa koordinujú zákony, iné právne predpisy a správne opatrenia o uplatňovaní právnych predpisov Spoločenstva, o postupoch verejného obstarávania subjektov pôsobiacich vo vodnom, energetickom, dopravnom a telekomunikačnom sektore (Ú. v. ES L 76, 23.3.1992, s. 14).
2.7.2008 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167/25 |
Prior notification of a concentration
(Case COMP/M.5211 — Outokumpu/Sogepar)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2008/C 167/07)
1. |
On 19 June 2008, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Outokumpu Oyj. (‘Outokumpu’, Finland) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking So.Ge.Par Group (‘Sogepar’, Italia) by way of a purchase of shares. |
2. |
The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:
|
3. |
On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
4. |
The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax ((32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.5211 — Outokumpu/Sogepar to the following address:
|
2.7.2008 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 167/26 |
Prior notification of a concentration
(Case COMP/M.5198 — Ramius/Morgan Stanley/Phoenix Dichtungstechnik)
Candidate case for simplified procedure
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2008/C 167/08)
1. |
On 24 June 2008, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which RCG International Opportunities SARL (‘Ramius’, Luxembourg), and Morgan Stanley & Co. International (‘Morgan Stanley’, USA) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation joint control of Phoenix Dichtungstechnik GmbH (‘PDT’, Germany) by way of purchase of shares. |
2. |
The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:
|
3. |
On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice. |
4. |
The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax ((32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.5198 — Ramius/Morgan Stanley/Phoenix Dichtungstechnik, to the following address:
|