25.6.2008

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/7

Summary of Commission Decision

of 23 January 2008

declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/M.4781 — Norddeutsche Affinerie/Cumerio)

(Only the English version is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2008/C 161/08)

On 23 January 2008, the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (1) , and in particular Article 8(1) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case and in the working languages of the Commission on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

I. SUMMARY

On 30 July 2007, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (‘EC Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking Norddeutsche Affinerie (‘NA’, Germany) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the EC Merger Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Cumerio SA (‘Cumerio’, Belgium) by way of a public bid announced on 27 June 2007.

NA is a German public limited company with production facilities in Hamburg, Emmerich and Lünen (Germany). NA produces copper cathodes (in Hamburg and Lünen). These copper cathodes are then processed into copper rod (Hamburg and Emmerich) and copper shapes (both cakes and billets in Hamburg). Downstream of the shapes production, through its subsidiary Prymetall GmbH & Co. KG (‘Prymetall’) in Stolberg (Germany), NA is also active in the production and sale of semi-finished copper products. Downstream of the copper rod production Prymetall produces shaped wires. Moreover, NA holds (indirectly, through Prymetall) 50 % in Schwermetall Halbzeugwerk GmbH & Co. KG (‘Schwermetall’, Germany), which produces copper shapes and pre-rolled strips. The other partner in the JV Schwermetall is Wieland Werke AG (‘Wieland’, Germany), itself a producer of copper shapes (only for own internal processing), as well as a producer of semi-finished copper products and final copper products. Both Wieland and Prymetall purchase copper shapes and pre-rolled strips from Schwermetall. Finally, NA holds a 60 % share in Deutsche Giessdraht GmbH (‘Deutsche Giessdraht’, Germany), a producer of copper rod jointly controlled with Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile (‘Codelco’, Chile), which holds the remaining 40 %.

Cumerio is a Belgian public limited company with production facilities in Olen (Belgium), Pirdop (Bulgaria), Avellino (Italy) and, through its subsidiary Swiss Advanced Materials AG, in Yverdon-les-Bains (Switzerland). Cumerio is active in the production of copper cathodes (Olen, Pirdop), of copper rod (Olen, Avellino) and of copper shapes (both cakes and billets in Olen), and further downstream of the copper rod production, to a lesser extent, of copper wires (Avellino) and profiles (Yverdon-les-Bains). Unlike NA, further downstream of the shapes and pre-rolled strips production, Cumerio is not active in the production of semi-finished copper products.

The Austrian holding A-TEC Industries AG (‘A-TEC’), an international industrial group with operations in drive systems, plant engineering, machine tools and metallurgy, has a share of 13,75 % in NA and a share of 25 % plus 1 share in Cumerio. A-TEC holds 100 % of the shares in Montanwerke Brixlegg AG (‘Brixlegg’) which is the main competitor of NA and Cumerio for copper shapes.

5.	The proposed transaction consists of the acquisition of sole control over Cumerio by NA via a public takeover offer for all outstanding shares, options and warrants.

6.	In order for the Commission to be able to dismiss any possible serious doubts in Phase I, the parties submitted on 28 August 2007 a remedy proposal offering for sale the entire copper shapes business line of Cumerio.

The market test of the remedy proposal was fairly negative. The Commission concluded, given the information available in Phase I, that the doubts as to potential unilateral effects in the market(s) for copper shapes could not be dismissed. The Commission therefore decided on 18 September 2007 to open a Phase II investigation.

The market investigation in Phase II revealed that the position of the new entity on the EEA merchant market for copper shapes will remain under the competitive pressure of both in-house producers of copper shapes and purchasers of copper shapes that may integrate upstream. Furthermore, on the basis of the characteristics of the market for copper shapes, its structure, the constraints exercised by the overcapacity and the competitive pressure exercised by the downstream markets of semi-finished copper products, it is concluded that the transaction does not threaten to significantly impede effective competition on the market for copper shapes in the EEA. In view of this, the new entity will not have the ability to undertake any successful strategy of input foreclosure on the downstream markets for semi-finished copper products.

9.	Therefore, a clearance decision pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Merger Regulation is proposed for adoption.

II. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

A. THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS

10.	The sector of activity affected by the proposed transaction is the copper industry.

1. Copper industry

11.

Copper is a natural product that is gained from copper ore. After extraction from the copper mine, copper ore is enriched in processing facilities into copper concentrate. Both copper concentrate and copper scrap are used to produce copper cathodes. To comply with the London Metal Exchange (LME) standard of ‘grade A’ copper cathodes, the most widely used standard in international trade, the cathodes must have a copper content of at least 99,9935 % and a defined maximum level of the various impurities such as silver, lead, phosphorous and others which make up the remaining 0,0065 % or less. Non-LME certified cathodes are called off-grade. The LME is the world's leading trading market for copper. The ‘LME price’ is thus considered as the ‘world copper price’.

12.	Copper cathodes, are the main inputs to produce both copper rod and copper shapes.

13.	Copper rod is a thin, long, round piece of copper, mostly produced in diameters of 8 mm. Copper rod is the main feedstock for power cables, installation cables and communication cables and wires. Copper rod can also be further processed into for example drawn and shaped wires, profiles and nuggets.

14.

There are two different kinds of copper shapes: billets and cakes. Billets are copper shapes with a circular section, with a diameter varying from 100-800 mm and a length of around 600 mm. Cakes are copper shapes with a rectangular section and weight up to 25 ton per cake. Copper billets are further transformed into tubes, bars and profiles, whereas copper cakes are the feedstock for pre-rolled strips and other rolled copper materials.

15.

The parties' activities overlap in the production of copper scrap, copper cathodes, by-products stemming from copper smelting and electrolysis, copper rod, copper shapes. Although Cumerio is not active as a producer of downstream copper products made out of copper shapes, these markets will be analysed with respect to both unilateral and vertical effects on the market for copper shapes.

2. Copper scrap

Product market definition

16.	The Commission has in previous decisions indicated that there is a distinct product market for copper scrap. The existence of a distinct product market for copper scrap has been confirmed by the market investigation.

17.	It has been claimed by one respondent to the market investigation that the refining of copper scrap under a so-called tolling arrangement might constitute a product market which is distinct from the market of copper scrap.

18.

The market investigation has shown that not only copper shapes producers, but all copper refiners, within and outside the EEA, use copper scrap as an input. There is significant trade in copper scrap. The market investigation confirmed that scrap tolling is one among several ways to dispose of copper scrap in a profitable way. The Commission therefore concludes that from a demand-side perspective scrap tolling is substitutable with selling scrap to refiners and possibly scrap traders.

Geographic market definition

19.	The market investigation has confirmed that suppliers and traders of copper scrap offer their scrap on a world-wide basis, and that many EEA-based buyers of scrap also purchase from sources outside the EEA.

3. Copper cathodes

Product market definition

20.	As the present transaction does not raise any competition concerns on the product market for cathodes, the question whether LME-grade and off-grade cathodes constitute a single product market or are rather to be distinguished, can, in line with previous Commission decisions, be left open.

Geographic market definition

21.	With respect to the geographic market definition, the respondents to the Commission's market investigation in the present transaction confirmed, in line with previous Commission decisions, that copper cathodes are traded world-wide.

4. Copper rod

Product market definition

22.

The production of copper rod can be achieved by two different processes: (i) by continuous casting and rolling; or (ii) by direct casting. While copper rod is being produced in various diameters ranging from 8 to 25 mm, 95 % of the overall European copper rod production relate to only one diameter, i.e. 8 mm, which serves as a standard product.

23.	The notifying party considers that the market for the production and supply of copper rod constitutes a single relevant product market and that no distinction between the two production processes or between the various diameters is necessary. This is in line with previous Commission decisions.

24.	The market investigation shows that the substitutability between copper rod (i) by continuous casting and rolling or (ii) by direct casting from a demand-side perspective is mainly one-sided.

25.

With regard to a potential further subdivision according to the different diameters of copper rod ranging from 8 to 25 mm the market investigation has shown that the different diameters are being used for different applications and most customers purchase copper rod of several different diameters. The market investigation confirmed the high degree of supply-side substitutability.

Geographic market definition

26.

In line with previous decisions of the Commission and in view of the dispersion of suppliers of copper rod in Europe, the market investigation has shown that there are overlapping geographical circles around production sites which influence each other's competitive situation. Therefore, the geographic market is to be defined as EEA-wide.

5. Copper shapes

Product market definition

27.

Copper shapes are copper products cast in a semi-continuous or a continuous process into billets or cakes Depending on the copper content and the content of impurities, the notifying party distinguish copper shapes of different qualities such as e.g. oxygen-free (OF-Cu), special-electrolytic (SE-Cu), electrolytic (E-Cu) and phosphorus-bearing (Ph-bearing Cu).

28.	With respect to demand-side substitutability between billets and cakes, the market investigation indicated that billets and cakes are not interchangeable, and constitute distinct product markets from their point of view.

29.

With respect to the supply-side substitutability of copper shapes, the notifying party has submitted that shape suppliers can easily switch from the production of billets to the production of cakes and vice versa within a short period of time and without any significant investment. The same has been stated on the possibility of switching the production between the various copper qualities of the shapes.

30.	Although it may not be possible for every copper producer/processor to switch easily between the production of cakes and billets on the same production line, the market investigation has confirmed that from the point of view of supply-side substitutability, billets and cakes are interchangeable.

31.

With respect to the various copper qualities, the market investigation has shown that these can in general be produced on the same production lines, with none or only minor additional costs. It has been confirmed that from the supply-side substitutability point of view, shapes of different copper qualities do not constitute distinct product markets, with the possible exception of OF-Cu shapes.

32.	However, since Cumerio does not produce OF-Cu shapes, it can be left open whether OF-Cu shapes constitute a distinct relevant product market, as it does not affect the competitive assessment of the transaction.

Geographic market definition

33.

The notifying party submits that the relevant geographic market for shapes is at least EEA-wide. The market investigation confirms that transport costs are relatively low compared to the value of copper shapes. More importantly, the market investigation confirmed that the EEA-based suppliers of the merchant market for copper shapes sell all over the EEA and to some extent outside the EEA, in Asia and North-America.

6. Markets downstream of copper shapes

Product and geographic market definition

34.

Copper shapes are further processed into semi-finished copper products. The market investigation confirms that there are different applications for copper products downstream of shapes, the most important of which are electrical engineering and the electronic industry; the construction industry; telecommunications; automotive industry; machine construction.

35.

In view of the fact that Cumerio is not active in the production of downstream semi-finished copper products, it is not necessary for the assessment to precisely define the boundaries between the different markets for the various semi-finished copper products, and to decide their exact geographic extension, either EEA or worldwide.

B. COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT

1. Unilateral effects

Non-coordinated effects on the market for copper scrap

36.	During the market investigation, a few customers have expressed concerns that the transaction might lead to the creation of buyer power, whereby the new entity could seek to take advantage of its position as one of the reduced number of buyers of copper scrap to lower the price thereof.

37.

As stipulated in the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’), increased buyer power, if established, is not in itself sufficient to conclude that competition may be significantly impeded.

38.

It appears to be very unlikely that significant buyer power would be created through the transaction. The aggregate share of demand for copper scrap of the new entity would be around [10-15] %. The new entity will face competitive pressure from many rivals, and will not be in a position to enter into anti-competitive behaviour on this market.

39.	In view of the above, it can be concluded that the proposed transaction will not lead to unilateral effects as a result of which effective competition will be significantly impeded in the world-wide market for copper scrap.

Non-coordinated effects on the market for copper rod

40.

Following the transaction the new entity would become the largest supplier of copper rod in the EEA. While [80-90] % of the production were sold to third parties, the rest of this volume was used by copper rod suppliers internally for their own production of wires, cables and profiles. On the merchant market for copper rod, the new entity would have a combined market share of around [30-40] %. In relation to the total production of copper rod, including production which is used internally, the new entity's combined market share would be around [20-30] %.

41.

Although some respondents to the market investigation who purchase copper rod raised concerns that the increased market share of the combined entity might lead to higher prices and less choice, such concerns can be dispelled. First, the new entity will face a number of major competitors active all over the EEA. Secondly, most customers source copper rod from two to three different suppliers and consider several other suppliers as an alternative option. Thirdly, most suppliers of copper rod have spare capacity and could increase sales on the merchant market or expand their overall production in case of a price increase for copper rod.

42.

The existence of other strong competitors together with the current situation of overcapacity for copper rod within the EEA as well as the potential expansion of the current production by competitors will continue to act as a competitive constraint and limit the ability and incentive for the new entity to raise prices after the transaction.

Non-coordinated effects on the market for copper shapes

43.	The main characteristic of the consumption of copper shapes in the EEA is the high proportion of in-house consumption: in-house consumption of copper shapes is nearly five times higher than merchant sales.

44.

On the merchant market, the parties are the main supplier of copper shapes in the EEA. The combined market share of the parties on the merchant market for copper shapes in the EEA is around [50-60] %. In a market for copper shapes excluding OF-Cu qualities, the combined market share of the parties in the EEA would be around [50-60] %. Montanwerke Brixlegg, which belongs to A-TEC, is the main competitor with a market share of around [20-30] %.

45.	Overall, the market investigation has shown that the production and use of copper shapes in the EEA, either in-house or through the merchant market, is driven by dynamics situated both upstream and downstream of the copper shapes production.

46.

First, the copper price affects the whole value chain of the copper industry since it represents around 95 % of the value (in-house consumption) or sales price (purchases on the merchant market) of copper shapes. Only less than 5 % of the value or sales price of copper shapes constitute the value added by the producers of copper shapes (the ‘transformation fee’).

47.

Secondly, the competitive dynamics are strongly influenced by the different degrees of vertical integration of the various actors and/or their location in the value chain. As the largest customers of the notifying party on the merchant market for copper shapes have at the same time an important in-house production of their own, they limit their dependence on the notifying party. Other important in-house producers of copper shapes use their entire copper shapes production to produce semi-finished copper products.

48.

The Commission has investigated to what extent an increase of prices on the EEA merchant market for copper shapes could be sustainable. The market investigation has confirmed that the availability of a considerable amount of spare capacity for the production of shapes will continue to exert a competitive constraint on the new entity and prevent it from increasing prices of copper shapes.

49.	In addition, should prices on the merchant market for copper shapes increase, there is a possibility that non-integrated users of copper shapes would integrate upstream and thus become active as producers of copper shapes.

50.

Furthermore, the market investigation confirmed that the downstream markets for semi-finished copper products exercise competitive pressure on the upstream market for copper shapes. This is the case first because there are more sellers (participants in the merchant market) on the downstream markets for semi-finished copper products than on the upstream market for shapes; secondly because the integrated sellers have excess capacity, as the new entity would have; thirdly because the sellers on the downstream markets for semi-finished copper products face competition from non-copper products; and fourthly because they face strong competition from rivals outside Europe for the semi-finished copper products that serve for electric and electronic applications.

51.

On the basis of the characteristics of the market for copper shapes, its structure, the constraints exercised by the overcapacity and the competitive pressure exercised by the downstream markets of semi-finished copper products, it is concluded that the transaction does not threaten to significantly impede effective competition on the market for copper shapes in the EEA.

2. Vertical effects

52.

It has been submitted to the Commission that the new entity would have the ability and the incentive to follow a foreclosure strategy on the markets for semi-finished copper products produced on the basis of its position on the market for copper shapes. These concerns pointed to a possible discrimination in favour of the new entity's subsidiaries (i.e. Schwermetall and Prymetall) who are present on the downstream markets for semi-finished copper products.

53.	As stipulated in the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, non-horizontal mergers ‘pose no threat to effective competition unless the merged entity has a significant degree of market power (which does not necessarily amount to dominance) in at least one of the markets concerned’.

54.

As demonstrated above, the position of the new entity on the EEA merchant market for copper shapes will remain under the competitive pressure of both in-house producers of copper shapes and purchasers of copper shapes that may integrate upstream. In view of this, the new entity will not have the ability to undertake any successful strategy of input foreclosure on the downstream markets for semi-finished copper products.

55.

Furthermore, even if the new entity decided to implement such a strategy, and some purchasers of copper shapes face, as a result, transitional difficulties in sourcing the copper shapes they need as an input, the markets for semi-finished copper products are, as demonstrated above, competitive and at least EEA-wide. Consequently, any concern of a reduction of consumer welfare can be dispelled.

56.	As a consequence, the transaction does not threaten to significantly impede effective competition on the markets for semi-finished copper products.

3. Coordinated effects

57.

The Commission has further investigated whether the fact that A-TEC, the main competitor of the parties on the EEA market for copper shapes, who is also an important minority shareholder in both NA and Cumerio, could give rise to coordinated effects on this market. The new entity and A-TEC's subsidiary Brixlegg would have a combined market share of around [70-80] % on the EEA-wide merchant market for copper shapes. When excluding OF-Cu shapes, the new entity and Brixlegg would have a combined market share of around [70-80] %.

58.	The Commission currently has no indications that A-TEC and the new entity have the intention to coordinate their market behaviour on the market for copper shapes.

59.	For coordination to be sustainable, three conditions as set out in the Airtours judgment and incorporated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines would have to be fulfilled.

60.

First, only the credible threat of timely and sufficient retaliation keeps companies away from deviating from terms of coordination. This requires in general that markets are sufficiently transparent to allow coordinating companies to monitor to a sufficient degree whether companies are deviating. The result of the market investigation with regard to the transparency of price conditions in this market is mixed. Should the new entity and A-TEC try to coordinate their competitive behaviour, it can indeed not be fully excluded that A-TEC's position as a minority shareholder might provide A-TEC with access to information on NA which it would not have if such a shareholder relationship did not exist.

61.

Secondly, coordination is not sustainable unless the consequences of deviation are sufficiently severe to convince coordinating companies that it is in their best interest to adhere to the terms of the coordination. In case of detected deviations of a potential coordination by the new entity or A-TEC, their ability and means of retaliation would seem to be quite different in view of their different capacity and market position. The fact that the new entity will have more spare capacity and a market share almost three times as high as A-TEC is likely to give the new entity a higher ability to retaliate than A-TEC. At the same time, the minority shareholding might provide A-TEC with the possibility to take advantage of its shareholding to retaliate by either using information it would not have as a simple competitor or by opposing the new entity's business policy as a major shareholder. In view of this it cannot be excluded that the A-TEC and the new entity might consider each other as able to react to deviations of a potential agreement.

62.

Thirdly, for coordination to be successful, the actions of non-coordinating companies and potential competitors, as well as customers, should not be able to jeopardise the outcome expected from coordination. If coordination were aimed at reducing overall capacity for copper shapes in the market, this would only hurt consumers if non-coordinating companies are unable or have no incentive to respond to this decrease by increasing their own capacity sufficiently to prevent a net decrease in capacity, or at least to render the coordinated capacity decrease unprofitable.

63.

Even if the new entity together with A-TEC managed to implement a coordination strategy which would not be fully jeopardised by competitors, the competitive conditions on the downstream markets for copper products would prevent these attempts from having any anti-competitive effects on the downstream markets by raising prices for copper products to consumers.

64.	As a consequence, it can be concluded that the proposed transaction will not lead to coordinated effects as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded on the EEA-wide market for copper shapes.

III. CONCLUSION

65.	For the reasons mentioned above, the decision concludes that the proposed concentration will not significantly impede effective competition in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it.

66.	Consequently the concentration should be declared compatible with the Common Market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 2(2) and Article 8(1) of the EC Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

(1) OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

25.6.2008

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/13

Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001

(2008/C 161/09)

Aid No: XA 120/08

Member State: Spain

Region: Castilla y León

Title of aid scheme: Ayudas a los agricultores profesionales, a las explotaciones asociativas prioritarias, y a las cooperativas agrarias para la adquisición de maquinaria y equipos destinados a la prestación de servicios a terceros en la actividad agraria; Ayudas a las inversiones colectivas

Legal basis: Orden de la Consejería de Agricultura y Ganadería, por la que se establecen las bases reguladoras de la concesión de las subvenciones destinadas a la mejora de las estructuras de producción y modernización de las explotaciones agrarias.

Orden de la Consejería de Agricultura y Ganadería, por la que se convocan ayudas, cofinanciadas por el Fondo Europeo Agrícola de Desarrollo Rural (FEADER), para la mejora de las estructuras de producción de las explotaciones agrarias en aplicación del Reglamento (CE) no 1698/2005 del Consejo y ayudas financiadas por la Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla y León, para la realización de otras inversiones en las explotaciones agrarias.

The information set out in this form refers exclusively to aid provided for in Chapter III

Annual expenditure planned under the scheme or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company: The subsidy planned for the two Chapter III aid schemes in 2008 is EUR 4 500 000

Maximum aid intensity: The two Chapter III aid schemes under the first piece of legislation provide for the following maximum aid:

The definition of the terms ‘agricultural holding’, ‘priority’ and ‘professional farmer’ is to be as laid down in Law No 19/1995 of 4 July 1995 on the modernisation of agricultural holdings and Law No 45/2007 of 13 December 2007 on the sustainable development of rural areas and, where amended, in accordance with the definitions in any further national and/or Autonomous Community legislation.

The total volume of the investments approved for all beneficiaries of the joint investment may not exceed the following limits:

(a)	EUR 300 000 per approved investment;

(b)	EUR 1 500 per hectare of pasture or mountain pasture improved or equipped;

(c)	EUR 15 000 per hectare irrigated or with improved irrigation

Date of implementation: The aid scheme will be implemented from 2008

Duration of scheme or individual aid award: The scheme may remain in force until 31.12.2013

Objective of aid: Global objective: To improve the structures and the diversification of the rural economy by means of incentives to invest in agricultural holdings in Castile-Leon with the aim of reducing production costs.

The measure is based on Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006, Investment in agricultural holdings.

Eligible investments:

The aid is intended for:

investment in machinery and new equipment, but not for the purchase of tractors or other vehicles,

in all the less-favoured areas aid is available for investment pursuing any of the following objectives:

—	fodder production, including the storage, conservation and distribution of fodder,

—	the improvement and equipping of pastures which are farmed jointly,

—	small-scale fodder-production water supply measures compatible with protection of the environment, including small-scale irrigation works, and the construction or repair of shelters necessary for transhumance, provided it is economically justified,

in all the mountain areas aid is also available for investment pursuing any of the following objectives:

—	the construction of water points, including catchments and related works,

—	the construction or improvement of access roads to pastures or mountain pastures, irrespective of their exploitation regime,

—	The construction or improvement of livestock housing, together with their corresponding installations and services, including for livestock on transhumance

Sector(s) concerned: Agriculture

Name and address of the granting authority: The aid is to be granted by the Dirección General de Industrialización y Modernización Agraria de la Consejería de Agricultura y Ganadería, and the Government of Castile-Leon will be responsible for its management

C/ Rigoberto Cortejoso, 14

E-47014 Valladolid

Website: The full text of the aid scheme is available on the website of the Castile-Leon Government at:

http://www.jcyl.es/AyudaEstado20072013

Direct links: http://www.jcyl.es/jcyl/ayudasestado/basesReguladoraSubvMejoraEstructurasAgrarias.doc

http://www.jcyl.es/jcyl/ayudasestado/ConvocatoriaAyudAgricProfesionExplotAsociativasCoopAgraInversColectiva.doc

Other information: Management of the aid will be subject to the Order and must comply with Article 19 of the Regulation as regards cumulation

Aid No: XA 122/08

Member State: The Netherlands

Region: —

Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving individual aid: Regeling LNV-subsidies

Legal basis: Artikel 2:68 van de Regeling LNV-subsidies, artikel 71a van het Openstellingsbesluit LNV-subsidies 2008

Annual expenditure planned under the scheme or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company: EUR 5 625 000

Maximum aid intensity: 70 %

Date of implementation:

Duration of the scheme or the individual aid: Aid can be requested during the period 1 May 2008 up to and including 30 May 2008. The last payments will be made on 31 December 2008 at the latest

Objective of aid: In accordance with Article 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006, subsidies can be granted to farmers for losses resulting from adverse climatic events which can be assimilated to natural disasters. By means of this amendment of Regeling LNV-subsidies the Dutch authorities intend to make a one-off payment to small and medium-sized farms as compensation for the damage they sustained as a result of extreme frost in 2005. The amount of the compensation is calculated in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006. Further details of the calculation method are provided in part 2 of the explanatory memorandum to the ‘Amendment of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality subsidy scheme and the Decision inviting applications for subsidies from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 2008’, Government Gazette 38, Friday 22 February 2008, page 10

Sector(s) concerned: Fruit sector

Name and address of the granting authority:

Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit

Bezuidenhoutseweg 73

2500 EK Den Haag

Nederland

Website: www.overheid.nl/op/

Explanation: on the website:

http://www.overheid.nl/op/

under part 2a, the following should be entered under ‘zinsdeel’: ‘Regeling LNV-subsidies’ or ‘Openstellingsbesluit LNV-subsidies’. The aid Regulation is the first search result.

www.hetlnvloket.nl/portal

Explanation: on the website:

http://www.hetlnvloket.nl/portal

Click on the tab ‘subsidies’. The aid Regulation is shown in the search results

Other information: In accordance with Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 any insurance payments and costs received as a result of factors other than the adverse climatic events are deducted from the losses taken into consideration for the granting of aid.

This condition is fulfilled. At the time this frost damage occurred it was not possible to effect frost damage insurance. This insurance was only made available after approval by the European Commission (aid measure N 124/07). Other costs resulting from adverse climatic conditions are not taken into consideration in the granting of aid.

In accordance with Article 11(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006, crop damage is calculated at farm level.

This condition is fulfilled. The compensation is dependent on the assessed crop damage per individual farm.

In accordance with Article 11(7) of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006, the public authorities officially assimilate the adverse climatic circumstances with a natural disaster.

The Dutch authorities have assimilated the extreme frost damage of 2005 with a natural disaster for the fruit sector. Consequently, it was decided to make a one-off compensation payment for the sector under this aid measure. For further documentation refer to Parliamentary Documents II 2005/06, 30 300, No 20.

Finally, the Dutch authorities confirm that the other conditions of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 are fulfilled

25.6.2008

Official Journal of the European Union

C 161/19

STATE AID — FRANCE

State aid C 24/08 (ex NN 38/07) — Fund for the prevention of risks to fishing: fiscal measures

Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2008/C 161/12)

By letter dated 20 May 2008, reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified France of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the above aid scheme.

Interested parties may submit their comments within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

Directorate F — Legal matters

Rue de la Loi 200

B-1049 Brussels

Fax (32-2) 295 19 42

These comments will be communicated to France. Confidential treatment of the identity of the interested party submitting the comments may be requested in writing, stating the reasons for the request.

TEXT OF SUMMARY

The Fund for the prevention of risks to fishing was created in 2004.

It received advances from the French Government with the aim of, firstly, acting against fluctuations in oil prices by acquiring and reselling purchase options on the oil futures markets and, secondly, providing partial compensation for the high cost of fuel for the vessels of fisheries undertakings that were members of the Fund when the price of fuel exceeded a certain level.

In its decision of today on State aid C-9/2006, the Commission takes the view that those advances constituted State aid incompatible with the common market.

During the formal investigation procedure carried out for this case, the Commission noted that the Fund and the fisheries undertakings concerned had also benefitted from fiscal arrangements under which, on the one hand, the Fund was exempt from corporation tax on income from its activities on the oil futures markets and, on the other, the fisheries undertakings concerned could deduct from their income membership fees, guarantee payments and other payments not connected with covering risks made to the Fund.

Since these fiscal arrangements constitute a new element of which the Commission was unaware when it opened the formal investigation procedure, they were not taken into consideration in the decision on State aid C-9/2006.

However, for the same reasons set out in that decision, the Commission takes the view that there are serious doubts about the compatibility of this aid with the common market.

TEXT OF LETTER

‘La Commission a l'honneur d'informer le gouvernement de la France qu'après avoir examiné les informations en sa possession et en complément des aides déjà analysées dans le cadre du dossier C-9/2006 concernant le fonds de prévention des aléas de la pêche (FPAP), elle a décidé d'ouvrir la procédure formelle d'examen prévue par l'article 93 [devenu 88], paragraphe 2, du traité CE et par le règlement du Conseil (CE) no 659/1999 du 22 mars 1999 portant modalités d'application de cet article (1) en ce qui concerne les mesures fiscales qui lui sont consenties ainsi qu' à ses adhérents.

1. PROCÉDURE

Par décision adoptée en date de ce jour à l'égard du régime C-9/2006, la Commission a décidé que les aides octroyées au FPAP sous forme d'avances pour l'acquisition d'options sur le marché du pétrole et les aides qui en ont résulté pour les entreprises de pêche en leur permettant, d'une part, de bénéficier de tarifs préférentiels pour leurs achats de carburant et, d'autre part, de bénéficier d'une compensation partielle de leurs coûts de carburant, étaient des aides d'État incompatibles avec le marché commun.

Dans le contexte de la procédure formelle d'examen du FPAP (2), la Commission a ensuite pris connaissance de l'existence d'un régime fiscal spécifique au FPAP et à ses adhérents. En effet, le cabinet Ménard, Quimbert et associés, avocats à Nantes, agissant en tant que Conseil du FPAP, a joint à l'un de ses courriers envoyés à la Commission suite à la publication de l'ouverture de la procédure formelle d'examen au Journal officiel des Communautés européennes deux lettres du ministère chargé du budget qui montrent l'existence d'un régime fiscal spécifique au FPAP et à ses adhérents. Ce régime fiscal n'a pas été examiné dans la décision C-9/2006, car il s'agissait d'un fait nouveau que la Commission ignorait au moment de l'ouverture de la procédure formelle d'examen.

La Commission considère que les éléments en sa possession sont suffisamment explicites pour lui permettre de conclure à l'existence d'aides illégales.

Le dossier a ainsi été enregistré sous le numéro NN 38/2007.

2. DESCRIPTION

Les deux lettres du ministère du budget sont, plus précisément, une lettre du Ministre délégué au budget et à la réforme budgétaire signée Alain Lambert et datée du 5 février 2004, et une lettre du secrétaire d'État au budget et à la réforme budgétaire signée Dominique Bussereau et datée du 28 novembre 2004, toutes deux adressées à Monsieur Merabet, président du FPAP.

Le premier de ces courriers, du 5 février 2004, s'inscrit dans le contexte de la création du FPAP. Il indique que:

“—	le fonds constitué sous la forme d'un syndicat professionnel ne sera pas soumis à l'impôt sur les sociétés au titre des cotisations versées par les patrons pêcheurs et des produits financiers issus du placement de la trésorerie,

—	les cotisations versées seront déductibles du résultat imposable des patrons pêcheurs l'année de leur versement. A titre exceptionnel, les premières cotisations versées au plus tard le 30 mars 2004 seront admises en déduction au titre des résultats 2003.”

Il donne également une indication sur les montants qui pourraient faire l'objet de cette déduction: la cotisation annuelle des patrons pêcheurs adhérents serait comprise entre 1 000 et 15 000 euros.

Le second courrier, du 28 novembre 2004, se concentre sur la déduction des revenus des cotisations versées par les adhérents. Il intervient dans le contexte d'une modification de la convention de garantie liant le FPAP à ses adhérents, qui permettrait désormais une restitution aux adhérents des cotisations versées et non utilisées au terme de la convention.

Il indique que:

“—	les cotisations versées par les adhérents en application de cette nouvelle convention seront bien déductibles, l'année de leur versement, dans la limite de 10 000 euros par an et par adhérent, ce plafond étant majoré de 25 % de la fraction du bénéfice comprise entre 40 000 et 80 000 euros,

—	les cotisations versées au-delà des limites précédentes au titre d'un projet de garantie mis en place par le fonds seront intégralement déductibles du revenu imposable des adhérents l'année de leur versement.”

Il est précisé au FPAP qu'un “bilan de cette expérimentation” devra être dressé fin 2006, et les aménagements éventuellement nécessaires étudiés. Il ne s'agit donc pas d'un régime fiscal accordé à titre permanent.

Par ailleurs, même s'il est prévu, d'après ce courrier du 28 novembre 2004, que les cotisations peuvent êtres déduites du revenu imposable l'année de leur versement, rien n'indique que la déduction de celles versées début 2004 (jusqu'à fin mars) sur les revenus de l'année 2003 soit remise en cause.

Il résulte de ces deux courriers que le régime fiscal accordé par le ministère des finances au FPAP et à ses adhérents comporte deux aspects:

—	d'une part, en faveur du FPAP, une exonération des impôts sur les sociétés,

—	d'autre part, pour les patrons-pêcheurs, la possibilité de déduire de leurs résultats imposables leurs contributions au FPAP.

Concernant le FPAP, la Commission suppose que la base juridique lui permettant de bénéficier de l'exemption de cet impôt est constituée par l'article 206, paragraphe 1bis, du code général des impôts (3) qui permet d'exonérer dans certaines conditions les syndicats professionnels. Dans ces conditions, il est fort possible qu'il bénéficie aussi de l'exemption de taxe professionnelle, prévue à l'article 1447 du même code en faveur des organismes bénéficiant de l'exonération prévue à l'article 206, paragraphe 1bis.

Concernant la mesure fiscale en faveur des patrons-pêcheurs, un autre document communiqué par MQA dans le cadre de la procédure formelle d'examen du FPAP et intitulé “Mode d'emploi détaillé du Fonds de prévention des aléas pêche”, daté du 22 novembre 2004, confirme quelles sont ces contributions et leurs modalités de calcul. Il y est indiqué: “l'adhésion au fonds est prévue pour une durée de trois ans. Les cotisations au fonds pourront bénéficier d'une déduction fiscale dès leur versement”. L'adhésion se concrétise par la signature d'une convention de garantie qui est assortie du versement d'une cotisation composée de deux éléments: un droit d'adhésion fixe de 150 euros par navire et par an et une contribution annuelle calculée en fonction du volume de carburant assuré, c'est-à-dire du volume annuel de carburant que l'armateur estime nécessaire à l'exercice de son activité.

En ce qui concerne ces cotisations de garantie, la Commission observe que, selon les deux lettres du ministère chargé du budget, “les cotisations versées seront déductibles du résultat imposable des patrons pêcheurs l'année de leur versement”. De plus, celle du 28 novembre 2004 prévoit que “… la convention de garantie serait amendée afin notamment d'autoriser la restitution aux adhérents des cotisations versées et non utilisées”). Aussi, outre la déduction de leurs cotisations, les armateurs ont-ils probablement été assurés de récupérer le trop-versé de cotisations calculées en fonction d'un besoin de carburant estimé sur base déclarative. En outre, bien que cette récupération des cotisations versées mais non utilisées au terme de la convention de garantie soit prévue, aucun élément des documents communiqués à la Commission dans le cadre du dossier C-9/2006 ne montre que la déduction correspondant aux cotisations versées en trop devrait être corrigée; la déduction fiscale des cotisations liées à la totalité du volume de carburant assuré par l'armateur semble acquise définitivement dans sa totalité, même si la consommation a été moindre que prévue. L'interprétation des clauses du Mode d'emploi va dans le même sens: celui-ci distingue le volume assuré du volume consommé.

On ne peut donc exclure que le régime fiscal consenti par les autorités françaises ait pu inciter les armateurs à surestimer leur besoin de couverture dans le seul but de bénéficier de la déduction fiscale. Ainsi, par exemple, la cotisation due pour un chalutier de 24 mètres, ayant une consommation moyenne de 10 tonnes par semaine (4) et actif pendant 48 semaines par an serait de 480 × 3,5 euros par tonne soit 1680 euros. Ce montant, bien que correspondant à un navire qui est déjà gros consommateur de carburant, est à comparer à la fourchette de montants, de 1 000 à 15 000 Euros, indiquée dans le courrier du ministre du 5 février 2004, et se situe ainsi dans la partie basse de cette fourchette.

En plus des cotisations décrites ci-dessus, le “Mode d'emploi” mentionne, en page 3, des “cotisations non-affectées à un risque de garantie versées en vue de bénéficier du traitement fiscal agréé par le ministère du budget [qui] devront faire l'objet de chèques distincts”.

On déduit de cette phrase qu'il y a une autre source de financement du FPAP, qui est clairement identifiée par un paiement par chèque séparé. Cela doit être interprété dans le sens où les adhérents ont aussi la possibilité de verser des cotisations qui n'entrent pas dans le système de garantie et pour lesquelles ils bénéficient d'un traitement fiscal spécifique.

La Commission estime que l'ensemble de ces déductions fiscales constitue une incitation, pour les propriétaires de navire de pêche, à cotiser à ce fonds.

Enfin, la Commission relève que les statuts du FPAP prévoient une possibilité d'adhésion au syndicat pour des personnes dont l'activité n'est pas impliquée dans la pêche. Etant donné que le FPAP a le statut de syndicat professionnel, il est possible que ces cotisations ouvrent droit au bénéfice des dispositions spécifiques du même code général des impôts en faveur des syndicats, notamment la réduction d'impôt prévue à l'article 199 quater C. L'application de cette disposition fiscale constitue aussi, cette fois-ci en faveur des adhérents n'étant pas impliqués dans la pêche, une incitation à cotiser à ce fonds.

3. APPRÉCIATION

La Commission constate que le régime fiscal consenti par les autorités françaises en faveur du FPAP et de ses adhérents doit être considéré, au regard des aides d'État, sous l'angle des avantages qu'il représente, d'une part pour le FPAP lui-même et, d'autre part, pour les entreprises de pêches adhérentes.

3.1. Existence d'une aide d'État

Comme cela est exposé dans la décision C-9/2006, le FPAP doit être considéré comme une entreprise au sens du droit communautaire de la concurrence. Le fait que le FPAP serait sans but lucratif ou est un syndicat est sans incidence à cet égard.

Par conséquent, la Commission considère que le régime fiscal accordé par les autorités françaises au FPAP lui procure, par rapport aux autres investisseurs privés agissant sur les marchés à terme des produits pétroliers, un double avantage:

—	en premier lieu, l'exonération d'impôt sur les bénéfices dont bénéficie le FPAP constitue un allégement des charges qui pèsent normalement sur le budget des entreprises actives dans ce domaine,

—

en second lieu, l'avantage fiscal consenti aux adhérents du FPAP, quel que soit le type d'avantage fiscal considéré, constitue une incitation à contribuer aux recettes du FPAP; il permet ainsi au FPAP d'augmenter sa trésorerie alors que les autres entreprises actives dans ce domaine ne bénéficient pas d'un tel mécanisme.

Par ailleurs, il ressort des deux correspondances du ministère chargé du budget que l'avantage tiré de l'exonération d'impôts dont bénéficie le FPAP et l'avantage résultant du dispositif d'incitation fiscale lui permettant d'augmenter ses recettes ont bien été consentis par l'État. Il n'y a donc pas de doute sur le fait que l'utilisation de ces ressources d'État a été non seulement décidée, mais contrôlée par l'État. Dès lors, la Commission considère que l'avantage financier en faveur du FPAP est imputable à l'État (5).

Enfin, le FPAP bénéficie grâce, à ces mesures fiscales, d'un avantage financier par rapport aux autres sociétés intervenant sur les marchés à terme, qu'il s'agisse de sociétés habituellement actives sur ces marchés en France ou dans les autres États membres.

D'autre part, cet avantage financier accordé au FPAP a permis aux entreprises de pêche adhérentes d'acheter du carburant à un tarif préférentiel grâce à l'activité menée par le FPAP sur les marchés à terme des produits pétroliers.

En outre, pour ce qui est de la possibilité accordée aux armateurs de déduire de leurs revenus les contributions au FPAP, cette déduction entraîne un allégement des charges pesant normalement sur les entreprises de pêche bénéficiaires. Cette déduction a été décidée par le ministère chargé du budget et elle est donc imputable à l'État. Les entreprises ayant la possibilité de procéder à cette déduction bénéficient d'un avantage par rapport aux autres entreprises de pêche communautaires. De la même manière, cet avantage financier affecte les échanges entre les États membres et fausse ou menace de fausser la concurrence. Pour cette raison, il constitue une aide d'État au sens de l'article 87 du traité CE.

3.2. Compatibilité avec le marché commun

L'analyse développée dans la décision C-9/2006 conserve ici aussi toute sa pertinence. Il convient de reprendre, pour le compte de la présente décision, l'ensemble du raisonnement et des conclusions de cette décision.

Ainsi, de la même manière, il s'agit d'aides au fonctionnement dont les bénéficiaires sont le FPAP lui-même et les entreprises de pêche.

Aucune des dispositions, soit du traité CE, soit d'un instrument adopté par la Commission en matière d'aide d'État (règlement, lignes directrices, …) ne permet de considérer ces aides comme étant compatibles avec le marché commun.

4. CONCLUSION

En conséquence, il existe, à ce stade de l'évaluation préliminaire telle qu'elle est prévue à l'article 6 du règlement (CE) no 659/1999, des doutes sérieux sur la compatibilité de ces mesures d'aide avec le marché commun, tant en ce qui concerne l'aide en faveur du FPAP que l'aide en faveur des entreprises de pêche.

A la lumière des considérations qui précèdent, la Commission, agissant dans le cadre de la procédure prévue à l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du Traité CE, demande à la France de lui présenter ses observations et de lui fournir tous les renseignements nécessaires pour apprécier l'aide en cause, dans un délai d'un mois à compter de la réception de la présente lettre.

Par la présente, la Commission avise la France qu'elle informera les intéressés par la publication de la présente lettre et d'un résumé de celle-ci au Journal officiel de l'Union européenne. Elle informera également les intéressés dans les pays de l'AELE signataires de l'accord EEE par la publication d'une communication dans le supplément EEE du Journal officiel, ainsi que l'autorité de surveillance de l'AELE en leur envoyant une copie de la présente. Tous les intéressés susmentionnés seront invités à présenter leurs observations à compter d'un mois à compter de la date de cette publication.’

(1) JO L 83 du 27.3.1999, p. 1.

(2) Voir décision d'ouverture formelle de la procédure JO C 91 du 19.4.2006.

(3) Disponible à l'adresse électronique suivante:

http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleCode?commun=CGIMPO&code=

(4) Montant de consommation fourni par le FPAP; cf. point 55 de la décision C-9/2006.

(5) Affaires C-482/99, France c/. Commission, arrêt de la Cour du 16 mai 2002 et C-345/02, Pearle BV, arrêt de la Cour de justice du 15 juillet 2004.

		ISSN 1725-2423
Official Journal of the European Union		C 161

English edition	Information and Notices	Volume 51 25 June 2008

Notice No	Contents	page
	II Information
	INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES
	Commission
2008/C 161/01	Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5032 — Roxel/Protac) ( 1 )	1

2008/C 161/02	Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5094 — Nokia/Trolltech) ( 1 )	1

	IV Notices
	NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES
	Council
2008/C 161/03	Notification by Romania concerning visa reciprocity	2

2008/C 161/04	Notification by Romania concerning visa reciprocity	3

	Commission
2008/C 161/05	Euro exchange rates	4

2008/C 161/06	Final report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.4781 — Norddeutsche Affinerie/Cumerio (Pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21)	5

2008/C 161/07	Opinion of the Advisory Committee on Mergers given at its meeting of 9 January 2008 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.4781 — Norddeutsche Affinerie/Cumerio — Rapporteur: Czech Republic	6

2008/C 161/08	Summary of Commission Decision of 23 January 2008 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4781 — Norddeutsche Affinerie/Cumerio) ( 1 )	7

	NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES
2008/C 161/09	Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001	13

	V Announcements
	ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
	Court of Justice
2008/C 161/10	Call for applications — Director-General (Grades AD15-AD16) of the Library, Research and Documentation at the Court of Justice of the European Communities	16

	European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO)
2008/C 161/11	Notice of open competition EPSO/AST/66/08	18

	PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY
	Commission
2008/C 161/12	State aid — France — State aid C 24/08 (ex NN 38/07) — Fund for the prevention of risks to fishing: fiscal measures — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty ( 1 )	19

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