16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/1

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‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products’

—

and the ‘Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common framework for the marketing of products’

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and the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down procedures relating to the application of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State and repealing Decision 3052/95/EC’

1.1

The EESC is firmly convinced of the importance of ensuring full application of the principle of the free movement of goods, which is enshrined in the Treaty and confirmed by numerous Court of Justice judgments, so that products lawfully marketed in a Member State can also be marketed without hindrance throughout the EU.

1.2

The EESC believes it is a priority to guarantee certainty, transparency and efficiency in trade, eliminating duplication of checks and tests and ensuring high levels of protection for consumers, citizens and businesses, and to coordinate and step up market surveillance activities to ensure active, uniform application of Community product safety requirements.

1.3

The EESC stresses that the free movement of goods is an essential driver for competitiveness and the economic and social development of the European single market and that reinforcement and updating of the requirements for the marketing of safe, high-quality products are key factors for consumers, businesses and European citizens.

1.4

The EESC believes that the updating and streamlining of EU legislation on goods cannot be put off, given:

1.5

The EESC supports the Commission's initiative of putting together a legislative package on the subject insofar as it fully achieves:

1.6

The EESC feels that high levels of transparency, legal certainty and simplification must be ensured in the application of common mutual recognition procedures, by means of:

1.7

The EESC endorses the basic principles of the proposals, which are derived from combining the successful elements of the ‘new approach’ with the ‘global approach’ in the area of conformity assessment. They should be applied across the board in present and future Community legislation, covering all aspects of products sold, particularly as regards safety, health and environmental protection.

1.8

It is vital that all economic operators in the supply and distribution chain — be they manufacturers, authorised representatives or importers — take the necessary measures and equal responsibility to ensure that only products which comply with the regulations are marketed.

1.9

Product traceability, ensuring accountability of economic operators who place goods on the market, must allow these operators to be identified clearly so that Community rules can be properly applied.

1.10

In the EESC's view, the problems of placing goods on the market online need to be addressed, given that online selling is not yet fully regulated.

1.11

The EESC feels that clearer provisions are essential to improve the current ‘new approach’ framework, as regards:

1.12

The EESC agrees that there is a need to enhance the status and significance of the CE marking, affording it greater legal protection by registering it as a collective mark, which will enable public authorities to take swift action and curb misuse.

1.13

The EESC stresses that technical standardisation plays a key role throughout this area, as the new approach is based precisely on essential legal requirements and European technical standards — which must be supported and harnessed — being closely linked.

1.14

The European Accreditation System (EAS) — providing a public service of general interest — must be based on internationally recognised standards and clear definitions, ensure acceptance across the board of conformity assessment results and prevent unnecessary duplication of assessment.

1.15

The provisions of the Regulation which relate to the EAS must apply to all accreditation bodies and the services they provide, within the European Economic Area, irrespective of the kind of conformity assessment services supplied to clients.

1.16

These provisions must ensure:

1.17

The EESC believes that it is necessary to establish a clear legal basis for European cooperation for Accreditation (EA), whose role must be enhanced and better defined: all national accreditation bodies must be members of the EA, to ensure equivalence, transparency, reliability and effectiveness; moreover, the EA network must be supported by the Member States.

1.18

The EESC believes that, since accreditation bodies have to show that the confidence placed in them is well-founded, they should have to prove that they participate successfully in peer reviews.

1.19

In addition, the EESC believes that it is important for stakeholders to be involved: they should be represented on accreditation bodies and this provision should be an integral part of the new Regulation.

1.20

The EESC believes in this connection that there should be greater awareness and acknowledgement of consumers' rights in the internal market and that an appropriate initiative needs to be planned to this end.

1.21

Market surveillance activities should also apply to products covered by the General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) as numerous products are sold both for professional use and for use by an end consumer. The EESC feels that the existence of the current rapid information-exchange system, RAPEX, which can assist market surveillance effectively, is fully justified.

1.22

It is necessary for customs authorities to cooperate in a European network with market surveillance authorities, to ensure effective checks on products before they are placed on the European internal market, where they can circulate freely.

1.23

For this and other reasons, customs authorities must be equipped with trained staff, sufficient funds and powers to be able to cope effectively with the tasks assigned to them, and instruments to deal rapidly with seasonal products or products sold over limited periods.

1.24

Lastly, the EESC believes that the Regulation should specify that measures taken in response to a proven lack of conformity must comply with the proportionality principle as well.

2.1

The internal market for goods is not only the driving force for growth within the Community: it also has a considerable impact on the European Union's ability to compete on the international market. As the EESC has pointed out a number of times, ‘a factor which has increased its importance is “Globalisation” which is both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge can only be met if the full potential of the single market is realised’ (2).

2.2

The central pillar of the single market is the free movement of goods: under Articles 28-30 (3) of the Treaty essential progress has been made in harmonising technical regulations at EU level to remove technical barriers to trade, often by means of ‘new approach’ directives (also known as ‘CE marking’ directives).

2.3

However, gaps have emerged in the application and enforcement of the Treaty's provisions, particularly in the area of non-harmonised products. The introduction of national technical rules has created major barriers to free trade, especially for SMEs, because of a legislative framework which is still too fragmented and the lack of a consistent approach to market surveillance among Member States.

2.4

The EESC has stressed that ‘Member States have a heavy responsibility to ensure that EU measures are properly transposed into their national law and enforced’ and that it is important that ‘the resulting regulatory framework at national level is both as balanced in terms of content and as simple as possible for business, employees, consumers and all civil society players’ (4).

2.5

The EESC firmly supports the goals of more transparent, effective rules and stronger, updated requirements for marketing of safe, high-quality products, in order to provide:

2.6

In its opinion on the Internal Market Strategy — Priorities 2003-2006 (5), the EESC pointed out that ‘trade with third countries has been growing faster than trade between Member States.’ and that ‘one reason is the failure of mutual recognition designed to give consumers confidence in products manufactured in another country. Member States should trust each other's systems. A sound legal system, high and transparent quality standards and consumer education initiatives provide the best conditions for increasing trade in goods between Member States.’

2.7

The EESC also stressed that knowledge of consumer rights in the internal market is extremely limited and that it had on several occasions drawn attention (6) — particularly as regards peripheral and recent accession countries — to these failings and the way in which national and local officials often exploit this ignorance.

2.8

In addition, the EESC points out that the four main barriers to the proper operation of the internal market identified by the SMO in 2007 are:

2.9

The EESC has stated: ‘It is noticeable and regrettable that after many years of European integration EU law and policy are not yet sufficiently integrated in a number of Member States as a political and administrative layer in domestic policy-making in those areas in which they have committed themselves to common policies and to carry out the results of common decision-making’ (7).

2.10

It went on to point out: ‘An effective and transparent approach of EU matters at national level is indispensable as 25 Member States, each with their own administrative culture and traditions as well as process management, have to respect the same acquis, which includes similar requirements regarding lawmaking, transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU law’ (8).

2.11

According to the ‘Kok Report’ (9), ‘the free movement of goods within the EU continues to be hindered by a range of local rules, often applied arbitrarily and in clear contradiction to the mutual recognition principle’ (10).

2.12

In the light of the above, the EESC feels that it is an urgent priority, with a view to securing the future of European integration, the protection of consumers and citizens and the development of European businesses, to:

3.1

The Commission takes as a starting point the observation that the internal market is not yet complete:

3.2

To address these issues, the Commission proposes:

3.3

The first regulation (COM(2007) 36 final) proposes the repeal of the current procedure for mutual exchange of information and addresses some aspects of the non-harmonised area:

3.4

The decision (COM(2007) 53 final) sets out the general framework for future sectoral legislation with:

3.5

The second regulation (COM(2007) 37 final) provides for reinforcement of the requirements for accreditation and for market surveillance, so that non-compliant products can be easily identified and taken off the market. The main objective of the proposal is to ensure the free movement of goods in the harmonised area by:

4.1

The EESC firmly believes that the free movement of goods is an essential driver for competitiveness and the economic and social development of the European single market and that reinforcement and updating of the requirements for the marketing of safe, high-quality products are key factors for consumers, businesses and European citizens.

4.2

Over the past 50 years, the single market for goods has helped to bring Europe's economies increasingly close: trade between the EU-27 Member States now accounts for two-thirds of all EU trade.

4.3

Implementing the provisions of Articles 28 and 30 (13) of the EC Treaty, harmonising the old and new approach technical rules and applying the mutual recognition principle properly are key pillars for the development of intraCommunity trade.

4.4

There are many reasons why the updating and adjustment of EU legislation on goods cannot be put off: the problems encountered in implementing and enforcing the provisions of the Treaty; the lack of a consistent approach to market surveillance in the Member States; shortcomings in conformity assessment bodies and in the legal protection of the CE marking; the inconsistencies and complexity of European legislation, which is often multi-layered and overlapping, with a patchwork of different procedures; and gaps in businesses', administrations' and citizens' awareness of their rights and obligations.

4.5

The EESC supports the Commission's initiative, as, moreover, it has already stressed, and it repeatedly called for such an initiative in its opinions on the single market (14); it supports the proposals issued insofar as they reflect the comments made in this opinion.

4.6

The EESC believes that four key criteria should be used to assess the proposed measures, to ensure that they are incorporated into the existing Community framework:

4.7

The EESC feels that the Commission's proposals allow major steps forward as they lay down:

4.8

The EESC fully agrees that there is a need to improve the quality of the system for accrediting notified bodies and to establish more stringent criteria for selecting, managing and supervising these bodies, with a legal framework providing consistency, comparison and coordination in the decentralised system to ensure reliability and increase mutual trust.

4.9

Particularly in view of increasing globalisation, the market surveillance system must provide a common legislative framework ensuring efficient, consistent application of legislation throughout the EU.

4.10

Non-compliant, potentially dangerous products must not be allowed to reach the market, as stressed in the RAPEX (Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products) 2006 annual report on dangerous consumer products (15).

4.11

As regards the CE marking — conceived as a conformity mark rather than a quality mark — the EESC feels that it is essential to restore faith in conformity marks. The value of the CE marking must be restored, with greater possibilities of prosecution for breach thereof and legal protection ensured for something which represents the legislative linchpin for all the ‘new approach’ directives, now covering 20 production sectors.

4.12

Regarding the current legislative framework, the EESC believes that the inconsistencies, duplicated rules and legal uncertainties may well be the Achilles Heel of the entire system, severely harming consumers, businesses, citizens and civil society as a whole.

4.13

The existence of several layers of legislation and failure to respect the need for consistency among initiatives linked to EU policy and other goals have led to excessive red tape and considerable burdens in terms of time relating to the actual launch of differing procedures. This has had a very harmful impact, especially on consumers, small and medium-sized enterprises and individuals.

4.14

The EESC therefore fully supports the proposal for a common reference framework for the marketing of products (16). This framework should include common elements, procedures and definitions for the future reorganisation and adjustment of individual directives so as to remove unnecessary red tape and shortcomings from the current legislative framework.

4.15

The EESC feels that it is important, as a key element in the single market, to draw up a practical telematic guide for the marketing of products in the European single market (17), giving a user-friendly overview of all legislation and procedures broken down by major sectors, including rights and obligations, access procedures, time frames and launch costs.

5.1.1

The principle of mutual recognition, provided for under Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty, is a cornerstone of the free movement of goods and services in the internal market. Fifty years on, as the EU has progressively enlarged and markets have become increasingly globalised, the EESC believes there is a need to strengthen and safeguard its role, providing greater legal certainty and uniform implementation, and harness its full potential for economic operators, European businesses and national authorities alike.

5.1.2

The Commission proposal represents a positive step in this direction since it:

5.1.3

The EESC believes, however, that there remain several problem issues which the proposal needs to address more specifically:

5.1.4

The EESC feels that it would be appropriate for the text to refer explicitly to the Treaty legal bases establishing the principle of mutual recognition, thus highlighting that safeguarding supposed national requirements can only be the exception.

5.1.5

The EESC feels that high levels of transparency, legal certainty and simplification must be ensured in the application and enforcement of the mutual recognition principle:

5.1.6

In the EESC's view, the maximum time limits for discussing appeals should be defined so that an issue can be settled before the court of first instance.

5.1.7

The Member States must equip themselves with efficient technical structures (including provision for an urgency procedure) in order to rapidly produce any evidence for a derogation from the principle of mutual recognition in accordance with Article 30 of the Treaty, which ‘allows Member States to take measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions when these are justified by general, non-economic considerations (public morality, public policy or public security, the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, the protection of national treasures and the protection of industrial and commercial property)’ (19).

5.1.8

The Product Contact Points (PCP) should employ SOLVIT methods in an initial attempt to settle disputes and to allow businesses whose products have been blocked at borders to access this out-of-court procedure for administrative cooperation between Member States, with answers due within 10 weeks (20).

5.1.9

The EESC believes it is important for the PCPs to take a proactive approach by making practical procedural guides available. They could also set up national websites, linked in a European network and to an EU website, featuring decisions on previous resolved cases, the list of products covered by the mutual recognition principle and a database open to potential users linked to the telematic network for the exchange of information between PCPs in accordance with IDABC interoperability (21).

5.1.10

Preparing and operating these instruments cannot be optional; it should be an obligation, stipulated in the proposal. The PCPs should, together with the Commission, hold regular joint information and training seminars for economic operators, administrative and customs officials and for consumers, to ensure proper understanding and dissemination of the rights and obligations laid down in the Treaty.

5.1.11

There is also a need to prepare a Telematic Guide, giving a user-friendly EU overview of all the current legislation in force, broken down horizontally and by major sector.

5.1.12

It does not seem worth drawing up a list of positive products covered by the Regulation, just as it would be inappropriate to exclude the urgency procedure provided for in the General Product Safety Directive.

5.1.13

The Commission must monitor closely the way the notification mechanisms are operated: Member States must thus be required to submit a copy of every notification and to draw up an annual report on the measures adopted, under the terms of the Regulation, to enable the Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the EESC — SMO.

5.2.1

The EESC endorses the principles of the proposal, which is underpinned by the positive experience of the New Approach, combined with the Global Approach (22) on conformity assessment. These principles should be applied across the board to current and future Community legislation, covering all aspects of marketed products, especially as regards safety, health and environmental protection. The key principle of the internal market, i.e. non-discrimination between economic operators, must be fully respected in law and implemented by the Member States.

5.2.2

The EESC would stress that ‘all economic operators intervening in the supply and distribution chain should take the appropriate measures to ensure that they make available on the market only products which are in conformity with the applicable legislation’ (23), whether they be manufacturers, authorised representatives or importers (24).

5.2.3

Product traceability is essential in order to identify the liability of economic operators who place goods on the European market, and to ensure that all the relevant Community requirements are enforced, rather than just the conformity requirement ‘limited to certain control measures’, as proposed by the Commission (25).

5.2.4

Turning to the subject matter and scope of the Decision, the EESC feels that the exceptions contained therein must be avoided and that the Common Framework for the Marketing of Products must apply — in line with the proposals advanced in point 5.3.3 relating to the Regulation on the European Accreditation System and Market Surveillance mechanisms — to all relevant Community legislation without exception, either for health and safety or environmental protection. The new framework must apply to the whole body of legislation in this field, without waiting to see whether each individual directive or regulation might be subject to a general review.

5.2.5

The common definitions contained in Chapter 1 of the proposal are of vital importance to market operators, given that too many directives use different definitions to cover the same products.

5.2.6

The EESC believes the following are essential:

5.2.7

The obligations for economic operators must be justified, proportionate and free from costly bureaucratic and administrative red tape, both with regard to sample testing of marketed products and the register of complaints (second paragraph of Article 7(4)), and as regards the reporting requirement, which should be restricted to the dangerous products as defined in the General Product Safety Directive.

5.2.7.1

In the European Accreditation System, the action taken by conformity assessment bodies must be proportionate; these bodies must use suitable methods when dealing with small and medium-sized businesses and non-mass produced products or products produced in small quantities.

5.2.8

With regard to the Notified Bodies, the EESC would reiterate that they must provide a guarantee of competence, impartiality and effectiveness throughout the European Economic Area. In order to enable all manufacturers to compete on even terms, and in compliance with the accreditation obligation laid down in Article 3 et seq., accreditation assessment must be carried out by the National Accreditation Body and accepted by the notifying authority, thus avoiding pointless, expensive duplication.

5.2.9

Module A for internal control should be the preferred conformity assessment procedure, largely due to the fact that, in any case, product liability rests entirely with the manufacturer or with the importer, in the European Economic Area (EEA). There is also a need to ensure choice between several different simplified modules, in particular for SMEs and limited series production.

5.2.10

The very heart of the provisions is the CE marking system, which is intended to certify the product's compliance with the applicable rules and which the Member States are required to safeguard more effectively by responding to improper use with sufficient and proportionate sanctions, including penal ones. The new provisions, like the old ones, stipulate that the product's conformity, attested by the CE marking, does not relieve the maker of the obligation to make good any damage caused by a product subsequently revealed to be faulty.

5.2.11

The EESC agrees unreservedly that a lack of credibility of the CE marking amounts to a ‘lack of confidence in the whole system: market surveillance authorities, manufacturers, laboratories and certifiers, and ultimately the adequacy of New Approach legislation’ (26).

5.2.12

The best way to boost the standing and importance of the CE marking, as defined in Council Decision 93/465 (27), is through a radical shake-up of the marking itself, which would involve:

5.2.13

The market surveillance mechanisms are dealt with in point 5.3.13 et seq., but here the EESC wishes to stress the importance of Commission involvement, not only in the case of all products that, though complying, also entail risks for health and safety, but also in cases of formal non-compliance as covered by Article 38 of the Proposal for a Decision.

5.2.14

The EESC reiterates the crucial role played in all aspects of this issue by the process of technical standardisation, since the very foundation of the new approach is the close linkage of minimum legal requirements and European technical standards, which need to be supported and harnessed. If there is a formal objection to harmonised standards (29), therefore, the relevant standards authority should be informed immediately so that it can pay due attention to this in drawing up the standards.

5.3.1

The EESC supports the proposals for establishing a European Accreditation System founded on mutual trust and cooperation inasmuch as this puts in place binding rules for both economic operators and public authorities to ensure that all products put on the market meet high levels of safety and health protection. The system should also guarantee the same level of application and regulation to all European consumers and to all economic operators, with simpler and more streamlined procedures.

5.3.2

The European Accreditation System must ensure universal acceptance of the outcome of conformity assessments and avoid superfluous duplication of testing: in order to ensure that the system is internationally acceptable, the competence of the accreditation assessment must be based on internationally recognised standards, and the definitions of ‘conformity assessment’, ‘conformity assessment bodies’, ‘designation of the body’ and ‘notification’ must be stated explicitly in the Regulation.

5.3.3

The provisions of the Regulation must apply to all accreditation bodies and the services they provide, within the European Economic Area, irrespective of the kind of conformity assessment services supplied to clients, and they must ensure:

5.3.4

The definition of accreditation should be modified to include calibration, testing, certification, inspection and other conformity assessment activities.

5.3.5

In addition, to ensure uniform rules embracing all the conformity assessment procedures, including those of quality assurance, calibration and ISO 43 evaluation tests, there should be no exemptions: all accreditation bodies and all the services they provide in the European Economic Area should be covered by the Regulation, irrespective of the kind of conformity assessment services supplied to clients.

5.3.6

National accreditation bodies should operate on a non-profit basis as proposed in Article 4(6). However, the present wording risks hampering the creation of the start-up capital needed to secure a sound financial footing for delivering quality services. In the EESC's view, national accreditation bodies should operate like non-profit bodies in the sense that they must not distribute profits, as established internationally in ISO/IEC 17011 (30).

5.3.7

The European Accreditation System (EAS) should be regarded as the system's highest level of accreditation, and as a public service of general interest must be free of competition. The EESC supports the rule which obliges Member States to have a single national accreditation body whose competence, objectivity and impartiality must be subject to peer review, with some exceptions in certain circumstances (31) for smaller states should they wish to use the national accreditation bodies of a neighbouring Member State.

5.3.8

The EESC thinks that a clear legal basis needs to be established for European cooperation for Accreditation (EA), whose role must be strengthened and better defined: all the national accreditation bodies must be members of the EA in order to ensure equivalence, transparency, reliability and efficacy, and the EA network must be supported by the Member States.

5.3.9

In order to further strengthen EA, the EESC thinks that the accreditation bodies must be signatories of multilateral recognition agreements (MLAs) operated by EA. In addition, the financing mechanisms enshrined in the Regulation should not only cover EA, but be extended to campaigns in support of market surveillance activities and joint training of the various national administrations taking part.

5.3.10

The peer review enshrined in Article 9(1), intended to facilitate and improve the operation of the single market by increasing its trustworthiness, must be organised within the European Accreditation System and implemented according to harmonised rules defined within EA. The results of the peer review must be rendered public and communicated to all the Member States and to the Commission.

5.3.11

Since accreditation bodies must actively demonstrate that the trust they enjoy is well placed, the EESC thinks they should have to prove that they participate successfully in peer review.

5.3.12

The EESC also considers it important for stakeholders to be involved: they should be represented on accreditation bodies and provision to this effect should be an integral part of the new Regulation.

5.3.13

The EESC stresses the importance of Member States achieving equivalent, more coherent and efficient market surveillance mechanisms by way of a harmonisation of Community legislation which includes the strengthening of crossborder cooperation: there should be a realignment of provisions on general product safety — Product Safety Directive 2001/95/EC — and of the other relevant directives in order to ensure the full application of the ‘better lawmaking’ principle to the operation of the single market. Market surveillance activities should also apply to products covered by the General Product Safety Directive (GPSD), as numerous products are sold both for professional use and for use by an end consumer. The EESC therefore regards as unjustified the exclusion of the GPSD from the provisions mentioned in Article 13(2), as this would create more confusion and complications for economic operators rather than greater cohesion of single market surveillance activities.

5.3.14

The EESC feels that the existence of the current rapid information-exchange system, RAPEX (32), which is capable of effectively assisting market surveillance, is fully justified: it should, however, be used in a more uniform and coordinated way by the Member States and the customs and administrative authorities.

5.3.15

Customs authorities should cooperate with market surveillance authorities in a European network in order to ensure effective checks on products before these are put on the single European market, and customs authorities must be equipped with trained staff, financial resources and sufficient powers to carry out the tasks entrusted to them effectively.

5.3.16

Market surveillance and customs inspection mechanisms must have, above all, the necessary instruments to deal promptly with products that are seasonal or sold only for limited periods as special promotions, often under ephemeral made-up names. The authorities must have the powers and means for rapid intervention against these and the importer into the Community must bear full responsibility for ensuring they satisfy essential EU requirements, especially as regards safety and environmental protection.

5.3.17

Finally, the EESC thinks that the Regulation should clearly stipulate that the measures taken in response to a proven lack of conformity respect the principle of proportionality, irrespective of the guidelines proposed in Article 19(1): the EESC thinks that Article 17 should be amended accordingly.

1)

OJ C 93 of 27.4.2007, Review of the Single Market, rapporteur: Mr Cassidy.

2)

Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Implementing the Community Lisbon programme: A strategy for the simplification of the regulatory environment, COM(2005) 535 final, rapporteur: Mr Cassidy, OJ C 309 of 16.12.2006.

3)

Exploratory opinion at the request of the UK Presidency on Better lawmaking, rapporteur: Mr Retureau, adopted on 28.9.2005, OJ C 24, 31.1.2006.

4)

Own-initiative opinion on How to improve the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation, rapporteur: Mr van Iersel, adopted on 28.9.2005, OJ C 24, 31.1.2006.

5)

Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Updating and simplifying the acquis communautaire, COM(2003) 71 final, rapporteur: Mr Retureau, adopted on 31.3.2004, OJ C 112, 30.4.2004.

6)

Own-initiative opinion on Simplification with particular reference to European Governance: Better lawmaking, rapporteur: Mr Simpson, adopted on 26.3.2003, OJ C 133, 6.6.2003.

7)

Exploratory opinion on the Communication from the Commission — simplifying and improving the regulatory environment, COM(2001) 726 final, rapporteur: Mr Walker, adopted on 21.3.2002, OJ C 125, 27.5.2002.

8)

Own-initiative opinion on Simplification, rapporteur: Mr Walker, adopted on 29.11.2001, OJ C 48, 21.2.2002.

9)

Own-initiative opinion on Simplifying rules in the single market, rapporteur: Mr Vever, adopted on 19.10.2000, OJ C 14, 16.1.2001.

10)

Own-initiative opinion on the Priorities of the Single Market 2005-2010, rapporteur: Mr Cassidy, adopted on 7.4.2005, OJ C 255, 14.10.2005.

11)

Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Internal Market Strategy — Priorities 2003-2006, rapporteur: Mr Cassidy, adopted on 16.7.2003, OJ C 234, 30.9.2003.

12)

Information report on simplification.

13)

Information report on the State of co-regulation and self-regulation in the Single Market, rapporteur: Mr Vever, adopted on 11.1.2005, CESE 1182/2004 fin.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/14

1.1

The EESC approves the present proposal without reservation.

1.2

The Directive mentions end 2009 as the deadline for using ‘supplementary indications’ i.e. non-metric indications. Maintaining this deadline would be a cost for all EU enterprises involved in trans-Atlantic trade.

1.3

The Directive also requires the UK and Ireland to fix a deadline concerning the exemptions to use the pint, mile and troy ounces.

1.4

The Commission's proposal is to get rid of these deadlines not replacing them with new ones.

1.5

The Directive defines as the legal units of measurement in the EU the metric units or SI units meaning Système International, which is the worldwide system adopted by the Conférence générale des poids et mesures (CGPM) in 1960. Though the European Union itself is not a signatory, all Member States are. The regular updating of SI units for technical progress leads to the Commission proposing to adopt as the ‘katal’ symbol as the SI unit for catalytic activity.

1.6

The EESC welcomes this Commission proposal as part of the drive to simplify and improve legislation and welcomes the Commission's sensitivity in acknowledging the importance of ‘subsidiarity’ for Ireland and the UK.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/15

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/15

1.1

The Committee notes the much delayed publication of the Green Paper on market-based instruments (MBI) for environmental protection.

1.2

The Committee shares the views expressed on the various fiscal and environmental impacts of various market-based instruments for environmental protection (taxes, charges, fees, subsidies, rights/certification schemes etc.).

1.3

The Committee notes that market-based instruments have long been an element of political action, so the discussion is no longer about whether they should be introduced but about how they should be used.

1.4

As the Commission rightly points out, MBI are a good way of tackling environmental issues in a cost-effective way. They are not, however, a panacea. The political discussion — and the Green Paper — should therefore address the relationship and interplay between, for instance, rules and bans, regulatory law and market-based instruments (such as taxes, charges, targeted subsidises and tradable permits). The Committee regrets, however, that the Commission Green Paper gives far too few pointers in this regard.

1.5

The Committee would therefore ask the Commission to use the public debate triggered by the Green Paper as an opportunity to set out the scope, impact and also the limits of various instruments for environmental protection by drawing on specific, practical examples.

2.1

On 28 March 2007 the Commission submitted the Green Paper on Market-based instruments for environment and related policy purposes (1), which had already been announced in 2004 and which is the subject of this opinion.

2.2

With the Green Paper the Commission intends to launch a discussion on advancing the use of market-based instruments (MBI) in society.

2.3

In the Green Paper the Commission refers to the environmental policy objectives agreed at European level, in particular the new energy and climate policy, which, the Commission feels, ‘implies nothing less than a new industrial revolution over the next 10 to 15 years’.

2.4

The Commission makes it clear that without public intervention these ambitious objectives cannot be achieved. The Commission considers that MBI should be increasingly used for environmental purposes. They should be ‘important parts of the efforts to achieve real change through changing incentives for businesses and consumers’.

2.5

However, the Commission also states that they ‘are not a panacea for all problems’.

2.6

MBI are defined as taxes, charges, targeted subsidies and tradable permit systems.

2.7

The rationale for using MBI lies, according to the Commission, in their ‘ability to correct market-failures in a cost-effective way. Market failure refers to a situation in which markets are either entirely lacking (e.g. environmental assets having the nature of public goods) or do not sufficiently account for the “true” or social cost of economic activity’.

2.8

The following advantages are listed:

2.9

However, the Commission also makes it clear that MBI are used not only to achieve environmental policy goals, but above all ‘to avoid distortions within the internal market caused by differing approaches in individual Member States, to ensure that a similar burden falls on the same sector across the EU and to overcome potential adverse competitiveness effects within the EU’.

2.10

It also points out that the various MBI differ in their effect. Quantitative systems (such as tradable permit schemes) provide more certainty as regards reaching specific policy objectives (e.g. emission limits) than purely price-based instruments (such as taxes). Price-based instruments, in turn, provide security regarding the cost or the price of a policy objective and tend to be easier to administer.

2.11

The Commission also points to another major difference: Taxes (and charges) have not only been used to influence behaviour — they also generate revenue. This is only the case with tradable permit systems ‘if the allowances are auctioned by public authorities’.

2.12

The Green Paper looks at the subject of growth and employment and sets out reasons for environmental tax reforms. At its Summit in June 2006 the European Council, in the context of the new sustainability strategy, discussed the possibility of a new tax system based on sustainability criteria, without however going into details. Now the Commission writes: ‘An environmental tax reform (ETR) shifting the tax burden from welfare-negative taxes, (e.g. on labour), to welfare-positive taxes, (e.g. on environmentally damaging activities, such as resource use or pollution) can be a win-win option to address both environmental and employment issues  (2) . At the same time, a long term tax shift will require relatively stable revenues from the environment related tax base’.

2.13

Finally, the document quotes a few examples of established MBI (energy taxes, Eurovignette, local charging systems to reduce urban congestion) and formulates a large number of questions, ranging from the very general to the specific, directed at the public with a view to launching a debate in society.

2.14

The Commission also sees ways of using MBI to protect biodiversity.

3.1

The EESC has often advocated the optimum use of a broad range of policy instruments for environmental protection, with MBI having an important role to play. Here the Committee and the Commission are in agreement.

3.2

The Committee, while endorsing the — in its view — sound and accurate points made, would have liked to see the Green Paper, which was a long time in preparation and the publication of which was repeatedly delayed, bring rather more clarity to the planned future use of MBI. In terms of the overall policy-shaping process, however, the protracted and quite possibly necessary consultation exercise within the Commission has, as far as the Committee can see, so far been to no discernible avail.

3.3

The impression, if anything, is that internal consultations are to some extent being outpaced by political realities.

3.4

The Committee notes that environmental MBI have long been a reality, albeit used in widely differing ways in the individual Member States. According to Eurostat, for instance, just under 7 % of total revenue collected in the EU Member States comes from environmental taxes.

3.5

The Green Paper and the attendant political debate can therefore no longer be about the possibility of introducing environmental MBI. The question is not whether, but how. In other words: to what extent are market-based instruments to be used and how are these to correlate with rules, bans and other policy tools?

3.6

However, the content of the Green Paper does not go any further than what has long since been known, and been the subject of discussion, in the business community and in society. Nor does it address the question of who is to be the prime mover. The EU does not of course have equal responsibility for all possible instruments. In taxation matters, for example, it has only very limited powers. Moreover, at a policy level, it is not clear just what is supposed to happen in the wake of the publication of the Green Paper, whether, as is usual, a white paper is to follow or what conclusions are to be drawn from the exercise.

3.7

Its biggest shortcoming is the lack of any clear indication of which policy instrument should be given priority in a given political situation. The intended demarcation or possible linkage between regulatory law and MBI remains unclear.

3.8

Consequently, while noting the Green Paper with approval, the EESC points out that the social debate on more effective environmental policy instruments needs to be conducted with greater commitment and must draw on as specific examples as possible, if the EU's ambitious climate and energy policy objectives are to become a reality.

3.9

The EESC considers that MBI should be guided by the polluter pays principle and could thus offer incentives to all those who actively protect the environment.

4.1

The EESC has always stressed the importance of internalising ‘external costs’. And here, as the Commission itself points out, MBI can play a part. But first a clear political decision is needed on the amount of the external costs to be internalised.

4.2

The ‘market-based’ road-transport instrument, the Eurovignette, described in the Green Paper, is a good illustration of the problem, as this instrument, which is regarded as a suitable tool for integrating external costs, has in reality been used only very half-heartedly. The Commission itself writes that ‘average charges can only cover infrastructure costs and thus exclude external costs’. Initiatives are therefore needed which would, for example, integrate external costs using the Eurovignette.

4.3

The Committee would ask the Commission, the Council and the Parliament to class an MBI as environmental only if it has a genuine and clearly discernible environmental objective. The Eurovignette, which is mentioned in the Green Paper, does not fully meet that criterion, as the external costs are not included. The Eurovignette is primarily designed to ensure that infrastructure costs are not met solely by the public purse but that users are also directly involved. Of course, that also has an indirect impact on the environment in cases where, for instance, users facing higher costs start to question their car use and wonder whether a better option would be to make the journey by train (or indeed not to make the journey at all). However, until steps are taken to factor in the (environmental) costs that have so far had ‘no market’ and have been left out of the equation, the Eurovignette should not be regarded an instrument of environment policy.

4.4

In the first instance, therefore, it is up to policymakers to make clear what a particular policy measure is meant to achieve. Only once the objective is defined should the discussion turn to the policy tool that is suited to achieving it.

4.5

Hence, the increased use of MBI will not enable policymakers to avoid what is in some cases the very difficult, controversial decision to lay down clear (environmental) objectives such as emission limits. This is what has often been lacking in the past. MBI are no substitute for such decisions but rather, as their name suggests, instruments for achieving defined political objectives.

4.6

The Commission must act without delay to remove the uncertainties thrown up by the Green Paper. It must clearly state just how it sees the various policy instruments being used in future. The EESC thus recommends that the Commission, in the context of the planned wide-ranging discussion on the subject, illustrate the possible policy options (with or without MBI) by means of a few practical examples drawn from different policy areas, e.g. energy and transport.

4.7

The Commission could, for instance, make clear that there is no intention of introducing MBI to resolve, say, the problem of carcinogenic substances.

4.8

MBI could, however, be useful in dealing, for instance, with the increasingly topical issue of CO2-free coal-fired power plants and the prospects for building such plants, should the requisite technology become available in the near future. Is it the intention to make it mandatory (i.e. via legislation) to use ‘state-of-the-art’ technology for these plants or are MBI to be used to make them profitable? Questions such as these should in future be debated more in society.

4.9

If the demarcation/linkage of regulatory law and MBI were made clearer by setting out specific options for action, this might also make the Green Paper's discussion of the use of MBI for the maintenance of biodiversity more comprehensible. In this area the EESC does not consider that the Commission has yet come up with any convincing ideas that might offer some hope of effectively combating the worrying decline in biodiversity.

4.10

In its opinion on the Biannual Progress Report of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy (3) the Committee called on the Commission to flesh out its very vaguely worded proposals for a new tax system based on sustainability indicators. According to Eurostat, revenue from environmental taxes amounts to some 7 % of the total.

4.11

The EESC considers a debate on reducing the taxation of labour and compensating for this with revenues from the taxation of environmentally harmful activities to be overdue. This should be accelerated following submission of the Green Paper. However, it also needs to be made clear in this context how the EU envisages changes of this kind taking place, given that, under the Treaties, it has only a marginal influence on the tax policies of the Member States.

4.12

The EESC considers it extremely important that the promised survey of environmentally harmful subsidies be submitted without delay and that these subsidies be abolished as soon as possible. The Committee sees environmentally harmful subsidies as a significant distortion of competition and a completely unacceptable misallocation of public funds. MBI will only be effective as instruments to promote environmental protection once environmentally harmful subsidies have been completely eliminated.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/19

1.1

Labour migration is of an economic nature and is the consequence of free movement of labour in a Europe in which great differences in living standards exist between the various Member States. High unemployment rates in a number of the new Member States and the demand for cheap, semi-skilled labour in the 15 old Member States ensure a steady stream of job-seekers.

1.2

In 2004 and 2007 transitional arrangements were agreed upon to enable the old Member States to regulate migration from the new Member States. One of the motives for this was that the old Member States wanted to avoid tensions caused by too great an influx of migrant workers arising on the labour market, possibly resulting in illegal employment.

1.3

The result of the transitional arrangements was precisely what the old Member States were trying to prevent. In its Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements, the European Commission states that restrictions on legal work for migrants from the new Member States actually lead to a proliferation of undocumented work, bogus ‘self-employed’ work, and fictitious service provision and sub-contracting.

1.4

The paradoxical situation has arisen that in the EU-15 countries there is a great deal of seasonal work available in agriculture, for which not enough legally resident workers can be found on the labour market. There are enough migrant workers from the new Member States who are willing to do that work, but many of them are not allowed to do it because of the restrictive transitional measures. Agricultural labour flows vary according to countries of origin and host countries. These differences are mainly connected with whether or not transitional measures, either total or partial, are in place.

1.5

In this situation the work often ends up in the black economy. It is difficult to obtain accurate information on this matter since it involves three parties who each have their own reasons for not making this information public. There are employers who want to pay rates below those prescribed by law or the collective wage agreements which are in force. There are workers who are ready to work for lower rates than those which they are entitled to receive by law or under collective wage agreements. And there are employment brokers of dubious repute who are only too willing to organise such deals since they may be very lucrative for them.

1.6

Many of the middlemen make sensational offers; ultimately, however, the price war is paid for by the migrant workers who have to make do with incomes that are below the social minimum. There are also cases where employers who take on seasonal workers pay employment brokers the market rate but these brokers do not make tax and social security deductions. On top of this, the middlemen who do this also frequently pocket part of the migrant workers' salaries. There are also websites with telephone numbers in both Eastern and Western Europe which offer self-employed workers for whom no payment of tax or employers' social security contributions are required.

1.7

This situation is undesirable in a number of respects. The basic principle must be that migrant workers must be treated in every respect in the same way as the legally resident workers alongside whom they are working. There must be equal pay for equal work and better conditions with regard to access to social security. This is not just a social issue for workers. It is also economically important to employers (a level playing field for fair competition) and financially important for the Member States (tax authorities).

1.8

There is a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals. The proposal provides for harmonised sanctions for employers and preventive measures, as well as the identification and exchange of good practices between Member States on the implementation of employer sanctions.

1.9

As long as the restrictions on migrants from the new Member States remain in place, the EESC argues that the proposed directive should also apply to employers who illegally employ workers from EU countries which are still subject to restrictions. Moreover, the EESC considers it essential that the EU should ensure that the directive is not just enacted in legislation in all Member States but is also enforced in practice.

1.10

The combating of the black economy would benefit from an unambiguous European definition which makes a clear distinction between the taking on of work (the supply of services) and the carrying out of duties in an employer-employee relationship (the employment contract). The ILO has issued a clear recommendation on this subject. This gives bonafide self-employed workers whose specialism goes beyond the supply of cheap, unskilled labour a clearer position in the world of work, and employers the protection they are entitled to. The EESC is pleased to note that the European Commission has approved a proposal for a study to be carried out by the European social partners in the construction industry on the subject of (bogus) self-employment. The EESC welcomes the fact that the Commission will also fund this study.

1.11

In view of the consequences of the restrictions on legal employment, it would perhaps be better to drop this kind of transitional measure in any future EU enlargements. The EESC also calls on the European Commission to explore the possibility of lifting all restrictions on workers from the 12 Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. A large proportion of the European social partners also hold this view, provided that real action is taken at EU and national levels, as well as at social partner level, to monitor equal treatment for migrant workers.

2.1

According to the Lisbon strategy, the EU must in future become a very competitive knowledge-based economy, founded on sustainable production and consumption and with a considerable degree of social cohesion.

2.2

The EU is at present a reasonably competitive knowledge-based economy with production and consumption patterns that are at present insufficiently sustainable and with a level of social cohesion that leaves much to be desired.

2.3

This opinion focuses in particular on this last aspect, social cohesion. The EU is paying a great deal of attention to economic development and sustainability, especially of production. The lack of attention to policy on the third pillar of the Lisbon strategy is leading not to an increase but rather a decrease in social cohesion.

2.4

The consequences of this are clearly apparent on the labour market. The proportion of informal labour is increasing and a type of employee has returned who until recently was thought to be long since extinct: the day labourer.

2.5

The new day labourers offer their services on the street, at places that are well-known as ‘pick-up points’ for illegal gangmasters. They are hired on a daily basis, with no deductions either for income tax or social security contributions. They have to work excessively long hours each day, are paid too little per hour and are not covered in any way by employment legislation — insofar as it exists.

2.6

Until a few years ago the labour market, especially for semi- and unskilled work, was nationally oriented. After the EU enlargement in 2004, a European labour market emerged for that segment of the market. Since the 2007 enlargement there has been a sharp increase in the supply of labour now that Bulgarian and Romanian workers are entering the market.

2.7

The sector where this trend is developing strongly is agriculture. Moreover, many people who are looking for work in another country almost always find their first job in this sector, in particular.

2.8

The aim of this EESC opinion is to place this problem on the EU agenda so that the relevant European institutions, together with the Member States and the social partners are in a position to look for solutions to this major and difficult problem — which is unfortunately growing.

3.1

Agriculture is the totality of economic activities by which the natural environment is adapted for the benefit of the production of plants and animals (1). Depending on the product, the production method and the level of prosperity, use is made of a large number of diverse methods, ranging from working with simple tools to the use of large machines which are increasingly replacing human labour.

3.2

The agricultural sector in the EU is a major sector. A total of more than 160 million hectares of land in the EU is used as farmland. There are 11 million agricultural enterprises, which provide employment for a total of 15 million people. The majority of these are the farmers themselves and members of their families, but about one million farms have a total of 6,5 million employees on the payroll. 4,5 million of these are working as seasonal workers, an unknown number of them in a country other than their country of origin (2). Many of the seasonal workers come from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.

3.3

Agriculture can be sub-divided into different activities: livestock farming (animal production) and aquaculture (fish production) and horticulture (small-scale production of short-cycle crops, such as vegetables, ornamental plants, fruit, and mushrooms), and arable farming (which differs from horticulture in that the crop cultivation is on a larger scale and is less labour-intensive). Commercial forestry is not regarded everywhere in the EU as forming part of the agricultural sector; in some countries it is considered to be an independent sector.

3.4

Agriculture produces not just food, but increasingly also other goods such as flowers, furs, leather, biofuels (biodiesel, ethanol, gas, fast-growing wood), enzymes, fibres, etc. Genetically modified crops also produce specialised medicines.

3.5

According to figures from both the ILO (3) and Eurofound (4), agriculture is one of the most hazardous industrial sectors for workers. In total, there are around 335 000 fatal accidents in the workplace each year. More than half of these, 170 000 fatal accidents, occur in the agricultural sector.

4.1

Because of numerous legal complications it is not possible to draw up an unambiguous definition of informal work in the EU. Practices which in one country are quite usual (if there are no rules in a certain field, there is nothing to comply with) are considered in another country to be unusual or even illegal.

4.2

The national definitions of informal work differ from Member State to Member State. It concerns activities that are not included in the official statistics of the formal economy. There are figures but they can often be traced back to one source only, and are not always verifiable and therefore not always reliable. However, it is undeniable that large-scale informal work exists.

4.3

Nearly all national definitions of informal work emphasise non-compliance with tax obligations. Non-compliance with obligations with regard to social security is cited in nearly all definitions. Oddly enough, non-compliance with other obligations in the field of employment law (working conditions, working time, binding collective agreements) hardly ever forms part of national definitions of informal work.

4.4

Informal work is done by non-registered employees who are not necessarily migrant workers without a work and/or residence permit. People who do have the documents are also working informally — or else they do not need them because they are nationals of the country in which the offence takes place. People without valid documents are more vulnerable though and therefore easier to exploit than people with valid documents. After all, the latter group has access to formal work anyway; the former group does not.

4.5

Apart from classic paid employment, there is also the ‘self-employed person with no employees’. These ‘self-employed persons’ are seen as entrepreneurs, and no tax or social security contributions need to be paid for them. They themselves are responsible for making these contributions.

4.6

Nor are they covered by employment law applicable to employees. For them there are no minimum wage rates, no maximum weekly hours of work, no health and safety regulations and no minimum wage. In view of the high risk of serious industrial accidents in this sector (see point 3.5 above), this situation is unacceptable. These self-employed persons are free to work for whatever rates of pay and under whatever conditions they agree on with their clients.

4.7

These self-employed persons were originally experienced specialists with specific vocational skills. As a rule, they had spent years qualifying as skilled specialists in order to be self-employed.

4.8

As a result of increased outsourcing after the hiving-off of non-core functions, much more than just specialised work is at present being outsourced. A small nucleus of permanent and well-established staff is sufficient, as the frequently simple work is done to an increasing extent by subcontracting and outsourcing. The demand for that sort of work is met by a large group of new self-employed persons seeking work on the labour market. The most important specialism of many of these new self-employed is the supply of cheap, unskilled labour.

4.9

This form of pseudo self-employment was used in the late 1980s to export unemployment from Ireland and the United Kingdom. Until then British law contained numerous safeguards to test whether the self-employed actually fulfilled a number of conditions. One of the conditions was that they should be experienced specialists in a particular vocation. The British government of the day dropped the assessment criteria, as a result of which many more people suddenly became able to register as self-employed persons and get jobs on the continent without the need to take account of labour law in the other Member State (5).

4.10

Moreover, this phenomenon is no longer exclusive to the English-speaking countries: a Polish government spokesman, for example, said at a conference on the free movement of workers that his government urged Polish job-seekers to register as self-employed (6). By doing so they can get round all remaining restrictions on workers in the other Member States and can work anywhere. In this way, self-employed status is regularly and deliberately used as a scheme arrangement for evading labour law or regulations by a chain of subcontracting and outsourcing. Responsibility for compliance with obligations with regard to income tax and social security payments, too, is passed on downwards by means of unfair contracts for bogus self-employed workers, which are often offered by recruitment agencies.

4.11

This phenomenon is also present on a large scale in the construction industry. Furthermore, much more research has already been carried out into this phenomenon in the latter sector than in the agricultural sector. There are considerable similarities between these two sectors. What they have in common, in particular, are the three largest risk factors for informal work, namely labour-intensive work of a temporary nature which is carried out, above all, by non-resident workers. The European social partners in the construction industry have now recognised this danger and have asked the European Commission to provide funding for a study into the phenomenon of (bogus) self-employment in 18 EU Member States. The Commission has agreed to this request and the proposed study will be put out to tender in the EU before the end of 2007.

4.12

The fact that there is still no European legal framework for the employment relationship creates room for dubious trade in cheap labour. This causes serious damaging side effects at European level. The European Commission itself comes to this conclusion in its Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty which notes that ‘the restrictions may have encouraged EU-8 nationals to look for other ways to perform economic activity in EU-15 Member States, reflected in an exceptionally high influx of posted workers or workers claiming to be self-employed’ (7).

4.13

In that same report the Commission states: ‘Recognising that migration flows from EU-8 to EU-15 Member States had been modest, social partners strongly emphasised that erosion of labour standards and “social dumping” should be avoided. They also pointed out that restrictions on legal work actually lead to a proliferation of undocumented work, bogus “self-employed work”, and fictitious service provision and sub-contracting’. The Commission later on corrects the view that migration flows have not been so great by commenting that ‘the true migration flows across the enlarged EU may be larger than would appear from the data presented in this report as the phenomenon of undeclared work is not fully captured by official statistics’. The Commission notes that, in general, restrictions on labour market access may exacerbate resort to undeclared work.

4.14

In the Netherlands, for example, in 1992 in the Netherlands there was a total of 54 200 FTEs (full time equivalents) engaged in horticulture, the agricultural sector with the most employees. Nearly 87 % of the workers were in permanent employment, more than 13 % were connected to the business in some other way (employment agency staff, temporary employment, (bogus) self-employed). In 2005 the sector numbered 59 000 FTEs, with more than 61 % of the workers then in permanent employment and nearly 39 % connected to the business in another way. Please note that these are figures for the formal economy. It is estimated that in spring 2007 a further 40 000 FTEs were working informally in the sector (8) but there are strong indications that the proportion of informal work in horticulture has been steadily decreasing since the lifting of the restrictions imposed on residents of those Member States which joined the EU in 2004.

5.1

The last few years have shown that imposing restrictions on access to the labour market is often counterproductive. It can result in the evasion of labour law and regulations. Until 31 December 2008 there are no restrictions for job-seekers from Romania and Bulgaria in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland, Cyprus and Slovenia, although in the latter three countries Romanian and Bulgarian nationals must register. The remaining 15 EU Member States do impose restrictions on job-seekers from Romania and Bulgaria (9). For job-seekers from the ten Member States that joined the EU in 2004, some restrictions also still apply but in a smaller number of countries and less stringent than for nationals of Bulgaria and Romania (10).

5.2

Labour migration in the EU is of an economic nature and is the consequence of free movement of labour in a Union in which great differences in living standards exist between the various Member States. High unemployment rates in a number of the new Member States and the demand for cheap, semi-skilled labour in the 15 old Member States ensure a steady stream of job-seekers.

5.3

Many job-seekers find work in the agricultural sector because there is a great demand for additional temporary workers in this sector at harvest time. It is also a sector where the chance of social dumping is greater than in other sectors. This is because, among other reasons, in a number of Member States there are no collective wage agreements in force for the sector or because in a number of cases those agreements that do exist have been declared not universally binding.

5.4

Seasonal work is a structural feature of European agriculture. Sustainable and efficient agricultural production is not possible without the deployment of a flexible workforce. Seasonal work in the agricultural sector is largely done by migrant workers. In some cases, problems arise which jeopardise social cohesion.

5.5

Migrants who work in the formal sector are often cheaper than legally resident workers because the employer does not have to pay a number of contributions for them. This applies, for example, to sectoral training funds and pension funds. Migrants from the 10 EU countries that joined the EU in 2004, and for whom there are still restrictions on the labour market in a number of old EU countries, often do informal work part of the time so that not all hours worked are reported to the tax authorities. Migrants from Bulgaria and Romania, for whom even more restrictions still apply, are in general entirely dependent on the informal sector, in which they are not paid for all hours worked, hourly rates are much too low or they are forced by unfair contracts to be (bogus) self-employed workers.

5.6

The ILO has devoted a number of conventions to the issues that are discussed in this opinion. These are Conventions C97 (Migration for Employment, 1949) C143 (Migrant Workers Supplementary Provisions, 1975), C181 (Private Employment Agencies, 1997) and C184 (Safety and Health in Agriculture, 2001). Conventions C97 and C181 have not been ratified by 17 of the 27 EU Member States. Convention C143 has not been ratified by 22 of the EU Member States, nor has Convention C184 by 24 Member States. Not one of the 27 current EU Member States has ratified all four conventions (11). Furthermore, in 2006 the ILO issued a Recommendation on the employment relationship (12). The core of the Recommendation was to improve legislation in all countries at national level in order to make a clear and common distinction between self-employed and employed workers. This is necessary in order to be able to put an end to the growing number of fraudulent practices aimed at disguising the fact that the people are employees and to make it appear that they are self-employed (13).

6.1

The basic principle must be that migrant workers must be treated in every respect in the same way as legally resident workers alongside whom they are working. There must be equal pay for equal work and better conditions with regard to access to social security. This is not just a social issue. It is also economically important to employers (a level playing field for fair competition) and financially important for the Member States (tax authorities). This basic principle has by no means been implemented everywhere. In the Netherlands, following the lifting of the transitional measures applying to residents of the Member States which joined the EU in 2004, the social partners expressed their intention to work together, as from 1 May 2007, in monitoring compliance with social laws and regulations and labour law and regulations. The government promised to introduce back-up measures. No tangible results have so far been achieved.

6.2

There is a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals (14). The proposal provides for harmonised sanctions for employers and preventive measures, as well as the identification and exchange of good practices between Member States on the implementation of employer sanctions.

6.3

The reason for this proposal is the substantial number of third-country nationals who are illegally staying in the EU (an estimated 4,5 to 8 million). This results in illegal employment, agriculture being, together with construction, hotels/catering and cleaning, one of the four main sectors in which this practice occurs. The European Parliament and the Council state in the proposal that illegal employment, ‘like undeclared work by EU citizens, leads to losses to public finances, can depress wages and working conditions, may distort competition between businesses and means that the undeclared workers will not benefit from health insurance and pension rights’.

6.4

In their report on the functioning of the transitional arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006), the European social partners reported ‘that restrictions on legal work actually lead to a proliferation of undocumented work, bogus “self-employed” work, and fictitious service provision and sub-contracting’. In the light of experience, it would be better to lift all restrictions on workers from the 12 Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 in order to create a level playing field. The overwhelming majority of the European social partners also hold this view, provided that real action is taken at EU and national levels as well as at social partner level to monitor equal treatment for migrant workers.

6.5

As long as restrictions are not yet lifted, the EESC argues that the proposed directive on sanctions against employers who illegally employ citizens of third countries who are staying in the EU should also apply to employers who illegally employ people from EU countries which are still subject to restrictions. Moreover, the EESC considers it essential that the EU should ensure that the directive is not just enacted in legislation in all Member States but also enforced in practice.

6.6

Moreover, the Directive does away with the great differences that exist in the quality and intensity of checks and the severity of penalties between the Member States. An employer in the Netherlands who is found to be illegally employing workers can receive a maximum fine of EUR 6 700 per worker. In Belgium it is EUR 20 000, in Luxembourg 50 000. However, there are some Member States which do not yet have any penalties for employers who are guilty of illegally employing workers.

6.7

The exchange of good practices is an indispensable part of the process that must result in an increase in social cohesion. At the hearing in Plovdiv (15), a number of examples of good practice were mentioned, such as:

6.8

The situations described in a number of these examples of good practice are not all entirely comparable to that of workers from Bulgaria and Romania who are looking for work in the old EU-15. For example, Hungarian workers who are employed in Burgenland simply go home every evening, whereas workers from Romania and Bulgaria are away from home for months. Malpractice can still occur in these situations, but on a much smaller scale, and with effective enforcement it can be easily detected and penalised. The general impression is therefore that here people's working conditions are socially acceptable.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/25

1.1

The Commission communication Employment in rural areas: closing the jobs gap  (1) was an important step in preparing the ground for the debate on the employment situation in the agriculture sector, which is a key factor in the creation and safeguarding of jobs in rural areas.

1.2

Agricultural structural change is continuing apace, and will affect hundreds of thousands of workers in the agriculture sector who are set to lose their jobs or see their circumstances changed. However, the communication gives virtually no consideration to one key aspect of agricultural employment — the situation of employed workers, and seasonal and migrant workers in particular.

1.3

That is regrettable, given the Commission's efforts as part of the European Year of Workers' Mobility in 2006. Every year, around 4 million seasonal and part-time workers — including some 2 million migrant workers — attest to the high level of mobility and flexibility in the agriculture sector.

1.4

Seasonal work, particularly in the fruit and vegetable sector, is a structural element of farming that is indispensable to efficient and sustainable land management. Since local workers are often unable to meet the demand for seasonal labour, migrant workers also play their part in the development of European agriculture.

1.5

Healthy food production is a mainstay of our very existence. This also includes fair levels of pay.

1.6

Despite high unemployment in many European regions, calls are being made for additional seasonal workers to be brought in from Belarus, Ukraine and other countries. The EU labour market must be developed in a socially sustainable way. In other words, everyone must have the opportunity to work for a living. That opportunity is compromised by additional cheap labour brought in from non-EU countries.

1.7

The EU's growth objectives can only be achieved through fair competition. Those employed in agriculture must be treated equally in all matters, irrespective of their place of origin.

1.8

The agricultural labour market is highly mobile. This is consistent with Commission objectives. However, mobile workers must not find themselves placed at a disadvantage. Hence social integration must also follow on the heels of political and economic integration. In the short term, the EESC sees a need for action in the following areas:

1.9

The European agriculture sector lacks transparency about the scale of employment and of social standards. This results in distortions of competition. One way of restoring fair competition is to award certificates to farms that meet certain social criteria.

2.1.1

Agricultural work has frequently been the subject of EESC opinions. The debate on migrant and seasonal workers is becoming ever more important both at European level and in many Member States. The three key stakeholders — employer representatives, trade unions and political and/or administrative representatives — have now taken up this issue and are involved in many fields and a range of activities, as illustrated by the following examples:

2.1.2

An observatory for migrant and seasonal work has repeatedly been called for. However, this demand has not been met — despite the fact that a key element in improving the position of workers is the collection, presentation and evaluation of readily understandable data on the agricultural employment situation.

2.2.1

One of the reasons for the halting nature of the debate on seasonal agricultural work is lack of transparency and shortcomings in the way the actual situation on the ground is portrayed. There are still no clear and detailed figures on the scale of agricultural seasonal work.

2.2.2

Across the EU, around 2 million people are employed full-time in the agriculture sector. Some 4 million people are employed as casual workers, some part-time, others on a seasonal basis for periods ranging from just a few days to as much as eight months in the year. Many of those who work on a seasonal basis are migrant workers not employed at their place of residence and often working abroad.

2.2.3

In analysing the employment figures, considerable clarification is needed about the criteria used, for instance, to classify farm size, to establish the particular branch or sector involved, and, in particular, to delimit the scope of horticulture and service-oriented agriculture.

3.1

The opinion is urgently needed for a number of reasons:

4.1

Migrant work is largely the result of the differing standards of living across the European regions. In the long run, migration leads to a shortage of workers — particularly skilled workers — in the countries of origin themselves. In the regions concerned, attempts are being made to counter the worker shortage not by increasing pay or improving educational standards, but rather by hiring workers from even poorer regions — increasingly in future from outside the European Union.

4.2

However, worker shortage is caused by the sometimes difficult and unusual working conditions in the sectors concerned. Migrant workers are simply following the rules of the market. In the free labour market, they migrate to wherever conditions are best for them.

4.3

Migrant work is fraught with problems:

5.1.1

The Committee welcomes the Commission's moves to boost employment in rural areas, including further efforts to promote transparency about the employment situation in the agriculture sector. These include the compilation of statistical data on the employment situation and also the provision to workers of a broad range of information on working and living conditions in the relevant countries.

5.1.2

Agricultural policy to date has focused primarily on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the products concerned. The working arrangements for those employed in the sector have to a large extent been ignored.

5.1.3

The objectives of the Lisbon and Gothenburg strategies must be further fleshed out. In the ongoing development of sustainable agriculture, due attention must be paid not only to economic and environmental aspects but to the social dimension as well.

5.1.4

The most pressing objective of all stakeholders must be to remove imbalances from the European labour market. That cannot be achieved by bringing more and more cheap labour into Europe from ever more far-flung regions. A key tenet of the ‘European model’ is the emergence of a collective sense of European society. There is no place for ghettos in which migrant workers have to endure poor living and housing conditions with no cultural or social ties to local life around them.

5.1.5

Gender must feature more strongly as a factor in any further studies in this area and in any potential solutions that may result.

5.1.6

The requisite conditions are still not in place. All stakeholders are called upon to play their part.

5.1.7

Migrant workers must be treated on a par with local workers. The Commission must do everything it can to help in this process. A first step is the forging of minimum standards. Such minimum standards are a good starting point for any broad-based discussion of the quality of work.

5.2.1

The EESC welcomes the social partners' efforts to promote in the social dialogue the development of vocational training in the agricultural sector and, in particular, the mutual recognition of occupational skills by the appropriate authorities in the Member States. The European ‘agri-pass’ passport that is being created aims to facilitate the mobility of agricultural workers in Europe. However, the pass should be merely an incentive to secure evidence of qualification and should not lead to workers who do not have it being disadvantaged.

5.2.2

Transparency in professional qualifications can also help improve mobility and give workers more scope to take a job and settle down in other countries. The Committee welcomes the Commission's initiatives to support the social partners by introducing an ‘agri-pass’.

5.2.3

In conjunction with the European Commission and the governments of the Member States concerned, the social partners should draw up and implement schemes to combat illegal employment.

5.3.1

Social security for seasonal workers is a matter of particular concern. Workers employed on a seasonal basis over a number of years must not be worse off, in social security terms, than other workers. In particular, this includes making sure:

5.3.2

Workers should be briefed in their own language about the host country's laws, agreements and practices as regards pay, organisations, social security, taxation, the rules on working conditions, etc., while at the same time the EU should respect the role of the contracting parties and not legislate in areas that are covered by national agreements.

5.4.1

Migrant workers have the right to decent housing in their destination country. A scheme must be developed at European level laying down basic standards for migrant worker housing.

5.5.1

The Committee has, over many years, adopted a large number of opinions calling for sustainable agriculture. Sustainable agriculture not only involves an environmental dimension but also takes in business and social aspects as well. A non-governmental, voluntary certification scheme for fair seasonal work could make competition more equitable. Possible criteria for voluntary certification include:

The purpose of certification is:

5.6.1

In the European farming sector, a large number of useful initiatives and projects are currently under way to boost mobility in agriculture and improve the position of seasonal workers. The Committee would ask the Commission to take steps to evaluate and disseminate examples of good practice.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/29

1.1

National Councils for Sustainable Development (NCSDs) can be a strong and powerful force for sustainable development since they can provide independent advice and foster dialogue with civil society and stakeholders on sustainable development.

1.2

An overview of NCSDs throughout the EU gives a very diverse picture. While some Member States have no or only inactive councils, those that are active differ considerably in their remit, composition, independence, resources and also as to the impact of their work.

1.3

Following the positive experiences in Member States with ‘strong’ NCSDs, the EESC calls on all Member States to strengthen their councils or to create operative and effective councils where they do not yet exist.

1.4

The EESC recommends that NCSDs should:

2.1

Sustainable development means satisfying the needs of the present generation without jeopardising the ability of future generations to satisfy theirs. This is one of the overall aims of the EU, governing all its policies and actions. It is founded on the principles of democracy, gender equality, solidarity, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, including freedom and equal opportunities for all.

2.2

In 1992, following the United Nations' Rio Conference, sustainable development became a globally recognised policy area. The idea of consultative bodies such as NCSDs also stems from the Rio Conference. Agenda 21, also a result of Rio, states that ‘a national strategy for sustainable development should be developed through the widest possible participation’; and in 2002, the Johannesburg recommendations also called for the setting up of sustainable development councils.

2.3

In the EU, the first sustainable development strategy was adopted in Gothenburg in 2001. In order to create a more comprehensive and effective strategy, the Commission started a revision process in 2004, and in June 2006 the Council adopted the renewed strategy for sustainable development for an enlarged Europe (1).This renewed strategy aims to implement Europe's long-term commitment to achieving the goal of sustainable development.

2.4

Following the recommendations of the UN Conclusions, and subsequently of the EU, institutions known as NCSDs started to be set up in the 1990s in a number of countries, their main aim being to ensure that Agenda 21 was effectively implemented and sustainable development principles put into practice. Some governments established inter-ministerial coordination bodies (e.g. the Hungarian Commission on Sustainable Development, 1993), some chose mixed bodies like the Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development (1993) and others created councils with a civil society composition, such as the Belgian National Council (1993) and the UK Round Table on Sustainable Development (1994). Other countries followed thereafter; some of the earlier bodies were restructured and others were eventually discontinued.

2.5

The renewed EU strategy states that: ‘Member States should consider strengthening, or where they do not yet exist, setting up multi-stakeholder national advisory councils on sustainable development to stimulate informed debate, assist in the preparation of National Sustainable Development Strategies and/or contribute to national and EU progress reviews. National sustainable development councils are meant to increase the involvement of civil society in sustainable development matters and contribute to better linking different policies and policy levels, also by using their network of European Environmental and Sustainable Development Advisory Councils (EEAC)’.

2.6

NCSDs have now been officially established in a number of Member States: Given their different histories Member States' NCSDs take a variety of forms across the EU. There is some form of council for sustainable development or environmental policy in 24 Member States; eight of these have specific councils for sustainable development, and another six have environmental councils made up of stakeholders or experts that are also active in the area of sustainable development. Other countries have governmental coordination bodies called councils, some with civil society involvement. Some of these bodies are inactive. In several countries where regions have considerable powers, regional councils have been set up in addition to the national councils. The rapid growth in NCSDs shows that they have potential and could provide added value to the policy-making processes and the debate across wider society.

2.7

This opinion aims to examine the role of the NCSDs, their remit, composition, resources, working methods, and above all their involvement of civil society. To a certain extent, the opinion also aims to look at the effectiveness of the NCSDs, bearing in mind that such an assessment is always prone to subjectivity. This assessment is based, in particular, on the research conducted by the EEAC network (2), the results of a questionnaire sent out by the EESC to several national focal points and NCSDs, and a number of civil society organisations. In addition, a number of interviews with NCSDs and civil society representatives have been carried out.

3.1

The following overview of the NCSDs shows a highly diverse picture:

3.2

Four main tasks of NCSDs can be identified:

3.2.1

These four tasks are not being fulfilled by councils in all Member States. In some of them, the remit is much more restricted, and in others, despite having been assigned these tasks, they are not or only partially fulfilled. This is also reflected in the fact that some councils meet very rarely (2 or 3 times per year). Others meet more often and have additional working groups (working groups set up in project teams working on an actual project, rather than static groups focussed on one topic, seem to be particularly efficient). In some Member States, councils may be given an early input into the national SD strategy while in others their input is sought at a very late stage, if at all. The number of reports produced varies from zero to over 10 reports per year. The well-established councils interact regularly with stakeholders, and organise public events or expert meetings on a regular basis.

3.3

The NCSDs vary in size and composition; the number of members varies from 15, as in Germany, to 78, 81 and 90, as in Belgium, Finland and France, respectively. Most councils comprise civil society representatives (business, trade unions, NGOs and research institutes). Others also include representatives from various government departments. In certain cases, the government coordination body is called a ‘Council’ and could include a small number of stakeholders. Regional and local governments are often represented too. A number of civil society representatives have voiced discontent about the insufficient involvement of civil society in their national Council and in SD processes in general.

3.4

As councils are established and funded by governments there is ‘dependence’ in this respect. In order to gain the respect of both government bodies and civil society organisations, the councils must achieve the right degree of independence, and striking this balance is a difficult task. The selection process varies, but in general, the government appoints the council members, typically on the basis of nominations by the civil society organisations represented in the council. Another issue concerns the staff working for the council; in several countries, the staff comes from government bodies. This may restrict the degree of independence of the council. Moreover, some councils are chaired by a member of the government.

3.5

The councils are very unevenly resourced, in terms of both human resources and the budget available. In some countries, where the secretariat is based in a ministry, there is only one administrator who, moreover, is often not working full time for the council. The total number of staff ranges from less than 1 to around 20. The biggest council is the UK Council with 58 employees. Not all councils have their own budget. Budgets range from less than EUR 0,1 million to around EUR 1 million, with the exception of the UK council whose budget is EUR 5,5 million.

3.6

Evaluating the impact of the councils' work is not easy, but a few conclusions can be drawn from the information received. For example, it would seem that in several countries where the council has a strong mandate, a large number of the recommendations made by the councils were incorporated in government policies, especially as regards the national SD strategy. Some councils clearly have good access to government ministers and departments and are regularly consulted on policy formation. Others are kept at a distance. It can also be stated that some councils have managed to reach out to a large number of stakeholders and the broader public by attracting a lot of participants to their events, thus ensuring a strong involvement of civil society in SD processes.

3.7

NCSDs can be a strong and powerful force for sustainable development. They can provide independent advice and a wide range of knowledge; they are in a position to foster dialogue with civil society and stakeholders; they can play an important part in monitoring progress towards longer-term sustainability goals, and exercise a valuable challenge function when progress is falling short.

3.8

While some Member States have no or only inactive councils, those that are active differ considerably in their remit, composition, independence, resources and also as to the impact of their work. This is the result of a variety of factors: the size and political organisation of the country, the role given to sustainable development policies by government, the tradition of civil society involvement, the existence of other bodies partially covering the remit of a council, the will of the government to accept advice from another body, etc.

3.9

The full potential of NCSDs is not exploited in all Member States. In some, the establishment of a council seems to be more a kind of ‘window-dressing’ than striving for real input from civil society. However, there are a number of countries with well-established councils that live up to their role and have a real impact.

3.10

Most councils do not seem to have sufficient resources to fulfil all their assigned tasks. A significant amount of manpower and funding is necessary to assemble evidence, analyse policies and their impact, organise council meetings and public engagement processes, produce well-argued and authoritative reports and to promote them actively to government and others.

3.11

In some Member States, the government appears to have a very strong role, e.g. as regards the appointment of council members, the number of government representatives on the council and the staff working for the council. In such cases, there is a certain risk that the government's view may dominate the work of the council, making it less likely that the council can play a significant part in helping governments to transcend shorter-term political considerations and move towards longer-term sustainability goals.

3.12

NCSDs have had mixed experiences in promoting engagement with civil society on sustainable development issues. Councils across Europe could have much to learn from each other in terms of developing good practice in this regard.

3.13

For many sustainable development issues competence is shared between the European Union and Member States. But most councils have a limited capacity to focus on the European aspects or to exercise any influence in Brussels. They have partly addressed this through the creation of the EEAC network, which is becoming an increasingly significant voice for sustainable development in Europe.

4.1

Following the positive experiences in Member States with ‘strong’ NCSDs, the EESC calls on all Member States to strengthen their councils or to create strong councils where they do not yet exist.

4.2

The composition, mandate and functions of NCSDs will differ from country to country depending on local circumstances and political structures. The EESC recommends that Member States give close attention to the following general recommendations on the key aspects of councils.

4.2.1

Membership: NCSDs have more authority and credibility if they include representatives from all the main sectors of society concerned with sustainable development issues. The broader the basis of membership, the higher the probability that solutions which will be broadly accepted can be found.

4.2.2

Mandate and vision: Achieving sustainability requires decision-makers to develop a long-term view and to take account of the needs of future generations and of the planet as a whole, as well as more immediate and short-term political considerations. NCSDs can play an important part in articulating that long-term vision. To play that role effectively they need to have members with vision, authority and standing in society, capable of taking an independent view and of challenging existing policies and practices.

4.2.3

Independence: NCSDs would be able to exercise a stronger influence in the direction of more sustainable development if they had a sufficient degree of independence from government, and were able to take up difficult political issues where there may be some degree of conflict between shorter-term political objectives and longer-term sustainability needs.

4.2.4

Scope: NCSDs should, from an early stage, play an important part in the development of sustainable development (and related) strategies and in monitoring their implementation. This includes addressing a wide range of sustainability issues like climate change, energy and transport policies, biodiversity, rural and agricultural issues, and the overall management of the economy in a sustainable way. NCSDs are likely to be most productive if they are able to both respond to government requests to study particular issues and also to take up other areas they deem to be important on their own initiative.

4.2.5

Access to information: In order to work well, NCSDs need the capacity to gather evidence from all relevant sources and, in particular, to have good access to government information and thinking.

4.2.6

Promoting the engagement of civil society on sustainable development issues: One important role of NCSDs is to increase public awareness. They can have a valuable role in aiding the relevant authorities to incorporate the sustainable development perspective into formal and informal education. They can promote wider understanding of the issues in the media. The publication of annual ‘state of sustainability’ reports by NCSDs could draw additional attention to the subject and foster public debate.

4.2.7

Resources: The EESC calls on the Member States to ensure sufficient funding of NCSDs so that they are able to fulfil their tasks and provide real added value to the debates and the decision-making process on sustainability issues.

4.2.8

European engagement: The Committee encourages the NCSDs to pool experience, exchange best practice and maintain open dialogue among the councils, particularly through the strengthening of the EEAC network. This would create a strong European voice for sustainable development.

4.3

The EESC also recommends that NCSDs seek to step up their capacity to engage individually and collectively with the European institutions on European aspects of sustainable development policy from the perspective of civil society. The EESC (and specifically the Sustainable Development Observatory) could play a useful role here in facilitating stronger engagement by NCSDs on European sustainability issues. The EESC could seek to engage with the EEAC and its members, on a regular basis on upcoming issues. It could seek to support EU-wide comparative studies on such topics, focusing particularly on the input and role of civil society. It could also seek to highlight and publicise examples of best practice.

4.4

The EESC stresses that broad public participation in sustainable development issues over and above the national councils' activities is also essential. It therefore calls on governments at national, regional and local levels to involve civil society representatives in all policy decisions with a significant sustainability aspect. There are no guidelines laying down minimum standards of good practice in terms of involving the public. To support the participation process, the EESC recommends carrying out regular benchmarking or rewarding of best practices. NCSDs should also ensure that they work closely together with other organisations and institutions that deal with sustainable development in their Member State, including with the national Economic and Social Councils where they exist.

4.5

To conclude, the EESC points out that the work of the NCSDs can only be fruitful if governments are willing to listen to and take heed of their advice and if they take concrete action in shifting national policies towards a more sustainable approach, including the allocation of adequate funding.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/33

1.1

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Commission's proposal for action at both the international and regional level to change, as soon as possible, current unacceptable ship dismantling practices.

1.2

As presently structured the international ship dismantling industry ranges from safe, well regulated, dry-dock facilities to beaches where vessels are taken apart by hand with the minimum of health, safety and environmental protection. Most merchant shipping currently ends its life on one of these beaches in South Asia. There is a serious worldwide shortage of dismantling facilities compatible with principles of environmental and social sustainability.

1.3

The Committee is concerned that this situation will be aggravated by the ‘bulge’ in the number of ships going out of service in the next few years following the global phase out of single hull oil tankers; the current back log of an estimated 15 million Light Displacement Tonnage (LDT) (1); and the recent boom in shipbuilding. Part of the surplus vessels needing to be disposed of in the coming years is a result of actions taken by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), prompted by the EU to protect its own environment so the EU has a clear responsibility for action.

1.4

It is noted that some ship owners do not make provision in their operating costs for safe, contained, end-of-life ship disposal though a large group (2) see the need for action and are beginning to set in place voluntary measures.

1.5

It is also noted that although legal provision exists in the EU which should prevent ships making a final voyage to be dismantled at a location with inadequate facilities, this is easily avoided. The EESC has consistently argued, most recently in March 2007 in its Opinion on the green paper Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union  (3), that Member States should promptly ratify international Conventions on maritime safety and environmental protection and ensure that they are properly enforced.

1.6

It is recognised that the dismantling of end-of-life vessels is a complex issue involving an important contribution in jobs and raw material resources which accrue to the developing countries offering low-cost dismantling. At the same time, the Committee acknowledges that structural poverty and other social and legal problems in some areas of South Asia is strongly linked to the absence or non-implementation of even minimum standards of safety at work, minimum labour standards and environmental protection.

1.7

A strong international regime for the identification, control and disposal of end-of-life ships should be established through the IMO. This regime must have an equivalent level of control as that found in the Basel Convention: incorporate all relevant International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards; not allow exemptions and prevent end-of-life ships with hazardous waste going to countries that are not party to the convention and which have inadequate facilities.

1.8

However, implementation of such an IMO agreement will take several years, therefore:

1.9

The EESC strongly supports encouraging best-practice ship recycling and the pre-cleaning of ships from gas and toxic waste within the EU. A commitment by member states to deal with all state-owned ships in this way and binding end-of-life clauses when such ships are sold to third parties are initial crucial steps in support of such an approach. Pre-cleaning vessels before export will provide avenues for getting clean secondary steel to South Asian destinations where the demand is high. A pre-cleaning guidance document should be developed for this purpose.

1.10

Providing financial and technical assistance to South Asian countries to improve their facilities — at a minimum converting beach operations to contained pier or dry-dock handling and providing better safety and downstream waste management facilities — will mitigate some of the worst problems.

1.11

The EESC recognises that effective action on this issue will involve extra costs. It supports the outline proposals by the Commission for mechanisms to ensure that provision for such costs become part of the normal operating costs of shipping. In particular further action is urged by the IMO and ship owners, to provide every ship with a recycling fund, either built up over its working life or established as a bond when it is launched. Various financial institutions are well-placed to structure and operate such measures. If such a fund is not made possible, the EU should look into regional mechanisms such as port state taxes or similar.

1.12

Recycling-aware design, identifying existing hazards and substituting as much toxic material as possible from ships when they are built will, in the long term, have a positive effect and the EESC supports efforts, both through the EU, IMO and by ship owners and builders.

2.1

The context of the Opinion is international shipping and the international shipment of waste. 200-600 large ships are broken up each year and recycled for their steel and other raw materials. Much of this takes place on tidal beaches in South Asian countries, with little regard for workers' safety or environmental protection. It is estimated that in the next eight years some 5.5 million tonnes of hazardous materials will arrive in these dismantling yards in end-of-life ships, notably oil sludge, oils, paints, PVC and asbestos.

2.2

None of the sites used for ship dismantling on the Indian sub-continent has containment to prevent pollution of soil and water and the treatment of waste rarely conforms to even minimum environmental standards. Due to the low level of safety measures, high accident rates are prevalent and long term health risks created through the workers handling toxic material without adequate protection (4).

2.3

The transfer of end-of-life ships from industrial to developing countries is covered by international law on the shipment of waste, and the export from the EU of vessels containing hazardous materials is banned by the EU's Waste Shipment Regulation. However, transfer to ship brokers and re-flagging obscures ownership and responsibility issues making it difficult to enforce existing legislation and allowing scope for irresponsible owners to evade their obligations.

2.4

Part of the solution is to encourage greater capacity in the EU. However, although this would be a positive step, and could be taken up by naval and state-owned ships, it will be unlikely to deal with more than a small percentage of the estimated 105 million LDT that will go for dismantling by 2020 (5).

2.5

The green paper is therefore urgently seeking ways forward which will cost-effectively and comprehensively improve standards in line with existing European and international legislation as mentioned above.

3.1

The conclusions of the November 2006 Council meeting were that environmentally sound management of ship dismantling was a priority for the European Union. The Commission had already set out its position in the Green Paper on Maritime Policy of June 2006 (6) where a future EU maritime policy should support initiatives at international level to achieve binding minimum standards on ship recycling and promote the establishment of clean recycling facilities.

3.2

This Green Paper presents fresh ideas in order to continue and intensify the dialogue with Member States and stakeholders, prepare the ground for future action and invites responses to a series of leading questions which highlight the main problems.

3.3

The main purpose of this exercise is the protection of the environment and of human health; the objective is not to artificially bring back ship recycling business volumes to the EU, thus depriving countries in South Asia of a major source of revenue and necessary materials. The final objective is to reach globally sustainable solutions.

3.4

At present there is ship recycling capacity conforming to environmental and safety standards, to handle, at most, 2 million tonnes per year worldwide — 30 % of the predicted total scrapping demand in normal years. Most of these facilities — particularly in China, but also in some EU Member States — cannot offer the same scrap prices and have much higher costs than their competitors in South Asia. These (and all other) facilities will come under pressure shortly as up to 1300 single-hulled tankers have to be taken out of service by 2015 following action taken after the Erika and Prestige disasters (7). The main concern is that the recruitment of less skilled workers to deal with greatly increased volume will lower safety and environmental standards still further. A peak will be reached in 2010, when it is estimated some 800 single hull ships may be scrapped so the need for action is urgent.

—

Lower or un-enforced regulatory requirements in waste and health and safety issues.

—

Significantly lower wage costs. Beach dismantling does not enable the use of heavy machinery and hence manual labour remains a large element of the cost.

—

The supply of ships is irregular and varied. Ships tend to be taken out of service when the freight rates are low and vessels vary widely in design and composition.

—

The market for used steel and second hand ship equipment is largely non-existent in OECD countries due to regulatory requirements.

3.11.1

For the substantially larger merchant fleet initiatives are needed to induce changes in the current practices of the shipping industry. For example, as mentioned below, a funding system whereby ship-owners and others contribute to the safe and environmentally sound dismantling of ships worldwide.

3.14.1

Setting up a sustainable ship dismantling fund as a mandatory element of the new international regime on ship dismantling via the IMO could also be a positive step. A precedent exists in the existing oil pollution funds under the MARPOL Convention.

a)

EU legislation, in particular on single-hull oil tankers.

b)

Streamlining of shipping aids with a link to green ship dismantling.

c)

Establishment of a European certification system for clean ship dismantling and awards for exemplary green recycling.

d)

Intensifying international research on ship dismantling.

4.1

Much ship recycling takes place in a way that contravenes internationally accepted standards on worker health and safety and environmental protection.

4.2

It is vital that the EU ensures that the maritime and safety protection it has imposed, for example for single hull tankers, does not translate to simply transferring the harm to developing countries, but in fact is addressed by full implementation of the Waste Shipment Regulation, which incorporates the Basel Convention, including the Basel Ban Amendment, and its principles.

4.3

Beyond technical and financial assistance to improve the conditions at the ship dismantling facilities in developing countries, funds will be required for the remediation of contaminated soil and water and other damages caused by uncontrolled shipbreaking activities. It should however also further be stressed that the types of problems endemic to the situation on the ground in developing countries cannot be addressed by simply providing technological advancement alone.

4.4

The EESC supports the Commission's concern on this issue and also its approach, which involves applying a wide-ranging mix of measures. Due to the urgent need to improve facilities and conditions, particularly in Bangladesh, rapid progress on determining the most effective forms of assistance, regulation and incentives should be prioritised so that proposals can be defined in a White Paper and appropriate impact assessments set in hand. The shipping industry also recognises the need to improve health and safety standards in ship recycling yards around the world (11) and is positive about the role the EU can play in this and in influencing the IMO.

5.1

To ensure clarity and brevity the specific comments resulting from the Committee's work on this issue have been condensed into practical action points and are presented in the Conclusions and Recommendations section (points 1.1 to 1.12) which prefaces this Opinion.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/38

1.1

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing the world in the 21st century. Action to limit these changes by limiting emissions of greenhouse gases is the top priority. But it is also important to plan in good time for adapting to such changes as have now become unavoidable. The Green Paper is a welcome first step for Europe in facing up to this.

1.2

The EESC recommends that an over-arching European adaptation strategy should now be put in place as a framework, outlining the actions that will need to be taken at European level, at national level, and by other actors.

1.3

In the EESC's view the following key points should be covered in the development of the European and national adaptation strategies:

2.1

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing the world in the 21st century.

2.2

The world has so far concentrated primarily on trying to mitigate the impact of climate change by limiting the emission of greenhouse gases. It is now however becoming increasingly clear that past emissions alone will cause a significant further warming of the atmosphere and seas over the next century and beyond. This will have major impacts on climate and weather related events, and on the physical and natural environment throughout the world. We now therefore need to focus more closely on these unavoidable impacts of global warming and climate change, and how best to adapt to them.

2.3

Such action must not diminish the efforts to limit emissions so as to mitigate further climate change. On the contrary, a proper understanding of how difficult adaptation could become should help to reinforce everyone's determination to achieve substantial reductions in emissions. To allow emissions to continue to rise unchecked would condemn future generations to much more painful and expensive adaptation.

2.4

Mitigation and adaptation strategies must match up and complement one another. We need to establish credible and deliverable strategies for restricting greenhouse gas emissions to tolerable target levels or ranges over realistic time-scales. The adaptation strategies must then map out how the world can best adapt to the most probable ranges of unavoidable climate change which those mitigation targets imply. Risk assessment and management will be a crucial tool in establishing the level of action needed and the order of priorities.

2.5

The Commission's Green Paper helpfully maps out many of the sectors that will be affected by climate change, and the kind of issues that will arise.

2.6

In the EESC's view there is now a strong case for the establishment of an over-arching European framework strategy dealing with the whole range of adaptation issues, and outlining the actions that will need to be taken at European level, at national level and by other actors.

2.7

This European Adaptation Strategy should itself call for the creation of National Adaptation Strategies by an appropriate date followed by regular national reporting on their implementation.

2.8

A European adaptation strategy will need to have a robust external dimension setting out how Europe plans to help other parts of the world to cope with their adaptation problems.

2.9

Europe will need strong and independent institutional arrangements to organise the necessary research and monitoring, and to hold the political bodies to account to deliver the necessary actions in good time. Civil society needs to be fully involved in the work of these institutions.

3.1

The EESC believes that the specific action areas identified in the Green paper are broadly the right ones. Following the Green Paper the EESC recommends that the European Union and its Members states should now develop concrete programmes and actions on each of these topics within the framework of their overall strategies. Timetables and plans need to be established, and appropriate financial resources mobilised.

3.2

On most of the topics the primary responsibilities for organising the necessary works will lie with national and local authorities. But there should be an important role for the European Union in setting the framework and in stimulating and supporting the national efforts on adaptation. In particular the Committee suggests that the EU should:

4.1

Coast Protection — Sea levels will rise as ice melts and sea temperatures increase. In some places it may be necessary to construct or reinforce physical barriers to protect land and settlements. In others managed retreat and the recreation of protective sea marshes may be the more appropriate strategy coupled with relocation of occupiers of vulnerable properties.

4.2

Flooding — Climate change is likely to lead to more variable weather patterns with longer periods of drought punctuated by episodes of more intense rainfall leading to rapid run-off and flooding. Flood defence plans need to be updated to take account of these new weather conditions. In some cases new programmes of flood defence works will be needed. In others appropriate flood plains or catchment areas may need to be created or re-established to receive flood waters. Development may need to be restricted in such areas, and relocation considered.

4.3

Water Resources and Shortages — Water resources are already under pressure in several parts of Europe and these pressures are likely to become more acute as climate change leads to longer periods of low rainfall and drought. Measures may be needed to bring new sources of water to affected areas (e.g. through such measures as desalination or long distance transfers) and to manage the uses of water more efficiently. Incentives to promote efficient use of water (including water pricing) need to be strengthened. It may also be necessary to discourage activities such as intensive agriculture or tourism in the worst affected areas. (The EESC is currently preparing a separate more detailed opinion on water scarcity and drought.)

4.4

The risk and incidence of serious fires is already increasing in areas such as the south of Europe that are becoming hotter and drier and may become more severe as temperatures rise further. Protective measures and response capacities will need to be strengthened and co-ordinated better. (EESC is preparing a separate more detailed opinion on natural catastrophes and civil protection.)

4.5

Public Health — Climate change may have consequences for public health in a variety of ways. It may cause widespread dissemination of vectors of disease, including in particular a northwards movement of a number of diseases previously confined to the tropics. Temperature extremes may also have more direct impacts. Plans need to be made to prepare for these changes.

4.6

Agriculture — Agriculture will be very strongly affected by climate change. Changes in temperature and rainfall will affect the suitability of land for different agricultural purposes, and will lead to big changes in the quality and quantity of production that can be achieved and hence on the viability of different farming regimes in different parts of Europe.

4.6.1

The health check of the CAP to be undertaken in 2008 should provide the opportunity to make further changes to encourage farmers to adapt their farming practices to the changes in climate that are now in prospect.

4.6.2

Agricultural research into new crops and methods of cultivation better suited to emerging climatic conditions needs to be expanded. Similarly the impact of climate change on the prospects for rearing animals in different parts of Europe need to be assessed along with ways of dealing with climate change induced spread of diseases. (The EESC will shortly be preparing a separate more detailed opinion on climate change and agriculture.)

4.7

Biodiversity — Climate change will bring about major changes in the habitats of plants and animals throughout Europe. In some cases particular species will no longer be able to survive in the changed habitats or will become critically at risk. Some species may successfully migrate to new habitats through natural processes. Other will need assistance in the transition if they are to survive. Existing biodiversity strategies and programmes will need to be updated and resources committed to implementation if this transition is to be accomplished without major species loss.

4.8

Trees and forests will also be substantially affected by climate change. Some areas may become less hospitable to particular species. Other areas may actually become more favourable for some species. Programmes of planting, replanting, tree care and forest management will need to be adapted accordingly.

4.9

Land-Use Planning — The planning of urban and other settlements and of transport and infrastructure will increasingly need to take account of changes in temperature and weather regimes. These considerations need to be factored into design standards and into professional practice and training. Individual development programmes and projects will similarly need to take these climate change impacts into account. Impact assessment methodologies will need to be adapted appropriately.

4.10

Buildings — The building and construction business will be severely affected by climate change. We need stricter minimum regulations for energy efficiency in buildings, better building standards etc. Information also needs to be made more accessible for citizens on best-practice, and on what methods, materials and subsidies are available for renovations of older buildings and new construction to reduce energy consumption and make them more appropriate for changing temperature and weather conditions.

4.11

EU Budget — In the annual budget, the EESC recommends that the heading ‘adaptation’ should appear for the policy areas where immediate investments will be needed (e.g. energy, research, agriculture, transport, building standards, natural disaster assistance, biodiversity protection, public health policy, etc.). The next Financial Framework should give a much higher share of available resources to programmes concerned with mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Member States should make similar changes in their own national budgets and spending programmes.

4.12

Structural Funds — In the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) there are criteria to support environment projects, but nothing is explicitly mentioned about adaptation to climate change and often the impact assessments are not adequate (many transport and energy projects are clearly harmful to the environment and the climate). In the next reviews of all these programmes much larger percentages of the available funds should be devoted to supporting measures for the mitigation of climate change and adaptation to it.

4.13

The European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) should build climate change into their budgetary processes and into their criteria for evaluating projects and programmes.

4.14

The Insurance Industry has taken a great interest in climate change, and is increasingly factoring climate change considerations into its decisions on what events it is willing to insure against and on what terms. The EU and its member states should institutionalise an ongoing dialogue with the insurance industry so as to ensure that the insurance sector plays its full part in helping business and others to adapt to climate change.

4.15

Developing countries — Many developing countries will have more serious adaptation problems than Europe and fewer resources to deal with them. Some of the least developed countries have done very little to contribute to the problem of climate change but will be amongst the worst affected and have an extremely strong claim in equity and justice for co-operation and support. They will need support from the developed world, including human, technical and financial resources to help them adapt appropriately. Europe should take a leading role both in providing additional resources for adaptation measures within its own collective and national development assistance programmes, and in helping the international financial community to adjust to the adaptation challenge.

4.16

Some parts of the world will become much less hospitable to human settlement (and in extreme cases may even become virtually uninhabitable) either as a consequence of sea level rises or as a result of extreme weather conditions. Climate change may lead to growing pressures for increased migration into Europe from other parts of the world, as well as population shifts within Europe. Development agencies and other relevant Government Departments will need to be ready to help developing countries identify such situations in good time and to help plan for any necessary relocation programmes.

4.17

The potential impacts of climate change at national and local level in Europe, and the likely pace of change are still only imperfectly understood, and a great deal of further research and analysis will be needed to improve and refine the forecasts. The European Environment Agency might have a useful role as a coordinating point for all the relevant research, monitoring, analysis and forecasting in this field, and as disseminator of best available information to decision-takers and others concerned with the detailed implementation of adaptation strategies. The EESC itself stands ready to play its part in promoting deeper and more widespread understanding of the impacts of climate change in the different parts of Europe and of the adaptation measures needed.

4.18

Civil society will need to be deeply engaged in the process of adaptation to climate change. Local communities, businesses and other organisations of all kinds will be increasingly affected by climate change, and will need to be involved with the response. People and organisations of all kinds need a deeper understanding of the changes that are already happening and are likely to happen in the future within their own lifetimes and those of their children. They also need a much fuller understanding of what will be involved for them in mitigating climate change and in adapting to it. Increasingly knowledge about these matters should become a core part of the curriculum in formal and informal education.

4.19

The EESC stresses the importance of involving civil society at all levels and of communicating with consumers and the general public. It fully supports the Green Paper's suggestion for sectoral Working Groups with interested parties to assist in developing the sector specific responses that will be needed. One important task for such groups should be to develop techniques for assessing risk levels, and auditing the readiness and preparedness of organisations and communities for responding to extreme weather events and other disasters that may become more severe or frequent as climate change progresses.

4.20

There are important roles for regional and local government authorities to co-ordinate and stimulate activity at their levels, and to mobilise public response and engagement. Public authorities at all levels can also play a crucial part in showing the way through appropriate planning of their own buildings and developments and in their procurement policies.

4.21

The Green Paper suggests the creation of a European Advisory Group for Adaptation to Climate Change with representatives of civil society, policy makers and scientists to act as an Expert group while the strategy is being developed. The Committee can support the idea of such a group.

4.22

In addition, the Committee suggests that the EU should consider establishing an independent monitoring body with an independent chairman, charged with keeping under review the progress of the whole climate change strategy (both adaptation and mitigation). It should report regularly and publicly on progress and give early warnings if action seems to be falling behind commitments and according to the requirements of the situation. The EESC itself also intends to keep progress in this area under regular scrutiny.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/42

1.1

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Commission's recommendation in its proposal on reform of the European market organisation in wine to maintain a specific market organisation for wine. The Committee would have liked the European Commission to take on board more of the recommendations it elaborated in its opinion of 14 December 2006 on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament — Towards a sustainable European wine sector  (1).

1.2

The EESC repeats its point that the main aim of the reform must be to improve the competitiveness of European wines and win back market shares. As far as the reform and external trade provisions are concerned, the Commission should take more account of the fact that Europe's wine sector leads the global market.

1.3

The EESC notes that wine and wine-growing are important and integral aspects of Europe's culture and way of life. Wine-growing shapes the social and economic environment of many European wine-growing regions. The Committee therefore believes it is important that both the objectives and the measures of the reform should reflect not just the economic effects, but also the consequences for employment, social structures and the environment — in particular through grubbing-up programmes — as well as consumer protection and health. The European Commission's proposal falls short in this regard.

1.4

The EESC would point out that wine-growing provides a livelihood for 1.5 million mainly small, family-run businesses in the European Union and at least seasonal employment for over 2.5 million workers. The Committee is therefore particularly concerned that the reform should give preference to measures that have a positive impact on the incomes of wine-growers and job opportunities in Europe's wine-growing sector.

1.5

The EESC considers the European Commission's proposal to provide the wine-producing Member States with an individual national budget envelope as an important fillip to subsidiarity and consideration of regional differences. However, the list of support instruments must be extended if the objectives of the reform are to be achieved.

1.6

The EESC regards the proposals submitted by the European Commission on consumer information measures as inadequate. It welcomes the proposals for promotion in export markets, but believes this idea should be extended to include the internal market.

2.1

The European Commission is proposing reform of the market organisation for wine mainly in the following areas:

3.1

The EESC broadly endorses the objectives of the European Commission proposal. However, it considers that certain adjustments and improvements are needed in the case of the measures recommended.

3.2

The EESC reiterates its call for the competitiveness of European wine producers in the internal market and export markets to be improved, for Europe as a business location to be strengthened, for quality measures to be supported and for there to be more focus on market developments and consumer preferences. The Commission does not take enough account of these issues in its current proposal.

3.3

The EESC also thinks it is important to make the economic objectives specific and to supplement them with social and employment policy objectives. These would include improving the income of wine-producing holdings, making it easier for young wine-growers to develop their businesses, and providing sustainable employment opportunities and appropriate remuneration for permanent and seasonal workers.

3.4

The EESC still has reservations about transferring powers from the Council of Ministers to the Commission, e.g. in relation to authorisation of more recent wine-making practices, since the Commission has not adequately defended the interests of European wine producers when negotiating bilateral agreements.

3.5

The EESC re-affirms its view that current funding must be increased to take account of the accession to the EU of two new wine-producing countries.

3.6

The EESC again calls for improved and more comprehensive market monitoring, so that better data on production, trade and consumption are available as the basis for organisation of the wine market. The general data used hitherto are important, but inadequate. It is also necessary to provide updated information on changes in production structures, distribution channels and consumer behaviour.

3.7

The EESC agrees with the Commission's view that the new market organisation in wine should come into effect as soon as possible. However, it considers a ‘phasing-out period’ to be necessary so that businesses can adapt to the new framework gradually if required.

3.8

The EESC is pleased that the European Commission has modified its proposal for a grubbing-up programme. However, it would make sense for these measures to be carried out under regional or national structural programmes, in order to avoid the negative effects of one-off grubbing-up measures (e.g. fallow land surrounded by vineyards) and ensure systematic implementation.

3.9

The EESC reiterates its objection to complete liberalisation of planting rules, as this would jeopardise the economic, social, environmental and landscape maintenance objectives of wine market reform.

4.1.1

The EESC welcomes the fact that its views have basically been taken on board in so far as the proposals provide for more account to be taken of regional differences and more consistent implementation of subsidiarity in the wine sector through the introduction of national budget envelopes. However, it regards the support measures provided for as inadequate.

4.1.2

The EESC agrees with the European Commission that a more consistent and more appropriate Community framework should be maintained. Within that framework, it should fall to the Member States to select measures for their wine-producing regions. Producer organisations, sectoral associations, regulatory bodies and other organisations with equivalent objectives should play an important role here.

4.1.3

The EESC would like to see a comprehensive list of measures that reflect the goals of the market organisation. It refers to its previous opinions on reform of the CMO in wine (2), in which it already called among other things for programmes to promote product quality in wine-growing, cellaring, marketing and consumer information, measures to support disadvantaged areas, and the possibility of direct area payments.

4.1.4

The EESC reiterates its call for coherent, integrated measures with a view to maximising efficiency. Such measures should be incorporated into comprehensive plants for the entire production chain, from wine-growing to processing and marketing of the product. This also includes measures to develop alternative market outlets for all grape products.

4.1.5

The EESC once again urges that a special programme be introduced to promote disadvantaged wine-growing areas, such as steep and sloping vineyards, and areas subject to extreme climate conditions.

4.1.6

The EESC welcomes the fact that the EU Commission has placed considerable emphasis on export promotion measures within the national budget envelope. Measures are also needed to inform consumers in the internal market about wine-growing and in particular about the advantages of moderate wine consumption and the dangers of alcohol abuse. It reiterates its call for support to be given to setting up a European market monitoring system.

4.1.7

The Committee does not regard immediate abolition of intervention measures as feasible. It therefore recommends that aids should be provided within the national envelopes during the 2008-2010 ‘phasing-out period’ for distillation to produce potable alcohol and for private storage support.

4.1.8

The Committee believes that the national financial envelopes should include crisis management measures based on shared responsibility among wine-producers. Existing measures (harvest insurance and mutual funds) are not adequate for managing economic crises. This makes it necessary to consider whether existing emergency distilling arrangements are effective and whether an emergency distillation system could be provided for within the national financial envelopes.

4.1.9

The prevailing ban on overpressing of grapes, grape mash and wine lees has proved an effective way of ensuring the quality of wine products and preventing abuse, and should therefore be retained. Member States should be authorised to raise the percentage of production for distillation during certain years.

4.1.10

The EESC notes the European Commission's elaboration of a proposal for allocating the budget for the national financial envelopes. Special financial provisions should be set out for the new Member States, for which no background information is available, according to the amount of land planted with vines.

4.2.1

In various opinions the Committee has emphasised the importance of the second pillar for the future development of rural areas, to which the European wine-producing areas also belong. But even taking account of this fundamental broad objective, the EESC considers that, with a view to resolving the specific problems of the wine sector, all the measures discussed in connection with the reform of the wine market should be financed from the wine budget. This budget must therefore not be reduced, either through cuts or transfers of funding.

4.3.1

The EESC believes that it is absolutely essential to establish an internationally recognised definition of ‘wine’. This would also make it necessary to lay down recognised production methods. It should be made clear that ‘fruit wines’ are not covered by the wine market organisation.

4.3.2

The EESC believes that measures to bring wine-making practices into line with OIV standards should be incorporated more consistently into the strategic thrust of bilateral or international trade agreements. The authorisation of any practice for imported wines that is approved elsewhere in the world would conflict with the proposed closer alignment of European wines with OIV standards and lead to further distortions in competition. The EESC is also against the proposal to allow for wine exports oenological practices that are banned on the internal market.

4.3.3

The EESC recommends that a catalogue of authorised oenological practices should be attached as an appendix to this directive and that the Council should retain its powers to update these practices and authorise new ones.

4.3.4

The EESC is pleased that the European Commission has distanced itself from the proposal to authorise the production in Europe of wine made from imported grape must or must concentrate and the proposal to authorise the blending of EU products with products from other countries.

4.3.5

The EESC calls on the Commission to take account in its proposals for production rules of the varying location, climate and weather conditions in the European Union. It notes that this issue is very sensitive and must not lead to rifts within the European wine sector or even a boycott of the reform proposals. The EESC, however, supports the demand for tighter control of oenological practices in order to enhance and guarantee the quality of wines.

4.3.6

The EESC therefore bases its assessment of the Commission's proposals on its previous opinion, the analyses set out by the Commission, the proposed liberalisation of wine production methods, recognition of wine production processes in bilateral agreements, and on the objectives of the reform, especially increasing competitiveness and reducing production costs. After weighing up the pros and cons of the Commission's proposals, the EESC advocates a general continuation of the existing rules governing the use of sucrose and aid for must concentrate.

4.4.1

The EESC welcomes the European Commission's elaboration of detailed proposals on labelling wines according to their provenance. It shares the Commission's view that the concept of quality wines in the Community is based inter alia on the specific characteristics attributable to the wine's geographical origin. Protecting the designation of origin and geographical indications is a high priority. For this reason the use of a designation of origin or geographical indication should be conditional on production within the delineated geographical areas.

4.4.2

The EESC welcomes the fact that the European Commission has now explained and elaborated its proposals such that it is possible to maintain tried-and-tested quality policy systems that are not, or not solely, based on the principle of designations of origin. Quality wine testing in particular has proved effective in many countries for producers and in particular consumers.

4.4.3

Many questions nevertheless remain regarding the compatibility with Commission Regulation (EC) No 753/2002 of 29 April 2002 laying down certain rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 1493/1999 as regards the description, designation, presentation and protection of certain wine sector products (3). The EESC therefore calls for an equivalency table to be presented from which the impact on geographical and traditional designations can be ascertained.

4.5.1

The EESC regards the Commission's proposals in respect of labelling as highly complex, and it expects the Commission to carry out an accurate simulation of the impact of the proposed changes.

4.5.2

The EESC draws attention to the fact that, following a debate lasting a number of years, labelling law has been amended only very recently. It therefore calls upon the Commission to explain what new factors now come into play that were not assessed in the debate which has just come to an end.

4.5.3

The EESC welcomes moves to simplify labelling provisions, provided that they promote improved consumer information. Such changes must not, however, increase the risk of distorting competition or misleading consumers, resulting in a flood of legal disputes. The proposal by the European Commission for the grape variety and vintage year to be optionally indicated for wines without a designation of origin or geographical indication should also be regarded as questionable from this perspective. This proposal can only be endorsed if a control and certification system is provided for to ensure the traceability of such wines so as to protect consumers and prevent misinformation and unfair competition.

4.5.4

The EESC draws attention to the growing linguistic diversity in an ever larger European Union. This linguistic diversity may give rise to trade barriers, as is currently the case with regard to the indication of sulphite use. It should therefore be possible to give mandatory information on labels, e.g. ingredients, using readily comprehensible symbols.

4.6.1

The EESC welcome the fact that the Commission has modified its proposals on grubbing-up rules and reduced the budget envisaged. It recognises the importance of grubbing-up as an instrument of market organisation which is to be offered as part of the regional or national structural programmes for limited periods of three to five years within the overall Community framework. Grubbing-up should be offered as a voluntary measure for removing vines from land that is not suitable for viticulture and as a cushion against the social effects of withdrawal from production of businesses that are not viable.

4.6.2

The EESC is pleased that the Commission has changed its original deadlines for liberalising planting rules. However, the EESC is still against full liberalisation — even at a later point — since this would jeopardise the economic, social, environmental and landscape maintenance objectives of the wine-market reform. It is not acceptable to shift wine production from culturally valuable man-made wine-growing landscapes to areas that are cheaper to cultivate, owing to general responsibility for employment, the economy and infrastructure of wine-growing regions, the social fabric, the environment and nature conservation.

4.6.3

If the EU planting regulation, together with a ban on new planting, is to be abolished, an enabling framework should be created to make it possible for wine-growing regions to continue applying or develop their planting rules in accordance with the objectives of the European wine market organisation.

4.7.1

The EESC believes that the Commission proposals fall short of what is needed in order to win back market shares from wines from third countries, especially the New World.

4.7.2

The EESC calls on the Commission to provide, within the national budget envelopes, for promotion of consumer information and sales promotion measures not just in export markets, but also within the internal market. With this aim in mind, particular attention must be paid to providing comprehensive information on the benefits of moderate wine consumption as an integral part of a healthy diet and a modern lifestyle.

4.7.3

The EESC stresses that any information and promotional measures should include all products made from grapes.

4.7.4

The EESC recommends that communication measures for wine products be linked to tourism, gastronomic activities and other products in wine-growing regions.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/47

1.1

On 13 September 2006, the European Economic and Social Committee adopted an own-initiative opinion on the Future outlook for agriculture in areas with specific natural handicaps (upland, island and outlying areas)  (1).

1.1.1

In this opinion, the EESC devoted the whole of chapter 4 to the problems faced by upland areas, and among other things emphasised the need for:

1.2

On 7 December 2006, during the policy dialogue concluding the Committee of the Regions' plenary session, Commission president José Manuel Barroso spoke out in favour of drawing up a Green Paper on the future of policies for upland areas.

1.3

The EESC therefore feels it appropriate to draw up an additional opinion, in order to express its views on the principles which could underlie such a Green Paper.

1.4

Upland areas provide all European citizens with numerous services as well as public and economic benefits, for example:

1.5

Unless upland areas are appropriately managed by people who live there, the production of such goods and services will be jeopardised.

1.6

Today, we have to face up to major new challenges, both present and future, such as intensifying economic competition, demographic change, climate change, etc. Although these challenges concern all regions, they have a much stronger impact on mountainous areas and a specific approach is therefore needed.

1.7

However, most existing policies which apply to upland areas are sectoral and are often adopted outside these areas without paying sufficient attention to their specific features. Policies on upland areas tend to be unimaginative, they often cover other areas, and fail to take the specific features of upland areas sufficiently into account. At the same time, European and national policies are increasingly focusing on the comparative strengths of regions requiring promotion or development.

1.8

Despite their importance at European level, upland areas are to some extent neglected by European policies, and there is a serious failure to acknowledge their considerable potential in terms of contributing to European growth and diversity, particularly in view of their innovative approaches.

1.9

The EESC is therefore in favour of a much more consistent and integrated policy approach. Upland areas require a cross-sectoral and territorial approach to their sustainable development.

1.10

A Green Paper on the future of policies for upland areas would help to rationalise and consolidate existing policies and initiatives at European level in order to make them more effective in the specific context of upland areas. This particularly applies to agriculture in upland areas, as mentioned in this opinion. In most European upland areas, farming is the foundation on which other socio-economic, agro-industrial and tourism-related activities are built, and it determines the attractiveness of such regions. The Common Agricultural Policy therefore has a key role to play and must be included in the review of European policies in upland areas envisaged by the Green Paper.

1.11

The EESC therefore calls for the Green Paper on the future of policies for upland areas to be added as soon as possible to the European Commission's work programme in order to define the issues of strategic importance for upland areas in the Member States of the European Union, to clarify the respective tasks of the various levels of authority and economic sectors and coordination between them, to consolidate specific statistical data used as a basis for policies in such areas, to study ancillary and support measures to be put in place in such areas in the light of the strategic objectives defined by the European Union, and to promote the development of European and national policies.

1.12

By making it easier to tap into the comparative strengths of upland areas, the Green Paper on the future of policies for upland areas will also tie in with the re-launched Lisbon strategy and the Gothenburg strategy. It will therefore contribute to the objectives of growth and employment, and will help the European Union to become a more internationally competitive knowledge-based economy in the years to come. Upland areas have a major contribution to make to Europe as a whole, and it is important to make the best possible use of their potential for innovation and growth.

1.12.1

At the EESC's plenary session of 11 and 12 July 2007, Ms Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for regional policy, referred to the EU's territorial agenda and announced that in 2008 a report on territorial cohesion would study the impact of major future challenges on the regions and means of dealing with them. The EESC urges that the specific features of upland, island and outermost regions be taken sufficiently into account in the current discussions on the EU's cohesion policy and in the preparation of the Territorial Agenda.

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/49

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/50

—

‘Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 76/768/EEC, 88/378/EEC, 1999/13/EC and Directives 2000/53/EC, 2002/96/EC and 2004/42/EC in order to adapt them to Regulation (EC) … on Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures, and amending Directive 67/548/EEC and Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006’

—

and on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 648/2004 in order to adapt it to Regulation (EC) No … on Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures, and amending Directive 67/548/EEC and Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006’

16.5.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/51

A.

Europe's economy is highly integrated into the global economy. The degree of integration varies across the sectors; it is particularly marked in the case of the industrial activities most susceptible to globalisation. Consequently, the European Union's (EU) economic and tax policies must also be defined in relation to global change. Although this opinion is focused on the impact of the territoriality of tax law on industrial change within the EU, the Union should not be viewed in isolation from the rest of the world.

B.

The EU and each of its Member States are responsible for managing economic, financial, social and environmental policies, the requirements of which go beyond market dynamics. It is therefore important to ensure that the territoriality of tax law has a positive impact on industrial change at EU level, which must of course respond to market dynamics, but which also benefits from being framed by the abovementioned policies, within a broader context. The very nature of the Lisbon process hinges on a delicate balance between its various strands (competitiveness, social dimension, environmental protection) which must be nurtured, with due regard also for tax competition between the Member States (1).

C.

The EESC notes that tax competition is one of the aspects of the single market that can lead to distortions of competition. With it comes the need for transparency rules and the identification of abuse and harmful practices (2). It also requires indicators to act as a good yardstick for gauging the tax competition situation. The EESC notes, however, that taxation is not a critical factor in SMEs' investment decisions. It has much more bearing in the more mobile multinational companies.

D.

Tax competition does not solely concern company taxation. With the increasing mobility of financial assets, this competition also affects personal investment income and taxation of capital.

E.

The EESC believes that coordinating tax provisions across the various governments can be a lever for strengthening the operation of the internal market by eliminating tax dysfunctions and compliance costs, particularly in border regions. The EESC reaffirms the recommendations it made in its opinion on Fiscalis 2013 (3).

F

In the Committee's view, the lack of coordination between Member States' national direct tax systems is leading to non-taxation (4), abuse and other distortions to the operation of the internal market. This situation can also lead to destabilisation or even the erosion of total EU tax revenues.

G.

Unlimited intra-EU tax competition risks, on the one hand, making the least mobile taxpayers — such as small businesses and services that cannot be relocated — part of a narrower tax base and, on the other hand, bringing about a re-distribution of the tax burden between taxpayers and consumers to cover public expenditure and social transfers. The latter could undermine social cohesion.

H.

SMEs and service companies are the least well-equipped to benefit from tax competition. The Committee advocates introducing support services and training programmes for their managerial staff (just as for public officials) as well as the establishment of suitable data bases, particularly in the EU's border and peripheral regions, to help such companies with the procedures required for branching out internationally.

I.

The Committee feels that the fight against tax fraud must be a priority and draws attention to the conclusions of its recent opinion on the subject (5).

J.

The transfer of the tax burden onto the least mobile production factors may decrease the competitiveness of the businesses concerned and their jobs vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. This burden transfer may be detrimental to the rate of national GDP growth, which may lead to a reduction in public investment capacity in the absence of new budgetary resources.

K.

Tax competition prompts Member States to improve their grip on public expenditure. The Committee would urge that this not be detrimental to either the range or quality of public services. Such services are vital for retaining and attracting wealth- and job-creating economic activities, which — ultimately — increase the tax base. Tax competition must not be prejudicial to collective social protection coverage or funding.

L.

The Committee supports the commitment made by Member States to eliminate harmful tax competition and a number of harmful tax measures by 2010 at the latest, as set out in the Code of Conduct adopted in 1997 (6). It also calls on the Commission to continue its work in this regard, which it began at that time.

M.

The Committee also supports the Commission's policy aimed at ensuring that State aid, including selective tax breaks for business, contributes to the pursuit of sustainable industrial change and regional development objectives whilst also being compatible with EU competition policy.

N.

The Committee calls for the introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) (7) in a bid to simplify and render more equitable and transparent tax practices across the Member States. This would enable maximum benefit to be derived from the internal market, whilst safeguarding Member States' budgetary and fiscal sovereignty and protecting them from potential clashes with Treaty provisions. Given that the CCCTB will probably be introduced on the basis of enhanced cooperation, the EESC hopes it will be adopted by as many Member States as possible.

O.

The Committee calls for more information on the content, practicalities and development of the CCCTB project before updating its opinion on this complex strategic issue, while in the meantime referring to its exploratory opinion, issued in 2006, in response to a request from Commissioner Kovács (8).

P.

However, the EESC would raise a number of points and questions concerning the CCCTB. It feels that this optional project should be adopted by as many Member States as possible (via transitional measures, if necessary) and that the Member States should ultimately apply a single tax base to all taxpayers at the end of a coexistence period. Furthermore, consideration should be given to whether the common base applied to companies operating on external markets will be entrusted to a transnational body. Finally, we should also consider the effects of the common base on tax rates, i.e., the risk of their increasing dispersion. In this case, a minimum rate could be established, which could be set just below the current average rate of the new Member States.

Q.

The EESC recommends that the Commission step up its monitoring of tax practices in certain tax havens that try to tap into the taxable income of Member States' tax systems.

1.1

Taxation (the level of tax burden and the amounts of tax levied) is often cited as one of the criteria for evaluating how attractive an area is for industrial, financial and commercial activity. There is not, however, agreement as to the relative weight of this criterion in comparison with others, such as the proximity of markets, production costs, the availability of skilled workers, public infrastructure and facilities, public funding, etc.

1.2

Tax systems are complex and comparing them is not easy. It is vital, however, to consider whether the tax incentives of the various authorities achieve the aims for which they were designed, to assess the impact that any decision seeking to facilitate positive industrial change in their areas could have and relate this to the estimated cost.

1.3

The aim of the opinion is to provide guidelines for anticipating and managing industrial change, aiding continued growth in European competitiveness under the Lisbon objectives and creating a true internal market, with healthy competition that is undistorted, or at least permissible (compatible with the internal market rules).

2.1

This mobility is increasing within the EU, for the following reasons: