29.11.2007

Official Journal of the European Union

C 287/1

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL

of 16 November 2007

on a European Agenda for Culture

(2007/C 287/01)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

(1)	recalling the objectives assigned to the European Community, in particular by Article 151 of the Treaty;

(2)	referring to the provisions of the Unesco Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions;

(3)	having regard to the Commission's Communication of 10 May 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World (1);

(4)	recalling its Conclusions of 24 May 2007 on the contribution of the cultural and creative sectors to the achievement of the Lisbon objectives (2);

(5)	taking into account the experience derived from planning and implementing the Council's 2002-2004 and 2005-2007 work plans (3);

(6)	taking into account the results of the First Cultural Forum for Europe, held in Lisbon on the 26 and 27 September 2007;

(7)	convinced that culture and its specificity, including multilingualism are key elements of the European integration process based on common values and a common heritage — a process which recognizes, respects and promotes cultural diversity and the transversal role of culture;

(8)	stressing that culture and creativity are important drivers for personal development, social cohesion, economic growth, creation of jobs, innovation and competitiveness;

(9)	sharing the view that the role of culture should be better recognized in the Lisbon Agenda in the new cycle which it will enter into in 2008;

(10)	considering that culture should play an important role in the EU's external relations as a means of enhancing international cooperation;

(11)

underlining the strong link between culture and development, and welcoming a more pro-active role by Member States and the European Community in the context of their respective external assistance, in order to foster the emergence of a dynamic cultural sector in developing countries, and taking note of the suggestion by the Commission to enhance mobilization and diversification of funding in favour of increased access of local population to culture, and of cultural goods of those countries to European markets;

(12)	stressing the importance of deepening intercultural dialogue at the international level, including with countries in a situation of fragility, and involving non-governmental actors in order to promote greater knowledge and understanding,

EUROPEAN AGENDA FOR CULTURE

WELCOMES the Commission's proposal to define a European Agenda for Culture, perceived as an important step towards further developing cooperation in the cultural field and increasing the coherence and visibility of European action in this field, while at the same time strengthening the transversal role of culture;

Strategic objectives

ENDORSES the three strategic objectives set out in the Commission's Communication with a view to shaping the shared European Agenda for Culture, i.e.:

(a)	promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue;

(b)	promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth, employment, innovation and competitiveness;

(c)	promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union's international relations;

Specific objectives

AGREES that those three strategic objectives are to be specified as follows:

AS REGARDS PROMOTION OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE:

—	encouraging the mobility of artists and other professionals in the culture field,

—	promoting cultural heritage, namely by facilitating the mobility of collections and fostering the process of digitisation, with a view to improving public access to different forms of cultural and linguistic expressions,

—	promoting intercultural dialogue as a sustainable process contributing to European identity, citizenship and social cohesion, including by the development of the intercultural competences of citizens;

AS REGARDS PROMOTING CULTURE AS A CATALYST OF CREATIVITY:

—	promoting better use of synergies between culture and education, in particular by encouraging art education and active participation in cultural activities with a view to developing creativity and innovation,

—	promoting the availability of managerial, business and entrepreneurial training capacities specifically tailored to professionals in the cultural and creative fields,

—

fostering a favourable environment for the development of cultural and creative industries, including the audiovisual sector, thus maximizing their potential, in particular that of SMEs, namely by making better use of existing programmes and initiatives and by stimulating creative partnerships between the cultural sector and other sectors, including in the context of local and regional development;

AS REGARDS CULTURE AS A VITAL ELEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

—	enhancing the role of culture in the EU's external relations and development policy,

—	promoting the Unesco Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and contributing to its implementation at international level,

—	fostering intercultural dialogue and interaction between civil societies of EU Member States and third countries,

—	encouraging further cooperation between cultural institutions of EU Member States, including cultural institutes, in third countries and with their counterparts in those countries;

Subsidiarity and flexibility

STRESSES that action pursuant to these objectives should have a real European added value and be carried out with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity, and that these common guidelines at EU level do not preclude the definition and implementation by Member States of their own national policy objectives;

5.	UNDERLINES that these objectives should be considered as a flexible framework for guiding future action in the cultural field;

WORKING METHODS

Dialogue with the cultural sector

6.	AGREES that a continuous, multi-layered and flexible dialogue with cultural stakeholders and in consultation with the sector at all levels (local, regional, national and European) is essential to both the development and the implementation of a European Agenda for Culture;

7.	WELCOMES the Commission's intention to identify representative interlocutors from the sector and to undertake a mapping of the sector, in order to set up channels of communication and to structure dialogue with stakeholders;

AGREES in view of the positive impact of the first Cultural Forum held in Lisbon on 26 and 27 September 2007 that interaction with and within civil societies at both national and European level is a major element in gathering the views of stakeholders in the context of the regular reporting exercise;

Open method of coordination

CONSIDERS that the new approach proposed by the Commission for cooperation in the field of culture, namely using the open method of coordination (OMC) in a specifically adapted way and taking into account the specificities of the sector, will provide a flexible and non-binding framework for structuring cooperation around the strategic objectives of the European Agenda for Culture and fostering exchanges of best practices;

10.

DECIDES that:

(a)

the OMC will be applied using a flexible approach suited to the cultural field, while fully respecting Member States' competences, including those of their regional and local authorities and in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Participation of Member States in the actions and procedures concerned will be voluntary;

(b)	when implementing the OMC, special attention will be paid to the need to minimise financial and administrative burden upon the different actors, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in the EC Treaty (4);

(c)

the objectives of the European Agenda for Culture will be implemented through triennial work plans covering a limited number of priority areas, which the Council determines as suitable for the OMC framework in the corresponding time period. On the basis of those priority areas, the Commission will propose specific actions for the work plans that will be discussed, supplemented, updated and, where necessary, endorsed by the Council of Ministers;

(d)	the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, will play a central role in ensuring continuity and follow-up of the priority areas for action and maintaining the momentum of the process;

(e)	after consulting the competent Council body (the Cultural Affairs Committee) the Commission will prepare a progress report to be submitted to the Council on the basis inter alia of the information voluntarily provided by Member States pursuant to the principles laid down in 10a and b above;

(f)	in order to enhance the general awareness and visibility of cultural cooperation at European level, cultural actors and the public at large will be informed about the objectives and priority actions of the work plan;

11.	AGREES, in accordance with paragraph 10c, that the work plan for the period 2008-2010 will concentrate on the priority areas for action set out in the Annex;

12.	The Council may, in cooperation with the Commission, review the application of the OMC in the cultural field in the light of progress made, and having regard to the reporting and evaluation exercise mentioned in paragraph (e) above;

13.	The European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions will be kept informed of the implementation of the work plans;

Horizontal aspects

14.	INVITES the Commission to pursue its work in the field of cultural statistics in terms of definitions and methodologies with a view to achieving comparability of statistical data to support evidence-based policy-making and actions;

15.	WELCOMES the creation by the Commission of an inter-service group to better ensure that cultural aspects are taken into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaty, as laid down by Article 151(4) of the EC Treaty;

16.

RECOMMENDS, that the interface between cultural aspects and other Community policies be strengthened, through coordination between relevant Council configurations on matters that have an impact on culture and through the creation of an effective and coherent mechanism for regular reporting on and following up cultural aspects under other provisions of the Treaty;

17.	INVITES the European Council to endorse these conclusions providing a framework for a European Agenda for Culture.

(1) Doc. 9496/07 and accompanying working document listing Community actions in the field of culture (Doc. 9496/07 ADD 1).

(2) Doc. 9021/07.

(3) OJ C 162, 6.7.2002 and doc. 13839/04.

(4) Article 5 of the EC Treaty thereof as interpreted by Protocol No 30 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, namely its Point 9.

ANNEX

PRIORITY AREAS FOR ACTION FOR THE PERIOD 2008-2010

In accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 10c and 11 above, the following priority actions will be pursued in the context of the strategic objectives of the European Agenda for Culture:

—	improving the conditions for the mobility of artists and other professionals in the cultural field,

—	promoting access to culture, in particular through the promotion of cultural heritage, multilingualism, digitisation, cultural tourism, synergies with education, especially art education, and greater mobility of collections,

—	developing data, statistics and methodologies in the cultural sector and improve their comparability,

—	maximising the potential of cultural and creative industries, in particular that of SMEs,

—	promoting and implementing the Unesco Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

29.11.2007

Official Journal of the European Union

C 287/12

EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on the handling of complaints by the Authority under Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement

(2007/C 287/06)

A.	The present notice is issued pursuant to the rules of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereafter the ‘EEA Agreement’) and the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (hereafter the ‘Surveillance and Court Agreement’).

The European Commission (hereafter the ‘Commission’) has issued a notice entitled ‘Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty’ (1). That non-binding act contains principles and rules which the Commission follows in the field of competition. It also explains how the Commission intends to handle complaints.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers the abovementioned act to be EEA relevant. In order to maintain equal conditions of competition and to ensure a uniform application of the EEA competition rules throughout the European Economic Area, the EFTA Surveillance Authority adopts the present notice under the power conferred upon it by Article 5(2)(b) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement. It intends to follow the principles and rules laid down in this notice when applying the relevant EEA rules to a particular case (2).

D.	In particular, the purpose of this Notice is to spell out how the EFTA Surveillance Authority aims to handle complaints concerning alleged infringements of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement.

E.	The present notice applies to cases where the Authority is the competent surveillance authority under Article 56 of the EEA Agreement.

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE NOTICE

Chapter II of Part I of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (hereafter ‘Chapter II’) (3) establishes a system in which the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA States' competition authorities and courts can apply Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement. Chapter II recognises in particular the complementary functions of the Authority and EFTA States' competition authorities acting as public enforcers and the EFTA States' courts that rule on private lawsuits in order to safeguard the rights of individuals deriving from Articles 53 and 54.

2.	Under Chapter II, the public enforcers may focus their action on the investigation of serious infringements of Articles 53 and 54 which are often difficult to detect. For their enforcement activity, they benefit from information supplied by undertakings and by consumers in the market.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority therefore wishes to encourage citizens and undertakings to address themselves to the public enforcers to inform them about suspected infringements of the competition rules. At the level of the Authority, there are two ways to do this, one is by lodging a complaint pursuant to Article 7(2) of Chapter II. Under Articles 5 to 9 of Chapter III of Part I of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (hereafter ‘Chapter III’) (4), such complaints must fulfil certain requirements.

The other way is the provision of market information that does not have to comply with the requirements for complaints pursuant to Article 7(2) of Chapter II. Such information about suspected infringements of Articles 53 and 54 can be the starting point for an investigation by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (5). Information about suspected infringements can be supplied to the following address:

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Competition and State Aid Directorate

Rue Belliard 35

B-1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

competition@eftasurv.int

Without prejudice to the interpretation of Chapters II and III by the EFTA Court, the present Notice intends to provide guidance to citizens and undertakings that are seeking relief from suspected infringements of the competition rules. The Notice contains two main parts:

—

part II gives indications about the choice between complaining to the EFTA Surveillance Authority or bringing a lawsuit before a national court. Moreover, it recalls the principles related to the work-sharing between the Authority and the national competition authorities of the EFTA States in the enforcement system established by Chapter II that are explained in the Notice on cooperation within the EFTA network of competition authorities (6),

—	part III explains the procedure for the treatment of complaints pursuant to Article 7(2) of Chapter II by the Authority.

This Notice does not address the following situations:

—	complaints lodged by EFTA States pursuant to Article 7(2) of Chapter II,

—	complaints that ask the EFTA Surveillance Authority to take action against a EFTA State pursuant to Article 59(3) in conjunction with Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement,

—	complaints relating to Article 61 of the EEA Agreement on State aids,

—	complaints relating to infringements by EFTA States that the Authority may pursue in the framework of Article 31 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

II. DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES FOR LODGING COMPLAINTS ABOUT SUSPECTED INFRINGEMENTS OF ARTICLES 53 OR 54 OF THE EEA AGREEMENT

A. Complaints in the new enforcement system established by Chapter II

Depending on the nature of the complaint, a complainant may bring his complaint either to a national court or to an EFTA State competition authority that acts as public enforcer. The present chapter of this Notice intends to help potential complainants to make an informed choice about whether to address themselves to the EFTA Surveillance Authority, to one of the EFTA States' competition authorities or to a national court.

While national courts are called upon to safeguard the rights of individuals and are thus bound to rule on cases brought before them, public enforcers cannot investigate all complaints, but must set priorities in their treatment of cases. The EFTA Surveillance Authority, entrusted by Article 55(1) of the EEA Agreement with the task of ensuring application of the principles laid down in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, is responsible for defining and implementing the orientation of EEA competition policy (7). According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, the Commission, in order to perform its tasks effectively, is entitled to give differing degrees of priority to the complaints brought before it under Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty (8). The Authority is of the opinion that a similar principle applies to the Authority within the context of the EEA Agreement.

Chapter II empowers EFTA States' courts and EFTA States' competition authorities to apply Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement in their entirety alongside the EFTA Surveillance Authority. Chapter II pursues as one principal objective that EFTA States' courts and competition authorities should participate effectively in the enforcement of Articles 53 and 54 (9).

10.

Moreover, Article 3 of Chapter II provides that EFTA States' courts and competition authorities have to apply Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement to all cases of agreements or conduct that are capable of affecting trade between Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement to which they apply their national competition laws. In addition, Articles 11 and 15 of Chapter II create a range of mechanisms by which EFTA States' courts and competition authorities cooperate with the EFTA Surveillance Authority in the enforcement of Articles 53 and 54.

11.

In this new legislative framework, the EFTA Surveillance Authority intends to refocus its enforcement resources along the following lines:

—	enforce the EEA competition rules in cases for which it is well placed to act (10), concentrating its resources on the most serious infringements,

—	handle cases in relation to which the EFTA Surveillance Authority should act with a view to define EEA competition policy and/or to ensure coherent application of Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement.

B. The complementary roles of private and public enforcement

12.

It has been consistently held by the Community Courts that national courts are called upon to safeguard the rights of individuals created by the direct effect of Articles 81(1) and 82 of the EC Treaty (11). It follows from Article 7 EEA and Protocol 35 to the EEA Agreement that EEA law does not entail a transfer of legislative powers. Therefore, EEA law does not require that individuals and economic operators can rely directly on non-implemented EEA rules before national courts (12). However, according to Protocol 35, the EFTA States are under an obligation to ensure, if necessary by a separate statutory provision, that in cases of conflict between implemented EEA rules and other statutory provisions the implemented EEA rules prevail. According to the EFTA Court, it is inherent in the nature of such a provision that individuals and economic operators in cases of conflict between implemented EEA rules and national statutory provisions must be entitled to invoke and to claim at the national level any rights that could be derived from provisions of the EEA Agreement, as being or having been made part of the respective national legal order, if they are unconditional and sufficiently precise (13).

13.

National courts can decide upon the nullity or validity of contracts and only national courts can grant damages to an individual in case of an infringement of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement. In order to ensure the full effectiveness of the EEA competition rules, any individual must be able to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct which restricts or distorts competition. Such actions for damages before the national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the territory covered by the EEA Agreement as they discourage undertakings from concluding or applying restrictive agreements or practices (14).

14.

Chapter II takes express account of the fact that national courts have an essential part to play in applying the EEA competition rules (15). By extending the power to apply Article 53(3) to national courts it removes the possibility for undertakings to delay national court proceedings by a notification to the EFTA Surveillance Authority and thus eliminates an obstacle for private litigation that existed under the previous rules.

15.

Without prejudice to the right or obligation of national courts to request an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court in accordance with Article 34 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, Article 15(1) of Chapter II provides expressly that national courts may ask for opinions or information from the EFTA Surveillance Authority. This provision aims at facilitating the application of Articles 53 and 54 by national courts (16).

16.

Action before national courts has the following advantages for complainants:

—	national courts may award damages for loss suffered as a result of an infringement of Article 53 or 54,

—	national courts may rule on claims for payment or contractual obligations based on an agreement that they examine under Article 53,

—

it is for the national courts to apply the civil sanction of nullity of Article 53(2) in contractual relationships between individuals (17). They can in particular assess, in the light of the applicable national law, the scope and consequences of the nullity of certain contractual provisions under Article 53(2), with particular regard to all the other matters covered by the agreement (18),

—	national courts are usually better placed than the EFTA Surveillance Authority to adopt interim measures (19),

—	before national courts, it is possible to combine a claim under EEA competition law with other claims under national law,

—	courts normally have the power to award legal costs to the successful applicant. This is never possible in an administrative procedure before the Authority.

17.	The fact that a complainant can secure the protection of his rights by an action before a national court, is an important element that the EFTA Surveillance Authority may take into account in its examination of the interest under the EEA Agreement for investigating a complaint (20).

18.	The EFTA Surveillance Authority holds the view that the new enforcement system established by Chapter II strengthens the possibilities for complainants to seek and obtain effective relief before national courts.

C. Work-sharing between the public enforcers in the EFTA pillar

19.

Chapter II creates a system where both the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA States' competition authorities are empowered to apply Articles 53 and 54 in their entirety (Article 5). Decentralised enforcement by EFTA States' competition authorities is further encouraged by the possibility to exchange information (Article 12) and to provide each other assistance with investigations (Article 22).

20.

Chapter II does not regulate the work-sharing between the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA States' competition authorities but leaves the division of case work to the cooperation of the Authority and the EFTA States' competition authorities inside the EFTA Competition Network. Chapter II pursues the objective of ensuring effective enforcement of Articles 53 and 54 through a flexible division of case work between the EFTA public enforcers.

21.

Orientations for the work sharing between the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA States' competition authorities are laid down in a separate Notice (21). The guidance contained in that Notice, which concerns the relations between the EFTA public enforcers, will be of interest to complainants as it permits them to address a complaint to the authority most likely to be well placed to deal with their case.

22.

The Notice on cooperation within the EFTA Network of Competition Authorities states in particular (22):

‘An authority can be considered to be well placed to deal with a case if the following three cumulative conditions are met:

(1)	the agreement or practice has substantial direct actual or foreseeable effects on competition within its territory, is implemented within or originates from its territory;

(2)	the authority is able to effectively bring to an end the entire infringement i.e. it can adopt a cease and desist order the effect of which will be sufficient to bring an end to the infringement and it can, where appropriate, sanction the infringement adequately;

(3)	it can gather, possibly with the assistance of other authorities, the evidence required to prove the infringement.

The above criteria indicate that a material link between the infringement and the territory of an EFTA State must exist in order for that EFTA State's competition authority to be considered well placed. It can be expected that in most cases the authorities of those EFTA States where competition is substantially affected by an infringement will be well placed provided they are capable of effectively bringing the infringement to an end through either single or parallel action unless the EFTA Surveillance Authority is better placed to act (see below […]).

It follows that a single NCA is usually well placed to deal with agreements or practices that substantially affect competition mainly within its territory. […]

Furthermore single action of an NCA might also be appropriate where, although more than one NCA can be regarded as well placed, the action of a single NCA is sufficient to bring the entire infringement to an end. […]

Parallel action by several NCAs may be appropriate where an agreement or practice has substantial effects on competition mainly in their respective territories and the action of only one NCA would not be sufficient to bring the entire infringement to an end and/or to sanction it adequately. […]

The authorities dealing with a case in parallel action will endeavour to coordinate their action to the extent possible. To that effect, they may find it useful to designate one of them as a lead authority and to delegate tasks to the lead authority such as for example the coordination of investigative measures, while each authority remains responsible for conducting its own proceedings.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority is also well placed if one or several agreement(s) or practice(s), including networks of similar agreements or practices, have effects on competition in two or more EFTA States (cross-border markets covering two or more EFTA States or several national markets).

Moreover, the EFTA Surveillance Authority is particularly well placed to deal with a case if it is closely linked to other EEA provisions which may be exclusively or more effectively applied by the Authority, if the EEA interest requires the adoption of an Authority decision to develop EEA competition policy when a new competition issue arises or to ensure effective enforcement.’

23.

Within the EFTA Competition Network, information on cases that are being investigated following a complaint will be made available to the other members of the network before or without delay after commencing the first formal investigative measure (23). Where the same complaint has been lodged with several authorities or where a case has not been lodged with an authority that is well placed, the members of the network will endeavour to determine within an indicative time-limit of two months which authority or authorities should be in charge of the case.

24.

Complainants themselves have an important role to play in further reducing the potential need for reallocation of a case originating from their complaint by referring to the orientations on work sharing in the network set out in the present chapter when deciding on where to lodge their complaint. If nonetheless a case is reallocated within the network, the undertakings concerned and the complainant(s) are informed as soon as possible by the competition authorities involved (24).

25.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority may reject a complaint in accordance with Article 13 of Chapter II, on the grounds that an EFTA State competition authority is dealing or has dealt with the case. When doing so, the Authority must, in accordance with Article 9 of Chapter III, inform the complainant without delay of the national competition authority which is dealing or has already dealt with the case.

III. THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY'S HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 7(2) OF CHAPTER II

A. General

26.

According to Article 7(2) of Chapter II, natural or legal persons that can show a legitimate interest (25) are entitled to lodge a complaint to ask the EFTA Surveillance Authority to find an infringement of Articles 53 and 54 EEA and to require that the infringement be brought to an end in accordance with Article 7(1) of Chapter II. The present part of this Notice explains the requirements applicable to complaints based on Article 7(2) of Chapter II, their assessment and the procedure followed by the Authority.

27.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority, unlike civil courts, whose task is to safeguard the individual rights of private persons, is an administrative authority that must act in the public interest. It is an inherent feature of the Authority's task as public enforcer that it has a margin of discretion to set priorities in its enforcement activity (26).

28.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority is entitled to give different degrees of priority to complaints made to it and may refer to the interest under the EEA Agreement presented by a case as a criterion of priority (27). The Authority may reject a complaint when it considers that the case does not display a sufficient interest under the EEA Agreement to justify further investigation. Where the Authority rejects a complaint, the complainant is entitled to a decision of the Authority (28) without prejudice to Article 7(3) of Chapter III.

B. Making a complaint pursuant to Article 7(2) of Chapter II

(a) Complaint form

29.

A complaint pursuant to Article 7(2) of Chapter II can only be made about an alleged infringement of Articles 53 or 54 with a view to the EFTA Surveillance Authority taking action under Article 7(1) of Chapter II. A complaint under Article 7(2) of Chapter II has to comply with Form C mentioned in Article 5(1) of Chapter III.

30.

Form C is available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/fieldsofwork/fieldcompetition/faq/ and is also annexed to this Notice. The complaint must be submitted in three paper copies as well as, if possible, an electronic copy. In addition, the complainant must provide a non-confidential version of the complaint (Article 5(2) of Chapter III. Electronic transmission to the EFTA Surveillance Authority is possible via the website indicated above, the paper copies should be sent to the following address:

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Competition and State Aid Directorate

Rue Belliard 35

B-1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

31.

Form C requires complainants to submit comprehensive information in relation to their complaint. They should also provide copies of relevant supporting documentation reasonably available to them and, to the extent possible, provide indications as to where relevant information and documents that are unavailable to them could be obtained by the EFTA Surveillance Authority. In particular cases, the Authority may dispense with the obligation to provide information in relation to part of the information required by Form C (Article 5(1) of Chapter III). The Authority holds the view that this possibility can in particular play a role to facilitate complaints by consumer associations where they, in the context of an otherwise substantiated complaint, do not have access to specific pieces of information from the sphere of the undertakings complained of.

32.

Correspondence to the EFTA Surveillance Authority that does not comply with the requirements of Article 5 of Chapter III and therefore does not constitute a complaint within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Chapter II will be considered by the Authority as general information that, where it is useful, may lead to an own-initiative investigation (cf. paragraph 4 above).

(b) Legitimate interest

33.	The status of formal complainant under Article 7(2) of Chapter II is reserved to legal and natural persons who can show a legitimate interest (29). EFTA States are deemed to have a legitimate interest for all complaints they choose to lodge.

34.

In many cases, the condition of legitimate interest is not a matter of doubt as the complainants are in a position of being directly and adversely affected by the alleged infringement. However, there are situations where the condition of a ‘legitimate interest’ in Article 7(2) requires further analysis to conclude that it is fulfilled. Useful guidance can best be provided by a non-exhaustive set of examples.

35.

The Court of First Instance of the European Communities has held that an association of undertakings may claim a legitimate interest in lodging a complaint regarding conduct concerning its members, even if it is not directly concerned, as an undertaking operating in the relevant market, by the conduct complained of, provided that, first, it is entitled to represent the interests of its members and secondly, the conduct complained of is liable to adversely affect the interests of its members (30). Conversely, the Commission has been found to be entitled not to pursue the complaint of an association of undertakings whose members were not involved in the type of business transactions complained of (31).

36.

Taking account of this case law, the EFTA Surveillance Authority is of the opinion that undertakings (themselves or through associations that are entitled to represent their interests) can claim a legitimate interest where they are operating in the relevant market or where the conduct complained of is liable to directly and adversely affect their interests. The Authority considers that a legitimate interest can, for instance, be claimed by the parties to the agreement or practice which is the subject of the complaint, by competitors whose interests have allegedly been damaged by the behaviour complained of or by undertakings excluded from a distribution system.

37.

Consumer associations can equally lodge complaints with the EFTA Surveillance Authority (32). The Authority moreover holds the view that individual consumers whose economic interests are directly and adversely affected insofar as they are the buyers of goods or services that are the object of an infringement can be in a position to show a legitimate interest (33).

38.

However, the EFTA Surveillance Authority does not consider as a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 7(2) the interest of persons or organisations that wish to come forward on general interest considerations without showing that they or their members are liable to be directly and adversely affected by the infringement (pro bono publico).

39.

Local or regional public authorities may be able to show a legitimate interest in their capacity as buyers or users of goods or services affected by the conduct complained of. Conversely, they cannot be considered as showing a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Chapter II to the extent that they bring to the attention of the EFTA Surveillance Authority alleged infringements pro bono publico.

40.

Complainants have to demonstrate their legitimate interest. Where a natural or legal person lodging a complaint is unable to demonstrate a legitimate interest, the EFTA Surveillance Authority is entitled, without prejudice to its right to initiate proceedings of its own initiative, not to pursue the complaint. The Authority may ascertain whether this condition is met at any stage of the investigation (34).

C. Assessment of complaints

(a) Interest under the EEA Agreement

41.

With reference to settled case law of the Community Courts and practice of the Commission, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that it is not required to conduct an investigation in each case (35) or, a fortiori, to take a decision within the meaning of Article 5(2)(a) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement on the existence or non-existence of an infringement of Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement (36), but is entitled to give differing degrees of priority to the complaints brought before it and refer to interest under the EEA Agreement in order to determine the degree of priority to be applied to the various complaints it receives (37). The position is different only if the complaint falls within the exclusive competence of the Authority (38).

42.	The EFTA Surveillance Authority must however examine carefully the factual and legal elements brought to its attention by the complainant in order to assess the interest under the EEA Agreement in further investigation of a case (39).

43.

The assessment of interest under the EEA Agreement raised by a complaint depends on the circumstances of each individual case. Accordingly, the number of criteria of assessment to which the EFTA Surveillance Authority may refer is not limited, nor is the Authority required to have recourse exclusively to certain criteria. As the factual and legal circumstances may differ considerably from case to case, it is permissible to apply new criteria which had not before been considered (40). Where appropriate, the Authority may give priority to a single criterion for assessing the Community interest under the EEA Agreement (41).

44.

Among the criteria which may be held relevant for the assessment of the interest under the EEA Agreement in the (further) investigation of a case are the following:

—	The EFTA Surveillance Authority can reject a complaint on the ground that the complainant can bring an action to assert its rights before national courts (42).

—

The Authority may not regard certain situations as excluded in principle from its purview under the task entrusted to it by the EEA Agreement but is required to assess in each case how serious the alleged infringements are and how persistent their consequences are. This means in particular that it must take into account the duration and the extent of the infringements complained of and their effect on the competition situation in the territory covered by the EEA Agreement (43).

—

The Authority may have to balance the significance of the alleged infringement as regards the functioning of the EEA Agreement, the probability of establishing the existence of the infringement and the scope of the investigation required in order to fulfil its task of ensuring that Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement are complied with (44).

—	While the Authority's discretion does not depend on how advanced the investigation of a case is, the stage of the investigation forms part of the circumstances of the case which the Authority may have to take into consideration (45).

—

The Authority may decide that it is not appropriate to investigate a complaint where the practices in question have ceased. However, for this purpose, the Authority will have to ascertain whether anti-competitive effects persist and if the seriousness of the infringements or the persistence of their effects does not give the complaint an interest under the EEA Agreement (46).

—	The Authority may also decide that it is not appropriate to investigate a complaint where the undertakings concerned agree to change their conduct in such a way that it can consider that there is no longer a sufficient interest under the EEA Agreement to intervene (47).

45.

Where it forms the view that a case does not display sufficient interest under the EEA Agreement to justify (further) investigation, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may reject the complaint on that ground. Such a decision can be taken either before commencing an investigation or after taking investigative measures (48). However, the Authority is not obliged to set aside a complaint for lack of sufficiently strong interest under the EEA Agreement (49).

(b) Assessment under Articles 53 and 54

46.	The examination of a complaint under Articles 53 and 54 involves two aspects, one relating to the facts to be established to prove an infringement of Articles 53 or 54 and the other relating to the legal assessment of the conduct complained of.

47.

Where the complaint, while complying with the requirements of Article 5 of Chapter III and Form C, does not sufficiently substantiate the allegations put forward, it may be rejected on that ground (50). In order to reject a complaint on the ground that the conduct complained of does not infringe the EEA competition rules or does not fall within their scope of application, the EFTA Surveillance Authority is not obliged to take into account circumstances that have not been brought to its attention by the complainant and that it could only have uncovered by the investigation of the case (51).

48.

The criteria for the legal assessment of agreements or practices under Articles 53 and 54 cannot be dealt with exhaustively in the present Notice. However, potential complainants should refer to the extensive guidance available from the EFTA Surveillance Authority (52), in addition to other sources and in particular the case law of the EFTA Court and the Community Courts and the case practice of the Authority and the Commission (53). Four specific issues are mentioned in the following points with indications on where to find further guidance.

49.

Agreements and practices fall within the scope of application of Articles 53 and 54 where they are capable of affecting trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. Where an agreement or practice does not fulfil this condition, national competition law may apply, but not EEA competition law. Extensive guidance on this subject can be found in the Notice on the effect on trade concept (54).

50.	Agreements falling within the scope of Article 53 may be agreements of minor importance which are deemed not to restrict competition appreciably. Guidance on this issue can be found in the EFTA Surveillance Authority's de minimis Notice (55).

51.

Agreements that fulfil the conditions of a block exemption regulation are deemed to satisfy the conditions of Article 53(3). For the EFTA Surveillance Authority to withdraw the benefit of the block exemption pursuant to Article 29 of Chapter II, it must find that upon individual assessment an agreement to which the exemption regulation applies has certain effects which are incompatible with Article 53(3).

52.

Agreements that restrict competition within the meaning of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement may fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement. Pursuant to Article 1(2) of Chapter II and without a prior administrative decision being required, such agreements are not prohibited. Guidance on the conditions to be fulfilled by an agreement pursuant to Article 53(3) can be found in the Notice on Article 53(3) (56).

D. The EFTA Surveillance Authority's procedures when dealing with complaints

(a) Overview

53.

As recalled above, the EFTA Surveillance Authority is not obliged to carry out an investigation on the basis of every complaint submitted with a view to establishing whether an infringement has been committed. However, the Authority is under a duty to consider carefully the factual and legal issues brought to its attention by the complainant, in order to assess whether those issues indicate conduct which is liable to infringe Articles 53 and 54 (57).

54.	In the EFTA Surveillance Authority's procedure for dealing with complaints, different stages can be distinguished (58).

55.

During the first stage, following the submission of the complaint, the EFTA Surveillance Authority examines the complaint and may collect further information in order to decide what action it will take on the complaint. That stage may include an informal exchange of views between the Authority and the complainant with a view to clarifying the factual and legal issues with which the complaint is concerned. In this stage, the Authority may give an initial reaction to the complainant allowing the complainant an opportunity to expand on his allegations in the light of that initial reaction.

56.

In the second stage, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may investigate the case further with a view to initiating proceedings pursuant to Article 7(1) of Chapter II against the undertakings complained of. Where the Authority considers that there are insufficient grounds for acting on the complaint, it will inform the complainant of its reasons and offer the complainant the opportunity to submit any further comments within a time-limit which it fixes (Article 7(1) of Chapter III).

57.

If the complainant fails to make known its views within the time-limit set by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, the complaint is deemed to have been withdrawn (Article 7(3) of Chapter III). In all other cases, in the third stage of the procedure, the Authority takes cognisance of the observations submitted by the complainant and either initiates a procedure against the subject of the complaint or adopts a decision rejecting the complaint (59).

58.	Where the EFTA Surveillance Authority rejects a complaint pursuant to Article 13 of Chapter II on the grounds that another authority is dealing or has dealt with the case, the Authority proceeds in accordance with Article 9 of Chapter III.

59.

Throughout the procedure, complainants benefit from a range of rights as provided in particular in Articles 6 to 8 of Chapter III. However, proceedings of the EFTA Surveillance Authority in competition cases do not constitute adversarial proceedings between the complainant on the one hand and the companies which are the subject of the investigation on the other hand. Accordingly, the procedural rights of complainants are less far-reaching than the right to a fair hearing of the companies which are the subject of an infringement procedure (60).

(b) Indicative time limit for informing the complainant of the EFTA Surveillance Authority's proposed action

60.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority is under an obligation to decide on complaints within a reasonable time (61). What is a reasonable duration depends on the circumstances of each case and in particular, its context, the various procedural steps followed by the Authority, the conduct of the parties in the course of the procedure, the complexity of the case and its importance for the various parties involved (62).

61.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority will in principle endeavour to inform complainants of the action that it proposes to take on a complaint within an indicative time frame of four months from the reception of the complaint. Thus, subject to the circumstances of the individual case and in particular the possible need to request complementary information from the complainant or third parties, the Authority will in principle inform the complainant within four months whether or not it intends to investigate its case further. This time-limit does not constitute a binding statutory term.

62.

Accordingly, within this four month period, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may communicate its proposed course of action to the complainant as an initial reaction within the first phase of the procedure (see point 55 above). The Authority may also, where the examination of the complaint has progressed to the second stage (see point 56 above), directly proceed to informing the complainant about its provisional assessment by a letter pursuant to Article 7(1) of Chapter III.

63.	To ensure the most expeditious treatment of their complaint, it is desirable that complainants cooperate diligently in the procedures (63), for example by informing the EFTA Surveillance Authority of new developments.

64.

Where the EFTA Surveillance Authority addresses a statement of objections to the companies complained of pursuant to Article 10(1) of Chapter III, the complainant is entitled to receive a copy of this document from which business secrets and other confidential information of the companies concerned have been removed (non-confidential version of the statement of objections; cf. Article 6(1) of Chapter III). The complainant is invited to comment in writing on the statement of objections. A time-limit will be set for such written comments.

65.	Furthermore, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may, where appropriate, afford complainants the opportunity of expressing their views at the oral hearing of the parties to which a statement of objections has been addressed, if the complainants so request in their written comments (64).

66.

Complainants may submit, of their own initiative or following a request by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, documents that contain business secrets or other confidential information. Confidential information will be protected by the Authority (65). Under Article 16 of Chapter III, complainants are obliged to identify confidential information, give reasons why the information is considered confidential and submit a separate non-confidential version when they make their views known pursuant to Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Chapter III, as well as when they subsequently submit further information in the course of the same procedure. Moreover, the Authority may, in all other cases, request complainants which produce documents or statements to identify the documents or parts of the documents or statements which they consider to be confidential. It may in particular set a deadline for the complainant to specify why it considers a piece of information to be confidential and to provide a non-confidential version, including a concise description or non-confidential version of each piece of information deleted.

67.

The qualification of information as confidential does not prevent the EFTA Surveillance Authority from disclosing and using information where that is necessary to prove an infringement of Articles 53 or 54 (66). Where business secrets and confidential information are necessary to prove an infringement, the Authority must assess for each individual document whether the need to disclose is greater than the harm which might result from disclosure.

68.

Where the EFTA Surveillance Authority takes the view that a complaint should not be further examined, because there is no sufficient interest under the EEA Agreement in pursuing the case further or on other grounds, it will inform the complainant in the form of a letter which indicates its legal basis (Article 7(1) of Chapter III), sets out the reasons that have led the Authority to provisionally conclude in the sense indicated and provides the complainant with the opportunity to submit supplementary information or observations within a time-limit set by the Authority. The Authority will also indicate the consequences of not replying pursuant to Article 7(3) of Chapter III, as explained below.

69.	Pursuant to Article 8(1) of Chapter III, the complainant has the right to access the information on which the Authority bases its preliminary view. Such access is normally provided by annexing to the letter a copy of the relevant documents.

70.

The time-limit for observations by the complainant on the letter pursuant to Article 7(1) of Chapter III will be set in accordance with the circumstances of the case. It will not be shorter than four weeks (Article 17(2) of Chapter III). If the complainant does not respond within the time-limit set, the complaint is deemed to have been withdrawn pursuant to Article 7(3) of Chapter III. Complainants are also entitled to withdraw their complaint at any time if they so wish.

71.	The complainant may request an extension of the time-limit for the provision of comments. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may grant such an extension.

72.

In that case, where the complainant submits supplementary observations, the EFTA Surveillance Authority takes cognisance of those observations. Where they are of such a nature as to make the Authority change its previous course of action, it may initiate a procedure against the companies complained of. In this procedure, the complainant has the procedural rights explained above.

73.	Where the observations of the complainant do not alter the EFTA Surveillance Authority's proposed course of action, it rejects the complaint by decision (67).

(d) The EFTA Surveillance Authority decision rejecting a complaint

74.

Where the EFTA Surveillance Authority rejects a complaint by decision pursuant to Article 7(2) of Chapter III, it must state the reasons in accordance with Article 16 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, i.e. in a way that is appropriate to the act at issue and takes into account the circumstances of each case.

75.

The statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the EFTA Surveillance Authority in such a way as to enable the complainant to ascertain the reasons for the decision and to enable the EFTA Court to exercise its power of review. However, the Authority is not obliged to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on by the complainant in support of its complaint. It only needs to set out the facts and legal considerations which are of decisive importance in the context of the decision (68).

76.

Where the EFTA Surveillance Authority rejects a complaint in a case that also gives rise to a decision pursuant to Article 10 of Chapter II (Finding of inapplicability of Articles 53 or 54) or Article 9 of Chapter II (Commitments), the decision rejecting a complaint may refer to that other decision adopted on the basis of the provisions mentioned.

77.	A decision to reject a complaint is subject to appeal before the EFTA Court (69).

78.

A decision rejecting a complaint prevents complainants from requiring the reopening of the investigation unless they put forward significant new evidence. Accordingly, further correspondence on the same alleged infringement by former complainants cannot be regarded as a new complaint unless significant new evidence is brought to the attention of the EFTA Surveillance Authority. However, the Authority may re-open a file under appropriate circumstances.

79.

A decision to reject a complaint does not definitively rule on the question of whether or not there is an infringement of Articles 53 or 54, even where the EFTA Surveillance Authority has assessed the facts on the basis of Articles 53 and 54. The assessments made by the Authority in a decision rejecting a complaint therefore do not prevent an EFTA State court or competition authority from applying Articles 53 and 54 to agreements and practices brought before it. The assessments made by the Authority in a decision rejecting a complaint constitute facts which EFTA States' courts or competition authorities may take into account in examining whether the agreements or conduct in question are in conformity with Articles 53 and 54 (70).

(e) Specific situations

80.

According to Article 8 of Chapter II, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may on its own initiative order interim measures where there is the risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition. Article 8 of Chapter II makes it clear that interim measures cannot be applied for by complainants under Article 7(2) of Chapter II. Requests for interim measures by undertakings can be brought before EFTA States' courts which are well placed to decide on such measures (71).

81.

Some persons may wish to inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority about suspected infringements of Articles 53 or 54 without having their identity revealed to the undertakings concerned by the allegations. These persons are welcome to contact the Authority. The Authority is bound to respect an informant's request for anonymity (72), unless the request to remain anonymous is manifestly unjustified.

(1) OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 65.

(2) The competence to handle individual cases falling under Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, is divided between the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the Commission according to the rules laid down in Article 56 of the EEA Agreement. Only one of the surveillance authorities is competent to handle any given case.

(3) Following the entry into force on 20 May 2005 of the Agreement amending Protocol 4 to the Agreement of the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice of 24 September 2004, Chapter II of Protocol 4 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement reflects to a large extent in the EFTA pillar Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

(4) Following the entry into force on 1 July 2005 of the Agreement of the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice of 3 December 2004, Chapter III of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement will reflect Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 (OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18).

(5) The Authority handles correspondence from informants in accordance with its principles of good administrative practice.

(6) EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on cooperation within the EFTA Network of competition authorities, not yet published.

(7) These tasks are shared with the Commission in accordance with the rules of competence in Article 56 of the EEA Agreement.

(8) Case C-344/98, Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream, [2000] ECR I-11369, paragraph 46; Case C-119/97 P, Union française de l'express (Ufex) and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraph 88; Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraphs 73-77. Article 6 of the EEA Agreement provides that, without prejudice to future developments of case-law, the provisions of this Agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and to acts adopted in application of these two treaties, shall in their implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities given prior to the date of signature of the EEA Agreement. As regards relevant rulings by the Court of Justice given after the date of signature of the EEA Agreement, it follows from Article 3(2) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement that the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court shall pay due account to the principles laid down by these rulings.

(9) Cf. in particular Articles 5, 6, 11, 12, 15, 22, 29 and 40 of Chapter II.

(10) Cf. Notice on cooperation within the EFTA network of competition authorities, paragraphs 5ss.

(11) Settled case law in the Community, cf. Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie (BRT) v SABAM and Fonior, [1974] ECR 51, paragraph 16; Case C-282/95 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR I-1503, paragraph 39; Case C-453/99, Courage v Bernhard Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 23.

(12) See Case E-4/01, Karlsson, EFTA Court Report [ 2002], p. 240, paragraph 28.

(13) See Case E-1/94, Restamark, EFTA Court Report [1994-1995], p. 15, paragraph 77.

(14) Case C-453/99, Courage v Bernhard Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraphs 26-27.

(15) Cf. Articles 1, 6 and 15 of Chapter II.

(16) For more detailed explanations of this mechanism, cf. Notice on the co-operation between the Authority and the courts of the EFTA States in the application of Articles 53 and 54 EC, not yet published.

(17) Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraph 93.

(18) Cf. the EFTA Court's decisions in Case E-3/97 Jæger v Opel Norge, EFTA Court Report [1998], p. 1, paragraph 77, and Case E-7/01 Hegelstad v Hydro Texaco, EFTA Court Report [2002], p. 310, paragraph 43, as well as the Community courts' decisions in Case C-230/96, Cabour and Nord Distribution Automobile v Arnor ‘SOCO’, [1998] ECR I-2055, paragraph 51; Joined Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 and T-190/96, Dalmasso and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR II-93, paragraph 50.

(19) Cf. Article 8 of Chapter II and paragraph 80 below. Depending on the case, EFTA States' competition authorities may equally be well placed to adopt interim measures.

(20) Cf. paragraphs 41ss. below.

(21) Notice on cooperation within the EFTA Network of competition authorities.

(22) Notice on cooperation within the EFTA Network of competition authorities, paragraphs 8-14.

(23) Article 11(2) and (3) of Chapter II ; Notice on cooperation within the EFTA Network of Competition Authorities paragraphs 15-16.

(24) Notice on cooperation within the EFTA Network of Competition Authorities, paragraph 33.

(25) For more extensive explanations on this notion in particular, cf. paragraphs 33ss. below.

(26) The Community courts has recognised such a margin of discretion for the Commission in its enforcement activities, see e.g. Case C-119/97 P, Union française de l'express (Ufex) and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraph 88; Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraphs 73-77 and 85. See also paragraph 8 above.

(27) The Commission's possibility to refer to the Community interest presented by a case as a criterion of priority has been settled case law since Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraph 85. The Authority considers that a similar possibility exists for the Authority within the context of the EEA Agreement.

(28) See in the Community context: Case C-282/95 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR I-1503, paragraph 36.

(29) Cf. Article 5(1) of Chapter II.

(30) Case T-114/92, Bureau Européen des Médias et de l'Industrie Musicale (BEMIM) v Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR II-147, paragraph 28. Associations of undertakings were also the complainants in the cases underlying the judgments in Case 298/83, Comité des industries cinématographiques des Communautés européennes (CICCE) v Commission of the European Communities, [1985] ECR 1105 and Case T-319/99, Federacion Nacional de Empresas (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities, not yet published in [2003] ECR.

(31) Joined Cases T-133/95 and T-204/95, International Express Carriers Conference (IECC) v Commission of the European Communities, [1998] ECR II-3645, paragraphs 79-83.

(32) See in the Community context: Case T-37/92, Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission of the European Communities, [1994] ECR II-285, paragraph 36.

(33) This question is currently raised in a pending procedure before the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Joined Cases T-213 and 214/01). The Commission has also accepted as complainant an individual consumer in its Decision of 9 December 1998 in Case IV/D-2/34.466, Greek Ferries, OJ L 109, 27.4.1999, p. 24, paragraph 1.

(34) Joined Cases T-133/95 and T-204/95, International Express Carriers Conference (IECC) v Commission of the European Communities, [1998] ECR II-3645, paragraph 79.

(35) Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraph 76; Case C-91/95 P, Roger Tremblay and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1996] ECR I-5547, paragraph 30.

(36) Case 125/78, GEMA v Commission of the European Communities, [1979] ECR 3173, paragraph 17; Case C-119/97 P, Union française de l'express (Ufex) and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraph 87.

(37) Settled case law in the Community since Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraphs 77 and 85; see also footnotes 26 and 27 above.

(38) Settled case law in the Community since Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraph 75. Under Chapter II, this principle may only be relevant in the context of Article 29 of that Chapter.

(39) See in this context: Case 210/81, Oswald Schmidt, trading as Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission of the European Communities, [1983] ECR 3045, paragraph 19; Case C-119/97 P, Union française de l'express (Ufex) and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraph 86.

(40) Case C-119/97 P, Union française de l'express (Ufex) and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraphs 79-80.

(41) See in this context: Case C-450/98 P, International Express Carriers Conference (IECC) v Commission of the European Communities, [2001] ECR I-3947, paragraphs 57-59.

(42) See in this context: Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraphs 88ss.; Case T-5/93, Roger Tremblay and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR II-185, paragraphs 65ss.; Case T-575/93, Casper Koelman v Commission of the European Communities, [1996] ECR II-1, paragraphs 75-80; see also part II above where more detailed explanations concerning this situation are given.

(43) See in this context: Case C-119/97 P, Union française de l'express (Ufex) and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraphs 92 and 93.

(44) Settled case law in the Community since Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraph 86.

(45) See in this context: Case C-449/98 P, International Express Carriers Conference (IECC) v Commission of the European Communities, [2001] ECR I-3875, paragraph 37.

(46) See in this context: Case T-77/95, Syndicat français de l'Express International and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR II-1, paragraph 57; Case C-119/97 P, Union française de l'express (Ufex) and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR I-1341, paragraph 95. Cf. also Case T-37/92, Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission of the European Communities, [1994] ECR II-285, paragraph 113, where an unwritten commitment between a Member State and a third county outside the common commercial policy was held not to suffice to establish that the conduct complained of had ceased.

(47) See in this context: Case T-110/95, International Express Carriers (IECC) v Commission of the European Communities and Others, [1998] ECR II-3605, paragraph 57, upheld by Case 449/98 P, International Express Carriers (IECC) v Commission of the European Communities and Others, [2001] ECR I-3875, paragraphs 44-47.

(48) See in this context: Case C-449/98 P, International Express Carriers (IECC) v Commission of the European Communities e.a, [2001] ECR I-3875, paragraph 37.

(49) See in this context: Case T-77/92, Parker Pen v Commission of the European Communities, [1994] ECR II-549, paragraphs 64 and 65.

(50) Case 298/83, Comité des industries cinématographiques des Communautés européennes (CICCE) v Commission of the European Communities, [1985] ECR 1105, paragraphs 21-24; Case T-198/98, Micro Leader Business v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR II-3989, paragraphs 32-39.

(51) See in this context: Case T-319/99, Federacion Nacional de Empresas (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities, not yet published in [2003] ECR, paragraph 43.

(52) Extensive guidance can be found on the Authority's website at:

http://www.eftasurv.int/fieldsofwork/fieldcompetition/

(53) As stated in Article 58 of the EEA Agreement and Protocol 23 thereto, the Authority and the Commission are to co-operate with a view to inter alia promoting a homogenous implementation, application and interpretation of the EEA Agreement. Although the Commission's Decisions and informal guidance letters are not binding on the Authority, the Authority will thus endeavour to take due account of the case practice of the Commission.

(54) Notice on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, not yet published.

(55) Authority Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (de minimis) (OJ C 67, 20.3.2003, p. 20) and EEA Supplement to the OJ No 15, 20.3.2003, p. 11.

(56) Authority Notice — Guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement, not yet published.

(57) See in this context: Case 210/81, Oswald Schmidt, trading as Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission of the European Communities, [1983] ECR 3045, paragraph 19; Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2223, paragraph 79.

(58) See in this context: Cf. Case T-64/89, Automec v Commission of the European Communities, [1990] ECR II-367, paragraphs 45-47; Case T-37/92, Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission of the European Communities, [1994] ECR II-285, paragraph 29.

(59) See in this context: Case C-282/95 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR I-1503, paragraph 36.

(60) Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, British American Tobacco Company and R. J. Reynolds Industries v Commission of the European Communities, [1987] ECR 249, paragraphs 19-20.

(61) See in this context: Case C-282/95 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR I-1503, paragraph 37.

(62) See in this context: Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR 1739, paragraph 57.

(63) The notion of ‘diligence’ on the part of the complainant is used by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities in Case T-77/94, Vereniging van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijprodukten and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR II-759, paragraph 75.

(64) Article 6(2) of Chapter III.

(65) Article 122 of the EEA Agreement, Article 14(4) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, Article 28 of Chapter II and Articles 15 and 16 of Chapter III.

(66) Article 27(2) of Chapter II.

(67) Article 7(2) of Chapter III, see in this context Case C-282/95 P, Guérin automobiles v Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR I-1503, paragraph 36.

(68) Settled case law, cf. Case E-2/94, Scottish Salmon Growers Association Limited v the EFTA Surveillance Authority, EFTA Court Report [1994-1995] p. 59, Case E-4/97, Norwegian Bankers' Association v the EFTA Surveillance Authority, EFTA Court Report [1998], p. 38, and in the Community i.a. Case T-114/92, Bureau Européen des Médias et de l'Industrie Musicale (BEMIM) v Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR II-147, paragraph 41.

(69) Article 36(2) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement. See in the Community context: Case 210/81, Oswald Schmidt, trading as Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission of the European Communities, [1983] ECR 3045.

(70) See in this context: Case T-575/93, Casper Koelman v Commission of the European Communities, [1996] ECR II-1, paragraphs 41-43.

(71) Depending on the case, EFTA States' competition authorities may equally be well placed to adopt interim measures.

(72) Case 145/83, Stanley George Adams v Commission of the European Communities, [1985] ECR 3539.

ANNEX

29.11.2007

Official Journal of the European Union

C 287/29

STATE AID — ROMANIA

State aid C 40/07 (ex NN 48/07) — Privatisation of Mittal Steel Roman

Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 287/08)

By means of the letter dated 25 September 2007 reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified Romania of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the above-mentioned aid measures.

Interested parties may submit their comments on the aid measure in respect of which the Commission is initiating the procedure within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:

European Commission

Directorate-General Competition

State aid Greffe

B-1049 Brussels

Fax (32-2) 296 12 42

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TEXT OF SUMMARY

PROCEDURE

In the context of the privatisation of Mittal Steel Roman (MS Roman), formerly Petrotub, in 2003 several public authorities granted debt waivers and rescheduling to the company. After the accession of Romania to EU the Commission requested information on this waivers and rescheduling, which Romania submitted on 8 March 2007, 13 March 2007, 14 June 2007and 5 July 2007.

DESCRIPTION

MS Roman is a producer of cast iron and steel tubes, located in Roman, Romania. It is part of the steel sector as defined by Annex B of the Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects. The company was privatised in 2003 to LNM Holdings N.V., now Mittal Steel. In the context of the privatisation, the social insurance budget, the unemployment fund, the national health fund and the Authority for Privatisation and Management of State Ownership APAPS (now Authority for State Assets Recovery — AVAS), the owner of Petrotub before its privatisation, agreed to waive outstanding debts amounting to around ROL 931,47 billion (EUR 24,39 million) and to reschedule outstanding debts of ROL 20,00 million (EUR 0,52 million). Romania argues that the privatisation was more advantageous for the State than the liquidation of the company and that the State acted as a private economy operator when waiving and rescheduling the debts and these waivers. Romania thus concludes that the waivers and the rescheduling do not constitute State aid.

ASSESSMENT

Although the potential aid was granted before accession of Romania to the EU, the Commission has the competence to assess this potential aid due to specific provisions contained in Annex VII to the Protocol to the Act of Accession on aid to the steel sector.

The Commission doubts that the waivers and rescheduling of public debts did not constitute State aid. First, the Commission doubts that the payments to the different public creditors and APAPS can be cumulated. Instead, each creditor has to be considered separately. On this basis it seems that bankruptcy of the company and its liquidation would have been more advantageous than privatisation for each of the creditors and APAPS.

Second, even if the Commission accepts that the public creditors and APAPS as the shareholder can be considered together, the Commission still has doubts that privatisation was the best outcome. In the calculation of the cost of the liquidation scenario, Romania takes into account costs for the State in form of payments under a State guarantee that had been provided to Petrotub in 1998. However, in the assessment whether the State acted as a private economy operator, a distinction has to be between the obligations that a private operator would face in a similar situation and the obligations of the State as a public authority. The public guarantee seems to have been provided by the State as a public authority and any payments under this guarantee can therefore not be taken into account in the calculations of the liquidation costs. If these payments are not taken into account, it seems that bankruptcy would have been a more favourable outcome for the State than privatisation.

TEXT OF LETTER

‘Comisia dorește să informeze România că, în urma examinării informațiilor furnizate de autoritățile dumneavoastră privind ajutorul menționat anterior, a decis să inițieze procedura prevăzută la articolul 88 alineatul (2) din Tratatul CE.

I. PROCEDURĂ

(1)

La 2 februarie 2007, Comisia a solicitat informații referitoare la scutirile de la plata datoriilor și reeșalonarea acestora acordate întreprinderii Mittal Steel Roman (denumită în continuare «MS Roman»), fostă Petrotub, în contextul privatizării acesteia. România a furnizat informații prin intermediul unei scrisori din data de 8 martie 2007, înregistrată la aceeași dată și al unei alte scrisori din data de 9 martie 2007, înregistrată la data de 13 martie 2007. Comisia a solicitat informații suplimentare la 1 iunie 2007, pe care România le-a furnizat prin intermediul unei scrisori din data de 14 iunie 2007, înregistrată la aceeași dată și al unei alte scrisori din data de 5 iulie 2007, înregistrată la aceeași dată. Au fost organizate două reuniuni cu autoritățile române și reprezentanții societății, care au avut loc la 2 mai 2007 și, respectiv, 12 iulie 2007.

II. DESCRIERE

2.1. Întreprinderea vizată

(2)

MS Roman este o întreprindere producătoare de tuburi turnate din fontă și oțel, localizată în Roman, România. Aceasta aparține societății Mittal Steel și produce diverse tipuri de oțeluri carbon si slab aliate, fără sudură. Produsele societății sunt utilizate în industria petrolului și a gazelor naturale, în industria energiei nucleare și a celei pe bază de combustibili fosili, în industria producătoare de mașini și în industria construcțiilor civile. În conformitate cu informațiile prezentate pe site-ul internet al societății Mittal Steel, MS Roman are o capacitate anuală de producție de 500 000 de tone și aproximativ 3 100 de angajați.

(3)	De la data expirării Tratatului CECO la 23 iulie 2002, MS Roman aparține industriei oțelului, astfel cum este definită în anexa B la Cadrul multisectorial privind ajutorul regional pentru proiecte mari de investiții (1).

2.2. Privatizarea

(4)

MS Roman a fost preluată în 2003 de societatea LNM Holdings N.V. (denumită în continuare «LNM»), numită ulterior Mittal Steel și în prezent Arcelor Mittal. Înaintea preluării de către LNM, statul era acționarul majoritar al societății, deținând aproximativ 70 % din acțiunile acesteia, numele societății fiind la acea vreme Petrotub. Privatizarea a fost efectuată pe baza unei proceduri de licitație, la care agenția română de privatizare APAPS (Autoritatea pentru Privatizare și Administrarea Participațiilor Statului) (2) a invitat câțiva posibili ofertanți să depună oferte. Conform informațiilor furnizate de România, APAPS a vândut societatea ofertantului care a propus condițiile cele mai avantajoase, și anume LNM. La momentul privatizării, Petrotub se afla într-o situație financiară dificilă. Cifra de afaceri a societății a scăzut de la 4 645 miliarde ROL (122 milioane EUR) în 2002 la 2 695 miliarde ROL (71 milioane EUR) (3) în 2003, iar cifra pierderilor a crescut de la 35 miliarde ROL (1 milion EUR) în 2002 la 1 235 miliarde ROL (32 milioane EUR) în 2003.

(5)	Acordul de vânzare-cumpărare pentru privatizare a fost semnat la data de 28 octombrie 2003. Transferul de acțiuni a avut loc la data de 14 ianuarie 2004. Prețul de achiziție a fost de 6 milioane USD și a fost achitat în două tranșe la data de 8 ianuarie 2004 și, respectiv, 14 iulie 2005.

2.3. Posibil ajutor de stat în contextul privatizării

(6)

În contextul privatizării, câteva autorități publice au acceptat să acorde scutirea de la plata anumitor datorii sau să reeșaloneze plata acestora. Aceste măsuri au făcut parte integrantă din acordul de vânzare-cumpărare. Conform informațiilor furnizate de România la data de 8 martie 2007, au fost acordate societății în contextul privatizării următoarele măsuri:

—

Bugetul asigurărilor sociale: scutirea de la plata datoriilor restante la data de 31 decembrie 2002, în valoare de 201,24 miliarde ROL (5,27 milioane EUR); scutirea de la plata dobânzilor și penalităților pentru datoriile restante la data de 31 decembrie 2002 și acumulate până la momentul transferului de acțiuni de la data de 14 ianuarie 2004, în valoare de 583,09 milioane ROL (15,27 milioane EUR).

—	APAPS: scutirea de la plata datoriilor reprezentând dividende, despăgubiri și fonduri de restructurare în valoare de 46,79 miliarde ROL (1,23 milioane EUR).

—

Fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate: reeșalonarea plăților pentru datoriile restante în valoare de 20,00 miliarde ROL (0,52 milioane EUR); scutirea de la plata creșterilor și penalităților pentru datoriile restante la fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate, în valoare de 100,34 miliarde ROL (2,63 milioane EUR).

(7)

În total, urma ca datoriile publice în valoare de aproximativ 931,47 miliarde ROL (24,39 milioane EUR) să fie scutite de la plată, iar plata datoriilor restante în valoare de 20,00 milioane ROL (0,52 milioane EUR) urma să fie reeșalonată. Cu toate acestea, conform informațiilor furnizate de România, nu a fost încheiat până în prezent între societate și fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate niciun acord de reeșalonare a plăților. Celelalte scutiri au fost înscrise în evidențele contabile ale societății la data de 31 decembrie 2003.

(8)

România a înaintat un raport elaborat de un consultant extern pentru a demonstra faptul că scutirile de la plata datoriilor și reeșalonarea plății acestora acordate de autoritățile publice în contextul privatizării nu au reprezentat un ajutor de stat. Raportul este elaborat pe baza evaluării societății de la data de 20 septembrie 2003, adică pe baza datelor celor mai recente disponibile înaintea semnării acordului de vânzare-cumpărare în octombrie 2003. Informațiile privind valoarea scutirilor de la plata datoriilor și a reeșalonărilor plății acestora cuprinse în acest raport variază în anumite privințe față de informațiile furnizate de România la 8 martie 2007.

(9)

Conform raportului elaborat de consultant, au fost acordate măsurile următoare:

—

Fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate (capital și penalități de întârziere a plăților): scutire de la plata datoriilor în valoare de 746,94 miliarde ROL (19,56 milioane EUR) și reeșalonarea plăților în valoare de 1,89 miliarde ROL (0,05 milioane EUR). O sumă restantă de 4,21 miliarde ROL (0,11 milioane EUR) urma să fie plătită de către noul proprietar, fără reeșalonarea plății.

—

Fondul de șomaj (capital și penalități de întârziere a plăților): scutire de la plata sumei de 23,51 miliarde ROL (0,62 milioane EUR) și reeșalonarea plăților în valoare de 4,27 milioane ROL (112 EUR). O sumă restantă de 69,62 milioane ROL (1 823 EUR) urma să fie plătită de către noul proprietar, fără reeșalonarea plății.

—	Fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate: nu a fost acordată nicio scutire de la plata datoriilor, dar a fost stabilită plata sumei restante de 95,16 miliarde ROL (2,49 milioane EUR) de către noul proprietar.

—	APAPS: scutirea de la plata tuturor datoriilor restante (dividende, penalități și fonduri de restructurare) în valoare de 47,14 miliarde ROL (1,23 milioane EUR).

(10)	Conform raportului, în baza acordului de vânzare-cumpărare și în conformitate cu legislația în vigoare, APAPS și Ministerul Finanțelor Publice au emis un Ordin comun prin care sunt acordate aceste scutiri.

(11)

Sumele care au făcut obiectul scutirilor acordate de la bugetul asigurărilor sociale și de APAPS, astfel cum sunt prezentate în raportul consultantului, corespund mai mult sau mai puțin cu cele prezentate de România în scrisoarea din 8 martie 2007. Cu toate acestea, scutirile acordate de fondul de șomaj nu sunt menționate de România în scrisoarea trimisă. De asemenea, în raportul consultantului se presupune că nu au fost acordate scutiri de fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate, fapt care se pare că este în contradicție cu informațiile furnizate de România în scrisoarea din 8 martie 2007.

III. EVALUARE

3.1. Legislația aplicabilă

(12)

Anexa VII la Protocolul Tratatului de aderare a României conține măsuri de tranziție pentru România referitoare la procesul de restructurare a industriei oțelului. Conform punctului 1 din apendicele B la anexa VII, ajutoarele de stat acordate de România în scopul restructurării anumitor sectoare ale industriei oțelului din România în perioada 1993-2004 trebuie să fie considerate compatibile cu piața comună cu condiția ca, printre altele, să fie îndeplinite cerințele stabilite în anexa respectivă.

(13)	Conform punctului 2 din apendicele B la anexa VII, ajutorul pentru restructurare poate fi acordat numai societăților incluse pe lista din apendicele A, partea 1. România a selectat șase societăți pentru a fi incluse pe lista respectivă, iar MS Roman nu se afla printre acestea.

(14)

Punctul 6 din apendicele B la anexa VII interzice acordarea oricărui tip de ajutor de stat pentru restructurare societăților care nu sunt incluse pe lista din apendicele A, partea 1, precum și a oricărui alt ajutor care nu este considerat a fi compatibil cu normele privind ajutorul de stat comunitar. În acest scop, punctul 17 conferă Comisiei puterea de a adopta măsurile necesare, solicitând societății în cauză să ramburseze orice ajutor acordat prin încălcarea termenilor stabiliți în aceste dispoziții și în apendicele A, în cazul în care procesul de monitorizare demonstrează faptul că România a acordat ajutoare de stat suplimentare incompatibile cu piața comună vreunei societăți producătoare de oțel.

(15)

Prin urmare, deoarece articolele 87 și 88 nu se aplică, în mod normal, în cazul ajutoarelor de stat acordate înaintea momentului aderării, dispozițiile din apendicele B la anexa VII extind controlul privind ajutoarele de stat efectuat în temeiul Tratatului CE asupra oricărui ajutor acordat pentru restructurarea industriei oțelului din România în perioada 1993-2008.

(16)

Decizia poate fi adoptată după aderarea României în temeiul articolului 88 alineatul (2) din Tratatul CE deoarece, în absența unor dispoziții specifice în cadrul apendicelui B la anexa VII, se aplică normele și principiile generale. Ulterior, se aplică, de asemenea, Regulamentul (CE) nr. 659/1999 al Consiliului de stabilire a normelor de aplicare a articolului 93 (în prezent, articolul 88).

3.2. Ajutor de stat în sensul articolului 87 alineatul (1) din Tratatul CE

(17)

În conformitate cu articolul 87 alineatul (1) din tratat, cu excepția derogărilor prevăzute de tratatul menționat, sunt incompatibile cu piața comună ajutoarele acordate de state sau prin intermediul resurselor de stat care denaturează sau amenință să denatureze concurența prin favorizarea anumitor întreprinderi sau sectoare de producție, în măsura în care acestea afectează schimburile comerciale dintre statele membre.

3.2.1. Favorizarea unei anumite întreprinderi

(i) Scutirea de la plata datoriilor publice

(18)

Ștergerea datoriilor de către autoritățile publice conferă un avantaj economic, deoarece autoritățile publice acceptă să renunțe la veniturile respective. Din acest motiv, astfel de măsuri pot fi considerate drept ajutoare. Cu toate acestea, o intervenție a statului reprezintă un ajutor de stat în sensul articolului 87 alineatul (1) din Tratatul CE numai dacă întreprinderii care beneficiază de ajutorul respectiv i se acordă un avantaj pe care nu l-ar fi obținut în condiții normale de piață. Din acest motiv, trebuie efectuată o evaluare prin care să se stabilească dacă un agent economic din cadrul economiei de piață ar fi acordat aceleași scutiri precum cele acordate de autoritățile publice. Pentru a decide dacă scutirea de la plata datoriilor ar reprezenta opțiunea cea mai adecvată din punct de vedere economic, un agent economic privat ar compara rezultatul financiar obținut în eventualitatea acordării scutirilor cu rezultatul care ar putea fi obținut în cazul adoptării unor scenarii alternative și ar alege opțiunea cea mai avantajoasă.

(19)

România afirmă că scutirile acordate societății MS Roman în contextul privatizării nu reprezintă un ajutor de stat. În acest sens, România afirmă că privatizarea prin acordarea scutirilor de la plata datoriilor a fost considerată a fi mai avantajoasă de către autoritățile române decât orice alt scenariu posibil. Astfel, autoritățile române au acționat în același mod în care ar fi acționat agenții economici din cadrul economiei de piață.

(20)

Pentru a demonstra faptul că privatizarea a reprezentat soluția cea mai avantajoasă pentru stat, România a furnizat un raport elaborat de către un consultant extern. Conform acestui raport, singurele scenarii alternative la privatizarea prin scutirea de la plata datoriilor au fost declararea falimentului societății și vinderea ulterioară a acesteia ca unitate funcțională (scenariu de faliment I) sau lichidarea societății, activele acesteia fiind vândute în mod individual (scenariu de faliment II).

(21)

Raportul a calculat rezultatul fiecăruia dintre aceste scenarii și implicațiile acestora pentru creditorii publici și pentru acționarul APAPS. Scenariul de privatizare reflectă condițiile care au fost agreate în cadrul acordului de vânzare-cumpărare. Scenariul de faliment I presupune inițierea procedurilor de recuperare și de declarare a insolvabilității societății și vinderea activelor societății ca unitate funcțională de către mandatar, sub supravegherea judecătorului sindic. Scenariul de faliment II presupune inițierea procedurilor de recuperare și de declarare a insolvabilității societății și vinderea individuală a activelor societății de-a lungul unei perioade de cinci ani de către mandatar, sub supravegherea judecătorului sindic.

(22)

Rezultatele fiecăruia dintre scenariile respective, astfel cum sunt calculate în raport, sunt prezentate mai jos:

În mii de ROL	Privatizare	Scenariu de faliment I	Scenariu de faliment II
Plăți în cadrul unei garanții de stat	0	[– 570 000 000-1 145 000 000] (4)	[– 570 000 000-954 000 000]
Bugetul asigurărilor sociale [sume indexate]	[2]	[213]	[243]
Fondul de șomaj [sume indexate]	[0,02]	[6]	[7]
Fondul de asigurări sociale de sănătate [sume indexate]	[31]	[26]	[30]
APAPS	0	0	0
Preț de achiziție	200 646 000	nu se aplică	nu se aplică
TOTAL instituții de stat [sume indexate]	[100]	[12]	[65]
TOTAL instituții de stat (în EUR) [sume indexate]	[100]	[12]	[65]
TOTAL instituții de stat fără garanția de stat [sume indexate]	[100]	[243]	[282]
TOTAL instituții de stat fără garanția de stat (în EUR) [sume indexate]	[100]	[243]	[282]

(23)

Primul rând face referire la plățile cu care statul român s-ar confrunta în cazul unui faliment. Aceste plăți rezultă din garanția de stat acordată Petrotub în 1998 de către Ministerul Finanțelor din România pentru un credit acordat de KfW. Potrivit autorităților române, în cazul unui faliment, garanția de stat ar fi preluată de KfW, iar Ministerul Finanțelor ar trebui să plătească [570 miliarde-1 145 miliarde ROL (15-30 milioane EUR)] (scenariul de faliment I) sau [570 miliarde-954 miliarde ROL (15-25 milioane EUR) (scenariul de faliment II) (5). În raport se presupune că în scenariul privatizării, societatea ar continua să ramburseze creditul KfW și garanția de stat nu ar fi preluată. Așadar, pentru statul român nu ar exista plăți în cadrul garanției de stat din scenariul de privatizare.

(24)

Rândurile doi-cinci indică sumele pe care creditorii în cauză, respectiv bugetul asigurărilor de stat, fondul de șomaj, fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate și APAPS le-ar putea recupera în diferitele scenarii. Se poate remarca faptul că niciun creditor nu ar putea recupera întreaga sumă solicitată în cererile lor din niciunul din cele două scenarii de faliment.

(25)	Rândul șase indică prețul de achiziție pe care APAPS l-ar obține în scenariul privatizării. În scenariile de faliment, APAPS nu ar obține acest preț de achiziție.

(26)

Consultantul cumulează sumele care urmează să fie recuperate de creditorii publici și autoritățile statului, precum și suma care urmează să fie plătită de Ministerul Finanțelor în cadrul garanției de stat pentru a obține plata totală către stat. Consultantul concluzionează că în cazul privatizării instituțiile statului ar încasa [indexat 100] ROL, inclusiv prețul de achiziție, în timp ce în cazul declarării falimentului și al vinderii societății ca unitate funcțională instituțiile statului ar încasa doar [indexat 12] ROL, și respectiv, [indexat 65] ROL în cazul declarării falimentului și al vinderii individualea activelor acesteia. Astfel, România concluzionează că scenariul de privatizare a fost cel mai avantajos.

Evaluarea individuală a diferiților creditori

(27)

Comisia își exprimă unele îndoieli cu privire la calculele prezentate de România. În primul rând, în conformitate cu hotărârea emisă în cauza Hamsa (6), creanțele diferiților creditori publici și ale altor instituții ale statului nu pot fi cumulate, ci trebuie să fie tratate în mod separat. Fiecare creditor, precum și APAPS, care este atât investitor cât și acționar și creditor, trebuie să decidă asupra sumei care va fi primită în cadrul scenariului de privatizare, pe de o parte, și suma pe care se așteaptă să o poată recupera în urma declarării falimentului societății și a lichidării acesteia.

(28)

În conformitate cu informațiile incluse în raport, bugetul asigurărilor sociale de sănătate și fondul de șomaj ar trebui să recupereze sume mai mari în cazul declarării falimentului societății decât în cazul privatizării acesteia. Astfel, se pare că scenariul falimentului ar fi fost mai avantajos pentru acestea, iar decizia adoptată de acordare a scutirilor nu corespunde deciziei pe care ar fi luat-o un creditor privat.

(29)

În ceea ce privește fondul de asigurări sociale de sănătate, din informațiile furnizate nu reiese în mod clar dacă a fost acordată sau nu scutirea de la plata datoriilor. În raport se presupune faptul că au fost acordate scutiri, în timp ce, conform scrisorii trimise de România la 8 martie 2007, fondul de asigurări sociale de sănătate a acceptat să acorde scutirea de la plata a [70-130] miliarde ROL ([1,8-3,4] milioane EUR).

(30)

Cu toate acestea, consultantul calculează rezultatul pentru fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate în cadrul celor două scenarii de faliment. Raportul concluzionează că fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate ar obține [indexat 26] ROL în cadrul scenariului de faliment I și [indexat 30] ROL în cadrul scenariului de faliment II. În cazul în care s-a aplicat scutirea de la plata datoriilor, astfel cum s-a arătat în scrisoarea transmisă de România la 8 martie 2007, se pare că fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate ar fi obținut plăți mai mari în cazul falimentului decât în cazul privatizării, când nu ar fi primit nimic. Așadar, scutirile, în cazul în care ar fi puse în aplicare, nu vor fi conforme comportamentului unui creditor privat.

(31)

În ceea ce privește APAPS, situația sa este diferită de a celorlalți creditori, deoarece APAPS este, de asemenea, proprietarul societății. APAPS a avut datorii restante din dividende, penalități și fonduri de restructurare. Conform consultantului, în cazul falimentului, APAPS nu ar putea recupera niciuna din aceste sume. Acest rezultat extrem de nefavorabil din faliment, care diferă de rezultatul pentru ceilalți creditori publici care cel puțin recuperează ceva, este provocat de faptul că bugetul asigurărilor sociale, fondul de șomaj și fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate sunt trecute în cea de-a doua categorie a creditorilor, cărora urmează să li se dea curs din sumele rămase din veniturile nete după plata creditorilor de prim rang (creditori cu credite garantate), în timp ce solicitările formulate de APAPS se înscriu în cea de-a cincea categorie care reprezintă creanțele acționarilor. Această categorie va fi abordată doar după ce ceilalți creditori au fost plătiți.

(32)

Comisia are îndoieli cu privire la faptul că clasificarea cererilor APAPS în cea de-a cincea categorie este justificată, în special în ceea ce privește fondurile de restructurare. Comisia nu deține informații cu privire la originea acestei datorii și prin urmare are îndoieli referitoare la faptul că aceasta reprezintă o creanță a unui acționar. În cazul în care cererea ar fi clasificată în aceeași categorie cu solicitările bugetare, APAPS ar putea recupera cel puțin partea datoriei în caz de faliment.

(33)

S-ar putea susține faptul că, chiar dacă ar fi cazul și APAPS ar urma să recupereze mai mult din cererile sale privind falimentul decât s-a presupus de către consultant, privatizarea ar reprezenta în continuare soluția cea mai avantajoasă din punct de vedere economic pentru APAPS, deoarece pentru orice soluționare a cererilor sale ar primi, în plus, prețul de achiziționare de 20,06 miliarde ROL.

(34)

Cu toate acestea, în această etapă, Comisia are îndoieli cu privire la plățile din prețul de achiziționare pe care l-a primit APAPS, iar sumele pe care APAPS le-ar recupera din cererile sale către societate pot fi cumulate pentru a fi comparate cu rezultatul diferitelor scenarii. Trebuie făcută diferența între obligațiile asumate de APAPS în calitate de acționar al societății și obligațiile sale ca autoritate a statului. Astfel cum s-a menționat anterior, Comisia nu deține informații cu privire la condițiile în care au fost acordate fondurile de restructurare. deoarece se pare că îndoielile Comisiei privind faptul că fondurile au fost acordate în condiții pe care un acționar privat le-ar fi furnizat, par total nefondate. Comisia nu deține niciun fel de informații nici în ceea ce privește originea datoriilor numite dividende și penalități, astfel încât aceasta nu se află în poziția de a evalua dacă acumularea acestor datorii a corespuns atitudinii unui agent economic din cadrul economiei de piață.

(35)

Prin urmare, Comisia are îndoieli că APAPS a acționat în calitate de acționar privat în acumularea de dividende și penalități și în furnizarea fondurilor de restructurare. Prin urmare, în compararea rezultatului APAPS în diferite scenarii, suma de recuperat pentru dividende, penalizări și fonduri de restructurare, care este posibil să nu fi fost oferite de APAPS în calitatea sa de acționar, ci în calitate de autoritate publică, precum și prețul de achiziționare obținut de APAPS în calitate de acționar, nu au putut fi cumulate.

Îndoieli cu privire la calcularea rezultatului în urma falimentului

(36)

În al doilea rând, chiar dacă s-ar accepta că creditorii publici și APAPS în calitate de acționar pot fi considerați împreună, Comisia are încă îndoieli cu privire la calculele prezentate. Aceste îndoieli privesc calcularea rezultatului pentru instituțiile statului în cazul unui faliment al societății și al lichidării acesteia.

(37)

Astfel cum a fost deja menționat anterior, în costurile de lichidare, consultantul a luat în considerare costurile pentru stat sub forma plăților în cadrul unei garanții de stat oferită Petrotub în 1998. România susține că această garanție a fost o obligație validă introdusă de stat în calitate de acționar. În cazul unui faliment, garanția ar fi invocată astfel încât statul s-ar confrunta cu plăți de [570 miliarde-1 145 miliarde ROL (15-30 milioane EUR)] (scenariul de faliment I) sau [570 miliarde-954 miliarde ROL (15-25 milioane EUR) (scenariul de faliment II).

(38)

În conformitate cu jurisprudența (7), pentru evaluarea capacității creditorilor și a agenției de privatizare APAPS în calitate de acționar de a recupera o sumă mai mare din privatizare decât din scenariul de faliment, numai obligațiile cu care s-ar confrunta un acționar privat într-o situație similară, precum și statul pot fi luate în considerare pentru calcularea scenariului de faliment. Prin urmare, trebuie realizată o distincție între obligațiile pe care trebuie să și le asume statul în calitate de proprietar al capitalului de acțiuni al unei societăți și obligațiile în calitate de autoritate publică (8). Astfel, trebuie evaluat dacă statul a oferit garanție în calitatea sa de acționar al societății, respectiv în condiții care ar fi fost acceptabile și pentru un acționar privat, astfel cum s-a solicitatde către România, sau în calitatea sa de organ public.

(39)

În această etapă, Comisia consideră că statul nu a acționat în calitate de investitor în economia de piață atunci când a oferit garanția. Garanția de stat a fost oferită de către Ministerul Finanțelor pentru un împrumut de investiții de [15-25 milioane EUR] de către banca germană Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), până în 2011. La momentul acordării garanției, APAPS era acționarul majoritar al societății. Prin urmare, Comisia menționează că Ministerul Finanțelor, care a acordat garanția, nu era proprietarul societății, împrejurare care a pus la îndoială faptul că garanția era oferită de minister în calitatea sa de acționar.

(40)

De asemenea, Comisia a menționat că pentru același credit, o garantare a creditului la export a fost oferită de Germania. Conform explicațiilor oferite de România cu privire la relația dintre garanția statului, garantarea dreptului la export și creditul KfW, KfW a dorit să obțină garantarea creditului la export din partea Germaniei pentru împrumutul de [15-25 milioane EUR]. Pentru a obține garantarea acestui credit la export din partea Germaniei, KfW a trebuit să solicite o garanție suverană din partea țării de origine a importatorului. În cazul de față, garanția suverană putea fi acordată numai de către Ministerul Finanțelor din România.

(41)	Faptul că agenția germană de credit la export a solicitat în mod expres o garanție din partea statului, demonstrează în mod clar că statul nu a acționat în calitate de acționar atunci când a oferit garanția, deoarece niciun alt acționar privat nu ar fi putut să o furnizeze.

(42)

În plus, în același timp cu acordarea creditului garantat de stat, KfW a acordat un al doilea credit în valoare de [1-10 milioane EUR] care a fost asigurat de o garanție din partea băncii române BCR. Această garanție poate fi utilizată ca o comparație pentru a evalua dacă condițiile garanției de stat au fost conform pieței.

(43)

Comisia menționează că garanția statului a fost acordată cu un risc mai scăzut decât garanția BCR. Statul a perceput o taxă unică de 4 % pentru garanție, plus o taxă anuală de 0,45 % pentru suma restantă, în timp ce BCR a perceput un comision de 4 % pe an. Garanția statului a avut, de asemenea, o durată mai mare și a fost mai puțin asigurată. Astfel, se pare că statul a acordat garanția în condiții pe care niciun operator privat nu le-ar fi acceptat.

(44)

România susține că situația statului în calitate de acționar al Petrotub care oferă garanția a fost diferită de poziția BCR în calitate de unul din principalii creditori ai societății, care nu a avut un avantaj comercial din acordarea acestei garanții societății, altul decât prima de risc. Acest aspect ar putea justifica o primă de risc mai scăzută pentru stat, deoarece statul ar determina alte avantaje comerciale, de exemplu, sub forma unei performanțe îmbunătățite a societății.

(45)

Comisia nu este de această părere. La momentul acordării de către stat a garanției, statul era principalul acționar al societății (aproximativ 70 % din acțiuni), dar nu unicul acționar. Orice avantaj suplimentar datorat unei performanțe îmbunătățite nu poate fi acordat în întregime de stat, de acesta beneficiind și ceilalți acționari. Această situație nu ar fi acceptată de niciun acționar privat.

(46)	Prin urmare, în această etapă, Comisia concluzionează că statul nu a acționat în calitate de investitor privat când a acordat garanția. Prin urmare, plățile potențiale din cadrul garanției statului nu pot fi luate în considerare în calcularea costurilor de lichidare.

(47)

În cazul în care aceste plăți potențiale sunt excluse din calculele prezentate de România, ambele scenarii de faliment ar fi fost mult mai avantajoase pentru stat decât scenariul privatizării, astfel cum reiese din tabelul 1 de mai sus. În cazul privatizării, instituțiile statului primesc [indexat 100] ROL, în timp ce în cazul falimentului I ar primi [indexat 243] ROL, iar în varianta de faliment II ar primi [indexat 282] ROL. Prin urmare, un agent economic din cadrul economiei de piață a decis să conducă societatea la faliment în schimbul privatizării, în condițiile date incluzând și scutirile de la plata datoriilor.

(48)	Prin urmare, concluziile preliminare ale Comisiei privind scutirea de la plata datoriilor acordată de bugetul asigurărilor sociale, fondul de șomaj, fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate și APAPS nu au fost conforme pieței, oferind în schimb un avantaj selectiv societății.

(ii) Reeșalonarea datoriilor publice

(49)

Referitor la reeșalonarea datoriilor, nu au fost furnizate niciun fel de informații potrivit cărora acestea ar fi în conformitate cu atitudinea unui agent economic din cadrul economiei de piață și acest aspect nu a fost abordat în raportul consultantului. Prin urmare, Comisia consideră că eventuala reeșalonare a datoriilor de către bugetul asigurărilor sociale, fondul de șomaj și fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate ar fi putut acorda un avantaj selectiv întreprinderii Roman.

3.2.2. Alte condiții prevăzute la articolul 87 alineatul (1) din Tratatul CE

(50)

Măsurile au fost întreprinse de agenția română de privatizare APAPS, bugetul asigurărilor sociale, fondul de șomaj și fondul național asigurări sociale de sănătate. Acestea rezultă astfel din resursele statului și sunt imputabile statului. Întreprinderea Roman produce țevi și tuburi din oțel. Având în vedere faptul că aceste produse sunt comercializate la scară largă în Uniunea Europeană, măsurile amenință să denatureze competitivitatea și să afecteze comerțul între statele membre.

3.2.3. Concluzie asupra articolului 87 alineatul (1) din Tratatul CE

(51)	Astfel, în această etapă, Comisia concluzionează că scutirile de la plata datoriilor și reeșalonarea constituie ajutor, iar compatibilitatea măsurilor trebuie evaluată în consecință.

3.3. Derogare în cadrul articolului 87 alineatele (2) și (3) din Tratatul CE

(52)	Articolul 87 alineatele (2) și (3) din Tratatul CE prevăd scutiri de la incompatibilitatea generală, astfel cum este prevăzut la alineatul (1) al aceluiași articol. În această etapă, Comisia consideră că niciuna din scutiri nu poate fi aplicată în cazul de față.

(53)

În special, Comisia consideră că Liniile directoare în domeniul ajutorului de stat pentru salvarea și restructurarea întreprinderilor aflate în dificultate (9) nu se aplică sectorului industriei oțelului și prin urmare, unei societăți care face parte din acest sector nu i se poate acorda niciun fel de sprijin în acest sens. De asemenea, Comisia consideră că orientările privind ajutorul regional la nivel național (10) nu se aplică industriei oțelului.

(54)

În această etapă, Comisia consideră că niciuna din liniile directoare și regulamentele comunitare, ca de exemplu pentru cercetare și dezvoltare, pentru mediu, pentru întreprinderile mici și mijlocii, pentru ocuparea forței de muncă și formare sau pentru capitalul de risc nu se poate aplica prezentei măsuri.

IV. DECIZIE

(55)

Astfel, în această etapă, Comisia concluzionează că scutirea de la plata datoriilor și reeșalonarea datoriei de către bugetul asigurărilor sociale, fondul de șomaj, fondul național de asigurări sociale de sănătate și APAPS reprezintă ajutor de stat și consideră cu titlu preliminar că acestea nu îndeplinesc condițiile de compatibilitate cu piața comună.

Având în vedere considerațiile anterioare, Comisia, acționând conform procedurii prevăzute în articolul 88 alineatul (2) din Tratatul CE, solicită României să-și prezinte observațiile și să furnizeze toate informațiile necesare pentru evaluarea ajutorului, în termen de o lună de la data primirii acestei scrisori. În caz contrar, Comisia va adopta o decizie în funcție de informațiile pe care le deține. Comisia solicită autorităților dumneavoastră să transmită o copie a acestei scrisori, în cel mai scurt termen, potențialului beneficiar al ajutorului.

Comisia dorește să reamintească României că articolul 88 alineatul (3) din Tratatul CE are efect suspensiv și vă atrage atenția asupra articolului 14 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 659/1999, care prevede că orice ajutor de tip ilegal poate fi recuperat de la beneficiar.

Comisia informează România că va informa părțile interesate publicând această scrisoare, precum și un rezumat justificativ al acesteia în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene. De asemenea, Comisia va informa Autoritatea de Supraveghere a AELS prin transmiterea către aceasta a unei copii a acestei scrisori. Toate părțile interesate vor fi invitate să-și prezinte observațiile în termen de o lună de la data acestei publicări.’

(1) JO C 70, 19.3.2002, p. 8.

(2) În luna mai 2004, APAPS (Autoritatea pentru Privatizare și Administrarea Participațiilor Statului) și AVAB (Autoritatea pentru Valorificarea Activelor Bancare) au fuzionat, rezultând astfel o nouă entitate — AVAS (Autoritatea pentru Valorificarea Activelor Statului).

(3) Rata de schimb utilizată este de 38 185 ROL = 1 EUR care era rata de schimb oficială stabilită de Banca Națională a României la data de 30 septembrie 2003. România a utilizat această rată de schimb în datele furnizate.

(4) Informațiile cuprinse între […] sunt informații cu caracter confidențial și reprezintă fie sumele indexate, fie marginile între care se situează sumele absolute.

(5) Din raport nu reiese în mod clar din ce motiv plățile diferă în cele două scenarii de faliment.

(6) Cauza T-152/99 HAMSA împotriva Comisiei, hotărârea Curții de Justiție din 11 iulie 2002.

(7) A se vedea, de exemplu, cauza C-344/99 Germania v. Comisie (Gröditzer Stahlwerke), hotărârea Curții din 28 ianuarie 2003, alineatul (134); cauze conexe C-278/92, C-279/92 și C-280/92 Spania v. Comisie (Hytasa), hotărârea Curții din 14 septembrie 1994, alineatul (22).

(8) A se vedea alineatul (134) din cauza C-344/99 (citat anterior).

(9) A se vedea nota de subsol 5.

(10) JO C 74, 10.3.1998, p. 9.

		ISSN 1725-2423
Official Journal of the European Union		C 287

English edition	Information and Notices	Volume 50 29 November 2007

Notice No	Contents	page
	I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions
	RESOLUTIONS
	Council
2007/C 287/01	Resolution of the Council of 16 November 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture	1

	IV Notices
	NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES
	Commission
2007/C 287/02	Euro exchange rates	5

2007/C 287/03	The appointment of members of the Committee of Senior Labour Inspectors for the term of office 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2009	6

	NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES
2007/C 287/04	Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises ( 1 )	8

2007/C 287/05	Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises ( 1 )	10

	NOTICES CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA
	EFTA Surveillance Authority
2007/C 287/06	EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on the handling of complaints by the Authority under Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement	12

	V Announcements
	PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY
	Commission
2007/C 287/07	State aid — Germany — State aid C 24/07 (ex NN 71/06) — State aid to Flughafen Lübeck GmbH and Ryanair — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty ( 1 )	27

2007/C 287/08	State aid — Romania — State aid C 40/07 (ex NN 48/07) — Privatisation of Mittal Steel Roman — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty ( 1 )	29

2007/C 287/09	Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.4910 — Motorola/Vertex Standard) ( 1 )	38

2007/C 287/10	State aid — United Kingdom — State aid C 42/04 (ex N 350/04) — Business Premises Renovation Allowances ( 1 )	39

	Currency	Exchange rate
USD	US dollar	1,4747
JPY	Japanese yen	162,02
DKK	Danish krone	7,4568
GBP	Pound sterling	0,71375
SEK	Swedish krona	9,3367
CHF	Swiss franc	1,6463
ISK	Iceland króna	91,89
NOK	Norwegian krone	8,1075
BGN	Bulgarian lev	1,9558
CYP	Cyprus pound	0,5842
CZK	Czech koruna	26,494
EEK	Estonian kroon	15,6466
HUF	Hungarian forint	255,27
LTL	Lithuanian litas	3,4528
LVL	Latvian lats	0,6984
MTL	Maltese lira	0,4293
PLN	Polish zloty	3,6489
RON	Romanian leu	3,5445
SKK	Slovak koruna	33,239
TRY	Turkish lira	1,7676
AUD	Australian dollar	1,6719
CAD	Canadian dollar	1,4676
HKD	Hong Kong dollar	11,4817
NZD	New Zealand dollar	1,9184
SGD	Singapore dollar	2,1293
KRW	South Korean won	1 374,13
ZAR	South African rand	10,2344
CNY	Chinese yuan renminbi	10,9047
HRK	Croatian kuna	7,319
IDR	Indonesian rupiah	13 887,99
MYR	Malaysian ringgit	4,9882
PHP	Philippine peso	63,184
RUB	Russian rouble	35,983
THB	Thai baht	45,627

BELGIUM	Mr Karel VAN DAMME Mr Michel ASEGLIO
BULGARIA	Mr Totyu MLADENOV Mr Veselin VESELINOV
CZECH REPUBLIC	Mr Rudolf HAHN Mrs Anežka SIXTOVÁ
DENMARK	Mr Jens JENSEN Mrs Annemarie KNUDSEN
GERMANY	Mr Hans-Jürgen BIENECK Mr Helmut DEDEN
IRELAND	Mr Michael HENRY Mr Peter CLAFFEY
ESTONIA	Mr Herko SUNTS Ms Katrin KAARMA
GREECE	Mr Alexandros KARAGEORGIOU Mrs Ioanna PAPAIOANNOU
SPAIN	Mr Raimundo ARAGON BOMBIN Mr Javier VALLEJO SANTAMARIA
FRANCE	Mr Jean BESSIERE Mrs Christiane GIRAUD
ITALY	Mr Mario NOTARO Mr Mariano MARTONE
CYPRUS	Mr Leandros NICOLAIDES Mr Anastasios YIANNAKI
LATVIA	Mrs Rita ELCE Mrs Tatjana ZABAROVSKA
LITHUANIA	Mr Mindaugas PLUKTAS Mrs Dalia LEGIENE
LUXEMBOURG	Mr Robert HUBERTY Mr Paul WEBER
HUNGARY	Mr István PAPP Mr János GÁDOR
MALTA	Mr Mark GAUCI Mr Vincent ATTARD
NETHERLANDS	Mr Jaap UIJLENBROEK Mr Peter WEEDA
AUSTRIA	Mrs Eva-Elisabeth SZYMANSKI Mrs Gertrud BREINDL
POLAND	Mrs Bozena BORYS-SZOPA Mr Roman GIEDROJĆ
PORTUGAL	Mr Paulo MORGADO DE CARVALHO Mr Manuel Joaquim FERREIRA MADURO ROXO
ROMANIA	Mrs Mariana BASUC Mrs Silvia TRUFASILA
SLOVENIA	Mr Borut BREZOVAR Mr Boris RUŽIC
SLOVAKIA	Mr Andrej GMITTER Mrs Jana GIBÓDOVÁ
FINLAND	Mr Mikko HURMALAINEN Mr Jaakko ITAKANNAS
SWEDEN	Mr Bernt NILSSON Mr Bertil REMAEUS
UNITED KINGDOM	Mr Justin MC CRACKEN Mrs Sandra CALDWELL