29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/1

(1)

On 27 February 2007 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Slovakia, which covers the period 2006 to 2009.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages that real GDP growth will increase from 6,6 % in 2006 to 7,1 % in 2007 and then decrease to 5,5 % and 5,1 % in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Assessed against currently available information, this scenario appears to be based on cautious growth assumptions for 2006 and plausible growth assumptions for the rest of the programme period. The programme's projections for inflation also appear realistic.

(3)

For 2006, the general government deficit is estimated at 3,4 % of GDP in the Commission services' autumn 2006 forecast, against a target of 4,2 % of GDP set in the previous update of the convergence programme. The better outturn is due to much stronger GDP and employment growth and lower interest expenditure and pension reform costs than expected. However, some of the additional revenues owing to the growth surprise were spent rather than devoted to faster deficit reduction.

(4)

(5)

(6)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced. The risks from the macroeconomic scenario are broadly neutral, while tax projections seem on the whole based on prudent assumptions. The envisaged fiscal consolidation in the programme relies heavily on expenditure restraint, but the programme does not provide sufficient information on the measures supporting this (after 2007) nor is there a binding medium-term expenditure framework. On the other hand, Slovakia has built up a good track-record in recent years, although achieving the budgetary targets was facilitated by higher-than-expected growth and lower-than-expected absorption of EU funds.

(7)

(8)

Government gross debt is estimated to have reached 33,1 % of GDP in 2006, well below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to decline by 3,4 percentage points over the programme period.

(9)

The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Slovakia is lower than the EU average, with pension expenditure influenced by the recent pension reform showing a more limited increase than in many other countries. The initial budgetary position constitutes a risk to sustainable public finances even before considering the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population. Consolidating the public finances would therefore contribute to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances. Overall, Slovakia appears to be at medium risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.

(10)

The convergence programme does not contain a qualitative assessment of the overall impact of the October 2006 implementation report of the national reform programme within the medium-term fiscal strategy. However, it provides some information on the direct budgetary costs or savings of the main reforms envisaged in the national reform programme and its budgetary projections seem to take into account the public finance implications of the actions outlined in the national reform programme. The measures in the area of public finances envisaged in the convergence programme do not seem to be fully consistent with those foreseen in the national reform programme. In particular, apart from education, expenditure priorities listed in the programme are different from the key challenges identified in the national reform programme. Moreover, the significant support for education indicated in the national reform programme is not evident in the 2007 budget or in the convergence programme.

(11)

The budgetary strategy in the programme is broadly consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008.

(12)

As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme provides all required and most of the optional data. (2)

i)

exploit the strong growth prospects to strengthen the structural adjustment in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit in 2007 with a larger margin and to speed up the progress towards the MTO; and

ii)

reinforce the binding character of the medium-term expenditure ceilings for central government.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/5

(1)

On 27 February 2007 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Estonia, which covers the period 2006 to 2010.

(2)

(3)

For 2006, the general government surplus is estimated at 2,5 % of GDP in the Commission services' autumn 2006 forecast, against a target of 0,3 % of GDP set in the previous update of the convergence programme. The much better outcome, also expected in the new update, arises from carry-over from the better-than-expected outcome in 2005 and from the growth surprise in 2006. Expenditure has been lower than planned in the budget.

(4)

(5)

(6)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced. The programme's macroeconomic assumptions can be regarded as cautious over the programme period. The tax revenue projections appear overall plausible. However, the achievement of the envisaged moderation in expenditure growth would benefit from making the medium-term fiscal planning framework more binding.

(7)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to maintain the MTO by a large margin throughout the programme period, as envisaged in the programme. A fortiori, it provides a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations over the programme period. The fiscal policy stance implied by the programme is not fully in line with the Stability and Growth Pact in the sense that it is pro-cyclical in good times during 2007, when the structural balance is set to decline by around 1 % of GDP.

(8)

Government gross debt is estimated to have fallen to 3,7 % of GDP in 2006, far below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to decline by a further 2 percentage points over the programme period.

(9)

The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Estonia is among the lowest in the EU, with age-related expenditure projected to fall as a share of GDP over the coming decades, influenced by the considerable expenditure-reducing impact of the reform of the pension system. The current level of gross debt is very low in Estonia and maintaining sound government finances, in line with the budgetary plans over the programme period, would contribute to containing the risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances. Overall, Estonia appears to be at low risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.

(10)

The convergence programme contains a qualitative assessment of the overall impact of the October 2006 Implementation Report of the National Reform Programme within the medium-term fiscal strategy. In addition, it provides some information on the direct budgetary costs or savings of the main reforms envisaged in the National Reform Programme and its budgetary projections explicitly take into account the public finance implications of the actions outlined in the National Reform Programme. The measures in the area of public finances envisaged in the convergence programme seem consistent with those foreseen in the National Reform Programme. In particular, both programmes emphasise prudent fiscal policies as a crucial element of macroeconomic stabilisation.

(11)

The budgetary strategy in the programme is broadly consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008.

(12)

As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme provides all required and most of the optional data (2).

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/9

(1)

On 27 February 2007 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Malta, which covers the period 2006 to 2009.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages that real GDP growth will hover around 3 % over the programme period. Assessed against currently available information, this scenario appears to be based on favourable growth assumptions for 2007 and markedly favourable ones thereafter, especially due to the optimistic medium-term evolution of the external sector. Less favourable net exports in the medium term than foreseen in the programme could heighten the external imbalance recorded in recent years. Inflation projections appear plausible.

(3)

For 2006, the general government deficit is estimated at 2,9 % of GDP in the Commission services' autumn 2006 forecast, against a target of 2,7 % of GDP set in the previous update of the convergence programme. The estimated outturn for 2006 in the new update (2,6 % of GDP) is below that projected in the Commission services' autumn 2006 forecast and seems plausible in the light of recent information on GDP growth and government finance cash data.

(4)

(5)

(6)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced for 2007 but the budgetary outcomes could be worse than projected in the programme thereafter. This is due to a favourable GDP growth projected for 2007 and a markedly favourable macroeconomic scenario in 2008-2009 underlying the update's projections (although tax projections for these years seem cautious). In addition, after 2007 no details are given on the adjustment strategy increasing the risks attached to the planned fiscal consolidation.

(7)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme seems consistent with a correction of the excessive deficit by 2006 as recommended by the Council. In addition, it seems to provide a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations from 2008 onwards. In the years following the correction of the excessive deficit, the pace of the adjustment towards the MTO implied by the programme is broadly in line with the Stability and Growth Pact, which specifies that, for euro-area and ERM II Member States, the annual improvement in the structural balance should be 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark and that the adjustment should be higher in good economic times and could be lower in bad economic times.

(8)

(9)

(10)

The convergence programme does not contain a qualitative assessment of the overall impact of the October 2006 implementation report of the national reform programme within the medium-term fiscal strategy. However, it provides systematic information on the direct budgetary costs or savings of the main reforms envisaged in the national reform programme and its budgetary projections explicitly take into account the public finance implications of the actions outlined in the national reform programme. The measures in the area of public finances envisaged in the convergence programme seem consistent with those foreseen in the national reform programme. In particular, both programmes envisage the implementation of the pension reform while the convergence programme provides details of the tax reform announced in the national reform programme.

(11)

The budgetary strategy in the programme is broadly consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008.

(12)

As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme has some gaps in the required and optional data (2).

(i)

pursue adequate progress towards the MTO as foreseen in the programme and ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio is reduced accordingly, while spelling out the budgetary strategy, especially on the expenditure side, with a longer time perspective.

(ii)

in view of the level of debt and the projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by achieving the MTO and making further progress in the design and implementation of the healthcare reform.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/13

(1)

On 27 February 2007 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Poland, which covers the period 2006 to 2009.

(2)

(3)

In the January 2006 convergence programme, the target for the general government balance in 2006 was set at – 2,6 % of GDP, the Commission services' autumn forecast points at – 2,2 % of GDP, while the November 2006 update of the convergence programme estimates the 2006 outturn at – 1,9 % of GDP. The better-than-expected outturn mainly results from an incomplete execution of expenditure plans (especially social transfers and public investment), while revenue increase resulted mainly from stronger-than-expected growth. The above-mentioned deficit figures exclude the pension reform cost, estimated at around 2 % of GDP in 2006, in line with the transition period for implementing the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classification of funded pension schemes (2), which expires in spring 2007. The main goal of the budgetary strategy in the November 2006 update is to correct the excessive deficit by 2007 by qualifying for the provision of the reformed Pact which allows a part of the pension reform cost to be deducted. For the following years, the programme plans a gradual reduction of the deficit so that the 3 % of GDP reference value is reached in 2009.

(4)

The deficit is planned to narrow by 0,4 percentage point of GDP annually (0,3 percentage point if the pension reform costs are included), from 1,9 % of GDP in 2006 to 0,6 % of GDP in 2009. The primary surplus is planned to improve from 0,5 % of GDP in 2006 to 1,7 % of GDP in 2009. Including the impact of the above-mentioned Eurostat decision, the deficit in the updated programme would improve from 3,9 % of GDP in 2006 to 2,9 % in 2009. The adjustment is planned to be revenue-based in 2007 (revenue ratio increase by 0,6 percentage point of GDP with a near-constant expenditure ratio) and strongly expenditure-based in 2008-2009 so as to more than offset a large decline in the revenue ratio (average annual expenditure ratio reduction by 1,6 percentage point, especially consumption and social transfers, with the revenue ratio declining by 1,2 percentage point on average mainly reflecting a cut in social contributions, changes in personal income tax system and other changes to the tax system, which are not always fully specified). Compared with the previous programme, the deficit targets have been revised downwards in view of much stronger growth and the better-than-expected outcome in 2006.

(5)

(6)

The budgetary outcomes could be worse than targeted in the programme in particular in the outer years of the programme. There are significant uncertainties about the effective implementation of planned reforms as they are not backed up by precise measures supporting the envisaged expenditure restraint. In addition, there are risks stemming from the rather favourable macroeconomic scenario for the outer years of the programme period. Consequently, the action taken so far is not sufficient and the planned measures should be strengthened to achieve that result.

(7)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme does not seem consistent with a correction of the excessive deficit by 2007 as recommended by the Council. The budgetary targets do not provide a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations throughout the programme period. In the years following the correction of the excessive deficit, the pace of the structural adjustment towards the MTO implied by the programme should be strengthened, taking advantage of good economic times, and should be backed up by measures.

(8)

Government gross debt is estimated to have reached 42,0 % of GDP in 2006, well below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to decline by 1,4 percentage point over the programme period. Including the impact of the above-mentioned Eurostat decision, the government gross debt would rise from 48,9 % in 2006 to 50,2 % in 2009.

(9)

The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Poland is the lowest in the EU, with age-related expenditure projected to fall, partly as a result of the considerable expenditure-reducing impact of the reform of the pension system — assuming that the pension reforms are fully implemented. The initial budgetary position, although improved compared to 2005, still constitutes a risk to sustainable public finances before the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population is considered and further budgetary consolidation envisaged in the programme would contribute to contain risks to the sustainability of public finances. Overall, Poland appears to be at low risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.

(10)

The convergence programme contains a qualitative assessment of the overall impact of the reforms listed in the October 2006 implementation report of the national reform programme within the medium-term fiscal strategy. In addition, it provides some information on the direct budgetary costs or savings of the main reforms envisaged in the national reform programme and its budgetary projections seem to take into account the public finance implications of the actions outlined in the national reform programme. The measures in the area of public finances envisaged in the convergence programme seem consistent with those foreseen in the national reform programme. In particular, both programmes envisage some harmonisation of the farmers' social security system with the general national system, the gradual harmonisation of the disability benefits with the reformed pension system and the implementation of the basket of guaranteed medical services.

(11)

The budgetary strategy in the programme is partly consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008. In particular, action taken to correct the excessive deficit does not appear adequate.

(12)

As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme provides all required and most of the optional data (3).

(i)

ensure the correction of the excessive deficit by 2007 in line with the new recommendation under Article 104(7).

(ii)

taking advantage of the good economic times, using any extra revenue for deficit reduction, strengthen the pace of adjustment towards the MTO after the planned correction of the excessive deficit, by specifying and implementing the additional measures, especially on the expenditure side, that are necessary to achieve the envisaged adjustment.

(iii)

safeguard the results of the pension reform.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/17

(1)

On 27 February 2007 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Sweden, which covers the period 2006 to 2009.

(2)

The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages that real GDP growth will slow from 4,0 % in 2006 to 3,0 % on average over the rest of the programme period, although it will remain at close to potential. Assessed against currently available information, this scenario appears to be based on plausible growth assumptions, with growth in 2006 having possibly been even higher. The programme's projections for inflation also appear realistic.

(3)

For 2006, the general government surplus is estimated at 2,8 % of GDP in the Commission services' autumn 2006 forecast, against a projected outturn of 0,9 % in the previous update of the convergence programme; the difference mainly reflects a base effect from the much higher-than-expected surplus in 2005. On the basis of available cash data it appears that, due both to lower primary expenditure and higher tax revenues, the 2006 surplus is likely to have been higher than the Commission services' forecast.

(4)

The updated programme confirms that a budget surplus of 2 % of GDP on average over the cycle remains the key guiding fiscal rule, supported by multi-annual expenditure ceilings. In the spring 2007 Fiscal Policy Bill, the Government will re-evaluate the present target for the general government surplus to take into account Eurostat's decision on the classification of funded second-pillar pension schemes. (2) After the expiry of the transition period for implementing this decision (spring 2007), the surplus will be lower by approximately 1 % of GDP each year and the gross debt-to-GDP ratio will be revised upward by about 0,5 % of GDP. The budgetary strategy presented in the update foresees a decline in the surplus in 2007 (from 3,0 % of GDP in 2006 to 2,4 %) and thereafter projects a progressive recovery (to 3,1 % in 2009); the primary surplus follows a similar path. Both expenditure- and revenue-to-GDP ratios are on a gradually declining trend throughout the programme period. The strategy is somewhat backloaded, with significant tax cuts in 2007 being only partially financed. Compared with the previous update, the projected path for the surplus (an initial decline followed by gradual recovery) is similar, but with higher net lending positions throughout the programme period.

(5)

The structural surplus (i.e. the cyclically-adjusted surplus net of one-off and other temporary measures), calculated according to the commonly-agreed methodology, is projected to remain above 2 % of GDP throughout the programme period, referring to the need to ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances. As in the previous update of the convergence programme, the medium-term objective (MTO) for the budgetary position presented in the programme corresponds to the above-mentioned objective of a budgetary surplus of 2 % of GDP on average over the business cycle (i.e. in structural terms), which the programme plans to maintain throughout the programme period. As the MTO is significantly more demanding than the minimum benchmark (estimated at a deficit of around 1 % of GDP), achieving it should fulfil the aim of providing a safety margin against the occurrence of an excessive deficit. The MTO is also significantly more demanding than implied by the debt ratio and average potential output growth in the long term.

(6)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced from 2007. The macroeconomic outlook and the tax revenue projections seem to reflect plausible assumptions, in spite of some uncertainty on the future performance of capital gains taxes. The expenditure targets are supported by a good track record owing to the above-mentioned expenditure ceilings.

(7)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to maintain the MTO throughout the programme period, as envisaged in the programme. In addition, it provides a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations during the programme period. There is a risk, however, that the fiscal policy stance implied by the programme may turn out to be pro-cyclical in 2007, during which good times are expected to continue. This would not be in line with the Stability and Growth Pact.

(8)

Government gross debt is estimated to have fallen to 46,5 % of GDP in 2006, well below the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio will continue following a downward path, falling by 13,5 percentage points over the programme period.

(9)

The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Sweden is lower than the EU average, with pension expenditure projected to remain relatively stable as a share of GDP over the long term, influenced by the considerable expenditure-reducing impact of the reform of the pension system. The initial budgetary position with a high primary surplus contributes to the reduction of gross debt and the accumulation of assets. Maintaining sound government finances with continued surpluses as planned would contribute to limiting risks to the sustainability of public finances. Overall, Sweden appears to be at low risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.

(10)

The convergence programme contains a qualitative assessment of the overall impact of the November 2006 implementation report of the national reform programme within the medium-term fiscal strategy. In addition, it provides systematic information on the direct budgetary costs or savings of the main reforms envisaged in the national reform programme and its budgetary projections seem to take into account the public finance implications of the actions outlined in the national reform programme. The measures in the area of public finances envisaged in the convergence programme seem consistent with those foreseen in the national reform programme. In particular, both programmes envisage the implementation of measures to increase the labour supply.

(11)

The budgetary strategy in the programme is broadly consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008.

(12)

As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme has some gaps in the required and optional data (3).

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/20

(1)

On 27 February 2007 the Council examined the updated convergence programme of the United Kingdom, which covers the period from financial year 2006/07 to financial year 2011/12 (2).

(2)

(3)

For 2006/07, the general government deficit is estimated at 3,0 % of GDP in the Commission services' autumn 2006 forecast. The current update of the convergence programme estimates a deficit of 2,8 % of GDP for the same year, which implies recent trends, showing robust growth in revenues and slower growth in expenditure, being maintained in the remaining months of the financial year.

(4)

(5)

(6)

The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced up to 2007/08 but the budgetary outcomes could be worse than projected in the programme thereafter depending on the implementation of spending control. The projected increase in the tax to GDP ratio partly relies on relatively volatile factors such as profits from the financial and oil-producing sectors. However, relatively good prospects for revenues appear supported by recent economic developments, including strong profitability. From 2008/09 on however, achievement of the deficit path in the programme will depend on implementing the projected moderation in expenditure growth, and on active monitoring to enforce expenditure limits. The full implementation of the reduction in expenditure growth expected from the Comprehensive Spending Review will be key to reaching the objectives of the programme. The UK authorities have pre-announced a reduction in the budgetary allocation for a number of smaller departments, and committed to 5 % annual real reductions in administration budgets across government and value for money savings. However, the greatest part of the moderation of expenditure growth from 2008/09 is not yet underpinned by specific budgetary allocations which are subject to confirmation in the authorities' Comprehensive Spending Review, planned for summer 2007, which will announce firm expenditure plans up to 2010/11. The record of active monitoring to enforce expenditure limits is positive.

(7)

In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme appears broadly consistent with a correction of the excessive deficit by 2006/07, as recommended by the Council. It provides a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations only around 2009/10, when the projections are subject to the outcome of the Comprehensive Spending Review. In the years following the correction of the excessive deficit, the pace of fiscal consolidation should thus be strengthened.

(8)

The gross debt ratio, which stood at 42,1 % of GDP in 2005/06, though remaining well below the Treaty reference value of 60 % of GDP, is projected to rise slowly over the projection period, peaking at just above 44 % of GDP in 2008/09. Thereafter the ratio is expected to stabilise and then begin to decline at the end of the programme period.

(9)

The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in the UK is close to the EU average, with pension expenditure showing a somewhat more limited increase than on average in the EU, in part as a result of the UK's historically relying relatively more on private pension arrangements than have other EU countries. The proposed reforms to pension provision address the concern of potentially inadequate provision in the future, by strengthening the incentives for private savings for retirement and by increasing provision of public pensions, thus involving a slightly higher increase in public pension expenditure than previously projected; the reform also incorporates a planned gradual increase in the statutory state pension age. The initial budgetary position, though improved compared to 2005, would still constitute a risk to sustainable public finances if no significant reduction in the deficit occurs in the medium term, even before the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population is considered. Consolidating the public finances by strengthening the budgetary position further than planned in the convergence programme would thus contribute to reducing risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances. Overall, the UK appears to be at medium risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.

(10)

The convergence programme contains a qualitative assessment of the overall impact of the October 2006 implementation report of the national reform programme within the medium-term fiscal strategy. In addition it provides systematic information on the direct budgetary costs or savings of the main reforms envisaged in the national reform programme and its budgetary projections explicitly take into account the public finance implications of the actions outlined in the national reform programme. The measures in the area of public finances envisaged in the convergence programme seem consistent with those foreseen in the national reform programme. In particular, both programmes envisage the gradual implementation of the government's objectives to increase efficiency and value for money in public service provision, while the long-term public finance projections incorporate the estimated cost of the proposed pension reform.

(11)

The budgetary strategy in the programme is broadly consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008.

(12)

As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme has gaps in the required and optional data (4).

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/24

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/27

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4585. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/27

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4554. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/28

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4503. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/28

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4502. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/29

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4547. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/29

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32007M4571. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/30

(1)

Article 1(8) of the protocol changes Article 16 of the Europol Convention which stipulates that Europol shall establish appropriate control mechanisms to allow the verification of the legality of retrievals from the computerised system of collected information referred to in Articles 6 and 6a of the Europol Convention, as amended by the protocol,

(2)

Data which is supplied by Member States and third parties for the inclusion in the analysis work files and the information system and which is processed according to Article 3 of the Council Act of 3 November 1998 adopting Rules applicable to Europol Analysis Files (4) and according to Article 6a of the Europol Convention, as introduced by the protocol, shall equally be subject to the control mechanism stipulated by the amended Article 16 of the Europol Convention,

(1)

a unique reference number related to the retrieval or the attempted retrieval

(2)

which of the components of the computerised system of collected information referred to in Articles 6 and 6a of the Europol Convention was accessed or consulted,

(3)

the identification of the user,

(4)

the date and time of the retrieval or consultation, including attempted retrievals,

(5)

where applicable, the Analysis Work File or Files concerned,

(6)

the identity of the person or persons concerning whom data were queried or accessed and displayed or the identification of the record retrieved.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/32

(a)

‘analysis group ’means the group associating the participants to an analysis project, as mentioned in Article 10(2) of the Europol Convention;

(b)

‘arrangement ’means an agreement, concluded between Europol and a third party, regulating the association of the latter to the activities of an analysis group;

(c)

‘association ’of third party's experts to the activities of an analysis group means that these experts shall be entitled to attend analysis group's meetings, to be informed by Europol, upon request, of the development of the concerned analysis work file and to receive and further disseminate, in accordance with the applicable legal requirements, analysis results which concern the third party they represent;

(d)

‘third part ’means a third State or body as referred to in Article 10(4) of the Europol Convention.

(a)

attend analysis group meetings, and

(b)

be informed by Europol, upon request, of the development of the concerned analysis work file, and

(c)

receive analysis results which concern the third party they represent; such dissemination shall take place in accordance with Articles 17(2) and 18(4) of the Europol Convention, with the relevant provisions of the cooperation and confidentiality agreements, with Article 5(5) of the Council Act of 12 March 1999 adopting the rules governing the transmission of personal data by Europol to third States and third bodies (2), and with the prior consent of the Member State which communicated the concerned data; and

(d)

further disseminate the analysis results, only with the prior agreement of the concerned participants and in compliance with the relevant provisions of the cooperation and confidentiality agreements.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/35

(a)

‘joint investigation teams ’means the joint investigation team as referred to in Article 3(a) of the Europol Convention.

(b)

‘national unit ’means the only liaison body between the competent national authorities and Europol as referred to in Article 4 of the Europol Convention.

(c)

‘competent authorities ’means all public bodies existing in the Member States which are responsible under national law for preventing and combating criminal offences according to Article 2(4) of the Europol Convention.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/37

(1)

According to Article 32a of the Europol Convention, on the basis of a proposal by the Director of Europol, the Management Board, acting by a majority of two thirds of its members, shall adopt rules for access to Europol documents for any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, taking account of the principles and limits stated in the regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents adopted on the basis of Article 255 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

(2)

The second subparagraph of Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘the EU Treaty’) enshrines the concept of openness, stating that the Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.

(3)

Openness guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. Openness contributes to strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights as laid down in Article 6 of the EU Treaty, in Article 255 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as ‘the EC Treaty’) and in Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

(4)

In accordance with Article 41(1) of the EU Treaty, the right of access also applies to documents relating to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

(5)

Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation 1049/2001’) lays down the general principles and limits governing the right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. Article 32a of the Europol Convention refers to the principles and limits stated in this Regulation.

(6)

In principle, all documents should be accessible to the public. However, public and private interests should be protected by way of exceptions. Europol should be entitled where necessary to safeguard its ability to carry out its tasks.

(7)

In order to ensure that the right of access is fully respected, a two-stage administrative procedure should apply, with the additional possibility of complaints to the Ombudsman.

(8)

These rules are without prejudice to Article 19 of the Europol Convention on the right of access.

(a)

‘Europol document ’or ‘document ’shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to Europol's activities, policies and decisions.

(b)

‘third party ’shall mean any natural or legal person, or any entity outside Europol including the Member States, other institutions, bodies and agencies of the European Union, international organizations and third countries;

(c)

‘Europol classified documents ’shall mean documents which contain information requiring additional security measures and which are marked with one of the classification levels ‘Europol RESTRICTED’, ‘Europol CONFIDENTIAL’, ‘Europol SECRET ’or ‘Europol TOP SECRET ’in accordance with the Rules on the confidentiality of Europol information.

(a)

to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing the right of access to Europol documents in such a way as to ensure the widest possible access to documents;

(b)

to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right; and

(c)

to promote good administrative practice on access to documents.

(a)

the public interest as regards:

(b)

the privacy and integrity of the individual.

—

commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property,

—

court proceedings and legal advice,

—

the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, other than those mentioned under paragraph 1 (a),

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/41

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/42

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation is a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of the EC Merger Regulation No 132/2004 of the Commission (1).

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purpose of assessing the present operation the definitions of the relevant product markets, as concerns gas in Belgium, are:

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purpose of assessing the present operation the definitions of the relevant geographic markets, as concerns gas in Belgium, are:

The majority of the Member States agrees, a minority disagrees concerning point (f).

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purpose of assessing the present operation the definitions of the relevant product markets, as concerns gas in France, are:

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purpose of assessing the present operation as concerns gas in France, the definitions of the relevant geographic markets, are based on the regional balancing zones and that each of them constitutes a relevant geographic market for all product markets as identified in question 4.

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purpose of assessing the present operation the definitions of the relevant product markets, as concerns electricity in Belgium, are:

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purpose of assessing the present operation the definitions of the relevant geographic markets, as concerns electricity in Belgium, are:

8.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purpose of assessing the present operation the definition of the relevant product market, as concerns district heating in France, is:

9.

10.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the proposed concentration is likely to result in a significant impediment to effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it and the EEA for the following markets:

Belgium:

France:

11.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the commitments are sufficient to remove the significant impediments to competition in the markets identified in Question 10. The majority of the Member States agrees, a minority disagrees.

12.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, subject to full compliance with the commitments offered by the parties, and considered all commitments together, the proposed concentration does not significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, within the meaning of Article 2(2) and 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. The majority of the Member States agrees, a minority disagrees.

13.

The Advisory Committee asks the Commission to take into account all the other points raised during the discussion

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/45

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/46

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) and that it has a Community dimension.

2.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purposes of assessing the present operation, the relevant product markets are the following:

A minority disagrees with respect to a) and a minority abstains for c).

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purposes of assessing the present operation, the relevant geographic markets are national.

4.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the operation as notified would give rise to non-coordinated effects in the Austrian market for the provision of mobile telecommunication services to end consumers and therefore result in a significant impediment of effective competition in that market. A minority abstains.

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the efficiency claims raised by T-Mobile are very unlikely to take place after the concentration.

6.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the commitments submitted by the parties are sufficient to remove the competition concerns raised and that, as a result, the concentration should be declared compatible with the Common Market. A minority disagrees.

7.

The Advisory Committee asks the Commission to take into account all the other points raised during the discussion.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/47

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/48

1.

Declare that by applying a requirement of residence in Liechtenstein for the entitlement to helplessness allowance, the Principality of Liechtenstein has failed to fulfil its obligations pursuant to Articles 19(1) and (2), 25(1) and 28(1) of the Act referred to at point 1 of Annex VI to the EEA Agreement (Council Regulation EEC No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community), as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Protocol 1 thereto; and

2.

Order the Principality of Liechtenstein to bear the costs of the proceedings.

—

The present case concerns the Liechtenstein Hilflosenentschädigung, (helplessness allowance) for persons who permanently require a considerable degree of help from a third person or personal surveillance to carry out daily tasks. The allowance is not supplementing any other social security benefit, and is granted without regard to income. The allowance is not linked to past contributions to the State, and the recipient is not required to suffer from a sickness.

—

Liechtenstein law requires that the recipient of the allowance reside in Liechtenstein.

—

The Liechtenstein helplessness allowance is listed in Annex IIa to Regulation 1408/71 (cf. Articles 4(2a)(c) and 10a of the Regulation) as a special non-contributory cash benefit, which would as such not be an exportable benefit under the Regulation.

—

The EFTA Surveillance Authority pleads, however, that the correct classification of the helplessness allowance would be as a sickness benefit in cash (cf. Article 4(1) of the Regulation), exportable in accordance with Articles 19 (1) and (2), 25 (1) and 28 (1) of the Regulation.

—

The correct classification of the allowance is decisive as to whether the Principality of Liechtenstein is obliged to grant the benefit to applicants residing outside Liechtenstein but otherwise fulfilling the relevant criteria as set out in the Regulation.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/49

1.

Declare that by failing to adopt, or to notify the Authority of, the measures necessary to implement the Act referred to at point 32g of Annex XX to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise), as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Protocol 1 thereto, within the time limit prescribed, the Principality of Liechtenstein has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 14 of that Act and Article 7 EEA, and

2.

Order the Principality of Liechtenstein to bear the costs of the proceedings.

—

The case concerns the non-implementation of the environmental noise directive.

—

In the pre-litigation phase, Liechtenstein has not disputed that, by the expiry of the time limit, it had not taken the measures necessary to ensure implementation of the directive.

29.3.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/50

1.

On 19 March 2007, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation group (‘China Shipbuilding’, China) through Quingdao Qiyao Linshan Power Development Company Ltd (‘Quingdao Qiyao Linshan’, China), Wärtsilä Corporation (‘Wärtsilä ’Finland) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd (‘Mitsubishi’, Japan) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation joint control by way of purchase of shares in a newly created company constituting a joint venture, under the name Quingdao Qiyao Wärtsilä MHI Linshan Marine Diesel Company (‘JV’, China).

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.