14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/1

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Euro exchange rates (1)

13 June 2005

(2005/C 144/01)

1 euro=

	Currency	Exchange rate
USD	US dollar	1,2062
JPY	Japanese yen	131,74
DKK	Danish krone	7,4412
GBP	Pound sterling	0,6683
SEK	Swedish krona	9,2665
CHF	Swiss franc	1,5379
ISK	Iceland króna	79,14
NOK	Norwegian krone	7,8485
BGN	Bulgarian lev	1,9558
CYP	Cyprus pound	0,574
CZK	Czech koruna	29,998
EEK	Estonian kroon	15,6466
HUF	Hungarian forint	249,58
LTL	Lithuanian litas	3,4528
LVL	Latvian lats	0,6958
MTL	Maltese lira	0,4293
PLN	Polish zloty	4,0372
ROL	Romanian leu	36 160
SIT	Slovenian tolar	239,43
SKK	Slovak koruna	38,645
TRY	Turkish lira	1,6631
AUD	Australian dollar	1,586
CAD	Canadian dollar	1,5165
HKD	Hong Kong dollar	9,381
NZD	New Zealand dollar	1,7132
SGD	Singapore dollar	2,0247
KRW	South Korean won	1 220,8
ZAR	South African rand	8,2891
CNY	Chinese yuan renminbi	9,9831
HRK	Croatian kuna	7,315
IDR	Indonesian rupiah	11 615,71
MYR	Malaysian ringgit	4,5846
PHP	Philippine peso	66,552
RUB	Russian rouble	34,339
THB	Thai baht	49,345

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(1)  

Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/2

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Invitation to submit comments on the draft Commission Regulation on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid

(Amendments concerning transport and the coal industry)

(2005/C 144/02)

Interested parties may submit their comments within one month of the date of publication of this draft Regulation to:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Energy and Transport

Unit A4

Office DM 28 06/109

B-1049 Brussels

Fax (32-2) 296 41 04

E-mail: TREN STATE-AID@cec.eu.int

Draft Regulation amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid

(Amendments concerning transport and the coal industry)

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1.   INTRODUCTION

1.1.   General legal framework concerning de minimis aid

Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 authorises the Commission, by means of a regulation, to set a ceiling below which aid measures are deemed not meet all the criteria of Article 87(1) of the Treaty. Among the four criteria set out in that paragraph it is more especially the criterion concerning distortion of competition affecting trade which is deemed not to be met. Such aid measures do not therefore fall under the notification requirement of Article 88(3).

That regulation provides for a ceiling of EUR 100 000 over three years per company below which Article 87(1) can be deemed not to apply. It also indicates that the de minimis aid in no way affects the possibility of undertakings obtaining, for the same project, State aid authorised by the Commission or covered by a category exemption regulation having the effect of possibly fairly generous cumulations of aid.

1.2.   Situation of the transport sector

When it was drawn up, it was agreed to continue to exclude the transport sector from the scope of Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid, as was the case with the previous legal framework (1) — together with fisheries and agriculture. The main reason for this special status was that, given the specific rules applicable and on account of the economic features of this sector, even a small amount of aid could distort competition between transport companies and could therefore meet the criteria of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.

1.3.   Situation of the coal sector

The coal sector has been covered by the EC Treaty only since 24 July 2002, following the expiry of the ECSC Treaty. Since then, the sector has been subject to specific rules (2) which prevent the application of other exemption regimes (3).

2.   MOTIVATION

2.1.   Situation of the transport sector

The approach chosen in 2001 is now regarded as being obsolete for the following reasons:

2.1.1.   Economic context

Firstly, the gradual and (compared to other sectors of the economy) recent liberalisation of the transport market, and the structural problems in certain sectors thereof, only allowed for the application of specific rules in the beginning. The Commission finds nonetheless that the economic context has developed in such a way that the threat of State aid causing significant distortion of competition is less serious given that the process of opening up the transport markets has now been successfully completed and the structure of the markets has stabilised, allowing a marked improvement in the financial soundness of undertakings. Consequently, the public authorities are no longer now subject to such strong pressure to come to the help of undertakings in difficulty or confer undue advantages on them.

However, excluding the transport sector does not entail exemption from the notification procedure and therefore the State aid procedure applies to all the amounts granted. In addition, the Member States are making increasing use of across-the-board State aid measures, including the de minimis regulation, which clearly corresponds to a competition policy requirement not to grant ad hoc or sectoral aid. None of the general frameworks applicable to State aid, whether applying to communications (4) or the exemption regulations other than the de minimis regulation (5), include exemption clauses for transport. To improve this situation and increase legal certainty with regard to Member States which wish to apply general schemes, thought should be given to how to reconcile the application of the State aid rules in the transport sector with the exemption accorded to other sectors of the economy.

In addition, it should be noted that the small amounts of aid notified to the Commission in recent years — including the authorisation of transport elements of de minimis general schemes (6) — have for the most part been deemed compatible with the provisions of the Treaty without major difficulty. On the contrary, their objectives were in accordance with Community policies: application of equipment modernisation plans going further than the Community standards (7), promotion of the use of combined transport, implementation of environmental provisions (8) and the acquisition of less-polluting vehicles (9). Other similar cases are being examined (10). On the other hand, the Commission has always regarded the acquisition of vehicles by road haulage companies other than on environmental and safety grounds as being incompatible with the Treaty since such aid is likely to have a damaging effect on inter-company competition (11).

2.1.2.   Effects of the current regime

Until the Renove judgements, the Commission had held that the exemption applied to all transport sectors. In effect, the Court of Justice ruled in its ‘RENOVE’ judgments of 26 September 2002 (C-351/98) (12) and 13 February 2003 (C-409/00) concerning road transport (13), that the exemption to the de minimis rule could not be applied to non-commercial transport, contrary to the Commission's approach, which was to regard a grant for the acquisition of lorries as being incompatible, without making a distinction between the different forms of organisation of transport activity. There is therefore a difference of treatment between two categories of undertaking. On the one hand, those whose principal activity is haulage cannot benefit from aid schemes with specific (regional, environmental, SME, etc.) objectives and which require authorisation by the Commission even for amounts below the ceiling. On the other, undertakings not belonging to the sector as such but nevertheless carrying out own-account transport activities (14) enjoy the benefit of the de minimis regulation without restrictions and without prior Commission authorisation.

2.1.3.   The treatment of mobile assets

As regards the treatment of mobile assets of transport companies (purchase of vehicles, vessels and aeroplanes), it is appropriate to evaluate the potential impact on competition of aid amounting to EUR 100 000 per undertaking over three years. Given the cost of aeroplanes and ships and inland waterway vessels, the impact on the structure of those sectors may be regarded as insignificant. However, in the road transport sector aid amounting to EUR 100 000 over three years may be regarded as significant. Given the exceptional structure of this sector, the large number of small hauliers (particularly in certain Member States) (15), and the cost of vehicles (16), it should be considered that such amounts can affect trade and distort competition between Member States. To the extent that the investment subsidised would result in a significant reduction in vehicle replacement costs, such aid could constitute operating aid. It could also increase the road vehicle fleet, which in a market which is already very competitive might reduce profit margins even further. In consequence, it is regarded as desirable to maintain an exception with regard to the acquisition of vehicles (purchase of a lorry) in the road sector.

There is still, nevertheless, the risk that such an exemption could, on account of differentiated treatment between transport for third parties and own-account transport (17), distort competition to a greater extent between these two segments of transport activity. The Commission undertakes to monitor this development and its effect on the road transport market.

2.1.4.   Use of Commission resources

Lastly, it should be recalled that, taking into account the necessarily limited human resources available to the Commission for its State aid activities, it would be worthwhile focusing Community action on aid the amount and scope of which are least likely to result in serious distortions of competition. It is all the more appropriate as the Commission, confronted with an increase in notifications of State aid cases and enlargement of the European Union to 25 Member States, needs to target the cases that are most damaging for competition.

2.1.5.   Conclusion

In the light of the Commission's experience in many State aid cases in the transport sector over the years of non-application of the de minimis rule, it can be established that, with the exception of the acquisition of vehicles by road hauliers, aid to transport companies not exceeding a ceiling of EUR 100 000 over a period of three years does not affect trade between Member States and does not distort or threaten to distort competition. The Commission therefore proposes to rectify the situation by removing the exclusion of transport from the de minimis rule, except in certain clearly defined cases (see point 2.1.3).

2.2.   Situation of the coal sector

The coal sector has been subject to the EC Treaty only since 24 July 2002, following the expiry of the ECSC Treaty. Since then, this sector is subject to specific rules (18) which prevent the application of other exemption rules (19). They specify that the Commission's authorising power must be exercised on the basis of precise and full knowledge of the measures which governments plan to take. Member States should therefore provide the Commission with a consolidation report showing the full details of the direct or indirect aid which they plan to grant to the coal industry. Consequently, all the aid may potentially meet the criteria of Article 87(1). Application of the de minimis regulation does not, however, seem permissible.

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(1)  Commission notice on the de minimis rules for State aid (OJ C 68 of 6 March 1996, p. 9) and the Community guidelines on State aid for small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ C 213 of 23 July 1996, p. 4) also excluded the transport sector.

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 1407/2002 on State aid to the coal industry (OJ L 205 of 2 August 2002, p. 1).

(3)  Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1407/2002.

(4)  E.g. the guidelines on national regional aid (OJ C 74 of 10 March 1998, p. 9), and the Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (OJ C 37 of 3 February 2001, p. 3).

(5)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid (OJ L 10 of 13 January 2001, p. 20), Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 10 of 13 January 2001, p. 10), Commission Regulation (EC) No 2204/2002 of 12 December 2002 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid for employment (OJ L 337 of 13 December 2002, p. 3) and procedural Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules on the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 83 of 27 March 1999, p. 1).

(6)  E.g. the Decision of 16 October 2002 concerning Case N 600b/2001 – Spain (Employment aid in the transport sector), etc.

(7)  E.g. the ‘Lorenz’ decision of 9 June 2001 concerning Case N 409/2001 – Spain (ARTE/PYME programme).

(8)  E.g. the Decision of 5 March 2003 concerning Case N 353/2001 – France (ADEME aid scheme in the transport sector).

(9)  E.g. Decision of 22 May 2002 concerning Case N 100/2001 – Denmark (Aid to road hauliers).

(10)  E.g. Case N 202/2003 – Sweden (Reduction of SME employers' social contributions).

(11)  The Commission decisions referred to as ‘RENOVE’: State aid decision C 20/1996 No 98/693/EC of 1 July 1998 (scheme for the period 1994 – 1996) and State aid decision C 65/1998 No 2001/605/EC (extension of the scheme in 1997); the Commission decisions referred to as ‘tax credits’: State aid decision C 32/92 No 93/496/EEC of 9 June 1993 (the 1992 scheme) and State aid decision C 45/95 No 96/3078 of 22 October 1996 (the scheme for the period 1993-1994).

(12)  Case C-351/98, Spain v Commission, Judgment of 26 September 2002, Renove I, ECR I-8031.

(13)  Case C-409/00, Spain v Commission, Judgment of 13 February 2003, Renove II , ECR I-1487.

(14)  In these cases, the Court confirmed that while the own-account transport sector is not part of the transport sector envisaged in the rules concerning de minimis aid, that sector remains in direct competition with the commercial transport sector in the case of aid exceeding the de minimis threshold. However the Court nevertheless found that the Commission cannot refuse to apply the de minimis rule to aid granted to undertakings in sectors which are not excluded from the application of that rule by the various texts applicable.

(15)  Considerable road transport segments in particular are made up of many small companies. For these micro-enterprises, aid below the ceiling set could represent a proportionally significant contribution to their activity. In 2000, there were 130 141 freight transport undertakings in Spain, 112 173 IN Italy, 32 885 in Germany, 36 819 in the United Kingdom and 10 290 in the Netherlands (Source: Eurostat). Analysis of the average turnover by undertaking in 2000 indicates a very low average in Spain and Italy, which is indicative of a large number of undertakings: EUR 160 000 in Spain, EUR 280 000 in Italy, and EUR 1 350 000 in the Netherlands and EUR 710 000 in Germany. It should be noted that these are average figures (large enterprises and SMEs taken together). Close analysis of the sector would certainly indicate turnover for the (very many) family firms much lower than the national averages. The number of persons employed by undertaking also illustrates the size of haulage companies. At EU level, on average they employ five or six people (fewer than three in Italy and Spain). Since these are average values, this result gives rise to the conclusion that there are many one-wage companies.

(16)  EUR 90 000—120 000 for a 40-tonne lorry.

(17)  In addition, since relations between undertakings in this sector are very fluid, it would seem probable that the structure of the market would react promptly to such financial contributions in a manner contrary to the general interest.

(18)  Regulation (EC) No 1407/2002 on State aid to the coal industry (OJ L 205 of 2 August 2002, p. 1).

(19)  Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1407/2002.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/8

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New Composition of the Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings

(2005/C 144/03)

(The Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings was set up by Commission Decision 2003/209/EC of 25 March 2003) (1)

By Decision of 7 June 2005, the Commission has reappointed the following as members of the Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings from 1 March 2005 for a period of one year:

Mr. Jean-Michel Colombani

Mr. Pippo Costella

Ms. Mary Cunneen

Mr. Brice de Ruyver

Mr. José Garcia Magariños

Mr. Marco Gramegna

Mr. Krzysztof Karsznicki

Mr. Plamen Kolarski

Ms. Martina Liebsch

Mr. Michel Marcus

Ms. Isabella Orfano

Ms. Nell Rasmussen

Ms. Elisabetta Rosi

Ms. Éva Rózsa

Mr. Henrik Sjölinder

Ms. Hana Snajdrova

Ms. Gerda Theuermann

Ms. Marina Tzvetkova

Ms. Bärbel Uhl

Ms. Marjan Wijers

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(1)  OJ L 79, 26.3.2003, p. 25.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/9

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Communication from the French Government concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations to prospect for, exploit and extract hydrocarbons (1)

(Notice regarding applications for exclusive licences to prospect for liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, designated the ‘Aquila’ and ‘Arcachon Maritime’ licences)

(2005/C 144/04)

(Text with EEA relevance)

By request of 18 December 2004, Vermilion Rep SAS and Vermilion Exploration SAS, with registered offices on Route de Pontenx, Parentis-en-Born, 40161 (France), applied for an exclusive five-year licence, designated the ‘Aquila’ licence, to prospect for liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons in an area of approximately 709 km2 covering part of the department of Gironde and the seabed off this department.

By request of 4 March 2005, Island Oil and Gas plc, with registered offices at ‘Curdarragh’, Annamult, Bennettsbridge, County Kilkenny (Ireland), applied for an exclusive five-year licence, designated the ‘Arcachon Maritime’ licence, to prospect for liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons in an area of approximately 638 km2 covering part of the seabed off the department of Gironde, in partial competition with the application for the Aquila licence.

The perimeter of the area covered by this licence is made up of the meridian and parallel arcs successively joining the vertices defined below by their geographical coordinates, the original meridian being that of Paris (Greenwich coordinates):

VERTICES	LONGITUDE	LATITUDE
A	4.30° W (1°31'56'' W)	49.90° N (44°54'40'' N)
B	3.90° W (1°10'20'' W)	49.90° N (44°54'40'' N)
C	3.90° W (1°10'20'' W)	49.80° N (44°49'16'' N)
D	4.00° W (1°15'44'' W)	49.80° N (44°49'16'' N)
E	4.00° W (1°15'44'' W)	49.59° N (44°37'55'' N)
F	4.01° W (1°16'17'' W)	49.59° N (44°37'55'' N)
G	4.01° W (1°16'17'' W)	49.56° N (44°36'18'' N)
H	4.00° W (1°15'44'' W)	49.56° N (44°36'18'' N)
I	4.00° W (1°15'44'' W)	49.50° N (44°33'04'' N)
J	4.10° W (1°21'08'' W)	49.50° N (44°33'04'' N)
K	4.10° W (1°21'08'' W)	49.60° N (44°38'28'' N)
L	4.20° W (1°26'32'' W)	49.60° N (44°38'28'' N)
M	4.20° W (1°26'32'' W)	49.70° N (44°43'52'' N)
N	4.30° W (1°31'56'' W)	49.70° N (44°43'52'' N)

Interested companies may, within 90 days of the publication of this notice, submit a competing application in accordance with the procedure summarised in the ‘Notice regarding the granting of mining rights for hydrocarbons in France’ published in Official Journal of the European Communities C 374 of 30 December 1994, page 11, and established by Decree 95-427 of 19 April 1995 regarding mining rights (Journal officiel de la République française of 22 April 1995).

Further information can be obtained from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry (Directorate-General for Energy and Raw Materials, Directorate for Energy and Mineral Resources, Bureau of Mining Legislation), 61, Boulevard Vincent Auriol, Télédoc 133, F-75703 Paris Cedex 13, France (tel. (33) 144 97 23 02, fax (33) 144 97 05 70).

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(1)  OJ L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 3.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/11

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.3832 — MatlinPatterson L.P./Matussière & Forest)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(2005/C 144/05)

(Text with EEA relevance)

1.

On 6 June 2005, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which investment funds controlled by MatlinPatterson L.P. (‘MatlinPatterson’, US) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation control of parts of the assets of Matussière & Forest S.A. (together ‘Matussière Assets’, France) by way of purchase of shares.

2.	The business activities of the undertakings concerned are: — for MatlinPatterson: investment group which invests in companies in financial difficulties with the objective of directing the reorganization process; — for Matussière Assets: manufacture and sale of publication papers.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.3832 — MatlinPaterson L.P./Matussière & Forest, to the following address: European Commission Directorate-General for Competition, Merger Registry J-70 B-1049 Brussels

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)  OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/12

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M. 3763 — Carlsberg/DLG/Sejet JV)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(2005/C 144/06)

(Text with EEA relevance)

1.

On 6 June 2005, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Carlsberg A/S (‘Carlsberg’, Denmark) and Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab a.m.b.a. (‘DLG’, Denmark) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation joint control of the Danish based undertaking Sejet Planteforaedling I/S (‘Sejet’), currently controlled by DLG, by way of purchase of assets.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are: — for Carlsberg: production, sale, marketing and distribution of beer and soft drinks; — for DLG: feeding stuff company mainly supplying feed, cereal seed, fertilizers, plant protection products to Danish farmers; — Sejet: commercial plant breeding, research and development of varieties of wheat, barley, oats, rye triticale, rape and maize for agricultural use.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M. 3763 — Carlsberg/DLG/Sejet JV, to the following address: European Commission Directorate-General for Competition, Merger Registry J-70 B-1049 Brussels

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)  OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/13

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Commission inquiry in the gas and electricity sector

(2005/C 144/07)

On 13 June 2005 the Commission decided to open inquiries under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (cases COMP/39172 and COMP/ 39173) into the following sectors of the economy: electricity and gas. The Advisory Committee gave its favourable opinion. For information purposes the text of the decision is made available on the official website of Directorate General for Competition.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/13

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Commission inquiry in the retail banking and business insurance sector

(2005/C 144/08)

On 13 June 2005 the Commission decided to open inquiries under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (cases COMP/39190 and COMP/39191) into the following sectors of the economy: retail banking and business insurance. The Advisory Committee gave its favourable opinion. For information purposes the text of the decision is made available on the official website of Directorate General for Competition.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/14

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OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

of 31 May 2005

at the request of the Council of the European Union concerning a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics on the structure and activity of foreign affiliates (COM(2005) 88 final)

(CON/2005/16)

(2005/C 144/09)

1.

On 6 April 2005, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Council of the European Union for an opinion on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics on the structure and activity of foreign affiliates (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation’).

2.	The ECB's competence to deliver an opinion is based on the first indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

3.

The objective of the proposed regulation is to establish a common framework for the systematic production of Community statistics on the structure and activity of foreign affiliates. On the one hand, under this framework Member States will report data on foreign affiliates resident in the compiling country but controlled by a foreign institutional unit. Annex I to the proposed regulation lays down a common module for such inward statistics on foreign affiliates (hereinafter ‘inward FATS’). On the other hand, the reporting of data on foreign affiliates not resident in the compiling country but controlled by an institutional unit resident in the compiling country is currently voluntary and will be subject to pilot studies to be conducted by some Member States at the latest within three years after entry into force of the proposed regulation. Annex II to the proposed regulation lays down a common module for such outward statistics on foreign affiliates (hereinafter ‘outward FATS’).

4.

The ECB welcomes the proposed regulation. By defining a common framework, the proposed regulation should improve the comparability of data on foreign affiliates throughout the EU, thereby making them more suitable for aggregation at the EU and/or euro area level and more reliable for all users. Data on foreign affiliates are currently compiled by national statistical institutes (usually inward FATS) and central banks (usually outward FATS) of the Member States. The compilation methods used are in line with the proposed regulation and such data should also assist the ECB in assessing economic developments relating to the activity of large corporations and their foreign affiliates inside and outside the euro area. Specifically, these data are considered valuable for investigating both trends in euro area trade and price-setting behaviour, as well as for understanding the economic impact of foreign direct investment on, for instance, competitiveness or employment.

5.

In this context, the ECB would take the opportunity to comment on certain specific provisions of the proposed regulation. The ECB notes that the proposed regulation does not make the provision of outward FATS mandatory with immediate effect. Only after a period of three years will it be possible to assess the results of the pilot studies to be conducted in some Member States. The ECB regrets that although the data flows provided for balance of payments statistics in Section 2 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 184/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 January 2005 on Community statistics concerning balance of payments, international trade in services and foreign direct investment (1) indicate separate categories for goods and services, goods and services are not categorised separately in this way in the proposed regulation. If such data are not categorised separately, their value for analysis will be reduced and it will be harder to compare them with data published in the countries that are the euro area's main counterparts.

6.

Another issue is the deadline of 20 months from the end of the reference year for Member States to transmit inward FATS currently provided for in Section 5 of Annex I to the proposed regulation. This would appear to be the maximum possible time limit for ensuring a regular assessment of economic developments involving (frequent) changes in the structure of large corporations and the number, size, and sector of economic activity of their affiliates. The ECB therefore encourages the Parliament and the Council to consider the possibility, after an evaluation of pilot studies, of reducing the proposed deadline in the medium term, at least for aggregated data (e.g. ‘Level 1’, as referred to in the proposed regulation). This would bring it more in line with the timeliness for reporting aggregated data on foreign direct investment laid down in Regulation (EC) No 184/2005, which provides for a deadline of nine months.

7.

Following a more detailed assessment of Annexes I to III to the proposed regulation the ECB notes that Section 6 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 184/2005 entitled ‘Geographical breakdown levels’ includes an additional item entitled ‘U4 Extra-euro-zone’ alongside other EU-wide items. The ECB considers that in order to produce the euro area aggregate, it would be useful to include a similar reference to the ‘Extra-euro area’ in Annex III to the proposed regulation as an additional geographical breakdown level under the heading ‘Level 1’. Finally, the Explanatory Memorandum refers to ‘EU-15’ (and alternatively ‘EU15-Member States’); the ECB proposes that it should refer instead to the current ‘EU-25’ or ‘EU-25 Member States’.

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(1)  OJ L 35, 8.2.2005, p. 23.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/16

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OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

of 3 June 2005

at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (COM(2005) 155 final)

(CON/2005/17)

(2005/C 144/10)

1.

On 3 May 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Council of the European Union for an opinion on a proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation’).

2.

The ECB's competence to deliver an opinion is based on the second subparagraph of Article 104(14) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

3.

Sound fiscal policies are fundamental to the success of economic and monetary union (EMU). They are prerequisites for macroeconomic stability, growth and cohesion in the euro area. The fiscal framework enshrined in the Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact is a cornerstone of EMU and thus key to anchoring expectations of fiscal discipline. This rules-based framework, which aims to secure sustainable public finances while allowing the smoothing of output fluctuations through the operation of automatic stabilisers, needs to remain clear, simple and enforceable. Compliance with these principles will also facilitate transparency and equal treatment in the implementation of the framework.

4.

The objective of the proposed regulation is to reflect changes in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact that were agreed by the Council (ECOFIN) on 20 March 2005. The proposed regulation concerns the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). The proposed regulation aims to ensure sound fiscal policies by providing incentives for fiscal discipline. While the ECB does not see a need to express an opinion on the specific provisions of the proposed regulation, it reiterates that the EDP needs to be both credible and effective as a safeguard against unsustainable public finances, maintaining a strict time frame. Against this background, the ECB favours an amendment that is as limited as possible of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (1). A rigorous and consistent implementation of the EDP would be conducive to prudent fiscal policies.

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(1)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

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14.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 144/17

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OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

of 3 June 2005

at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (COM(2005) 154 final)

(CON/2005/18)

(2005/C 144/11)

1.

On 3 May 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Council of the European Union for an opinion on a proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation’).

2.

The proposed regulation is based on Article 99(5) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Although this provision does not explicitly envisage consultation of the ECB, the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies are relevant to the European System of Central Banks' primary objective of maintaining price stability. Therefore, the ECB's competence to deliver an opinion is based on the first indent of Article 105(4) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

3.

Sound fiscal policies are fundamental to the success of economic and monetary union (EMU). They are prerequisites for macroeconomic stability, growth and cohesion in the euro area. The fiscal framework enshrined in the Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact is a cornerstone of EMU and thus key to anchoring expectations of fiscal discipline. This rules-based framework, which aims to secure sustainable public finances while allowing the smoothing of output fluctuations through the operation of automatic stabilisers, needs to remain clear, simple and enforceable. Compliance with these principles will also facilitate transparency and equal treatment in the implementation of the framework.

4.

The objective of the proposed regulation is to reflect changes in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact that were agreed by the Council (ECOFIN) on 20 March 2005. The proposed regulation concerns the surveillance process and the setting of medium-term objectives for Member States' fiscal policies. While the ECB does not see a need to express an opinion on the specific provisions of the proposed regulation, it endorses the aim of improving the surveillance and coordination of economic policies so as to achieve and maintain medium-term objectives that ensure the sustainability of public finances. A rigorous and consistent implementation of the surveillance procedures would be conducive to prudent fiscal policies.

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