20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/1

1.1

There is currently no harmonised framework for the supervision of reinsurance undertakings in the EU. As a result, reinsurance supervision regimes vary widely from one Member State to another.

1.2

On 21 April 2004, therefore, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Directive on reinsurance and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC and Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC. Its key features are as follows:

2.1

The purpose of the directive is to establish a harmonised supervisory framework for reinsurance undertakings and captives (1) in the European Union.

2.2

The proposal lays down the minimum conditions necessary to obtain official authorisation. Among other things, these conditions stipulate that the undertaking in question must have a specific legal form. It must submit a scheme of operations and must also hold a minimum guarantee fund. Business is limited to reinsurance and related operations and the qualifying shareholders and management of the undertaking are also subject to checks. An authorisation, once granted, is valid for the entire Community.

2.3

The directive seeks to prohibit reinsurers from depositing security with primary insurers, where this is required under Member States' national law. Contractual deposits remain unaffected. In addition to establishing a functioning single market, the Commission is also seeking to lay down an international benchmark to alleviate worldwide the constraints placed on European reinsurers as a result of the deposit of security.

2.4

Under the solvency provisions for undertakings, the solvency requirements that apply to primary non-life insurance companies are also to apply to the non-life reinsurance business. These requirements may be increased by up to 50 % through the comitology procedure. The solvency provisions for life reinsurance undertakings are to be based on those that apply to primary life insurance undertakings. Where an undertaking conducts life and non-life reinsurance business simultaneously, the total sum must be covered by its own funds. Like primary insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings will also be required to maintain a minimum guarantee fund of not less than EUR 3 million. For captive reinsurance undertakings, that figure may be reduced to EUR 1 million.

2.5

The proposed directive lays down specific supervisory powers in cases where a company's financial situation deteriorates, where no adequate technical provisions are in place or where there is insufficient solvency. These powers match those in the primary insurance sector and provide scope to require the submission of a plan for the restoration of a sound financial situation, a finance scheme and a financial recovery plan, and to withdraw authorisation.

2.6

Reinsurance undertakings which were entitled or authorised to conduct reinsurance business before the date of implementation of the directive may continue to do so without requesting authorisation. They are subject to the substantive provisions of the directive, although the Member States may grant an additional transitional period of two years.

2.7

The proposal gives the Commission implementing powers to make technical adjustments to the directive (‘comitology’).

2.8

The life, non-life and insurance groups directives are also to be adapted in line with the supervision rules for reinsurance undertakings. Thus,

3.1

The Committee welcomes the Commission's proposal which will help consolidate Europe's position as a financial centre by ensuring that reinsurance undertakings and captives have adequate capital at their disposal to meet their obligations. This will give a lasting boost to the position of European reinsurance undertakings on the international insurance markets.

3.2

The Committee would expressly point out the importance of the reinsurance industry for Europe's position as a financial centre. In 2002, the total reinsurance premium of the 40 largest reinsurers amounted to USD 138 601 200 000, of which USD 58 544 000 000 stemmed from EU reinsurers.

3.3

The reinsurance business is concerned mainly with the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. However, the loss of one or more reinsurers may have an impact on consumers if, as a result, a primary insurer is no longer able to meet its obligations. The Committee therefore recognises that the proposed directive also indirectly boosts EU consumer protection. The Committee also draws attention to the benefit to consumers of adequate reinsurance cover. That in turn requires the availability on the European market of sufficient reinsurance capacity at reasonable premiums.

3.4

The Committee welcomes the Commission's fast-track approach, i.e. that the reinsurance supervision rules are be adopted on the basis of the current primary insurance supervision rules. This is the right approach, not least in the light of the ongoing Solvency II project.

3.5

A key fact about reinsurance is that it is a global market. In the ongoing consultations on the directive, therefore, the Committee would ask the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to pay particular attention to the international competitiveness of the European reinsurance industry.

3.6

The Committee recognises that the European reinsurance industry in particular proved its financial soundness in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks. Thus, any new burden placed on the European reinsurance industry should be subject to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis.

3.7

The Committee acknowledges that, up to now, different supervision regimes have been in operation in the EU, involving a mix of solvency, capital investment and deposit-related rules. Under the Commission proposal, the current rules for deposits in particular are set to disappear. It is vital to ensure that the supervisory authorities concerned develop sufficient trust in the future supervisory mechanisms and their uniform application across the EU.

4.1

Under the proposed directive, the provisions for calculating the solvency margin of primary life insurance undertakings are also to apply to life reinsurance undertakings. For life reinsurance, the Commission proposes the adoption – unchanged – of the solvency rules of the primary insurance sector. The solvency calculation comprises two elements: 3‰ of the sum at risk and 4 % of the mathematical provisions. The Committee feels that this places a disproportionate burden on European life reassurance undertakings. The Commission's proposal:

4.2

In Europe, the risk structure of primary life insurance undertakings and life reinsurers differs considerably. In the life reinsurance business, the capital investment risk generally remains with the primary insurer. That difference alone shows that the solvency formula for primary life insurance cannot adequately reflect the risk structure in the life reinsurance business.

4.3

It is clear from a comparison with the calculation methods used by rating agencies that the proposed EU requirements would seem excessive. US solvency requirements for instance, while based on the amount at risk, also include a variable factor contingent on the size of the relevant portfolio (0.8‰ on holdings over EUR 25 billion – see appendix). The Canadian supervisory authorities and rating agencies take a similar approach.

4.4

While the primary insurance business between insurer and client still bears national hallmarks, reinsurance has always been an international operation, not least because of the need for international risk diversification. It is therefore necessary to establish a level playing field between providers within the Union and international competitors in the USA, Bermuda and Switzerland.

4.5

The fear for European reinsurers competing globally is that they would be placed at a serious disadvantage compared with their rivals outside Europe, where capital requirements are lower. Much of the reinsurance business could well shift to non-European reinsurance centres such as Bermuda or the USA. Any shift in reinsurance capacity would considerably weaken Europe's position as a financial centre. The excessive requirements would inevitably deplete reinsurance capacity and/or make reinsurance more expensive. Such price hikes for reinsurance will inevitably be reflected in the cost of primary insurers' products and thus filter down to consumers too. In turn higher prices will inevitably also have an adverse impact on the establishment of private funded pension schemes that is so urgently needed.

4.6

The Committee feels that none of these developments are conducive to promoting the European single market. The new EU Member States in particular are keen to have a properly working single European market in reinsurance and would be particularly affected by any adverse changes in the structure of reinsurance provision.

4.7

The Committee therefore concludes that the method for calculating the solvency margin for life reinsurance activities proposed in the draft directive could damage European reinsurers' competitiveness. It thus feels that significant changes are needed to the Commission's proposed solvency provisions of life reinsurance undertakings.

4.8

Building on that, the Committee proposes that the solvency calculation for non-life reinsurers should also be taken as a guide for the life reinsurance sector.

4.8.1

In terms of risk and competition, the solvency calculation method for non-life insurers is more than adequate. The non-life solvency formula is broadly consistent with comparable international solvency requirements so that there is little chance of European reinsurers being placed at a competitive disadvantage.

4.8.2

The non-life formula adequately meets the needs of the life reinsurance sector. Because of its overwhelming reliance on existing calculations of mortality risk, the life reinsurance business has more in common with the primary non-life insurance and the non-life reinsurance sectors than with the primary life insurance business.

4.8.3

Individual risks not reflected in the non-life formula can easily be incorporated under the Solvency II project.

4.8.4

From a legislative standpoint, the non-life formula is easy to implement as the Commission has already submitted a finished text in its draft proposal for a directive (revision 3).

4.8.5

By using the non-life formula, life reinsurance undertakings are able to determine their solvency requirements quickly since companies already have the requisite data which does not therefore need to be collected. The non-life formula is especially useful given the lack of information in international business.

4.8.6

The non-life solvency formula is particularly well suited to a fast-track approach. It is easy to apply as it needs no further adjustment in cases where, for instance, contractual deposits are placed.

5.1

The proposed directive applies the provisions for calculating the solvency margin of primary non-life insurance activities to the non-life reinsurance business as well. The proposal also allows for the possibility of increasing the solvency requirements for non-life reinsurance by up to 50 % under the Lamfalussy procedure.

5.2

The Committee feels that, under the fast-track procedure, it is appropriate to transfer, unchanged, the solvency rules for primary non-life insurers to non-life reinsurers. However, the Committee has considerable misgivings about extending the Lamfalussy procedure in the area of solvency requirements.

5.3

The proposed directive was conceived as a fast-track project, not as a framework directive within the Lamfalussy procedure. The solvency requirements should only be amended as part of the more far-reaching Solvency II project.

5.4

Nor is there any material case for applying the Lamfalussy procedure. Capital requirements for reinsurance undertakings are not in any sense implementing measures under the terms of the Lamfalussy procedure. As is readily clear from the protracted Basle II negotiations in the banking sector, capital requirements are the very core of the future supervisory system and not some downstream detail.

5.5

The Committee feels that the specific capital requirements should be made clear in the directive itself and not in downstream Community legislation. This distinction is also backed up by the current Convention draft, which requires that substantive provisions be incorporated into the directive itself. The Commission's reference to extensive consultation of the relevant stakeholders does not therefore go far enough.

6.1

Under the proposed directive, retrocession to other reinsurers may be taken into account in solvency calculations only up to a ceiling of 50 % of the gross amount of claims. This is in line with the current rules for primary insurers in the life and non-life sectors. The draft directive on the supervision of reinsurance undertakings is designed to make a substantial contribution to boosting the financial soundness of the reinsurance sector within the European Union. The Committee therefore feels that full recognition of cessions of primary insurers and retrocessions of reinsurers is warranted, provided the ceding or retroceding undertaking concerned is subject to supervision within the EU.

6.2

The Committee would recommend increasing the reinsurance and retrocession factors, not least given the increased demands made on the insurance industry to resolve issues facing society as a whole. Because of the low reinsurance and retrocession factor, it has not always been possible to offer economical solutions, e.g. in response to the calls made in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks to cover industry and the aviation sector against terrorist risks. In some Member States, the low retrocession factor has so far prevented the development of insurance cover for terrorist risks.

7.1

The Committee accepts the qualitative prudential rules provided for in Article 34 (the ‘prudent person principle’). Given the special features and, in particular, the international nature of the reinsurance business, such an approach is more appropriate than a rigid quantitative one. The EU is thus pursuing a modern approach that is also recommended by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). At the same time, however, the Committee recognises that a qualitative approach is not a blank cheque, but requires undertakings to continuously monitor and improve the capital investment process.

7.2

As the directive restricts or repeals existing prudential rules (as regards depositing security for instance), the Committee recommends that the directive should give Member States the option of requiring the application of additional quantitative investment rules for reinsurers established in their territory. Any such rules must, however, be justified under the ‘prudent person principle’ and the obligations entered into.

9.1

The Committee backs the Commission's Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on reinsurance and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC and Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC subject to the reservations set out above. It considers that the proposal covers almost all areas relating to the supervision of reinsurance undertakings. The full implementation of the directive will go a considerable way to meeting the Commission's objective of strengthening and stabilising the reinsurance markets in the European Union.

9.2

Having examined the Commission document, the Committee has addressed selected aspects of the proposal for a directive in order, among other things, to give the Commission practical pointers and suggestions for further deliberations and analysis. The Committee proposes that the solvency calculation for non-life reinsurers should be taken as a basis for the life reinsurance sector as well. The solvency requirements should remain outside the scope of Lamfalussy procedure. The Committee considers this to be a key directive and therefore calls for a rapid legislative process.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/6

1.1

‘Existing’ substances are substances deemed to have been on the European Community market between 1 January 1971 and 18 September 1981. 100,195 such substances were identified and listed in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances (EINECS) published in the Official Journal in 1990 (1). Substances placed on the market after 18 September 1981 are defined to be ‘new’ and require pre-marketing notification under the relevant European Union legislation.

1.2

Risks to human health and the environment of these existing substances have been routinely assessed under Council Regulation (EEC) 793/93 (2). To date, four priority lists for assessment have been established, for implementation by the competent authorities in Member States. The last of these was dated 25 October 2000 (3). These identified 141 substances where some risk might be expected either due to their specific structures and known or anticipated biochemical interactions, or where their high production volumes (HPV) gave rise to concern.

1.3

Member States assess each substance at all stages of manufacture and use for both hazard and exposure to determine whether or nor there are indeed risks to health and the environment and if there are, what risk reduction measures might be required. If it is determined that, despite being on a priority list for assessment, there are no or very low risks in any actual or planned use, control measures are either not required or are likely to be low in both impact and benefit.

1.4

Completed Risk Assessment Reports (RARs) from the Member States have in turn been evaluated by the Scientific Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment (CSTEE). If the CSTEE agrees with the conclusions and supports the overall assessment process, risk reduction measures, if required, can be proposed as amendments to Annex 1 of the Council Directive on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations 76/769/EEC (4). The present proposal is the twenty-eighth such amendment.

1.5

The two substances (toluene and trichlorobenzene) referred to in the proposal have been assessed in accordance with the above procedure. Both were included in the second list of priority substances published as Commission Regulation EC 2268/95 of 27 September 1995 (5). Both were awarded to Denmark for the process of assessment. The CSTEE substantially agreed with and supported the subsequent RARs in Opinions delivered at its 24th and 25th plenary meetings on 12 June 2001 and 20 July 2001 respectively.

1.6

This proposal sets out risk reduction measures for the two substances to be implemented by Member States within eighteen months of the entry into force of the Directive. The Commission published the proposal on 28 April 2004. After following due procedures, and if agreement can be reached on any changes required, it should take effect in Member States by no later than June 2006.

2.1

The proposal seeks to protect human health and the environment, as well as establishing (or preserving) the Internal Market for these two substances. It is believed that this can be done at little or no cost as uses in the specified applications have already declined and alternative products are believed to be readily available.

2.2

In the case of toluene, recognised as a versatile HPV substance used as an essential raw material for chemical synthesis and as a solvent in many industrial and consumer applications, restrictions are to be placed on any use above 0,1 % by mass in adhesives and spray paints for sale to the general public. This does not apply to any industrial applications and is intended to protect consumer health.

2.3

In the case of trichlorobenzene, with a more limited use as an intermediate for certain herbicides and as a process solvent in closed systems, restrictions are to be placed on any use above 0,1 % by mass in any use except as an intermediate. This restricts any possible sales to the general public and provides additional protection to health in the work place.

2.4

The two products to which this amendment applies are defined by their CAS Numbers 108-88-3 120-82-1 in the Annex to the proposal. Restrictions on usage will be added to Annex 1 of Directive 76/769/EEC.

2.5

Member States will have one year to publish laws necessary to comply with this Directive, with the controls to be effective within a further six months. This will be from the date of entry into force of this proposal, after consulting, as required by Article 95 of the Treaty, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and following the Co-decision Procedure with the European Parliament.

3.1

As with the twenty-sixth amendment of Council Directive 76/769/EEC (restrictions on the marketing and use of nonylphenol, nonylphenol ethoxylates and cement) (6), on which the EESC delivered its Opinion in March 2003 (7), this proposal deals with unrelated substances which, for clarity, will be discussed separately. (The intervening twenty-seventh amendment on polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in extender oils and tyres has been published but is still under review.)

4.1

Toluene is a clear colourless liquid with a distinctive smell. Also known as methyl benzene, it has the second, after benzene, most simple aromatic structure – a six-member carbon ring with a one member (alkyl) carbon chain attached. It occurs naturally in crude oil, in some plants and trees, and in emissions from volcanoes and forest fires, and can be deliberately manufactured in very large quantities from coal or crude oil.

4.2

According to industry sources, worldwide capacity and production levels for deliberately produced toluene in 2002 were 20 million tonnes and 14 million tonnes respectively. 75 % of this capacity is located in the US, Asia and Japan. The CSTEE Opinion quotes EU production in 1995 at 2,6 million tonnes. Much larger quantities result from the routine manufacture of gasoline and contribute to overall exposures; these are not included in these totals (8).

4.3

Toluene is used primarily as the raw material in closed systems for the deliberate manufacture of benzene, urethane foams and other chemical products, and, in much smaller quantities, as a solvent carrier in paints, inks, adhesives, pharmaceutical products and cosmetics. Its effects on human health and the environment have been widely studied and generally accepted by all those concerned. There is a clear need to minimise any unnecessary actual or theoretical uncontrolled exposure, in particular where alternative products, with similar solvating power, exist.

4.4

The two end uses specified in this proposal fall into this latter category. The usage of toluene as the solvent for adhesives and spray paints for sale to the general public is neither necessary nor supported by its manufacturers in Europe. Actual sales are currently believed to be low or nil to these two end uses. This is therefore a largely precautionary measure, with little anticipated effect on manufacturers' costs or on consumers' choice or health.

4.5

The EESC recognises that the prime requirement is to ensure that toluene can be safely handled in large quantities in closed systems in the work place. This proposal ensures that members of the general public, outside of a controlled work environment, will be adequately protected, both now and in the future, from unnecessary exposure. The EESC therefore supports this part of the proposal.

5.1

The situation for trichlorobenzene differs significantly from the above and some amendments and clarifications are required to the proposal.

5.2

‘Trichlorobenzene’ is a deliberately made chemical which does not occur in nature, other than by the degradation of other chlorinated aromatic compounds. There are three different isomers, depending on the location of the chlorine atoms around the six-member carbon ring. Each has (marginally) different physical properties and biochemical interactions, for instance as measured by their LD50 values. Each has a different CAS and EINECS Number. In addition there is an entry in both CAS and EINECS registers for ‘trichlorobenzene’ in general. All are commercially available in the US and elsewhere. 1,3,5-Trichlorobenzene is no longer believed to be manufactured in Europe. Details of the listings are as follows (9):

5.3

The RAR and CSTEE Opinion refer specifically to 1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene, with EINECS and CAS Numbers as above. The present proposal confirms this single CAS Number (and therefore the one isomer that has been studied) in the Annex – but not in the title or text.

5.4

The different isomers are manufactured to high degrees of purity as intermediates in closed systems for the synthesis of certain herbicides, pesticides, dyes and other specialist chemicals. Where the specific isomeric structure is less important, a mixture of isomers can be used in closed systems as a solvent carrier for dyes or as process regulators or heat transfer media, in sprays as a corrosion inhibitor and in metal working fluids.

5.5

In the EU (and elsewhere) the prime usage is of 1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene (1,2,4-TCB), in varying degrees of purity. Production is believed to have declined steadily since the 1980s. Data presented to the OSPAR Commission for the protection of the marine environment estimated 1994 production of 1,2,4-TCB as being between 7-10 thousand tonnes; 1,2,3-TCB as less than 2 thousand tonnes; and 1,3,5-TCB as less than 200 tonnes (10). In June 2000 OSPAR added all three isomers as individual entries to its list of Hazardous Substances for Priority Action. The CSTEE Opinion of July 2001 also quotes 7 thousand tonnes production in Europe in 1994/95. Production levels have continued to decline and are currently believed to be around half these levels, with the greater part being for export (11).

5.6

At present there is believed to be only one remaining producer in the EU/OSPAR region. Sales are said to be restricted to the isomers 1,2,4-TCB and 1,2,3-TCB for use only as intermediates, with this being confirmed in pre-delivery written use statements from each customer.

5.7

A limited number of other closed system uses are known and recognised by the Commission and CSTEE, for instance as process solvents with no release to the external environment. As this proposal is intended to allow essential manufacture but severely restrict emissions due to open use, it would seem reasonable to add this to the permitted uses in the Annex to this proposal.

5.8

The EESC believes that, subject to the specific points made above, this proposal should provide increased protection in the work place and remove altogether any risks of exposure outside the work place. Manufacturers and users of trichlorobenzene and of competing products seem to have largely anticipated this proposal. There should, therefore, be only minor impacts on manufacturers' and users' costs. The EESC therefore supports this part of the proposal.

6.1

The EESC notes, as above, that this proposal has to be based on the relevant RAR and CSTEE Opinion and therefore has to refer solely to 1,2,4-TCB. This should be made clear in the title and text. Happily the effect of the restrictions on usage will remain the same, as this isomer is the principal constituent of mixed-isomer TCBs previously sold for use in solvents or sprays.

6.2

Other closed system uses should be permitted, by the addition of the words ‘or in other closed systems where no release to the environment is possible’ at the conclusion of the relevant restriction.

6.3

As with previous amendments to Council Directive 76/769/EEC, the EESC regrets the linking of unrelated products in a single text which may require specific and continuing amendments to match external realities. This does not support good, timely and effective governance. If it follows from resource limitations during this final and critical stage of agreeing specific risk reduction measures, these limitations should be overcome as quickly as possible.

6.4

The EESC notes that the last list of priority substances for assessment was published in October 2000. The EESC regrets that this approach seems to have been abandoned long before other procedures such as REACH can be implemented. This loss of momentum is regretted.

6.5

The EESC notes the key role played by the CSTEE in the past and trusts that adequate provision has been made for continuing this role in the future, despite the recently announced changes to the structure and responsibilities of the scientific committees.

6.6

The EESC shares the generally expressed concerns over the time taken to evaluate substances under the present system. For these two products close to 11 years will have elapsed before the legislation comes into effect. Five years of this will be after the CSTEE pronounced the RARs to be satisfactory. When the legislation does come into force, there will be virtually no costs – or measurable health or environmental benefits – for anyone concerned. In the absence of further information, it is impossible to say whether this is good (i.e., the market has adapted under pressure of the continuing risk assessments) or bad (the process has achieved very little, at considerable cost to all concerned) – or how to make any desired improvements.

6.7

The EESC therefore believes that, as a complement to other proposals such as REACH and to ensure that they will indeed improve rather than detract from the existing processes, reasons for the slow progress should be evaluated without further delay. This should be in parallel with other studies now in progress to measure impacts, costs and benefits for all the stakeholders in these processes designed to benefit health and the environment, within the framework of a successful and competitive knowledge-based European economy.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/10

1.1

Believing that the role of SMEs and SEEs is of particular relevance to the Lisbon Strategy, the European Commission asked the EESC to deliver an exploratory opinion on the above-mentioned subject. Furthermore, it proposed that the Committee should identify those factors which should make up the regulatory and support framework required by these operators.

1.2

This request followed the publication of an EESC own initiative opinion on the role of SMEs and social economy enterprises in economic diversification in accession countries, which was adopted unanimously on 1 April 2004. This opinion dealt jointly with both types of operators, defining them and referring to their importance in the EU as a whole, in the light of their contribution to the economy, employment and social cohesion, and their deep interactions and synergies. It further specified that the difference between the concepts of economic change is substantially broader and more dynamic than the concept of restructuring. It alluded to the Gyllenhammar report delivered by the high-level expert group on Managing Change set up by the European Commission, which stresses the need for job creation whilst recognising the validity of an approach built on benchmarking, innovation and social cohesion. It recommended an integrated ten-point programme for the promotion of SMEs and SEEs in the economic diversification of accession countries, a programme largely inspired by several examples of SEE good practice in the EU.

1.3

SEE good practice in the EU could form the basis for interaction and synergy between SEEs and SMEs, opening new avenues for the spirit of cooperation, innovation and the growth of SEEs and their considerable potential use by SMEs. In this way, they would contribute real added value to the growth of SMEs, fostering, by their very structure, cooperation, representativeness and mutual confidence they need.

1.4

The European Council of March 2000 put forward the Lisbon Strategy with the intention of making Europe the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, whilst stressing the need for ‘creating a friendly environment for starting up and developing innovative businesses, especially SMEs’ and adding that ‘the competitiveness and dynamism of businesses are directly dependent on a regulatory climate conducive to investment, innovation, and entrepreneurship’  (1). Basing itself on this premise, the Feira European Council of 19 and 20 June 2000 adopted the European Charter for Small Enterprises, which states that ‘Small enterprises are the backbone of the European economy [and] are a key source of jobs and a breeding ground for business ideas’  (2). Furthermore, the Lisbon Strategy also states that economic growth is a key factor for ensuring social cohesion in Europe. The Commission subsequently argued that the challenges presented by the implementation of the Lisbon agenda were the need to create employment, and increase the rate of employment, improve technical know-how, and ensure an ordered flow from agriculture and industry to services without generating increasing regional disparities in the countries themselves (3).

1.5

SMEs, a term, which also includes micro-enterprises with their special features, are enterprises corresponding to precise numerical criteria defined by the European Commission as follows (4).

1.6

SEEs fall into four categories: cooperatives, mutual societies, associations and foundations. They are characterised by the primacy of their social objectives, rather than the need for maximum returns - this often gives rise to a link with their local area and local development. Their basic values are: solidarity, social cohesion, social responsibility, democratic management, participation and autonomy (5).

1.7

Most SEEs are included in the EU's standard definition of SMEs (6). Those which do not match that definition, because of their size, generally have certain characteristics in common with SMEs, such as a low level of external investment, no stock exchange listing, proximity of owner-shareholders, and a close link with the local social fabric.

1.8

The European institutions have established a regulatory framework for SMEs. Until 2005, one main binding measure will apply to SMEs, namely Council Decision 2000/819/EC on a multiannual programme for enterprise and entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 2001-2005. This programme, which is also used to advance the implementation of the European Charter for Small Enterprises, seeks to:

1.9

On 21 January 2003, the Communication from the Commission COM(2003) 26 final summarised five reports: two reports on the implementation of the European Charter on Small Enterprises in the EU and in the accession countries; a report on EU activities for SMEs; a report by the SME Envoy; and the Green Paper on entrepreneurship. Amongst the challenges it refers to, the report on EU activities demonstrates the EU's commitment, particularly in terms of Structural Funds, and the multiannual programme already mentioned in the Sixth Framework Programme. Finally, a Community action plan (2006-2010) that promotes entrepreneurial spirit and competitiveness was drafted on the basis of the Green Paper.

1.10

The European Commission also put forward a regulatory framework for social economy enterprises. Cooperatives, the most significant of social economy enterprises, were the subject of the Communication on the promotion of cooperative societies in Europe of 23 February 2004. The Communication proposes to raise the profile and improve understanding of this type of enterprise, and to facilitate consistency between national laws in EU countries (7). It includes the fundamental characteristics of this type of enterprise as defined by the ILO's Recommendations for the promotion of cooperatives, adopted in June 2002 at international level, and in particular, by the representatives of the 25 EU Member States and the majority of national employer and employee associations. This recommendation also makes reference to the main international labour laws, specifying that they apply fully to the employees of cooperatives. Furthermore, the European Commission recently published a consultation document on Mutual societies in an enlarged Europe on 3 October 2003, defining the fundamental characteristics of this type of SEE (8).

2.1

The Commission has acknowledged that SMEs are the bedrock of the European economy, providing 66 % of all jobs and 60 % of the EU's total added value, excluding the agricultural sector. Regions with a high concentration of SMEs, such as Emilia Romagna, Baden-Württemberg and Jutland are amongst those regions with the highest employment and per capita GDP rates (9).

2.2

In its opinion on the Social Economy and the Single Market  (10), the EESC underlines the socio-economic importance of SEEs, stating that the latter are fundamental to entrepreneurial plurality and economic diversity (11). The Commission also recognised this point in its Communication on the promotion of cooperative societies in Europe and in its consultation document, Mutual societies in an enlarged Europe, referred to in point 1.10 (above). In the EU, the social and economic importance of social economy enterprises and organisations is growing. With about 9 million direct workers (full-time equivalent), they account for 7,9 % of civilian waged employment (12). Moreover, they involve a considerable proportion of civil society. According to the European Commission, cooperatives have 140 million members and mutual societies 120 million. It is estimated that more than 25 % of EU citizens are members of SEEs as producers, consumers, savers, householders, policy-holders, students, volunteers etc. SEEs are developing in all sectors and particularly in a number of public utility or public interest sectors (13) such as health, the environment, social services and education (14). Thus they play an essential role in the creation of social capital, the capacity to employ disadvantaged people, social welfare, revitalising local economies, and modernising local management models. Some of them have perfected social and environmental impact assessment systems.

2.3

In the context of ongoing industrial change, SMEs and SEEs play an important part in employment and re-employment in all sectors, from declining sectors and sectors that are cutting down on their workforce in traditional sectors (crafts and trades), and in others which are expanding, such as services to enterprises, the new information and communication technologies, high-technology sectors, construction and public works, proximity services (including health) and tourism.

2.4

Nevertheless, SMEs and SEEs are faced with specific challenges. The European Charter for Small Enterprises acknowledges that the latter are more sensitive to change in the business environment. The European Commission's Green Paper on Entrepreneurship states that SEEs, because they have to apply ‘business principles and efficiency to achieving social and societal objectives, … face particular challenges in accessing finance, management training and advice.’  (15)

2.5

There are various ways in which SMEs and SEEs can play an important role in the process of socio-economic change. There are many examples of good practice: through the employment of people who have just entered the labour market; by supporting the innovative capacity of micro-enterprises and small enterprises; by reemploying people made redundant by businesses that had to cut down on staff or shut down; by setting up social welfare mutual societies; by creating new businesses in the growing sectors; by developing services and sub-contracting; by transferring enterprises in crisis to their workers; by supporting new micro-enterprises and self-employment; and through qualitative transformation within the same sector. In addition, SEEs can make certain specific contributions to this process of change both through their capacity to train entrepreneurs, which has already been demonstrated, and through the values they promote, such as socially responsible entrepreneurship, democracy and citizen participation, involvement (including financial) of workers in the enterprise, social inclusion, and interest in local and sustainable development.

2.6

There is a considerable degree of interaction between conventional SMEs and SEEs, which has the potential for further development. Interaction takes place in the following three ways.

3.1.1

The Commission has published examples of good practice in various documents relating to Best projects within the framework of the multiannual programme ‘that is, practice that appears to illustrate an approach to a current development in business support that deserves the attention and interest of practitioners’ (16). This does not necessarily imply ‘best practice’ but seeks to inspire change and ‘better practice’ that will result in guidelines for EU policies.

3.1.2

The EESC is aware that, in recent years, considerable work has already been undertaken towards the development of good practice models for SMEs (c.f. above-mentioned Best projects). The good practice models below concern existing or potential interaction between SMEs and SEEs, exclusively. They are illustrated in the appended documents by concrete examples that also demonstrate the adaptability of these models and the way they can change to cope with economic growth in the context of the single market and globalisation.

3.1.3

It is useful to extrapolate according to type in order to develop public policy proposals that could strengthen SME and SEE growth, in the light of the Lisbon Strategy. Examples are given of good practice amongst SEEs that could be adopted by SMEs, and interaction between SMEs and SEEs, where SEEs are used directly by SMEs, and could be even more so.

3.1.4

The working hypothesis, which has already been partially demonstrated in some cases, is that each of these models offers substantial opportunity cost (17), or even net gains for medium-term public expenditure.

3.2.1

Creating or saving jobs by starting up or restructuring businesses. SEE experience in various EU countries tends to show that finance systems, combined with adequate support for redundant workers who wish to take over their failing enterprise or create a new one, can not only create or save jobs and help create or sustain economic activity, but can also enable the State or other investors to recover funding within a relatively short period, and possibly, make a profit (18).

3.2.2

Systems and business clusters for development, innovation and competitiveness. Some SEEs, notably in northern Italy and the Spanish Basque Country, formed regional clusters, which then went on to become horizontal or joint systems or groups, thus transforming these enterprises (small or medium-sized, for the most part) into leading economic operators in their own regions, and creating state-of-the-art technological and managerial innovation centres.

3.2.3

Pooling resources to achieve economies of scale. In several European countries, a considerable percentage of conventional SMEs in certain sectors, including micro-enterprises and the self-employed, (such as retailers in Italy, hairdressers and butchers in France, bakers in Germany) form groupings, usually cooperatives, to bulk buy and pool their efforts in marketing and services. Each SME remains completely independent, whilst retaining the ability to boost its competitiveness, maintain and extend its market, avoid sub-contracting and middlemen, and achieve economies of scale. This system provides the community with sustained employment and local development (19).

3.2.4

Access to finance and risk reduction. Mutual guarantees enable SMEs, including micro-enterprises and the self-employed, that lack sufficient guarantees to access credit. The mutual guarantee society (which often takes the form of a mutual society) undertakes to act as guarantor to the exclusive benefit of the lender. In case of non-repayment, the society will assume ultimate responsibility by drawing on the guarantee fund made up of associate SME contributions. The joint funds of SEEs have been used to leverage bank loans by fostering the banks' trust (20) for the purposes of business creation, reconversion, and development projects.

3.2.5

Services provided to the community. SEEs have proved to be important operators in the social, health, educational and cultural sectors, particularly in the context of privatisation, by combining an entrepreneurial spirit with respect for the public interest, which is at the heart of such services. These enterprises have often been known to provide better quality services at a lower cost than the State. In some cases, these services are local public-private partnerships between SEEs and local governments for public utility services such as employment agencies, healthcare centres, home-helps, etc.

3.2.6

Ethical and quality production and marketing. Some SEEs have specialised in marketing quality assured products that also comply with ethical production principles (non-exploitation, compliance with labour laws, fair remuneration, etc.).

4.1.1

The combined importance of SMEs and SEEs for the European economy, the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, and the potential for positive interaction between these two types of operators through the application of SEE models and structures, argue in favour of renewing combined efforts to support them at EU level.

4.1.2

The EESC takes note of existing support programmes for SMEs in particular, but also notes that existing support structures for SEEs are inadequate, as are structures for promoting initiatives fostering interaction between SMEs and SEEs.

4.1.3

It further notes the lack of concrete, exhaustive, transeuropean and multidisciplinary studies estimating the opportunity cost of good practice that strengthen SMEs and SEEs and their reciprocal interaction.

4.1.4

Such a deficiency seriously limits the development of public policies to promote the reciprocal interaction of SMEs and SEEs. In order to define policies, continued assessment and cost-benefit analysis are essential.

4.2.1.1

The EESC recommends the establishment of a European Observatory of social economy enterprises to carry out research not only into SEEs themselves but also into existing and potential interaction between SMEs and SEEs, and how such interaction could be fundamental to the economic development of SMEs and SEEs, and the promotion of corporate social responsibility and the fight against exclusion.

4.2.1.2

This Observatory will be supported by the European Commission and the governments of the 25 EU Member States. It will involve SEEs and university-level SEE research centres. They will coordinate closely with the Observatory and SMEs.

4.2.1.3

The EESC also suggests launching, through this Observatory, a three-year multidisciplinary and inter-European research project, in order to identify good practice involving SEE systems that directly develop SMEs or with the potential to develop SMEs, particularly in the areas mentioned in section 3.

4.2.1.4

Such research will aim to demonstrate the opportunity cost by concentrating on the following calculations:

4.2.1.5

The European SEE Observatory's research results should be made public through the intensive communication efforts of the European institutions, Member State governments, and the general public.

4.2.1.6

The EESC will ensure the good progress of the research carried out by the Observatory for social economy enterprises, and will assess the Observatory's conclusions at the end of the three-year period by studying the possible impact of these conclusions on the European Commission's policies for SMEs and SEEs.

4.2.2.1

The EESC calls on the Commission to ensure that SEEs are able to participate, on equal terms, in the Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship (2006-2010), and to promote initiatives that encourage interaction between SMEs and SEEs, particularly the involvement of SEEs in cooperation between SMEs.

4.2.2.2

The EESC further calls for the level of participation of SMEs and SEEs in EU programmes for access to research, innovation, and world markets to be made a top priority for European policies.

4.2.2.3

The EESC considers that the number of Structural Fund projects for SMEs should be maintained, and that the number of projects for SEEs and interaction between SEEs and SMEs should be increased, especially when they are likely to create jobs and enhance rural development. Access to the Structural Funds must not be made dependent upon the sector in which the enterprise concerned operates.

4.2.3.1

The EESC further recommends that the Commission extend application of the policy conclusions reached at the OECD Conference of ministers in Istanbul to SEEs. It therefore calls for an approach that is better suited to the needs and characteristics of SMEs and SEEs. In particular the aim should be:

4.2.4.1

In several EU countries, and especially in some new Member States, SMEs are not adequately represented in national social dialogue forums. The EESC believes that SME representation should be increased, if only to enhance the effectiveness of public policies for the promotion and regulation of these enterprises. Large enterprises and SMEs should also be able to set out their views on an equal footing.

4.2.4.2

SEEs are not included in social dialogue in most Member States or at European level. The EESC recommends that the organisations that represent SEEs at EU or national level should be more structured and further strengthened. They should be included in social dialogue at Community and national levels. Their opinions should be granted greater consideration when regulations that affect enterprises are being drawn up (22).

4.2.5.1

SEEs have developed know-how that is specific to worker participation in their own enterprise's decision-making process and capital. More specifically, some cooperatives have developed cooperative worker ownership (23), according to which all or the majority of the members are workers and vice versa. All members have a voice in the decision-making process, irrespective of their financial stake in the enterprise. Financial stakes are nominal and non-transferable. This form of association is one of the main factors underlying the success of many of the examples of best practice. It encourages direct worker responsibility for the enterprise's future and enables workers to participate on an equal footing in the enterprise's development strategy. In seeking to attain the objectives of the knowledge-based economy proposed by the Lisbon Strategy, we are growing increasingly aware that an enterprise's most fundamental resource is its human resources, and therefore this type of association is gradually revealing itself to be modern and innovative.

4.2.5.2

The EESC recommends that the Commission examine, in the above-mentioned Observatory and in the thematic seminars that it organises, this specific form of association from the following angles:

5.1

SMEs are the backbone of the economy and employment in Europe, and consequently offer the primary tools for the implementation of the Lisbon objectives. SEEs play an increasingly important role in social cohesion and local development. The scope for interaction between SMEs and SEEs, particularly with regard to SMEs making extensive use of SEEs in the interest of both types of enterprise, has thus far been greatly under-exploited.

5.2

As a consequence, the EESC recommends that the Commission should re-examine existing and potential interaction between SMEs and SEEs, and help demonstrate that this interaction is beneficial to the development of both types of enterprise, within the context of the profound changes brought on by economic growth, and particularly, in regional development, social cohesion and innovation policies.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/17

1.1

The permanent study group resumed its work in January 2003 when its remit (1) was extended to cover all matters relating to the development of the pan-European transport corridors. In December 2002 the Plenary Assembly had taken note of and emphatically approved the activities of the previous term of office. In addition to the continuation and development of corridor-related activities, the European Commission also made significant new decisions in 2003 and 2004 on the development of the trans-European transport networks (TEN-T), which also relate to work in the ten Helsinki corridors. EU enlargement in May 2004 and the prospects for accession of south-east European countries also change the general framework for joint infrastructure policy and cooperation in the corridors.

1.2

The purpose of this own-initiative opinion is not only to report on the activities and views of the European Economic and Social Committee on the pan-European transport corridors over the past two years, but also to indicate what further steps should be taken by the parties concerned and how the Committee can be of help.

2.1

The Commission began to revise the TEN-T in mid-2003 with the report from the High Level Group chaired by Karel van Miert. As a result, the 1996 list of priority projects was extended and new EU financing options, and a new kind of improved coordination, were put forward (2). Plans were also made to enshrine the concept of transport corridors in EU infrastructure policy, with the intention of concentrating in future on priorities along certain trunk routes instead of general network-related policy. The van Miert Group's approach failed to secure support.

2.2

The EESC discussed the future of TEN-T in detail at a section meeting in Rome in September 2003 with the Italian Economic and Labour Council's (CNEL) Commission V on large-scale infrastructure projects and networks. A joint statement (3) was issued calling for more commitment to achieve an integrated transport network that effectively integrates the new Member States and goes beyond this. Intermodality and sustainability would have to come to the fore and financing would have to be jointly reinforced and possibly assisted by European funding for the trans-European transport network.

2.3

The Italian presidency asked the EESC to draft an own-initiative opinion to build on the discussion begun in Rome. The Committee outlined its current key positions on the European transport infrastructure policy in the document: Preparing transport infrastructure for the future : planning and neighbouring countries - sustainable mobility - financing  (4). The EESC suggested trying out new ways and means of financing in the future, giving greater priority to environmental protection and social and environmental sustainability and in the planning and implementation of a pan-European transport network, continuing the established work in the Helsinki corridors, and responding in new ways to new challenges.

2.4

The European Union has made the peaceful reconstruction of the south-east Europe region a key priority and has pressed ahead consistently with the development of a fully functional transport infrastructure. A transport concept has been developed for south-east Europe in addition to the existing corridors related to the region (X, V, VII, IV and VIII), and based on the 1997 Helsinki Declaration and TINA (5) experiences. It consists of an intermodal infrastructure network, the so-called South East Europe Core Regional Transport Network, which should be implemented through a joint, coordinated course of action. The states involved (6) have prepared a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which, inter alia, explicitly refers to cooperation with the region's socio-economic interest groups and the permanent EESC study group.

2.5

The coordination of the steering committees' work in the ten Helsinki corridors (7) and four transport areas (PETRAs) (8) has been given a new look. About once a year the Commission invites presidents and heads of the corridor secretariats and other representatives of European or EU institutions to discuss the progress of the work and its prospects. The former G-24 transport working group should be replaced by a smaller, more efficient structure. It is also clear to those responsible in the Commission, that it alone can provide certain aspects of coordination and technical and organisational support. The most recent meetings took place in June 2003 and on 15 March 2004. The most important points discussed are taken up in sections 3 and 4 below.

2.6

EU enlargement and the new neighbourhood policy also have some bearing on future transport policy planning in Europe and beyond. A joint Commission-European Parliament strategy meeting was held in June, which representatives of the European transport sector, including from the EU's new neighbouring states, were invited to attend. It was decided to set up a high-level group, with the task of preparing the ground for agreements on the expansion of trans-European trunk routes, particularly in the direction of eastern neighbours, the Russian Federation, the Black Sea region, and the Balkans. For the Mediterranean, a project was launched for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean transport network. Investigations are currently under way into transport infrastructure needs in Turkey.

3.1.1

Despite seven years of implementing the Helsinki Declaration and consolidating cooperation through steering committees, and despite, in overall terms, input from the European Commission, there has been scant improvement in the transparency and enhanced networking of the various planning processes. The new TEN-T guidelines, the corridors and transport areas, the SEE Core Regional Transport Network, the work of ECMT and UN-ECE, and various regional reinforced cooperation initiatives are still the domain of just a small group of experts.

3.1.2

The lack of transparency is amplified at the level of organised civil society. One of the key roles of the permanent study group has been and continues to be to act as an interface for information both within official bodies, and to civil society organisations.

3.1.3

The Commission is working on an information system (GIS), which is to be available across the board for planning and evaluating results. At present this information system is only available for internal use, but it could be expanded to include socio-economic data, which would also make it more useful for the EESC. This matter should be discussed with the Commission.

3.2.1

The van Miert group results highlight the difficulties that cause a gap to emerge between ambitious European planning and actually putting those plans into practice. This gap is also hard to influence. It has been rightly pointed out that more cross-border planning procedures and closer involvement of civil society interest groups will be needed for better results in the future. These concerns are also reflected in the new TEN guidelines.

3.2.2

Involvement of civil society organisations is the key to balanced development, taking account of local and regional interests and bringing life to the operation and use of the roads. Infrastructure projects with European implications only fulfil their function if they are in the interests of sustainability. This requires the involvement of business associations, transport companies, trade unions, and environmental and consumer organisations working across borders at European level. The impetus for implementing ‘European’ transport routes can only be sustained by a socially-rooted appreciation of ‘Europe’ and a consensus which takes account of economic and social realities.

3.2.3

The EESC has repeatedly offered to help build this consensus. Hearings must be used systematically at European level to achieve this. However, the EESC advises against carrying this out as a mandatory act without considering the results. Despite meeting with considerable interest and producing clear conclusions, the 1998 hearing on the TINA process organised by the EESC in conjunction with the Commission was completely ignored in the final report.

3.3.1

The EESC has spent many years working on pan-European transport policy, and for a long time, the basic call was for consultation and involvement. To a large extent, this concern has now been taken on board by actors throughout Europe, and the EESC has established good working contacts. The Committee therefore has a legitimate claim to participate in the work of steering committees and other bodies, both by contributing ideas and through practical forms of collaboration.

3.3.2

The recent own-initiative opinion on Preparing transport infrastructure for the future, which explicitly defines what the Committee considers to be the basic principles of European transport policy is, in particular, a substantive basis for contributing ideas. The objective of sustainability, ways of improving financing, and gearing transport infrastructure to pan-European needs are three key issues. The opinion also lays down priorities for action in the development of the transport corridors. Given their relevance as guidelines for the work of the permanent study group, they are briefly summarised below (9):

3.3.3

The Commission has taken some of these objectives on board in the revised TEN guidelines. The main concern now is to push ahead in a practical and coherent way with their implementation through cross-border cooperation. The EESC is well placed to contribute to this process through specific action which takes practical concerns into account.

3.4.1

Work in the steering committees is now proceeding at about the same rate in all corridors. At the same time regional connections can be observed, which means that today we are dealing with a corridor network rather than individual trunk routes. A regional component of cooperation is increasingly being developed in approaches for the transport areas, for example in Corridors IV, V, VII and X in south-east Europe, and Corridors I and IX in the Baltic area. By contrast, there is little activity in the officially designated transport areas (PETRAs).

3.4.2

Both approaches – the establishment of trunk routes and the extensive development of regional connections – are mutually reinforcing. In future, the permanent study group should focus more closely on regional development issues. The EESC makes a substantial contribution across its various sections by bringing together transport policy, regional development, and the central themes of its external relations work (eastern neighbours, the Northern Dimension, south-east Europe).

3.5.1

The strategic meeting of the Commission and the European Parliament in June 2004 was a welcome move as the EESC has always held that the EU's role in initiating implementation of European transport connections should not be weakened as a result of enlargement. A letter from the Commission to the EESC describes the meeting as a starting point for a more open and broad-based coordination process to which all actors can contribute. Achieving this is crucial for the success and sustainability of new transport planning at European level.

3.5.2

It is vital for new planning to draw on past experience, not least the work of the steering committees. The specific contribution of the EESC described in this opinion, which is the outcome of many years of practical experience, could now be used at an early stage of infrastructure planning. It is important to make use of this opportunity.

4.1

A trade union working party has now been set up in Corridor II  (10). The first meeting took place in Moscow on 10 and 11 April 2003. The EESC also took part in the official meeting of the steering committee on 15 and 16 May 2003 in Berlin. Both meetings signal a promising outlook for our work. The problem in Corridor II is caused by difficult cooperation with Belarus. Meanwhile a trend has set in, whereby Belarus – and with it a large, very well developed part of the corridor – is circumvented to the north due to border difficulties. Cooperation with rail companies is currently being increased. Extension of the corridor to Ekaterinburg was recently proposed. It is particularly important to find better ways of dealing with road traffic problems and border procedures, and to take up the EESC's help in this regard.

4.2

Involvement in Corridor IV  (11) work has gone from strength to strength. At the meeting of the steering committee in Sopron (Hungary) on 20 and 21 May 2003, representatives of the rail companies and the railway trade unions in Corridor IV also came together for a productive discussion – which is to be continued – on the promotion of rail transport. This occurred at the last session on 10 and 11 November 2003 in Dortmund. Technical and organisational obstacles and proposed solutions for border crossings were identified as the main theme for further discussions. To ensure continuity, a representative of the trade-union-based cooperation involving railway workers will take part in the steering committees as an observer. The economic and social situation and technical and organisational aspects in the road freight transport in Corridor IV could now be addressed.

4.3

The EESC is particularly keen to promote Corridor X  (12). To that end, contacts with the appropriate steering committee have been stepped up. More specific moves were made on possible EESC activities at the steering committee meeting in Slovenia on 18 and 19 July 2003. On 3 November 2003 the EESC held a very successful dialogue conference in Belgrade and issued a joint statement (13). This set in motion further steps to increase rail transport in particular. Working relations in Sarajevo and cooperation with the SEE Core Networks steering group are further topics to be covered by this work. With an eye to securing a balanced policy for seaports and their incorporation into hinterland transport systems, Corridor V  (14) is an important trunk route.

4.3.1

A joint event to promote better rail services is planned for early November 2004, to be held in conjunction with the ARGE Corridor XLine, railways syndicate. This will include a demonstration train and events in Villach (Austria), Zagreb (Croatia), and Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina). (15)

4.4

The EESC has drawn up a series of proposals (16) to support inland waterway transport and Corridor VII  (17) (the Danube). The most recent steering committee meeting was held in July 2004. Discussions are continuing under the auspices of the permanent study group, and these are focussing on current obstacles to the growth of shipping in Corridor VII, and on suitable provisions to overcome them. Also under discussion are options and investment needs for closer integration into a multimodal transport system. (18)

4.4.1

In its opinion on Preparing transport infrastructure for the future adopted on 28 January 2004 (19) the EESC mentioned the necessity of ‘promoting the inland waterway Corridor VII, the Danube, links to rail routes and appropriate technical and social regulations governing cross-border inland waterways transport’.

4.4.2

Moreover, the Joint Consultative Committee EU/Romania (Bucharest, 23-24/5/02) proposed that, in order to optimise the role of the Danube as a pan-European transport corridor, measures be taken and greater financial assistance provided to improve its navigability and its connection with the Black Sea.

4.5

Since the 2001 dialogue conference on Corridors III  (20) and VI  (21) in Katowice, the EESC has not engaged in any activities of its own in relation to these corridors. However, a letter was sent by the Corridor III secretariat in August 2004, inviting contributions for further development in the form of proposals for the 2004/2005 work programme.

4.6

The EESC has received particular support over the past year or two from the new trade-union-based cooperation, organised by the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF) and involving transport workers along the corridors and across Europe. The ETF project has made a substantial contribution both in terms of ideas and practical activities to the success of the EESC's work across all transport sectors, and is set to step up its cooperation in the future.

4.7

Finally, it should be noted that the president of the permanent study group, in cooperation with the TEN Section secretariat and with the support of the relevant European Commission departments, has prepared information sheets with brief descriptions of each of the corridors. (22)

5.1

The permanent study group has taken on board the new objectives of pan-European transport policy, as described above, and incorporated them into its regional, practical and conceptual planning. More than ever, the EESC's strength is its ability to reconcile interests and to make practical suggestions. The emphasis must be on action and presence on the ground.

5.2

Interested parties from inside and outside the EESC can use the Committee's permanent study group as a clearing house for information and contacts. The permanent study group's main remit is to lead and coordinate the EESC's activities and to disseminate information on them. It also has a responsible role in overall coordination at European level. The study group can draw on 13 years of active EESC involvement in helping shape pan-European transport policy.

5.3

Over the next two years the emphasis of EESC activities should shift to practical cooperation and involvement of civil society organisations on the ground. The aim is to enable the relevant civil society organisations to contribute to achieving the transport policy objectives listed in point 3.3.2 by offering evaluations, criticisms and suggestions for improvement in relation to individual corridors, regions or infrastructure projects.

5.4

EESC cooperation with the corridor steering committees and the European Commission should be stepped up. The permanent study group needs to take on a new role in helping to establish the ‘South East Europe Core Regional Transport Network’ (see point 2.4).

5.5

The permanent study group needs to look into ways and means of ensuring that operational aspects of the transport business are taken into account more closely when setting up the pan-European transport corridors. In particular, it should be possible to define specific aspects of corridor policy relating to intermodality, environmental protection, security, social conditions and efficiency.

5.6

In the context of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) new corridors are currently being planned. The permanent study group should contribute by responding to the European Commission's call for openness in this process.

5.7

The work of the European Commission and the steering committees in corridors and transport areas should be more closely interconnected. The European Commission has an important role to play as a coordinator and provider of technical and organisational support. It would be good to have more scope for joint coordination, involving all parties, of the various activities at European level, and closer involvement of the European Parliament.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/22

1.1

The Committee welcomes the analysis and recommendations in COM(2004) 61 final ‘Connecting Europe at high speed: recent developments in the sector of electronic communications’ communication from the Commission. It is an astute and timely report that combines strategic acuity with executive will to guide the European electronic communications sector through its next stage of growth.

1.2

While providing support for the analysis and thrust of the communication, this opinion also emphasises areas of specific concern to the Committee.

2.1

On 3 February 2004, the Commission adopted its communication ‘Connecting Europe at high speed: Recent developments in the sector of electronic communications’. This communication responds to the request of the 2003 spring European Council for a report on developments in the sector ahead of its spring 2004 meeting. It is a summary report on the electronic communications sector in Europe as it affects the Lisbon strategy, including an analysis of the key issues affecting future growth. It is also a call for political support of the actions necessary to support the further development of the sector.

2.2

The Lisbon Strategy recognises that information and communication technologies (ICT) are a key drivers of growth, improvements in productivity and competitiveness. They help to improve both economic performance and social cohesion. The Communication underlines the importance of the electronic communication sector – which includes both a service segment and an equipment segment – for the health of the European economy and its key role in boosting productivity. The sector plays such a role because of its size, dynamism and impact on nearly all other economic activities. Recent evidence shows that it has been the largest contributor to European labour productivity growth.

2.3

In spite of vigorous growth in the early 1990s and the ambitions of the Lisbon strategy, Europe has fallen behind the USA and some Asian countries with the pace of production and use of information and communications technologies (ICT) and this shortfall in ICT investment hurts European competitiveness (1). Progress in the sector of electronic communications over the next 18 months is critical to the success of the eEurope 2005 Action Plan, and to the longer-term goals of the Lisbon strategy. This sector grew fast in the late nineties, but underwent a sharp downturn in 2000 and 2001 which led the Council and the Commission to closely monitor the situation in the electronic communications sector and to report ahead of the 2003 Spring European Council meeting.

2.4

After two years of consolidation the conditions now seem right for a return to higher rates of growth. According to the Commission, these conditions include improved financial conditions for operators, and continued growth in revenue from services. However, sustainable growth in this sector can be achieved only through a revival in capital spending and further deployment of new innovative services.

2.5

Since the burst of the Internet bubble, telecom operators have been reducing capital expenditure as part of their consolidation plans. A return to renewed growth for the whole sector requires a revival in capital spending. The rate of investment will be affected by what public policy makers do: the implementation of the new regulatory framework will provide greater legal certainty for investment; the implementation of national broadband strategies will increase access to service; the encouragement of new services and the availability of innovative content will stimulate demand; and the removal of regulatory and technical barriers will facilitate the roll-out of 3G networks.

This is why four priority areas for action are identified in the communication:

2.6

At the European Telecom Council meeting, which took place on 8–9 March 2004 in Brussels, the Council underlined the political commitment to the Lisbon Strategy goals of sustainable growth, jobs and social cohesion by endorsing the calls to action in the communication [COM(2004) 61 final], and the e-Europe Mid-Term Review communication [COM(2004) 108 final].

3.1

The communication deals with a wide and complex domain of critical importance to the Lisbon vision – the electronic communications industry. Over the years the Committee has adopted many opinions dealing with aspects of policy concerning the sector (3). We now welcome the opportunity to comment on the general development of the electronic communications industry, the provision of Broadband, the development of the mobile communications sector and the new regulatory framework for the industry.

3.2

The Commission has done an excellent job in supporting the development and execution of policy to support the growth of the electronic communications sector. With the vigorous efforts of commercial and social interests pursuing their own goals, aided by the strong political support of the Council of Ministers, national governments and regional authorities, this is a very fast moving and rapidly evolving domain.

3.3

Given the complex dynamic character of this topic and its importance to the economic and social development of the Union, the Committee believes it is important for all interested parties to regularly have their say so that a more complete and integrated policy can be implemented. The Committee supports the Commission's intention to continue working with stakeholders to inform policy in areas such as Intellectual Property Rights, Digital Rights Management, trust and security issues, interoperability and standardisation, spectrum management and coverage of remote and rural areas. The Committee will continue to take an active interest in the sector and all these issues.

3.4

We particularly support the emphasis the Commission has put on the need for interoperability and openness at various levels of the technology and services: device to network; device to device; network to network; and between content and/or applications. Without appropriate interoperability and platform openness, the development of a mass market for the new technologies will be severely hampered.

3.5

As stated at 1.1 above, the Committee is supportive of the communication and congratulates the Commission on the excellent work it is doing in this area. We note that extensive research and consultation has gone into the understanding of the electronic communications sector and the development of policy to foster strong and sustained growth: we are strongly supportive of the eEurope 2005 Action Plan and support the actions recommended in the communication COM(2004) 61 final.

3.6

For the sake of emphasis, we would like to stress the Committee's particular interest in a few areas:

3.6.1.1

The Committee welcomes the new Regulatory Framework for electronic communications which provides greater predictability, coherence and a more harmonised approach to the way markets operate across the Union. The greater certainty and transparency provided by the framework will encourage investment in the electronic communications sector and speed-up the pace of competition, and the introduction of new innovative services.

3.6.1.2

We agree with the Commission that a technology-neutral, open-standards, coordinated approach to the development of facilities-based competition on the supply-side of the electronic communications sector is critical to the creation of a vibrant and competitive market. The Committee is pleased that the new framework encourages fair competition between diverse access technologies (broadband, 3G, digital TV etc.). Such an approach will lower network costs and the prices for services, and it will increase the ease of use and mobility for customers. A technology-neutral, open-platform approach to the sector will also greatly stimulate the demand for services.

3.6.1.3

Thus we welcome the technology-neutral approach taken by the new regulatory framework to reflect the convergence between fixed and mobile services, on-line and broadcast content and a whole range of different delivery platforms. We want the Commission to ensure that interoperable platforms are implemented in accordance with the Framework Directive 2002/21/EC.

3.6.1.4

A truly competitive market for services depends on competitive pricing for the connection to the customer's home or premises (the local loop). At present, in most markets, the introduction of new services and lower prices is hampered by control of the local loop by the dominant operators. The Commission should keep under review whether the regulatory framework is adequate to un-bundle the local loop from the dominant operators' control in every market.

3.6.1.5

The Committee deplores the fact that it was necessary for the Commission to take infringement proceedings in the European Court of Justice against Member States for failing to implement the new regulatory framework. We ask that the Commission continues to prosecute the full implementation of the framework in all States, including the new entrants.

3.6.1.6

We support the recent agreement among the European Regulators Group on a Common Position on how they apply remedies to address competition problems in the newly opened markets for electronic communications (4). Recognising that the purpose of the regulatory framework is to roll-back regulation and promote competition, the Committee asks the Commission to ensure the framework is implemented in a way that stimulates the emerging markets and services, and does not hinder their development. We ask the Commission to scrutinise the adequacy of remedies for infringement and their consistent application in the Member States.

3.6.2.1

A widespread, secure broadband infrastructure is essential for the development and delivery of services and applications such as eHealth, eBusiness, eGovernment and eLearning, making broadband vital to European growth and quality of life in the years ahead. Broadband access is a public good, a utility that should be available to all EU citizens as a right. We recommend that the Commission consider the inclusion of broadband in the list of Universal Services.

3.6.2.2

The eEurope 2005 Action Plan calls for widespread broadband availability and use in the European Union by 2005, but we are lagging behind our ambitious targets. Unless the pace of broadband roll-out increases, particularly outside urban centres, the Union will not achieve the Barcelona objective (5).

3.6.2.3

The Committee welcomes the submission of national broadband roll-out strategies by the EU15 Member States and notes that the new Member States will table their strategies before the end of 2004. We note the positive first assessment of the plans by the Commission (6) and we look forward to a more detailed report on the strategies in June.

3.6.2.4

However, we dislike the wide definition of ‘broadband’ used in various studies and reports (for example, access capacity as low as 144kbs is considered ‘broadband’ by the COCOM04-20 FINAL report referenced below, and the same report includes 3G connections in Italy's total of broadband access lines but not for other Member States). This lack of precise definition greatly reduces the transparency and usefulness of the term 'broadband' in all deliberations. We call on the Commission to legislate for a precise and demanding definition of the term 'broadband' for use in the Union.

3.6.2.5

We also dislike that the broadband coverage statistics do not deal with the quality of access available. We call on the Commission to include a minimum standard of connection quality in its precise definition of ‘broadband’. Only then will broadband statistics be meaningful.

3.6.2.6

The Committee is strongly aware of the need to aggressively bridge the digital divide opening-up across Europe, which hurts the less advantaged and e-Inclusiveness. Although we note that the Council of Ministers has endorsed a shift in policy emphasis from connectivity to the development and the effective use of innovative services, we are concerned about the momentum and coverage of the roll-out of broadband. We are particularly concerned about the disparity between certain countries and regions in the latest broadband penetration statistics from the Communications Committee of the Commission (7). Within the EU15, 20 % of the European population is currently excluded from broadband access because network coverage is insufficient. We welcome the Commission's focus in the communication on the need to roll-out broadband to underserved areas. And, in the detailed review of the national broadband strategies, we ask the Commission to emphasise the need for broadband networks to be extended to cover the whole of the Union in a timely fashion and to highlight network gaps in future reports.

3.6.2.7

We support the Quick-Start initiatives and the availability of structural funds to provide access in the rural and commercially less attractive areas of the Union, however we want the Commission to maintain close scrutiny of the implementation of the National Broadband Strategies of the member states and to focus on problems of pace, coverage and quality.

3.6.2.8

The Committee regrets that the Communication from the Commission deals only with the geographical digital divide (underserved areas) and does not deal with the financial digital divide (inability to afford network access). The Commission's argument that high-speed services improve living conditions by reducing distances and by facilitating access to healthcare, education and public services applies not only to geographically isolated citizens but also to the poorest.

3.6.2.9

The Committee believes that the Commission's assertion that any government intervention to counter the digital divide must be carried out in accordance with the principles of and laws on competition is a fallacy: the digital divide exists because the market is not interested in the target population. There is therefore a need for a statutory public service remit setting out the precise nature of the public service obligations.

3.6.3.1

The Committee welcomes the setting-up of the Mobile Communications & Technology Platform by the Commission, last October, to bring together leading players from among mobile operators, equipment and component manufacturers and content providers. We also welcome the first report of this group (8) which set-out 20 recommendations on steps needed to support and sustain the roll-out of mobile networks and services across Europe – including action on research, standards, content, security, spectrum, international co-operation and regulation.

3.6.3.2

We are pleased that in the Mobile Platform report, and in statements from the Commission, the emphasis for 3G is on providing a customer-focused, secure, environment to support ‘anytime’, any place access to high-speed data and entertainment services on the move through a range of broadband-enabled devices.

3.6.3.3

The Committee fully endorses the views expressed by all parties that open, interconnected networks and interoperability in applications and services is the goal and we welcome the commitment of the Mobile Platform to preparing a strategic research agenda for a future Wireless World within the 7th Research Framework Programme.

3.6.3.4

The Committee would like the Commission to bring-to-bear whatever pressure it can to make it easier and more cost effective to roll out the new 3G networks. In particular, the Member States must help to quickly resolve the planning and environmental impact problems that are holding-up the roll-out of this important new platform.

3.6.3.5

We are concerned about the high level of payments made by network operators for 3G licences in some Member States, and the negative effect this might have on future strategy. We would like the Commission to share its detailed views on this issue and advise measures to ameliorate any adverse affects on Union strategy for ICT deployment and use.

3.6.3.6

In the interests of consumers and the efficient use of resources in the EU, we would like the Commission to consider legislating for facility sharing among 3G operators, where this is practical. Such a policy would speed-up availability of access, reduce negative environmental concerns, reduce the cost of providing service. We note the Commission's advice that some major operators are against facility sharing for competitive reasons, but we believe that the best interests of the Union as a whole should prevail over the narrow commercial motives of a few operators.

3.6.3.7

We note that the Mobile Platform believes that a new overall policy framework is needed to address the 3G issues coherently. The group is meeting again in June and we look forward to the communication promised by the Commission in response to the outcome of the June meeting.

3.6.4.1

The Commission advises that even in areas where there is 90 % availability of broadband access, take-up is low (average of 12 %) and decelerating. The reasons for this are high prices, poor quality and lack of relevant content – consumers do not have sufficient interest in acquiring broadband service.

3.6.4.2

Developing content and services to stimulate the take-up of broadband connections is viewed as vital to the take-up of ICT, and hence to competitiveness, productivity growth and employment across the European Union. In this regard, the Committee welcomes the recent proposal from the Commission for an eContentplus programme (2005-2008) (9) which aims to create conditions for broader access to and use of digital content.

3.6.4.3

The Committee recognises that demand stimulation on deployed broadband and 3G networks, the need for new, innovative services, competition and the roll-out of networks are all interrelated. Each development helps the other. Having dealt with the supply-side issues above, we welcome any initiatives taken by the Commission to encourage the development of new and innovative services that will boost consumer demand and leverage the power of the new technologies and networks.

3.6.4.4

The Committee believes that interoperability between networks, platforms and devices will provide a big stimulus to service adoption and growth. We encourage the Commission to push for interoperability within the regulatory framework, and in its dealings with all stakeholders in the electronic communications sector.

3.6.4.5

We support the Commission's call on Member States to maintain the momentum behind the roll-out of government e-services (including eHealth, eLearning etc.) and recognise the public sector to be a major driver of demand in the early stages of development of these new information services.

3.6.4.6

In particular, we welcome the Commission's commitment to work with industry to address the identified issues hampering the development of new services – Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems, interoperability, micro-payments, m-payments etc. In this regard, we welcome the recent communication (10) and consultative process dealing with Intellectual Property Rights and we call the attention of the Commission to the Opinion of the Committee in 2003 on IPR (11).

3.6.4.7

The Committee stresses the importance of security issues to the take-up of new services by consumers. Consumer confidence in new technologies and services will depend on assurances re the protection of consumers' interests.

3.6.4.8

The Committee asks the Commission to continue its workshops with operators, internet service providers, content providers, broadcasters and the entertainment industry, on how they can adapt their activities through new forms of partnerships to create new business models and services for a convergent, mobile Union.

3.6.4.9

We also welcome the support given to R&D under the 6th Research and Development Framework Programme. In the electronic communications technology sector, as in all other areas of technology development, we stress the need for Europe to invest in R&D and innovation, in line with the targets we set ourselves under the Lisbon strategy. Recognising that this sector has undergone a period of consolidation and retrenchment of investment, the Committee now calls on all parties – the EU, Member States and the private sector – to demonstrate renewed commitment to investment in the future of electronic communications by significantly increasing the scale and rate of R&D activities.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/28

1.1

Since the 11 September 2001 and the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks, the world has discovered that the war on terrorism is bound to last for a long time. The EESC was prompted at an early stage by Commissioner De Palacio to deliver an exploratory Opinion on Transport Security. The EESC gave a set of yardsticks (1) regarding a future EU policy on transport security and is pleased to note that they have been adopted by the Commission.

1.2

Following an EU Communication on Enhancing Maritime Transport Security and a Regulation on Enhancing Ship and Port Facility Security, the EESC delivered an opinion (2) which refers to security of port terminals.

1.3

On 30 June 2004, the EESC adopted a further opinion (3) referring to the proposed Directive on enhancing port security. The proposed Directive complements the security measures introduced by the Regulation on enhancing the security of ship and port facilities by ensuring that the entire port is covered by a security regime.

2.1

Following discussions in Council on the draft Directive on enhancing port security, the Commission proposes (4) a modification in Article 7 whereby the port security plan will ensure that, on the basis of risk assessments, adequate security controls are carried out by competent national authorities on cars and goods vehicles set for embarkation on vessels which also carry passengers.

2.2

The proposal applies to roll-on roll-off vessels on domestic and international routes. In the latter case, the Member States concerned will cooperate in the risk assessment.

3.1

The EESC firmly supports a balanced approach safeguarding security without impeding the free flow of trade. It understands, therefore, the concern of the Commission as expressed in the new eighth recital of the proposed Directive.

3.2

In line with its previous opinions, the EESC fully agrees with the proposed modification to the draft Directive on enhancing port security. Although absolute security can never be achieved, the EESC reiterates that the entire logistic transport chain has to be covered by security measures making sure that no weak links exist. Priority should be given to passenger transport where the consequences of a terrorist act would be the heaviest with regard to the human lives at stake.

3.2.1

Ro-Ro vessels are particularly vulnerable to terrorist actions especially if they carry passengers. Indeed, cars loaded on board Ro-Ro vessels may become modern ‘Trojan horses’ in terms of security.

3.2.2

Adequate measures should be taken to ensure that the cars and goods vehicles on board Ro-Ro vessels will not cause a risk. The measures should be taken in the port or at the port's confines prior to loading of the vessel and in a way impeding as little as possible the fluidity of the operations.

3.2.3

Security inspections of cars/goods vehicles to be loaded on Ro-Ro passenger ferries present difficulties due to the nature of cargoes loaded on the vehicles. Longstanding experience indicates that the most adequate control of the contents of these vehicles should take place prior to embarkation in the port area in order to make use of sophisticated security devices as well as of properly trained personnel.

3.3

The EESC wishes to draw attention to the liability issues arising from the inspections. Obviously, liability from security controls of cars and goods vehicles should rest with the relevant national authorities involved and not with the ship on which these vehicles are subsequently loaded.

3.4

Regarding the identification of seafarers and port personnel involved in security controls, requirements should be applied in a practical way in order not to obstruct unduly commercial operations.

3.5

The EESC notes that as a result of the proposed modification the Commission, in cooperation with the national authorities, will start inspections to verify the means of monitoring implementation of the national plans adopted pursuant to the Directive, six months after the date of application of the proposed Directive. It emphasises the need for immediate preparedness on the part of EU ports as well as ports of non EU Member States in relation to the new security measures (ISPS Code) for port terminals which entered into force internationally on 1 July 2004.

3.6

Finally, the EESC takes the opportunity to urge that the economic dimension of port security should be addressed promptly at EU level and a harmonised approach should be developed to avoid distortion of competition among ports and among modes of transport, especially to the detriment of roll-on roll-off transport. The Commission is invited to draw up an overall impact study about the financial effects of port security and to devise an EU scheme for financing, where necessary, the implementation measures.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/30

1.1

Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are naturally-occurring substances formed whenever carbon-containing compounds are burned at low temperatures in uncontrolled conditions. This happens in forest fires and volcanoes; in human activities such as smoking; in home heating, power generation and driving using fossil fuels; in cooking food and burning waste materials; and in a number of industrial processes. PAHs occur naturally in crude oil and coal and, being easily formed and stable, accumulate during the early stages of cracking and distillation.

1.2

This process of partial oxidation results in a mixture of compounds with linked unsaturated five and six-member carbon rings which can repeat in virtually any direction. Around 600 structures have been identified; only a few have been characterised or isolated for use as intermediates. None have been deliberately produced in significant quantities. Further oxidation results in the formation of soot (i.e., impure particles of carbon) with which PAHs are frequently associated.

1.3

As they always occur in undifferentiated groups, the individual characteristics of PAHs cannot be easily determined (and, for the same reason, are largely irrelevant). However, as some can be shown to be carcinogenic to animals, it is reasonable to classify the mixtures as likely to cause cancer in humans. Oils and some other preparations known to contain PAHs therefore require risk and safety labelling and appropriate handling to ensure safety in the work place. Processes likely to release PAHs into the environment should, where possible, be controlled or avoided.

1.4

One such process is the use of extender oils in tyres for cars, goods vehicles, motorcycles, racing cars and aircraft. These oils, which may make up as much as 28 % of the tread, confer the essential characteristic of grip which is not required in the carcass. If the tread does not work as intended, or does not remain coherent in use, then safety and performance are compromised, with obvious consequences for the drivers of the vehicles.

1.5

Technically the oils must be capable of dissolving the natural and synthetic rubbers and other materials used in tyres, must be long-lasting and stable, must distribute well and remain bound in the rubber matrix, must function in different conditions of temperature and humidity, and must be safe to handle in manufacture and use. The oils must also be available in large quantities, manufactured to globally agreed specifications, from a number of competing suppliers, at costs below that of the rubber to reduce the overall cost of the tyres.

1.6

Highly aromatic oils meeting these specifications have traditionally been supplied by leading oil producers under the title of distillate aromatic extracts (DAEs). The required solvating power depends on the total aromaticity of the oils which in turn depends on the presence of significant levels of PAHs. As the tread of a tyre wears away, it must be assumed that these PAHs are released to the environment. Whether or not these releases are significant compared to other releases is in dispute. However the process of change to other oils is under way in Europe and needs to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

1.7

This is especially important as the world-wide supply of DAEs is also becoming limited, with refinery upgrades now focusing on the production of higher value fully hydrogenated (i.e. low aromatic and reduced solvating power) products and on ‘clean’ gasoline and fuel products.

1.8

Given that around 300 million tyres are produced each year in Europe and the world market for extender and process oils for the tyre industry is close to 1 million tonnes, to bring this about in a cost-effective manner, whilst maintaining the drive for safety and high performance at low or acceptable cost, is a major challenge for oil suppliers, tyre manufacturers and regulators alike.

1.9

So far, two formulations for non-carcinogenic oils have been proposed, requiring varying degrees of investment by the oil suppliers and different reformulations by the tyre companies. These are known as mild extraction solvate (MES) and treated distillate aromatic extract (TDAE) respectively. Other oils may be developed by other suppliers outside Europe.

1.10

As far as can be determined (as details are not publicly available in the extremely competitive tyre market), some substitution has already taken place – for instance in winter and truck tyres where wet traction for tread is less important. However it is generally accepted that conversion of higher performance summer tyres, let alone tyres for racing cars and aircraft, will take much longer. Also there is a shortage of installed capacity for MES and TDAE, in addition to the limitations on DAE availability already mentioned.

1.11

In order to bring about the desired changes, in a timely manner and consistent with other EU legislation on both competition and health and safety, representatives of the industry sectors (CONCAWE, IISRP and BLIC) have worked with the Commission and other regulatory bodies to agree the appropriate manufacturing approach and regulatory framework. Still outstanding in this are tests to define which oils are acceptable for use in Europe, and tests for all tyres placed on the market, whether manufactured in or outside of the EU, to demonstrate that acceptable low-PAH oils are incorporated in the finished articles.

2.1

In July 2003 the Commission proposed a general restriction on heavy metals and PAHs in ambient air. The EESC gave its Opinion on this first proposal in February 2004. The current proposal, also published in February 2004, seeks to establish an Internal Market as well as providing a high level of protection to human health and the environment by adding certain PAHs to Annex 1 of Directive 76/769/EEC. The PAHs listed are not high production volume (HPV) substances and have not appeared on any of the four priority lists for the assessment of existing substances. They are however regarded as a group as being Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) under the relevant UN ECE Protocol and Convention.

2.2

One specific PAH, benzo(a)pyrene (BaP, CAS number 50-32-8) is classified in the framework of Directive 67/548/EEC as being carcinogenic, mutagenic and reprotoxic Category 2, and is proposed here as a qualitative and quantitative marker for the presence of other PAHs.

2.3

Extender oils may not be placed on the market and used for the production of tyres if they contain more than 1mg/kg BaP or more than 10mg/kg of the sum of all the listed PAHs.

2.4

The Commission recognises that a number of technical problems still need to be overcome, therefore the date of general application is set at 1 January 2009. Racing car tyres would be covered from 1 January 2012 and aircraft tyres at some date in the future to be determined. The absence of relevant harmonised test methods for the content of PAHs in extender oils and tyres, e.g., from CEN or ISO, should not delay the entry into force of the Directive.

2.5

The Commission notes that it has consulted the Scientific Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment (CSTEE) with respect to the scientific findings on the adverse health effects of PAHs.

2.6

Member States will have one year to publish laws necessary to comply with this Directive. This will be from the date of entry into force of this proposal, after consulting, as required by Article 95 of the Treaty, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and following the Co-decision Procedure with the European Parliament.

3.1

This proposal, which supplements other controls on PAHs, is based on reports on the alleged health and environmental effects of tyre debris from the German Umweltbundesamt (UBV) dated 18 March 2003 and the Swedish National Chemicals Inspectorate (KEMI) dated 27 March 2003. These were reviewed by the CSTEE, as reported in an Opinion adopted at its 40th plenary session of 12-13 November 2003.

3.2

THE CSTEE agreed, for the reasons given above, that PAHs, as a group, should be considered as likely carcinogens for man and that PAHs are emitted to the environment as a result of tyre wear. It however gave only partial support to the use of BaP as a qualitative and quantitative marker for other PAHs and severely questioned the overall impact of this emission route.

3.3

In summary, PAH emissions from tyre wear contribute less than 2 % to total human exposure, with the sources mentioned in 1.1 contributing the remaining 98+ %. This is consistent with repeated WHO assessments that the primary causes of air pollution and associated diseases, including cancer, are smoking and wood and coal burning for heat and food preparation. The CSTEE therefore concluded that ‘a limitation of PAHs in tyres will not considerably affect the PAHs concentrations in ambient air and sediments’.

3.4

It follows that the routine statement that the Directive ‘will yield benefits in terms of providing a high level of protection to human health and the environment’ does not apply strongly in this case. The extender oils are already labelled and can be handled safely in the work place under existing legislation on Dangerous Substances. This proposal will therefore bring no benefits in the work place and minimal benefits to the environment.

3.5

It should be also noted that this proposal, as with the twenty-sixth amendment of Council Directive 76/769/EEC in its attempt to limit concentrations of naturally occurring chromium VI in cement, on which the EESC delivered its Opinion in March 2003, stretches the scope of the Directive to, or past, its intended limits. PAHs are neither deliberately manufactured nor placed on the market as such. This is recognised in the Annex – where the limitations are, correctly, on products containing PAHs – but not in the title, which should therefore be amended.

3.6

The title and the text are also confusing in the references to ‘certain PAHs’ as a specific and meaningful group. Given that, as the CSTEE notes, very few PAHs have been characterised, and of these even fewer shown to be unlikely to be carcinogens, it must be concluded that the entire class presents risks where human exposures are possible. The restrictions on marketing and use should therefore be on ‘oils rich in PAHs used in the manufacture of tyres, and on tyres containing these oils’.

3.7

Given the above, and the overlap with the earlier Commission proposal on heavy metals and PAHs in ambient air, it has been argued that this Directive is unnecessary and should be withdrawn. The market has become fragmented, with at least two products needed to replace the one previously used. There is insufficient installed capacity to meet demands. There are still concerns over the safety of the replacement formulations; if treads made with low-PAH oils fail in use, real deaths will replace the hypothetical deaths used to justify precautionary action.

3.8

The EESC understands these concerns however feels strongly that the Directive must proceed, in close consultation with the affected industries, to bring about a successful transition to the world-wide use of low-PAH extender oils in the manufacture of tyres. These replacement oils must clearly meet the same minimum standards of performance in all matters relating to safety. The establishment of an effective, competitive and reliable Internal Market in Europe in these new products is therefore a sufficient and proper driving force for this proposal.

3.9

Crucial to this in terms of timing is agreement on the tests to be used to determine which oils will be acceptable in use. The present Annex suggests testing for the presence of individual PAHs. This is inappropriate to continuous running large scale refinery operations where the actual chemical constituents of specific streams vary with the crude oils being processed. Other tests such as IP-346 from the Institute of Petroleum (which controls total PAH content by measuring the quantity of three to seven-member ring PAHs extractable by the solvent DMSO) are in already in use in the oil industry as an acceptable measure of carcinogenicity under Directive 67/548/EEC. Studies by CONCAWE for the oil industry support the CSTEE Opinion that the single measurement of BaP gives a poor correlation with overall potential carcinogenicity. The use of IP-346 for defining and testing the different extender oils is therefore strongly recommended.

3.10

In order to protect the tyre industry in Europe – and the environment if such benefits exist – there must be a similar test for the oils used in imported tyres. A draft standard from the International Standards Organisation (ISO TC 45/SC 3 N dated 29 October 2003) proposes, for review and comment, a test method for the determination of oil type in rubber compounds. This work should be brought to a satisfactory conclusion before this Directive is implemented.

3.11

Given the above, it should be possible to resolve the current supply restrictions, in particular for TDAE which requires higher levels of investment than MES. All of this however takes time and the current requirement for the change to be completed for all general purpose tyres by 1 January 2009 looks increasingly unrealistic. Given that the benefits of this proposal are likely to be minimal, and the costs and risks of unsuccessful reformulations are considerable, the EESC proposes that this initial deadline should be extended by 12 months to 1 January 2010. Even this will entail considerable negotiation between the various competing stakeholders. The Commission will continue to have a key role in facilitating this process within the constraints of EU law and eventually bringing it to a successful conclusion.

4.1

In the light of the above, the title of this proposal and subsequent wording should be consistent with the overall aim of introducing restrictions on the marketing and use of ‘oils rich in PAHs used in the manufacture of tyres, and on tyres containing these oils’.

4.2

This should be reflected in the Annex with limitations imposed on the marketing and use of oils used in the manufacture of tyres having greater than 3 % DMSO extractables under IP-346 and therefore classified as carcinogenic under Directive 67/548/EEC. All references to BaP as a marker and to other individual PAHs should be deleted.

4.3

An international standard test method should be developed for the characterisation of oils in rubber compounds, in particular tyres, and incorporated in this Directive.

4.4

Appropriate time should be given to the rubber and tyre industries to complete the reformulation work under way, and to the oil industry to invest in and supply the required raw materials. At present it is believed that all the parties could meet such requirements by 1 January 2010 and this date should therefore be incorporated as the initial deadline in the proposal. Derogations for tyres for racing cars, aircraft and other high performance end uses should be agreed with the stakeholders; in the light of the above, it is difficult to see any measurable benefits from these changes compared to the obvious risks of non-performance to all concerned.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/34

1.1

Until 1999, the EU co-financed information campaigns and promotional activities for agricultural products both inside and outside the EU as part of the individual market organisations. Subsequently, under Regulations (EC) No 2702/1999 and (EC) No 2826/2000 relating to third countries and the internal market, these sectoral provisions were replaced by a more horizontal strategy designed to support Member States' and businesses' own promotional activities. Unless it is extended, the first of these regulations expires at the end of 2004. As required by the regulations, the Commission submitted a detailed report on their application in March 2004, together with proposals for simplification and improvements.

1.2

In the EU, problems such as BSE, dioxin and listeria have increased the need for European food initiatives and information about monitoring arrangements to secure quality and traceability. The focus is therefore on information about legislation relating to quality, safety, labelling, traceability, protected geographical indications, designations of origin, certificates of specific character and organic and integrated production, with the aim of upgrading the image of European products in consumers' eyes.

1.3

In third countries, the schemes also seek to provide information about: (a) the EU's efforts to guarantee quality and safety, including the characteristics of products linked to specific regions, and (b) requirements to safeguard organic products. Tools used both inside and outside the EU include information campaigns, PR measures, promotional activities, advertising, and participation in trade fairs and exhibitions, which may prepare the ground for national and private campaigns designed to increase the market share of their own products.

1.4

As a rule, the Community contributes 50 % to promotion programmes. The relevant professional and interprofessional organisations contribute 30 %, the Member States 20 % – in both cases with the option of using parafiscal taxes. Member States' expenditure is regarded as intervention and is refunded by the Commission.

1.5

The European or national organisations involved must themselves initiate the programmes, while the Member States are responsible for management, control and payment. To safeguard the European dimension, priority is given to programmes presented jointly by two or more Member States and professional organisations. However, these programmes face a range of practical difficulties as a result of different administrative rules and procedures and a lack of commitment on the part of certain Member States. Moreover, proposers are, on the whole, required to spend an inordinate amount of time and resources on coordination, monitoring and administration.

1.6

The purpose of the proposals is to mitigate the disadvantages of complicated rules and red tape. This is discussed in greater detail in the Commission's report. The changes are also designed to ensure that the programmes are, in substance, of much more genuinely European interest.

2.1

The changes to the common agricultural policy, along with stiffer market competition confirm the need for the scheme. Competing countries' support for information campaigns and promotion actions on export markets also warrant a continuation of the EU system both inside and outside the Union.

2.1.1

There is, however, a considerable need for simplification and improvement. Having consulted the professional organisations and other parties concerned, the Commission has drawn up a comprehensive report on the upcoming revision with a view to simplifying administrative procedures, and ensuring that the system operates as efficiently as possible.

2.2

As the Commission points out, however, it is too early to judge the results of the new regime. Gradual implementation only started in 2001 for third countries and in 2002 for the internal market. 2003 was the first year in which the system was fully operative. It would therefore be useful, as the Commission proposes, to draw up a second report by the end of 2006, analysing the operation of the regime following revision. This would also make it possible to evaluate its implementation in the new EU Member States.

2.3

Hence, many organisations are only now familiarising themselves with the regime's provisions and administrative requirements. As the Commission points out, however, some of the proposed programmes have been of limited European interest. Greater emphasis should therefore be placed on programmes that have sufficient scope to be significant within the EU context, and on securing synergies between national and EU activities.

2.4

Especially after enlargement, the EU should seek, overall, to frame rules that are as simple and as clear as possible. Although the internal and external programmes do vary in terms of objectives and content, the breakdown into two regulations is historically-based. In a bid to secure further simplification, the two regulations should be merged at the earliest opportunity into a common set of more user-friendly rules. Most of the provisions are identical and the differences that do exist are generally without foundation. The proposed changes to the regulations are also the same in terms of presentation of proposals, decision-making and monitoring.

2.5

Support for information, promotion and advertising activities for agricultural products and foodstuffs is also granted under rural development provisions that differ from the rules of the present regime. Leaving aside recent moves to make a clearer distinction between the systems' different areas of application, the Commission should, even at this stage, assess what might be done to eliminate the overlap. Hence, there is no reason to put off this discussion until a later date, as the Commission proposes.

2.6

EU co-financing should continue in its present form and the budget resources should be increased to take account of enlargement and future requirements. The system can thus help integrate and establish the single market in the various production areas with due regard for variety and gastronomic diversity. The European professional organisations should therefore be more involved in implementing information campaigns that provide details of product quality and variations in consumer preferences within the EU. Third-country markets should also be given higher priority – at the same time as the gradual phase-out of export refunds – bearing in mind the realistic possibilities for implementing effective programmes.

2.7

The scheme's limited use on third-country markets is due not least to the requirement that the programmes apply solely to generic campaigns. As a result, the member companies of the professional organisations are in many cases reluctant to act and unwilling to become involved in programme funding. Support for brand labels – and thus for individual companies – is out of the question but if the measures are to have any perceptible impact on export markets, the Commission must show some flexibility in campaigns and similar ventures in accepting a balanced number of brand labels as an integral part of the generic campaign. This makes it possible to establish a link between the campaign message and the products on the market endeavouring to combine the generic with the specific to create common synergies. That in itself will not affect the campaign message but it will help ensure that buyers and customers can in practice find the products included in any campaign. More attention is also being paid to product origin across the EU. If, however, a market is already brand-dominated, EU promotion action is of limited added value, as, in such cases, private brands will usually engage in intense competition and use sizeable advertising budgets to boost their market share.

2.8

There is no reason to change the co-financing rates between Member States and professional organisations. The problem is that certain Member States show a lack of commitment or find it impossible to meet the co-financing requirement. This means that the professional organisations concerned are precluded from taking up the schemes unless funding is provided through parafiscal taxes. For reasons of administrative simplification, the current degressive co-financing rates for multi-annual programmes should be eliminated and EU co-financing should be set at 50 %.

2.9

The acceptance of parafiscal taxes as a source of financing already implies that de facto, certain organisations cover 50 %. This option should be retained. This means, however, that the rules on the mandatory Member State share of 20 % should be relaxed so that the Member States can decide case-by-case on the share of financing they allocate to a programme. That said, a minimum contribution of, say, 20 % from the organisation in question should be obligatory.

2.10

The Committee feels that it should be possible to support measures to promote flowers and plants on third-country markets in the same way as on the internal market.

2.11

It is an administrative burden and serves no objective purpose to subject Member States' financial contributions under this scheme to the Treaty rules on state aid. Thus, as in regional development measures, the proposed exemption from the notification procedure should apply from the outset.

2.12

Given the administrative burden involved and the considerable number of smaller programmes that have no impact on the markets in question, a good option is to set a minimum and a maximum budget for the selected programmes. Preference must be given to programmes whose duration and budget are sufficient to secure a more effective impact.

2.13

With regard to organic products in the EU, the national and private certification and monitoring arrangements must as far as possible be incorporated into the Union's common regime for such products. This process is well under way and should as far as possible be backed up by information campaigns so as to establish a genuine internal market in organic products to replace the national and private systems. Information campaigns in third countries for EU organic products have had only a limited impact to date. Establishing the internal market in organic products is a prerequisite for marketing such products in third countries. Up to now, difficulties have arisen with regard to the mutual recognition of the different schemes, for instance between the EU and the USA.

3.1

Consideration must be given to the possibility of more radical action than that set out in the proposal with regard to the internal division of remit and responsibility between the Member States and the Commission. The same goes for the need for simplification and a clearer division of responsibilities, given the large number of committees and bodies involved in drawing up the rules and in the process of selection, implementation, follow-up and monitoring. As a further measure, therefore, the proposal is to set up ad hoc working groups of representatives from the Member States and/or experts with particular expertise in promotion and publicity matters who can usefully advise the Commission in developing the strategy and implementing measures of the regime.

3.2

The proposed change in the selection of implementing organisations represents a substantial simplification. Depending on the nature of the campaign, there is also a need for the relevant organisations themselves to carry out certain activities as part of a programme, and the implementing body may be selected after the proposal has been adopted by the Commission.

3.3

The proposed changes go some way towards meeting the criticisms that have been voiced, among other things, about the length of time involved from the presentation of proposals to the final decision, the level of detail required at this early stage, and the lack of transparency in the decisions. At the same time, however, it is also important to consider relaxing the onerous reporting requirements.

3.4

The proposed flexibility, allowing the Commission itself to initiate information campaigns and promotion actions in a bid to secure a fairer distribution across the various production areas is a welcome move, given the preponderance of applications in the fruit and vegetable sectors, while other sectors have received little or no attention. However, practical implementation raises a range of questions, such as the restrictions contained in the Annexes which limit the countries and products that can be promoted by the EU.

3.5

The EU's organic logo should appear clearly in any information and promotion activities so as to raise awareness of the EU's certification and monitoring regime and to promote the harmonisation of the national systems. The logo depicts the twelve stars and symbolises the EU. Hence, the requirement to have the EU flag visible on campaign material should, under certain specific conditions, be toned down. The current requirements result in different EU symbols being used in the same promotional material. There are also national environmental logos and logos depicting the place of origin, with the result that the message becomes blurred. Campaigns to support the LIFE programme thus carry the LIFE logo, which also depicts the twelve stars, and not the EU flag.

3.6

The current requirement that national environmental logos are only admissible if more far-reaching national rules are involved is discriminatory and runs counter to harmonisation. The draft of the European environmental action plan (1) therefore proposes that national logos be used alongside the EU logo.

3.7

The EESC calls upon the Commission to draw up a procedural guide for operators that would help both them and the authorities in their supervisory role, and thus benefit this new Community promotional policy as a whole.

3.8

The implementation of these regulations is recent, but some basic requirements are beginning to emerge which must be considered for the future. The Commission should take care to coordinate actions in different markets so as to avoid overlapping or mixed messages, which only detract from the effectiveness of promotion.

4.1

The Commission proposal should be adopted, bearing in mind the above comments on the need for further simplification.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/37

1.1

This own-initiative opinion focuses on the link between industrial change and State aid, as illustrated by the example of the steel sector.

1.2

The authors of this own-initiative opinion understand the term ‘industrial change’ to mean the normal and ongoing process, within an industrial sector, of reacting proactively to dynamic trends within a branch of the economy in order to remain competitive and to create opportunities for growth.

1.3

Europe cannot remain aloof from ongoing industrial change. In view of the fact that markets are, to an increasing extent, becoming global markets, economic structures have to be brought into line, sooner or later, with events taking place on the world market. In this context the European Union must endeavour to play an active role in defining the basic international conditions.

1.4

This own-initiative opinion has been triggered by:

Taking the steel industry as an example, this own-initiative opinion analyses how State aid can have on impact on necessary structural change.

1.5

Companies which do not receive State aid to safeguard their competitiveness are often disadvantaged compared to competitors which do; the adverse effects on the development of such companies can be serious, and they may even be forced out of the market. In spite of this experience gained over several decades of restructuring, the European steel industry case demonstrates that political decision-makers often find it hard to desist from authorising the payment of subsidies to major enterprises employing correspondingly large workforces which are threatened with closure. In general, this means that over-capacity and uneconomic activities are maintained beyond the withdrawal date determined by the market. Essential adjustment processes are only hesitantly set in train.

1.6

Despite this, there is now general agreement, in the world of politics, in the economy, and also within trade unions, both on the unavoidability of industrial change and the need to shape such change through international framework agreements (e.g. WTO, OECD, ILO, etc.). This understanding also derives from the decades of industrial change which the coal and steel industry has already experienced. Restructuring and consolidation together with the accompanying social dialogue are now generally recognised both as prerequisites and the context for ensuring the competitiveness of European enterprises on markets which are becoming increasingly integrated.

1.7

In the communication on industrial policy which it issued at the end of April 2004 (1) the European Commission drew attention to the fact that industrial change must not be equated with out-and-out de-industrialisation. The latter phenomenon is characterised by a simultaneous decline in employment, production and growth in productivity. Out-and-out de-industrialisation results in the loss of low-productivity jobs to developing countries and newly industrialised countries where labour costs are lower. The principal cause of this transfer of jobs is that comparative cost structures have become more favourable in non-EU states.

1.8

In its analysis of the industrial policy, the European Commission does, however, come to the conclusion that de-industrialisation is currently taking place in the mining industry and only a small number of other sectors (textiles, clothing, leather goods, shipbuilding, coking plants, oil-refining and the manufacture and processing of nuclear fuel and fertile material). Whilst structural change is undoubtedly painful for individual regions, it is, however, beneficial from an overall economic standpoint, provided that such change is properly foreseen, identified and backed up.

1.9

The proportional decline in the share of overall economic activity made up by industry reflects a long-term structural process. Whilst most sectors of industry, such as the iron and steel sector, have considerably reduced their workforces over the last few decades, they have, at the same time witnessed a clear increase in the added value of their products and their labour productivity.

1.10

The increase in the social importance of the service sector is often regarded by the public as proof of a process of structural change at the expense of industry. This shift does, however, need to be put into perspective in view of the increasing interlinking between these two sectors. Over the last few decades processing industries have outsourced various activities (transport, logistics, data processing, etc.) to external service-providers. Care and considerable caution therefore need to be exercised when interpreting statistics on industrial change. Incorrect conclusions, based on superficial analyses or politically-motivated half-truths can quickly trigger dire industrial consequences.

1.11

In a knowledge-based European Union added value produced by industry remains essential. Bearing in mind all the added value generated for industry in other sectors of the economy, it is clear that, since the beginning of the 1990s, industry has continued to be of major importance to the EU. In Germany, for example, taking account of this combined input, industry continues to account for a good 40 % of gross value added.

1.12

In the light of – sometimes very painful – experience, with privatisation and restructuring dating back almost 30 years, the European Commission now proposes that future structural measures (taken in the CEEC in the steel sector and other sectors) should be based on the experience acquired by the EU steel sector in applying adjustment measures.

1.13

In recent decades there have been considerable changes in the political, technical and economic environment in which the EU steel sector operates. The oil crises, the establishment of the EU's internal market, EU enlargement and also globalisation have had a deep impact on this commodity sector, which is important to other sectors of industry. Despite all the cyclical and structural fluctuations since the first crisis year of 1975, the level of steel production in the EU has, however, remained virtually stable. Steel is, still today, produced in virtually all the EU-15 Member States. Today, however, due to technological progress only approximately one third of the 1975 workforce is required to produce this steel. The percentage of steel enterprises in EU-15 in which the State has a dominant interest has fallen from 53 % in 1985 to less than 10 % today. Moreover, State-controlled and private steel enterprises are now exposed to similar economic conditions.

1.14

Against this background, the European Economic and Social Committee's Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCIC) is attracted by the task of examining the role which State aid plays in general in the context of structural change and the role which they have played, in particular, with regard to the European steel industry. For the purposes of this own-initiative opinion, the term ‘steel sector’ is taken to mean all industrial activities linked to the production and marketing of steel and the key role it plays with regard to the steel-using sectors in the EU.

2.1

State aids are selective benefits which State bodies grant to selected branches of manufacturing and, ultimately, to particular groups. In order to determine whether measures constitute State aid, a distinction has to be drawn between measures which are intended to provide support for certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, in accordance with Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, and general measures which are likewise applied in the Member States but which are intended to benefit the economy as a whole. Measures which fall into the latter category do not represent State aid in accordance with Article 87(1), but are general economic policy measures which are equally applicable to all companies (e.g. general tax incentives for investment allowances).

2.2

It should, however, be borne in mind that in market economies economic activities are determined by supply and demand and coordinated via the price mechanism. Any measures which jeopardise the role of the price factor in providing information, direction and stimulus therefore risk, in principle, being harmful.

2.3

State aid may jeopardise free competition on a lasting basis, prevent the efficient allocation of resources and constitute a threat to the EU internal market. The European Union therefore recognises that safeguarding free and undistorted competition is one of the basic principles of the Community.

2.4

Specific allocations of State aids (financial aid or tax concessions) can only be justified if the market is not fully operational and if there is a realistic chance that the granting of subsidies will provide a better economic outcome. In the event of a failure of the market, State intervention, in the form of the provision of financial aid, may help to avoid misallocations. The State, however, rarely possesses the knowledge which it needs to ensure that in cases of market failure, the right extent of public funding is injected. Enterprises which are fighting for State aid are not always a reliable source of information.

2.5

A further difficulty is that market conditions are constantly changing. A State aid which was originally justified may, over time, prove to be no longer economically necessary but it nonetheless remains in place because of the slowness of the political process or as a result of the influence exercised by regional or sectoral interest groups.

2.6

The granting of State aid also frequently brings about changes in patterns of behaviour on the part of market players. When they receive subsidies, this reduces their readiness to carry out adjustments which are required in order to retain or re-establish the competitiveness of enterprises; subsidized enterprises may also develop a ‘subsidy mentality’.

2.7

At least in the medium term, State aid may also increase the tax burden. Reductions in State aid are not only vital as a means of achieving lasting budgetary consolidation but are also necessary for economic and regulatory reasons. Structural change is held back if the wrong approach is adopted to subsidies.

2.8

With a view to bringing about the necessary reduction in the overall volume of State aid, calls were made, in the conclusions set out following various meetings of the EU Council of Ministers, for a shift in emphasis away from providing support for individual enterprises or branches of the economy towards achieving horizontal goals of common interest, including cohesion objectives. State aid granted for the purposes of achieving horizontal objectives is usually intended to compensate for a failure on the part of the market and it normally brings about fewer distortions in competition than do sectoral aid and aid granted for specific purposes. The bulk of the latter form of aid is granted for the purposes of rescuing or restructuring enterprises which are in difficulties.

2.9

The main horizontal objectives which the provision of State funding seeks to pursue include the following:

2.10

The State has traditionally exercised a considerable influence on the steel industry; military and security considerations have, not least, played a decisive role in this respect. In order to illustrate the extent of State influence, attention is drawn to the fact that in 1980 some 60 % of the world's steel output was still produced by enterprises which were under direct, or indirect State control.

2.11

When steel-producing enterprises are owned by the State this generally results in losses largely being written off by the State, thereby providing undertakings with a virtual guarantee of survival. From the standpoint of achieving efficient competition, such a situation is just as damaging as the granting of State aid to strengthen the competitive position of enterprises or the introduction of measures to prevent the impending closure of enterprises not directly owned by the State. Economic measures taken to prevent such closures are also backed up by political measures. As a result, the burden of carrying out adjustments may be transferred to more competitive enterprises. Such measures can also trigger a spiral of intervention.

2.12

Apart from aid granted to enterprises which cease operations, the only aid which can therefore still be granted to the European steel industry is horizontal aid. In view of the fact that the process of structural change proceeded at only a woefully slow pace until the late 1990s, the European steel industry finally accepted the need to shift from sectoral and ad hoc aid to horizontal aid. In its aid regime the European steel industry has now gone so far as to give up regional aid, too (2).

2.13

In the European Union, considerable importance is attached to the monitoring of all national expenditure. The European Commission must ensure that its EU aid policy is founded upon transparent monitoring and use of State aid, as is already the case in the steel sector.

2.14

The European Commission is currently continuing its review of the general guidelines and basic provisions governing State aid. These measures need to be drafted in a simpler and clearer way. Discrepancies should be removed. The Commission will give priority to the following measures: reviewing the provisions governing aid granted for the purposes of rescuing and restructuring enterprises which are in difficulties; the reform of the EU provisions governing regional aid following EU enlargement; the elaboration of new basic provisions governing the assessment of what constitutes relatively small sums of aid; and clarifications in respect of the field of services of general economic interest.

2.15

The forthcoming development of the general EU aid regime over the next few years needs to take account of the international context and, in particular, of multilateral commitments. Aid in respect of non-agricultural goods and products is subject to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

3.1

The 1952 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty contained clear rules on whether or not it was permissible for Member States to grant aid to companies in the coal and steel industry: ‘The following (is) recognised as incompatible with the common market for coal and steel and shall … (be) prohibited within the Community, as provided in this Treaty: … subsidies or aids granted by States … in any form whatsoever’. This ban on all support for companies from individual States, set out in Article 4c, was a logical consequence of the removal of all national protection measures within the Common Market.

3.2

Following the establishment of the common market it soon became apparent, however, that without State support it would not be possible to secure Europe's energy supplies or iron and steel production from internal sources of coal. The search for a solution that would not require changes to the ECSC Treaty led policy-makers to propose that certain kinds of State aid could be reinterpreted as Community aid, which was in principle permissible. Article 95, the provision adopted to cover unforeseen circumstances once the treaty had been signed, was used as the basis for this. It allowed for Community intervention where this was necessary to achieve one or more of the Treaty's aims.

3.3

Keeping the coal mining industry going, in particular the jobs associated with it, was one such aim. From then on, aid which Member States paid out to their coal mining companies in return for secure energy supplies and steel production was viewed as Community aid.

3.4

In the 1970s many Member States did not even bother to use this loop hole for the aid they gave to steel companies. Instead they paid out billions, largely without any objections being raised, initially to foster expansion in the steel sector, and later to keep these companies going, the majority of them being State owned. Even in the early 1980s, the then Director-General for Competition at the Commission openly referred to the ECSC Treaty's ban on aid as being obsolete.

3.5

From 1978 onwards private steel companies, which had suffered considerably from distortions in competition as a result of the ‘aid race’, met with increasing success in their attempts to bring the subsidy ban back into force.

3.6

The steel subsidy codes, based on Article 95, stipulated from 1980 onwards that aid to steel companies could only be granted under strictly defined circumstances. However, the types of aid still permitted initially included almost all the aid which Member States were already paying out to their companies anyway. Thus, for the most part, the first subsidy code only served to legalise existing practices. It was only gradually that the kinds of aid most damaging to competition, such as rescue, operating and investment aid, were banned completely.

3.7

From the second half of the 1980s onwards, only research and development, environmental and closure aid were still permitted under the subsidy code. Despite this, some State-owned steel companies still received State funds up to the mid 1990s for debt repayment and restructuring purposes, based on further derogations under Article 95.

3.8

Eventually, the granting of any further ‘Community aid’ was made contingent upon fundamental reductions in production capacity. At last a consensus was reached between EU Member States, according to which no further exceptions would be allowed to the ban on subsidies other than those permitted in the subsidy code.

3.9

This strict legislation on steel aid, which the founding fathers of the ECSC Treaty had already had in mind and responsibility for which the EU-Commission took over when the treaty expired in 2002, was not least achieved thanks to continued political efforts and legal actions brought by the steel industry. Even if the cases brought before the European Court of Justice did not always lead to a withdrawal of the aid authorisation which was being contested, they did, however, help ensure that the legal boundaries for exceptions to the steel aid ban were precisely defined and further restricted.

3.10

The total amount of money channelled to ECSC steel companies has been considerable: over EUR 70 billion from 1975 onwards! This can be broken down as follows:

3.11

According to the most recent European Commission aid scoreboard, the steel industry's share of all EU aid today amounts to less than 2 thousandths of the total. This aid is almost entirely for environmental protection measures. Today's steel aid legislation and practices are clearly tougher than the EC aid arrangements in other industrial sectors.

3.12

In the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, world steel consumption showed strong, steady growth, averaging more than 5 % per year. In 1974 raw steel production in the then European Community of Nine reached record heights at almost 156 million tons with a capacity utilisation of 87 %.

3.13

However, one year later, in 1975 the oil price crisis caused a sharp drop in steel production, and as a consequence, within a year production in the EC had shrunk by 30 million tons (19 %). The corresponding slump in steel prices outstripped the decline in production. At the same time ECSC steel companies faced a market increase in imports, accompanied by an equally clear drop in their own exports. The decline in steel use in the single market was exacerbated by the fact that steel stocks were run down.

3.14

Initially it looked as though this was just a particularly acute cyclical downturn. All of the experts therefore believed that it would soon be followed by an upturn. The economic institutes questioned by the European Commission confirmed that the recovery would be particularly powerful and long lasting. The Commission's long-term forecast, General Objectives 1985, drawn up in conjunction with producers, consumers and traders, predicted that steel production would reach no less than 188 million tons in the nine EC countries in 1985. However, only 120 million tons were actually produced. Steel companies' medium- and long-term investment planning was therefore based on completely incorrect parameters; surplus capacity was generated and supply and demand drifted further and further apart.

3.15

Steel consumers' investment activity has been drastically cut back due to the worldwide slow-down in economic growth, and this has impacted particularly negatively on steel consumption, since approximately two thirds of steel consumption in the highly developed industrialised countries is associated with investment activity.

3.16

Another key reason for the stagnant worldwide demand for steel since 1975 lies in the fact that less steel is being used for specific purposes, because it is now being used more efficiently. The constant shift from quantitative to qualitative growth and the expansion of the tertiary sector have also led to a slump in the demand for steel in Europe.

3.17

Despite stagnating steel consumption since 1975, steel capacity was again increased significantly. The nominal world raw steel capacity rose by 150 million tons between 1974 and 1983 alone, while the global demand for steel fell by 44 million tons during the same period. At the same time, capacity in the ‘new’ steel countries and Eastern Bloc countries rose particularly sharply. Compared to actual steel consumption, the nominal capacity surplus in 1974 amounted to 130 million tons worldwide, and almost tripled within ten years (343 million tons).

3.18

Since the collapse in demand at that time was still regarded as a purely cyclical phenomenon, capacity was maintained despite crisis measures. These measures did not succeed in holding back supply-side pressure, preventing price wars on the European steel market or lowing down the slump in prices. Companies with high production costs and little reserves faced increasing hardships. They called for State support and usually received this from their national governments. The problems faced by individual companies therefore became the problems of the whole sector. The system of voluntary restrictions adopted by the members of the newly founded European trade association for the steel industry, ‘Eurofer’, finally collapsed when none of the major companies were participating any longer.

3.19

After the collapse of the voluntary system, in autumn 1980 the Commission was forced to declare that there was a clear crisis and introduce a mandatory system of production quotas (obligatory quota regulation) for all plants in the EC. Thereafter production quotas were laid down by the Commission on a quarterly basis. The system provided for the possibility of sanctions in the event of non-compliance. Moreover, special minimum prices were set for specific products. In addition, price stabilisation and socially and regionally bearable capacity reductions constituted focal points of the approach adopted. Production quotas and quotas for supplies to the common market were stipulated for each steel-producing company in the EC. Voluntary restraint agreements were also concluded with 15 importing countries. In view of the low world market prices for steel products it was important to avoid losses on exports that would have required additional subsidies from the EC under the terms of the crisis system. About 70 % of European steel production was subject to the quota system in the early 1980s.

3.20

However, the political aim of a gradual reduction in capacity was not initially achieved. The hopes of the companies involved for an upturn in demand and the elimination of competitors, as well as for State aid and controlled supply, hampered the reduction in capacity by the least competitive companies. The capacity reduction only gradually got under way with the second subsidy code, which stipulated that the implementation of a restructuring programme would be a condition for the granting of aid. The obligatory quota regulation, which was initially only supposed to be in force until 1981, had to be extended again and again for reasons of competition.

3.21

The Commission chose State aid prohibited under the ECSC Treaty as a means of applying pressure and decided to legalise the previously illegal practice with the subsidy code introduced at the same time, in order to implement the unavoidable capacity reduction; but it simultaneously called for a licensing regime which it tied in with the reduction in capacity requirements. This phase in steel policy lasted until the end of 1985. As a countermove to the State aid approval, capacity equivalent to about 44 million tons of raw steel and 32 million tons of hot rolled steel was dismantled under the inventory protection of the quota system.

3.22

Between 1983 and 1985 alone, around EUR 15 billion was allocated in State aid for steel companies. Instead of harmonising competition rules, the political decision-makers made too little use of the opportunity to impose adequate capacity closedown on financially strong companies. As a result they delayed the adjustment of superfluous capacity long called for by the market.

3.23

In 1985, with the affirmation that the clear crisis had passed, the European Commission finally called for a radical reorientation of EC steel market policy. Shortly after the release of State aids amounting to EUR 15 billion. As part of moves to make the quota system more flexible and then totally liberalise the market, there should have been a market-driven cutback in surplus capacity, something that could obviously not be achieved with interventionist measures from Brussels. However, during its sudden change of direction, the Commission ignored the fact that the billions it had granted in aid up to the end of 1985 would contribute to competitiveness only in the following years. By the end of 1986 it had drastically cut back the share of regulated products.

3.24

Despite a capacity adjustment of around 40 million tons and the shedding of tens of thousands of jobs, an excess production potential of around 25 million tons still put pressure on the market at that time.

3.25

A short-term increase in demand after 1987 in the end supported the Commission's argument that the steel industry should no longer be deemed to be in crisis. Regulating measures such as production certificates and compulsory registration for supplies were abolished. The pressure on national governments and the Commission increased, so the third (1985), fourth (1989) and fifth (1992) subsidy codes were issued to put a permanent lid on the Community's subsidy barrel. Aid should in future only be granted in EU Member States for research and development, environmental protection and special closure aid. (3) Nearly all of this aid came from the ECSC Fund, financed by contributions from the coal and steel industry.

3.26

After a short-lived high in 1990, steel demand sank again; steel prices also fell back by about 20 %. In 1992 there were renewed, increasingly frequent calls for further Commission intervention. Specifically, they called for quarterly production and supply estimates for individual products, the simplification of mergers, import protection in relation to Eastern Europe and restructuring aid. In order to reduce overcapacity they proposed a structural crisis cartel, a system for sharing the burden between companies and a 20 % definitive reduction in capacity by the end of 1996, laying off 50 000 employees.

3.27

However the Commission rejected the idea of a structural crisis cartel and a new production quota system; in 1993 it presented its own proposal consisting only of indirect measures. The measures provided for the pre-financing of capacity shut-down by the Commission, the promotion of mergers and production cooperation, temporary protection for the steel market against imports from Eastern Europe, an increase in market transparency through information about production and supply to the EU and accompanying social measures as an incentive to cut back capacity. A restructuring process was introduced, during which production capacity was reduced by a further 19 million tons and about 100 000 people were laid off in the EC iron and steel industry. The model for pre-financing, which had already been approved by the Council of Ministers, was not used.

3.28

In December 1993, despite the fifth subsidy code, the EU Council of Ministers unanimously approved further State aids amounting to nearly EUR 7 billion for various European steel producers, following a proposal by the Commission, in exchange for a reduction in capacity. At the same time, it was made clear that this aid was only to be granted on a one-off basis.

3.29

The ECSC Treaty introduced a strict ban on State aid in its Article 4c. However, only to a limited extent did the ban on aid keep the EC Member States from supporting their steel industries, with full approval at the highest European level. Over EUR 70 billion of tax-payers' money, paid out until the ECSC Treaty expired, delayed the necessary adjustments to industrial change, but could not prevent them from being made in the end. The European Commission also kept up the tried and tested basic approach of State aid approvals in exchange for capacity reduction in the 1990s, also for restructuring the CEEC steel industries as part of preparations for EU accession.

3.30

In 1982 the EU Member States – circumventing the market principle - reached a political agreement on sharing the necessary capacity reduction equally. This was in contravention of Article 2 of the ECSC Treaty, according to which steel should be manufactured wherever production costs are most favourable. Instead of promoting uneconomic companies' elimination from the market while acting to cushion the social consequences, and thus enabling equilibrium between supply and demand to be restored quickly, the EU Member States and the European Commission made use of the instruments envisaged by the ECSC Treaty for crisis situations, which was not necessarily advantageous for the steel industry as a whole. For reasons of social, regional and distribution policy, unprofitable capacity was supported, while profitable capacity - usually in the private sector - was lost, together with jobs which should have been comparatively safe.

3.31

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the EU steel industry was, after a fashion, able to survive the crisis period. Ultimately, steel producers succeeded in making themselves sufficiently competitive by international standards. This process, which could only be brought to a conclusion through intensive dialogue between the two sides of industry, was extremely costly, with over 550 000 lay-offs, even though on the whole unacceptable social consequences were avoided.

3.32

Many of the technical innovations that transformed the European steel industry were launched or developed in much greater depth under the ECSC research programme, which was self-financed through contributions from the coal and steel industry. The ECSC Treaty intended to make research resources available for Community research in order to promote the competitiveness of industry in general and improve job security.

3.33

The first ECSC research programme started as early as 1955. From that time on, researchers and engineers at the cutting edge of technological innovation geared their work more and more to a European approach based on cooperation. The steel industry, and with it European society, benefited from this type of cooperative research, where endeavours are coordinated, joint efforts undertaken and results made available to all concerned. Industrial innovation therefore quickly progressed through constant improvements.

3.34

ECSC research was also able to obtain significant results in the field of the environment, which is so important for society. Sulphur dioxide emissions were cut by 70 % and soot emissions by 60 %. Carbon dioxide output was halved compared with the beginning of the 1980s. European steel manufacturers today use 40 % less energy per ton of steel produced than 20 years ago.

3.35

Only €7 million per year were initially allocated for Community research under the 1955 ECSC budget. In the 1990s in the EU15, this figure climbed to approximately €50 million a year. The ECSC research programme supported research activities in its Community projects to improve procedures, materials and the environment by 60 %. As of 1983, an additional 40 % research aid was allocated to pilot and research projects.

3.36

In this way, each and every euro invested in ECSC research yielded on average EUR 13. Against this background, it is therefore not surprising that with the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, the EU Member States unanimously agreed to use the remaining resources, raised from coal and steel companies' contributions, exclusively to continue sectoral research in the coal and steel industry. The guidelines adopted aim to use the annual post-ECSC interest of approximately €60 million exclusively for coal and steel research, and in particular for the following areas (in the case of steel):

3.37

At this point in time, in the context of European enlargement, the steel industry in the EU is well equipped to meet global competition. Over the last few years, the European steel industry has strengthened its position, not only in technical and economic terms, but also in environmental terms. Some former State companies have made targeted use of the financial support which they have received, and, with the help of technological adaptation and more streamlined structures have advanced to the position of leaders on the global market.

3.38

The steel industry has succeeded in bringing itself into line with globalisation and sustainable development demands. Clearly the European steel industry has learnt its lessons from the steel crises of the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s. The steel sector is now so competitive that even in economically difficult times it is mainly able to remain in the black.

3.39

The strong demand for steel on the internal market of the EU underlines the major efforts made by EU steel producers, who are endeavouring to be cost-effective whilst, at the same time, improving the quality of their products and forging close links with customers. By means of mergers and takeovers and by increasing efficiency and cutting costs, EU steel producers have laid the foundations for a competitive steel industry in the 21st century. The terms ‘rescue and restructuring aid’ have disappeared from the vocabulary of steel producers. In making their clear plea for the retention of strict rules governing State aid, even after the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, steel-producing enterprises in the EU have underlined the fact that they want the era of the subsidy mentality and distortions in competition to be regarded as definitively over.

3.40

The processes of consolidation and industrial change are, however, not yet by any means, over. Some enterprises are already seeking to achieve trans-continental mergers. The rise of China as an industrial player is currently having a considerable impact on the competitiveness of enterprises. The rapidly growing demand for steel in China is exacerbating the situation as regards demand on the international commodity markets. Chinese imports of, for example, iron ore and scrap metal are causing shortages on world markets and resulting in exploding prices for raw materials and freight rates.

3.41

The pace of structural change in the steel industries of the new Member States is currently also being stepped up. The challenges facing these States over the restructuring of their steel industries are more or less comparable to the situation experienced in western Europe 25 years ago, even though the markets have become considerably more globalised since then. This being the case, it is essential that partners in eastern and central Europe also benefit from the experience of restructuring the steel industry in western Europe and of the role played by social dialogue in this process.

3.42

In return for receiving special aid (during the grace period), the CEEC were required by the Europe Agreements of the early 1990s to carry out effective restructuring measures and an extensive reduction in excess capacity and to demonstrate that the enterprises receiving aid had become more viable. In order to ensure free and fair competition in the market for steel in the EU also after EU enlargement, the new Member States are obliged, under the accession treaties, to observe the existing EU provisions (e.g. Directives and framework Decisions in the fields of competition and State aid, taxes, the environment, social policy, etc.). The European Commission must strictly monitor the situation to ensure that the State aid provided by the national governments of the CEEC is in conformity with the agreed rigorous EU aid regime and also ensure that, bearing in mind the actual level of demand, inefficient production capacity really is reduced, as planned.

4.1

The consequences in the United States of the difficult situation on the world market for steel caused the US Administration to introduce temporary import duties in March 2002, under Article 201 of the US Trade Act, to protect the domestic steel market, thereby contravening WTO provisions. Against the background of a highly volatile trade in steel, brought about by the existence of inefficient, surplus capacity throughout the world, the Bush Administration also announced that it was ready to support international negotiations on the removal of inefficient production capacities and the worldwide curbing of State aid to the steel industry.

4.2

The EU Member States and the European Commission give their backing to all endeavours to introduce greater discipline with regard to the granting of aid to the steel industry throughout the world. The start of the multinational negotiations under the aegis of the OECD in Paris in December 2002 provided the EU with the opportunity to propose that its tried and tested aid regime for the steel industry serve as the basis for an international Steel Subsidy Agreement (SSA).

4.3

The European Economic and Social Committee supports the action of the European Commission despite the fact that the EU steel industry seems to have considerable doubts as to the serious intent of other States and regions when it comes to cutting steel subsidies and consequently adding their signatures to an effective SSA involving compulsory notification and sanctions. The Committee is also concerned that the issues of aid and capacity are not being discussed at the same time as the issue of trade defence instruments, which are often used with no justification, resulting in distortions of competition.

4.4

EU steel producers go further than most national representatives at the OECD on the issue of the scope of a possible SSA. At the OECD negotiations, EU steel producers are united in calling for all State aids which help to bring about an increase in capacity or to maintain uneconomic capacity to be banned under the SSA. This demand, therefore, does not only cover specific aid restricted to selected steel producers but also applies to non-specific or generic aid.

4.5

The European Economic and Social Committee shares the view of EU steel producers that State aid should only be authorised as long as it does not have a harmful influence on the development of production capacity, fair competition and trade flows. This being the case, the Committee gives its backing to the following exemptions in the negotiations at the OECD:

4.6

In connection with a subsidy agreement, it should also be recognised that at least some developing economies have already a fully competitive steel industry. Steel producers in developing or emerging countries benefit from competitive advantages such as low labour costs, access to raw materials, lower environmental standards, and the protection of high import duties. Therefore, State aid for steel enterprises in these economies can only be envisaged on condition that the relevant State aid:

5.1

Past experience with the restructuring of the European steel industry shows that State aid to companies is a two-edged sword: it only benefits particular companies and results in misallocation, as uneconomic production capacity is kept in business over the medium term. However, if it is part of a negotiated restructuring programme, State aid can alleviate social hardship and thus promote the acceptability and consequences of industrial change. The control of this process through social dialogue has been vindicated.

5.2

The question also arises of whether no better use could be found, e.g. in training or research for the enormous sums of taxpayers' money spent.

5.3

Another problem was that during the crisis years in the steel industry, although the legal position (Article 4c, ECSC Treaty) with regard to State aid seemed clear (all State aids were prohibited), various subsidies codes, Council of Ministers' decisions and court rulings softened the line taken and made it unpredictable. Steel producers felt the lack of security in planning and general terms of reference.

5.4

In the context of the accession of ten or twelve new Member States, it is all the more important to insist on strict compliance with the clear rules on aid for the steel industry, with action in response to all infringements, as in the case of USS Kosice.

5.5

The mistakes which were made in the EU-15 must not be repeated.

5.6

Negotiations within the OECD (which are currently on hold) are only worthwhile if they lead to a sustainable improvement on the current situation, i.e.:

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/47

1.1

For the citizens of Europe, medical safety - which is one of the basic aspects of public health - means that they have an enhanced right to care from the competent authorities (even on occasions when bio-terrorism is involved) and that, on this basis, they exercise their new right to be kept informed in a transparent way of the decisions taken by these authorities.

1.2

Safety and healthcare systems are two terms that people normally associate with each other, albeit subconsciously, even though the concept of public health is still exposed to downward sociological pressures and to medical customs geared to performing diagnoses and individual therapy.

1.3

At a time when the upheavals experienced in Europe clearly show that health risks are no longer a purely medical matter but have erupted into the social and political arena, defining a safe health strategy has become the responsibility of all, particularly political leaders: from now on, citizens must be certain of having such guarantees.

1.4

Health safety does not start from nothing, it enriches and complements the traditional areas of public health, particularly epidemiology, it draws its support from reflection and systems developed to monitor drugs, and achieves dominance as the iatrogenic effects of all medical practices are discovered.

1.5

A health safety-based approach is no different from a medical approach. It proceeds by stages, it is a series of choices based on probabilities at a given moment, dictated by an assessment of the cost/benefits ratio and the risks involved. The quality of health safety mirrors the quality of the healthcare system.

1.6

Health safety is based on a medical approach and on the urgent need for a health safety methodology and a genuine commitment to public action. The field of health safety is, of course, much broader because it goes hand in hand with constant medical innovation.

1.7

The concept of health safety has to evolve, especially when acts of bio-terrorism are to be feared, for example; it cannot stand still: a balance has to be struck between striving for absolute safety, which is unobtainable, and negligence or positive abstention. The growing effectiveness of the health system prompts the need for health safety, though one should not forget to draw comparisons with the poorest countries, whose only current problem is first to acquire the basics of a public health system.

1.8

In the EU, which is richer and well versed in spreading risks, the thing to do now is to get health safety taken into account on an institutional basis. To discuss health decisions and make them public it is necessary to use all the means available, so as to offer the EU's citizens other alternatives than panic or dissimulation; this is how the EU will become a mature democracy as regards public health.

2.1

Before the Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 on the European Union, references to health policies in Community texts were only peripheral. The Treaty of 25 March 1957 establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) contained specific provisions on protecting the health of the population against the dangers of ionising radiation.

2.2

However, in the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957, ‘health protection’ appeared only in Article 36, which stated:

2.2.1

‘The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.’

2.3

The insertion of an Article 118A into the Single European Act in 1986 extended the powers of the Community institutions by enabling the European Commission to make proposals in the field of health, based on the need for a ‘high level of protection.’

2.4

Another indirect reference to health protection could be found in Article 130R of the Treaty of Rome, added by the Single European Act, which stipulated that action by the Community relating to the environment should aim, among other things, to ‘contribute towards protecting human health.’

2.5

The Treaty on European Union radically changed the prospects for European integration as regards health, since it introduced a Title X entitled ‘Public Health’, under which ‘The Community shall contribute towards ensuring a high level of human health protection.’ Under Article 129(4) the Council, to achieve its objectives, may adopt either incentive measures, provided for in Article 189B, or recommendations.

2.6

Similarly, the concept of health protection appears in other articles of the Treaty on European Union, since Article 129A, concerning consumer protection, mentions measures to protect the health and safety of consumers.

2.7

A precise legal framework, which would be improved in Article 179 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, will allow the European institutions to deploy their activities as regards public health:

2.8

The new structures set up (e.g. the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products) can have an even greater impact if the European institutions are engaged in a policy of increased cooperation with non-EU countries and the major international organisations, particularly the World Health Organisation, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Atomic Energy Agency for radiation protection, the Office of the United Nations for Drug Control and Crime Prevention for drug addiction. This cooperation must be continued.

3.1.1

Medical decisions are taken against a background of uncertainty: uncertainty about pathology, the effects of treatments and their respective risks; imperfect medical information for the patient about the options for further examinations and health equipment; a lack of precision in medical questioning dominated by emotion or concern; and clinical examinations that by their nature are only approximate.

3.1.2

A medical act is often the result of a series of decisions based on probability and taken in a situation of uncertainty: the more choices and decisions are involved in a diagnosis or treatment, the greater the risk, or even the probability, of making an error, although such an error may not necessarily be culpable.

3.1.3

In each medical act or decision there is an element of the imponderable, a hazard that cannot be controlled in the present state of scientific knowledge, an unavoidable statistical risk which is part and parcel of medical science.

3.1.4

The lack of health safety has human causes: a mistake or non-culpable error by the practitioner, and factual causes: risks that are known but are statistically inevitable, given the state of scientific knowledge, and unknown risks, which are always possible.

3.1.5

It is impossible to talk about health safety without mentioning these basic features of medical decisions. When health or life is at stake, it is often difficult to agree to ask only for the possible. However, there is no medical activity without risks, because life is not without risks.

3.2.1

The same observations apply to health safety decisions as to medical decisions, and inaction is a decision in the same way that action is; failure to do anything can be reprehensible.

3.2.2

It is a question of weighing the therapeutic risk against the risks of spontaneous evolution. The irrational denial that risk exists in health-related matters is just as irresponsible as negligence.

3.2.3

The culture of the risk/benefit ratio is far removed from the concerns of a European society which has managed to substantially reduce natural risks.

3.2.4

In order to assess the health safety of an act or product, it is important to use a risk scale that makes it possible to determine the minimum risk rather than zero risk. Five criteria should be applied in this risk/benefit ratio:

3.2.5

It is therefore up to the public authorities, exposed to converging or contradictory pressures of public opinion and producers of health care, to decide, in conditions of uncertainty, whether to adopt the most pessimistic – and hence the most conservative – hypothesis in terms of public health or to opt for the most plausible estimate.

3.2.6

Moreover, health decisions sometimes have to be taken in a crisis situation. The authorities then have to deal simultaneously with a spate of problems, the malfunctioning of certain systems and deeply divergent views on the decisions to be taken.

3.2.7

To avoid having to improvise when faced with an urgent situation, it must be possible to count on tried and tested procedures for evaluation, monitoring and intervention. This requires analysis of previous crises and a health safety methodology.

3.2.8

Regardless of the scientific and medical safeguards, ultimately the assessment of the risk/benefit ratio frequently involves a deep conviction.

4.1.1

As epidemiologic monitoring is an essential component of public health protection, it is necessary to establish specific arrangements for health monitoring through a European centre in order to ensure health safety (see point 6.3).

4.1.2

The purpose of health monitoring is to identify medical accidents and iatrogenic pathologies, to determine the unforeseen or undesirable effects of the use of therapeutic protocols, to carry out checks and analyse the findings and to evaluate the effectiveness of health intervention procedures; in short, all the activities necessary for health safety.

4.1.3

At international level, efforts have been made to advance health monitoring by establishing information exchange and alert procedures under the auspices of the WHO and the European Union.

4.1.4

Multilateral texts exist on organising cooperation at all levels, in all areas of specialisation and on all continents. They enable the rapid implementation of health measures designed to ensure the maximum level of health safety.

4.2.1

The quality and safety of the choice of the therapeutic strategy depend primarily on the current state of science, and therefore on practitioners' knowledge of it.

4.3.1

Compliance with obligations is monitored by all the authorities concerned and there is a large and uniform body of case law which specifies the obligations of health professionals and defines the concept of conscientious, attentive health care that conforms with current scientific knowledge.

4.3.2

Clearly, the performance of medical acts depends on health safety arrangements, which vary considerably according to the nature of the acts and the existence of ‘natural’ risks.

4.3.3

Comparing the difficulties inherent in the performance of acts, i.e. leaving aside statistically avoidable – albeit marginal – risks, is the only way to establish the health safety conditions to be observed. This is a kind of a risk/benefit analysis which makes it possible to set a standard health safety level which is both accepted and expected.

—

Health safety is largely determined by the quality of the organisation and operation of the healthcare system.

—

Health safety imposes an obligation of resources on all public or private establishments, resources which are provided for by regulations and subject to special authorisation. The healthcare system must be able to meet the needs of the people and provide health services under the best safety conditions.

4.5.1

Health products used for prevention, diagnosis and treatment are subject to strict laws and regulations, known as ‘topical regulations’ and governing:

4.5.2

The health regulations applicable to these products provide a genuine safety chain.

5.1.1

The public health institutions of the EU Member States have yet to take account of health safety principles.

5.1.2

Health safety is not the result of some equation or formula; it is based on the spirit of precaution and contradiction.

5.1.3

Health safety calls for cross-border awareness campaigns and initiatives. We must resist the illusion of some Maginot line that can effortlessly seal off the next epidemic. Health risks are unpredictable, infinitely varied, and generally appear unexpectedly. Behaviour towards the illness changes, viruses mutate, infectious agents renew themselves or hide.

5.2.1

Given the lack of any specific legal instruments for public health protection, some European Union countries have tended to skirt around the problem, sometimes employing dubious practices, often involving improper use of social security regulations, because this enables them to mix up health and economic issues in the same debate. While it is legitimate to appreciate the cost of healthcare and to make the most rational use of the limited resources available, it is nevertheless dangerous to confuse the two issues.

5.2.2

It is one thing to acknowledge the effectiveness, quality and safety of a product or a therapy; it is quite another to decide that it is to be made available under national healthcare schemes. The problems involved in public health decision-making are compounded by the fact that there are several competing authorities.

5.2.3

Establishing the areas of competence means establishing responsibilities and, consequently, establishing the health authority that will take up the moral, administrative and/or legal burden. This responsibility can only be fully exercised as long as there are no shortcomings or ambiguities in the relevant texts that might lead to disagreement or action that could distort the choices that need to be made.

5.3.1

At European level, public health administration is inadequate and has very weak legal support. It also lacks medical legitimacy, owing to the scarcity of resources. All that must be improved.

5.3.2

The public sector can only be effective if it has real legitimacy, and a health administration can only fully exercise its health safety role if it is endowed with this dual legitimacy, i.e. it must be recognised by the official authorities of every EU country, and of course by the general public, i.e. consumers.

5.3.3

For the sake of scientific, medical and technical credibility, more resources and first-rate technical staff are needed, as is cooperation between all the European and national institutions.

5.3.4

Five basic tasks have been identified. These involve recommending, supervising, checking, appraising and evaluating.

5.3.5

The establishment of a European public health network is evidence of the willingness of all European authorities to pool public health players and make existing national health vigilance instruments more consistent and effective.

5.4.1

Regardless of the technical and scientific excellence of health safety services, the traditional and respected principle of the contradictory must, of necessity, be applied to health safety efforts.

5.4.2

Involving independent experts fulfils the objective of making the most eminent specialists available to the European authorities, thus making it possible, through dialogue, to refine and supplement information upstream of the decision-making process.

5.4.3

In the most sensitive or technical areas, it would even seem essential to call on third-country experts of international repute. By opening up to international experts, a consensus could be achieved in all the countries concerned, thus avoiding any time lags that might be universally detrimental (i.e. to patients and stakeholders of all kinds).

5.4.4

This could enable the debate to rise above any particularities of national healthcare culture or practitioner training methods.

5.5.1

Health policing powers, which are, in fact, the prerogative of decision-makers (whether to authorise, whether to ban) can only be legitimately exercised if all the information relating to the public health problem in question is taken on board.

5.5.2

This always involves an appraisal of the benefit/risk ratio. This cannot be solely scientific, and it must not be imposed by the manager or by a stakeholder who has some material or intellectual interest in its being disseminated.

5.5.3

Clarification of the roles of expert and decision-maker ensures transparent links between experts and managers. A strict code of conduct must be declared and respected. This is not always taken as read, particularly when the problem is very technical; in such cases there are very few experts and they have often established links with the relevant institutions or companies.

5.5.4

Transparency, which must be the hallmark of health safety decision-making, requires each expert to declare to the health authorities any links he might have with agencies, companies or individuals affected by his professional opinions.

5.5.5

The European Community has started to outline these procedures: rolling out transparency procedures, as called for by the experts themselves, ensures that the experts' opinions are as objective as possible.

5.6.1

As with innovation in general, new health risks tend to upset accepted ideas and habits.

5.6.2

The intellectual approach must be the same, i.e. ‘to listen to the silence’.

5.6.3

Regardless of the quality of the vigilance system established, the risk of collective blindness cannot be ignored.

5.6.4

Public debate is crucial. Patients and doctors from beyond the panel of experts should be able to make their voices heard, ask the questions that worry them, and sound the alarm.

5.6.5

The debate must be organised properly, so as not to give unnecessary cause for alarm.

5.6.6

This ‘health pluralism’, which is crucial to improving our chances of avoiding new tragedies, will require more transparent decision-making procedures. Without prejudice to medical or industrial confidentiality, the experts' findings and reasons for health decisions must be made public.

5.7.1

Despite being made available to a wide audience, there are some basic aspects of public health communication that are even more evident in the field of health safety.

5.7.2

Communicating about these issues often means communicating about illness or death. Transparency and restraint must be the key words when organising this delicate task of the health system.

5.7.3

Transparency is essential to ensure confidence and to avoid the distress that would be caused by revealing information that might seem sensational because it appeared to be surrounded in secrecy.

5.7.4

Health authorities and institutions must comply with this, just as a doctor has to inform his patient. Given the risks involved for everyone's health, the ‘duty of truth ’ is essential.

5.7.5

However, this moral obligation is accompanied by a duty of restraint. Since it is often released in a hurry, information must be comprehensible and scientific, and must take care not to be conflicting, sensational or alarmist. It requires common working rules for the media, health professionals, patients' associations and the public authorities. Causing panic or cover-ups are not alternatives.

5.8.1

Patients are always inclined to scrutinise health information particularly closely.

5.8.2

There is a distinction to be drawn between the type of information intended for doctors and that intended for the general public.

5.8.3

The former benefits from the scientific background of its target group, which has its own channels: courses, conferences, symposia, and professional and industry associations.

5.8.4

On the other hand, communication intended for the general public cannot assume –without risking being misunderstood or causing panic – that the public has the medical knowledge needed to grasp the scope of the information provided. It has to find a balance between, on the one hand, the need for information about new or traditional therapies, and on the other, the risks connected with misinterpreting the information.

5.8.5

The information thus released could lead to unnecessary or exaggerated public panic or, conversely, unfounded hopes of new therapies. It is part and parcel of public health education, which contributes directly to the effectiveness of health policies, risk prevention, and a pro-active healthcare system.

5.9.1

In a health emergency or serious danger to public health, communication has to deal with three requirements:

5.9.2

Whatever the scenario, the press plays a decisive role in the success of crisis communication. The media must sometimes accept the fact that they cannot release information to the general public until health professionals have been fully informed. So, there is also a need to provide training for specialist journalists who are capable of understanding what is happening and communicating correctly on health safety matters.

5.9.3

This is difficult since, for example, calculating undesirable effects, their origin, the impact of the media on the notification rate and overall risk assessment involves difficult, complex analyses, whereas the public expects to be informed immediately in simple, emotional language.

6.1

Through becoming aware of the successive public health crises which have shaken the world over the past two decades (AIDS, contaminated blood, SARS, legionnaires' disease, bio-terrorism through the threat of anthrax), the EESC proposes to hold regular high level European congresses on public health.

6.2

The aim of these conferences will be to discuss what collective measures should be taken, provide precise information on these crises, produce coordinated responses, assess the threats of risks from outside, help speed up diagnoses and provide adequate responses.

6.3

The EESC recommends that the future European health monitoring centre in Stockholm be given as of now an extensive and reinforced mandate to draw up targeted and regular reports on public health and have the necessary measures taken by the EU countries, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle.

6.4

The EESC considers that it is the ideal place for alerting and raising the awareness of European civil society.

6.5

The EESC asks that all the parties concerned adopt an active attitude towards public health: an overall view of the crises in public health should enable all experiences to be shared at a time when such crises are global issues.

6.6

The EESC considers that a grand information policy must be promoted at European level, involving specific training for all the actors and organs of the press that have a particular stake in the matter.

6.7

The EESC would point out that its recommendations are interlinked and require a strong commitment by the EU countries to implement them; they include:

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/54

1.1

There are many interrelated reasons for these trends.

1.2

This will necessarily cause problems in health policy, whether with respect to the quality or accessibility of cross-border healthcare, or to the information needs of patients, health professionals and policy-makers.

1.3

These factors are already making it necessary to evaluate national policies, which must take all these needs into account, in the light of European commitments that are gradually growing and giving new rights to Europe's citizens.

1.4

This new situation now guides the debate between those who maintain that this freedom of choice will produce a harmful destabilisation of current healthcare systems, on the grounds that limiting patient mobility makes it easier to control systems in terms of cost or priorities, and those who advocate patient mobility because it allows interoperability of systems, use of the same indicators, exchange of best practice and a more intelligent pooling of resources. The aim should no doubt be to follow the second school of thought, whilst drawing all the requisite conclusions in terms of harmonising national systems.

2.1

In its own-initiative opinion of 16 July 2003 (1), the European Economic and Social Committee defined health as ‘a fundamental asset for society’, which ‘is equally applicable to each individual citizen, family, and nation’. The Committee concluded that it ‘intends to make healthcare issues an area for action, whilst respecting the existing Community political and legal framework.’

2.2

In that opinion, the European Economic and Social Committee put forward arguments and proposed work approaches and methods of analysis which have been taken up in two recent communications of the European Commission (of 20 April 2004) addressed to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

2.3

The communication in question was needed because of the recent publication (on 9 February) of the latest proposal for a Directive on services. Unfortunately, its treatment of social and health services provoked much criticism because the wording is too open to interpretation. Therefore more precise definitions are required in these sections of the directive so that adequate account is taken of the special nature of these services, which has to do with citizens' safety and equal treatment.

2.4

The Commission also published the two communications concomitantly because, starting with the Kohll ruling on 28 April 1998 and continuing through to the Leichtle ruling on 18 March 2004, the Court of Justice has established a whole body of case law that now allows European Union citizens to use healthcare facilities in other countries of the Union, as well as clarifying the conditions for reimbursing the costs of healthcare.

2.5

Since 1 June 2004, Europe's citizens can prove their entitlement with a future European health-insurance card (2), which replaces the E111 form.

2.6

The different healthcare conditions and environments in different EU countries may encourage people to seek the most effective systems, producing sudden bottlenecks or incapacitating European centres of reference. There is also a risk of exploiting social protection systems, which are unable to respond to erratic movements of patients from other countries. In this context, the new Regulation 1408/71 might contribute to creating new and problematic situations.

2.7

The challenge is therefore to develop a European policy that allows the most constructive goals to be set, even if this entails modifying the prerogatives of national healthcare systems where absolutely necessary.

2.8

A close look at the own-initiative opinion adopted by the European Economic and Social Committee on 16 July 2003 shows that it covers much the same ground as the high level reflection process initiated by the European Commission, and the points covered in its recommendations are raised and analysed in this draft opinion: European cooperation, information for patients, professionals and policy-makers, access to high-quality care, reconciling national health policies with European obligations, etc.

3.1

The communication on patient mobility contains a set of concrete proposals covering many areas. Thanks to these proposals the Treaty's objective of ensuring a high level of human health protection will be able to be incorporated into Community policy.

3.2

Community law entitles citizens to seek healthcare in other Member States and receive reimbursement. Court of Justice case law and the proposal for a directive on services in the internal market effectively clarify the terms of reimbursement for healthcare provided in a Member State other than that in which the patient is insured. However, in practice it is often not always easy to exercise these rights.

3.3

It therefore seems necessary to develop a European strategy to:

3.3.1

promote European cooperation to allow better use of resources:

3.3.2

In order to establish a clear and transparent framework for the purchase of healthcare, which the relevant authorities of the Member States would be able to use when entering into agreements with each other, the European Commission will ask them to provide information on existing arrangements and will present appropriate proposals.

3.3.3

Meeting the information requirements of patients, professionals and policy-makers:

3.3.4

Strengthening the Union's role in achieving healthcare objectives:

3.3.5

Responding to enlargement by expanding investment in health and health infrastructure.

3.3.5.1

The reflection process invited the Commission, the Member States and the acceding countries to consider how to facilitate the inclusion of investment in health, health infrastructure development and skills development as priority areas for funding under existing Community financial instruments, in particular in Objective 1 areas. In fact, the Union already supports investment in health in the existing Member States, where this has been identified as a priority by the countries and regions concerned. Taking forward this recommendation therefore depends on the regions and countries concerned identifying investment in health and health infrastructure as a priority for European support. The Commission will work with the Member States through the High Level Group on Health Services and Medical Care and through the appropriate structures for the financial instruments concerned to ensure that health is given the necessary weight in the development of overall plans. The need for European investment in health infrastructure should also be addressed in connection with developing the new financial perspectives for the Union from 2006.

4.1

The free movement of patients in the Member States raises several issues whose implications must be estimated, evaluated, analysed and taken into account. The first of these is to fully understand the various existing social protection systems, and ideally this means enumerating the criteria governing their establishment as part of a dynamic process, i.e. in the light of current and future trends.

4.2

Prevention is undoubtedly a priority objective, since it can and must make it possible to achieve appreciable savings, and is the best way to approach health policy; the value of good preventive policies with respect to traffic accidents, the spread of AIDS or tobacco use is obvious. The overall impact of prevention in these areas is very impressive.

4.3

To this admittedly incomplete list can be added preventive policies that are currently attracting the attention of all stakeholders - health professionals, the media and political decision-makers - and concern abuse of intoxicants (drugs, alcohol, medicines), promotion of healthy lifestyles (exercise, nutrition, rest), accidents in the workplace and occupational diseases, etc.

4.4

Evaluating these individual, social and family risk factors gives an indication of the incidence of premature avoidable deaths and the associated costs.

4.5

Technological progress in the sphere of medicines or investigative techniques must lead to effective replacement of old techniques by new ones.

4.6

Above all, greater efficiency must be achieved, even if social, cultural and/or corporate interests act as a constraint on necessary changes. In the final analysis, this is more economical for society as a whole.

4.6.1

The idea should be to encourage the search for more specific and more effective measures, which must stimulate initiatives by socio-occupational stakeholders to improve common health policies.

4.7

If patient mobility has been correctly anticipated, the European Union must be able to guarantee that people seeking healthcare abroad can use centres of excellence for health and hospital care, and that these are not only concentrated in the richer countries which have invested heavily in their healthcare systems. To this end, the European Union must support the development of systems of evaluation, certification and approval for new technologies and therapies; the effectiveness of hospital systems or any type of healthcare institution must be based on approval or certification procedures.

4.8

This quality campaign should enable the European Union to establish an EU-wide network of institutions that are host to both the scientists and highly qualified professionals who are so crucial to the existence of the centres of reference; and it is not unreasonable to hope that such centres will soon appear in certain countries of the enlarged European Union of 25, especially if the Union develops a mechanism for monitoring, analysing and exchanging information on national policies, while respecting the fundamental principles of our treaties, including subsidiarity and national remits.

4.9

By the same token, it is important not to forget the harmonisation of public health indicators. Harmonisation is useful in improving information about the health objectives of the European Union - the key indices of mortality, avoidable mortality, morbidity and avoidable morbidity - which are not necessarily equally accepted in all the EU Member States.

4.10

Differences show that results can be improved by raising healthcare to the level of the best-performing country. At the moment the five-year survival rate for lung cancer is not the same in France and Poland. Treatment of blood disorders such as leukaemia is not equally effective in the United Kingdom and France, depending on the treatment protocols used.

4.11

Information for patients, professionals and policy-makers is a key objective of the European Commission's policy.

4.12

With respect to patient information, health education refines European citizens' understanding of health, e.g. with respect to expectations and behaviour. Good health can now be seen as an absolute asset and right and in any event is a state which must be protected by the competent authorities. Meeting these expectations entails an increase in the resources allocated to pursuing health objectives involving treatment, and frequently also an increase in prevention and in attention given to environmental factors; otherwise social protection systems will be disrupted.

4.13

Health safety has become a right and a new power acquired by European Union citizens (3).

4.14

Technology, privacy, shared medical records, freedom of information and data protection are all matters that must be discussed, as transparently as possible, so that all stakeholders can be sensitised. The discussion must be ongoing, because the pace of development is rapid and decisions are difficult and/or must be taken promptly. Each of these factors is a major issue for the three sets of players in the healthcare triangle.

4.15

Reconciling national objectives with European obligations: the comparative analysis of healthcare systems raises difficult strategic issues which it must be possible to use to promote European cooperation in the healthcare sphere and to monitor the impact of the European Union on healthcare systems. For example, it is necessary to take a closer look at horizontal issues that may have serious implications, such as: good practice and efficacy in the health sector, ageing and healthcare, health in the new EU Member States, and evaluation of the impact of different health factors.

4.16

It is also urgently necessary to look at ways of ensuring legal certainty, thereby upholding patients' right to enjoy high-quality medical treatment in any EU Member State; appropriate proposals must be made by the EU in this area (to clarify the application of case law, simplify rules for coordinating social security systems, and facilitate intra-European cooperation).

4.17

The most unexpected but valuable news announced by the Commission in its communication is the use of the EU Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds to promote investment in the sphere of health and develop health infrastructure and medical skills, which have become priority targets for support from Community financial instruments.

4.18

The European Economic and Social Committee strongly endorses this decision: a new field of action is opening up for the development and success of the European Union, especially in the context of the Lisbon Strategy.

4.19

Finally, the European Economic and Social Committee in principle supports the Commission's approach towards the health professions. The development of health systems depends on professional skills and knowledge moving forward. Healthcare requires a trained, highly-qualified workforce and continuing, life-long training.

4.20

It is the task of the European Economic and Social Committee to promote awareness of these critical healthcare issues affecting the European Union, its cohesion and its ability to become a knowledge-based economy.

4.21

The problems must be analysed and pre-empted in order to encourage professional mobility, but without destabilising national systems. The European Economic and Social Committee trusts in this connection that the directive due to be adopted on qualifications and skills, is a crucial and valuable document and one that is necessary for the completion of the internal market.

4.22

The arrangements provided for are practical and well-conceived. In addition, the European Economic and Social Committee believes that it will also be very useful to harmonise codes of conduct for all healthcare professionals and that it will be well received.

4.23

All these measures have been taken in anticipation of the shortages of healthcare professionals expected over the coming years. Investment in the healthcare professions is rewarding, profitable and expedient if the intention is to provide EU citizens with high-quality care.

4.23.1

Improving health and healthcare with the help of information and communication technologies.

4.24

The European Economic and Social Committee believes that it is from this area that the strongest arguments will come for reforming healthcare systems and improving quality in the European Union. Several components are already on the table.

4.25

Information networks are now in place, fulfilling the demands of patient organisations. However, care must be taken to ensure the protection of professional secrecy when the patient-doctor relationship is at stake.

5.1

In its opinion of 16 July 2003, the European Economic and Social Committee recognised the key importance of these policies and made proposals which appear to have already been taken up by the European Commission, whose arguments are underpinned by a guiding principle.

5.2

Cooperation between the Member States must pinpoint joint objectives that lead to national plans, and the choice of appropriate indicators will make it possible to carefully monitor the development of healthcare policies pursued in each of the European Union countries.

5.3

The Committee notes that one tool will be indispensable: an observatory or agency should be set up to collect comments, analyses and exchanges of opinion on national health policy - in strict compliance with existing treaties, and the principles of subsidiarity and national remits – with special regard to the process of improving quality of care, the efforts of public authorities and managers to enhance the efficacy of all healthcare providers, public or private, and the creation of centres of excellence and their networking across the European Union, in both rich and poor regions.

5.4

A vigorous and sustained employment policy must be pursued to pre-empt anticipated manpower shortages, without waiting until there is a demand.

5.5

A health information policy must be promoted by drawing on the results of healthcare programmes, identifying the information needs of stakeholders in the system – patients, professionals and public authorities – and also taking account of sources such as the World Health Organisation and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

5.6

The European Economic and Social Committee can only welcome the Commission's intention to use the open method of coordination (see EESC opinion of July 2003), detailing its modus operandi and specifications in advance. This would cover key issues such as:

6.1

The European Economic and Social Committee is very aware that the last three Commission communications are the fruit of discussion between the five Directorates-General concerned.

6.2

This demonstrates that the European Commission has understood the implications of health policies in the context of completing the internal market and enlargement.

6.3

This is one of the first instances of five Directorates-General of the European Commission pooling their political will, skills and resources in order to achieve an objective, in this case that of giving the different countries of Europe the means to coordinate their health and social protection policies for the benefit of all EU citizens.

6.4

The European Economic and Social Committee therefore would like a lightweight but permanent task force to be set up to monitor these policies and enable the Committee to contribute its insights, expertise and experience on this matter that is so sensitive and important for all EU citizens.

20.5.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 120/60

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‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for purposes of scientific research’

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‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation to facilitate the admission of third-country nationals to carry out scientific research in the European Community’

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‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation to facilitate the issue by the Member States of uniform short-stay visas for researchers from third countries travelling within the European Community for the purpose of carrying out scientific research’

1.1

The subject of this Communication is a proposal for a directive and two proposals for recommendations on the admission of third-country nationals to carry out scientific research in the European Community.

1.2