22.3.2005   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/1

I-IX

1-14

1-5

6-14

15-63

15-38

15-18

19-26

27-38

39-63

39-42

43-55

56-60

61-63

64-73

74-82

ACP

African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)

ALAT

Local technical assistance agent

CRIS

Common Relex Information System

DEV

Directorate-General Development

EAMR

External assistance management report

EC

European Community

EDF

European Development Fund

EuropeAid

EuropeAid Cooperation Office

F & C

Finance and contracts (unit)

FR

Financial Regulation

HQ

Headquarters

IAS

Internal Audit Service

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

OLAS

On-line accounting system

RAC

‘Restant à contracter’ = commitments to be contracted

RAL

‘Restant à liquider’ = commitments to be paid

RELEX

Directorate-General External Relations

SINCOM

Accounting system of the Commission

TAO

Technical assistance office

I.

In May 2000 the Commission announced a major reform of the management of its external aid programme, the main objectives being to make radical improvements in the speed and quality of EC external aid, while ensuring robust financial procedures. A key component of the reform is the extensive devolution of aid management tasks and responsibilities to the Commission delegations. As a result of devolution, delegations are now responsible for project preparation, contracting, and financial and technical implementation, and have received substantial extra human and technical resources. Devolution also has important consequences for the central services of the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (or EuropeAid) in Brussels, as their role is moving away from direct management of projects towards monitoring and supporting delegations (see paragraphs 1 to 5).

II.

The Court has visited 10 delegations as well as the central services in Brussels, to examine whether the Commission has managed the devolution process successfully and whether devolved management in the delegations is starting to achieve the intended results (given that the delegations had only worked under devolved management for a fairly short period) (see paragraphs 6 to 14).

III.

The devolution of aid management responsibilities to 78 delegations constituted a major reorganisation of the Commission’s services in the area of external aid and its implementation is a considerable achievement, with almost all delegations operating under devolved management by summer 2004 (see paragraphs 15 to 17).

IV.

Regarding the Commission’s management of the devolution process, it can be considered reasonably successful, at least as far as the delegations themselves are concerned. Its planning process, however, did not incorporate a number of elements which could have facilitated its control over that process, and some problem areas need further attention (see paragraph 18).

V.

In general, delegations have been reasonably well prepared to operate under devolved management, although there are problems with filling posts and there is a continuing need for training. The preparation of the headquarters’ (HQ) services has been less well planned, lacking both analysis and consultation. Delegations still require considerable support in adjusting to their new role, and central services find it difficult to provide delegations with the support required, as thematic expertise is becoming thinly spread across geographical directorates due to reductions in HQ staffing. Although HQ services have developed a number of monitoring instruments and have provided substantial support to delegations, there is scope for improvement in both areas (see paragraphs 19 to 38).

VI.

Regarding the results of devolution, it is still too early, after less than two years of devolved management, to see the envisaged improvements in the speed and quality of EC external aid. Also, the lack of a complete set of performance indicators at an early stage in the devolution process makes it difficult to measure progress against the main objectives (see paragraphs 39 to 42, 48 to 51, 53, 56 and 57).

VII.

However, in the majority of delegations visited there are signs that devolved management is on the right path to achieving the intended results. The speed and quality of project management are benefiting from the increased capacity in the operational units of the delegations and from having the finance and contract staff available on the ground. This leads to a better problem-solving capacity within the delegation and to increased contacts with beneficiaries and other relevant parties as well as to a better understanding of local conditions, risks and opportunities. Robust financial management procedures are generally ensured under devolution but are not yet sufficiently developed in respect of the financial monitoring of implementing organisations (see paragraphs 43, 46, 54, 58, 61 and 62).

VIII.

For the time being, problems in recruiting staff with appropriate expertise and using this expertise in an optimal way, difficulties experienced by HQ in providing support to delegations, as yet inadequate financial information systems and complicated procedures are limiting the expected results of devolution in terms of increased speed and improved quality of project management (see paragraphs 44, 45, 47, 52, 55, 59, 60 and 63).

IX.

The main recommendations made on the basis of the Court’s observations and conclusions are the following:

1.

In May 2000, the Commission announced a major reform of the management of its external aid programme (1) based on the principles in its White Paper on the reform of the Commission in general (2). Its main objective, as stated in the Commission’s Communication, is to make radical improvements in the speed, quality and profile of EC external aid. More specifically, the basic aims are described as follows:

2.

A key component of the reform is devolution i.e. the delegation of tasks and responsibilities concerning the management of EC-financed cooperation activities from the Commission’s headquarters in Brussels (i.e. EuropeAid) to its delegations in the beneficiary countries across the world (3). Final responsibility still remains with the headquarters of the Commission in Brussels. Other important elements of this reform are: strengthening multi-annual programming; integration of the project cycle; creation of a single body in charge of project implementation (EuropeAid); developing a common administrative culture within the External Relations services; and actions to eliminate old and sleeping commitments.

3.

The guiding principle for the devolution exercise was formulated in the May 2000 Communication as follows: ‘all that can be better managed and decided on the spot, close to the field, should not be managed or decided in Brussels’. In operational terms, the most significant changes for delegations resulting from devolution are that they are responsible for the identification of projects/programmes and the preparation of financing proposals (but with approvals required from HQ), as well as for contracting and financial and technical implementation (4). At the same time, the devolution process was also used to address the problem of general understaffing of delegations to enable them to carry out operational functions more effectively or to assume the aid management functions previously performed by technical assistance offices (TAOs) (5).

4.

Devolution also has important consequences for the central services in Brussels as their role evolves away from direct management of projects towards monitoring and supporting delegations (including coordination, quality control and improvement in working practices).

5.

The devolution process involves all geographical areas covered by the Commission’s external aid programme, whether financed through the Commission’s budget or through the European Development Funds. Devolution was planned in three ‘waves’ of some 20 to 30 delegations each, in the years 2001 to 2003, covering 78 delegations in total (6). The first group of 21 delegations started to operate with devolved management from the beginning of 2002, the second group of 26 delegations (plus the Kabul Office) started at the end of 2002/early 2003, and the third group of 30 delegations (all of which are in ACP countries) started at the end of 2003/early 2004. Devolution will concern all programmes, but the geographical programmes (7) are dealt with first, to be followed by ‘horizontal’ programmes such as food security, human rights, NGO cofinancing, and regional programmes (but excluding humanitarian aid, which is not devolved). According to the Commission, a total amount of 14 billion euro of financial commitments to be paid, relating to the geographical programmes, was under devolved management at the end of 2003. This amount represents some 72 % of the total of such financial commitments.

6.

The Court’s audit has focused on two main questions:

7.

To answer the first question the audit has looked at the way in which delegations have been prepared for devolved management and how the central services have been prepared for their monitoring and support role.

8.

As for the second question, the audit has specifically looked at the results in terms of improving the speed and quality of aid and of ensuring robust financial procedures.

9.

The Court recognises that the devolution process was not yet completed at the time of the audit (October 2003 to May 2004) and that the period during which delegations have worked under devolved management has been fairly short. Yet it was considered that the preparation and implementation of devolution had sufficiently advanced since its start in 2000 for the Court to be able to carry out this audit and produce relevant results, particularly regarding the process of devolution.

10.

Rather than expecting outright improvements in quality to already become visible in such a short time span, the Court has been looking, as a first step, for indications of increased involvement of delegation staff in the various phases and activities of the project cycle. For the same reason the audit has not paid specific attention to another major reform objective, i.e. to improve the impact and visibility of EC aid.

11.

Ten delegations (8) were visited in the context of this audit, seven of these belonged to the ‘first wave’ delegations and three to the ‘second wave’, while no delegations were chosen from the ‘third wave’ delegations, as these were expected to start operating under devolved management, at the earliest, by the end of 2003.

12.

At central level, extensive interviews were held within EuropeAid (including all its geographical directorates), and within the Directorates-General for External Relations (RELEX) and Development (DEV).

13.

Concurrently with the Court’s audit, the Commission services carried out an evaluation of the devolution process. The draft report of the evaluation became available to the Court at the end of 2003, just after the Court had completed its first round of (six) delegation visits. The report was analysed and compared with the Court’s findings at that stage, from which it was concluded that there were no significant differences between the main findings of the two exercises (particularly concerning the major risk factors involved). The final report of the Commission’s evaluation became available in May 2004 (9).

14.

In 2003 the Commission carried out an in-depth audit of EuropeAid. This audit had a different objective, aiming to provide a reasonable assurance on the EuropeAid internal control system, but some of its observations are nevertheless relevant to the Court’s audit, as they confirm several of the Court’s findings, in particular concerning the Common Relex Information System.

15.

Detailed preparation of the devolution process started following the Commission’s Communication of May 2000. A list of the key actions and dates in the overall preparatory process of devolution is included in the Annex.

16.

The process of devolution to all 78 delegations was initially planned to be completed before the end of 2003. In order to make this process more manageable, and to benefit from lessons learned, delegations were to be devolved in three waves. The devolution of each delegation involved consultations to assess the delegation's needs, followed by the recruitment and training of agreed staff, the increasing of office capacity and IT equipment and the establishment of computer connections. Progress towards these objectives in each delegation was monitored using action plans. In addition, changes to the staffing and structure of HQ were being planned and implemented.

17.

Reviewing the whole preparation period and the available documentation covering this period, it is clear that during the one and a half years between the official decision in May 2000 and the actual start of devolved management in the first delegations in early 2002, there has been extensive planning, consultation and implementation carried out, in particular by EuropeAid and by the DGs RELEX and DEV and coordinated through the Devolution inter-service working group. Since then a similar process of preparation has been followed in relation to the second and third wave delegations. By April 2004 devolution was operational in 66 delegations and the remaining 12 delegations of the third wave were expected to be devolved by mid-2004.

18.

However, the planning process did not incorporate a number of elements which could have facilitated the Commission’s control over the devolution exercise. For instance, although the Commission decision of May 2000 included an action plan, it did not link devolution activities with expected results. In the Communication to the Commission of January 2002 (10) the total annual cost of delegations when fully devolved in 2005 was estimated to be some 177 million euro higher than before devolution. This estimate did not incorporate savings from reductions in HQ staffing. The monitoring of actual costs against estimated costs was not done in a way which enables the overall evolution of costs (and staffing levels) in delegations and HQ to be clearly understood. Other such missing elements which are developed further in this report are reference standards for allocating resources to delegations (see paragraphs 19 to 21), a global plan and definition of the new role for HQ (see paragraphs 27 to 28) and performance indicators for the speed and quality of aid management (see paragraphs 39 to 42).

19.

Delegations chosen in the first ‘wave’ were informed by HQ in November 2000, and asked to prepare an estimate of their needs for additional resources (such as staff, office space and equipment). Second ‘wave’ delegations were similarly approached in December 2001. Delegations were told to take into account indicators such as the volume of aid or the number of projects and payments, but also particular constraints like the local work environment and the quality of the local public administration. No specific methodology was provided to delegations to explain how to translate such factors into an assessment of the additional resources required.

20.

The audit has shown that, in general, delegations were not able to make such an analysis on their own and requests were made without any clear indication of how the numbers had been arrived at. Estimates for additional office space, computers and other office facilities were easier to make, as these would generally be based on the manpower estimates.

21.

Although not supported by a specific methodology to assess resource requirements, extensive consultations took place between HQ and delegations, concluded by a final hearing between the Head of Delegation and the Directors-General of the main DGs involved (RELEX, DEV and EuropeAid). The outcome of this process has been that delegations’ requests were largely fulfilled and staff in delegations increased considerably. In general, delegations received two officials and several support staff for a new Finance and Contracts (F & C) unit, as well as significant reinforcements for the operational unit or units responsible for cooperation activities (11).

22.

As part of the preparatory process, two separate verifications for all devolved delegations were carried out by HQ, to make sure that all basic conditions were fulfilled. The first verification was the basis for the subdelegation of responsibility for commitments and payments from the geographical director of EuropeAid to the Head of Delegation. The second verification was carried out a few months later involving visits to the delegations, making sure that devolved management was operating satisfactorily.

23.

While delegations visited during the Court’s audit were generally satisfied with the number of extra posts allocated, six of the 10 delegations had experienced problems in getting the posts filled in time and/or with the relevant expertise. Contributing factors have been:

24.

As for other necessary resources, such as office infrastructure, computers and communication facilities, these were, with few exceptions, provided to delegations without major problems.

25.

Major efforts have been undertaken to provide training for delegation staff. This included training for officials (in particular the F & C staff) before they take up their posts in the delegation, training courses given by HQ staff in delegations for all delegation staff and specialised training courses on a regional basis. Course subjects covered, in particular, the Commission’s financial and contract procedures, the CRIS financial information system and the reinforcement of managerial capacities.

26.

Audits at the delegations have shown, however, that despite all the training efforts undertaken, which were mostly considered to have been very useful, there still remain unfulfilled training needs, partly because of the regular rotation of staff, and partly because of inadequate budget provisions for delegations for local training and for training-related travel expenses. Recently, due to the reduction in HQ staff, the planned training programme for 2004 in the Asia region had to be reduced. Topics on which further training in delegations is considered desirable include in particular the CRIS system, the new Financial Regulations (FR) (14) and their implications, project implementation and monitoring, and management of staff.

27.

EuropeAid was established in January 2001. However, a detailed description of the role of HQ in a devolved environment was first available in November 2002 (15) following seminars and workshops during 2002, and further developed in July 2003 (16).

28.

There was no analysis in any of the abovementioned documents which quantified the resources necessary for HQ to carry out its new tasks and responsibilities following devolution, such as monitoring (see paragraphs 34 and 35) and support (see paragraphs 36 to 38). Although the needs assessment for delegations also lacked a quantified analysis of the appropriateness of staffing levels in delegations relative to the tasks to be carried out, it was, nevertheless, an iterative process based on extensive discussions and consultations between delegations and HQ ensuring ownership by the delegation. There was, however, no comparable process involving Heads of Units concerning the assessment of needs for HQ, which consequently lacked both analysis and consultation.

29.

The January 2002 Communication on the implementation and financing of devolution secured funding for the 1 400 additional staff in delegations (including 375 officials) but did not indicate how many would be redeployed from HQ. Nevertheless, according to the Commission, the number of new posts for officials allocated for devolution is only 158 (44 for the first phase in 2001 and 114 for the second phase in 2002). The 217 posts allocated to delegations in 2003 and 2004 were redeployed from HQ, although it is not clear on what kind of analysis the decision to reduce HQ posts was based.

30.

Geographic directorates in EuropeAid have been requested to contribute to the reduction of 217 posts in 2003 and 2004. Most of these reductions will be met by the thematic units and by the finance and contracts units. The audit has shown that as a result some thematic units are no longer in a position to provide effective support to Delegations.

31.

In order to meet their quota of the overall reduction in posts, thematic units have sometimes not been able to offer posts to experienced staff returning from delegations. Staff remaining in thematic units who were previously responsible for managing and processing project files may not be able to adapt easily to the new role of providing support, sectoral knowledge and advice.

32.

The Commission did not consider that a global planning approach towards the structure of HQ was realistic, and so a pragmatic, evolutionary approach was adopted instead. However, although at the time of the audit there was no overall plan for restructuring EuropeAid, some consideration had been given to the idea of reorganising thematic units in order to concentrate thematic expertise. In this way the knowledge and experience of HQ can be provided more rationally and efficiently to delegations.

33.

As for the Finance and Contracts units of the different EuropeAid directorates, a comparative workload assessment showed great variation between the units in the ratio of number of posts to number and volume of payments.

34.

With the devolution of responsibilities, in particular those for implementation of cooperation programmes, to its delegations, the role of the Commission’s HQ is evolving towards one of monitoring of, and providing support to, its delegations, as described in detail in the EuropeAid document ‘Mission statement, Responsabilités et tâches des services’ of July 2003. Concerning its monitoring role, HQ uses a number of instruments to monitor the activities of delegations, the main ones being the following:

35.

Although these monitoring instruments provide HQ with useful information on the performance of delegations, because of a lack of operational instructions the application of these instruments was not always clear for the staff concerned in terms of the required scope and depth of the monitoring, and problems have been encountered in the following areas:

36.

With the transfer of its implementation responsibilities to the delegations the new role of HQ, in addition to monitoring, consists of providing support to the delegations in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of projects. The geographical coordination units in EuropeAid in particular will be the focal point for the delegations’ requests, supported by the thematic units.

37.

The audit has shown that considerable support has been provided by HQ to delegations, for example in the following areas:

38.

However, there is still scope for improvement in the transition of HQ towards its new support role in a devolved environment in the following areas:

39.

The Communication to the Commission of 16 May 2000, concerning the reform of the management of external aid, stated that performance indicators would be introduced to measure progress made towards the objectives of the reform (increasing speed of implementation, improving quality of aid management and robustness of financial procedures) and to ensure that the success of programmes was no longer judged in terms of whether a budget allocation in a given year had been used.

40.

A number of indicators were adopted by the Commission in 2001, mainly based on financial data then available. These included commitments and disbursements, the related RAC and RAL, the percentage of invoices paid within 60 days, distribution of commitments and payments throughout the year and the number of years needed to complete a project.

41.

The indicators mentioned above may be useful in the long term and at a global level, but they should be complemented by other indicators to provide a complete picture of the speed and quality of project preparation and of implementation on the ground. At the end of 2003 EuropeAid was still considering additional performance indicators which would meet this objective.

42.

The delay in introducing such indicators has resulted in difficulties in establishing base line data on the situation at the start of devolution (or the reform). In addition, it is difficult to identify indicators which isolate the impact of devolution from the impact of the elements of the wider reform. Moreover, indicators may also be affected by other Commission initiatives such as the introduction of project cycle management, sector-wide approaches or new Financial Regulations and by developments in beneficiary countries, such as changes in the local political environment or in the quality of the national administration.

43.

Through its audit, the Court has tried to find evidence of any improvements in speed in relation to different activities within the project cycle for which the Delegation now has specific responsibility, in particular the preparation of financing proposals, the conclusion of contracts, the payment of invoices, and project implementation. The first phase of the project cycle, i.e. of programming, is not dealt with here because this is still the responsibility of HQ, albeit with an expected greater involvement of the delegations.

44.

Although the ‘pipeline’ schedule of projects under preparation is closely monitored to ensure deadlines are met, in some cases devolution has slowed down the speed of project preparation as delegations pass through the necessary learning process. For example in 2003 Delegation HQ had to assist some delegations in Asia in preparing draft financing proposals, deadlines had to be postponed and in the end a higher percentage of commitments were concluded in the fourth quarter than in previous years (80 to 90 %, against some 50 % before).

45.

Several delegations visited during the audit had encountered specific problems in 2003 in the preparation of new financing proposals, following the introduction of the new FR applicable to the general budget from 1 January 2003. Delegations were unsure how to interpret and apply new provisions of the FR relating to the concept of ‘decentralised management’ of aid activities by beneficiary countries. Repeated requests for clarification were left unanswered by HQ, where the subject in question was apparently still being studied at the time of the second round of the Court’s audit visits to the delegations in March 2004. As a result, a number of project proposals could not be finalised for lack of a clear understanding and agreement on the implementation mechanisms to be put in place.

46.

The overall conclusion on the basis of the visits to delegations is that the routine processes of making contracts and payments are managed adequately by the delegations. The main contributory factor has been that the bigger, first wave delegations in particular have received well qualified, experienced staff for their Finance and Contracts units (F & C), which has facilitated the smooth introduction of the basic financial systems and procedures.

47.

In countries where the national administration plays an important role in the contract and payment process (21), delays within these administrations are sometimes more serious constraints to speedy project implementation than any delays occurring in the delegations (22).

48.

Many delegations do not keep track of specific indicators to measure the periods used to make payments or to conclude contracts, nor do they usually set themselves specific objectives in this respect, other than the formal compulsory periods set by the FR, by contracts or by published tender procedures (23).

49.

The financial information systems used in delegations, CRIS and (for EDF) OLAS, in principle allow the calculation of the period used to make a payment, but the checks carried out at a few delegations indicate a number of errors in the underlying data (24). The reliability of the EuropeAid performance indicator, which shows the overall percentage of invoices paid within 60 days, is therefore uncertain.

50.

Indicators on the speed of payments are not available prior to devolution. A manual test was therefore carried out at two delegations, whereby a number of similar payments was chosen, some made before devolution (and therefore by HQ) and some made after devolution, and the periods used to process the payments were compared. The results were inconclusive, showing an improvement in the case of one delegation (average time taken went down from 61 days before devolution to 47 days after devolution), but no apparent change in the case of another delegation (average time taken remained around 50 days).

51.

A number of delegations experienced difficulties in relation to managing payments and contracts as a result of the many errors which they encountered in the data previously entered in the CRIS financial information system, after this system became operational in the course of 2002.

52.

EC procedures in the area of tendering and contracting are complicated. The audit indicates that delegation staff, project staff and local government officials sometimes meet serious difficulties in this respect even when there is room for derogation or more flexible interpretation. Often, tender procedures have to be cancelled and restarted for lack of a sufficient number of interested parties or of valid offers. Derogations are not easily approved by HQ and in certain cases not even possible under specific rules, which require that the tender process be repeated until a sufficient number of valid offers is received. In these cases preparation or implementation of projects is seriously hindered.

53.

The effect of devolution on the speed of project implementation as a whole can not easily be measured (as the audit visits at delegation level have shown), certainly not yet considering the relatively short period during which devolved management is in place in the delegations (25). For more than half of the delegations visited, the conclusion of the audit was that the positive effects of devolution are being offset by other factors.

54.

One common finding of the audit visits is that project implementation is benefiting from having the Finance and Contracts unit’s staff available on the ground and from the increased capacity in the operational units of the delegations. Both factors contribute to a better understanding of local conditions and together create a better problem-solving capacity regarding any problems affecting projects and programmes. Interviews held with delegations’ counterparts (government officials, project staff, representatives of other donors) confirm the increased capacity of delegations following devolution, which allow closer contacts with, and more involvement by, delegation staff.

55.

However, constraints discussed earlier in the report in the context of the preparation of delegations and HQ for devolution, may offset improvements in speed resulting from devolution (see paragraphs 23, 26, 35(c) and 38).

56.

Regarding the second main objective of the reform and of devolution, i.e. to make radical improvements in the quality of EC external aid, it is too early, after less than two years of devolved management, to see the full potential effect of devolution on the quality of aid throughout the whole project cycle. This would require a period of at least four to five years, until a significant number of projects and programmes prepared under devolved management are being implemented.

57.

In addition, it would be necessary to identify at an earlier stage the most appropriate set of indicators for determining the quality of aid. The results-oriented monitoring system, which the Commission expanded in 2002 to cover all regions concerned by EC external cooperation programmes, is meant to give an appreciation of a project’s or programme’s performance. In the longer term, these assessments could form an important indicator of the level of quality of EC aid and, provided that the reports are of a consistent standard so that they are comparable over time, of any improvements in quality.

58.

The positive factors referred to above in relation to the speed of project implementation are also at work in relation to the quality aspect. The audit has shown that in the majority of delegations visited there are signs of an increased capacity within the delegations to deal with the different aspects of development activities, leading to increased contacts with beneficiaries and other relevant parties and to a better understanding of local conditions, risks and opportunities. File reviews carried out during the audit also confirm an increased involvement of delegation staff in project monitoring activities, such as examination of, and commenting on, project work plans and progress reports.

59.

On the other hand, there are also constraints at work, discussed earlier in the report (see paragraph 56) which may offset improvements in quality resulting from devolution.

60.

In addition, in most delegations visited there were several categories of staff (such as individual experts, ALATs and local agents) working in the operational units and sharing the workload, usually in such a way that each of them was responsible for a number of projects. This practice does not ensure that the different types of resources are used in an optimal way, because it means that the more experienced experts sometimes spend a considerable part of their time on relatively simple administrative tasks.

61.

The overall opinion from the devolution audit visits to the delegations, supported by the findings of a number of concurrent financial audits to the same delegations (26), is that robust financial management procedures are generally ensured under devolved management. However, the financial monitoring of implementing organisations is not yet sufficiently developed. In particular, although the system of audits of implementing organisations has improved since 2002, discussions on the approach are still under way and in general the use and follow-up of audit reports is not yet adequate for the purpose of deriving overall assurance concerning the legality and regularity of transactions managed by implementing organisations.

62.

There are signs that devolution is having a positive effect, leading to improvements in supervisory systems and controls. The early establishment of a Finance and Contracts unit in a delegation, often staffed with a strong and experienced team, has led in many delegations to a strong emphasis on financial procedures. It also contributed to quicker problem-solving and to improved practices being followed, e.g. through the introduction of standard documents or formats for checklists, routing slips, and guidelines to be used both inside the delegation and by project management. In at least two delegations visited the F & C units have started to address the problem of monitoring implementing organisations, and have developed an approach for external audits of projects, including their systematic follow-up.

63.

However, the existence of complicated procedures (see paragraph 52) and inadequate guidance on financial issues (see paragraph 45) have in some cases had an adverse effect on the achievement of the two other objectives of improving speed and quality of aid.

64.

The devolution of aid management responsibilities to 78 delegations constituted a major reorganisation of the Commission’s services in the area of external aid. Its implementation, with almost all delegations operating under devolved management by summer 2004, is a considerable achievement (see paragraphs 15 to 17).

65.

The Commission’s management of the devolution process can be considered reasonably successful, at least as far as the delegations themselves are concerned. Its planning process, however, did not incorporate a number of elements which could have facilitated its control over that process, and some problem areas need further attention (see paragraph 18).

66.

In general, delegations have been reasonably well prepared to operate under devolved management, although there are problems with filling posts and there is a continuing need for training in financial systems and project management, despite all the training efforts undertaken (see paragraphs 19 to 26).

67.

The preparation of HQ services has been less well planned, lacking both analysis and consultation. Delegations still require considerable support in adjusting to their new role, and central services find it difficult to provide to delegations with the support required, as thematic expertise is becoming thinly spread across geographical directorates due to reductions in HQ staffing (see paragraphs 27 to 33).

68.

Although HQ has developed instruments to monitor delegations, such as external assistance management reports (EAMR), its monitoring role and instruments are not yet fully developed (see paragraphs 34 and 35).

69.

Similarly, although HQ has provided substantial support to delegations through training initiatives, quality support groups, thematic networks and helpdesks, there are still shortcomings in providing guidance and meeting training needs (see paragraphs 36 to 38).

70.

It is still too early, after less than two years of devolved management, to see the envisaged improvements in the speed and quality of EC external aid. Also, the lack of a complete set of performance indicators at an early stage in the devolution process makes it difficult to measure progress against the main objectives. In the meantime, the Commission continues to use mainly financial data (such as the level of commitments and disbursements) as indicators of speed, although these can vary for reasons unconnected with devolution or the reform and are precisely the very criteria for judging EC aid which the reform intended to replace (see paragraphs 39 to 42, 53, 56 and 57).

71.

However, in the majority of delegations visited there are signs that devolved management is on the right path towards achieving the intended results. The speed and quality of project management are benefiting from the increased capacity in the operational units of the delegations and from having the Finance and Contracts staff available on the ground. This leads to a better problem-solving capacity within the delegation, and to increased contacts with beneficiaries and other relevant parties, and to a better understanding of local conditions, risks and opportunities. Robust financial management procedures are generally ensured under devolution but are not yet sufficiently developed in respect of financial monitoring of implementing organisations (see paragraphs 54, 58, 61 and 62).

72.

For the time being, problems in recruiting staff with appropriate expertise and using this expertise in an optimal way, difficulties experienced by HQ in providing support to delegations, as yet inadequate financial information systems and complicated procedures are limiting the expected results of devolution in terms of increased speed and improved quality of project management (see paragraphs 52, 55, 59, 60 and 63).

73.

There are also indications that project preparation may slow down in the short term until delegations have adapted to their new responsibilities in this area. Although the reliability of indicators on speed of payments is uncertain due to errors in the underlying data, contracts and payments are generally managed in a timely manner by delegations. However, serious delays still occur outside the delegation, for example in the national administration and programme management units (see paragraphs 43 to 51).

74.

A system of appropriate indicators, based on reliable underlying data, should be introduced, relating to both speed and quality of aid, which measures progress from year to year and against standards to be set, at the global level and at the level of individual delegations.

75.

The actual annual costs of devolution should be monitored against the estimated costs.

76.

The Commission should ensure that its recruitment procedures, salaries and other conditions of employment can attract staff with the appropriate expertise to fulfil the increased staffing needs of its delegations.

77.

Thematic expertise within HQ services should be organised in order to provide good quality support to delegations in an efficient way.

78.

HQ’s monitoring role should be developed by establishing reference standards for assessing staffing levels in delegations, by providing more systematic and constructive feedback to delegations and by continuing to improve the financial information systems.

79.

HQ’s support role should be developed, in particular by providing more clarification on the new FR (applicable to the general budget), ensuring guidance is available promptly in the working language of the delegation and continuing to address outstanding training needs.

80.

The Commission should increase its efforts to try to reduce delays in project implementation, which occur outside the delegation at the level of the national administration or project units, particularly delays in making payments.

81.

The good example set by some devolved delegations in developing a comprehensive and systematic approach to external audits of implementing organisations, including their systematic follow-up, needs to be extended to all delegations.

82.

In order to optimise the results of devolution the Commission should continue to pay particular attention to the simplification, harmonisation and clarification of financial and contractual procedures.

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Special Report No 21/2000 on the Management of the Commission’s aid programmes, in particular on country programming, project preparation and the role of Delegations, paragraphs 51 to 53, (OJ C 57, 22.2.2001, p. 1).

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Special Report No 1/98 in respect of bilateral financial and technical cooperation with non-member Mediterranean countries, paragraph 39 (OJ C 98, 31.3.1998, p. 1).

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Special Report No 3/97 concerning the decentralised system for the implementation of the Phare programme, paragraphs 2.13 to 2.22 (OJ C 175, 9.6.1997, p. 4).

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Annual Report 1997, paragraph 5.23 (OJ C 349, 17.11.1998, p. 1).