1

This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 2 and of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

2

The request has been made in proceedings between B.V., a retired judge, and I.J. (the Romanian Judicial Inspectorate) concerning the latter’s refusal to issue him a standard certificate including the per diem posting allowances which B.V. had received, for the purpose of reviewing his pension rights.

3

Article 82(1) of the Legea nr. 303 privind statutul judecătorilor și procurorilor (Law No 303 on the status of judges and prosecutors) of 28 June 2004 (republished in Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 826 of 13 September 2005) in the version applicable in the main proceedings (‘the Law on the former status of judges and prosecutors’), provided, in essence, that judges with at least 25 years of seniority in judicial functions ‘may, when they reach the age of 60, receive a retirement pension, equal to 80% of the basis of calculation represented by the gross monthly special employment allowance or the gross basic monthly salary, as the case may be, and any increases received during the last month of service before the date of retirement’.

4

Article 7 of the implementing rules approved by the Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 1275 pentru aprobarea Normelor metodologice de aplicare a prevederilor Legii nr. 303/2004 privind statutul judecătorilor și procurorilor, republicată, și ale Legii nr. 47/1992 privind organizarea și funcționarea Curții Constituționale, republicată, referitoare la pensiile de serviciu și la acordarea indemnizațiilor pentru creșterea copilului în vârstă de până la 2 ani (Government Decision No 1275 approving the rules implementing the provisions of Law No 303/2004 on the status of judges and prosecutors, republished, and of Law No 47/1992 on the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court, republished, relating to retirement pensions and the granting of allowances for children under the age of two) of 18 October 2005 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 979 of 3 November 2005), provides, in paragraphs 1 and 3 thereof:

‘1.   The amount of the retirement pension provided for in Article 82(1) and (2) shall be equal to 80% of the average of the gross income earned during the last 12 months of service before the date of retirement.

…

3.   Permanent and non-permanent increases shall be included in the gross income earned, as well as the gross monthly special employment allowance. Gross income shall not include sums received as bonuses, perquisites, settlements, reimbursement of claims relating to another period, or the allowance equivalent to seven gross monthly special employment allowance payments referred to in Article 81(1) of the Law or other claims of a remunerative character.’

5

Under Article 13(1)(b) of those implementing rules:

‘For the purpose of determining the retirement pension, the pension file must contain:

…

6

Article 13(1)(a) of the Ordonanța de urgență a Guvernului nr. 27 privind salarizarea și alte drepturi ale judecătorilor și procurorilor și altor categorii de personal din sistemul justiției (Government Emergency Order No 27 on remuneration and other rights of judges, prosecutors and other categories of staff in the judicial system) of 29 March 2006 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 314 of 7 April 2006, ‘the OUG No 27/2006’), provides:

‘Judges, prosecutors, staff treated as such and assistant judges, posted or delegated to a place other than their place of residence shall, throughout the duration of the delegation or posting, be entitled to the following:

7

The Legea nr. 303 privind statutul judecătorilor și procurorilor (Law No 303 on the status of judges and prosecutors) of 15 November 2022 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 1102 of 16 November 2022), entered into force on 16 November 2022 and was amended by Legea nr. 282 pentru modificarea și completarea unor acte normative din domeniul pensiilor de serviciu și a Legii nr. 227/2015 privind codul fiscal (Law No 282 amending and supplementing implementing rules in the field of service pensions and Law No 227/2015 on the Tax Code) of 19 October 2023 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 950 of 20 October 2023) (‘the Law on the new status of judges and prosecutors’).

8

Following those amendments, Article 211 of the Law on the new status of judges and prosecutors was supplemented by paragraph 41, according to which, as of 1 January 2024:

‘The basis for calculating the retirement pension shall not include amounts received as bonuses, perquisites, adjustments, reimbursement of pay claims relating to a period other than that taken into account for the determination of pension entitlement, per diem allowances or any other entitlement which is not permanent.’

9

The explanatory memorandum to the draft law which led to that legislative amendment states that ‘the recalculation of the amount of retirement pensions does not amount to an expropriation of the beneficiaries of those pensions, but aims to reduce, compared to the current situation, pension rights within the scope of public obligations for which the State budget is committed. The recalculation of retirement pensions does not amount to a restriction of a constitutional right, but is necessary to reduce budgetary expenses’.

10

The applicant in the main proceedings, B.V., served as a judge until 1 December 2022, the date of his retirement. During the period in which he was an investigating judge within the Romanian Judicial Inspectorate, namely between 28 December 2018 and 1 December 2022, he received a per diem posting allowance, corresponding, under Article 13(1)(a) of the OUG No 27/2006, to 2% of the gross monthly special employment allowance.

11

In order to calculate his pension rights, on 10 November 2022, B.V. requested that the Chief Inspector of the Romanian Judicial Inspectorate issue a standard certificate stating the gross income he had received in November 2022, including the per diem posting allowance. That allowance amounted to Romanian lei (RON) 10143 (approximately EUR 2000) for the month of November 2022.

12

The Romanian Judicial Inspectorate refused to grant B.V.’s request, on the grounds that that allowance was not part of the basis for calculating the retirement pension under Article 82(1) of the Law on the former status of judges and prosecutors.

13

In November 2023, B.V. challenged that refusal before the Tribunalul Neamț (Regional Court, Neamț, Romania), which is the referring court.

14

It follows from the order for reference that, since the entry into force of the Law on the former status of judges and prosecutors, Romanian judges and prosecutors have been recognised as being entitled to receive a retirement pension corresponding to 80% of the basis of calculation consisting of, as the case may be, the gross monthly special employment allowance or the gross basic monthly salary, and any increases received during the last month of service before the date of retirement.

15

The referring court notes that, first, after classifying the per diem posting allowance as a remunerative right, in particular, in the decisions of 7 February 2022 and of 13 March 2023, the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania) has, by a decision of 11 November 2024 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 1269 of 17 December 2024), excluded that allowance from the basis for calculating the retirement pension and, secondly, since 1 January 2024, that approach is expressly provided for in Article 211(41) of the law on the new status of judges and prosecutors.

16

In that context, the referring court asks whether, in the absence of an objective criterion in the rules governing the remuneration of judges, the exclusion of that allowance from the basis for calculating retirement pensions breaches the principle of the independence of judges, which results from Articles 2 and 19 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, and which requires that judges receive stable remuneration that is linked to the importance and specificities of the duties performed. Several international instruments also emphasise that point, in particular, point 54 of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, entitled ‘Judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities’, adopted on 17 November 2010, and point 6.4 of the European Charter on the statute for judges, adopted in Strasbourg on 10 July 1998 by the Council of Europe.

17

In those circumstances the Tribunalul Neamț (Regional Court, Neamț) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Must Article 2 [TEU], which, in setting out the values on which the European Union is founded, refers to respect for the rule of law, and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) [TEU], read in conjunction with Article 47 of the [Charter], according to which the Member States are to ensure effective judicial protection based on the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal, be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence precludes a refusal to include also, within the scope of [retirement pension] rights, the pay component represented by the per diem [posting allowance] – a pay component which was not paid as reimbursement of expenses actually incurred as a result of the posting, such as travel, board and lodging expenses, and granted to judges who had the status of posted/delegated judges – in that that refusal derogates from the mechanism for determining judges’ [retirement pensions] on the basis of objective criteria, independent of the arbitrary intervention of the executive and the legislature, with the effect of permanently reducing the level of remuneration, thereby infringing the constitutional guarantees intended to ensure that judges receive a [retirement pension] in keeping with the dignity of their office and their sphere of competence, and that justice is administered by independent judicial bodies and independent judges?’

18

Under Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the reply to a question referred for a preliminary ruling may be clearly deduced from existing case-law or where the answer to the question referred admits of no reasonable doubt, the Court may at any time, on a proposal by the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide to rule by reasoned order.

19

That provision must be applied in the present case.

20

By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 2 TEU and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence precludes the refusal to take into account a per diem posting allowance for the calculation of a retirement pension, where such a refusal, first, derogates from the mechanism whereby the retirement pension of judges is intended to be determined on the basis of objective criteria, independent of the arbitrary intervention of the executive and the legislature, and, secondly, leads to a lasting reduction in the level of remuneration of retired judges.

21

As follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice, although, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary must be ensured in relation to the legislature and the executive of a Member State, the mere fact that the legislature and the executive are involved in determining judges’ remuneration is not, in itself, such as to create a dependence of those judges on the legislature or executive or to give rise to doubts as to the independence or impartiality of the judges. The Member States enjoy broad discretion when drawing up their budgets and deciding between the various items of public expenditure. That broad discretion includes determining the method of calculating that expenditure and, in particular, the judges’ remuneration. The national legislature and executive are indeed best placed to take into account the particular socio-economic context of the Member State in which that budget must be drawn up and judicial independence guaranteed (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė, C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraphs 50 and 51).

22

The fact remains nonetheless that national rules on judges’ remuneration must not give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to the interests before them. To that end, charters, reports and other documents drawn up by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the United Nations may provide relevant guidance for the interpretation of EU law where national provisions are adopted on the subject (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė, C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraphs 52 and 53).

23

As the Court held in paragraph 65 of the judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė (C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109), the legislature and the executive of a Member State may derogate from national legislation, which objectively defines the detailed rules for determining judges’ remuneration, by deciding to reduce the amount of that remuneration, subject to a number of requirements being met.

24

First, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, a measure reducing judges’ remuneration or their retirement pension must be provided for by law and must be objective, foreseeable and transparent (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

25

In that regard, it should be stated that the requirement of foreseeability is met in the case where the individual concerned is in a position, on the basis of the wording of the relevant provision and with the help of the interpretative assistance given by the courts, to know which acts or omissions will make him or her liable (see, by analogy, judgments of 3 May 2007, Advocaten voor de Wereld, C‑303/05, EU:C:2007:261, paragraph 50, and of 26 June 2025, Makeleio and Zougla, C‑555/23 and C‑556/23, EU:C:2025:484, paragraph 88). The principle of legal certainty, which requires that the rules of law be clear and precise and that their application be foreseeable for those subject to the law, in particular where they may have adverse consequences, cannot be understood as meaning that the legislature or national courts must, in the context of a norm that the legislature adopts and those courts interpret, refer to the various specific hypotheses in which an abstract norm may apply, given that those hypotheses cannot all be determined in advance (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council, C‑703/23 P, EU:C:2025:608, paragraph 33).

26

Secondly, a measure reducing judges’ salaries or their retirement pension must be justified by an objective in the general interest, such as a requirement to eliminate an excessive government deficit, within the meaning of Article 126(1) TFEU, it being specified that the possibility for a Member State to rely on such a requirement does not presuppose that a procedure under Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the EU and FEU Treaties, is initiated against it (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

27

The budgetary reasons justifying the adoption of a measure derogating from the rules of ordinary law on judges’ remuneration must be clearly set out. In addition, subject to duly justified exceptional circumstances, those measures must not be aimed specifically at members of the national courts alone and must form part of a more general framework seeking to ensure that a wider set of members of the national civil service contribute to the budgetary effort which is being pursued (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

28

As point 54 of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010) 12 of 17 November 2010 provides, ‘specific legal provisions should be introduced as a safeguard against a reduction in remuneration aimed specifically at judges’. By contrast, as stated in point 57 of the explanatory memorandum to that recommendation, ‘public policies aiming at the general reduction of civil servants’ remuneration are not in contradiction with the requirement to avoid reducing specifically judges’ remuneration’.

29

Consequently, when a Member State adopts budgetary restriction measures affecting its officials and public servants, it may, in a society in which solidarity prevails, as stated in Article 2 TEU, decide to apply those measures also to national judges (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

30

Thirdly, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, which constitutes a general principle of EU law, a measure seeking to reduce judges’ remuneration must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective of general interest pursued to eliminate an excessive government deficit, be limited to what is strictly necessary in order to attain that objective and not be disproportionate to that objective, which means that the importance of that objective must be weighed against the seriousness of the interference with the principle of judicial independence (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraph 30).

31

Nevertheless, in view of the broad discretion conferred on the Member States when drawing up their budgets and deciding between the various items of public expenditure, as recalled in paragraph 21 of this order, it is open to a Member State to adopt a legislative measure which seeks not to derogate from the basic legislation fixing judges’ remuneration in order to deal with a budgetary crisis but to amend that legislation for the future, by reducing their remuneration, in order to improve its long-term budgetary position (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraph 32).

32

The principle of judicial independence, which follows from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU, cannot preclude such an amendment, even if it is not limited in time, provided that the newly set level of judges’ remuneration remains sufficient to ensure their independence. The preservation of judicial independence requires in fact that, notwithstanding the application to the judiciary of a budgetary restriction measure, the level of remuneration of judges is always commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out, so that they remain shielded from external interventions or pressure liable to jeopardise their independent judgment and to influence their decisions (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraphs 33 and 34).

33

The level of remuneration of judges must be sufficiently high, in the light of the socio-economic context of the Member State concerned, in order to confer on them a certain economic independence to protect them against any external interference or pressure that might undermine the neutrality of their decisions. Thus, the level of that remuneration must be such as to protect judges against the risk of corruption. In order to assess the adequacy of judges’ remuneration, account must be taken, inter alia, of the economic, social and financial situation of the Member State concerned. From that point of view, it is appropriate to compare the average remuneration of judges to the average salary in that State (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraphs 35 and 36).

34

Those considerations apply mutatis mutandis to retired judges. The fact that serving judges have a guarantee that they will receive a sufficiently high pension after their retirement is such as to protect them against the risk of corruption during their period of service (judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

35

Reference should be made, in that regard, to point 54 of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010) 12 of 17 November 2010, according to which ‘guarantees should exist for the payment … of a retirement pension, which should be in a reasonable relationship to their level of remuneration when working’. Likewise, it is apparent from point 6.4 of the European Charter on the statute for judges referred to in paragraph 16 of this order that that statute must guarantee that judges ‘who have reached the legal age of judicial retirement, having performed their judicial duties for a fixed period, are paid a retirement pension, the level of which must be as close as possible to the level of their final salary as a judge’.

36

Fourthly, a salary reduction measure must be capable of being subject to effective judicial review, in accordance with the procedural rules laid down by the law of the Member State concerned.

37

Although in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU it is not for the Court to apply the rules of EU law to a particular case, it may, in order to provide an answer of use to the referring courts, provide guidance based on the documents relating to the main proceedings and on the written observations before it, in order to enable those courts to give judgment (judgment of 25 February 2025, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė, C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, EU:C:2025:109, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

38

In that regard, the Court notes that, in the present case, neither the Law on the former status of judges and prosecutors, nor Government Decision No 1275 of 18 October 2005 nor the OUG No 27/2006 has expressly settled the question of whether the per diem posting allowance has a remunerative character or not. Moreover, taking into account the fluctuations noted on that point in the case-law of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice), referred to in paragraph 15 of this order, it follows that the right to have that allowance included in the calculation of the retirement pension cannot be regarded as having a sufficient basis in Romanian law (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 June 2025, Curtea de Apel București (Abolition of severance payment made to judges upon retirement), C‑762/23, EU:C:2025:400, paragraph 48).

39

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 2 TEU and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude the refusal to take into account a per diem posting allowance for the calculation of a retirement pension, where such a refusal, first, derogates from the mechanism whereby the retirement pension of judges is intended to be determined on the basis of objective criteria, independent of the arbitrary intervention of the executive and the legislature, and, secondly, leads to a lasting reduction in the level of remuneration of retired judges.

40

Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Seventh Chamber) hereby rules:

Article 2 TEU and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude the refusal to take into account a per diem posting allowance for the calculation of a retirement pension, where such a refusal, first, derogates from the mechanism whereby the retirement pension of judges is intended to be determined on the basis of objective criteria, independent of the arbitrary intervention of the executive and the legislature, and, secondly, leads to a lasting reduction in the level of remuneration of retired judges.