26.1.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/27


Appeal brought on 16 November 2007 by Philip Morris Products SA against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) delivered on 12 September 2007 in Case T-140/06 Philip Morris Products v OHIM

(Case C-497/07 P)

(2008/C 22/52)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Philip Morris Products SA (represented by: T. van Innis and C. S. Moreau, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

Form of order sought

Set aside the judgment under appeal;

Order the Office to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of First Instance infringed Articles 4 and 7(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (1). In this respect, it complains, first, that the Court of First Instance based its assessment on a bias against the category of marks in which the mark applied for falls. In finding that consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of goods on the basis of their shape or of the shape of their packaging, the Court of First Instance made a factual finding which has no scientific foundation whatsoever and misconstrues the human perception of signs in general, and of shapes in particular.

Second, the appellant complains that the Court of First Instance carried out an incorrect legal analysis of the relevant public's perception of the mark. That error arises, on the one hand, from the fact that the Court envisaged use of the mark only through its incorporation into a packet of cigarettes, although the shape of packaging for a given product can be perceived by the public in a multitude of other forms, such as graphic or three-dimensional representations of the mark in advertising material. The error of assessment arises, on the other hand, from the fact that the Court of First Instance reduced the concept of a mark to its part which is perceptible by a prospective purchaser at the moment immediately prior to his purchase, whilst the public concerned by a mark is composed of all those who may be faced with it in the course of normal use of the mark, which occurs both during the advertising of the product before it has been purchased and during use or consumption of the product after it has been purchased.

The appellant claims, thirdly and lastly, that the grounds of the judgment under appeal are contradictory.


(1)  OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1.