02006R0765 — EN — 17.12.2020 — 028.001


This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document

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▼M7

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 765/2006

of 18 May 2006

concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus

▼B

(OJ L 134 20.5.2006, p. 1)

Amended by:

 

 

Official Journal

  No

page

date

 M1

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1587/2006 of 23 October 2006

  L 294

25

25.10.2006

 M2

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006

  L 363

1

20.12.2006

►M3

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 646/2008 of 8 July 2008

  L 180

5

9.7.2008

►M4

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 84/2011 of 31 January 2011

  L 28

17

2.2.2011

 M5

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 271/2011 of 21 March 2011

  L 76

13

22.3.2011

 M6

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 505/2011 of 23 May 2011

  L 136

48

24.5.2011

►M7

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 588/2011 of 20 June 2011

  L 161

1

21.6.2011

►M8

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 999/2011 of 10 October 2011

  L 265

6

11.10.2011

 M9

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1000/2011 of 10 October 2011

  L 265

8

11.10.2011

 M10

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1320/2011 of 16 December 2011

  L 335

15

17.12.2011

 M11

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 114/2012 of 10 February 2012

  L 38

3

11.2.2012

 M12

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 170/2012 of 28 February 2012

  L 55

1

29.2.2012

 M13

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 265/2012 of 23 March 2012

  L 87

37

24.3.2012

►M14

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 354/2012 of 23 April 2012

  L 113

1

25.4.2012

►M15

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 1014/2012 of 6 November 2012

  L 307

1

7.11.2012

 M16

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1017/2012 of 6 November 2012

  L 307

7

7.11.2012

 M17

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 494/2013 of 29 May 2013

  L 143

1

30.5.2013

 M18

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013

  L 158

1

10.6.2013

 M19

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1054/2013 of 29 October 2013

  L 288

1

30.10.2013

 M20

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 46/2014 of 20 January 2014

  L 16

3

21.1.2014

 M21

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 740/2014 of 8 July 2014

  L 200

1

9.7.2014

 M22

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1159/2014 of 30 October 2014

  L 311

2

31.10.2014

 M23

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1133 of 13 July 2015

  L 185

1

14.7.2015

 M24

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1326 of 31 July 2015

  L 206

16

1.8.2015

 M25

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/1948 of 29 October 2015

  L 284

62

30.10.2015

 M26

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1949 of 29 October 2015

  L 284

71

30.10.2015

►M27

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/276 of 25 February 2016

  L 52

19

27.2.2016

►M28

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2016/277 of 25 February 2016

  L 52

22

27.2.2016

►M29

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2017/331 of 27 February 2017

  L 50

9

28.2.2017

►M30

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2018/275 of 23 February 2018

  L 54

1

24.2.2018

►M31

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/1163 of 5 July 2019

  L 182

33

8.7.2019

►M32

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1387 of 2 October 2020

  L 319I

1

2.10.2020

►M33

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1648 of 6 November 2020

  L 370I

1

6.11.2020

►M34

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/2129 of 17 December 2020

  L 426I

1

17.12.2020


Corrected by:

 C1

Corrigendum, OJ L 299, 17.10.2014, p.  32 (46/2014)

 C2

Corrigendum, OJ L 328, 13.11.2014, p.  60 (740/2014)

 C3

Corrigendum, OJ L 176, 7.7.2015, p.  40 (740/2014)




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COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 765/2006

of 18 May 2006

concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus

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Article 1

For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

1. 

‘funds’ means financial assets and benefits of every kind, including but not limited to:

(a) 

cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;

(b) 

deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;

(c) 

publicly- and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;

(d) 

interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;

(e) 

credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;

(f) 

letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale;

(g) 

documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial resources.

2. 

‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the use of the funds, including portfolio management.

3. 

‘economic resources’ means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services.

4. 

‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them.

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5. 

‘territory of the Community’ means the territories of the Member States, including their airspace, to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty.

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6. 

‘technical assistance’ means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services; including verbal forms of assistance.

Article 1a

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, whether or not originating in the Union, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(b) 

to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in point (a).

2.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, including flak jackets and helmets, temporarily exported to Belarus by United Nations (UN) personnel, personnel of the Union or its Member States, representatives of the media or humanitarian and development workers and associated persons exclusively for their personal use.
3.  
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities in the Member States as listed in Annex II may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment which might be used for internal repression, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, if they determine that such equipment is intended solely for humanitarian or protective use.

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4.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to the rifles and their ammunition and sights that are listed in Annex IV and which also comply with the specifications for biathlon equipment as defined in the event and competition rules of the International Biathlon Union (IBU) and are intended exclusively for use in biathlon events and training.

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5.  
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities in the Member States as listed in Annex II may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of sporting rifles, sporting pistols and their ammunition, as listed in Annex V, which also comply with the specifications defined in the equipment control guide of International Shooting Sport Federation, under such conditions as those authorities deem appropriate, if they determine that such equipment is intended exclusively for use in sports events and sports training recognised by the International Shooting Sport Federation.
6.  
The Member State concerned shall notify the other Member States and the Commission of its intention to grant an authorisation pursuant to paragraph 5 at least 10 days prior to the authorisation, including the type and quantity of the equipment concerned and the purpose for which it is intended.

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Article 1b

1.  

It shall be prohibited:

(a) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List of the European Union ( 1 ) (‘Common Military List’), or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods included in that list, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(b) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(c) 

to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List or in Annex III, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for any provision of related technical assistance to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

(d) 

to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) to (c).

2.  

By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the prohibitions referred to therein shall not apply to:

(a) 

non-lethal military equipment, or equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian purposes or protective use or for institution building programmes of the UN and the Union, or for EU or UN crisis management operations; or

(b) 

non-combat vehicles fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for the protective use of personnel of the Union and its Member States in Belarus,

provided that the provision thereof has first been approved by the competent authority of a Member State, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II.

3.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Belarus by UN personnel, personnel of the Union or its Member States, representatives of the media or humanitarian and development workers and associated persons exclusively for their personal use.

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4.  
Paragraph 1 shall not apply to the rifles and their ammunition and sights that are listed in Annex IV and which also comply with the specifications for biathlon equipment as defined in the event and competition rules of the IBU and are intended exclusively for use in biathlon events and training.

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5.  
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities in the Member States as listed in Annex II may authorise the provision, directly or indirectly, of technical assistance or brokering services, financing or financial assistance related to sporting rifles, sporting pistols and their ammunition, as listed in Annex V, which also comply with the specifications defined in the equipment control guide of International Shooting Sport Federation, under such conditions as those authorities deem appropriate, if they determine that such equipment is intended exclusively for use in sports events and sports training recognised by the International Shooting Sport Federation.
6.  
The Member State concerned shall notify the other Member States and the Commission of its intention to grant an authorisation pursuant to paragraph 5 at least 10 days prior to the authorisation, including on the nature of the assistance or services related thereto.

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Article 2

1.  
All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex I shall be frozen.
2.  
No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex I.
3.  
The participation, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is, directly or indirectly, to circumvent the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be prohibited.
4.  
Annex I shall consist of a list of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with point (a) of Article 4(1) of Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus ( 2 ), have been identified by the Council as being responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, or any natural or legal persons, entities and bodies associated with them, as well as legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them.
5.  
Annex I shall also consist of a list of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with point (b) of Article 4(1) of Decision 2012/642/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenka regime, as well as legal persons, entities and bodies owned or controlled by them.

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Article 2a

The prohibition set out in Article 2(2) shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned, if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe this prohibition.

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Article 2b

1.  
►M15  Annex I ◄ shall include the grounds for the listing of listed persons, entities and bodies.
2.  
►M15  Annex I ◄ shall also include, where available, information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities and bodies, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

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Article 3

1.  

By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are:

(a) 

necessary to satisfy the basic needs of persons listed in ►M15  Annex I ◄ and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

(b) 

intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services; or

(c) 

intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources.

2.  
By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the Member State concerned has notified the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least 2 weeks before the authorisation.
3.  
Member States shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 or 2.

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Article 4

1.  

Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of

(a) 

interest or other earnings on those accounts; or

(b) 

payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this Regulation,

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to Article 2(1).

2.  
Article 2(2) shall not prevent financial or credit institutions in the EU from crediting the frozen accounts, if they receive funds transferred by third parties to the account of the listed person, entity or body, provided that any additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial or credit institution shall inform the competent authorities about such transactions without delay.

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Article 4a

By way of derogation from Article 2(1), where a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in ►M15  Annex I ◄ is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned before the date on which that person, entity or body had been listed, the competent authorities of the Member States, as indicated on the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that:

(i) 

the competent authority concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of a person, entity or body listed in ►M15  Annex I ◄ ; and

(ii) 

the Member State concerned has, at least 2 weeks prior to the grant of the authorisation, notified the other Member States and the Commission of that determination and its intention to grant the authorisation.

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Article 4b

By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are necessary for official purposes of diplomatic missions or consular posts or international organisations enjoying immunities in accordance with international law.

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Article 5

1.  

Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:

(a) 

immediately supply the competent authorities indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, in the country where they are resident or located, with any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2, and directly or indirectly supply such information to the Commission; and

(b) 

cooperate with the competent authorities indicated in the websites listed in Annex II in any verification of this information.

2.  
Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

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Article 6

The freezing of funds and economic resources or the refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen as a result of negligence.

Article 7

The Commission and Member States shall immediately inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and shall supply each other with any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.

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Article 8

The Commission shall be empowered toamend Annex II on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

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Article 8a

1.  
Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2(1), it shall amend ►M15  Annex I ◄ accordingly.
2.  
The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
3.  
Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body accordingly.
4.  
The lists in ►M15  Annex I ◄ shall be reviewed in regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

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▼B

Article 9

1.  
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2.  
Member States shall notify these rules to the Commission without delay after entry into force of the Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

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Article 9a

1.  
Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in Articles 3, 4(2) and 5 and identify them in the websites listed in Annex II.
2.  
Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities and the contact details thereof by 31 July 2008 and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment without delay.

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Article 9b

Where there is, in this Regulation, a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex II.

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Article 10

This Regulation shall apply:

— 
within the territory of the Community, including its airspace,
— 
on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State,
— 
to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Community who is a national of a Member State,
— 
to any legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State,
— 
to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Community.

Article 11

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

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ANNEX I

Persons referred to in Article 2(1)

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List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2(1)



▼M34

A.  Natural persons referred to in Article 2(1)

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Names

Transcription of Belarusian spelling

Transcription of Russian spelling

Names

(Belarusian spelling)

Names

(Russian spelling)

Identifying Information

Reasons for listing

1.

Navumau, Uladzimir Uladzimiravich

Naumov, Vladimir Vladimirovich

НАВУМАЎ, Уладзімір Уладзіміравіч

НАУМОВ, Владимир Владимирович

DOB: 7.2.1956

POB: Smolensk (Russia)

Failed to take action to investigate the case of the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Minister of Interior and also former Head of the President's Security Service. As a Minister of Interior he was responsible for the repression of peaceful demonstrations until his retirement on 6 April 2009 for health reasons. Received a residence in the Drozdy nomenklatura district in Minsk from the Presidential Administration. In October 2014, was awarded the Order ‘For Merit’ III degree by President Lukashenka.

2.

Paulichenka, Dzmitry Valerievich

Pavlichenko, Dmitri Valerievich (Pavlichenko, Dmitriy Valeriyevich)

ПАЎЛІЧЭНКА, Дзмітрый Валер'евіч

ПАВЛИЧЕНКО, Дмитрий Валериевич

DOB: 1966

POB: Vitebsk

Белорусская ассоциация ветеранов спецподразделений войск МВД ‘Честь’

220028, Минск Маяковского, 111

Key person in the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Head of the Special Response Group at the Ministry of Interior (SOBR).

Businessman, Head of ‘Honour’, the Ministry of Interior's Association of the veterans from special forces from the Ministry of Interior.

3.

Sheiman, Viktar Uladzimiravich (Sheyman, Viktar Uladzimiravich)

Sheiman, Viktor Vladimirovich (Sheyman, Viktor Vladimirovich)

ШЭЙМАН, Bіктap Уладзіміравіч

ШЕЙМАН, Виктор Владимирович

DOB: 26.5.1958

POB: Hrodna region

Address:

Управлениe Делами Президента

ул. К.Маркса, 38

220016, г. Минск

Head of the Management Department of the President's Administration. Responsible for the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Secretary of the Security Council. Sheiman remains a Special Assistant/Aid to the President.

4.

Sivakau, Iury Leanidavich (Sivakau, Yury Leanidavich)

Sivakov, Iury (Yurij, Yuri) Leonidovich

СІВАКАЎ, Юрый Леанідавіч

СИВАКОВ, Юрий Леонидович

DOB: 5.8.1946

POB: Onory, Sakhalin Region

Address:

Белорусская ассоциация ветеранов спецподразделений войск МВД ‘Честь’

220028, Минск Маяковского, 111

Orchestrated the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Minister of Tourism and Sports, former Minister of Interior and former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration.

▼M32

5.

Yuri Khadzimuratavich KARAEU

Yuri Khadzimuratovich KARAEV

Юрый Хаджымуратавіч КАРАЕЎ

Юрий Хаджимуратович КАРАЕВ

Minister of Internal Affairs, Major-General of Militia (police force)

DOB: 21.6.1966

POB: Ordzhonikidze, former USSR (now Vladikavkaz, Russian Federation)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Minister of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

6.

Genadz Arkadzievich KAZAKEVICH

Gennadi Arkadievich KAZAKEVICH

Генадзь Аркадзьевіч КАЗАКЕВІЧ

Геннадий Аркадьевич КАЗАКЕВИЧ

First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – Chief of the Criminal Militia, Colonel of Militia (police force)

DOB: 14.2.1975

POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

7.

Aliaksandr Piatrovich BARSUKOU

Aleksandr Petrovich BARSUKOV

Аляксандр Пятровіч БАРСУКОЎ

Александр Петрович БАРСУКОВ

Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major-General of Militia (police force)

DOB: 29.4.1965

POB: Vetkovski, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

8.

Siarhei Mikalaevich KHAMENKA

Sergei Nikolaevich KHOMENKO

Сяргей Мікалаевіч ХАМЕНКА

Сергей Николаевич ХОМЕНКО

Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major-General of Militia (police force)

DOB: 21.9.1966

POB: Yasinovataya, former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

9.

Yuri Genadzevich NAZARANKA

Yuri Gennadievich NAZARENKO

Юрый Генадзевіч НАЗАРАНКА

Юрий Геннадьевич НАЗАРЕНКО

Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Commander of the Internal Troops

DOB: 17.4.1976

POB: Slonim, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and Commander of the MoIA Internal Troops, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces, in particular Internal Troops under his command, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

10.

Khazalbek Baktibekavich ATABEKAU

Khazalbek Bakhtibekovich ATABEKOV

Хазалбек Бактібекавіч АТАБЕКАЎ

Хазалбек Бахтибекович АТАБЕКОВ

Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops

DOB: 18.3.1967

Gender: male

In his position as Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces, in particular Internal Troops under his command, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators, as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

11.

Aliaksandr Valerievich BYKAU

Alexander Valerievich BYKOV

Аляксандр Валер’евіч БЫКАЎ

Александр Валерьевич БЫКОВ

Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR), Lieutenant Colonel

Gender: male

In his position as Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by SOBR forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators.

12.

Aliaksandr Sviataslavavich SHEPELEU

Alexander Svyatoslavovich SHEPELEV

Аляксандр Святаслававіч ШЭПЕЛЕЎ

Александр Святославович ШЕПЕЛЕВ

Head of the Department for Safety and Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 14.10.1975

POB: village of Rublevsk, Kruglyanskiy district, Mogilev region, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his senior position as Head of the Department for Safety and Security in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is involved in the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

13.

Dzmitry Uladzimiravich BALABA

Dmitry Vladimirovich BALABA

Дзмітрый Уладзіміравіч БАЛАБА

Дмитрий Владимирович БАЛАБА

Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) for the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 1.6.1972

POB: village of Gorodilovo, Minsk region, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his command position over OMON forces in Minsk, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Minsk in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

14.

Ivan Uladzimiravich KUBRAKOU

Ivan Vladimirovich KUBRAKOV

Іван Уладзіміравіч КУБРАКОЎ

Иван Владимирович КУБРАКОВ

Head of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 5.5.1975

POB: village of Malinovka, Mogilev Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as Head of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

15.

Maxim Aliaksandravich GAMOLA

Maxim Alexandrovich GAMOLA

Максім Аляксандравіч ГАМОЛА

Максим Александрович ГАМОЛА

Head of the Police Department in Moskovski District, Minsk

Gender: male

In his position as Head of the Police Department in Moskovski District, Minsk, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill‐treatment, including torture.

16.

Aliaksandr Mikhailavich ALIASHKEVICH

Alexander Mikhailovich ALESHKEVICH

Аляксандр Міхайлавіч АЛЯШКЕВIЧ

Александр Михайлович АЛЕШКЕВИЧ

First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk, Head of Criminal Police

Gender: male

In his position as First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk and Head of Criminal Police, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill‐treatment, including torture.

17.

Andrei Vasilievich GALENKA

Andrey Vasilievich GALENKA

Андрэй Васільевіч ГАЛЕНКА

Андрей Васильевич ГАЛЕНКА

Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk, Head of Public Safety Police

Gender: male

In his position as Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk and Head of Public Safety Police, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill‐treatment, including torture.

18.

Aliaksandr Paulavich VASILIEU

Alexander Pavlovich VASILIEV

Аляксандр Паўлавіч ВАСІЛЬЕЎ

Александр Павлович ВАСИЛЬЕВ

Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Oblast Executive Committee

DOB: 24.3.1975

POB: Mahilou/Mogilev, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Oblast Executive Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

19.

Aleh Mikalaevich SHULIAKOUSKI

Oleg Nikolaevich SHULIAKOVSKI

Алег Мікалаевіч ШУЛЯКОЎСКІ

Олег Николаевич ШУЛЯКОВСКИЙ

First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Criminal Police

DOB: 26.7.1977

Gender: male

In his position as First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Oblast Executive Committee and Head of Criminal Police, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill‐treatment, including torture.

20.

Anatol Anatolievich VASILIEU

Anatoli Anatolievich VASILIEV

Анатоль Анатольевіч ВАСІЛЬЕЎ

Анатолий Анатольевич ВАСИЛЬЕВ

Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Public Safety Police

DOB: 26.1.1972

POB: Gomel/Homyel, Gomel/Homyel Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Oblast Executive Committee and Head of Public Safety Police, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill‐treatment, including torture.

21.

Aliaksandr Viachaslavavich ASTREIKA

Alexander Viacheslavovich ASTREIKO

Аляксандр Вячаслававіч АСТРЭЙКА

Александр Вячеславович АСТРЕЙКО

Head of Department of Internal Affairs of Brest Oblast Executive Committee, Major-General of Militia (police force)

DOB: 22.12.1971

POB: Kapyl, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as Head of Department of Internal Affairs of Brest Oblast Executive Committee and Major-General of Militia, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill‐treatment, including torture.

22.

Leanid ZHURAUSKI

Leonid ZHURAVSKI

Леанід ЖУРАЎСКІ

Леонид ЖУРАВСКИЙ

Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Vitebsk/Viciebsk

DOB: 20.9.1975

Gender: male

In his command position over OMON forces in Vitebsk/Viciebsk, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Vitebsk in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

23.

Mikhail DAMARNACKI

Mikhail DOMARNATSKY

Міхаіл ДАМАРНАЦКІ

Михаил ДОМАРНАЦКИЙ

Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Gomel/Homyel

Gender: male

In his command position over OMON forces in Gomel/Homyel, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Gomel/Homyel in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

24.

Maxim MIKHOVICH

Maxim MIKHOVICH

Максім МІХОВІЧ

Максим МИХОВИЧ

Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Brest, Lieutenant Colonel

Gender: male

In his command position over OMON forces in Brest, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Brest in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

25.

Aleh Uladzimiravich MATKIN

Oleg Vladimirovitch MATKIN

Алег Уладзіміравіч МАТКІН

Олег Владимирович МАТКИН

Head of Penal Correction Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), Major-General of Militia (police force)

Gender: male

In his position as Head of the Penal Correction Department that has authority over MoIA detention facilities, he is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters.

26.

Ivan Yurievich SAKALOUSKI

Ivan Yurievich SOKOLOVSKI

Іван Юр’евіч САКАЛОЎСКІ

Иван Юрьевич СОКОЛОВСКИЙ

Director of the Akrestina detention centre, Minsk

Gender: male

In his capacity as Director of the Akrestina detention centre in Minsk, he is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in that detention centre in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

27.

Valeri Paulavich VAKULCHYK

Valery Pavlovich VAKULCHIK

Валéрый Пáўлавічimage

Валерий Павлович ВАКУЛЬЧИК

Former Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB). Currently State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus

DOB: 19.6.1964

POB: Radostovo, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he was responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

28.

Siarhei Yaugenavich TSERABAU

Sergey Evgenievich TEREBOV

Сяргей Яўгенавіч ЦЕРАБАЎ

Сергей Евгеньевич ТЕРЕБОВ

First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

DOB: 1972

POB: Borisov/Barisaw, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he is responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

29.

Dzmitry Vasilievich RAVUTSKI

Dmitry Vasilievich REUTSKY

Дзмітрый Васільевіч РАВУЦКІ

Дмитрий Васильевич РЕУЦКИЙ

Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he is responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

30.

Uladzimir Viktaravich KALACH

Vladimir Viktorovich KALACH

Уладзімір Віктаравіч КАЛАЧ

Владимир Викторович КАЛАЧ

Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he is responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

31.

Alieg Anatolevich CHARNYSHOU

Oleg Anatolievich CHERNYSHEV

Алег Анатольевіч ЧАРНЫШОЎ

Олег Анатольевич ЧЕРНЫШЁВ

Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he is responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

32.

Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich KANYUK

Aleksandr Vladimirovich KONYUK

Аляксандр Уладзімiравіч КАНЮК

Александр Владимирович КОНЮК

Former Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 11.7.1960

POB: Hrodna/Grodno, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as Prosecutor General, he was responsible for the widespread use of criminal proceedings to disqualify opposition candidates ahead of the 2020 presidential election and to prevent persons from joining the Coordination Council launched by the opposition to challenge the outcome of that election.

33.

Lidzia Mihailauna YARMOSHINA

Lidia Mikhailovna YERMOSHINA

Лідзія Міхайлаўна ЯРМОШЫНА

Лидия Михайловна ЕРМОШИНА

Chairwoman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 29.1.1953

POB: Slutsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

As Chairwoman of the CEC, she is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

34.

Vadzim Dzmitryevich IPATAU

Vadim Dmitrievich IPATOV

Вадзім Дзмітрыевіч ІПАТАЎ

Вадим Дмитриевич ИПАТОВ

Deputy Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 30.10.1964

POB: Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: male

As Deputy Chairman of the CEC, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

35.

Alena Mikalaeuna DMUHAILA

Elena Nikolaevna DMUHAILO

Алена Мікалаеўна ДМУХАЙЛА

Елена Николаевна ДМУХАЙЛО

Secretary of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 1.7.1971

Gender: female

As Secretary of the CEC, she is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

36.

Andrei Anatolievich GURZHY

Andrey Anatolievich GURZHIY

Андрэй Анатольевіч ГУРЖЫ

Андрей Анатольевич ГУРЖИЙ

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 10.10.1975

Gender: male

As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

37.

Volga Leanidauna DARASHENKA

Olga Leonidovna DOROSHENKO

Вольга Леанідаўна ДАРАШЭНКА

Ольга Леонидовна ДОРОШЕНКО

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 1976

Gender: female

As a member of the CEC college, she is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

38.

Siarhei Aliakseevich KALINOUSKI

Sergey Alekseevich KALINOVSKIY

Сяргей Аляксеевіч КАЛІНОЎСКІ

Сергей Алексеевич КАЛИНОВСКИЙ

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 3.1.1969

Gender: male

As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

39.

Sviatlana Piatrouna KATSUBA

Svetlana Petrovna KATSUBO

Святлана Пятроўна КАЦУБА

Светлана Петровна КАЦУБО

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 6.8.1959

POB: Podilsk, Odessa Oblast, former USSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: female

As a member of the CEC college, she is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

40.

Aliaksandr Mikhailavich LASYAKIN

Alexander Mikhailovich LOSYAKIN

Аляксандр Міхайлавіч ЛАСЯКІН

Александр Михайлович ЛОСЯКИН

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 21.7.1957

Gender: male

As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

41.

Igar Anatolievich PLYSHEUSKI

Ihor Anatolievich PLYSHEVSKIY

Ігар Анатольевіч ПЛЫШЭЎСКІ

Игорь Анатольевич ПЛЫШЕВСКИЙ

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 19.2.1979

POB: Lyuban, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

42.

Marina Yureuna RAKHMANAVA

Marina Yurievna RAKHMANOVA

Марына Юр’еўна РАХМАНАВА

Марина Юрьевна РАХМАНОВА

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 26.9.1970

Gender: female

As a member of the CEC college, she is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

43.

Aleh Leanidavich SLIZHEUSKI

Oleg Leonidovich SLIZHEVSKI

Алег Леанідавiч СЛIЖЭЎСКІ

Олег Леонидович СЛИЖЕВСКИЙ

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 16.8.1972

POB: Hrodna/Grodno, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for the misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

44.

Irina Aliaksandrauna TSELIKAVETS

Irina Alexandrovna TSELIKOVEC

Ірына Аляксандраўна ЦЭЛІКАВЕЦ

Ирина Александровна ЦЕЛИКОВЕЦ

Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

DOB: 2.11.1976

POB: Zhlobin, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

As a member of the CEC college, she is responsible for the misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non‐compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of some opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

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45.

Aliaksandr Ryhoravich LUKASHENKA

Alexandr Grigorievich LUKASHENKO

Аляксандр Рыгоравіч ЛУКАШЭНКА

Александр Григорьевич ЛУКАШЕНКО

President of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 30.8.1954

POB: Kopys settlement, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

As President of Belarus with authority over State bodies, he is responsible for the violent repression by the State apparatus carried out before and after the 2020 presidential election, in particular with the dismissal of key opposition candidates, arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

46.

Viktar Aliaksandravich LUKASHENKA

Viktor Aleksandrovich LUKASHENKO

Віктар Аляксандравіч ЛУКАШЭНКА

Виктор Александрович ЛУКАШЕНКО

National Security Advisor to the President, Member of the Security Council

DOB: 28.11.1975

POB: Mogilev/Mahiliou (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as National Security Advisor to the President and a Member of the Security Council, as well as his informal supervisory position over Belarus security forces, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

47.

Ihar Piatrovich SERGYAENKA

Igor Petrovich SERGEENKO

Ігар Пятровіч СЕРГЯЕНКА

Игорь Петрович СЕРГЕЕНКО

Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration

DOB: 14.1.1963

POB: Stolitsa village in Vitebsk/Viciebsk Oblast (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, he is closely associated with the President and responsible for ensuring the implementation of presidential powers in the field of domestic and foreign policy. He is thus supporting the Lukashenka regime, including in the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

48.

Ivan Stanislavavich TERTEL

Ivan Stanislavovich TERTEL

Іван Станіслававіч ТЭРТЭЛЬ

Иван Станиславович ТЕРТЕЛЬ

Chairman of KGB, former Chairman of the State Control Committee

DOB: 8.9.1966

POB: village Privalki/Privalka in Hrodna/Grodno Oblast (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Chairman of State Security Committee KGB and in his former position as the Chairman of the State Control Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

49.

Raman Ivanavich MELNIK

Roman Ivanovich MELNIK

Раман Іванавіч МЕЛЬНІК

Роман Иванович МЕЛЬНИК

Head of Main Directorate of Law and Order Protection and Prevention at the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 29.5.1964

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Head of Main Directorate of Law and Order Protection and Prevention at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

50.

Ivan Danilavich NASKEVICH

Ivan Danilovich NOSKEVICH

Іван Данілавіч НАСКЕВІЧ

Иван Данилович НОСКЕВИЧ

Chairman of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 25.3.1970

POB: village of Cierabličy in Brest Oblast (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, notably with investigations launched against the Coordination Council launched by the opposition to challenge the outcome of that election and peaceful demonstrators.

51.

Aliaksey Aliaksandravich VOLKAU

Alexey Aleksandrovich VOLKOV

Аляксей Аляксандравіч ВОЛКАЎ

Алексей Александрович ВОЛКОВ

Former First Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, currently Chairman of the State Committee for Forensic Expertise

DOB: 7.9.1973

POB: Minsk (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership position as the First Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, notably with investigations launched against the Coordination Council launched by the opposition to challenge the outcome of that election and peaceful demonstrators.

52.

Siarhei Yakaulevich AZEMSHA

Sergei Yakovlevich AZEMSHA

Сяргей Якаўлевіч АЗЕМША

Сергей Яковлевич АЗЕМША

Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 17.7.1974

POB: Rechitsa, Gomel Oblast (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, notably with investigations launched against the Coordination Council launched by the opposition to challenge the outcome of that election and peaceful demonstrators.

53.

Andrei Fiodaravich SMAL

Andrei Fyodorovich SMAL

Андрэй Фёдаравіч СМАЛЬ

Андрей Федорович СМАЛЬ

Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee

DOB: 1.8.1973

POB: Brest (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, notably with investigations launched against the Coordination Council launched by the opposition to challenge the outcome of that election and peaceful demonstrators.

54.

Andrei Yurevich PAULIUCHENKA

Andrei Yurevich PAVLYUCHENKO

Андрэй Юр’евіч ПАЎЛЮЧЕНКА

Андрей Юрьевич ПАВЛЮЧЕНКО

Head of Operational-Analytical Center

DOB: 1.8.1971

Gender: male

In his leadership position as the Head of Operational-Analytical Center, he is closely associated with the President and responsible for the repression of civil society, notably with interrupting connection to telecommunication networks as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

55.

Ihar Ivanavich BUZOUSKI

Igor Ivanovich BUZOVSKI

Ігар Іванавіч БУЗОЎСКІ

Игорь Иванович БУЗОВСКИЙ

Deputy Minister of Information DOB: 10.7.1972

POB: village of Koshelevo, Grodno/Hrodna region (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Deputy Minister of Information, he is responsible for the repression of civil society, notably with the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

56.

Natallia Mikalaeuna EISMANT

Natalia Nikolayevna EISMONT

Наталля Мікалаеўна ЭЙСМАНТ

Наталья Николаевна ЭЙСМОНТ

Press Secretary of the President of Belarus

DOB: 16.2.1984

POB: Minsk (former USSR, now Belarus)

Maiden name: Kirsanova (RU: Кирсанова) or Selyun (RU Селюн)

Gender: female

In her position as Press Secretary of the President of Belarus, she is closely associated with the President and responsible for coordinating media activities of the President, including drafting statements and organising public appearances. She is thus supporting the Lukashenka regime, including in the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. In particular, with her public statements defending the President and criticising opposition activists as well as the peaceful protesters, made in the wake of 2020 presidential election, she contributed to seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

57.

Siarhei Yaugenavich ZUBKOU

Sergei Yevgenevich ZUBKOV

Сяргей Яўгенавіч ЗУБКОЎ

Сергей Евгеньевич ЗУБКОВ

ALFA Unit Commander

DOB: 21.8.1975

Gender: male

In his commanding position over ALFA Unit forces, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign carried out by these forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

58.

Andrei Aliakseevich RAUKOU

Andrei Alekseevich RAVKOV

Андрэй Аляксеевіч РАЎКОЎ

Андрей Алексеевич РАВКОВ

Former State Secretary of the Security Council

DOB: 25.6.1967

POB: village of Revyaki, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Oblast (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former position as State Secretary of the Security Council, he is closely associated with the President and responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign carried out by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill‐treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

59.

Pyotr Piatrovich MIKLASHEVICH

Petr Petrovich MIKLASHEVICH

Пётр Пятровіч МIКЛАШЭВІЧ

Петр Петрович МИКЛАШЕВИЧ

Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus

DOB: 18.10.1954

POB: Minsk Oblast (former USSR, now Belarus)

Gender: Male

As the chairman of the Constitutional Court, he is responsible for the Constitutional Court’s decision adopted on 25 August 2020, by which the results of the fraudulent elections were legitimised. He has therefore supported and facilitated actions of repression and intimidation campaign by the State apparatus against peaceful protestors and journalists and is therefore responsible for seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

▼M34

60.

Anatol Aliaksandravich SIVAK

Anatoli Aleksandrovich SIVAK

Анатоль Аляксандравiч СIВАК

Анатолий Александрович СИВАК

Deputy Prime Minister, former Chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 19.7.1962

POB: Zavoit, Narovlya District, Gomel/Homyel Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership capacity as Chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign run by the local apparatus in Minsk under his oversight in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists. He made numerous public statements criticising peaceful protests taking place in Belarus.

In his current leadership position as Deputy Prime Minister he continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

61.

Ivan Mikhailavich EISMANT

Ivan Mikhailavich EISMONT

Iван Мiхайлавiч ЭЙСМАНТ

Иван Михайлович ЭЙСМОНТ

Chairman of the Belarusian State Television and Radio Company, Head of Belteleradio Company

DOB: 20.1.1977

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his current position as Head of the Belarusian State Television and Radio Company, he is responsible for the dissemination of state propaganda in public media and continues to support the Lukashenka regime. This includes using media channels to support the President’s continuation of his term in office, despite the fraudulent presidential elections that took place on 9 August 2020, and the subsequent and repeated violent crackdown on peaceful and legitimate protests.

Eismont made public statements criticising the peaceful protesters and refused to provide media coverage of the protests. He also fired striking employees of Belteleradio Company under his management, thereby making him responsible for human rights violations.

62.

Uladzimir Stsiapanavich KARANIK

Vladimir Stepanovich KARANIK

Уладзiмiр Сцяпанавiч КАРАНIК

Владимир Степанович КАРАНИК

Governor of the Grodno/Hrodna Oblast, former Minister of Healthcare

DOB: 30.11.1973

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his former leadership capacity as the Minister of Healthcare, he was responsible for the use of healthcare services to repress peaceful protesters, including using ambulances to transport protesters in need of medical assistance to isolation wards rather than to hospitals. He made numerous public statements criticising the peaceful protests taking place in Belarus, on one occasion accusing a protester of being intoxicated.

In his current leadership position as the Governor of the Grodno/Hrodna Oblast he continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

63.

Natallia Ivanauna KACHANAVA

Natalia Ivanovna KOCHANOVA

Наталля Iванаўна КАЧАНАВА

Наталья Ивановна КОЧАНОВА

Chair of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus

DOB: 25.9.1960

POB: Polotsk, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: female

In her current leadership position as Chair of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus, she is responsible for supporting the decisions of the President in the field of domestic policy. She is also responsible for organising the fraudulent elections that took place on 9 August 2020. She made public statements defending the brutal crackdown of the security apparatus on peaceful demonstrators.

64.

Pavel Mikalaevich LIOHKI

Pavel Nikolaevich LIOHKI

Павел Мiкалаевiч ЛЁГКI

Павел Николаевич ЛЁГКИЙ

First Deputy Minister of Information

DOB: 30.5.1972

POB: Baranavichy, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as First Deputy Minister of Information, he is responsible for the repression of civil society, and in particular the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

65.

Ihar Uladzimiravich LUTSKY

Igor Vladimirovich LUTSKY

Iгар Уладзiмiравiч ЛУЦКI

Игорь Владимирович ЛУЦКИЙ

Minster of Information

DOB: 31.10.1972

POB: Stolin, Brest Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Minister of Information, he is responsible for the repression of civil society, and in particular the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

66.

Andrei Ivanavich SHVED

Andrei Ivanovich SHVED

Андрэй Iванавiч ШВЕД

Андрей Иванович ШВЕД

Prosecutor General of Belarus

DOB: 21.4.1973

POB: Glushkovichi, Gomel/Homyel Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as Prosecutor General of Belarus, he is responsible for the ongoing repression of civil society and democratic opposition, and in particular the launching of numerous criminal proceedings against peaceful demonstrators, opposition leaders and journalists in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections. He also made public statements threatening participants in ‘unauthorised rallies’ with punishment.

67.

Genadz Andreevich BOGDAN

Gennady Andreievich BOGDAN

Генадзь Андрэевiч БОГДАН

Геннадий Андреевич БОГДАН

Deputy Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate

DOB: 8.1.1977

Gender: male

In his position of Deputy Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate, he oversees the functioning of numerous enterprises. The body under his leadership provides financial, material and technical, social, household and medical support to the State apparatus and republican authorities. He is closely associated with the President and continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

68.

Ihar Paulavich BURMISTRAU

Igor Pavlovich BURMISTROV

Iгар Паўлавiч БУРМIСТРАЎ

Игорь Павлович БУРМИСТРОВ

Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 30.9.1968

Gender: male

In his leadership position as First Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Internal Troops under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular the arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

69.

Arciom Kanstantinavich DUNKA

Artem Konstantinovich DUNKO

Арцём Канстанцiнавiч ДУНЬКА

Артем Константинович ДУНЬКО

Senior Inspector for Special Matters of the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee

DOB: 8.6.1990

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Senior Inspector for Special Matters of the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with investigations launched into opposition leaders and activists.

70.

Aleh Heorhievich KARAZIEI

Oleg Georgevich KARAZEI

Алег Георгiевiч КАРАЗЕЙ

Олег Георгиевич КАРАЗЕЙ

Head of the Prevention Department of the Main Department of Law Enforcement and Prevention of the Public Security Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 1.1.1979

POB: Minsk Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Head of the Prevention Department of the Main Department of Law Enforcement and Prevention of the Public Security Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

71.

Dzmitry Aliaksandravich KURYAN

Dmitry Aleksandrovich KURYAN

Дзмiтрый Аляксандравiч КУРЯН

Дмитрий Александрович КУРЯН

Police Colonel, Deputy Head of the Main Department and Head of the Department of Law Enforcement in the Ministry of Internal Affairs

DOB: 3.10.1974

Gender: male

In his leadership position as Police Colonel and Deputy Head of the Main Department and Head of the Department of Law Enforcement in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

72.

Aliaksandr Henrykavich TURCHIN

Aleksandr Henrihovich TURCHIN

Аляксандр Генрыхавiч ТУРЧЫН

Александр Генрихович ТУРЧИН

Chairman of Minsk Regional Executive Committee

DOB: 2.7.1975

POB: Novogrudok, Grodno/Hrodna Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as the Chairman of Minsk Regional Executive Committee, he is responsible for overseeing local administration, including a number of committees. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

73.

Dzmitry Mikalaevich SHUMILIN

Dmitry Nikolayevich SHUMILIN

Дзмiтрый Мiкалаевiч ШУМIЛIН

Дмитрий Николаевич ШУМИЛИН

Deputy Head of the department for mass events of the GUVD (Main Department of Internal Affairs) of the Minsk City Executive Committee

DOB: 26.7.1977

Gender: male

In his position as Deputy Head of the department for mass events of the GUVD of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

He is documented as personally taking part in the unlawful detention of peaceful protesters.

74.

Vital Ivanavich STASIUKEVICH

Vitalyi Ivanovich STASIUKEVICH

Вiталь Iванавiч СТАСЮКЕВIЧ

Виталий Иванович СТАСЮКЕВИЧ

Deputy Chief of Public Security Police in Grodno/Hrodna

DOB: 5.3.1976

POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

In his position as Deputy Chief of Public Security Police in Grodno/Hrodna, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

According to witnesses, he personally supervised the unlawful detention of peaceful protesters.

75.

Siarhei Leanidavich KALINNIK

Sergei Leonidovich KALINNIK

Сяргей Леанiдавiч КАЛИННИК

Сергей Леонидович КАЛИННИК

Police Colonel, Chief of the Sovetsky District Police Department of Minsk

DOB: 23.7.1979

Gender: male

In his position as Chief of the Sovetsky District Police Department of Minsk, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

According to witnesses, he personally supervised and took part in torturing unlawfully detained protesters.

76.

Vadzim Siarhaevich PRYGARA

Vadim Sergeevich PRIGARA

Вадзiм Сяргеевiч ПРЫГАРА

Вадим Сергеевич ПРИГАРА

Police Lieutenant Colonel, Head of the District Police Department in Molodechno

DOB: 31.10.1980

Gender: male

In his position as Head of the District Police Department in Molodechno, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

According to witnesses, he personally supervised beatings of unlawfully detained protesters. He also made numerous derogatory statements about the protesters to the media.

77.

Viktar Ivanavich STANISLAUCHYK

Viktor Ivanovich STANISLAVCHIK

Вiктар Iванавiч СТАНIСЛАЎЧЫК

Виктор Иванович СТАНИСЛАВЧИК

Deputy Head of the Police Department of the Sovetsky District of Minsk, Head of the Public Security Police

DOB: 27.1.1971

Gender: male

In his position as Deputy Head of the Police Department of the Sovetsky District of Minsk and Head of the Public Security Police, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

According to witnesses, he personally supervised the detention of peaceful protesters and beatings of those unlawfully detained.

78.

Aliaksandr Aliaksandravich PIETRASH

Aleksandr Aleksandrovich PETRASH

Аляксандр Аляксандравiч ПЕТРАШ

Александр Александрович ПЕТРАШ

Chairman of the Moskovski district court in Minsk

DOB: 16.5.1988

Gender: male

In his position as chairman of the Moskovski district court in Minsk, he is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence and reliance on statements from false witnesses were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

He was instrumental in fining and detaining protesters, journalists and opposition leaders in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

He is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

79.

Andrei Aliaksandravich LAHUNOVICH

Andrei Aleksandrovich LAHUNOVICH

Андрэй Аляксандравiч ЛАГУНОВIЧ

Андрей Александрович ЛАГУНОВИЧ

Judge of the Sovetsky district court in Gomel/Homyel

Gender: male

In his position as judge of the Sovetsky district court in Gomel/Homyel, he is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

He is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

80.

Alena Vasileuna LITVINA

Elena Vasilevna LITVINA

Алена Васiльеўна ЛIТВIНА

Елена Васильевна ЛИТВИНА

Judge of the Leninsky district court in Mogilev

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Leninsky district court in Mogilev, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Siarhei Tsikhanousky – opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tiskhanouska. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

81.

Victoria Valeryeuna SHABUNYA

Victoria Valerevna SHABUNYA

Вiкторыя Валер’еўна ШАБУНЯ

Виктория Валерьевна ШАБУНЯ

Judge of the Central district court in Minsk

DOB: 27.2.1974

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Central district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Sergei Dylevsky – Coordination Council member and leader of a strike committee. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

82.

Alena Aliaksandravna ZHYVITSA

Elena Aleksandrovna ZHYVITSA

Алена Аляксандравна ЖЫВIЦА

Елена Александровна ЖИВИЦА

Judge of the Oktyabrsky district court in Minsk

DOB: 9.4.1990

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Oktyabrsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

83.

Natallia Anatolievna DZIADKOVA

Natalia Anatolievna DEDKOVA

Наталля Анатольеўна ДЗЯДКОВА

Наталья Анатольевна ДЕДКОВА

Judge of the Partizanski district court in Minsk

DOB: 2.12.1979

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Partizanski district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Coordination Council leader Mariya Kalesnikava. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

84.

Maryna Arkadzeuna FIODARAVA

Marina Arkadievna FEDOROVA

Марына Аркадзьеўна ФЁДАРАВА

Марина Аркадьевна ФЕДОРОВА

Judge of the Sovetsky district court in Minsk

DOB: 11.9.1965

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Sovetsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

85.

Yulia Chaslavauna HUSTYR

Yulia Cheslavovna HUSTYR

Юлiя Чаславаўна ГУСТЫР

Юлия Чеславовна ГУСТЫР

Judge of the Central district court in Minsk

DOB: 14.1.1984

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Central district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of opposition presidential candidate Viktar Babarika. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

86.

Alena Tsimafeeuna NYAKRASAVA

Elena Timofeevna NEKRASOVA

Алена Цiмафееўна НЯКРАСАВА

Елена Тимофеевна НЕКРАСОВА

Judge of the Zavodsky district court in Minsk

DOB: 26.11.1974

Gender: female

In her position as judge of the Zavodsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

87.

Aliaksandr Vasilevich SHAKUTSIN

Aleksandr Vasilevich SHAKUTIN

Аляксандр Васiльевiч ШАКУЦIН

Александр Васильевич ШАКУТИН

Businessman, owner of Amhodor holding

DOB: 12.1.1959

POB: Bolshoe Babino, Orsha Rayon, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

Gender: male

He is one of the leading businessmen operating in Belarus, with business interests in construction, machine building, agriculture and other sectors.

He is reported to be one of the persons who benefited most from the privatisation during Lukashenko’s tenure as President. He is also a member of the presidium of the pro-Lukashenka public association ‘Belaya Rus’ and a member of the Council for the Development of Entrepreneurship in the Republic of Belarus.

As such he is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

In July 2020 he made public comments condemning the opposition protests in Belarus, thereby contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

88.

Mikalai Mikalaevich VARABEI/VERABEI

Nikolay Nikolaevich VOROBEY

Мiкалай Мiкалаевiч ВАРАБЕЙ/ВЕРАБЕЙ

Николай Николаевич ВОРОБЕЙ

Businessman, co-owner of Bremino Group

DOB: 4.5.1963

POB: Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: male

He is one of the leading businessmen operating in Belarus, with business interests in petroleum, coal transit, banking and other sectors.

He is the co-owner of Bremino Group – a company that has enjoyed tax breaks and other forms of support from the Belarusian administration.

As such he is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.



B.  Legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2(1)

 

Names

Transcription of Belarusian spelling

Transcription of Russian spelling

Names

(Belarusian spelling

(Russian spelling)

Identifying Information

Reasons for listing

Date of listing

1.

CJSC Beltechexport

ЗАО ‘Белтехэкспорт’

Address: Nezavisimosti ave. 86-B, Minsk 220012, Belarus

Tel. +375 17 358 83 83; +375 17 373 80 12

Website: https://bte.by/

Email: mail@bte.by

CJSC Beltechexport is a private entity which exports weapons and military equipment produced by Belarusian state-owned companies to countries in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East. Beltechexport is closely associated with the Ministry of Defence of Belarus.

As such CJSC Beltechexport is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime, by bringing benefits to the presidential administration.

17.12.2020

2.

Dana Holdings/Dana Astra

Дана Холдингз/Дана Астра

Address: P. Mstislavtsa 9 (1st floor), Minsk 220114, Belarus

Registration number: Dana Astra: 191295361

Website: https://dana-holdings.com/

Email: PR@bir.by

Tel. +375 17 269 32 90; +375 17 393 94 65

Dana Holdings/Dana Astra is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus. The company received plots of land for the development of several large residential complexes and business centres.

Owners of Dana Holdings/Dana Astra maintain close relations with Alexandr Lukashenko. Liliya Lukashenka, daughter-in-law of the President, has a high-ranking position in the company.

As such Dana Holdings/Dana Astra is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

3.

GHU – the state institution ‘The Main Economic Office’ of the Administrative Affairs Office of the President of the Republic of Belarus

ГХУ – Государственное учреждение ‘Главное хозяйственное управление’ Управления делами Президента Республики Беларусь

Address: Miasnikova str. 37, Minsk 220010, Belarus

Tel. +375 17 222 33 13

Website: http://ghu.by

Email: ghu@ghu.by

GHU is the largest operator on the non-residential real estate market in Belarus and a supervisor of numerous companies.

The head of GHU, Victor Sheiman, was asked by Alexandr Lukashenko to supervise the safety of the 2020 presidential elections.

As such GHU is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

17.12.2020

4.

LLC Synesis

ООО ‘Синезис’

Address: Platonova 20B, Minsk 220005, Belarus; Mantulinskaya 24, Moscow 123100, Russia

Registration number (УНН/ИНН): 190950894 (Belarus); 7704734000/770301001 (Russia).

Website: https://synesis.partners; https://synesis-group.com/

Tel. +375 17 240 36 50

LLC Synesis provides the Belarusian authorities with a surveillance platform, which can search through and analyse video footage and employ facial recognition software, making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition by the State apparatus in Belarus.

Synesis employees are forbidden from communicating in Belarusian, making the company responsible for undermining labour rights.

The Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs are listed as users of a system created by Synesis. The company is therefore benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

Synesis CEO Alexander Shatrov publicly criticised those protesting against the Lukashenka regime and relativized the lack of democracy in Belarus.

17.12.2020

5.

AGAT Electromechanical Plant OJSC

OAO ‘АГАТ-электромеханический завод’

Address: Nezavisimosti ave. 115, Minsk 220114, Belarus

Tel. +375 17 272 01 32; +375 17 570 41 45

Email: marketing@agat-emz.by

Website: https://agat-emz.by/

AGAT Electromechanical Plant OJSC is part of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and is subordinate to the Council of Ministers and President of Belarus. As such AGAT Electromechanical Plant OJSC is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

The company manufactures ‘Rubezh’, a barrier system designed for riot control, which has been deployed against peaceful demonstrations that took place in the wake of the presidential elections on 9 August 2020, thereby making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

6.

OJSC 140 Repair Plant

OAO ‘140 ремонтный завод’

Address: L. Chalovskoy str. 19, Borisov, Belarus

Tel. +375 17 776 20 32; +375 17 776 54 79

Email: info@140zavod.org

Website: https://140zavod.org

OJSC 140 Repair Plant is part of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and is subordinate to the Council of Ministers and President of Belarus. As such OJSC 140 Repair Plant is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

The company manufactures transport vehicles and armoured vehicles, which have been deployed against peaceful demonstrations that took place in the wake of the presidential elections on 9 August 2020, thereby making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

17.12.2020

7.

OJSC MZKT/MWPT (a.k.a. VOLAT) – Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant

OAO ‘МЗКТ’ – Минский завод колёсных тягачей

Address: Partizanski ave 150, Minsk 220021, Belarus

Tel. +375 17 330 17 09

Fax +375 17 291 31 92

Email: link@mzkt.by

Website: www.mzkt.by

OJSC MZKT (a.k.a. VOLAT) is part of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and is subordinate to the Council of Ministers and President of Belarus. As such OJSC MZKT (a.k.a. VOLAT) is benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

Employees of OJSC MZKT who protested during the visit of Alexandr Lukashenko to its factory and went on strike in the wake of 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were fired, which makes the company responsible for violation of human rights.

17.12.2020

▼M3




ANNEX II

▼M4

Websites for information on the competent authorities referred to in Articles 3, 4(2), and 5, and address for notifications to the European Commission

▼M31

BELGIUM

https://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/Beleid/beleidsthemas/vrede_en_veiligheid/sancties

https://diplomatie.belgium.be/fr/politique/themes_politiques/paix_et_securite/sanctions

https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions

BULGARIA

https://www.mfa.bg/en/101

CZECH REPUBLIC

www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html

DENMARK

http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/sanktioner/

GERMANY

http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Aussenwirtschaft/aussenwirtschaftsrecht,did=404888.html

ESTONIA

http://www.vm.ee/est/kat_622/

IRELAND

http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=28519

GREECE

http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html

SPAIN

http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/GlobalizacionOportunidadesRiesgos/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx

FRANCE

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/

CROATIA

http://www.mvep.hr/sankcije

ITALY

https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/politica_europea/misure_deroghe

CYPRUS

http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa35_en/mfa35_en?OpenDocument

LATVIA

http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539

LITHUANIA

http://www.urm.lt/sanctions

LUXEMBOURG

https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/mesures-restrictives.html

HUNGARY

http://www.kormany.hu/download/9/2a/f0000/EU%20szankci%C3%B3s%20t%C3%A1j%C3%A9koztat%C3%B3_20170214_final.pdf

MALTA

https://foreignaffairs.gov.mt/en/Government/SMB/Pages/Sanctions-Monitoring-Board.aspx

NETHERLANDS

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties

AUSTRIA

http://www.bmeia.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=12750&LNG=en&version=

POLAND

https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja

PORTUGAL

http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/ministerios/mne/quero-saber-mais/sobre-o-ministerio/medidas-restritivas/medidas-restritivas.aspx

ROMANIA

http://www.mae.ro/node/1548

SLOVENIA

http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi

SLOVAKIA

https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

FINLAND

http://formin.finland.fi/kvyhteistyo/pakotteet

SWEDEN

http://www.ud.se/sanktioner

UNITED KINGDOM

https://www.gov.uk/sanctions-embargoes-and-restrictions

Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission

Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)

EEAS 07/99

B-1049 Brussels, Belgium

E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

▼M7




ANNEX III

List of equipment which might be used for internal repression as referred to in Article 1a and Article 1b

1. Fire-arms, ammunition and related accessories therefor, as follows:

1.1. 

Firearms not controlled by ML 1 and ML 2 of the Common Military List of the European Union ( 3 ) (‘Common Military List’);

1.2. 

Ammunition specially designed for the firearms listed in item 1.1 and specially designed components therefor;

1.3. 

Weapon-sights not controlled by the Common Military List.

2. Bombs and grenades not controlled by the Common Military List.

3. Vehicles as follows:

3.1. 

Vehicles equipped with a water cannon, specially designed or modified for the purpose of riot control;

3.2. 

Vehicles specially designed or modified to be electrified to repel borders;

3.3. 

Vehicles specially designed or modified to remove barricades, including construction equipment with ballistic protection;

3.4. 

Vehicles specially designed for the transport or transfer of prisoners and/or detainees;

3.5. 

Vehicles specially designed to deploy mobile barriers;

3.6. 

Components for the vehicles specified in items 3.1 to 3.5 specially designed for the purposes of riot control.

Note 1   This item does not control vehicles specially designed for the purposes of fire-fighting.

Note 2   For the purposes of item 3.5 the term ‘vehicles’ includes trailers.

4. Explosive substances and related equipment as follows:

4.1. 

Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosions by electrical or non-electrical means, including firing sets, detonators, igniters, boosters and detonating cord, and specially designed components therefor; except those specially designed for a specific commercial use consisting of the actuation or operation by explosive means of other equipment or devices the function of which is not the creation of explosions (e.g., car air-bag inflaters, electric-surge arresters of fire sprinkler actuators);

4.2. 

Linear cutting explosive charges not controlled by the Common Military List;

4.3. 

Other explosives not controlled by the Common Military List and related substances as follows:

a. 

amatol;

b. 

nitrocellulose (containing more than 12,5 % nitrogen);

c. 

nitroglycol;

d. 

pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);

e. 

picryl chloride;

f. 

2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT).

5. Protective equipment not controlled by ML 13 of the Common Military List as follows:

5.1. 

Body armour providing ballistic and/or stabbing protection;

5.2. 

Helmets providing ballistic and/or fragmentation protection, anti-riot helmets, antiriot shields and ballistic shields.

Note: This item does not control:

— 
equipment specially designed for sports activities,
— 
equipment specially designed for safety of work requirements,

6. Simulators, other than those controlled by ML 14 of the Common Military List, for training in the use of firearms, and specially designed software therefor.

7. Night vision, thermal imaging equipment and image intensifier tubes, other than those controlled by the Common Military List.

8. Razor barbed wire.

9. Military knives, combat knives and bayonets with blade lengths in excess of 10 cm.

10. Production equipment specially designed for the items specified in this list.

11. Specific technology for the development, production or use of the items specified in this list.

▼M28 —————

▼M29




ANNEX IV

Rifles, ammunition and sights referred to in Article 1a and 1b which also comply with the specifications for biathlon equipment as defined in the event and competition rules of the International Biathlon Union

Biathlon rifles:

ex 9303 30

Other sporting, hunting or target-shooting rifles

Ammunition for biathlon rifles:

ex 9306 21

Shotgun cartridges

ex 9306 29

Parts of shotgun cartridges

ex 9306 30 90

Cartridge and parts thereof, for weapons other than shotguns, military weapons, revolvers and pistols of heading 9302 , sub-machine-guns of heading 9301

Sights for biathlon rifles:

ex 9305 20

Parts and accessories of shotguns or rifles of heading 9303

▼M30




ANNEX V

Sporting rifles, sporting pistols and ammunition as referred to in paragraph 5 of Article 1a and in paragraph 5 of Article 1b, intended exclusively for use in sports events and sports training, as follows:



ex 9303 30

Sporting rifles of calibre .22 inches

ex  93 02

Sporting pistols of calibre .22 inches

ex 9306 30 10

Ammunition for sporting pistols of calibre .22 inches

ex 9306 30 90

Ammunition for sporting rifles of calibre .22 inches.



( 1 ) OJ C 86, 18.3.2011, p. 1.

( 2 ) OJ L 285, 17.10.2012, p. 1.

( 3 ) OJ C 86, 18.3.2011, p. 1.