WRITTEN QUESTION E-0302/03

by Jan Wiersma (PSE), Joost Lagendijk (Verts/ALE)and Elisabeth Schroedter (Verts/ALE) to the Council

(10 February 2003)

Subject: Nuclear strikes part of US strategic doctrine; harmful implications for CFSP, ESDP and transatlantic relations (inter alia in NATO)

1. Has the Council read the articles in the Washington Post of 11 December entitled: Preemptive Strikes Part of US Strategic Doctrine, and in The Guardian entitled US nuclear strategy threatens the world, and has the Council received a copy of the US policy document referred to in these articles in which it is confirmed that the US is ready to use nuclear weapons against countries which are believed to develop and/or possess weapons of mass destruction or components of weapons of mass destruction (published in December 2002 under the title: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction)?

2. Can the Council deny or confirm that this document is part of a Presidential directive, and does the Council agree with the point of view that the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, as described in the above-mentioned policy document, must be considered as official US security policy?

3. Would the Council share the point of view that such a policy is a violation of the so-called negative security guarantees, as agreed upon in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which exclude the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states?

4. Is the Council concerned about the operational use of tactical nuclear weapons against hardened underground targets (robust nuclear earth penetrator), as foreseen by the US New Nuclear Posture Review, published in January 2002?

5. What measures is the Council undertaking with and through the Member States, in NATO, in the UN and in direct relations with the US to convince the US Administration that the threat to use nuclear weapons by way of self-defence outside the scope of classical deterrence is a globally dangerous concept because it would lower the threshold for nuclear war and be a big threat for partnership relations between the USA and the EU, within as well as outside NATO? What measures will the Council undertake to engage the US more actively in existing non-proliferation and arms control schemes?

6. What guarantees can the Council give that US nuclear strikes will not be part of any operation in which EU Member States or the future NATO Rapid Response Force will be involved?

Reply

(13 May 2003)

It is a general policy of the Council not to discuss matters on the basis of newspaper articles. The Council has not examined the article in the Washington Post referred to by the Honourable Members. The Council has not examined the mentioned US policy document nor has it been submitted officially to the Council.

The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed in the Final Document that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear weapons States parties to the [NPT] strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore the Conference noted the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the UNSC resolution 984/1995 on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the [NPT]. All EU Member States are States parties to the NPT.

The EU is and remains committed to a multilateral approach to address issues relating to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Furthermore the EU, in its regular contacts with the US, raises also these issues and in particular encourages the US to stay actively engaged in the discussions in the various international fora. In the context of the EU-US dialogue among other issues the EU continues to strongly urge the US to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Regarding the issue set out in paragraph 6, it is for EU Member States to decide on their participation in military operations on the basis of their national sovereignty. In addition it should be recalled that the principle of decision making autonomy of the European Union will apply in the context of any operation undertaken under Title V of the TEU.