JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

30 September 2026 (*)

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Word mark MAP – Absolute ground for invalidity – Bad faith – Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – Examination limited to the grounds and arguments submitted by the parties – Second sentence of Article 95(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑564/25,

Heinz Reinwald, residing in Meneou (Cyprus),

HK Evolution LTD, established in Larnaca (Cyprus),

represented by M. Pütz-Poulalion, lawyer,

applicants,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Klee and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

International Nutrition Research Center, Inc., established in Coral Gables, Florida (United States), represented by A. Mascetti, G. Beltrame, M. Barié and G. Panigazzi, lawyers,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, M. Kancheva (Rapporteur) and F. Bestagno, Judges,

Registrar: G. Mitrev, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 16 June 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, Mr Heinz Reinwald and HK Evolution LTD, seek annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 5 June 2025 (Case R 1334/2024-2) (‘the contested decision’).

 Background to the dispute

2        On 30 November 2021, the intervener, International Nutrition Research Center, Inc. (INRC), filed with EUIPO, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), an application for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark registered following the designation of the European Union in the international registration of the word sign MAP, made on 13 April 2011 by Mr Reinwald and the German company Dr Reinwald healthcare GmbH & Co. KG (‘the company DRHC’), the predecessor in law of HK Evolution, and the partial protection granted to that word sign in the European Union on 26 November 2014.

3        The goods covered by the contested international registration, following the restriction and partial refusal of protection, were in Classes 5 and 29 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 5: ‘Pharmaceutical and veterinary products; dietary products for medical purposes; baby food; dietary nutrients for health care, based on amino acids, vitamins; mineral nutrients, trace minerals, either alone or as combinations; preparations for the care of health; dietary supplements for medical purposes, as far as included in this class, in particular dietary supplements bases on amino acids and/or based on trace minerals, as well as dietary supplements consisting of amino acids, vitamins, enzymes, chelates, lecithin, pectin, vegetable derivatives and fibre, miscellaneous sugars (like glucose, fructose, dextrose, lactose, saccharose, maltose) and milk components and yeast components’;

–        Class 29: ‘Dietary supplements based on protein, none being natural foodstuffs; concentrates from nutrients rich in protein as prefabricated foodstuff or mixtures to be used as dietary supplements; products from lupins/pulses and protein from lupins/pulses none being natural foodstuffs and all for use in dietary supplements’.

4        The application for a declaration of invalidity was, inter alia, based on the following marks:

–        the United States word mark MASTER AMINO ACID PATTERN MAP, filed on 20 April 1998 and registered on 11 December 2001, for goods in Class 5 corresponding to the following description: ‘Nutritional supplements, namely, amino acid based formulations and nutrified protein food supplements’;

–        the EU word mark MAP MASTER AMINO ACID PATTERN (‘EU trade mark No 1’), filed on 20 October 1998 and registered on 26 January 2000 for goods in Classes 5 and 29 corresponding to the following descriptions:

–        Class 5: ‘Nutritional supplements including amino acid based formulations and nutrified protein foods’;

–        Class 29: ‘Food supplements included in this class’;

–        the Canadian word mark MASTER AMINO ACID PATTERN MAP, filed on 28 February 2008 and registered on 1 November 2010, for goods in Class 5 corresponding to the following description: ‘Nutritional supplements, namely, amino acid based formulations and nutrified protein food supplements’;

–        the EU word mark MASTER AMINO ACID PATTERN MAP (‘EU trade mark No 2’), filed on 3 March 2008 and registered on 5 February 2009 for goods in Class 5 corresponding to the following description: ‘Nutritional supplements, namely, amino acid based formulations and nutrified protein food supplements’;

5        The grounds relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity were the absolute ground for invalidity referred to in Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and the relative ground for invalidity set out in Article 60(1)(b) of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 8(3) of that regulation.

6        On 7 May 2024, the Cancellation Division rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity based on Article 60(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(3) of that regulation, but upheld the application based on Article 59(1)(b) of that regulation, finding that the applicants had acted in bad faith when the application for the contested international registration was filed. It also found that there was no need to examine the applicants’ claims concerning the limitation in consequence of acquiescence on the part of the intervener, on the ground that that limitation did not apply where the contested mark had been filed in bad faith.

7        On 1 July 2024, the applicants filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Cancellation Division’s decision, in so far as the latter had upheld the application for a declaration of invalidity based on Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

8        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the Cancellation Division’s decision on the ground that, when the contested international registration was filed, the applicants had acted in bad faith within the meaning of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. In particular, it concluded that there was a dishonest intention on the part of the applicants, which existed at the time of that filing. According to the Board of Appeal, it was apparent from the file that at that time the applicants and the intervener had a commercial relationship, that the applicants were aware of the intervener’s business activities under the sign at issue and that the applicants had filed the contested international registration without the intervener’s consent. The Board of Appeal held that the file contained sufficient conclusive evidence that demonstrated that the applicants’ relationship with the intervener and its chairman, Professor Maurizio Lucà-Moretti, was such as to have created a sufficiently close link so that it was legitimate to expect the applicants not to proceed with that filing independently, in accordance with the principle of good faith.

 Forms of order sought

9        The applicants claim that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision;

–        order EUIPO to pay the costs.

10      EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicants to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

11      The intervener contends, in essence, that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicants to bear the costs of the proceedings, including those incurred during the invalidity and appeal proceedings before EUIPO.

 Law

 The applicable law ratione temporis

12      In view of the date on which the application for registration at issue was filed, namely 13 April 2011, which is decisive for the purposes of identifying the applicable substantive law, the facts of the case are governed by the substantive provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1) (see, to that effect, order of 5 October 2004, Alcon v OHIM, C‑192/03 P, EU:C:2004:587, paragraphs 39 and 40, and judgment of 23 April 2020, Gugler France v Gugler and EUIPO, C‑736/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:308, paragraph 3 and the case-law cited).

13      Consequently, in the present case, so far as concerns the substantive rules, the references to Article 59(1)(b) and Article 62(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 made by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision and by the parties in their written pleadings must be understood as referring respectively to Article 52(1)(b) and Article 55(2) of Regulation No 207/2009, the wording of which is identical.

14      Furthermore, since procedural rules are generally held to apply on the date on which they enter into force (see judgment of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited), the present dispute is governed by the procedural provisions of Regulation 2017/1001 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1).

 Admissibility of the action

15      Without formally raising an objection of inadmissibility under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the intervener pleads, in its response, that the action is inadmissible on the ground that it was not brought within the prescribed period. More specifically, it argues that, although, according to the applicants themselves, the contested decision was notified to them on 5 June 2025, the present action was not brought until 15 August 2025, that is to say, after the expiry of the two-month time limit for bringing an action laid down in Article 72(5) of Regulation 2017/1001. Consequently, the action should be dismissed as being inadmissible.

16      In that regard, it must be stated that, in accordance with Article 72(5) of Regulation 2017/1001, an action against a decision of a Board of Appeal of EUIPO must be brought before the General Court within two months of the date of notification of that decision.

17      Furthermore, it is apparent from Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure that the procedural time limits for bringing actions before the Court are to be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days. According to the case-law, the time limit on account of distance, laid down in that article, applies to the bringing of an action against a decision of EUIPO (see judgment of 1 December 2021, Inditex v EUIPO – Ffauf Italia (ZARA), T‑467/20, not published, EU:T:2021:842, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

18      In the present case, the contested decision was notified to the applicants on 5 June 2025. The period for bringing an action, including the extension on account of distance, therefore expired at midnight on 15 August 2025. The present action was brought on 15 August 2025.

19      The plea of inadmissibility raised by the intervener must therefore be rejected.

 Admissibility of evidence submitted for the first time before the General Court

20      The intervener submits that some factual claims of the applicants, in particular in paragraphs 15, 17, 18 and 20 of the application, which were not raised during the proceedings before EUIPO, are new and therefore inadmissible under Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure.

21      It must be stated that those claims, concerning a company which marketed the intervener’s PRO SHAPE product (paragraph 15 of the application), contract manufacturers of the intervener (paragraphs 17 and 18 of the application) and an email sent by a health product retailer to Professor Lucà-Moretti (paragraph 20 of the application), were not raised before EUIPO and are submitted for the first time before the Court.

22      In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 188 of the Rules of Procedure, the pleadings of the parties may not change the subject matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. In addition, it is for the Court, in the context of an action brought before it under Article 72(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, to review the legality of the decision of the Board of Appeal. Consequently, the Court’s review cannot go beyond the factual and legal context of the dispute as it was brought before the Board of Appeal (see judgment of 15 April 2026, Instanta v EUIPO – Heineken España (LEONHART), T‑461/25, not published, EU:T:2026:259, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).

23      It follows that the factual claims referred to in paragraph 21 above must be rejected as inadmissible.

 Substance

24      In support of their action, the applicants raise a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. In their view, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that they had acted in bad faith at the time of the application for the contested international registration.

25      It is apparent from the wording of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 that an EU trade mark is to be declared invalid where the applicant was acting in bad faith when the application for the trade mark was filed.

26      The absolute ground for invalidity referred to in Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 applies where it is apparent from relevant and consistent indicia that the proprietor of an EU trade mark has filed the application for registration of that mark not with the aim of engaging fairly in competition but with the intention of undermining, in a manner inconsistent with honest practices, the interests of third parties, or with the intention of obtaining, without even targeting a specific third party, an exclusive right for purposes other than those falling within the functions of a trade mark, in particular the essential function of indicating origin (judgment of 12 September 2019, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO, C‑104/18 P, EU:C:2019:724, paragraph 46).

27      In addition, the intention of an applicant for a trade mark is a subjective factor which must, however, be determined objectively by the competent administrative or judicial authorities. Consequently, any claim of bad faith must be the subject of an overall assessment, taking into account all the factual circumstances relevant to the particular case. It is only in that manner that a claim of bad faith can be assessed objectively (see judgment of 12 September 2019, Koton Mağazacilik Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO, C‑104/18 P, EU:C:2019:724, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

28      To that end, relevant factors include, first, the fact that the applicant knows or must know that a third party is using, in at least one Member State, an identical or similar sign for an identical or similar product or service capable of being confused with the sign for which registration is sought; secondly, the applicant’s intention to prevent that third party from continuing to use such a sign; and, thirdly, the degree of legal protection enjoyed by the third party’s sign and by the sign for which registration is sought (judgment of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, C‑529/07, EU:C:2009:361, paragraph 53). Those factors are, however, only examples drawn from a number of factors which can be taken into account (see judgment of 11 March 2026, SBG v EUIPO – VF International (GEOGRAPHICAL NORWAY EXPEDITION), T‑303/25, not published, EU:T:2026:188, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

29      Other factors can be taken into account in order to decide whether an applicant for registration was acting in bad faith when the trade mark application was filed (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2024, ChiCom Marketing v EUIPO – China Faw Group (Hongqi), T‑533/23, not published, EU:T:2024:786, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited), such as the existence of direct contractual relations between the parties (see judgment of 12 July 2019, Café del Mar and Others v EUIPO – Guiral Broto (Café del Mar), T‑772/17, not published, EU:T:2019:538, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited), irrespective of the exact nature of the agreements concluded (see judgment of 5 October 2016, Foodcare v EUIPO – Michalczewski (T.G.R. ENERGY DRINK), T‑456/15, EU:T:2016:597, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

30      In the context of the overall analysis undertaken pursuant to Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, account may be taken of the origin of the contested sign and its use since its creation, the commercial logic underlying the filing of the application for registration of that sign as an EU trade mark, and the chronology of events leading up to that filing (see judgment of 7 July 2016, Copernicus-Trademarks v EUIPO – Maquet (LUCEO), T‑82/14, EU:T:2016:396, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

31      The overall assessment of whether the applicant acted in bad faith must be based on any evidence that enables the court to be informed of the applicant’s intention at the time of filing the application for registration of the mark at issue. Circumstances, even after the filing of that application for registration, may serve as indicia of the applicant’s intention at that time. By contrast, evidence of which the applicant became aware only after the filing of the application for registration of the mark at issue is not such as to alter the applicant’s perception at the time of filing (judgment of 19 June 2025, CeramTec, C‑17/24, EU:C:2025:455, paragraphs 71 and 72; see also judgment of 23 May 2019, Holzer y Cia v EUIPO – Annco (ANN TAYLOR and AT ANN TAYLOR), T‑3/18 and T‑4/18, EU:T:2019:357, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited).

32      In the present case, the applicants’ single plea is divided into four parts. The first part of the single plea alleges infringement of the second sentence of Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 55(1) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625. The second part of the single plea alleges infringement of Article 55(2) of Regulation No 207/2009. The third part of the single plea alleges infringement of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. The fourth part of the single plea alleges infringement of Article 52(1)(b) of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001.

33      It is appropriate first to examine the third part and then, in that order, the second, first and fourth parts of the single plea.

 The third part of the single plea, alleging infringement of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009

34      The applicants complain that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 by assessing whether there was bad faith at the date on which the contested international registration was filed, namely 13 April 2011. They claim that the relevant date for assessing whether there was bad faith was the date of filing of the application for registration of the German word mark MAP on which the contested international registration is based (‘the German mark MAP’), namely 6 February 2009.

35      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicants’ arguments.

36      The Board of Appeal found that the relevant time for the purposes of assessing whether there was bad faith, within the meaning of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, was the time of filing the application for registration of the contested mark, which, in the case of international registrations, corresponded to the date on which the European Union or the Member State concerned had been designated. In the present case, it found that the relevant date for considering whether there was bad faith on the part of the applicants was 13 April 2011, the date on which the European Union was designated in the contested international registration, and not 6 February 2009, the date on which the German mark MAP was filed.

37      In that regard, it should be stated that it is also apparent from the wording of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, applicable in the present case, that the relevant time for determining whether there was bad faith on the part of the applicant is the time of filing the application for registration (judgment of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, C‑529/07, EU:C:2009:361, paragraph 35). In the case of international registrations, that time corresponds to the date on which the European Union or the Member State concerned was designated.

38      In the present case, the Board of Appeal was therefore entitled to find that the relevant date for determining the applicants’ bad faith was the date of designation of the European Union in the contested international registration, namely 13 April 2011 (‘the relevant date’), and not the date of filing of the German mark MAP.

39      The third part of the single plea must therefore be rejected.

 The second part of the single plea, alleging infringement of Article 55(2) of Regulation No 207/2009

40      The applicants claim that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 55(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 by wrongly stating that the intervener was the proprietor of EU trade marks Nos 1 and 2 when their collaboration had begun, even though those marks had been declared invalid with ex tunc effect by the German courts.

41      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicants’ arguments.

42      Under Article 55(2) of Regulation No 207/2009, an EU trade mark declared invalid is to be deemed not to have had, as from the outset, the effects specified in that regulation, to the extent that the trade mark has been declared invalid.

43      In the present case, the Board of Appeal noted that the ownership of EU trade marks Nos 1 and 2 existed at the time of filing the contested international registration and had to be taken into consideration in the context of the analysis of whether there was bad faith, notwithstanding the fact that those marks had subsequently been cancelled retroactively by the German courts on the ground that they were descriptive and not distinctive.

44      In that regard, it must be stated that the Board of Appeal took into account EU trade marks Nos 1 and 2 in order to assess the intention of the applicants at the time of filing the contested international registration. The reference to those marks did not aim to acknowledge rights on the basis of those marks, but rather to show that, taken into consideration with other factual circumstances, they demonstrated the bad faith on the part of the applicants at that time.

45      Contrary to the applicants’ complaint, the retroactive cancellation of EU trade marks Nos 1 and 2 is irrelevant for the purpose of assessing their bad faith at the time of filing the contested international registration, as it is not capable of altering their intention at that time.

46      The Board of Appeal was therefore entitled to take into account the existence of EU trade marks Nos 1 and 2 in the assessment of the bad faith on the part of the applicants at the time of filing the contested international registration, notwithstanding the fact that those marks had subsequently been cancelled retroactively by the German courts.

47      The second part of the single plea must therefore be rejected.

 The first part of the single plea, alleging infringement of the second sentence of Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 55(1) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625

48      By the first part of the single plea, the applicants complain, in essence, that the Board of Appeal failed to take full account of the facts submitted and the evidence produced by the parties before it, infringing the second sentence of Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 55(1) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625.

49      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicants’ arguments.

50      In that regard, it should be recalled that, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, in invalidity proceedings brought on the basis of the bad faith on the part of the applicant pursuant to Article 59 of that regulation, EUIPO is to limit its examination to the grounds and arguments submitted by the parties.

51      In accordance with Article 55(1) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, EUIPO is to examine any evidence given or obtained in any proceedings before it to the extent necessary to take a decision in the proceedings in question.

52      In the present case, in the first place, so far as concerns the chronology of events which led to the filing of the contested international registration, the Board of Appeal noted, first of all, that Professor Lucà-Moretti, President of the intervener, had discovered the Master Amino Acid Pattern (‘MAP’), namely a particular combination of essential amino acids, and that he had published several scientific articles dedicated to MAP as from 1998, well before the filing of the contested international registration, and even that of the German mark MAP. Next, the Board of Appeal noted that, as was apparent from the evidence produced, that combination of essential amino acids had been the subject of patents, in respect of which Professor Lucà-Moretti was the inventor, referring to a United States patent dated 21 July 1992 and to a European patent application of 22 October 1991. In addition, the Board of Appeal noted that Mr Reinwald had admitted, in a work first published in February 2012, that Professor Lucà-Moretti had presented MAP at seminars and conferences organised in Austria and Germany between 1999 and 2001, that he had become aware of the results concerning amino acids at one of those seminars and that he had been ‘immediately enthused by the nutritional and physiological possibilities offered by MAP’. Lastly, the Board of Appeal noted that Professor Lucà-Moretti and Mr Reinwald had then begun to collaborate, Mr Reinwald assisting or supporting Professor Lucà-Moretti in preparing MAP presentations and lectures in Germany. During that period, as was apparent from email correspondence between 2004 and 2006, the applicants had questioned the intervener on the extent to which MAP could still be marketed in the animal sector, in particular in horses, in order to develop the German market. According to the Board of Appeal, it was apparent from the evidence that, at least three years before the filing of the German mark MAP and five years before the contested international registration, there was a certain form of cooperation between the applicants and the intervener as regards MAP, the applicants assisting and supporting the intervener.

53      In the second place, the Board of Appeal stated that it was apparent from the file that the intervener had produced evidence concerning its MAP trade mark applications which had been submitted at different times and in respect of different territories, but, in any event, years before the filing date of the contested international registration and even the filing of the German mark MAP, namely the United States mark, EU trade marks Nos 1 and 2 and the Canadian mark, listed in paragraph 4 above. According to the Board of Appeal, that meant that, at the time when the applicants had filed the contested international registration or even when they had begun to collaborate with the intervener, the intervener was already the proprietor of several marks and, in particular, of EU trade mark No 1, covering, inter alia, ‘nutritional supplements, including amino acid preparations and protein food’ in Class 5 and ‘food supplements’ in Class 29. It noted that the contested international registration covered goods in Classes 5 and 29, which were identical or similar to those covered by EU trade mark No 1. In addition, according to the Board of Appeal, it could not be denied that there was at least a certain degree of similarity between the contested international registration and EU trade mark No 1, because the contested international registration consisted exclusively of the word ‘map’, which was the first element of EU trade mark No 1, on which the consumers’ attention was mainly focused.

54      In the third place, the Board of Appeal found that it was clear from the file that the intervener and the applicants had begun to develop commercial relations before the filing of the contested international registration and that, at the time of that filing, and before that filing, the applicants could not have been unaware of the existence of the ‘MAP marks’ owned by the intervener. According to the Board of Appeal, the file contained invoices (Exhibit 20) proving that the applicants had purchased from the intervener large quantities of bottles of food supplements bearing the term ‘MAP’, labelled and unlabelled, before and after the relevant date. In particular, between June 2009 and April 2011, three invoices were dated 15 June and 23 and 25 September 2009 in respect of the bottles labelled ‘MAP’. Other invoices relating to unlabelled bottles, dated 2010 and 2011, were also documented in the evidence. The Board of Appeal found that it was apparent from the documents submitted that the product designated by the sign MAP which had been purchased by the applicants from the intervener consisted in exactly that particular combination of essential amino acids. It found that those invoices clearly demonstrated, first, that the applicants and the intervener had business relations before the relevant date, secondly, that the intervener used the ‘MAP marks’ and, thirdly, that the applicants could not therefore have been unaware of the existence of those marks.

55      The Board of Appeal also found that, given that the applicants purchased not only unlabelled MAP products, as alleged, but also labelled MAP products, they could not but be aware that the intervener used or held an identical or similar earlier right when they filed the contested international registration. According to the Board of Appeal, that was all the more true since it was apparent from email correspondence dated 20 June 2011, that is to say, a few weeks after the date of filing of the contested international registration, that the applicants had requested the intervener’s consent to use their own label ‘dr. Reinwald MAP’ on the bottles. It was also apparent from the same evidence that, on the label used by the applicants, there was the ‘important information’ according to which, ‘in accordance with the study of Prof. Dr. Lucà-Moretti at the INRC …, MAP® (Master Amino Acid Pattern®) provides a unique patented amino acid profile with an unprecedented Net Nitrogen Utilisation …’. Consequently, according to the Board of Appeal, it was clear that the expression ‘map’ was used by the intervener as a trade mark and that the applicants were aware of it.

56      In the fourth place, the Board of Appeal found that, even if there was no evidence in the file of other transactions based on the mark MAP, it was not disputed that the intervener had concluded licensing or sub-licensing agreements, inter alia, in 2008, 2009 and 2010, that is to say, before the relevant date, with United Kingdom or Italian entities regarding a product defined as ‘the patented amino acid nutritional formulas protected by [the European] patent’ and stating that the product label had to display prominently, inter alia, EU trade mark No 1 owned by the intervener. It noted that those agreements had been duly signed by the parties concerned and that another similar agreement had also been signed on 1 September 2011, that is to say, during the same year as the filing of the contested international registration. According to the Board of Appeal, contrary to what the applicants claimed, those agreements contained a direct reference to the marks linked to MAP that were owned by the intervener, namely the mark SON Formula and EU trade mark No 1.

57      The Board of Appeal concluded that there was a dishonest intention on the part of the applicants, which existed at the time of filing the contested international registration. It held that the fact that the intervener had not registered the sign MAP did not constitute a circumstance capable of justifying the filing of that international registration in the context of the relationship between the applicants and the intervener. According to the Board of Appeal, there was no honest commercial logic behind the filing of that international registration. On the contrary, it was apparent from the file that, at the time of that filing, the applicants and the intervener had a commercial relationship, that the applicants were aware of the intervener’s business activities under the sign at issue and that the applicants had filed the contested international registration without the intervener’s consent.

–       The similarity between the contested international registration and the intervener’s earlier marks

58      It should be noted that the applicants do not dispute the assessments made by the Board of Appeal in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the contested decision (see paragraph 53 above) as regards the identity or similarity of the products covered by the contested international registration and EU trade mark No 1, as well as the existence of a certain degree of similarity between those marks, because the contested international registration consisted exclusively in the element ‘map’, the first element of EU trade mark No 1. In that regard, it should also be pointed out that that element ‘map’ is the acronym of the expression ‘master amino acid pattern’ contained in EU trade mark No 1 and is the most distinctive element within that mark. Those findings also apply, mutatis mutandis, in respect of EU trade mark No 2, of which ‘map’ is the last element.

59      Therefore, the existence in the European Union, at the time of filing the contested international registration, of signs identical or similar to the contested international registration for an identical or similar product must be considered to be established.

–       The applicants’ knowledge of the use of the intervener’s earlier marks before the filing of the contested international registration

60      The applicants complain that the Board of Appeal failed to take full account of the facts submitted and the evidence produced by the parties before it, in particular as regards the alleged earlier existence of a MAP product. In their view, there was no product distributed under the mark MAP before Mr Reinwald placed it on the market under the contested international registration. The intervener did not provide a single shipping document or invoice concerning a MAP product which is prior to when Mr Reinwald first placed his ‘dr. reinwald MAP’ supplement on the market. The Board of Appeal, without the intervener having produced evidence to that effect, proceeded on the assumption that that product existed and was marketed before Mr Reinwald, and then his company DRHC, began to distribute their own product, called ‘dr. reinwald MAP’, in 2009, as evidenced by the invoices relating to his first orders. The intervener did not provide proof of use of the mark MAP at any time, either before or after 2011. By contrast, the applicants have demonstrated that the intervener’s product was marketed under the marks SON Formula and PRO SHAPE.

61      In that regard, the applicants claim that the intervener still holds the invoices and orders placed by Mr Reinwald or his company DRHC which date back to 2009, whereas there is no evidence of sales of nutritional supplements bearing the MAP label or MAP trade mark (‘the MAP product’) to other parties. The applicants maintain that the invoices addressed to Mr Reinwald or his company for bottles labelled ‘MAP’ dating from June 2009 do not permit the inference that those products, namely the nutritional supplements bearing the MAP label or MAP trade mark, already existed before those orders. On the contrary, it is apparent from those invoices that it was Mr Reinwald who had begun to use that mark and who had ordered the use on the label of his own mark dr. reinwald healthcare. The Board of Appeal was therefore wrong to find the delivery of ‘labelled’ bottles, as opposed to ‘unlabelled’ bottles, as proof of use and of the existence of an earlier MAP product of the intervener.

62      Furthermore, the applicants submit that the licensing or sub-licensing agreements concluded by the intervener in 2008, 2009 and 2010 were never implemented and did not establish a genuine commercial relationship in the context of which the licensees manufactured or marketed the products.

63      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicants’ arguments.

64      At the outset, it should be borne in mind that, as stated in paragraph 38 above, the relevant date for the purpose of assessing whether the applicants acted in bad faith is the date of designation of the European Union in the contested international registration, namely 13 April 2011.

65      First, it should be noted that, in Exhibit 20 in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity, the intervener produced a selection of 54 invoices issued by it between 2009 and 2015. Those invoices are addressed either to Mr Reinwald, or to the company DRHC or to the Cypriot company dr. Reinwald global health LTD. They detail the sale of bottles of the mark MAP containing food supplements consisting in the particular combination of essential amino acids constituting the MAP product. Those bottles are not labelled, labelled in accordance with United States, German or Swiss legislation or labelled ‘Biosa’. The mark MAP appears on all those invoices, whether or not they relate to a labelled bottle, and is accompanied by the symbol ‘^TM’ or ‘®’.

66      It should be stated that a substantial part of those invoices, relating to the sale of large quantities of food supplements, concern the bottles labelled ‘MAP’ and that some of them are dated before the relevant date, namely the invoices of 15 June and 23 and 25 September 2009.

67      In so far as the applicants submit that the references to the mark MAP in the invoices for the bottles labelled ‘MAP’ do not concern the ‘MAP marks’ owned by the intervener, but rather refer to their own labels, it should be noted that those invoices expressly refer to ‘MAP’ as an element of the intervener’s marks and as an acronym for the expression ‘Master Amino Acid Pattern’.

68      At the time when those invoices were issued, the intervener already owned earlier marks containing the element ‘map’, in particular the United States word mark MASTER AMINO ACID PATTERN MAP and EU trade marks Nos 1 and 2, namely MAP MASTER AMINO ACID PATTERN and MASTER AMINO ACID PATTERN MAP. In that regard, it must be held that the applicants knew or should have known that the intervener was using the element ‘map’, since such knowledge may arise, according to the case-law, inter alia, from general knowledge, in the economic sector concerned, of such use (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2009, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, C‑529/07, EU:C:2009:361, paragraph 39).

69      Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not err in its assessment by considering that the references to the element ‘map’ in the invoices produced as Exhibit 20 referred to the intervener’s marks, and not to a mark of the applicants.

70      The Board of Appeal was therefore correct in finding, in paragraph 39 of the contested decision, that the invoices produced in Exhibit 20 clearly demonstrated that (i) the applicants and the intervener had a commercial relationship before the relevant date, (ii) the intervener used the marks containing the element ‘map’ and (iii) the applicants could therefore not have been unaware of the existence of those marks. It was also correct in finding, in paragraph 40 of that decision, that the expression ‘map’ was used by the intervener as a trade mark and that the applicants were aware that the intervener used or held an identical or similar earlier right when they filed the contested international registration.

71      Secondly, as the Board of Appeal noted in paragraph 40 of the contested decision, the applicants’ knowledge of the intervener’s use of the expression ‘map’ as a trade mark is supported by the fact that it is apparent from email correspondence dated 20 June 2011, that is to say, a few weeks after the relevant date, that the applicants requested the intervener’s consent to use their own label ‘dr. Reinwald MAP’ on the bottles they ordered from the intervener. The label template attached to that email contains ‘important information’ that ‘in accordance with the study of Prof. Dr. Lucà-Moretti at the INRC …, MAP® (Master Amino Acid Pattern®) provides a unique patented amino acid profile …’.

72      The fact remains that such a reference to the mark ‘MAP® (Master Amino Acid Pattern ®)’ in connection with ‘Prof. Dr. Lucà-Moretti at the INRC’ on the labels of the bottles ordered by the applicants proves that they were aware that the intervener used or owned an earlier right identical or similar to the contested international registration.

73      Furthermore, as regards the licensing or sub-licensing agreements with third parties produced by the intervener, dated 6 August and 23 September 2008, 15 October 2009, 17 September 2010 and 1 September 2011, it should be noted that, under Clause 2.3 of those agreements, the label of the licensed product had to display, inter alia, EU trade mark No 1. In that regard, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal did not base its finding of the bad faith on the part of the applicants exclusively on those agreements, but assessed them in conjunction with other relevant circumstances, including the existence of registrations of earlier marks and the use of those marks, and the earlier relationship between the applicants and the intervener.

74      It must be concluded that the Board of Appeal was entitled to find, in essence, that the evidence submitted by the intervener demonstrated that the applicants knew or should have known of the use of the element ‘map’ in the marks of the intervener at the time of filing the contested international registration.

75      Accordingly, the factor relating to the knowledge that the intervener used an identical or similar sign for an identical or similar product in the European Union, which must be taken into account in order to assess whether the applicants acted in bad faith, must be considered to be established.

–       The relationship between the applicants and the intervener at the time of filing the contested international registration

76      The applicants dispute, in essence, the existence of a commercial relationship with the intervener before Mr Reinwald launched his business activity in 2009 and placed orders for his own product called ‘dr. reinwald MAP’. They submit that, before Mr Reinwald established his own undertaking in 2009, there was no sale or distribution of any MAP product and that there could not be a duty of fair play or other obligation on the part of Mr Reinwald towards Professor Lucà-Moretti or the intervener. In their view, it was only once Mr Reinwald had established his own undertaking and placed orders for his own product that the intervener used a contract manufacturer of nutritional supplements who provided the purchasers of his amino acid formula with products under any brand or label, or even without a label. It is the orders placed by Mr Reinwald in 2009 which constitute the starting point for that activity.

77      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicants’ arguments.

78      As regards the chronology of events listed in paragraphs 32 to 34 of the contested decision (see paragraph 52 above), it should be noted that the applicants do not dispute the truth of the facts which were stated in that chronology of events by the Board of Appeal, but merely claim, in essence, that their relationship with the intervener did not involve any sale or distribution of a MAP product or any duty of fair play.

79      In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 29 above, the existence of a direct contractual relationship between the parties, whatever the exact nature of the agreements concluded between them, is one of the factors making it possible to point to the potential existence of bad faith on the part of the applicant for the contested mark when the application for registration was filed. It is therefore not necessary for there to have been a formal commercial relationship between the parties, such as a distribution agreement.

80      In the present case, it is apparent in particular from the chronology of events that, following their meeting at seminars and conferences in Austria and Germany between 1999 and 2001, Professor Lucà-Moretti and Mr Reinwald began to collaborate, with Mr Reinwald assisting or providing support to Professor Lucà-Moretti in preparing presentations and conferences on MAP in Germany. From that time onwards, there was therefore a relationship of cooperation between the applicants and the intervener.

81      In addition, it is apparent from the facts established in paragraphs 65 to 70 above that, before the relevant date, there was a contractual relationship between the applicants and the intervener involving the MAP product.

82      In particular, it must be pointed out that, in email correspondence with Professor Lucà-Moretti of 22 December 2006, entitled ‘MAP horses, Christmas and more’ and referred to by the Board of Appeal in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, Mr Reinwald used the acronym ‘MAP’ to refer to the intervener’s product in the context of the veterinary use of that product for horses. It referred on several occasions to its ‘customers’ and its ‘marketing’.

83      It has also been found in paragraphs 71 and 72 above that the reference to the mark ‘MAP® (Master Amino Acid Pattern®)’ in connection with ‘Prof. Dr. Lucà-Moretti at the INRC’ on the labels of the bottles ordered by the applicants proved that they were aware that the intervener used or held an earlier right identical or similar to the contested international registration.

84      Consequently, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, that it was clear from the evidence that, at least five years before the filing of the contested international registration, there was some sort of cooperation between the applicants and the intervener concerning the MAP product, the applicants assisting and supporting the intervener, and that it also found, in paragraph 38 of that decision, that it was clear from the file that the intervener and the applicants had started to develop a commercial relationship before the filing of that international registration and that, at the time of that filing, or even before, the applicants could not have been unaware of the existence of the ‘MAP trade marks’ owned by the intervener.

85      In the light of all those factual circumstances, assessed globally, it must be concluded that, before the filing of the contested international registration, there was a contractual relationship between the applicants and the intervener which entailed, in particular, the obligation for the applicants not to carry out such a filing. That relationship concerned not only Mr Reinwald and Professor Lucà-Moretti personally, but also the intervener, whose email address appeared in the emails dated 2006.

86      Accordingly, the factor relating to the existence of a contractual relationship prior to the filing of the contested international registration, which makes it possible to assess the bad faith on the part of the applicants, must be considered to be established.

–       The existence of a dishonest intention on the part of the applicants

87      The applicants claim that their conduct is lawful and ethical and criticise the Board of Appeal for finding bad faith despite the absence of any tangible evidence.

88      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicants’ arguments.

89      In view of all the relevant factual circumstances of the present case, in particular the applicants’ knowledge that the intervener used a sign identical or similar to the contested international registration for an identical or similar product in the European Union and the existence of an earlier contractual relationship between the applicants and the intervener which entailed a duty of fair play, it must be observed that it is apparent from relevant and consistent indicia that the applicants filed the application for the contested international registration not with the aim of engaging fairly in competition, but with the intention of undermining, in a manner inconsistent with honest practices, the intervener’s interests.

90      The Board of Appeal was therefore correct in finding, in paragraph 43 of the contested decision, that there was a dishonest intention on the part of the applicants, which existed at the time of filing the contested international registration.

91      Consequently, the Board of Appeal was entitled, taking into account all the relevant factual circumstances of the present case, to conclude that, at the time of filing the contested international registration, the applicants acted in bad faith within the meaning of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

–       Certain facts subsequent to the filing of the contested international registration

92      The applicants complain that the Board of Appeal relied on acts which took place well after the relevant date in order to establish their bad faith at that date.

93      In the first place, the applicants complain that the Board of Appeal took into account the marketing, after 2015, of their MAP products as the original products of Professor Lucà-Moretti. In the second place, the applicants claim that the ‘test’ application for registration of the German word mark MAP Master Amino Acid Pattern in 2016 cannot be construed as proof of their bad faith in 2011. In the third place, the applicants claim that they did not impede the enforcement of decisions of the German courts, contrary to what the Board of Appeal found. In their view, although Mr Reinwald was ordered in court to assign the German trade mark MAP to the intervener, that decision did not give rise to an attachment order. From a legal point of view, Mr Reinwald was free to cancel that mark as long as he was its proprietor.

94      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicants’ arguments.

95      It is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 31 above that it is possible to take into account facts subsequent to the application for registration of the contested mark, which may also be capable of confirming the dishonest intention of the applicants at the date of the application for registration.

96      In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that the evidence after the relevant date contained additional information that was useful for interpreting the applicants’ intention at that date and reinforced the assessment of bad faith. Thus, it was apparent from screenshots extracted in November 2016 from several websites that, although the intervener and the applicants terminated their commercial relationship in October 2015, the applicants had continued to market the products under the mark MAP online, which were presented as the original products of the intervener. The Board of Appeal found that several other facts which occurred after the end of that commercial relationship and which had not been properly clarified by the applicants reinforced its finding as to their unethical behaviour towards the intervener and their dishonest intention. It relied, in particular, on successive filings, waivers or cancellations of trade mark applications by Mr Reinwald and his wife, the proceedings brought by the intervener before the German courts concerning trade mark infringement and the impediment to the enforcement of the decisions of the German courts which had ordered the assignment of the German trade mark MAP to the intervener.

97      In that regard, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal did not rely on the facts and evidence subsequent to the relevant date in order to establish the applicants’ bad faith on that date, but found, inter alia, that several facts and items of evidence subsequent to that date ‘reinforced’ its assessment of bad faith and its finding as to the applicants’ unethical behaviour towards the intervener and their dishonest intention.

98      Consequently, it must be held that the Board of Appeal did not fail to apply the case-law relating to Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 by taking into account facts subsequent to the date of filing of the contested international registration in order to ‘reinforce’ its assessment of the applicants’ bad faith and to confirm their dishonest intention at that time.

99      In that regard, in the first place, as regards the marketing by the applicants, after 2015, of their MAP products as original products of the intervener, it is apparent from screenshots made on an online platform that, even after the termination of their commercial relationship with the intervener in 2015, the applicants continued to market the MAP products using the words ‘Das Original von Prof. Dr. Lucà-Moretti’ (‘The original product of Professor Lucà-Moretti’).

100    It is apparent from the label of the products thus marketed, bearing the words ‘dr. reinwald’, that those products came from the applicants and not from the intervener. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicants expressly acknowledge that, when the professional relationship between Professor Lucà-Moretti and Mr Reinwald came to an end, Mr Reinwald ‘could easily be supplied by some other contract manufacturer for nutritional supplements using the same bottles and labels, because the product itself was not protected by intellectual property rights’. Accordingly, it must be held that the words ‘original product of Professor Lucà-Moretti’ on such products originating from the applicants confirms their dishonest intention at the relevant date.

101    In the second place, as regards their subsequent application for the German word mark MAP Master Amino Acid Pattern in 2016, the applicants claim that, at that time, the intervener had already applied for a definitive order against the company DRHC. In that context, that application for registration was only an attempt seeking to demonstrate that that mark would be denied registration under the case-law relating to the distinctive and descriptive character of composite marks made up of a descriptive term and an abbreviation. Unfortunately, the Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt (German Patent and Trade Mark Office) disregarded the case-law and, contrary to the expectations of the applicants, proceeded to register the mark. Consequently, Mr Reinwald’s wife surrendered the mark and requested its cancellation. The applicants conclude that Mr Reinwald’s conduct in 2016, when the intervener had already brought proceedings against him for trade mark infringement, cannot be interpreted as establishing their bad faith in 2011.

102    It is sufficient to note that those claims do not call into question the Board of Appeal’s reasoning and do not affect the legality of the contested decision. On the contrary, they constitute evidence of the applicants’ intention to usurp the intervener’s rights and confirm the applicants’ dishonest intention at the relevant date.

103    In the third place, as regards the applicants’ claim that they did not impede the enforcement of judicial decisions, it should be noted that, on 20 April 2021, the Oberlandesgericht Nürnberg-Fürth (Higher Regional Court, Nuremberg-Fürth, Germany) ordered Mr Reinwald to assign the German trade mark MAP to the intervener and that Mr Reinwald surrendered that mark to the German Patent and Trade Mark Office with effect from 28 April 2021, with the result that the assignment could not take place.

104    In that regard, even if Mr Reinwald were the lawful proprietor of the German trade mark MAP and even assuming that the intervener did not obtain an attachment order, it must be stated that the surrender of that mark, while being aware of the order of a German court to assign that mark to the intervener, constitutes conduct contrary to honest and ethical practices, which confirms the dishonest intention of the applicants at the relevant date.

105    Therefore, the factor relating to the applicants’ intention to prevent the intervener from continuing to use, in at least one Member State, a sign similar to the contested international registration must be regarded as confirmed.

106    It follows from the foregoing that, in paragraphs 32 to 43 of the contested decision (see paragraphs 52 to 57 above), the Board of Appeal relied on a set of objective circumstances apparent from the file as a basis for its overall assessment of the dishonest intention of the applicants at the relevant date.

107    Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not infringe the second sentence of Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 55(1) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625.

108    The first part of the single plea must therefore be rejected.

 The fourth part of the single plea, alleging infringement of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001

109    The applicants submit that the Board of Appeal appears to have given the intervener the ‘benefit of the doubt’ and, consequently, infringed the provisions of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 and of Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001. They complain that the Board of Appeal relied mainly on speculation and actions subsequent to the filing of the contested international registration, whereas it was for the intervener to prove bad faith. They claim that Mr Reinwald acted like any other trader in good faith, by establishing an undertaking, registering a trade mark and starting to distribute a new product under that mark with its own label and company name.

110    EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicants’ arguments.

111    In accordance with the second sentence of Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, in invalidity proceedings brought under Article 59 of that regulation, EUIPO is to limit its examination to the grounds and arguments submitted by the parties.

112    It follows from Articles 52 and 55 of Regulation No 207/2009 that an EU trade mark is regarded as valid until it has been declared invalid by EUIPO following invalidity proceedings. It therefore enjoys a presumption of validity, which is the logical consequence of the review carried out by EUIPO in the examination of an application for registration (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 June 2020, Louis Vuitton Malletier v EUIPO – Wisniewski (Representation of a chequerboard pattern), T‑105/19, not published, EU:T:2020:258, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

113    It is for the applicant for a declaration of invalidity to prove the circumstances which substantiate a finding that the EU trade mark proprietor had been acting in bad faith when it filed the application for registration of that mark (see judgment of 8 May 2014, Simca Europe v OHIM – PSA Peugeot Citroën (Simca), T‑327/12, EU:T:2014:240, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited), good faith being presumed until proven otherwise (see judgment of 11 March 2026, GEOGRAPHICAL NORWAY EXPEDITION, T‑303/25, not published, EU:T:2026:188, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 May 2019, ANN TAYLOR and AT ANN TAYLOR, T‑3/18 and T‑4/18, EU:T:2019:357, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

114    In that regard, where EUIPO finds that the objective circumstances of the particular case which were relied on by the applicant for a declaration of invalidity may lead to the rebuttal of the presumption of good faith which the proprietor of the mark at issue enjoys when he or she files the application for registration of that mark, it is for the proprietor of that mark to provide plausible explanations regarding the objectives and commercial logic pursued by the application for registration of that mark (judgment of 21 April 2021, Hasbro v EUIPO – Kreativni Dogadaji (MONOPOLY), T‑663/19, EU:T:2021:211, paragraph 43; see also judgment of 11 March 2026, GEOGRAPHICAL NORWAY EXPEDITION, T‑303/25, not published, EU:T:2026:188, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

115    The proprietor of the trade mark at issue is best placed to provide EUIPO with information regarding his or her intentions at the time of applying for registration of that mark and to provide it with evidence capable of convincing it that, in spite of the existence of objective circumstances, those intentions were legitimate (see judgment of 21 April 2021, MONOPOLY, T‑663/19, EU:T:2021:211, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

116    In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that the file contained sufficient conclusive evidence which demonstrated that the relationship between the intervener and the applicants was such as to have established a sufficiently close link for it to be fair to expect the applicants not to file the contested international registration independently. It noted that, in a situation where there is a relationship between the parties, as documented in the present case, it was expected that the principle of good faith applies, which imposed on the applicants a minimum duty of fair play in relation to the legitimate expectations of the intervener, but that that had not been the case here. It considered that the applicants’ conduct fell far short of the pursuit of a legitimate objective or of compliance with accepted principles of ethical conduct or honest commercial and professional practices. In its view, it could reasonably be assumed that the applicants’ objective was to usurp the intervener’s rights in the sign MAP and such an intention could never be considered compatible with accepted principles of honest or ethical conduct or in pursuit of a legitimate objective. Consequently, it concluded that the applicants had acted in bad faith.

117    In that regard, it must be held that the objective circumstances of the present case, on which the Board of Appeal relied in paragraphs 32 to 43 of the contested decision (see paragraphs 52 to 57 above) as a basis for its overall assessment of the applicants’ dishonest intention at the relevant date and which have been stated in paragraphs 58, 59, 64 to 75, 78 to 86 and 89 to 91 above, are capable of leading to the rebuttal of the presumption of good faith enjoyed by the applicants.

118    Therefore, it is for the applicants to provide plausible explanations concerning the objectives and commercial logic pursued by the filing of the contested international registration.

119    To that end, the applicants claim that Mr Reinwald acted like any other trader in good faith, by establishing an undertaking, registering a trade mark and starting to distribute a new product under that mark with its own label and company name. They maintain that that filing was a normal commercial transaction designed to protect their trade mark, after registration of the German trade mark MAP on 6 February 2009.

120    In that regard, it is appropriate to make the following findings.

121    First of all, any reference to the element ‘map’ in the invoices produced as Exhibit 20 concerned the intervener’s marks, and not a trade mark of the applicants, as has been stated in paragraphs 65 to 69 above.

122    In addition, the reference to the mark ‘MAP® (Master Amino Acid Pattern®)’ in connection with ‘Prof. Dr. Lucà-Moretti at the INRC’ on the applicants’ labels, which appears in the email of 20 June 2011, proves that the applicants were aware that the intervener used or held an earlier right identical or similar to the contested international registration, as has been stated in paragraphs 71 and 72 above.

123    In addition, on 21 March 2022, Mr Reinwald’s wife registered, in respect of food supplements in Class 5, another international trade mark MAP which covered, inter alia, the European Union and Germany, thus obliging the intervener to initiate a significant number of opposition and cancellation proceedings. It is clear that such conduct demonstrates an intention to usurp the intervener’s rights and may serve as evidence of the dishonest intention of the applicants at the relevant date.

124    In that regard, it must be held that, even if evidence of which the applicant became aware only after the filing of the application for registration of the mark at issue is not such as to alter the applicant’s perception at the time of filing (judgment of 19 June 2025, CeramTec, C‑17/24, EU:C:2025:455, paragraph 72), by contrast, the applicant’s conduct after that filing constitutes a circumstance which may serve as evidence of the applicant’s intention at the time of filing at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2025, CeramTec, C‑17/24, EU:C:2025:455, paragraph 71).

125    It follows from those findings that the explanations provided by the applicants concerning the objectives and commercial logic pursued by the contested international registration are implausible and do not constitute evidence capable of demonstrating that, despite the existence of the objective circumstances of the present case, their intention at the time of applying for that international registration was legitimate.

126    The Board of Appeal was therefore entitled to find that the objective circumstances of the present case relied on by the intervener were capable of leading to the rebuttal of the presumption of good faith enjoyed by the applicants at the time of the application for the contested international registration and that the applicants had not provided plausible explanations concerning the objectives and commercial logic pursued by that application. Thus, the Board of Appeal did not grant the intervener the ‘benefit of the doubt’, contrary to what the applicants claim.

127    Consequently, it must be held that the Board of Appeal did not infringe Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001.

128    The fourth part of the single plea must therefore be rejected and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

129    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

130    In the present case, since a hearing has taken place and the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener.

131    Furthermore, the intervener has claimed that the applicants should be ordered to pay the costs that the intervener incurred in the invalidity and appeal proceedings before EUIPO.

132    In that regard, first, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 190(2) of the Rules of Procedure, only costs necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal are to be regarded as recoverable costs. It follows that the costs incurred in respect of the proceedings before the Cancellation Division cannot be regarded as recoverable costs (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2019, Lotte v EUIPO – Générale Biscuit-Glico France (PEPERO original), T‑459/18, not published, EU:T:2019:119, paragraph 193 and the case-law cited). Therefore, the intervener’s form of order must be rejected in so far as it seeks to have the applicants bear the costs incurred before the Cancellation Division.

133    Secondly, in so far as the intervener’s request concerns the costs of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, it is sufficient to note that, since the present judgment dismisses the action brought against the contested decision, it is point 2 of the operative part of the contested decision which continues to determine the costs in question (see, to that effect judgment of 28 February 2019, PEPERO original, T‑459/18, not published, EU:T:2019:119, paragraph 194 and the case-law cited).

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Mr Heinz Reinwald and HK Evolution LTD to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 September 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.