Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

3 June 2026 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Taxation – Common system of VAT – Directive 2006/112/EC – Adjustment of VAT improperly invoiced – Transactions relating to a period closed by a tax inspection – National legislation making the initiation of a new inspection subject to a new fact updated by the taxpayer – Principle of effectiveness – Principle of tax neutrality – Proportionality )

In Case T‑198/25,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest-Capital Regional Court, Hungary), made by decision of 19 February 2025, received at the Court on 4 March 2025, in the proceedings

G Kft.

v

Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber, sitting with five Judges),

composed of N. Półtorak, President, G. Hesse, G. Steinfatt, D. Petrlík (Rapporteur) and I. Dimitrakopoulos, Judges,

Advocate General: M. Brkan,

Registrar: A. Juhász-Tóth, Administrator,

having regard to the transmission of the request for a preliminary ruling to the General Court by the Court of Justice on 25 March 2025, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 50b of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union,

having regard to the fact that the case concerns the area referred to in point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 50b of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the fact that there is no independent question relating to interpretation within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 50b of that statute,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 17 December 2025,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        G, by A. Németh, ügyvéd,

–        the Hungarian Government, by M. Fehér and R. Kissné Berta, acting as Agents,

–        the European Commission, by M. Herold and A. Sipos, acting as Agents,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 167, 168, 179, 180, 183, 250 and 252 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1; ‘the VAT Directive’), and the principles of tax neutrality, effectiveness and proportionality.

2        The request has been made in proceedings between G Kft. and Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága (Appeals Directorate of the National Tax and Customs Authority, Hungary) concerning the adjustment of value added tax (VAT) improperly invoiced by that company.

 Legal framework

 European Union law

3        Article 203 of the VAT Directive provides as follows:

‘VAT shall be payable by any person who enters the VAT on an invoice.’

 Hungarian law

4        Paragraph 54(5) of the az adózás rendjéről szóló 2017. évi CL. törvény (Law No CL of 2017 on general tax procedure; ‘Law on general tax procedure’) (Magyar Közlöny 2017/192.) provides as follows:

‘From the start of an inspection, the taxes and subsidies subject to inspection cannot be corrected by means of self-correction in respect of the period inspected. The taxable person cannot correct the taxes and subsidies calculated subsequently by the tax authority. A correction in respect of the tax, subsidies and period to be inspected shall be regarded as a self-correction carried out before the start of the inspection where the amended return has been submitted (by post) by the taxable person to the tax authority no later than the day before receiving prior notice of the inspection or, where no such notice is given, notification of the mandate or, in the absence of such notification, delivery of the mandate.’

5        Paragraph 89(2) of the az adóigazgatási rendtartásról szóló 2017. évi CLI. törvény (Law No CLI of 2017 regulating the tax authority; ‘Law regulating the tax authority’) (Magyar Közlöny 2017/192.) states as follows:

‘Under the conditions established by law, an inspection may be carried out even in respect of a period closed by means of an inspection (repetition of the inspection).’

6        Paragraph 92 of the Law regulating the tax authority is worded as follows:

‘In respect of a period closed by a tax inspection, the taxes or subsidies may be subject to a new inspection

…

(b)      at the request of the taxable person where the clarification of new facts or circumstances brought to light by the taxable person results in a change to the findings of the earlier inspection, provided that the taxable person did not previously have, nor could in good faith have had, that new fact or circumstance at his or her disposal and was not, nor could in good faith have been, aware of that new fact or circumstance,

…’

 The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

7        G is a company governed by Hungarian law whose main activity consists in renting returnable and reusable trays and pallets (‘the goods concerned’) to fruit growers, retailers, wholesalers and food processors.

8        In the context of the activity referred to in paragraph 7 above, G operated a deposit system under which, on the supply of the goods concerned, G charged its customers deposit fees so that they would return the goods supplied to it within the specified period. Where the customer returned only part of those goods, the invoices relating to the deposit fees were corrected. Where the customer returned all of those goods, those invoices were cancelled. The invoices for deposit fees issued by G included VAT.

9        By advance tax rulings of 1 June 2015 (‘the advance tax rulings’), the Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium (Ministry of the Economy, Hungary) considered that the deposit transactions at issue did not come within the scope of VAT and that, concerning the deposit transactions in respect of which VAT had been improperly invoiced, G was entitled to issue corrected invoices which did not include VAT and to correct its VAT returns by means of a ‘self-correction’. G ceased to include VAT on its deposit fee invoices after 9 November 2015.

10      On 12 December 2017, the Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Heves Megyei Adó- és Vámigazgatósága (Heves Provincial Tax and Customs Directorate of the National Tax and Customs Authority, Hungary; ‘the first-tier tax authority’) initiated, at G, a tax inspection relating to VAT, concerning the period from January 2015 to July 2017 (‘the period under examination’). Under the applicable national legislation, G could no longer, from the start of that inspection, correct its VAT returns in respect of that period by means of a ‘self-correction’.

11      By decision of 19 July 2018, the first-tier tax authority closed the tax inspection without making any findings relating to VAT. Since G did not lodge a complaint against that decision, it became final on 22 August 2018. The period under examination was therefore to be considered, under the applicable national legislation, as a ‘period closed by an inspection’.

12      On 13 November 2020, G requested the first-tier tax authority to carry out a new VAT inspection in respect of the period under examination. In support of its request, G referred, inter alia, to the advance tax rulings and stated that it had found, after the closure of the earlier tax inspection, that some of the corrected invoices for deposit fees which it had issued had not been included in the VAT returns in respect of the period under examination and that others had only been issued after the start of that inspection. G argued that the updated information should entitle it, in the context of a further inspection, to a refund of VAT in respect of that period.

13      By decision of 26 November 2020, the first-tier tax authority rejected the request for a new inspection, without an examination on the merits, finding that the conditions laid down in Paragraph 92(b) of the Law regulating the tax authority were not satisfied. It considered that the advance tax rulings did not constitute new facts or circumstances, within the meaning of that provision, justifying a new tax inspection, on the ground that G had had the opportunity to make a ‘self-correction’ of the VAT before the earlier tax inspection, following the issue of those rulings. Similarly, it found that the invoices not included in the VAT returns in respect of the period under examination did not constitute such new facts or circumstances, since the supporting documents relating to those invoices were already available to G at the time of the earlier tax inspection.

14      By decision of 18 January 2021, the Appeals Directorate of the National Tax and Customs Authority upheld, without an examination on the merits, the decision of the first-tier tax authority. It noted, inter alia, that, between the adoption of the advance tax rulings, on 1 June 2015, and the start of the earlier tax inspection, on 12 December 2017, G had had the opportunity to correct the VAT improperly invoiced by means of a ‘self-correction’.

15      G brought an action against the decision of 18 January 2021 before the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest-Capital Regional Court, Hungary), the referring court, submitting that that decision infringed the principles of fiscal neutrality, effectiveness and proportionality. It submitted, inter alia, that the corrections which it intended to make related to a period in respect of which the limitation period had not yet expired and that it had not been able to challenge its liability to VAT within the legal time limit, since it did not have, at that time, the supporting documents for the corrections made.

16      The referring court is uncertain as to the compatibility with EU law of the conditions, laid down in Paragraph 92(b) of the Law regulating the tax authority, which must be satisfied by a request for a new tax inspection in respect of a period closed by an inspection.

17      That court notes that, under Paragraph 92(b) of that Law, a new inspection may be carried out only if the taxable person brings to light a new fact or circumstance, resulting in a change to the findings of the earlier inspection, that the taxable person did not previously have, nor could in good faith have had, at his or her disposal, or of which the taxable person was not, nor could in good faith have been, aware. It adds that, according to the interpretation of the Appeals Directorate of the National Tax and Customs Authority, such a new fact or circumstance can be reasonably relied on only where the taxable person, on account of an external circumstance and without fault on his or her part, was only subsequently in a position to make the necessary corrections.

18      In those circumstances, the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest-Capital Regional Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Must Articles 167, 168, 179, 180, 183, 250 and 252 of [the VAT Directive], together with the principles of tax neutrality, effectiveness and proportionality, be interpreted as permitting national legislation – in this case Paragraph 92(b) of [the Law regulating the Tax Authority] – and an interpretation and application of that legislation, to the effect that, in relation to a period closed by means [of] an inspection, the correction and refunding of [VAT] improperly invoiced are only possible if there are new facts [or] circumstances that the taxable person did not previously have, nor could in good faith have had, at [his or her] disposal, or of which the taxable person was not, nor could in good faith have been, aware, even if there was no risk of any loss of tax revenue, because the tax improperly invoiced and which the taxable person is seeking to correct has been paid to the tax authorities?’

 Consideration of the question referred

19      As a preliminary point, in the first place, it should be noted that the fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded its request for a preliminary ruling by referring to certain provisions of EU law does not preclude the EU judicature from providing to the national court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions. It is for the EU judicature to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 14 February 2019, Nestrade, C‑562/17, EU:C:2019:115, paragraph 28).

20      In the present case, according to the information in the order for reference, the dispute in the main proceedings concerns only a request for adjustment of VAT improperly invoiced. In its question, the referring court refers to Articles 167, 168, 179, 180 and 183 of the VAT Directive, which concern the right to deduct VAT, and Articles 250 and 252 of that directive, which lay down the obligation for the taxable person to submit VAT returns and which circumscribe the law of the Member States as regards the time limits in order to satisfy that obligation. Since the dispute in the main proceedings does not concern those aspects and the order for reference does not specify the reasons why the interpretation of those provisions is sought, there is no need for the Court to give a ruling on those provisions.

21      In the second place, according to the case-law of the Court, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which a taxable person paid a sum corresponding to VAT that was unduly invoiced, in respect of which a tax debt has arisen under Article 203 of the VAT Directive, it is, in principle, for the issuer of the invoice to put that invoice in order, it being understood that, in the absence of any provision in the VAT Directive on the adjustment by the issuer of the invoice of VAT improperly charged, it is, in principle, for the Member States to lay down the conditions in which that VAT may be adjusted (see judgment of 13 March 2025, Greentech, C‑640/23, EU:C:2025:175, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

22      More specifically, in order to ensure neutrality of VAT, it is for the Member States to provide, in their domestic legal systems, for the possibility of adjusting any tax improperly invoiced where the person who issued the invoice shows that he or she acted in good faith (see judgment of 13 March 2025, Greentech, C‑640/23, EU:C:2025:175, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited) or where he or she has, in sufficient time, wholly eliminated the risk of any loss of tax revenue (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2019, EN.SA., C‑712/17, EU:C:2019:374, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

23      As regards the relationship between the two conditions referred to in paragraph 22 above, the Court has held that, where the issuer of the invoice had, in sufficient time, wholly eliminated the risk of any loss of tax revenue, the adjustment of VAT could not be made conditional by the Member States upon the good faith of the issuer of the relevant invoice (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Terracult, C‑835/18, EU:C:2020:520, paragraph 28).

24      In the present case, as is apparent from the very wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring court set out the question on the assumption that the risk of any loss of tax revenue had been eliminated in the dispute in the main proceedings.

25      In so far as it is for the General Court to take account of the factual and legislative context of the question referred for a preliminary ruling, as described by the referring court (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 March 2022, Daimler, C‑232/20, EU:C:2022:196, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited), it is not for the General Court to verify the accuracy of the referring court’s assessment referred to in paragraph 24 above.

26      In the third place, as is apparent from the order for reference and from the clarifications provided at the hearing before the General Court, the national provision referred to by the question referred for a preliminary ruling, namely Paragraph 92(b) of the Law regulating the tax authority, lays down the procedural conditions under which a taxable person may exercise his or her right to adjust VAT in respect of a period which has already been the subject of a tax inspection.

27      According to Paragraph 92(b) of the Law regulating the tax authority, for a period which has already been the subject of a tax inspection, the adjustment of VAT is possible in the context of a new tax inspection, the initiation of which is, however, subject to the condition that the taxable person must rely on a new fact or circumstance resulting in a change to the findings of the earlier tax inspection, which previously the taxable person was not aware of or which was not at the taxable person’s disposal and which the taxable person could not in good faith have been aware of or which the taxable person could not in good faith have had at his or her disposal.

28      As regards, more specifically, the concept of ‘good faith’ laid down by that provision, and as all the interested parties who took part in the hearing before the General Court confirmed, that concept does not relate to the question whether the taxable person acted in good faith when he or she issued an invoice incorrectly including VAT, but to whether the taxable person who relies on a new fact in order to initiate a new tax inspection could not, previously, have been aware of or have had that fact at his or her disposal. It follows that the condition of good faith laid down by the national provision referred to by the question referred for a preliminary ruling does not correspond to the concept of ‘good faith’ within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 23 above.

29      In the light of the foregoing, it must be considered that, by its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the VAT Directive and the principles of effectiveness, fiscal neutrality and proportionality must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which makes the exercise of the right to adjust VAT improperly invoiced in respect of a period which has already been the subject of a tax inspection subject to conditions linked to the submission of a new fact capable of resulting in a change to the findings of that inspection, even in the absence of risk of any loss of tax revenue.

30      For the purpose of answering that question, it must be recalled that, in the absence of EU rules on applications for the repayment of taxes, the detailed procedural rules designed to ensure the protection of the rights which individuals acquire under EU law are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, under the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States; the conditions under which such applications may be made must observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, that is to say, they must not be less favourable than those relating to similar claims founded on provisions of domestic law or framed so as to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order (see judgment of 11 April 2019, PORR Építési Kft., C‑691/17, EU:C:2019:327, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

31      As regards the principle of effectiveness, to which the uncertainty of the referring court relates, the Court has already held that the possibility of exercising the right to a refund of VAT, without any temporal limit, was contrary to the principle of legal certainty, which requires the tax position of the taxable person, having regard to his or her rights and obligations vis-à-vis the tax authorities, not to be open to challenge indefinitely. In that regard, it follows in particular from the case-law that the principle of effectiveness is not infringed where the taxable person has, under the procedural rules laid down by national law, a reasonable period in which to exercise his or her rights, at the end of which that exercise is no longer possible, in the interests of legal certainty, which protects both the taxable person and the authority concerned. The existence of such temporal limitations is not liable to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law, even though their application may lead to the dismissal, in whole or in part, of the action brought (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Terracult, C‑835/18, EU:C:2020:520, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

32      It is for the referring court to determine whether the national procedural provisions are compatible with the principle of effectiveness, having regard to all the circumstances of the case in the main proceedings. The Court may, nevertheless, provide the referring court with all indications that may assist it in that regard (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2015, Surgicare, C‑662/13, EU:C:2015:89, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

33      In that regard, according to the case-law of the Court, the question as to whether a national procedural provision makes the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by EU law practically impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, viewed as a whole, and to the conduct and special features of that procedure before the various national bodies (see judgment of 14 February 2019, Nestrade, C‑562/17, EU:C:2019:115, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

34      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that, according to the national legislation applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, the taxable person may adjust VAT improperly invoiced by submitting a ‘self-correction’ return for that purpose. It is true that, as from the initiation of a tax inspection relating to a given period, a ‘self-correction’ can no longer be made in respect of that period, even if the limitation period in order to request a refund of that VAT has not yet expired.

35      However, as the referring court stated in its reply to the General Court’s request for clarification, first, the taxable person has the possibility, under the applicable national legislation, to adjust VAT improperly invoiced in respect of the period which is the subject of the tax inspection by submitting the corrected invoices during that tax inspection. Secondly, that taxable person may also obtain such an adjustment by submitting those invoices in the context of a complaint against the decision closing the tax inspection.

36      In that regard, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that, in the light of the applicable national legislation, G had more than two and a half years, before the initiation of the tax inspection, to adjust VAT improperly invoiced by means of a ‘self-correction’. Furthermore, the tax inspection, during which that taxable person could also obtain an adjustment of VAT by submitting corrected invoices, extended over a period of more than seven months. In addition, G had an additional period of time in order to obtain that adjustment by submitting such invoices in the context of a possible complaint against the decision closing the tax inspection.

37      It follows, first, that the taxable person concerned had a period of time of more than three years during which that taxable person could request the adjustment of VAT improperly invoiced. Such a period is, in principle, reasonable in the light of the principle of effectiveness (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 December 2011, Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta, C‑427/10, EU:C:2011:844, paragraph 25).

38      Secondly, nothing in the file before the Court indicates the existence of special circumstances which objectively prevented the taxable person concerned from obtaining the adjustment of the VAT at issue. In that regard, G merely claimed, in essence, that the number of invoices which it had to correct was high. However, that fact alone does not appear likely to have prevented G from requesting the adjustment of VAT during the period referred to in paragraph 37 above.

39      Therefore, in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, where the taxable person has a sufficient period of time in order to adjust VAT improperly invoiced before the initiation of the tax inspection, during that inspection or in the context of the complaint against the decision closing that tax inspection, the application of national legislation such as that referred to by the question referred for a preliminary ruling, although it may make it impossible to obtain the adjustment of that VAT in the context of a new tax inspection, does not appear liable to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to adjust VAT.

40      That finding is not invalidated by the fact that the limitation period in respect of the transactions at issue in the main proceedings had not yet expired at the time when the request for a new tax inspection was submitted. The mere fact that the national legislation lays down, in addition to the general limitation period, other procedural rules governing the exercise of the right to adjust VAT is not contrary to the principle of effectiveness, provided that the application of those rules does not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of that right, as follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 31 above.

41      In that regard, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that, under the applicable national legislation, the initiation of a tax inspection in respect of a given period alters, irrespective of the limitation period, the rules under which the taxable person may obtain the adjustment of VAT in respect of that period. Accordingly, such an adjustment is no longer possible by means of a ‘self-correction’, but rather the taxable person must request the tax authority to take the corrected invoices into account in the context of that tax inspection, in the context of any complaint against the decision closing that tax inspection or in the context of a new tax inspection, the initiation of which is, however, subject to the conditions laid down by the national provision referred to by the question referred for a preliminary ruling.

42      The application of the procedural rules referred to in paragraph 41 above, which exist independently of the general limitation period, is not liable, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to adjust VAT, given that, as stated in paragraph 37 above, the period of time during which the taxable person could obtain that adjustment – before the initiation of the tax inspection, during that inspection or in the context of the complaint against the decision closing that tax inspection – was, in principle, reasonable.

43      Similarly, the findings set out in paragraph 39 above are not invalidated by the judgments of 26 April 2018, Zabrus Siret (C‑81/17, EU:C:2018:283), and of 2 July 2020, Terracult (C‑835/18, EU:C:2020:520). The approaches identified in those judgments concerned situations characterised by the fact that the taxable person had a very short period of time to exercise his or her rights (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 April 2018, Zabrus Siret, C‑81/17, EU:C:2018:283, paragraph 41, and of 2 July 2020, Terracult, C‑835/18, EU:C:2020:520, paragraph 34). As has been stated in paragraph 36 above, in circumstances such as those of the dispute in the main proceedings, the taxable person had a much longer period of time in order to exercise his or her right to adjust VAT improperly invoiced, both before the initiation of the tax inspection and during that inspection, and in the context of a complaint against the decision closing that tax inspection.

44      As to the remainder, as regards the principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality, also referred to by the question referred for a preliminary ruling, it must be recalled that, first, the principle of fiscal neutrality is not a rule of primary law, but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently with other principles, including the principle of legal certainty (see judgment of 7 July 2022, X, C‑194/21, EU:C:2022:535, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

45      Consequently, the principle of fiscal neutrality cannot, in itself, have the effect of allowing a taxable person to adjust VAT improperly invoiced in a situation in which he or she did not exercise his or her right to such an adjustment in accordance with the procedural rules laid down by national law, where those rules are not liable to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of that right (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 7 July 2022, X, C‑194/21, EU:C:2022:535, paragraph 50).

46      Secondly, it is true that the Court has held that, even where the request for a refund of VAT improperly paid resulted from the taxable person’s own negligence, the Member State concerned had to employ means which, whilst enabling it effectively to attain the objective pursued by national legislation, were the least detrimental to the principles laid down by EU legislation, such as the principle of neutrality of VAT, and that, in view of the position which that principle had in the common system of VAT, a penalty consisting of an absolute denial of the right to a refund of VAT incorrectly invoiced and paid but not due, appeared disproportionate (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Terracult, C‑835/18, EU:C:2020:520, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited).

47      However, although the application of national legislation such as that referred to by the question referred for a preliminary ruling may lead, in certain cases, to a denial of the right to a refund of VAT in the context of a new tax inspection, the fact remains that, in the circumstances such as those of the dispute in the main proceedings, the taxable person was not in fact deprived of the possibility of exercising that right, before the initiation of the earlier tax inspection, during that inspection and in the context of a complaint against the decision closing that inspection. Therefore, that application cannot be considered as consisting in an absolute denial of the right to a refund of VAT incorrectly invoiced which is disproportionate to the objective of ensuring compliance with the principle of legal certainty, as recalled in paragraph 31 above.

48      In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling is that the VAT Directive and the principles of effectiveness, fiscal neutrality and proportionality must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which makes the exercise of the right to adjust VAT improperly invoiced in respect of a period which has already been the subject of a tax inspection subject to conditions linked to the submission of a new fact capable of resulting in a change to the findings of that inspection, even in the absence of risk of any loss of tax revenue, provided that the taxable person concerned is actually able to exercise his or her right to the adjustment for a reasonable period.

 Costs

49      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the General Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

hereby rules:

Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax and the principles of effectiveness, fiscal neutrality and proportionality

must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which makes the exercise of the right to adjust value added tax improperly invoiced in respect of a period which has already been the subject of a tax inspection subject to conditions linked to the submission of a new fact capable of resulting in a change to the findings of that inspection, even in the absence of risk of any loss of tax revenue, provided that the taxable person concerned is actually able to exercise his or her right to the adjustment for a reasonable period.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 June 2026.

[Signatures]

*      Language of the case: Hungarian.