Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
RICHARD DE LA TOUR
delivered on 19 March 2026 (1)
Case C‑808/24 [Zálečta] (i)
M.R.
v
Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Okresný súd Lučenec (District Court, Lučenec, Slovakia))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – Directive 2003/88/EC – Organisation of working time – Article 2(1) – Working time – Article 6(b) – Maximum weekly working time – Protection of the safety and health of workers – Working time of firefighters and rescue workers – On-call duty performed at the workplace not included in working time – Simultaneous breach of the limit on weekly working time – Right to compensation for non-material damage from a Member State for breach of EU law – Incorrect transposition – Conditions – Determination of the amount of compensation )
I. Introduction
1. An officer in a local fire and rescue service in Slovakia brought an action against the State before the Okresný súd Lučenec (District Court, Lučenec, Slovakia) seeking compensation for non-material damage he claims to have suffered as a result of the incorrect transposition into Slovak law of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time. (2)
2. The request for a preliminary ruling from that court concerns the interpretation of Article 2(1) of that directive, read in conjunction with Article 6(b) thereof, and the rules on compensation for the alleged damage. Thus, the Court is asked, once again, about the conditions for establishing the liability of a Member State in relation to the working time of a firefighter employed in the public sector.
3. I propose that the Court be guided by the principles set out, inter alia, in the judgment of 25 November 2010, Fuß, (3) to find that:
– of those two provisions of Directive 2003/88, only Article 6(b) may confer individual rights on individuals entitling them to a right to reparation for infringement of that article by the Member State concerned;
– only non-material damage caused by exceeding the maximum weekly working time fixed by Article 6(b) of that directive may give rise to reparation in the event of an infringement by a Member State of Article 2(1) of that directive, and
– the determination of the amount of compensation that would be payable as a result of that infringement is a matter for national law, in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
II. Legal framework
A. European Union law
4. Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88 defines ‘working time’ as ‘any period during which the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national laws and/or practice’.
5. Article 6 of that directive, headed ‘Maximum weekly working time’, provides:
‘Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that, in keeping with the need to protect the safety and health of workers:
(a) the period of weekly working time is limited by means of laws, regulations or administrative provisions or by collective agreements or agreements between the two sides of industry;
(b) the average working time for each seven-day period, including overtime, does not exceed 48 hours.’
B. National law
6. Article 85(1) of the zákon č. 315/2001 Z. z. o Hasičskom a záchrannom zbore (Law No 315/2001 on the fire and rescue service), of 2 July 2001 (‘Law No 315/2001’), provides:
‘An officer’s duty time is the time during which the officer is on duty and remains at the disposal of the official authority.’
7. Under Article 86(2) of that law: (4)
‘In the event of an uneven distribution of duty time, the duration of duty on individual duty days may not exceed 18 hours. The duration of duty and the directly related on-call duty assigned at the place where duty is performed may not exceed 24 hours per duty day in total.’
8. Article 92(1) of that law provides:
‘The official authority assigns an officer to on-call duty at the place where duty is performed; the on-call duty is directly related to the performance of duty under Paragraph 86(2), as part of the duty time schedule.’
9. Article 122(3) of Law No 315/2001 provides:
‘Remuneration for the on-call duty … is not due for the time when duty is performed during such on-call duty; the performance of such duty is treated as overtime.’
III. The facts of the dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
10. M.R., an officer in a local fire and rescue service, seeks compensation for non-material damage resulting from the fact that his on-call duty performed at the workplace is not included in his working time, (5) contrary to Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88, which, according to M.R., also led to an infringement of Article 6(b) of that directive. The damage he alleges is based on the incorrect transposition of the first of those provisions, which resulted in the maximum weekly working time, as defined in the second of those provisions, being exceeded. M.R. does not seek financial compensation in the latter respect.
11. By judgment of 20 December 2023, the Okresný súd Lučenec (District Court, Lučenec), which is the referring court, ruled, first, that Slovak legislation allows M.R.’s employer not to count on-call duty as working time, contrary to Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88, as interpreted by the Court. (6) Second, it held that that infringement gave rise to the right to compensation only if M.R.’s working time including on-call duty exceeded the maximum weekly working time, contrary to Article 6(b) of that directive.
12. Lastly, the referring court found that, during the period at issue, M.R.’s working time, including on-call duty, exceeded the limit laid down in Article 6(b) of that directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(1), by 28 days and that the infringement of those provisions had an impact on M.R.’s privacy and family life. Accordingly, it ordered the State to pay him compensation both on that basis and for loss of hope for a change in the legislation.
13. By order of 30 May 2024, the Krajský súd v Banskej Bystrici (Regional Court, Banská Bystrica, Slovakia), ruling on the appeal brought by the State, set aside the judgment of 20 December 2023 on the ground that the referring court had ruled ultra petita. It held that M.R. claimed neither a right based on the loss of hope for a change in the legislation nor a right to compensation for non-material damage relating to the number of hours worked beyond the limit set by Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88. In addition, it held that the non-material damage caused by the conflict between national law and Article 2(1) of that directive gives rise to compensation without there being any ground for finding an infringement of Article 6(b) of that directive.
14. The case was referred back to the referring court, which questions the relevance of that interpretation. It states that this has consequences both for the basis of a claim for damages and the basis of calculation of the damages, depending on whether or not that right is linked to the number of hours worked beyond the limit laid down in Article 6(b) of the directive.
15. In those circumstances, the Okresný súd Lučenec (District Court, Lučenec) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Does the fact that, pursuant to national legislation, an employee’s on-call duty is not counted as working time, contrary to Article 2(1) of Directive [2003/88], provide a basis for a claim for damages against a Member State for an infringement of EU law without the need to demonstrate that Article 6(b) of that directive was also infringed in relation to that employee?
(2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, should the national court, in determining whether the amount of compensation is appropriate, take into account the number of hours of on-call duty which, as a result of the national legislation, was not included in the employee’s working time, or should the amount of compensation payable by the Member State be determined on the basis of the duration of the unlawful situation arising from the national legislation, which allows on-call duty hours not to be included in the employee’s working time, contrary to Directive 2003/88?
(3) If the answer to the [first question] is in the negative, should the national court, in determining whether the amount of compensation is appropriate, take into account the number of hours during which Article 6(b) of the directive was infringed, or should the amount of compensation payable by the Member State be determined on the basis of the duration of the unlawful situation arising from the national legislation, which allows on-call duty hours not to be included in the employee’s working time, contrary to Directive 2003/88?’
16. Written observations were submitted by the Slovak Government, Ireland and the Commission.
IV. Analysis
17. Since an action seeking compensation for damage caused by an infringement of EU law by a Member State has been brought before the referring court, it is appropriate to set out the general rules applicable to the matter before examining, in turn, the first question referred for a preliminary ruling and, depending on the proposed answer to that question, either of the additional questions relating to the criteria for determining the amount of compensation payable.
A. The general rules on the liability of a Member State in the event of infringement of EU law and of Directive 2003/88 in particular
18. First, it must be ascertained whether the referring court sets out special conditions for establishing the liability of the State under national law, with less restrictive conditions than those provided for in EU law. (7)
19. Second, if that is not the case, the principles of EU law reiterated by the Court of Justice having regard to Directive 2003/88 apply, namely:
– the directive does not contain any provision regarding the penalties applicable where the minimum requirements laid down by it are infringed, for example regarding the duration of working time, and therefore it contains no specific rule regarding the reparation for the loss or damage which may have been suffered by workers as a result of such an infringement, (8) and
– however, the principle of State liability for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the treaties on which the European Union is based. (9)
20. For individuals harmed to have a right to reparation, the Court has held that the following three conditions must be met: (10)
– the rule of EU law infringed must be intended to confer rights on them; (11)
– the infringement of that rule must be sufficiently serious; and
– there must be a direct causal link between that infringement and the loss or damage sustained by those individuals.
21. Third, the Court gives the national courts guidance on the application of those conditions for establishing the liability of Member States for damage caused to individuals by breaches of EU law. (12)
B. The first question, relating to the first condition for establishing the liability of the State
22. By its first question, the referring court seeks to ascertain, in essence, whether Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88 must be interpreted as meaning that it is intended to confer rights on individuals capable of entitling them to compensation from a Member State under the principle of State liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of a breach of EU law attributable to that Member State.
23. I would point out, first, that in the present case, it is common ground that according to the criteria defined by the Court’s case-law, M.R.’s on-call duty constitutes working time within the meaning of Article 2(1) of that directive, that the Slovak legislation did not comply with EU law, (13) and that the average weekly working time, provided for in Article 6(b) of that directive, had been exceeded for part of the period relied on by M.R. (14)
24. Second, Slovak law does not provide for less restrictive special conditions than those provided for in EU law for the liability of the State. (15)
25. As regards the question whether Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88 confers rights on individuals that they may rely on before the national courts, I note, first, that there is no case-law of the Court of Justice concerning that provision.
26. Second, it should be pointed out that:
– Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88, as its heading suggests, gives a definition of ‘working time’ as ‘any period during which the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national laws and/or practice’, (16)
– that definition has been interpreted by the Court of Justice. According to settled case-law, the whole of the stand-by time must be classified as ‘working time’, within the meaning of Directive 2003/88, irrespective of the professional activity actually carried out by the worker during that period when he or she is required to remain at his or her workplace and to be available to his or her employer (17) or when, during stand-by time spent at home, the worker has the duty to respond to calls from his employer within 8 minutes. (18) Thus, as regards the on-call time of firefighters, the Court’s examination is on a case-by-case basis. (19) No direct effect of Article 2(1) of that directive has been recognised.
27. I therefore propose that the Court, like all the parties who submitted written observations, hold that Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88 merely defines the concept of ‘working time’. On its own, it does not confer individual rights, the breach of which would be capable of giving rise to a Member State’s liability for the damage caused to individuals in the event of the State’s failure to apply that definition in national legislation.
28. In that regard, I also share Ireland’s view that to interpret Article 2(1) of that directive ‘as allowing for damages per se would have far-reaching consequences, including making a State liable for damages even in cases where no loss is established’. (20)
29. Accordingly, since Article 2(1) of the directive does not grant rights to individuals, the second question referred for a preliminary ruling becomes devoid of purpose. Therefore, there is no need to answer it.
C. The third question
30. In order to answer that question, which concerns the rules on compensation for non-material damage suffered as a result of the alleged infringement of EU law, it is necessary, first, to examine whether the conditions for establishing the liability of the Member State, referred to in point 20 of this Opinion, as a result of the infringement of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88, (21) are met. The fact that it results from the infringement of Article 2(1) of that directive is immaterial.
1. The conditions for establishing the liability of the State in the event of infringement of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88
(a) First condition: the rule of EU law confers rights on individuals
31. The Court has held that Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88 constitutes a rule of EU social law which confers on individuals rights upon which they are entitled to rely directly before the national courts on the ground that it ‘imposes on Member States a maximum limit for the average working week from which every worker must benefit, because it is a minimum requirement’. (22)
(b) Second condition: the breach of that rule must be sufficiently serious
32. In the judgment in Fuß, (23) it is recalled that:
– it is necessary to determine whether the infringement of EU law occurred in manifest breach of the relevant case-law of the Court, (24) and
– it is, in principle, for national courts to determine whether the conditions for State liability for breach of EU law are met, unless, in the case in the main proceedings that gave rise to the reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court has all the information necessary in order to judge whether the facts presented are to be characterised as a sufficiently serious breach of EU law.
33. In the present case, ruling on M.R.’s application, in relation to the period of work from 1 August 2020 to 30 June 2023, the referring court found, on the one hand, that M.R. had spent ‘a total of 24 hours on duty, of which 18 hours are counted as working time’ under Article 86(2) of Law No 315/2001, (25) on-call duty not being counted as working time. It also established that, in that situation, during the six-month reference period, the duration of M.R.’s working time had exceeded the maximum duration of 48 hours in a seven-day period provided for in Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88. (26)
34. However, during that period, the Court’s case-law on the concept of ‘working time’ of firefighters was sufficiently developed in the sense that ‘the activities carried out by the operational crews of a public fire service … fall within the scope of Directive 2003/88, with the result that, in principle, Article 6(b) thereof precludes the exceeding of the 48-hour ceiling prescribed as the maximum weekly working time, including time on call’. (27)
35. In those circumstances, since the failure to comply with the requirements of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88 during the period at issue in the main proceedings occurred in manifest breach of the Court’s case-law, it must be regarded as a sufficiently serious breach of EU law. Consequently, the second condition that must be met in order for the right to reparation to be recognised is also satisfied in the case in the main proceedings.
(c) Third condition: there must be a causal link between the breach of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88 and the damage
36. Since, according to the referring court, the exceeding of M.R.’s working time by 28 days over the reference period ‘must have objectively affected his private and family life’, (28) it is my view that the existence of the necessary causal link has been established.
37. Since the three conditions for establishing the liability of the State arising from the infringement of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88 are met, (29) an answer must be given to the third question on the rules on compensation.
2. The rules on compensation for infringement of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88
38. The referring court questions the Court on the elements to be taken into consideration in determining the amount of compensation for non-material damage relied on by M.R.. It considers as the basis of calculation either the number of hours that exceeded the maximum duration of working time provided for in Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88, or the period of time during which the Member State has failed to amend its legislation so that on-call duty is included in working time.
39. It should be recalled, first, that the Court has held that that directive contains no specific rule regarding the reparation for the loss or damage which may have been suffered by workers as a result of an infringement of the minimum requirements laid down by it, in particular regarding the duration of working time. (30)
40. Second, in the judgment in Fuß, the Court also held that:
– ‘it is on the basis of the rules of national law on liability that the State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss or damage caused, provided that the conditions for reparation of loss or damage laid down by national law are not less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims (principle of equivalence) and are not so framed as to make it, in practice, impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation (principle of effectiveness)’; (31)
– ‘with regard to the form and method of calculation of reparation for loss or damage, it must be pointed out that reparation for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law must be commensurate with the loss or damage sustained so as to ensure the effective protection of their rights’; (32)
– ‘in the absence of relevant EU law provisions, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, subject to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, to set the criteria for determining the extent of reparation’, (33) and
– ‘it follows that it is for the national law of the Member States, while ensuring observance of [those] principles …, first, to determine whether reparation for the loss or damage caused to an individual as a result of the infringement of the provisions of Directive 2003/88 must be granted as additional time off in lieu or as financial compensation and, second, to lay down the rules concerning how that reparation is to be calculated’. (34)
41. I note that, in the case that gave rise to the judgment in Fuß, the alleged damage was of a material nature (35) and that the Verwaltungsgericht Halle (Administrative Court, Halle, Germany) questioned the granting of either time off in lieu or financial compensation to Günter Fuß as reparation. (36)
42. In the present case, however, M.R. seeks appropriate damages for the non-material damage he suffered as a result of his working time being calculated without including his on-call duty, in accordance with Slovak legislation. (37)In those circumstances, in order to give a useful answer to the referring court, several questions arise: as regards the compensation for non-material damage, should the Court’s answer recalled in point 40 (last indent) of this Opinion be more detailed, or even different? If so, what criteria should be used?
43. In their written observations, the Slovak Government, Ireland and the Commission adopted convergent positions with several nuances.
44. The Commission proposes that the Court reiterate its answer in paragraphs 93 and 94 of the judgment in Fuß. The Slovak Government emphasises the need to set two limits. First, national courts are entitled to ensure that the protection of rights guaranteed by the legal order of the European Union does not result in unjust enrichment of the persons concerned. (38) Second, the system of liability of Member States does not require them to pay punitive damages to individuals that goes beyond the actual damage caused to them by the infringement of their right. (39)
45. Ireland argues that the amount of compensation should be determined on the basis of the number of hours that were not counted as ‘working time’ contrary to Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88, which establishes the existence of harm and meets the requirements of effectiveness. It considers that the criterion of the duration of the unlawful situation arising from the national legislation should be rejected.
46. As regards that criterion, I share the view that the conditions for establishing State liability for infringement of EU law and, in particular, that relating to the existence of a causal link between that infringement and the damage effectively or actually suffered preclude the award of damages related to the period of time during which the national legislation had not been brought into line with EU law by the Member State concerned.
47. Furthermore, as regards the method of calculating compensation for the infringement of EU law, I see no reason to supplement the Court’s case-law, even if non-material damage has been found. It is therefore for the national courts to determine, according to their national law, the reparation commensurate with the loss or damage sustained, such as to ensure the effective protection of the rights of individuals. (40)
48. Therefore, compensation for an infringement of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88 should not always be calculated on the basis of the number of hours worked in excess of the limit laid down therein.
49. The only element to be taken into consideration, in my view, is the method of calculation proposed by individuals in support of their application.
50. Evidently, the compensation sought may be based, as in the present case, on the number of hours (41) in relation to the infringement of privacy and family life resulting from the infringement of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88. However, such an infringement could cause other types of non-material damage, such as physical harm (serious illness, for example) or mental harm (burnout or depression, for example). In that case, the amount of compensation could be calculated differently, without a strict correlation with the fact that the time limit was exceeded.
51. I therefore propose that the Court, in answer to the third question referred for a preliminary ruling, take the view, following on from the judgment in Fuß, (42) that it is for the national law of the Member State concerned to determine, while ensuring observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the method of calculating the amount of compensation for non-material damage caused by that State in the event of infringement of Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88.
V. Conclusion
52. Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, I suggest that the Court of Justice answer the questions referred by the Okresný súd Lučenec (District Court, Lučenec, Slovakia) as follows:
(1) Article 2(1) of the Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time
must be interpreted as meaning that it is not intended to confer rights on individuals capable of entitling them to compensation from a Member State under the principle of State liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of a breach of EU law attributable to that Member State.
(2) Where the infringement of Article 2(1) of that directive caused an infringement of Article 6(b) of that directive, the reparation, for which the authorities of the Member States are responsible, of the loss or damage caused by them to individuals as a result of those breaches of EU law must be commensurate with the loss or damage sustained. In the absence of relevant provisions of EU law, it is for the national law of the Member State concerned to determine, in compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the method of calculating the amount of compensation for the alleged non-material damage.
1 Original language: French.
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.
2 OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9.
3 C‑429/09, ‘the judgment in Fuß’, EU:C:2010:717.
4 The referring court states that that provision governs the uneven distribution of the applicant’s working hours over a six-month period.
5 In that regard, the referring court states that it is common ground that during on-call duty, M.R. was required to be at his place of work and remain at his employer’s disposal, without being able to leave the workplace.
6 The referring court cites judgment of 21 February 2018, Matzak (C‑518/15, EU:C:2018:82).
7 See judgment in Fuß (paragraph 66). See, also, judgment of 28 June 2022, Commission v Spain (Breach of EU law by the legislature) (C‑278/20, EU:C:2022:503, paragraph 179), in which the Court held that the principle of equivalence cannot form the basis for an obligation on the part of the Member States to allow a right to reparation to arise under conditions more favourable than those laid down by its case-law.
8 See judgment in Fuß (paragraph 44), and judgment of 20 June 2024, Artemis security (C‑367/23, EU:C:2024:529, paragraph 26).
9 See judgment in Fuß (paragraph 45) and, for a general reminder of that basis, judgment of 22 December 2022, Ministre de la Transition écologique and Premier ministre (Liability of the State for air pollution) (EU:C:2022:1015, paragraph 43).
10 See, inter alia, judgment in Fuß (paragraph 47 and the case-law cited), and judgment of 1 August 2025, Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth and Others (C‑97/24, EU:C:2025:594, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
11 See, as a recent illustration of a case in which that first condition is not met, judgment of 22 December 2022, Ministre de la Transition écologique and Premier ministre (Liability of the State for air pollution) (C‑61/21, EU:C:2022:1015, paragraph 56). The Court held that it did not follow either explicitly or implicitly from the provisions of EU law examined relating to limit values for certain particulate matter harmful to human health that individuals are granted rights the breach of which would be capable of giving rise to a Member State’s liability for the damage caused to them.
12 See, inter alia, judgment in Fuß (paragraph 48).
13 I note that the Commission has expressed a different view on the national legislation.
14 See point 12 of this Opinion.
15 See point 18 of this Opinion.
16 On the reference to ‘national laws and/or practice’, see judgment of 9 March 2021, Stadt Offenbach am Main (A firefighter’s period of stand-by time) (C‑580/19, ‘the judgment in A firefighter’s period of stand-by time’, EU:C:2021:183, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited), on the impossibility of attaching conditions or restrictions to the right to have working periods and corresponding rest periods duly taken into account, in order to ensure the effectiveness of Directive 2003/88 and compliance with its objective. In paragraphs 26 to 28 of that judgment, the Court pointed out that the purpose of that directive is to lay down minimum requirements intended to improve the living and working conditions of workers and that, through those requirements relating to both maximum working hours and minimum rest periods, the directive gives specific form to the fundamental right expressly enshrined in Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
17 See, inter alia, judgment in A firefighter’s period of stand-by time (paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
18 See judgment of 21 February 2018, Matzak (C‑518/15, EU:C:2018:82, paragraph 66). See, also, judgment in A firefighter’s period of stand-by time (paragraphs 36, 38 and 39). In summary, the general criterion is the ‘little freedom to manage the time during which [the worker’s] professional services are not required’.
19 See, also, judgment in A firefighter’s period of stand-by time (paragraphs 41 and 42), and judgment of 11 November 2021, Dublin City Council (C‑214/20, EU:C:2021:909, paragraphs 43 to 45 and 48).
20 Emphasis added. Ireland underlines the financial impact of such an interpretation. However, it is for each Member State to decide whether it intends to take more favourable measures (see point 18 of this Opinion). In addition, the way in which workers are remunerated for periods of stand-by time is not covered by Directive 2003/88 but by the relevant provisions of national law. That does not preclude a law that, as regards periods of stand-by time which should be entirely regarded as not being covered by the concept of ‘working time’ for the purposes of the application of that directive, nevertheless provides for the payment to the worker concerned of a sum intended to compensate him or her for the inconvenience that those periods of stand-by time cause to the organisation of his or her time and to the pursuit of his or her own interests. See judgment in A firefighter’s period of stand-by time (paragraphs 57 and 58 and the case-law cited).
21 See point 23 of this Opinion.
22 See judgment in Fuß (paragraphs 49 and 50).
23 See judgment in Fuß (paragraphs 52 and 53 and the case-law cited).
24 See also judgment of 1 August 2025, Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth and Others (C‑97/24, EU:C:2025:594, paragraph 30).
25 See point 7 of this Opinion.
26 After consultation, on the basis of information from the Slovak Government, of the judgment of the referring court of 20 December 2023 (see point 11 of this Opinion), available at: https://www.justice.gov.sk/sudy-a-rozhodnutia/sudy/sud_141/rozhodnutia/ae74e401-6f01-447a-afff-174757c1bc7a:d7df1744-bda4-4193-8022-29e14a926b6d/ (paragraphs 4 and 17), and the order of the Krajský súd v Banskej Bystrici (Regional Court, Banská Bystrica) of 30 May 2024 (see point 13 of this Opinion), available at: https://www.justice.gov.sk/sudy-a-rozhodnutia/sudy/sud_138/rozhodnutia/d18ccc21-de3d-4606-9661-d5ab2077894d:80ac45f7-45b5-49d5-aed7-cc4094dbaba7 (paragraph 7.2), the information given by the referring court in paragraph 8 of the request for a preliminary ruling, which appears to be different from that in paragraph 13 of that request, can be confirmed.
27 See judgment in Fuß (paragraph 57).
28 See point 12 of this Opinion.
29 See point 20 of this Opinion.
30 See judgment in Fuß (paragraphs 44, 96 and 98). For a reminder of that finding in the case of an action for damages against an employer who infringed the national rules implementing EU law on the protection of workers assigned to night work, see judgment of 20 June 2024, Artemis security (C‑367/23, EU:C:2024:529, paragraphs 26 and 27).
31 Judgment in Fuß (paragraph 62). See, also, the case-law cited. See, also, judgment of 28 June 2022, Commission v Spain (Breach of EU law by the legislature) (C‑278/20, EU:C:2022:503, paragraphs 176 and 184).
32 Judgment in Fuß (paragraph 92). See, also, the case-law cited. Emphasis added.
33 Judgment in Fuß (paragraph 93). See, also, the case-law cited. Emphasis added.
34 Judgment in Fuß (paragraph 94). Emphasis added.
35 See judgment in Fuß (paragraph 23).
36 See judgment in Fuß (paragraph 30, third question).
37 See points 10 and 13 of this Opinion.
38 The Slovak Government cites judgment of 21 March 2023, Mercedes-Benz Group (Liability of manufacturers of vehicles fitted with defeat devices) (C‑100/21, EU:C:2023:229, paragraph 94).
39 The Slovak Government cites, by analogy, judgment of 4 October 2024, Agentsia po vpisvaniyata (C‑200/23, EU:C:2024:827, paragraph 153).
40 See, as regards compensation for non-material damage alleged against a data controller, judgment of 4 October 2024, Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības centrs (C‑507/23, EU:C:2024:854, paragraph 37). The Court concluded that Article 82(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1), must be interpreted as meaning that the making of an apology may constitute sufficient compensation for non-material damage on the basis of that provision, inter alia where it is impossible to restore the situation that existed prior to the occurrence of that damage, provided that that form of redress is such as to compensate in full the damage suffered by the data subject.
41 The referring court states that, ‘in the view of the court of appeal, [M.R.] in fact characterised his claim as one arising from long-standing interference in his personal rights. He claimed compensation for non-material damage, which he quantified by reference to the number of hours of on-call duty that he actually performed and which were not included in his working time in violation of Articles 2(1) and 6(b) of the directive’. Emphasis added.
42 See judgment in Fuß (paragraph 98).