30.1.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 30/40

Appeal brought on 28 November 2016 by Merck KGaA against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 8 September 2016 in Case T-470/13: Merck KGaA v European Commission

(Case C-614/16 P)

(2017/C 030/44)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Merck KGaA (represented by: B. Bär-Bouyssière, Rechtsanwalt, S. Smith, Solicitor, R. Kreisberger, Barrister, D. Mackersie, Advocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Generics (UK) Ltd

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—

Set aside paragraph 1 of the operative part of the Judgment;

—

annul Articles 1(1), 2(1) of the Decision and Articles 3 and 4 insofar as these are addressed to Merck;

—

in the alternative, annul or reduce the penalty imposed on Merck;

—

set aside paragraph 2 of the operative part of the Judgment and order the Commission to bear their own costs and to pay the costs of Merck, relating to both the proceedings at first instance and to this appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

1.

The Appellant’s first ground of appeal is that the General Court erred in law by finding that the patent settlement agreements (‘PSAs’), concluded between Generics (UK) (‘GUK’) and Lundbeck, were restrictions by object under Article 101(1) TFEU:

i.

By its first plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court misdirected itself as to the applicable legal standard and the correct approach to determining whether the PSAs could be characterised as restrictions by object, in particular in the light of the legal principles upheld in Case C-67/13 P Cartes Bancaires.

ii.

By its second plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by failing to analyse whether the wording of the PSAs revealed a sufficient degree of harm.

iii.

By its third plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by holding that the PSAs revealed a sufficient degree of harm on the basis that they were equivalent to market exclusion agreements.

iv.

By its fourth plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by holding that the PSAs revealed a sufficient degree of harm by avoiding litigation whose outcome was uncertain.

v.

By its fifth plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by treating the payment to GUK under the PSAs as one of the principal elements of a restriction by object.

vi.

By its sixth plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by relying on factual considerations extraneous to the wording of the PSAs to support its finding of a restriction by object.

vii.

By its seventh plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by finding that the PSA relating to the EEA exceeded the scope of Lundbeck's patents.

2.

The Appellant’s second ground of appeal is that the General Court erred in law by concluding that GUK and Lundbeck were potential competitors at the time when the PSAs were concluded:

viii.

By its eighth plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by failing to consider whether the eight routes to market posited by the Commission were economically viable, or practically possible, for GUK within a sufficiently short time-frame.

ix.

By its ninth plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by reversing the burden of proof in relation to potential competition.

x.

By its tenth plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by finding that the fact that the parties had entered into the PSAs was relevant to the assessment of potential competition.

xi.

By its eleventh plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by failing to recognise that the assessment of potential competition was not apt for consideration in the context of a ‘by object’ assessment.

3.

The Appellant’s third ground of appeal is that the General Court erred in law by upholding the fine imposed by the Commission on the Appellant:

xii.

By its twelfth plea, the Appellant argues that the General Court erred by finding that the Commission had jurisdiction to impose a fine on the Appellant or, alternatively, to impose a fine that was more than symbolic.