9.11.2015

Official Journal of the European Union

C 371/26

Appeal brought on 26 August 2015 by the European Commission against the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of 18 June 2015 in Case F-5/14, CX v Commission

(Case T-493/15 P)

(2015/C 371/29)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by J. Currall and C. Ehrbar, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: CX (Enghien, Belgium)

Form of order sought by the appellant

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of 18 June 2015 in Case F-5/14 CX v Commission;

—	refer the case to the Civil Service Tribunal in order that it may rule on the other pleas in law;

—	reserve the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on four pleas in law.

First plea in law, relating to medical opinions produced in the framework of disciplinary proceedings, alleging errors of law due to a failure to take account of (i) the rules on the burden of proof, (ii) Annex IX to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the regulations’), (iii) Article 59 of the regulations and (iv) the powers of the Civil Service Tribunal.

2.	Second plea in law, relating to the concept of a body of consistent evidence, alleging a failure to take account of the scope of obligations regarding the collection of evidence and defects in reasoning.

Third plea in law, alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the duty to care, since the Civil Service Tribunal held that, on the basis of the evidence available to it when it adopted the contested decision, the Commission had acted in breach of its duty of care by failing, for the third hearing, to invite the applicant at first instance before it on the ground that, first, the facts subject to the proceedings were relatively old, secondly, that the official was on sick leave and that, third, his lawyer had refused, for a second time, the invitation.

Fourth plea in law, alleging an error of reasoning as regards the consequences of the infringement of the right to be heard and substantive factual inaccuracy, in so far as the Civil Service Tribunal relied upon substantively inaccurate facts in order to conclude that hearing the applicant at first instance could have had an effect on the contested decision.