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By the first plea in law, the applicant claims that the decision breaches the general principles of equal treatment and protection of legitimate expectations and errs in law in departing unlawfully from the binding Guidelines, even though the Guidelines make no provision for any such departure. The reasons given, that the exemptions are not aimed at keeping inefficient firms artificially on the market, are erroneous because (i) they distinguish between efficient and inefficient undertakings, even though the Guidelines do not do so, and (ii) the Commission’s interpretation of ‘efficiency’ is incompatible with fundamental principles of the law on State aid.

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By the second plea in law, the applicant claims that, even on the assumption that the Commission can measure the exemptions directly against Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, the decision is vitiated by a number of errors of law and manifest errors of assessment because it does not clearly define the objective of the aid and thus fails to explain why the aid is necessary for achieving the objective. In particular, in the applicant’s view, the Commission has failed to take into account the fact that the authorised operating aid to firms in difficulty is, according to the case-law, fundamentally unsuited to achieving objectives of common interest, and that the exemptions have no incentive effect.

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By the third plea in law, the applicant claims that — in breach of the right to a hearing and the procedural safeguards under Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (2) — the disputed decision goes far beyond clarification of the issues raised in the initiation decision. First, the contested decision concludes that it is inappropriate to measure the aid against the Guidelines, whereas the initiation decision emphasises that that is ‘the only legal basis for compatibility’. Secondly, the contested decision concludes that it is — exceptionally — appropriate for the aid to be measured against Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, even though there is nothing in the initiation decision that would indicate such a possibility. As a result the applicant was deprived of the opportunity to comment on those issues which, so far as the Commission was concerned, were ultimately decisive.

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By the fourth plea in law, the applicant claims that the contested decision is vitiated by serious defects of reasoning, in that the Commission failed to put forward any reasonable considerations in relation to numerous points. In particular, no reasonable grounds have been put forward (i) as regards the application of the derogation provided for by Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and (ii) as regards the exceptional circumstances that would justify the authorisation of operating aid as in the present case.