1. 

This request for a preliminary ruling, submitted by the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék (Regional Court, Budapest), invites the Court to interpret Article 1(1) of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. ( 2 )

2. 

The request has been made in proceedings brought before the national court concerning the recognition in Hungary of the effects of a final judgment delivered by a court in another Member State, in this case the Republic of Austria, sentencing Mr Balogh to a term of imprisonment for having committed a criminal offence and ordering him to pay the costs of the proceedings.

3. 

It is apparent from the order of reference that, by judgment of 13 May 2014, which became final on 8 October 2014, ( 3 ) the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt, Austria) sentenced Mr Balogh, a Hungarian national, to a term of imprisonment of four years and six months for aggravated burglary and ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mr Balogh is in custody in Austria, where he is to serve his sentence until 24 December 2017.

4. 

The hearing which took place before the Court and, in particular, the clarifications provided by the Austrian Government, revealed that, on 15 September 2014, the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) transmitted the most important information contained in the judgment handed down against Mr Balogh to the Austrian criminal records office (österreichisches Strafregisteramt) using, in accordance with Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA, ( 4 ) the code prescribed by the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) corresponding to the offences giving rise to the conviction.

5. 

On 21 September 2014, ( 5 ) the Austrian criminal records office, as central authority for the Republic of Austria within the meaning of Article 3 of Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States, ( 6 ) and in compliance with the obligation laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(2) of that framework decision, informed the Hungarian central authority, namely the central office for administrative and public electronic services (Közigazgatási és Elektronikus Közszolgáltatások Központi Hivatala), of the judgment in the electronic format provided for under ECRIS.

6. 

The Hungarian Ministry of Justice (magyar Igazságügyi Minisztérium) subsequently told the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) that it had to receive the judgment in order for it to be recognised as valid in Hungary. It also stated that the foreign judgment, once recognised in Hungary, would be equivalent to a national conviction entered in the criminal record.

7. 

It is in the context of the application of this special procedure for the recognition of foreign judgments under Hungarian law, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék (Regional Court, Budapest), that that court questions whether or not the cost of translating the judgment delivered by the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) can be charged to Mr Balogh.

8. 

The relevant provisions of Hungarian law are as follows.

9. 

Article 46 of Law XXXVIII of 1996 on international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (a nemzetközi bűnügyi jogsegélyről szóló 1996. évi XXXVIII. törvény) provides as follows:

‘(1)   The Minister for Justice shall receive notifications for the recognition of the validity of a foreign judgment as well as foreign applications for the transfer of enforcement of a custodial sentence or of a detention order, seizure or asset confiscation, or a measure rendering electronic data permanently inaccessible, and, provided that Article 2 of this law does not so preclude, shall forward them to the court with jurisdiction. The Fővárosi Törvényszék [(Court of Budapest)] has substantive and territorial jurisdiction to verify whether the conditions for the enforcement of a custodial sentence or detention order, seizure or asset confiscation, or a measure rendering electronic data permanently inaccessible, as laid down in this law, are satisfied.

…

(3)   Save as otherwise provided for in this law, the judicial procedure shall be governed by the general rules laid down in Chapter XXIX [of Law XIX of 1998 on criminal procedure (a büntetőeljárásról szóló 1998 évi XIX. Törvény; “the Law on criminal procedure”)] relating to special procedures, except for the provisions of Article 555(2)(b) and (d).’

10. 

Furthermore, Article 48 of the Law on international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters provides:

‘(1)   The court, when delivering its decision, shall be bound by the findings of fact of the foreign court.

(2)   In the course of the procedure before it, the court shall determine the legal consequences deriving from the conviction under Hungarian law. If the sentence or measure imposed by the judgment of the foreign court is not fully compatible with Hungarian law, the court shall make a finding in its decision as to the sentence or measure applicable under Hungarian law, so that it corresponds as closely as possible to the sentence or measure imposed by the foreign court, and, where an application is made for enforcement, shall accordingly rule on the enforcement of the sentence or measure.

(3)   When determining the applicable sentence or measure, reference shall be made to the law that applied at the time the offence was committed. If, under the Hungarian law applicable at the time the sentence or applicable measure is determined, the act in question no longer constitutes a criminal offence or is subject to a lesser punishment, that later law shall apply.’

11. 

Article 9(1) of the Law on criminal procedure provides that criminal proceedings are to be conducted in Hungarian.

12. 

Pursuant to Article 338(1) of the Law on criminal procedure, the court is to order the defendant to bear the costs if he is found guilty of, or is held liable for, the commission of an offence. This provision does not apply to the costs of criminal proceedings which, by law, must be borne by another party. Article 338(2) of the Law on criminal procedure provides that the defendant may be ordered to pay the costs incurred only in respect of the act or in respect of the part of the offence for which he was found guilty or held liable. He may not be ordered to pay costs incurred unnecessarily, unless this is attributable to negligence on his part.

13. 

Under Article 339(1) of that law, the State is to bear the costs which the defendant has not been ordered to pay.

14. 

In accordance with Article 555(1) of the Law on criminal procedure, special procedures are governed by the provisions of that law, save as otherwise provided in the chapter dealing with such procedures.

15. 

Article 555(2)(j) of the Law on criminal procedure provides that, in special procedures, the costs are to be borne by the defendant if he has been ordered to pay the costs in the main proceedings.

16. 

The referring court explains that, under Hungarian law, what are referred to as ‘special’ procedures are conducted, after a final decision has been taken on the main criminal law issues, in order to decide on ancillary criminal law matters which are closely related to the main issue. In other words, they are simplified procedures of an ancillary nature.

17. 

The referring court also states that the special procedure in question in the main proceedings does not give rise to a fresh conviction and is limited to recognising that a judgment handed down by a foreign court has the same status as a judgment handed down by a Hungarian court.

18. 

Since the judgment delivered by the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) is in German, the referring court considers that, in the context of the application of that special procedure, it is required to ensure that the judgment is translated into the language used in proceedings, in this instance Hungarian. It points out, in that regard, that in Hungary, translation costs are treated as part of the costs of criminal proceedings.

19. 

The referring court observes that two different practices have become established in Hungary with regard to responsibility for translation costs as costs relating to criminal proceedings.

20. 

According to the first practice, it is to be inferred from the provisions of Directive 2010/64 that translation costs incurred during the procedure for recognising the validity of a foreign judgment constitute costs relating to criminal proceedings to be borne by the State. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(1) of that directive, which provides that the directive lays down rules concerning the right to interpretation and translation in, inter alia, criminal proceedings, such proceedings should be construed as including special procedures.

21. 

National provisions requiring a person who has been ordered to pay the costs in the main proceedings to bear the translation-related costs of the special procedure should, therefore, be disregarded.

22. 

It is then necessary to apply Article 9 of the Law on criminal procedure, under which a defendant of Hungarian nationality is entitled to use his native tongue, so that the State is required to bear the costs of translating a foreign judgment in a special recognition procedure. Furthermore, the rule under which translation costs are to be borne by the State, pursuant to Article 339(1) of the Law on criminal procedure, also applies for the purpose of recognising the validity of a foreign judgment.

23. 

The second practice in place in Hungary is based on the consideration that the translation into Hungarian of a foreign judgment which is necessary for the conduct of the special procedure for the recognition of that judgment is unrelated to the right to use one’s native tongue. The defendant is therefore required to bear the translation costs arising in that special procedure. Since the foreign proceedings are, in the present case, the main proceedings for the purpose of Article 555(2)(j) of the Law on criminal procedure, and since the foreign court ordered the defendant to pay the costs of the criminal proceedings, he should bear all the costs, including those arising in the special procedure.

24. 

Considering it necessary to ask the Court for an interpretation of Directive 2010/64, the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék (Regional Court, Budapest) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question for a preliminary ruling:

‘Article 1(1) of Directive 2010/64 reads: “This Directive lays down rules concerning the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings and proceedings for the execution of a European arrest warrant.” Must this formulation be taken to mean, inter alia, that, during a special procedure (Chapter XXIX of the Law on criminal procedure), a court in Hungary must apply this Directive, that is to say, must a special procedure under Hungarian law be regarded as being covered by the expression “criminal proceedings”, or must this expression be interpreted as referring only to procedures which conclude with a final decision concerning the criminal liability of the defendant?’

25.

By its request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court asks the Court to interpret Directive 2010/64 in order to ascertain, in essence, whether it precludes a national practice whereby a Hungarian national given a custodial sentence in another Member State is required to bear the costs of translating the judgment handed down by the criminal court in the context of a special procedure for the recognition of foreign judgments.

26.

Before considering the problem relating to the translation of a judgment delivered by a court of another Member State in the special recognition procedure under Hungarian law, it must be noted that, a convicted person such as Mr Balogh has the right, under the conditions laid down in Article 3 of Directive 2010/64, to have the judgment handed down against him by the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) translated into Hungarian.

27.

Under Article 1(2) of that directive, the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings applies ‘to persons from the time that they are made aware by the competent authorities of a Member State … that they are suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence until the conclusion of the proceedings, which is understood to mean the final determination of the question whether they have committed the offence, including, where applicable, sentencing and the resolution of any appeal’.

28.

As regards the right to interpretation in particular, Article 3(1) of that directive provides that Member States are to ensure ‘that suspected or accused persons who do not understand the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are, within a reasonable period of time, provided with a written translation of all documents which are essential to ensure that they are able to exercise their rights of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings’.

29.

According to recital 30 of Directive 2010/64, ‘safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings requires that essential documents, or at least the relevant passages of such documents, be translated for the benefit of suspected or accused persons in accordance with this Directive. Certain documents should always be considered essential for that purpose and should therefore be translated, such as any decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any judgment’.

30.

Concrete expression is given to that recital in Article 3(2) of Directive 2010/64, which provides that ‘essential documents shall include any decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or indictment, and any judgment’.

31.

The principle underlying Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2010/64 is therefore that a written translation of a judgment such as that handed down against Mr Balogh by the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) should be provided.

32.

By request for clarification under Article 101 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék (Regional Court, Budapest) was asked to state whether the judgment delivered by the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt), as an essential document within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 2010/64, had been translated in Austria into the language of the convicted person and whether, if so, it had been notified to that person in his language.

33.

In its reply of 21 October 2015, the referring court stated that, as far as it was aware, the judgment of the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) had not been translated and, consequently, had not been notified to Mr Balogh either. However, it made clear that the hearing had been conducted in the presence of a Hungarian interpreter.

34.

Nonetheless, according to the information supplied in that respect by the Austrian Government during the hearing, the judgment of the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) was in fact translated into Hungarian, first orally, at the end of the hearing before that court, then in writing. The written translation of the judgment in question was available in August 2015 and was notified to Mr Balogh.

35.

It is thus apparent from this information that Mr Balogh enjoyed the right to have the judgment against him translated, as provided for in Article 3 of Directive 2010/64.

36.

That point having been clarified, it is to be noted that the translation into Hungarian of the judgment handed down by the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt), which is sought by the referring court, is to be used to initiate a special procedure under Hungarian law for the recognition, under that law, of the validity of judgments delivered in other Member States.

37.

Like the Hungarian and Austrian Governments and the European Commission, I take the view that this procedure falls outside the scope of Directive 2010/64, as defined in Article 1(2) thereof. Furthermore, I consider that, in any event, the lawfulness of that procedure, in the light of other rules of EU law, is questionable. Therefore, I do not think it appropriate to examine the issue raised by the referring court from the standpoint of Directive 2010/64.

38.

I would also observe that ‘the fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded a question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing that court with all the guidance on points of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not it has referred to those points in its questions. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject-matter of the dispute’. ( 7 ) More generally, it was possible from both the written and oral observations submitted to the Court in these proceedings to identify the relevant provisions of EU law for the purposes of giving an answer that will be of assistance to the referring court.

39.

The Hungarian Government states that, in the procedure laid down in Article 46 and Article 48 of the Law on international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, the Hungarian court with jurisdiction does not carry out an assessment of the facts or of the degree of criminal liability (it is already bound in that regard). Instead, it tailors the legal consequences as determined in the foreign judgment to the requirements of the Hungarian legal system. This means that the purpose of the procedure is not to impose a new criminal penalty, but rather to satisfy an essential procedural requirement for the recognition and enforcement in Hungary of the foreign judgment, as well as the criminal penalty imposed therein. Thus, the procedure for the recognition of foreign judgments simply makes a technical adjustment to the penalty imposed in the foreign judgment so that it is consistent with Hungarian law. That being the case, the translation into Hungarian of the foreign judgment is a necessary tool in the judicial recognition procedure.

40.

As the Commission pointed out in its written observations, this special procedure is akin to an exequatur procedure, which was confirmed by the exchanges which took place during the hearing. It is therefore clear that the very principle underlying the special procedure is contrary to the first subparagraph of Article 82(1) TFEU, which provides that judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU is to be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions.

41.

Both the referring court’s reply to the Court’s request for clarification ( 8 ) and the exchanges before the Court during the hearing demonstrate that the special procedure at issue is initiated systematically by the Hungarian authorities in order to recognise the validity and effectiveness of foreign judgments under Hungarian law. In particular, as the main proceedings show, this special procedure is initiated by the Hungarian authorities regardless of whether or not a custodial sentence is enforced in Hungary or the judgment taken into account in criminal proceedings conducted there. Neither Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, ( 9 ) nor Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings, ( 10 ) apply in the present case.

42.

Furthermore, the entry in the Hungarian criminal record of a conviction handed down by a court of another Member State is subject to the prior initiation of the special recognition procedure, which, according to the referring court, requires that court to have the Austrian judgment translated into Hungarian.

43.

This approach is, as I will demonstrate, contrary to the European mechanism for the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States as established by Framework Decision 2009/315 and Decision 2009/316.

44.

It is apparent from these two legal instruments that the judgment of the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) should be entered in the Hungarian criminal record not by means of a special recognition procedure such as that provided for under Hungarian law, but directly on the basis of the notification sent by the convicting Member State through ECRIS. Neither the transmission of the judgment nor its translation is, in principle, necessary.

45.

Framework Decision 2009/315 contributes to achieving the goals set out in measure 3 of the programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters ( 11 ) adopted by the Council of the European Union on 29 November 2000, in accordance with the conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999. Measure 3 of that programme calls for the establishment of a standard form for criminal records requests, translated into all EU languages. The aim of using standard forms is to facilitate mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. ( 12 )

46.

As recital 9 of Framework Decision 2009/315 makes clear, that legal instrument is designed to ‘replace Article 22 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters[, signed in Strasbourg on 20 April 1959]. In addition to the obligations of a convicting Member State to transmit information to the Member States of the person’s nationality concerning convictions handed down against their nationals which this Framework Decision incorporates and further defines, an obligation on the Member States of the person’s nationality to store information so transmitted is also introduced, in order to ensure that they are able to reply fully to requests for information from other Member States’.

47.

Framework Decision 2009/315 thus remedies one of the deficiencies of the system established by the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, namely the difficulty in understanding any information transmitted. Translation problems may be partly to blame for this difficulty in comprehension. ( 13 )

48.

The aim of that framework decision is therefore to improve the circulation of information through the establishment of a computerised system. The purpose of any system for exchanging information on convictions must be to enable end users to obtain exhaustive and readily understandable information on an individual’s previous convictions throughout the European Union. The information must be made available to end users rapidly, electronically, and in a secure manner via their national criminal record authority. The use of a code-based, standardised European format recognised by all Member States facilitates translation of the information exchanged, so that it can be understood by all parties.

49.

As stated in recital 17 of Framework Decision 2009/315, ‘improving the circulation of information on convictions is of little benefit if such information cannot be understood by the Member State receiving it. Mutual understanding may be enhanced by the creation of a “standardised European format” allowing information to be exchanged in a uniform, electronic and easily machine-translatable way’. It is apparent from this recital that ‘information on convictions sent by the convicting Member State should be transmitted in the official language or one of the official languages of that Member State’.

50.

The purpose of Framework Decision 2009/315, according to Article 1(a) thereof, is to define the ways in which the convicting Member State is to transmit the information on such convictions to the Member State of the convicted person’s nationality. Under Article 1(c), the aim of the framework decision is also ‘to lay down the framework for a computerised system of exchange of information on convictions between Member States to be built and developed’.

51.

Article 4(1) of that framework decision provides that ‘each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that all convictions handed down within its territory are accompanied, when provided to its criminal record, by information on the nationality or nationalities of the convicted person if he is a national of another Member State’.

52.

The first subparagraph of Article 4(2) of Framework Decision 2009/315 provides that ‘the central authority of the convicting Member State shall, as soon as possible, inform the central authorities of the other Member States of any convictions handed down within its territory against the nationals of such other Member States, as entered in the criminal record’.

53.

In addition to this reporting obligation of the convicting Member State, the Member State of the person’s nationality is required to store the information transmitted, in accordance with Article 5(1) of that framework decision.

54.

Furthermore, Article 11(4) of Framework Decision 2009/315 provides for the adoption by the Council of measures intended, inter alia, to define ‘all means by which understanding and automatically translating transmitted information may be facilitated’ (point (a)).

55.

This explains how ECRIS came to be established, as stated in the first paragraph of Article 1 of Decision 2009/316. Under Article 3(1) of that decision, ECRIS ‘is a decentralised information technology system based on the criminal records databases in each Member State’.

56.

As stated in recital 6, Decision 2009/316 ‘aims to implement Framework Decision 2009/315 … in order to build and develop a computerised system of exchange of information on convictions between Member States. Such a system should be capable of communicating information on convictions in a form which is easily understandable. Therefore, a standardised format allowing information to be exchanged in a uniform, electronic and easily computer-translatable way as well as any other means of organising and facilitating electronic exchanges of information on convictions between central authorities of Member States should be set up’.

57.

In particular, as shown by recital 12 of Decision 2009/316, ‘the reference tables of categories of offences and categories of penalties and measures provided for in this Decision should facilitate the automatic translation and should enable the mutual understanding of the information transmitted by using a system of codes’.

58.

To that end, the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of that decision provides that, ‘when transmitting information in accordance with Article 4(2) and (3) and Article 7 of Framework Decision 2009/315 … relating to the name or legal classification of the offence and to the applicable legal provisions, Member States shall refer to the corresponding code for each of the offences referred to in the transmission, as provided for in the table of offences in Annex A’.

59.

Similarly, the first subparagraph of Article 4(2) of Decision 2009/316 provides that ‘when transmitting information in accordance with Article 4(2) and (3) and Article 7 of Framework Decision 2009/315 … relating to the contents of the conviction, notably the sentence as well as any supplementary penalties, security measures and subsequent decisions modifying the enforcement of the sentence, Member States shall refer to the corresponding code for each of the penalties and measures referred to in the transmission, as provided for in the table of penalties and measures in Annex B’.

60.

These measures facilitate the exchange of information between Member States while enabling the mutual understanding of such information.

61.

As the Austrian Government explained clearly at the hearing, the special procedure for the recognition of judgments handed down in other Member States applied by the Hungarian authorities is not compatible with the mechanism established by Framework Decision 2009/315 and Decision 2009/316. Nor do those legal instruments require the judgments in criminal matters forming the basis of the exchanges of information on convictions to be translated.

62.

First, the translation of those judgments is not necessary. By using standardised codes and a uniform communication format, information on convictions is transmitted in an easily understandable way allowing for automatic translation. That is sufficient for the purpose of entering a conviction in the criminal record of the Member State of nationality of the person concerned.

63.

Secondly, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, to require the translation of a judgment handed down in another Member State is not permissible. As indicated above, the aim of Framework Decision 2009/315 is to improve the circulation of information on convictions between Member States. Furthermore, arrangements for mutual legal assistance in order to consult national criminal records should be swift and efficient. In other words, the period between the entry of a conviction in the criminal record of the Member State where the criminal proceedings were conducted and its entry in the criminal record of the convicted person’s Member State of nationality should be as short as possible. In that context, if Mr Balogh’s conviction could only be entered in the Hungarian criminal record once the judgment handed down by the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) had been translated, that would be contrary to the objective of processing foreign convictions expeditiously. The simplification and speeding-up of exchanges of information which Framework Decision 2009/315 seeks to achieve would thus be undermined.

64.

It is true that Framework Decision 2009/315 contemplates the possibility of the convicting Member State communicating additional information to the Member State of the person’s nationality. Indeed, Article 4(4) of that framework decision provides that ‘any Member State which has provided information under paragraphs 2 and 3 shall communicate to the central authority of the Member State of the person’s nationality, on the latter’s request in individual cases, a copy of the convictions and subsequent measures as well as any other information relevant thereto in order to enable it to consider whether they necessitate any measure at national level’. ( 14 )

65.

However, it is apparent from the wording of that provision that the transmission of judgments under the system for the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record established by Framework Decision 2009/315 is intended to be exceptional. The automatic transmission of judgments would, as pointed out above, be contrary to the objective of that framework decision to facilitate the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States. Nevertheless, it is indeed as a matter of course that the Hungarian authorities ask the courts of other Member States, in the course of their special recognition procedure, to communicate judgments imposing convictions. Furthermore, the Hungarian Government did not claim that there were any special reasons which caused it, in the specific case at issue in the main proceedings, to ask the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) to communicate its judgment. On the contrary, its request was the result of the automatic application of the special procedure for the recognition of foreign judgments. The practice followed by the Hungarian authorities cannot therefore be regarded as justified under Article 4(4) of Framework Decision 2009/315.

66.

Accordingly, the communication of the judgment handed down by the Landesgericht Eisenstadt (Regional Court, Eisenstadt) was neither necessary nor permissible within the framework of ECRIS. It follows, a fortiori, from this that the costs that would be incurred by the referring court in order to have the judgment translated could not be charged to Mr Balogh.

67.

In the light of all the above considerations, I propose that the Court’s answer to the national court should therefore be that Article 1(1) and (2) and Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2010/64 are to be interpreted as not applying to a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where a court of a Member State, in the context of a national procedure for recognition of the validity of foreign judgments, intends to have translated into the language used in proceedings in that State a judgment delivered by a court of another Member State. Furthermore, Articles 4(2) and 5(1) of Framework Decision 2009/315, as well as Decision 2009/316, are to be interpreted as precluding a situation whereby the entry in the criminal record of a Member State of a conviction handed down by a court of another Member State is conditional on such a procedure being initiated beforehand.

68.

In view of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court give the following answer to the question referred by the Budapest Környéki Törvényszék (Regional Court, Budapest):

Article 1(1) and (2) and Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings are to be interpreted as not applying to a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where a court of a Member State, in the context of a national procedure for recognition of the validity of foreign judgments, intends to have translated into the language used in proceedings in that State a judgment delivered by a court of another Member State.

Articles 4(2) and 5(1) of Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States, as well as Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315, are to be interpreted as precluding a situation whereby the entry in the criminal record of a Member State of a conviction handed down by a court of another Member State is conditional on such a procedure being initiated beforehand.