Table of contents

1Introduction

1.1    Purpose and scope of the evaluation    

2What was the expected outcome of the intervention?

2.1    Description of the intervention and its objectives    

2.2    Point(s) of comparison    

3How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period?

4Evaluation findings

4.1    To what extent was the intervention successful and why?    

4.1.1    Effectiveness    

4.1.2    Efficiency    

4.1.3    Coherence    

4.2    How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?    

4.3    Is the intervention still relevant?    

4.3.1    Scope    

4.3.2    Procedural aspects    

4.3.3    Market access    

4.3.4    Strategic objectives    

4.3.5    Governance    

4.3.6    Conclusions - Relevance    

5What are the conclusions and lessons learned?

5.1    Overall conclusions    

5.2    Lessons learned    

Annex IProcedural Information

Annex IIMethodology

Annex IIIEvaluation matrix and answers to the evaluation questions

Annex IVOverview of benefits and costs

Annex VStakeholders’ consultation

Annex VISupplementary information and data

Annex VIIECJ case law

Annex VIIIBibliography

Glossary

Country codes used in the text:

AT - Austria

BE - Belgium

BG - Bulgaria

DE - Germany

DK - Denmark

CY - Cyprus

CZ - Czechia

EE – Estonia

FI - Finland

FR- France

EL - Greece

HR - Croatia

HU - Hungary

IE - Ireland

IT - Italy

LV - Latvia

LT - Lithuania

LU - Luxembourg

MT - Malta

NL – Netherlands, the

PL - Poland

PT - Portugal

RO - Romania

SK - Slovakia

SI – Slovenia

ES - Spain

SE - Sweden

IS – Iceland

LI – Liechtenstein

NO – Norway

1Introduction

With public authorities 1 in the EU spending around 15% of GDP 2  a year on public procurement, rules on the procurement of goods, services and works are key for ensuring public funds are invested efficiently while preventing corruption and anti-competitive practices. 3  This is why European Commission President von der Leyen has announced a revision of the EU public procurement rules, emphasising the strategic importance of public procurement and announcing the introduction of made in Europe criteria for certain strategic sectors 4 . Executive Vice-President Séjourné additionally underlined the enormous potential of public procurement as part of the European investment strategy to boost EU competitiveness, resilience and economic security 5 .

EU law sets out minimum harmonised public procurement rules to create a fair, transparent and competitive single market for businesses and to improve the efficiency and integrity of public spending, providing better value for public money. These rules govern the way contracting authorities and entities 6 purchase goods, works and services. The rules are transposed into national legislation and apply to tenders whose monetary value exceeds agreed thresholds 7 . For tenders of lower value, national rules complying with the general principles of EU law apply.

The procurement of goods, services and works by public authorities in the EU amounts to around EUR 2.6 trillion ( Table 83 , p. ), representing roughly 15% of GDP 8  and up by around 1% compared with the pre-COVID period 9 . In many sectors such as energy, transport, waste management, social protection and the provision of healthcare or education services, public authorities are the main buyers. Around one quarter of the total procurement value 10  is subject to EU rules and published on the EU Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) 11 . Between 2018 and 2023, an average of 44 000 contracting authorities in the Member States ( Figure 78 , p. ) published on TED approximately 198 000 contract award notices each year of an average annual value of EUR 616 billion 12 of public contracts awarded to nearly 155 000 companies annually ( Figure 79 , p. ). The value of procurement contracts published on TED more than doubled over the last decade (in real terms, adjusted for inflation).

Given the significant volume of public investments, Enrico Letta in his March 2024 report on the future of the Single Market 13 called for better leveraging of public procurement practices and the simplification of processes to support the European Industrial Market. Subsequently, in his report on EU competitiveness 14 , Mario Draghi highlighted the need to use European public resources strategically to achieve the key policy objectives of competitiveness, strategic autonomy, resilience and sustainability.

1.1Purpose and scope of the evaluation

This evaluation aims to assess the effects of the Directives adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2014 on public procurement between approximately 2016 and 2024. The evaluation covers Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement [“Classical”] 15 ; Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts [“Concessions”] 16 ; and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport, and postal services sectors [“Utilities”] 17 , hereafter referred to as a whole as “the Directives” or “the 2014 Directives” 18 .

In a special report on public procurement in the EU 19 , the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in 2023 underlined that the tools the Directives offer have not been made the most of to achieve their objectives and boost competition 20 . Analysing several indicators based on EU TED data (e.g. the share of single bidding, the number of direct awards, the number of cross-border bids), the ECA concluded that competition on the EU public procurement markets had decreased in the 2011-2021 period.

The EU Council subsequently underlined the need to avoid an unnecessary administrative burden for public buyers and economic operators, including small and medium enterprises (SME), and considered in this respect that the complexity of the legislation relating to public procurement may deter economic operators from taking part in public procurement. 21  The Council asked the Commission to carry out an in-depth analysis of the existing framework 22  and to examine the root causes behind the decrease of competition in the EU public procurement market.

The European Parliament in 2025 adopted an own initiative report on Public Procurement 23 , calling upon the Commission to simplify the current framework, reducing bureaucracy and regulatory burdens, while maintaining high social and environmental standards and boosting EU competitiveness.

2What was the expected outcome of the intervention?

The 2014 Directives (i.e. the intervention subject to this evaluation) aimed to simplify procurement procedures, provide flexibility for contracting authorities, promote fair access for all economic operators, including SMEs, and secure the best value for money in public procurement by improving transparency, integrity, and legal certainty. The resulting EU rules aimed at improving environmental sustainability, social inclusion, and innovation, all underpinned by a strong focus on efficiency and competition. Promoting the use of digital tools and transitioning to full eProcurement were considered key for making the tendering process faster, more transparent, and less burdensome.

2.1Description of the intervention and its objectives

The Impact Assessment of 2011 accompanying the legislative proposal 24  identified the following problems behind the intervention logic:

·Disproportionate procedures defined in EU rules, which generating excess costs (especially for smaller contracts), with significant differences across Member States in the time procurement took.

·Complex EU rules defining scope and coverage, which generate uncertainty, lead to risk-averse and 'box-ticking' behaviour by public purchasers to the detriment of the quality of procurement outcomes.

·Emergence of different models and fragmented national procurement administration and resource dispersion, resulting in inconsistent application, control and monitoring across the EU.

·Incorrect application of public procurement rules and, in some instances, the incorrect transposition of the Directives into national legislation.

The rationale for EU intervention was based on a fundamental need to enable the single market to realise its full potential. The general objectives were:

·to give economic operators fair access and encourage cross-border competition;

·to ensure the best value for money;

·to achieve optimal societal outcomes;

·to support the fight against corruption.

These objectives were translated into specific and operational objectives:

·comprehensive rules on scope and coverage;

·simplified and clarified procedures;

·the promotion of strategic public procurement;

·the facilitation of transparent market access, in particular for SMEs; and

·administrative organisation and governance (see Figure 1 overleaf).

The intervention was supported by inputs in the form of substantial financial, human and institutional resources, engaged both at EU level and in the form of contributions from Member States. This has led, on the one hand, to the adoption, transposition and effective implementation of these rules (activities); and, on the other hand, to the development of new national public procurement rules, as well as better coordination, reporting and monitoring activities (results).

The expected results included greater clarity and certainty for stakeholders, more efficient and flexible procurement procedures, better alignment of public procurement with EU strategic priorities, greater market openness and more competition, in particular cross-border competition, as well as strengthened administrative governance and greater integrity. In the long term, the expected impact was an integrated and efficient European public procurement market, delivering added value and greater accountability, while remaining resilient to external challenges and changing policy priorities.

Figure 1: Intervention logic

2.2Point(s) of comparison 

The main point of comparison for assessing the intervention in this evaluation is the state of the public procurement market before the existing legislative framework entered into application in 2016 (noting that some Member States were late transposing the Directives). For selected elements, the time frame may be adjusted: extended to covering long-term phenomena or shortened due to data limitations 25 . Overall, the evaluation covers the period between 2016 and 2024. Given the importance of the ECA (2023) report, this evaluation will also make frequent reference to the findings made by the EU’s independent external auditor 26 .

3How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period?

The Directives were adopted on 26 February 2014, with a transposition deadline into national legislation of 18 April 2016. All Member States have since transposed these Directives, with the last transposition taking place in early 2020 (the exact transposition dates per Member State, are provided in Table 85 , p. 196). Member States transposed the Directives in a number of ways: some use one legal instrument for Classical and Utilities, others separate instruments per Directive, and some adopt a unified approach to all areas, including concessions. Beyond the scope of the Directives', Member States have discretion, resulting in varying approaches to below-threshold procurement. 

The Commission has monitored Member States’ compliance with the Directives, assessing both transposition and conformity. During the compliance checks, it identified shortcomings in the following areas: scope, modification of contracts, exclusion criteria, procedures, award criteria, and subcontracting. The Commission launched infringement procedures against several Member States for either non-transposition or non-conformity issues 27 . These concerned primarily the award of contracts without proper EU-level procedures and the modification of contracts. Monitoring has also highlighted instances of incorrect application, with the Council adopting 31 country-specific recommendations under the European Semester between 2017-2024 28 to address the matter. The Commission has particularly paid attention to the monitoring of procurement funded by EU funds, through the ex-ante conditionality (applicable until 2021) and the current horizontal enabling conditionality under the Conditionality Regulation 29 .

From 2016 to March 2025, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued 107 judgments on public procurement 30 , primarily relating to Directive 2014/24/EU. Common issues include exclusion grounds, subcontracting, contract modifications, and concessions.

During the period assessed, several new legislative acts adopted by the European Parliament and the Council introduced new public procurement provisions 31 . As a result, public procurement is now regulated not only by the 2014 Directives, but also by over 50 different and often sector-specific EU legal acts ( Table 101 , p. 252) covering a wide range of topics, such as new guiding principles for public procurement 32 , exclusion grounds 33 , international aspects of procurement 34 , and resilience 35 or social criteria 36 . 

4Evaluation findings

4.1To what extent was the intervention successful and why? 

This evaluation assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value of the Directives in line with the methodology set out in the Better Regulation Guidelines and Better Regulation Toolbox (BRT) 37 . As noted in Section 2.2, for certain elements, the time frame may be adjusted - extended to capture longer-term phenomena for comparative purposes or shortened when constrained by data limitations. The methodology applied, as well as sources used, are detailed in Annex II 38 . 

4.1.1Effectiveness

This section assesses the extent to which the 2014 Directives have been effective in achieving their stated objectives. The structure of this section mirrors the key problem blocks identified in the Impact Assessment of 2011 that accompanied the legislative proposal and focuses on scope, procedural aspects, market access, strategic objectives and governance. Each of these aspects pursued different objectives. With regards to scope and procedural aspects, the Directives aimed at achieving greater legal certainty. Market access, strategic procurement and governance were objectives by themselves.

4.1.1.1Scope

The Directives sought to clarify the scope of EU procurement rules above certain thresholds by providing greater clarity and legal certainty in relation to i) the actors covered; and ii) the subject matter.

In the open public consultation (hereafter: the “OPC”) 39 , stakeholders expressed mixed views on whether the Directives enhanced legal certainty in procurement procedures, with 38.4% (266 replies 40 ) agreeing and 35.9% (248 replies) disagreeing ( Figure 13 , p. 112). However, 45.4% of companies replying to the survey agreed that the Directives gave greater legal certainty on the compliance with procurement procedures (59 replies). When asked whether the scope of the applicable rules became clearer, stakeholders' views were divided: 41.1% responded positively (284 replies), while nearly 36.9% (255 replies) disagreed. Companies predominantly indicated their agreement (47.3%, 62 replies), compared to 27.5% that disagreed (36 replies). For public authorities, 71 contributions (36%) considered that clarity had improved, while 91 (46.2%) took the opposite view ( Figure 4 and  Table 8 , p. 104). Finally, when asked whether the Directives have led to a more consistent application of public procurement policy across EU countries, nearly half of OPC respondents (45%, 304 replies) had no opinion. Among those expressing a view, a greater share agreed (30.1%, 203 replies) than disagreed (24.9%, 168 replies). In particular, all but one reply from trade unions (51 responses) indicated a negative view about the consistency of application of the rules. Companies and business associations provided predominantly positive feedback, though not by a large margin ( Figure 53 and Table 57 , p. 162).

However, it should be noted that the Directives do not stand on their own - they are transposed into a national procurement system with oftentimes additional procedural steps regarding e.g. the preparation of the tender or the composition of an evaluation committee 41 . The long times required for the transposition of the Directives, with multiple delays across Member States hints at a complex public procurement system.

4.1.1.1.1Rules on appropriate actors

To improve legal certainty and clarity the 2014 Directives codified existing case-law on the actors covered and provided new streamlined definitions of contracting authorities and entities 42 . The objective was to address “grey zones” that existed with regard to the actors subject to public procurement and difficulties for contracting authorities to determine their classification (contracting authority, public undertaking, body governed by public law, etc.), both identified in the evaluation of the previous procurement Directives dating back to 2004 43 .

Ensuring legal certainty when determining who is subject to public procurement (in the case of contracting authorities) or who has access to procurement contracts (for economic operators) is key for a level playing field and the use of public procurement as an investment instrument. Yet, Member States’ reporting under Article 45 of Directive 2014/23/EU, Articles 83 and 85 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 99 and 101 of Directive 2014/25/EU (hereafter: “Triennial reporting”) 44 frequently identified some of the new provisions introduced by the Directives as unclear or problematic. These new provisions included public contracts between entities within the public sector, exclusion grounds, reliance on the capacities of other entities and, abnormally low tenders 45 . Furthermore, in another consultation carried out in 2025 with Member States’ first instance review bodies 46 , they indicated that the different scopes of application of the Directives are not always clearly understood in practice, with the definitions of contracting authority and contracting entity still posing difficulties in their application.

In addition, several contributions to the OPC and the Call for Evidence (hereafter: “CfE”) both from economic operators and contracting authorities point to recurring difficulties in determining the correct legal framework, with instances of misapplication of Directives and legal disputes over applicable rules 47 . Review bodies and contracting authorities also highlighted inconsistencies in the interpretation of key definitions - such as “public contract”, “central government authority”, and “body governed by public law”- and noted that differences in national and EU legal terminology further complicate implementation.

Moreover, additional evidence gathered through the evaluated period have emphasized 48  the need for clarity of the Directives in relation to the access of third country economic operators without secured access to EU public procurement markets. While the Directives do not guarantee access to economic operators from countries with whom the EU does not have a reciprocal agreement, contracting authorities often face uncertainty as to how to determine the origin of the economic operator 49 . These difficulties are exacerbated when it comes to determining the origins of the products or services in the tender. Despite Directive 2014/25/EU including the possibility to limit the countries from which the goods and services come from, consultations with both contracting authorities and economic operators reveal that this possibility is rarely used, with complexity and the need to have specialised knowledge of customs legislation often cited as main burdens. 

The considerations above show that when it comes to determine who is subject to public procurement rules and in which situations, issues over legal certainty and clarity regarding the interplay of the different Directives persist. This is confirmed by the continuous and frequent interpretation of the topics highlighted above by the ECJ with more than 100 cases related to the interpretation of the Directives and multiple infringement cases opened against Member States 50 .

4.1.1.1.2Subject-matter of procurement

With regard to the subject-matter of procurement, the 2014 Directives aimed to address the lack of legal certainty as to which activities are covered by EU public procurement rules, while maintaining the division between Classical and Utilities introduced in the 2004 reform (Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU, respectively). To that purpose, the Directives introduced i) new rules on public-public cooperation; ii) a new regime for social services (simplifying the pre-existing division under Directive 2004/18/EC); iii) improved rules to opt-out from utilities provisions; and iv) new rules on concessions. In addition, the Directives introduced new concepts—such as those on exclusion grounds, in-house awards, contract modifications or conditions governing the execution of the contract.

To provide contracting authorities with sufficient legal certainty to adapt to different national legal traditions, the Directives introduced a significant number of optional provisions allowing Member States and contracting authorities to tailor the Directives to their national needs. Directive 2014/23/EU lays down 25 optional provisions, Directive 2014/24/EU 48 optional provisions, and Directive 2014/25/EU 42 such provisions. The implementation of these options varies significantly by Member State and topic 51 .

To clarify the exemptions on public-public cooperation, the Directives incorporated in the legal framework certain aspects arising from the case law 52 pertaining vertical and horizontal cooperation between public authorities 53 . The modifications aimed to clarify in which cases contracts concluded within the public sector are excluded from the application of public procurement rules, while preventing a distortion on competition.

During consultations with Local and Regional Authorities, public-public cooperation was often mentioned as an area of concern. Provisions in the Directive were aimed at providing contracting authorities with sufficient flexibility to deliver the services needed to their citizens, yet oftentimes contracting authorities - particular those of smaller size- found the current provisions not certain enough and not matching their needs. When needing to have recourse to public-public cooperation, contracting authorities often reported lack of legal certainty with regards to the feasibility to use the regime, citing among others difficulties in determining the level of control over an entity or quantifying the activities performed in the open market 54 . In addition, recent case law has raised concerns regarding the compatibility of in-house arrangements when it comes to e.g. competition law, i.e. Irgita 55 .

In addition, lack of proper application of public-public cooperation rules is an issue often detected by Commission’s auditors, when examining the application of public procurement rules to projects financed by EU cohesion policy funds.

The above shows that with regards to public-public cooperation, the Directives did not achieve the intended level of clarity and legal certainty.

For contracts related to social and other specific services, the Directives merged Annexes A and B of Directive 2004/18/EC to create a new “light regime” 56 . The goal of this revision was to offer greater legal certainty to contracting authorities, while ensuring flexibility to adapt to different national legal traditions. The light regime allows contracting authorities to procure social and other specific services more flexibly and to reserve the participation of contracts to certain types of organisations 57 . Moreover, the Directives’ rules are applicable only above a threshold that is significantly higher than for regular public procurement contracts 58 .

When comparing the total number of calls for competition published on TED concerning social and other specific services with those where the light regime was used, nearly four out of five of the contract award notices potentially falling under the light regime were subject to the general rules in the Directives instead 59 . In addition, the possibility to reserve the participation to the contract has only been used 70 times between 2016 and 2022.

An analysis of 100 out of 357 contracts published between 2017-2020 60 revealed a lack of clarity as to how the light regime is to be used, with 44 contracts applying the light regime to the wrong Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) code, 49 contracts applying the light regime wrongly to correct CPV codes and only 7 contracts applying correctly the light regime to the appropriate CPV codes. This analysis, albeit small, illustrates that the intended objective of providing a clear regime for social services has not been achieved.

Beyond a lack of clarity, the reasons for the low uptake of the light regime may be either a lack of added value for an additional regime running in parallel to a wide range of other procedures (see Section 4.1.1.2.1), and/or relate to the professional capacities of contracting authorities (see Section 4.1.1.5.3).

The Utilities Directive in its Article 34 provides for a mechanism to exclude certain activities from the scope of the public procurement rules if they are directly exposed to competition on markets to which access is not restricted. The Directive allows Member States, or contracting entities directly, to request the Commission to confirm that the Directive does not apply to the award of contracts for a specific activity. In practice, most requests for derogations 61 concern the postal and energy sectors 62 .

The revision of Article 34 of Directive 2014/25/EU aimed to clarify the objective criteria to determine when an activity is subject to competition, and in particular the notion of “relevant geographical markets”. The clarification efforts have been seemingly successful to the extent that no major negative feedback from stakeholders have been gathered during the consultation exercise. Nonetheless, the exemption process itself can be legally complex and time-consuming for the utilities operator that requests the Commission to confirm that the Directive does not apply to the award of contracts for a specific activity. Finally, differences in market conditions across Member States may lead to regulatory fragmentation across similar sectors.

Concession contracts differ from standard public contracts because they are usually high-value, complex, and involve the transfer of an operating risk. This complexity justifies a more flexible set of rules for awarding them. Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts was adopted to address the absence of a coherent, all-encompassing EU-level framework for concessions, as the absence of a clear legal framework across the EU was causing distortions in the functioning of the internal market. Directive 2014/23/EU clarified and expanded the scope of application of EU public procurement rules by introducing a precise definition of concessions and extending coverage to both works and services concessions across all sectors, including utilities. It clarified the cases in which a contract concluded between a contracting authority and an economic operator is not subject to the concession award rules. It established mandatory EU-wide publication for high-value contracts, applied remedies rules to ensure legal protection, and introduced flexible but transparent award principles - marking a major step in harmonizing and simplifying concessions regulation across the EU.

Although Directive 2014/23/EU has helped harmonize procurement laws across Member States, significant inconsistencies remain. The term "concession" is still interpreted differently across countries and sectors - sometimes equated with licenses or authorizations - leading to fragmented legal frameworks. These discrepancies create uncertainty and higher costs for cross-border operators, who cannot rely on a single, uniform understanding of what constitutes a concession. This often results in misunderstandings about applicable rules and definitions, affecting both contracting authorities and economic operators.

Furthermore, concerning the operating risk, which is a key feature distinguishing concessions from other public contracts, only a few Member States adopted the definition exactly as set out in the Directive, while most use slightly different wording, and some omitted it entirely. These variations may lead to inconsistent treatment of similar contracts across the EU, potentially excluding them from the Directive’s scope and creating legal uncertainty. The situation is further complicated by differing national approaches to public-private partnerships, where definitions and their relationship to concession rules remain unclear or inconsistent across Member States 63 .

However, in targeted consultations with stakeholders operating in the field of concessions 64 , economic operators praised the flexibility and simplification offered under the Concession’s directive 65 .

4.1.1.1.3Conclusions - Scope

The 2014 Directives did not achieve their objective of providing legal certainty and clarity with regard to the actors subject to public procurement rules. The introduction of new concepts and the interplay between the three legal instruments generated novel interpretative challenges. With regard to the rules on appropriate actors as well as the definition of the subject matter, the Directives did not translate into increased legal certainty. On utilities, the clarification of the opt-out system has worked as intended, although there is still a margin for further clarification. As for concessions, the Directives have increased legal certainty, while selected definitions have caused a significant number of case law on the matter. Overall, stakeholders predominantly consider that the Directives have not resulted in greater legal certainty or clarity.

4.1.1.2Procedural aspects

The 2014 Directives aim to make public procurement procedures simpler and more flexible, thereby reducing the administrative burden associated with conducting procedures above the EU thresholds and giving contracting authorities a toolbox comprised of six procedures 66 and two procuring techniques 67 . Simplification measures included faster procedures, easier modification of contracts and digital tools. However, it should be noted that Member States often introduce additional rules on public procurement (gold-plating), that add complexity to the procedures 68 . Additional source of complexity could be contracting authorities themselves 69 . According to a consultation carried out by the Committee of the Regions among local and regional authorities, 69% of respondents 70 consider additional rules at national or regional level a source for the complexity of public procurement procedures. 

4.1.1.2.1Flexibility of procedures

The Directives aimed at providing contracting authorities with flexibility to adapt to their different purchasing needs, while ensuring a transparent 71 system and a competitive procurement market. This flexibility is translated into the possibility to choose among the above-mentioned different procurement procedures and techniques 72 .

The three directives offer different options to contracting authorities. To offer the maximum flexibility possible, Directive 2014/23/EU does not set out rules on procedures but rather guiding principles. On the other hand, Directive 2014/24/EU sets out open and restricted procedures as the standard and Directive 2014/25/EU offers also the possibility to have recourse to the negotiated procedure with publication 73 . In both Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU, innovation partnership is designed to cater to the procurement of innovative solutions.

During the examined period, the majority of procurement processes in the EU followed the open procedure. According to Ecorys (2025), the share of open procedure rose from 73% before the adoption of the Directives (2006–2010) to 82% in 2017–2024. Between 2017 and 2024, six Member States (EL, HR, LV, MT, PT, and RO) used open procedures for 90% or more of their above-threshold procurements 74 . The observed increase in openness occurred primarily at the expense of the restricted procedure, whose share declined from more than one tenth in 2006–2010 to barely 2% in the most recent period (2017-2024) 75 . This shift towards more open procedures appears to be driven mainly by the utilities sector with usage rising from 39% before the Directives, to 54% in 2024 ( Figure 86 , p. 218). Under the Classical Directive alone, the share of open procedures has been high and stable, but with a peak of 89% in 2019 ( Figure 85 , p. 217), which could have meant a rising trend that was impacted by COVID.

The Directives included the possibility to use the negotiated procedure without publication when there are no suitable tenders, no competition in the market or due to extreme urgency. As reported by Ecorys (2025), the use of this procedure has decreased from 7% in 2006-2010, to around 5% in 2017-2024 in terms of the number of contract award notices 76 , despite a recent health crisis and supply chain disruptions. According to Da Rosa, I. et al. (2025), the value of negotiated procedure without publication accounted for 3.87% before the Directives, compared to 3.44% in the post-adoption period (i.e. on average, the use of direct award procedures in the Member States has decreased by 0.43%). However, the proportion of direct awards in recent years still exceeded 5% in five Member States (even if it dropped from nine Member States before the new rules entered into application) 77 . It should be noted however, that while its use has decreased, the absence of publication obligations makes it ill-suited for achieving the Directive’s transparency goals and ensuring the effective use of public expenditure to drive strategic investment.

Even with a wide range of procedures available, nearly half of the respondents (49.3%, 342 replies) in the OPC expressed dissatisfaction with the level of flexibility provided by the Directives (e.g. a broader choice of procedures and procurement techniques), against 31.3% (217 replies) indicating that sufficient flexibility in the public procurement system was provided (Figure 5, p. 105). Among the most dissatisfied stakeholder groups were public authorities, business associations and companies, with 56.1%, 46.8% and 46.2% negative replies, respectively ( Table 9 , p. 105). This is often linked to the fact that Directive 2014/24/EU only allows negotiations in limited circumstances, such as justified technical difficulties (competitive procedure with negotiation) or extreme urgency (negotiated procedure without publication), which in fact limit the flexibility of contracting authorities.

In addition to the possibility of using negotiation to minimise the risk of cancellations 78 , experts from Member States, contracting authorities and economic operators often signal the added value of negotiations during past crises. This is echoed in the OPC, where many respondents considered that the Directives have not been capable to address urgent situations (42.1%, 284 negative replies;  Figure 55 , p. 165) or major supply chain disruptions (43.9%, 297 negative replies;  Figure 56 , p. 166). During the stakeholder consultations economic operators also signalled the added value of negotiations in such circumstances 79 . As part of the workshop organised by Altaee (2025), experts from Member States reported that whether the conditions for the use of negotiated procedures are met is often only known in retrospect, which creates legal uncertainty 80 . As a result, decision-making is hampered, and response times may be delayed—ultimately failing to address the urgency of the situation effectively. As an example, Altaee (2025) reported that the use of negotiated procedures without publication was only effective in early stages of the COVID crisis 81 . This is because one of the criteria needed for a situation to be considered “urgent” was its unforeseeability, which made this procedure ill-suited for a long-term crisis.

Outside urgent situations, in consultation with contracting authorities, particularly local and regional authorities, the use of framework agreements or dynamic purchasing systems (DPS) is often mentioned as mechanisms to simplify the procurement process and overcome uncertainty. These techniques allow contracting authorities to pull the demand and create stable relationships with the market through central purchasing bodies 82 . 

With regards to data concerning framework agreements, when compared with the period before the reform, their use has significantly evolved. According to Ecorys (2025), starting at an average of 17% in 2006-2010, the share of framework agreements in the total value of procurement reached 37% in 2017-2024. In terms of the number of contracts, this value increased from 11% in the baseline period to 19% in the most recent time interval (2017-2024), which indicates relatively high value of these contracts 83 . The increased use of framework agreements seems to reflect a gradual shift toward more strategic and long-term procurement practices 84 . 

While this evolution suggests a more structured and strategic approach to procurement, the implementation of these agreements varies across Member States. Notably, according to Da Rosa, I. et al. (2025), in 14 Member States, more than 50% of framework agreements are established with a single supplier - a practice that has increased by 4.8% on average in recent years. This trend raises concerns about the potential impact on market competition, as single-supplier frameworks may limit opportunities for other economic operators. Although such models can offer efficiency, continuity and predictability, they may also reduce competitive pressure and pose transparency and integrity risks, especially when individual contracts under these frameworks are not clearly disclosed 85 .

With regards to the DPS, its use since the introduction of the Directives is rather modest – Ecorys (2025) estimated that in 2017-2024, DPS accounted for around 0.5% of the number of contracts (a decrease from 1.1% in 2006-2010), which corresponded to 1.9% of contract value (an increase from 0.7% in 2006-2010) 86 , which indicates a neat increase in the average value of a DPS between the two evaluated time periods. As a general observation, this technique is more frequently used for goods (3.1% in terms of contract value in 2017-2024) 87 . According to Da Rosa, I. et al. (2025), DPS increased from an average of 9 to 39 systems per Member State annually, which indicates an uptake in demand pulling 88 .

4.1.1.2.2Simplification

Simplification was a further key objective of the Directives. The reform aimed to make procedures easier to apply for both contracting authorities and entities and economic operators. The Directives sought to lower the administrative burden and facilitate faster, more efficient procurement processes. In this way, simplification was intended not only to improve compliance with the rules but also to contribute to a more effective functioning of the internal market. The simplification of the legal framework was to be achieved inter alia through the provision of shorter procedures (notably reducing the minimum time required for the submission and award of contracts and reducing documentation requirements) and changes to the rules pertaining to the modification of contracts. This was to be complemented by new digital tools.

Generally speaking, the simplification objectives of the 2014 reform have not been met according to stakeholders responding to the OPC. In total, 54.1% (364 replies) stated that the Directives did not lead to simpler rules, with only 17.8% (121 replies) taking the opposite view ( Figure 8 , p. 108). The lack of simplification was perceived above all by trade unions (52 negative replies out of 54) or by as much as 2/3 of public authorities (123 negative replies out of 197). Companies and business associations followed suit in their discontent, with both groups giving roughly 43% negative replies ( Table 12 , p. 108). This confirms the prevailing perception that the Directives have not led to the awaited simplification and streamlining of the procedures.

As regards the length of procedures, procurement procedures can be divided into three stages: the time spent in the preparation of the procurement itself by the contracting authority; the time needed for an economic operator to submit a bid; and the time spent by the contracting authority evaluating the offers before awarding the contract. For the period of submission of bids and evaluation, the Directives introduced shortened minimum times.

As regards the preparation of procurement documents, the Directives sought to specify which documents can be requested from economic operators as well as the references that can be used in technical specifications. This simplification, however, has been affected by a number of additional pieces of legislation containing procurement provisions (see Section  4.1.3.2 ). With additional obligations governing the preparation of the procurement documents 89 , supplementing those already introduced at national level, contracting authorities face a multiplication of rules that oftentimes contradict themselves and risk legal certainty 90 . These issues increase the length of the preparatory stage, which according to surveys among TED users 91 (hereafter: “TED survey”) run by Ecorys (2025) is perceived as the most burdensome by 53% of contracting authorities (one-off procurements) and 54% of authorities in case of framework agreements. Among companies, the pre-proposal phase is considered the most burdensome but only in framework contracts (48%). In one-off calls for tender, it is the proposal phase that is seen as burdensome by the largest share of respondents (43%) 92 .

With regard to the time for the submission of offers, Ecorys (2025) estimates that the median days went from 48 in 2006-2010 to 30 in 2017-2024 93 , which mirrors the change in the legal framework 94 . However, the time spent in the evaluation - from the deadline of submission until the award, excluding potential litigation - went from an average of 58 days (2006-2010) to 62 (2017-2024). For open procedures, the median days from the deadline for submissions to the award increased from 53 in the period 2006-2010 to 59 in 2017-2024. The length of all other procedures has been reduced (e.g. the negotiated procedures saw decrease from 127 to 115 days, negotiated without publication from 58 to 34 days, and restricted procedures from 160 days in 2006-2010 to 142 in 2017-2024) 95 . 

When asked about the timing of procedures under the Directives compared with below EU thresholds procurement, OPC respondents indicated that the Directives never lead to faster procedures in 38% of cases or (rarely) in 17%. The most negative view was shared by public authorities: three quarters of them (148 respondents) considered procedures above the EU thresholds to be slower than those carried out below the thresholds. More than half of business associations (54.9%, or 55 replies) shared the above negative opinion, as did half of the NGOs (32 replies) and 45.1% (55 replies) of companies ( Figure 60 and Table 64 , p. 172). When compared with private procurement, less than 4.2% of respondents considered that the Directive led to faster purchases, while 48.8% of respondents (315 replies) indicated that it is never or rarely the case ( Figure 70 , p. 183).

Furthermore, stakeholders’ perception of the extent to which the Directive contributed to achieving better value for money in the procurement of works, goods, and services was rather negative – only 26.3% (184 replies) believed it did, while 42.4% (297 replies) disagreed. The group of stakeholders providing the most negative feedback were the trade unions (94.5%, 52 replies), who disagreed with the statement that the Directives helped obtain better value for money. Public authorities were also predominantly sceptical (44.7%, 88 negative replies, compared to 27.3%, 54 noting a positive impact). Companies’ views were divided, with 36.6% (49 replies) seeing no improvement in value for money and 31.4% (42 replies) acknowledging a positive role of the Directives. A similar split was observed among business associations - 33%, 36 negative opinions, compared to 28.4%, 31 positive ones (Figure 3 and Table 7 , p. 103).

The Directives clarified the possibilities to introduce modifications in procurement, while ensuring that those would not undermine the transparency of procurement or a level playing field in the internal market. These changes aimed to provide contracting authorities with the possibility to amend their contracts in case of technological changes or price indexations. According to Da Rosa, I. et al. (2025), since the adoption of the Directives 10.96% of contracts were modified. For three Member States, the value exceeds 25% of the total number of procedures 96 . 

The topic of modifications was also extensively discussed in a workshop with procurement experts from different Member States by Altaee (2025) 97 . It was concluded that the current modification regime had failed to meet its simplification objectives, particularly in light of a changing procurement landscape where contracting authorities are more often faced with exogenous shocks in the supply chain or emergency crisis such as the COVID pandemic 98 . This is further emphasized by an increased rate of cancelled procedures. As discussed with the experts during the workshop conducted by Altaee (2025), representatives from Member States expressed that the complexity of current modification rules leads in many instances to an early cancellation of the procedure and the obligation to re-tender -with the additional administrative burden for both contracting authorities and economic operators 99 . It was suggested that excess in cancellations does not occur when negotiation is available, as contracting authorities can adapt earlier to technical changes or price indexations 100 . Some Member States (e.g. SK) already provide such possibility below the thresholds.

The issues above regarding the length of procedures, modifications and possibility to negotiate were also echoed in consultations with Member State’s authorities. Together with the replies in the OPC, these emphasize the differences between transactions under the Directives and private procurement, with public procurement being perceived as complex, rigid and overbearing 101 ( Figure 68 to Figure 77 , pp. 181-190), thus hampering its potential to unlock economic development.

4.1.1.2.3Digital Procurement

Digital or electronic public procurement (eProcurement) refers to the use of electronic communications, transactions and tools for purchasing by public sector organisations. These tools include the mandatory use of electronic means of communication for all procurement procedures - including the submission of offers (eSubmission) - and limitations to the use of national digital signatures.

To complement simplification and flexibilization efforts, the Directives introduced a series of digital tools aimed to lower the administrative burden and to make procurement faster. These tools include the mandatory use of electronic means of communication for all procurement procedures: from the publication of notices, over free access to procurement documents to the submission of offers.

The introduction of eProcurement as the default method of running public procurement is generally positively perceived by the end users. For example, OPC respondents agreed or strongly agreed that eProcurement helped lower the administrative burden (42%, 288 replies). Positive views were most evident among EU citizens (69.2% favourable opinions based on 36 out of 52 replies), followed by companies with 57.4% (74 firms) that noted reductions in administrative burden and 39.6% of public authorities (78 replies) sharing similar view ( Figure 6 and Table 10 , p. 106). With regard to the impact of eProcurement on the faster conduct of procedures, companies provided predominantly positive feedback (51.6%, 66 replies), while contracting authorities were of the opposite view (41.1% disagreed with the statement, based on 81 replies). Nevertheless, the overall feedback indicated that digitalisation made procurement faster (37.7%, 258 replies; Figure 7 and  Table 11 , p. 107).

Similarly, feedback received from Member States that recently invested in eProcurement platforms revealed the following benefits: improved procurement efficiency and the growth of a new market for eProcurement providers, creating jobs and fostering a competitive ecosystem. Digitizing tender calls has made it easier for businesses, especially SMEs, to access opportunities as well as facilitate engagement in procurement processes. The shift to a paperless process conserves environmental resources and cuts costs. eProcurement helps anti-corruption and significantly improves screening and detection of anti-competitive practices efforts by enabling access to extensive contract data, enhancing transparency. In a reply to an internal survey Member States highlighted the use of eProcurement systems brought several advantages, both operational and strategic, that strengthened the efficiency, transparency and quality of the entire purchasing process 102 .

According to OECD (2025), 18 Member States report that they have integrated their eProcurement systems with other digital government systems to allow the real-time exchange of information 103 , which is undoubtedly sign of the right approach in terms of governance of public procurement (even if not imposed by the Directives). At the same time, there is significant potential to further enhance system integration, as only 8 Member States have integrated their eProcurement systems with tax registries, 1 with beneficial ownership databases and 2 with budgeting systems 104 . The lack of integration often forces economic operators to have to resubmit documentation requested through the procurement process, originating additional administrative burden.

The introduction of the European Single Procurement Document (ESPD) aimed to ease the access of economic operators to procurement by creating a self-declaration model providing preliminary evidence concerning exclusion and selection criteria. While the Directives established the minimum information that needs to be available in the ESPD, Member States had discretion in designing their national ESPDs. In workshops held by the Commission to facilitate the uptake of eProcurement, stakeholders argued that the ESPD has increased administrative burdens for both contracting entities and tenderers due to its unnecessary complexity and detailed documentation that needs to be resubmitted with every tender. This is often due to the lack of a harmonised format, recognised across Member States, the amount of information required and the need for customization of requirements in each procurement procedure. Moreover, a survey on the use of the ESPD conducted in 2020 105 indicated that the lack of a harmonised format at EU level, automatic pre-filling and interoperability with existent databases added administrative burden to economic operators. The relevance of these challenges was pointed out by respondents to the OPC, with 39.2% (269 replies) indicating that they believe the rules in the Directives aimed at simplifying procedures, such as the ESPD, are no longer relevant or adequate. This view is particularly pronounced among public authorities, where more than half (53.6%, 105 replies) consider the rules aimed at procedural simplification no longer relevant (Figure 15 and Table 19 , p. 115).

4.1.1.2.4Conclusions – Procedural aspects

The 2014 Directives were only partially effective in meeting the objectives to simplify and make public procurement procedures more flexible. The introduction of several procedures did not translate into more flexibility in practice, as contracting authorities chose to make use of the standard open procedure in 82% of cases. Contracting authorities and economic operators found the procedures available rigid as they did not translate into the possibility to adapt to unforeseeable situations or to negotiate the best outcomes of their procurement. In some sectors contracting authorities used mechanisms strengthened by the 2014 Directives to aggregate demand, with a significant increase in the use of framework agreements, now accounting for 1/3 of contracts value. Simplification was supported through the roll-out of eProcurement, even if some of the tools introduced, in particular the ESPD, did not meet their intended aims.

4.1.1.3Market access

The 2014 public procurement reform sought, in terms of market access, to ensure fair and open competition and to establish a level playing field for all economic operators, including SMEs. It also aimed to facilitate unhindered cross-border participation by firms from other Member States as well as from non-EU countries 106 . The extent to which these objectives have been met is discussed below. 

4.1.1.3.1Competition

Since the entry into implementation of the Directives, the number of contract notices published on TED increased by nearly 70% 107 , while the real value of above-threshold procurements more than doubled 108 . Such growth in above-threshold participation may suggest improved accessibility of procurement opportunities. 

Additionally, as discussed in Section 4.1.1.2.1, contracting authorities increasingly favoured open procedures for procurements above EU thresholds (see Section 4.1.1.2.1), with their share reaching a peak of 89% in 2019 and many Member States using it for 90% or more of their above-threshold procurements in 2017-2024. Also from a global perspective, the EU market is relatively open. According to World Bank (2025), as much as 94% of the total awarded value above EU thresholds being conducted through competitive procedures ( Figure 83 , p. 216), including the above-mentioned open procedure but also other unrestricted formats such as competitive dialogue, etc. In a broader context, this stands in contrast to for example the U.S. federal government procurement system, where a significantly larger share of contracts is awarded through non-competitive or limited competition procedures 109 ( Figure 84 , p. 216). 

From a sectoral perspective, Ecorys (2025) estimates that environment, general government activities, social protection, education and health were the areas where the open procedure was most frequently used (all above 86% in terms of the number of contracts in 2017–2024, compared to 78-75%, before the reform 110 , i.e. 2006-2010). At the other end of the spectrum are the utilities sectors, such as electricity (rising from 22% in 2006-2010, to 35% in the most recent period where data is available i.e. 2017-2024) and gas and heat (increasing from 23% to 45%). One of the most striking changes was observed in the gas and oil sector, where the share of open procedures rose from 17% in 2006-2010 to 68% in the above-mentioned latest period available 111 . 

The competitive nature of the market is also evidenced by the fact that the median market share of the main supplier by market was 16% (considering all markets that awarded at least EUR 10 million during 2018-2023 and published at least 20 notices). The analysis of market structure also shows that in the EU27, 75 markets 112 have shown the concentration level above 50% of the awarded value going to a single supplier 113 . Although any such cases call for further analysis and monitoring, these figures indicate significantly lower concentration levels than in the UK and NO, suggesting a more competitive structure within the EU public procurement market 114 . 

Market structure analysis also reveals that most large contracting authorities in the EU appear to have a diversified supplier base. Among contracting authorities that awarded at least EUR 10 million and published at least 20 notices between 2018 and 2023, the median market share held by the main supplier was 21%, with an average of 26% 115 .

Despite the indicators cited above confirming the relatively high level of competition of the EU public procurement market, stakeholders responding to the OPC do not necessarily share this perception – when asked whether the Directives have led to more competition in public procurement markets (e.g. by making it easier for companies to enter through increased transparency), 27.2% of respondents (185 replies) believe that they did, while 46.2% (315) hold the opposite view. The negative perception was predominant among contracting authorities (54.1%, 106 replies disagreed with the positive impact of the Directives on competition), while views were more mixed among companies (36.6%, 48 replies in favour, compared to 34.4%, 45 disagreeing). Business associations were somewhat more sceptical - 30.2% (32 replies) were in favour, while 41.5% (44 replies) disagreed with the statement that the Directives had a positive impact on competition ( Figure 20 and Table 24 , p. 122). OPC respondents were also asked about the Directive’s role in fostering competition – the second set of questions focused on their perception of current market conditions 116 . In this part of the survey, 37.6% of respondents (259 replies) considered the level of competition in the EU public procurement market to be too low. This view was particularly common among public authorities (51.3%, 101 out of 197 replies), business associations (42.5%, 46 replies), and EU citizens (41.5%, 22 replies). A slightly lower share (32.9%, 226 replies) found the level of competition adequate - predominantly academic institutions 117 (45.5%, 15 replies), NGOs (41.8%, 28 replies), firms (38.5%, 50 replies), and around one-third of public authorities and business associations (66 and 36 replies respectively). A small share (11.1%) perceived competition as too high ( Figure 40 and Table 44 , p. 147).

In this part of the survey, 37.6% of respondents (259 replies) considered the level of competition in the EU public procurement market to be too low, including 51.3% of public authorities (101 out of 197 replies) and 42.5% of business associations (46 replies) as well as EU citizens (41.5%, 22 replies). The perception of too low competition was followed by as slightly smaller share of those that found it adequate (32.9%, 226 replies) - predominantly NGOs 41.8% (28 replies), academic institutions 45.5% (15 replies), firms 38.5% (50 replies), and around one-third of public authorities and business associations and (66 out of 197 replies and 36 out of 108, respectively). A smaller share (11.05%) perceived competition as too high, and 18.46% (127 replies) had no opinion on the matter ( Figure 40 and Table 44 , p. 147). 

Finally, respondents’ views on changes in the level of competition in the EU public procurement market over the last eight years, are mixed. Around one-quarter (170 replies) believe it has decreased, another one-quarter (165 replies) think it has increased, and 21.28% (143 replies) say it has remained the same. A further 28.9% have no opinion ( Figure 47 and Table 51 , p.154). Overall, this distribution suggests no clear consensus among stakeholders on the trend in competition over the period 118 .

When discussing further aspects of EU public procurement related to market access, it is worth recalling that ECA (2023) concluded that the EU experienced a notable decline in competition between 2011 and 2021. According to ECA (2023), the number of bidders per procedure almost halved over the last decade, decreasing from an average of 5.7 bidders to 3.2 119 . This is confirmed by Ecorys (2025), according to which the average number of bids dropped from 5.4 in 2006-2010 to 3.4 in 2017-2024 120 .

In line with the Council’s conclusions calling for an in-depth analysis on the root causes behind the reduction in competition identified by the ECA (2023), it is useful to explore the data in greater depth to better understand the underlying patterns. This was done by World Bank (2025), which found that whilst in 2018-2023 around 67% of the awards received three bids or less, the largest contracts drove higher turnouts resulting in 58% of the awarded value counting four or more bidders ( Figure 87 , p. 218) 121 . When looking at the bidder turnout by contract sizes, the number of bids received clearly increases with the value of the call for tender 122 , with high-value contracts attracting more economic operators on average compared to smaller projects ( Figure 88 , p. 219). For example, contracts valued over EUR 20 million attracted an average of more than 9.2 tenders, with a median of 3. Despite representing only 2.1% of the total number of contract notices, these high-value contracts accounted for 62.1% of the total awarded value 123 . 

As far as the level of single-bidder procedures (i.e. awarding a contract after receiving only one offer), the ECA estimated that over the 2011-2021 period, the rate of single bidding across the EU increased from 23.5% to 41.8 % of all procedures 124 . Examining the same issue, Da Rosa, I. et al (2025) confirms that the proportion of single-bidder procedures increased after the introduction of the Directives, however only by an average of 3.8% (i.e. 15.66% and 19.43% over the two periods under review). This difference is due to the fact that the indicator in Da Rosa, I. et al. (2025) does not include framework agreements nor direct awards 125 , primarily because the latter is analysed separately. According to the same source, after the adoption of the Directives the proportion of single-bidder procedures exceeded 25% in seven Member States (compared to six Member States before 2014). However, the data show that based on the average of the 10 years examined some countries indeed have a relatively high single bidder rates (more than 30%), notably CY, CZ, HR, HU, LV, PL, and SI 126 . Yet, for some countries, the trend decreased in 2016-2023 (in particular HR, HU, RO, SK). Nonetheless, the fact that the EU average has increased according to both sources cited above paints an unfavourable picture of the practice in the majority of Member States.

When examining the frequency of direct awards (i.e. negotiated procedures without prior publication of a contract notice), it appears more informative to treat this indicator separately from single bidding, as the factors explaining why a procurement procedure attracts only one bidder, differ from the reasons why a contracting authority decides to procure goods or services through a non-competitive or non-transparent procedure. In particular, the former is predominantly driven by external factors, while the latter reflects internal ones. Such an approach is also taken by Da Rosa, I. et al. (2025), who analysed direct awards as an indicator distinct from single-bid procedures. According to this source, the overall use of the direct award procedures has slightly declined whereas the performance of Member States is diverse. Before the entry into application of the Directives, the proportion of direct awards exceeded 5% in nine Member States and its average level was 3.87%. In the post-Directives period, the same proportion exceeded 5% in only five Member States with an EU average of 3.44% 127 . Finally, when interpreting the frequency of direct awards, it should be also kept in mind that, an increase in reported direct awards may - paradoxically - reflect greater diligence and improved transparency, with previously unannounced awards now being disclosed 128 . Furthermore, at least in certain markets their use may have increased in recent years due to external shocks such as health or security crises (e.g. the procurement of personal protective equipment during the COVID pandemic). According to Ecorys (2025), the sharp rise in negotiated procedures without prior publication in 2020, suggests a strong link to public buyers’ response to the COVID pandemic - when excluding purchases under CPV divisions 33 (Medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and personal care products) and 85 (Health and social work services), the spike in 2020 becomes much less pronounced, and the share of such procedures has nearly returned to 2019 levels 129 . Additionally, this is confirmed by econometric modelling 130 , which supports the hypothesis that the use of negotiated procedures without prior publication declined following the transposition of the Directives but rose sharply in response to the pandemic 131 ( Figure 89 , p. 219). It is also to be noted that although the propensity of contracting authorities to use the negotiated procedure without publication tended to decline in the 2020-2023 period after the temporary COVID spike, there were Member States where the opposite can be observed 132 . 

Referring to the stakeholders’ opinions, neither the frequency of single bidding nor the frequency of direct awards appears to be a major concern for most of them. In both cases, a large share of the OPC respondents – 41.1% (282 replies) for single bidding and 33.3% (226 replies) for direct awards – have no opinion on the matter. Among those expressing a view on the frequency of single bidding, 28.7% consider it too frequent (197 replies) 133 , 24.5% find it adequate (168) 134 , and only 5.7% (39) think it is too rare ( Figure 41 and Table 45 , p. 148). For direct awards, 14.6% (99 replies) see them as too frequent, 29.2% (198 replies) 135  as adequate, and 22.9% (155 replies) 136 as too rare ( Figure 42 and Table 46 , p. 149), indicating that concerns about excessive use are less common than one might expect based on the TED usage data and the conclusions of ECA (2023) report.

Furthermore, 57.8% of OPC respondents (376 replies) 137 believe that the high frequency of single bidding is not linked to procurement practices, but rather to market structure or other factors outside procurement. Around one-quarter (165) 138 see it as a sign of bad procurement practices, while 16.9% (110 replies) do not agree with either statement ( Figure 44 and Table 48 p. 151). This indicates that most stakeholders attribute single bidding primarily to structural market conditions rather than procedural shortcomings.

As for the opinions on the usage of direct awards, most respondents (67%, 438 replies) view it as legitimate under certain circumstances and as a way to facilitate flexibility and timeliness of procedures. This view is most pronounced among public authorities (91.8% agreed with the statement, 179 replies) 139 . Similarly, two-thirds of companies (72 replies) perceived direct awards as a legitimate practice, a view also shared by 46.5% of business associations (47 replies). Only 13.9% (91 replies) consider it a sign of bad procurement practices, while 19.1% (125 replies) do not agree with either statement ( Figure 45 and Table 49 , p.152). As with single bidding, this suggests that stakeholders tend to attribute the use of direct awards to acceptable or context-driven reasons rather than to poor procurement conduct.

4.1.1.3.2SMEs participation

With small and medium enterprises (SMEs) accounting for 49% of combined EU company turnover 140 , increasing their access to public procurement markets was an important objective of the 2014 reform. The Directives included several provisions aimed at facilitating SME access, including on the division of procedures into lots. The aim was to overcome challenges SMEs face when seeking to participate in public procurement procedures, which according to Celotti, P. et al. (2021) include complex selection criteria, low trust in procurement procedures and procurers, high administrative burden 141 . In addition, many Member States took policy measures to support SME participation 142  and examples of good practices include guidelines on how to divide contracts (FI, DK) or helpdesks and training programmes both for contracting authorities and economic operators 143 . Some Member States advanced the digitisation of procurement procedures (single platform, e-invoicing, online publication at low thresholds, etc.) as a means to reduce administrative burden and facilitate SME access and reduced documentation burden to this end, while others streamlined conditions for participating in calls for tenders (economic or experience requirements, participation guarantee, etc.).

Assessing the effectiveness of these measures, ECA (2023) concluded that there was no significant increase in the access of SMEs to procurement procedures following the 2014 reform 144 . These findings were echoed by the OPC responses: only 27.4% of respondents (188 replies) 145 agreed that the Directives made life easier for SMEs, while 44.8% (307 replies) disagreed with this statement — in particular, two-thirds of public authorities (115 replies), 44.8% of NGOs (30 replies), 44.6% of business associations (49 replies), and 36.7% of firms (47 replies) did not agree that the SMEs can bid easily( Figure 22 and Table 26 , p. 124).

However, these findings are not supported by recent data 146 - according to Ecorys (2025), SMEs were more successful in winning procurement procedures after the 2014 reform. In the period 2017-2024, SMEs won 71% of above EU thresholds contracts, that accounted for 55% of the total value published on TED 147 , compared to 61% by number of awards 41% by value in 2013 148 . This increase can be linked with the introduction of SME friendly provisions in the Directives, such as lower financial requirements or division into lots. De Bas, P. et al. (2019) found that - compared to no lots - the proportion of awards that SME can secure increases by 4% for supply contracts, 2% for service contracts, and 6% for works 149 . Similarly, SMEs were also successful when participating in below the thresholds procedures winning 81% of contracts (by number) and 75% (by value) in 2017–2024 150 . Information shared by Member States as part of their Triennial Reporting confirms that SMEs are more successful in securing procurement contracts below the thresholds presumably given their smaller values ( Figure 91 , p. 222). 

4.1.1.3.3Cross-border participation

Cross-border procurement typically remained low, with only a small share of contracts awarded to firms established in other EU Member States or third countries. According to VVE (2017), the average level of direct cross-border procurement 151 before the 2014 reform (i.e. 2009-2015) was 1.7% of contract awards issued by EU countries, while in terms of value it accounted for 3% 152 ( Table 90 , p. 223). This relatively low level of direct cross-border sourcing in public procurement also holds true after the entry into application of the Directives. According to World Bank (2025), only about 2% of the number of awards and 4% of the awarded value was granted to economic operators not established in the awarding country (encompassing both companies from another EU Member State and companies from third countries) 153 . Merely utilities award contracts more often to cross-border suppliers (9% of awarded value was won by firms located in another country that the one of contracting entity) 154 . The above findings are broadly in line with a previous post-adoption study on the subject 155 , notably Prometeia (2021), which estimated the level of direct-cross border procurement at 2.4% in terms of the number of awards and 4.1% in terms of value 156 ( Figure 92 , p. 223). The share of direct cross-border procurement is correlated with contract value: for procurements above EUR 50 million, the shares are 5.2% and 5.5%, respectively. The level of direct cross-border awards also varies significantly between countries with smaller countries characterised by relatively high share of such procurement (e.g. 13.7% in number and 31.4% in value in CY, or 42.9% and 56.0% respectively in MT). In contrast, larger Member States with a large industrial base tend to source the majority of works, goods, and services domestically (e.g. 1.3% in number and 1.9% in value in FR, or 1.5% and 3.0% in DE, respectively)  157 . Secondly, direct cross-border procurement is heavily influenced by the physical distance between the buyer and the seller - around 40% of direct cross-border procurement took place within 500 km and 30% occurred between 500 and 1 000 km 158 .

In terms of sectoral differences, some products show particularly high levels of tradability. For example, direct cross-border awards accounted for around 12.7% by value (3.7% by number) in transport equipment, 12.5% by value (11.8% by number) in laboratory, optical, and precision equipment, and 11.9% by value (6.4% by number) in electrical machinery 159 . Within the above sectors, intra-EU participation predominates, although specific situations arise in certain sectors and cases involving companies from third countries.

The fact that there is a higher participation of non-EU companies in some sectors is also confirmed by experience from the application of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation 160 .

However, overall data on direct cross-border public procurement does not reflect the full complexity not only of supply chains, which are sometimes divided between numerous companies and subcontractors, but also in terms of the structure of companies themselves: a company may participate in a public contract under its branch registered in the same Member State as contracting authority, when in reality its global ultimate owner is from another Member State, potentially outside the EU. The same is pointed out by World Bank (2025) 161 . Indeed, the average level of indirect cross-border procurement 162  before the 2014 reform (i.e. 2009-2015) was 21.9% of all contract awards issued by EU countries, while in terms of value it accounted for 20.4% 163 ( Table 90 , p. 223). After the entry into application of the Directives, the indirect access to procurement market through affiliates still represents around one-fifth of overall procurement (20.2% by number of awards and 21.6% by value) 164  of which some 80% being intra-EU procurement and the remaining 20% (i.e., around 4% of the overall procurement) being extra-EU, with significant variations across sectors. For example, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals: 61.3% in value and 50.2% in number; office and computing machinery: 41.4% in value and 23.3% in number; software package and information systems: 42.2% in value and 26.4% in number; laboratory, optical and precision equipment: 38.6% in value and 37.4% in number; electrical machinery, apparatus: 37.7% in value and 22.4% in number; transport equipment and auxiliary products to transportation: 33.1% in value and 27.3% in number of indirect cross-border procurement 165 .

In this general context, while most cross-border markets are intra-EU, and the participation of suppliers from outside the EU represents a smaller share in terms of value and number, feedback received during stakeholders’ consultations 166 pointed towards persisting market access inequalities, with non-European companies allowed to participate in EU tenders without European companies benefiting from reciprocal market access. Previous case studies 167 support these observations 168 . 

The Directives were intended to facilitate cross-border bidding, and a majority of OPC respondents consider that this is the case: 53.4% (365 replies) agreed or strongly agreed that the rules ensure equal treatment of bidders from other EU countries at all stages of the process and support the objective evaluation of tender. This view was expressed by 81.8% of academic institutions (27 replies), 65.1% of firms (82 replies), 54.6% of NGOs (36 replies), 52.8% of public authorities (104 replies), and 52.7% of business associations (58 replies). In contrast, only 12% (82 replies) of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the above statement ( Figure 21 and Table 25 , p. 123). Similarly, when replying to another question from the OPC, 37.6% of respondents (256 replies) agreed that the Directives made it easier to bid on public contracts from abroad - for example, through the introduction of eProcurement tools. The stakeholders’ groups that noticed a positive influence of the Directives included 54.5% of academic institutions (18 replies), 48% of firms, 39.4% of NGOs (26 replies), and 35.8% of business associations (39 replies). However, at the same time 21.3% of respondents (145 replies) disagreed with the above, including public authorities (42.1%, 83 replies) that provided predominantly negative opinions ( Figure 23 and Table 27 , p. 125). 

Advancements in the adoption of eProcurement (see Section 4.1.1.2.3.) have reduced administrative burden and established a shared terminology and procedural base within the EU public procurement market that lowers barriers for companies seeking to participate in public tenders within and beyond their national borders. However, for intra EU‑participation, some barriers lie beyond the scope of the Directives and relate to regulatory fragmentation of the single market (in particular in services), persisting barriers to labour mobility, physical distance between suppliers and the place of delivery, inconsistent documentation requirements and language differences 169 . These barriers are reflected in the continued low share of actual cross-border awards 170 . 

4.1.1.3.4Conclusions – Market access

The 2014 Directives have been partially effective in maintaining competition in EU public procurement markets. While the number of bidders per procedure has decreased from an average of 5.4 (2006-2010) to 3.4 (2017-2024), high value contracts (e.g. worth more than EUR 20 million) still receive on average more than 9 bids. The use of open procedures increased, and the supplier base remained diverse. The proportion of single-bidder procedures increased by 3.8% (from 15.66% before the entry into application of the Directives), while the use of direct awards remained broadly stable.

SMEs are generally performing well in securing procurement contracts, in particular where these are of lower values or divided into lower value lots. Overall, the access of SMEs to above EU thresholds procurement procedures appears to have improved on the back of the 2014 reform, also due to supportive measures taken by Member States.

With regards to direct cross-border participation, the Directives present a mixed picture, as only about 4% of awarded value and just 2% of the number of contracts is awarded directly to firms established in other EU Member States or third countries. At the same time, indirect cross-border procurement (around 20% of overall procurement) suggests a deeper degree of cross-border integration, reflecting complex value chains and corporate structures.

Comments from stakeholders indicate that the EU procurement framework is widely perceived as ensuring equal treatment, but concerns remain regarding the significant participation by non-EU firms especially in strategic sectors.

4.1.1.4Strategic objectives

An important novelty of the 2014 public procurement reform was the explicit objective of supporting broader policy goals, such as sustainability, innovation and social considerations 171 . Among other provisions, the Directives clarified the possibility to award contracts on the basis of criteria other than price such as quality.

The Directives sought to advance strategic goals through legal tools 172 , encouraging the uptake of green, innovation, and social aspects in public procurement. These legal tools were complemented with supportive policies, encouraging pilot projects and strategic guidance (see Section 4.1.1.5.3), while still leaving it to Member States and contracting authorities to set their own ambitions and targets at national and local level 173 , for example, in Commission’s communication, Making Public Procurement work in and for Europe 174 .

Despite the above efforts, ECA (2023) found that the share of awards based on lowest price had increased over the period 2011-2021 175 . The recent figures broadly confirm the above, indicating that since the implementation of the Directives, the number of contracts awarded on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) criteria has declined from 70% in 2006-2010 to 63% in 2017-2024 176 . However, Ecorys (2025) points out that the increase may be attributed to changes in the composition of tenders rather than actual changes in the use of award criteria 177 . When taking the above into account, the study shows that the use of non-price criteria remained relatively stable across years and begins to rise after reaching a low point in 2017 ( Figure 90 , p. 220). Moreover, higher value contracts were more likely to include non-price criteria 178 .

According to the TED survey run by Ecorys (2025), nowadays contracting authorities consider that both price and quality criteria are more important than before the 2014 reform, with the importance attached to price increasing from 35% in 2008-2010 to 59% in 2019-2024, and on quality increasing from 36% to 63% respectively. As far as economic operators are concerned, the importance they attach to price only has decreased from 70% in 2008-2010 to 38% in 2019-2024, however their perceptions concerning quality remained roughly the same (i.e. the weight on quality was identified as important by 56% respondents in the past, compared to 53% recently) 179 , Clearly, whether or not non-price criteria are used in award processes captures only one aspect of the procurement processes as sustainability considerations are often included already in technical specifications or contract conditions, therefore it is the composition of tenders that account for much of the observed decrease 180 .

When OPC respondents were asked about their perception of the current level of use of price only as award criteria, nearly half of respondents (49.1%, 337 replies) considered the frequency of awards based on price only to be too high. This view was most strongly expressed by trade unions (52 out of 53 replies), followed by NGOs (78.8%, 52 replies), business associations (66.1%, 72 replies), and firms (53.9%, 69 replies). Another one-third of respondents (34.7%, 238 replies) found the frequency of such awards to be adequate - mainly public authorities (66.5%, 129 replies) and academic institutions (60.6%, 20 replies; Figure 43 and  Table 47 , p. 150). Furthermore, over one-third of respondents (36.8%, 247 replies) consider the high frequency of price-only awards a sign of bad procurement practices 181 . Meanwhile, 29% of respondents (195 replies) think that high quality can be ensured through technical requirements. This was the predominant view among public authorities (56.4%, 110 replies), followed by one-third of authorities (63 replies) who considered price only awards to be more efficient in certain circumstances (e.g. as a simpler and faster way to purchase homogenous goods). The latter approach was shared overall by 26.7% of respondents (179 replies), including 48.5% (16 replies) of academic institutions and 30.9% (38 replies) of firms ( Figure 46 and Table 50 , p. 153).

Next, the OPC investigated whether the Directives had encouraged strategic procurement objectives (environmental sustainability, social responsibility, and innovation), by asking both sides of the market separately:

·Public authorities were positive with regards to green procurement - nearly 56% (109 replies) agreed or strongly agreed that the Directives have encouraged them to buy environmentally friendly works, goods and services (Table 33, p. 133). Similarly, 55% of public authorities (108 replies) 182 believed the Directives encouraged socially responsible purchasing (Table 34, p. 134) and 45% saw similar impact in the case of innovative solutions (Table 35, p. 135).

·Economic operators were more measured in their feedback. Only one in three economic operators (43 replies) agreed that the Directives prompted them to increase their efforts to meet environmental standards, while 44% (59 replies) did not share this view. Business organisations were somewhat more positive: 39% (44 replies) acknowledged a beneficial impact of GPP, although 37% (42 replies) still disagreed (Table 36, p. 137). When asked whether the rules encouraged firms to consider social aspects more in their operations, 42% of business associations agreed (47 replies). Among companies, the picture was mixed: one-third recognised some spillover effects (43 replies), while 41% (54 replies) took the opposite view (Table 37, p. 137). The weakest perceived impact concerned innovation, with only 22% of firms (29 replies) and 20% of business associations (22 replies) affirming an additional positive effect. In both groups, nearly half of respondents disagreed (Table 38, p. 138). 

Taken together, the replies to the above OPC questions suggest that the potential for using public procurement as a tool to achieve broader strategic goals is predominantly put in practice by contracting authorities, but also by some economic operators. The distribution of replies among firms is broadly consistent with the feedback received through other consultation channels, indicating difficulties in implementing provisions on IPP compared to, for example, GPP. Private suppliers seem to need more clarity, or operational support to make these objectives a reality in day-to-day procurement practice.

Additionally, as mentioned earlier Ecorys (2025) collected data on the actual use of environmental, social and innovation award criteria by contracting authorities and economic operators whose contact data was provided in notices published on TED in 2019-2024. According to the most recent TED survey, for contracting authorities, the environmental priorities featured in 28% of framework contracts and 22% in one-off contracts, social considerations in 25% for both contract types and innovation aspect in 8% and 7% in one-off and framework contracts, respectively. To compare, economic operators considered environmental considerations in 35% of one-off contracts and 30% of framework contracts, social considerations in 29% of framework contracts and 26% in one-off contracts, and innovation considerations in 22% of one-off contracts and 17% of framework contracts ( Table 91 , p. 223).

Turning to the effects of the promotion of strategic policy objectives, Altaee (2025), based on stakeholders’ feedback on strategic procurement, found that the fact that the Directives incorporated strategic policy goals alongside its foundational objectives of transparency and market efficiency created difficulties for contracting authorities 183 . According to Altaee (2025), reconciling the focus on transparency, market efficiency, and an increasingly broad set of strategic policy goals (e.g. sustainability, social inclusion, and innovation) was challenging as the Directives lack a coherent structure to guide public buyers in balancing competing priorities, resulting in fragmented and sometimes contradictory implementation 184 . Altaee (2025) also pointed out that as a result, public buyers often found themselves in a dilemma: they are expected to deliver on ambitious policy goals (e.g. social inclusion or equal opportunity) but are restricted in how they can shape procurement processes to do so. The disconnection between policy intent and legal interpretation undermined the framework’s strategic potential, according to Altaee (2025) 185 .

The following sections provide more details on each of the three components of strategic procurement (i.e. sustainable / green, innovation, social).

4.1.1.4.1Green

To enable green public procurement (GPP) the 2014 Directives for the first time explicitly provide for the possibility for contracting authorities to include environmental characteristics in different stages of public procurement procedures. The Directives did, however, not provide for any legal definitions or harmonisation in this regard. To facilitate the uptake of environmental elements in public procurement, the European Commission subsequently developed numerous activities and tools, such as the Green Public Procurement Helpdesk 186 , voluntary Green Public Procurement Criteria and EU Ecolabel Manuals 187 , the Urban Agenda for the EU Public Procurement 188 , and the project Public Buyers Community - Big Buyers Working Together 189 .

Some Member States also undertook a variety of measures to embed green and circular principles into procurement practices. These initiatives included, for example, the adoption of national mandatory green criteria and GPP-related targets or development of GPP action plans and strategies.

The voluntary nature of the GPP provisions in the Directives, coupled with the absence of any definition of GPP, has led to important regulatory differences between Member States and an unequal implementation of GPP across the EU 190 . These differences have been exacerbated by the adoption of numerous EU legal instruments containing specific and differing provisions on GPP.

Due to the absence of harmonised definitions and national differences in implementation, data collection and monitoring, the actual uptake levels of GPP across Member States is difficult to measure 191 . Nevertheless, data from a subset of Member States 192 for which information is available reveals a significant variation of practices, with some Member States mainstreaming GPP across procurement procedures. For example, LT reported as much as 89.3% of its procurement value dedicated to green initiatives in 2023, due to making GPP nearly universal. DK and FI also showed strong engagement, with DK’s green procurement volume at 59.9% in 2022, and FI achieving 48.3% in 2023. According to data from 14 Member States, the average of green public procurement in terms of contract number is just under 25%. In terms of procurement value (data from 10 Member States), the average stands at roughly 37%, indicating a more significant emphasis on green criteria in high-value contracts. Yet, as mentioned above, these results should be interpreted with caution, as they are based on non-aligned data collection methodologies and contain potential self-reporting bias 193 .

The key opportunities and challenges are well summarised by ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability 194 , pointing out that the implementation of GPP offers several benefits for Local and Regional Authorities, such as reduced environmental impacts, energy efficiency and enhanced public reputation, while on the other hand facing challenges such as potentially higher upfront costs, the need for administrative resources to manage often technically demanding GPP procedures or supply chain constraints 195 . 

In terms of more detailed practical feedback on the current rules, labels are seen by stakeholders as a successful tool to promote sustainable solutions and ease the procurement process 196 . However, the possibility for economic operators to provide equivalent label or another proof of equivalence is frequently reported by stakeholders as leading to serious inefficiencies due to its time-intensiveness and necessity of technical knowledge 197 . Secondly, stakeholders highlight the difficulties experienced with the obligation under the existing Directives to link sustainability criteria to the subject matter of contracts.

Interesting insights on the GPP have been provided by an OECD survey conducted in 2022 and carried out in 38 countries 198 . Results from this survey clearly show that countries increasingly recognise GPP as a major driver for innovation. In fact, in 2022, 35 out of 38 OECD members had adopted a national GPP policy or framework, 21 of these countries were EU Member States, which indicates the role of the Directives in promoting the uptake of GPP.

4.1.1.4.2Social

The 2014 aimed to facilitate socially responsible public procurement (SRPP), defined as procurement that takes into account one or several social considerations for advancing social objectives, such as employment opportunities, decent working conditions, or social inclusion, among others.

On the back of the 2014 reform, the European Commission has launched various initiatives aimed at promoting SRPP and providing support to Member States over the past decade. These efforts included the provision of training sessions for public procurement officers in all 27 Member States (“Buying for Social Impact” 2018 and “We Buy Social” 2022 projects), the publication of guidance documents (“Buying Social Guide” 2021, “How to apply SRPP” 2025), the compilation of good SRPP examples (“71 Good Practice Cases” 2020), the creation of a social and green support helpdesk for contracting authorities (“GPP Helpdesk”), the development of communication materials, media campaigns, information webinars, the Union of Skills 199 , etc.

Although comprehensive data on the actual use of SRPP across the EU and at national level is scarce 200 , SRPP has been gaining traction in recent years, with Member States increasing efforts to integrate social considerations into their public procurement practices. The level of maturity in implementing SRPP, however, varies significantly across Member States. While some Member States have implemented specific legal provisions, policies and strategies to drive the effective use of SRPP, others are still at an initial stage where the use of SRPP is far from being a common practice. Top-performing Member States often share common success factors, such as the adoption of public procurement strategies addressing the social dimension, the presence of dedicated support centres or networks providing guidance and expertise to contracting authorities, or the introduction of specific minimum targets for socially responsible public contracts. This is exemplified by countries like FR, which has set a national target of having 30% of its procurement contracts include at least one social consideration by the end of 2025, or ES, which has established a specific target for reserved contracts at central level, currently set at 10%.

However, Member States also report several challenges when pursuing SRPP, such as lack of clear guidance about correct implementation, difficulties in measuring social impact, challenges in connecting social considerations to the subject matter of a contract, and the absence of a generally accepted definition of SRPP 201 . In addition to this, the widespread use of the lowest price as the sole award criterion, along with the lack of monitoring and reporting mechanisms for social provisions act as further barriers for enhanced implementation of SRPP 202 .

4.1.1.4.3Innovation

Like green public procurement, the 2014 Directives aim to support the procurement of innovative solutions. To this end, the Directives introduced a definition of innovation procurement as well as an innovation specific procurement procedure, namely innovation partnerships.  203 Beyond these, the legal framework remains non-prescriptive and no innovation-specific targets have been set.

To help public buyers navigate legal uncertainties by clarifying how EU public procurement rules apply to innovation-oriented procedures, the Commission published Guidance on Innovation Procurement 204 and developed supportive initiatives such as the Urban Agenda, the Public Buyers Community Platform - Big Buyers Working Together 205 , training courses 206 , or actions under the New European Innovation Agenda, adopted on 5 July 2022 207 . 

Despite the above initiatives, the uptake of public procurement of innovation (PPI) remains very low across Member States 208 . Overall, it represents a marginal share of total public procurement value and volume. Only few Member States monitor the take up of PPI and indicate that the uptake is very low. The Member State reporting the highest take up is LT (2.6% in value terms in 2023). In many other Member States the percentage is below 1%, with few contracts awarded every year.

The innovation partnership procedure, introduced to stimulate the development of innovative solutions in public procurement, has seen only limited uptake in practice with only 199 contracts awarded in 2016-2023, with over EUR 8.5 billion in contract value. It has been used only in 17 Member States (i.e. contracting authorities from 10 Member States never used this procedure). Top three countries for the number of contracts awarded in 2023 were FI (28 cases), CZ (27) and FR (27). Stakeholders often point to its procedural complexity, the perceived risks, and the preference for more familiar procurement methods as key reasons for its underuse. As a result, its intended role as a driver of innovation has not been achieved despite the Commission’s initiatives to that effect.

Strategic and institutional challenges such as risk aversion or the need to provide for upfront investments are often cited as explanations for the low uptake of the public procurement of innovation. Furthermore, the most pressing issues identified explaining this low uptake are: the absence of clearly defined legal bases for running PPI procedures, lack of flexibility in the legal framework 209 , the lack of capacity, professionalisation, the risk adverse mind-set of public buyers, a lack of standardized tools and templates to ensure compliance with the legal framework, and persistent ambiguity surrounding audit and compliance procedures. These findings were confirmed by consultations held as part of the Innovation Procurement Hubs initiative. As far as start-ups are concerned, feedback received from the OPC points to difficulties for such companies in participating in public tenders.

The use of overly detailed technical specifications by contracting authorities hampers the participation of innovative suppliers 210 , de facto decreasing competition. Furthermore, as more innovative solutions come to the market, the pre-existing technical specifications might limit their eligibility under longer time-framed techniques such as framework contracts. Other identified barriers to the participation of innovative firms are the use of selection criteria based on past performance requirements, or high turnover requirements. While the Directives leave the discretion to establish provisions concerning the transfer of Intellectual property rights (IPR), the contractual arrangements used by contracting authorities often denote a lack of strategic insight to allow innovative suppliers to grow while adhering to the interest of public authorities. This aligns with the results of the OPC, which indicate that the provisions in the Directives concerning the transfer of IPR to support innovation through public procurement are among the least well-understood and least clearly assessed by stakeholders 211 ( Figure 39 and Table 43 , p. 143, as well as Section 4.3.4. on the relevance of rules on strategic public procurement).

The lack flexibility of contractual arrangements and risk-sharing models - both essential to supporting innovation - are not yet sufficiently addressed in the current regulatory framework, as confirmed also with the results in Section 4.1.1.2. Moreover, existing procurement processes often lack the flexibility to accommodate iterative development, co-design, and phased implementation - approaches particularly suited to innovative projects and necessary to achieve the potential of public procurement as an investment tool. These findings are supported by a study performed by Altaee (2025) investigating the relevance and added value of the currently legal framework 212 .

4.1.1.4.4Conclusions – Strategic objectives

The 2014 Directives marked a step forward in promoting green, social and innovation procurement. The voluntary approach chosen in 2014 enabled Member States and contracting authorities to pursue strategic policy objectives through procurement procedures and adapt rules to their policy objectives and specific context, but led to an uneven adoption across the EU due to its voluntary nature. This flexible approach avoided rigid requirements not always easy to apply.

Contracting authorities do use green public procurement, but its uptake varies across countries. On average, according to data reported by 14 Member States, slightly below 25% of contracts include green procurement criteria. The uptake of innovative public procurement is monitored only by a few Member States but seems to have been limited in practice, with a percentage of less than 1% in many Member States and few contracts awarded each year. Finally, the adoption of socially responsible public procurement is difficult to evaluate, but available data suggests that it has gained ground.

The integration of strategic objectives into public procurement legislation has also been reflected in the increasing number of sector-specific legislative acts. However, many stakeholders have expressed concern about this proliferation and particularly about a lack of legal coherence.

4.1.1.5Governance

The Directives aimed at strengthening the governance framework by increasing the transparency of the activity of contracting authorities and thus, preventing corruption and fostering the professionalisation of public buyers.

Increased transparency, by means of a fully digital public procurement system, enables contracting authorities or economic operators to monitor and prevent corruption and anti-competitive (i.e. bid-rigging) practices more efficiently. Open competition creates a system of mutual accountability that acts as a deterrent to abuse and ensures better value for public money. Higher levels of competition undoubtedly serve as one of key instruments in preventing corruption. When multiple firms compete for public contracts, it becomes more difficult to justify the selection of a suboptimal or overpriced offer, thereby limiting opportunities for favouritism or bribery. High value competitive procedures also attract broader scrutiny—from competitors, media, and civil society—which raises the reputational and legal risks of corrupt practices.

The professionalisation of procurement practices is a key element to ensure the most efficient use of public funds and take full advantage of public procurement as a leverage for growth 213 . To support the work of contracting authorities, the Directives acknowledged the need for professionalising the procurement workforce. By including this aspect in the Directives, the EU laid the groundwork for more skilled and capable contracting authorities.

4.1.1.5.1Transparency

To support open and fair competition, the Directives aimed to promote transparency through a series of both mandatory and optional measures and notably the transition to digital public procurement (eProcurement).

First and foremost, the Directives required the advertisement of procurement notices, contract modifications and the award of each contract. The compilation of all notices in TED allows contracting authorities and economic operators to keep a transparent and easily accessible record. Since the adoption of the Directives the number of published tenders has almost doubled 214 , indicating a strong increase of the transparency of public contracts. In addition, the number of countries offering direct links to procurement documents on the TED platform rose from 11 in 2018 to 24 by 2025. However, the same legal framework results in different behaviours and, consequently, different outcomes. For example, the disclosure of data on contract modifications is highly heterogeneous, as some Member States actively disclose their data, while others do not.

Additional mandatory measures include the provision of electronic access, free of charge (eAccess), to the procurement documents from the date of publication of the contract notice. This enabled economic operators to have equal opportunities to engage in procurement. Free access to the contracting authority’s documents helps that any attempts to unduly favour one economic operator against another can be detected more easily.

In a major effort to further enhance transparency, the Commission in 2024 launched the Public Procurement Data Space (PPDS) 215 under the European data strategy 216 , supported by the Commission data initiative for public procurement 217 , as an integrated EU-wide platform for public procurement data so far dispersed across EU, national, and regional levels. EU countries are encouraged to link their data sources to the PPDS, which can be supported by the EU Technical Support Instrument (TSI).

Da Rosa, I. et al. (2025) underlines the potential of PPDS in addressing challenges stemming from a lack of integrated data, pointing out that a coherent understanding of EU public procurement relies heavily on national data and that integrating TED with national datasets opens this possibility 218 . Currently the PPDS includes approximately eight years of procurement information (2018-2025) from TED and the national procurement information from DE, AT, FI and NO.

Measures to enhance procurement transparency are widely supported by stakeholders, with nearly two-thirds of OPC respondents (427 out of 691 replies) recognising a clear role of the Directives in doing so. The groups of stakeholders showing the most favourable opinions were in particular: academic institutions (87.9%, 29 replies), public authorities (77%, 151 replies), business associations (60.6%, 66 replies), companies (57.7%, 78 replies), and NGOs (56.1%, 37 replies; Figure 12 and Table 16 p. 112). As far as contracting authorities are concerned, the above has been confirmed in TED surveys run by Ecorys (2025), where this group indicated that transparency is for them increasingly important (i.e. 57% in 2008-2010, compared to 82% in 2019-2024) 219 .

The effectiveness of transparency supporting fair and competitive procurement procedures critically depends on the quality of data provided. Problems such as missing, incorrect, or inconsistent data undermine the reliability of procurement information, which in turn affects stakeholders' ability to engage confidently with the system 220 and make it more difficult for national competition authorities to detect and investigate anti-competitive practices. Despite regulatory efforts, the lack of publication of key information such as award criteria, contract duration, and price weighting has increased in many Member States, particularly after 2016. For example, missing award criteria rose from 8.4% to 34.1%, and the lack of price weighting data now affects over half of all procedures. These gaps discourage participation, especially from less experienced or cross-border bidders, and reduce the overall integrity of the procurement process. They complicate the work of contracting authorities and prevent the use of automated data tools to prevent corruption (Rabuzin and Modrusan, 2019) 221 .

4.1.1.5.2Corruption, anti-competitive practices and integrity

The Directives aimed at creating a strong framework against corruption and anti-competitive (bid-rigging) practices by introducing rules on conflict of interests and ensuring the exclusion from public procurement of economic operators convicted/sanctioned for these kinds of infringements.

Despite the existing regulatory framework, public procurement remains in most Member States an area at high risk of corruption, even if efforts of Member States to mitigate corruption risks in relation to public procurement are continuous 222 . The total cost of corruption risk in public procurement in the EU-27 between 2016 and 2021 across all sectors has been estimated at EUR 29.6 billion 223 . To counter this risk, the Commission has undertaken various initiatives, such as the Integrity Pacts Pilot Project 224 or the Anti-Fraud Knowledge and Resource Centre 225 .

The corruption risk in public procurement as measured by the Corruption Risk Index (CRI) at the EU level varies significantly between 2016 and 2021. The risk in CRI values increased 10% between 2019-2021, following a decrease between 2016-2018. According to the 2024 Eurobarometer, 37% of respondents believe that bribery and the abuse of power for personal gain are widespread among officials responsible for awarding public tenders. Similarly, 52% of EU respondents in Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer express doubt that government contracts are awarded competitively. Instead, they believe that public procurement in their countries is frequently influenced by bribes or personal connections 226 .

In contrast to the above, the OPC results paint a more positive picture – stakeholders’ perception of whether the Directive help reduce corruption and fend off political pressure in public procurement was generally favourable (37.8%, 258 replies) – 44.2% of firms (57 replies), 42.1% of business associations (45 replies), and roughly half of academic institutions (17 replies) agreed with the statement. Another one-third of stakeholders (35.1%, 240 replies) expressed a neutral view - this was the predominant position among public authorities (46.2%, 91 replies). Finally, only 14.5% of respondents (99 replies 227 ) disagreed with the statement that the Directives play a positive role in reducing corruption and fending off political pressure (Figure 9 and Table 13 , p. 109). Similarly, 36.9% of respondents (254 replies) - mainly public authorities (43.2%, 85 replies), companies (42.6%, 55 replies) and business associations (42.6%, 46 replies) - believed that the Directives fostered a culture of integrity and fair play in public procurement, whereas one-third (200 replies) chose a neutral stance, including 38.6% of public authorities (76 replies). In contrast, 24.1% of respondents (166 replies) held the opposite view (Figure 10 and  Table 14 , p. 110). Another source – a survey run by Ecorys (2025) confirms that both contracting authorities and economic operators have consistently valued fairness. The share of contracting authorities that attach importance to fairness in public procurement rose significantly, from just 55% in 2010 to 78% in 2025. For economic operators, the importance of fairness has remained stable at 55-56% 228 .

It is important to stress that there are noticeable differences among Member States that might be explained by an interplay of factors influencing these results. For instance, some countries have a high overall value of contracts (and a high overall number of contracts), but also a relative high corruption risk across their public procurement contracts over the years respectively to the EU-27 average. Other countries, in comparison, have lower corruption risk index (CRI) values but a really high overall value of the contracts for one of the years, leading to high costs of corruption risk 229 .

Recent surveys confirm that even for years 2023 and 2024 (after Covid-19), the risk of corruption is perceived as continuing on an upward trend. Business perceptions echo these concerns. The 2024 Eurobarometer on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU shows that 27% of companies surveyed across the EU that have participated in a procurement procedure, think that corruption has prevented them from winning a public tender or a public procurement contract in practice in the last three years 230 . 

Expressing themselves on the type of irregularities experienced, companies highlight specifications that are tailor-made for particular companies as “very” or “fairly widespread” practice in their country (61%); widespread conflicts of interest in the evaluation of bids (52%); collusive bidding (50%); abuse of emergency grounds to justify use of non-competitive or fast-track procedures (46%); abuse of negotiated procedures (45%); and amendments of contract terms after conclusion of the contract (40%).

While transparency tools introduced by the Directives provide for elements to counteract the risk of corruption and anti-competitive practices, identified gaps in data quality and missing information, such as selection method (award criterion), procedure type, winner name, contract value etc., are associated with the risk of corruption and bid-rigging and raise concerns about the fairness of procurement outcomes and undermine the effectiveness of the 2014 reform 231 . 

4.1.1.5.3Professionalisation

While the Directives do not include direct measures affecting the professionalisation, they laid the groundwork for a more skilled and capable procurement workforce. Professional contracting authorities are indispensable to ensure a stronger governance model, where transparency is maintained, corruption prevented and strategic policy objectives can be pursued. Since the entry into application of the Directives, the Commission has taken many steps to support professionalisation of public procurement ( Table 92 , p. 247) 232 , notably through the adoption of a Recommendation encouraging the development and implementation of long term professionalisation policies in the Member States (October 2017) 233 , and the launch of a European competency framework for public buyers (ProcurCompEU), a toolbox designed to help public administrations, contracting authorities and procurement practitioners improve their knowledge, skills and competences in the field of procurement (December 2020) 234 . In 2022, the professionalisation of the public procurement workforce was designated as one of the twelve Flagship Technical Support Projects for 2023 in the public governance agenda 235 . Additionally, throughout the years the Commission has provided practical guidance materials and training programs to foster the exchange of best practices, guidance on avoidance of most common errors in procurement 236 , and encourage the uptake of green, socially responsible and PPI 237 . These initiatives have provided a structured framework and practical tools to support Member States in developing long-term professionalisation strategies.

Despite the efforts being done at EU and Member States’ level, challenges still persist. Skills and competency gaps, limited competency models and certification frameworks, insufficient training opportunities in advanced procurement topics, low attractiveness of the profession along with the difficulty in retaining skilled procurement professionals are recurrent themes in many countries 238 . A significant barrier is the limited recognition of procurement as a standalone profession 239 . 

In this context, it’s worth noting the mixed results emerging from the OPC survey, where one-third of respondents agreed that the Directives contributed to the professionalisation of public buyers (38.4%, 263 replies), while a similar share did not perceive such an effect (33.6%, 230 replies). As far as positive feedback is concerned, it came from 35.5% of business associations (38 replies), 41.1% of public authorities (81 replies), 47.3% of firms (61 replies), as well as 63.6% of academic institutions (21 replies). In contrast, trade unions were the group where negative views were most prominent, with 50 out of 52 replies disagreeing that the Directives have contributed to increased professionalisation of public buyers ( Figure 11 and Table 15 , p. 111).

The share of unsuccessful procurement procedures offers yet another interesting indicator of the administrative capacity of contracting authorities. With the overall EU average failure rate of 14.57% - due to the absence or invalid bids or discontinued procedures-, in some Member States this exceed 25%. These figures highlight systemic inefficiencies that may result from poor planning, ambiguous requirements, but also insufficient market awareness 240 .

4.1.1.5.4Conclusions – Governance

The extent to which the 2014 Directives improved the transparency, integrity and professionalisation of the procurement system, remains uneven and difficult to measure, as the effective governance of public procurement depends heavily on the availability of reliable and comparable data. Yet, widespread data gaps and quality issues both at EU and national level undermine the transparency and integrity of the system, as well as the ability of Member States to steer procurement in line with policy objectives and assess compliance with the Directives to avoid potential corruption and/or anti-competitive practices 241 . Therefore, the goals of the Directives have not been fully achieved regarding the principles of transparency and integrity. 

With regards to professionalisation, the increasing complexity of procurement, driven by its alignment with broader strategic policy goals and external pressures such as geopolitical instability and technological challenges, has reinforced the critical need for a highly skilled procurement workforce and administrative capacity. However, while substantial progress has been made at both EU and national level, professionalisation of public procurement remains uneven.

4.1.2Efficiency

The efficiency in public procurement is increasingly within focus, particularly among public buyers, according to a recent TED survey among users. When asked about the importance of selected aspects of public procurement procedures, “efficiency” was indicated by 41% of contracting authorities in 2008-2010, while in the recent survey this share rose to 77% ( Table 93 , p. 246). Given the central role of efficiency in determining the overall role of public procurement as a policy measure, it should be acknowledged that the system frequently requires balancing competing policy objectives. The evaluation has identified, mainly through the feedback provided by stakeholders, several elements that may involve unavoidable trade-offs, for example:

·Aggregation of demand through framework agreements or central purchasing bodies can increase transactional efficiency and reduce costs. At the same time, such aggregation may unintentionally restrict access for SMEs, who struggle to compete in large, bundled contracts.

·While the aim of promoting greener procurement supports important EU environmental and climate change objectives, it can contradict the objective to simplify procurement. Incorporating GPP criteria can, in practice, increase the complexity of these procedures, as designing, verifying, and monitoring environmental requirements requires technical expertise and additional documentation, which can discourage participation, particularly among SMEs.

·Increased flexibility, such as easier access to negotiations, can streamline procedures and enhance efficiency. However, such flexibility may also reduce transparency and undermine safeguards against corruption.

·Greater competition generates higher savings. However, it also comes at a cost: the more bidders take part, the more unsuccessful participants there will be, whose efforts represent foregone costs for the economy 242 .

Therefore, when evaluating the overall cost benefit balance of the Directives, it should be kept in mind that the net efficiency outcome may be shaped by policy choices that prioritise certain objectives at the expense of others. These trade-offs can be justified, as the long-term benefits or positive externalities—such as environmental sustainability or social inclusion—outweigh immediate costs.

Considering the abovementioned policy context, the overall efficiency of the Directives will largely depend on the balance between:

·direct costs and benefits, such as direct compliance costs vs. better price–quality ratios in public procurement transactions on the benefits side, and 

·indirect (societal) costs and benefits, such as lost opportunities for innovation if procedures that are too burdensome vs. indirect benefits for society, such as long- and short-term environmental gains from GPP.

4.1.2.1Direct costs and benefits

In terms of direct costs and benefits of the intervention, this evaluation identified direct compliance cost 243 that predominantly take the form of administrative costs 244  of running the public procurement procedures, which are borne by contracting authorities and economic operators (Section 4.1.2.1.1 below), as well as adjustment costs 245 borne by the Member States (Section 4.1.2.1.2 below). Secondly, the direct costs of the intervention also encompass the enforcement costs 246 , which are linked to the monitoring of the implementation of the Directives and are borne by the Member States’ administrations (see Section of 4.1.2.1.3, concerning the Triennial reporting). Finally, the transactional savings (understood as direct regulatory benefits 247 ) are also discussed below.

4.1.2.1.1Time and cost-effectiveness of procedures

There are two main ways to understand and measure the time-effectiveness of procurement procedures, and they capture different dimensions of the process:

·Time actually spent working on the procedure (person-days): this measures the active effort required from staff (contracting authorities as well as economic operators) to process the procurement, such as drafting documents, evaluating bids, and preparing award decisions. It constitutes direct compliance costs.

·Time elapsed between the submission deadline and contract award (calendar days): this captures the overall duration of the award process from an external perspective 248 . It encompasses periods during which the authorities actively evaluate tenders but may also include periods where no work is actively carried out (e.g., waiting for approvals or scheduling delays) 249 . It provides a more indirect measure, relevant for suppliers and market responsiveness 250 and constitutes indirect costs related to market functioning.

These two indicators are complementary: person-days show the internal effort involved, while calendar days indicate how quickly the process delivers results.

In terms of direct compliance costs of the Directives, the median number of person-days spent on public procurement procedures above EU thresholds significantly decreased from 108 days in 2008-2010 to 57 days in 2019-2024 251 . Referring to main procedure type, the total days for open procedures declined from 107 to 64. Negotiated procedures saw total days decrease from 116 to 71, and framework agreements from 70 to 49 ( Table 94 , p. 246). One of the factors behind this improvement was a reduction in time spent on carrying out procurement procedures due to improved efficiency among contracting authorities and economic operators. Nonetheless, other factors contributing to the overall results were not linked to efficiency gains. These included a decrease in the number of bids received per procedure and a less frequent use of the most time-consuming restricted procedure 252 . 

When it comes to the time necessary to evaluate offers, Ecorys (2025) estimates that median days till award above EU thresholds increased by 4 days on average, from 58 days in 2008-2010 to 62 days in the post-Directives period 253 . The time to evaluate offers has increased most notably for framework contracts and e-auctions (66 to 94 days and 50 to 78 days, respectively). Interestingly, since the implementation of the new rules, the time to evaluate bids for framework contracts or in e-auctions has been quite similar above and below EU thresholds 254 .

Looking at time-effectiveness from yet another perspective, those with direct experience in public procurement 255 were asked about the effort required at different procurement phases ( Table 95 , p. 246) - contracting authorities identified the pre-award phase as the most burdensome, both for one-off contracts (53%) and for framework agreements (54%). The same applies to economic operators: 48% of firms participating in framework agreements and 41% involved in one-off bidding considered this phase burdensome. Unlike contracting authorities, however, economic operators also pointed to the proposal phase as particularly demanding (43%), though to a lesser extent for framework agreements (37%).

Building on the above data regarding the duration of procedures in terms of person-days and assigning a monetary value to this time, Ecorys (2025) found that in constant prices, the overall costs of procedures above EU thresholds have increased in the analysed period, from about EUR 34 600 256 in 2008-2010 to about EUR 43 200 in 2019-2024. However, as a percentage of the contract value, the cost decreased over time accounting for on average 0.9%. Looking at the different types of procedures separately, the total cost increased from about EUR 34 600 to about EUR 46 400 per open procedure and from about EUR 32 700 to about EUR 42 900 per negotiated procedure. The cost of restricted procedures decreased, but so did their use (hence, overall, this aspect matters less) 257 . The average cost per procedure for contracting authorities decreased from EUR 6 900 258 in 2008-2010 to EUR 6 000 in 2019-2024, while it increased for economic operators from EUR 4 700 to EUR 11 400, mainly driven by the high cost of firms’ participation in framework agreements (EUR 12 100). In contrast, the costs of participation in framework agreements have decreased for contracting authorities from EUR 6 000 per contract in 2008-2010 to EUR 3 500 in 2019-2024 259 . Finally, most TED survey respondents find the above costs broadly affordable when weighed against the potential gains from successful procurements 260 .

For comparative reasons, one can also refer to a study by Oslo Economics and Inventura (2023) for the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, that estimates transaction costs in public procurement. The above EU threshold transactions cost on average NOK 156 000–367 000 (EUR 15 400 – EUR 36 300) per procedure 261 . In relative terms, these costs represent 0.2–0.5% of contract values, which is notable given that the Norwegian study included both the preparation and execution of the competition as well as contract follow-up 262 . The Danish Competition Authority (2019) estimated transaction costs in procurement above EU thresholds at 2.6% (i.e. average administrative cost out of total contract value until contract signing of contract) for contracting authorities and 2% for the winning economic operators. The relative administrative costs were decreasing according to contract value 263 .

Comparisons with below EU thresholds procurement

In 2010, 60% of contracting authorities indicated that procedures exceeding EU thresholds were more time-consuming than those below the thresholds. According to Ecorys (2025), fewer than 1 in 3 respondents continued to report these issues nowadays 264 . For the economic operators this perception dropped albeit less abruptly, from 35% in 2010 to 27% in the post-Directive period. As far as cost are concerned, initially, 39% of contracting authorities felt that costs were higher above EU thresholds, compared to below thresholds procurement - in case of contracting authorities, this difference had narrowed to 21% most recently. For economic operators, cost differences remained relatively stable over time 265 . Overall, the perceived differences between procedures above and below EU thresholds for both aspects (i.e. timeliness and cost) have decreased, indicating either more streamlined processes above EU thresholds or suggesting that the two tiers now operate as an increasingly integrated market.

According to the respondents to OPC survey, carrying out transactions under the Directives’ rules is generally not seen as simpler than procurement below EU thresholds 266 . Only 16.4% provided positive feedback (109 replies), while more than half considered it rarely or never simpler (58.6%, 391 replies; Figure 58 , p. 170). When asked about better value for money, only 9.9% of respondents (66 out of 666) replied positively. By contrast, nearly half gave negative replies (“rarely” 34% and “never” 11% - 300 replies altogether; Figure 59 , p. 171). Finally, only 19% of respondents (126) considered the Directives result in faster procedures, compared to almost 55% (364) that gave negative replies ( Figure 60 , p. 172). Overall, the prevailing opinion leans noticeably towards scepticism, although a sizeable group acknowledges the advantages of at least some elements of the regime above EU thresholds.

Comparisons with private procurement

In 2008-2010, the majority of economic operators reported that public procurement was more time-consuming and costly than private sector purchasing (58% and 59% respectively). This perception declined to 39% (time) and 34% (cost) in the post adoption period (2019-2024). Consistent with these developments, the proportion of economic operators who considered public procurement to be more efficient than private sector procurement rose from 24% in 2008-2010 to 35% on average in 2019-2024. These trends suggest a gradually growing recognition of the cost and time-effectiveness of public procurement compared with the private market 267 .

As far as the OPC is concerned, the respondents were also asked to compare selling under the Directives’ rules to private procurement 268 - only a very small share of respondents answered that buying under the Directives was simpler (3.7%, 24 replies), while the majority indicated the opposite (49.2%, 320 replies; Figure 68 , p. 181). With regard to achieving better value for money, they were equally sceptical, with predominantly negative feedback (32%, 210 replies), however the largest group (38%, 246 replies) unable to judge ( Figure 69 , p. 182). Finally, almost half of respondents (48.8%, 315 replies) considered that selling under the Directives is rarely or never faster than private procurement ( Figure 70 , p. 183).

4.1.2.1.2Investment in IT infrastructure by Member States

As part of the evaluation, a survey among Member States was conducted to understand the costs associated with the setup and maintenance of the eProcurement systems that were necessary in order to implement the Directives. The Commission received responses from 14 Member States 269 and NO. All of the EU countries reported recent substantial investments in eProcurement systems between the year 2023 and now ( Table 5 , p. 90), following the entry into application of eForms. Except for one Member State that outsources this service to private providers, 13 countries use state owned systems or a combination of publicly and privately owned systems (e.g. eProcurement system(s) run by governmental agencies or CPBs).

The size and financial commitment towards the systems varied significantly among the Member States, influenced largely by the size of the country. Ranging from several hundred thousand euros to EUR 10 million, with a median cost around EUR 1.4 million. The majority of these costs, around 65% to 100%, were dedicated to system design and development, with the remaining resources allocated toward planning and testing. Operational and maintenance costs also varied widely, with the median cost reaching almost EUR 240 thousand per year. Some Member States also included the cost of guidance and training when reporting the recurrent costs.

4.1.2.1.3Cost of the Triennial reporting

As noted earlier, the Directives also require triennial reporting under Article 45 of Directive 2014/23/EU, Articles 83 and 85 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 99 and 101 of Directive 2014/25/EU. This obligation constitutes administrative cost resulting from these rules 270 . An estimate 271 of the effort required to prepare each national evaluation suggests an average workload of around 0.35 full-time equivalents (FTEs) per Member State for the period 2021-2024, primarily involving administrative coordination, data extraction, and analysis and drafting. This varies from 0.24 FTE for those with smaller populations to 0.63 FTE for the largest and is borne once every three years.

4.1.2.1.4Transactional savings

From a broader perspective, the economic literature consistently points to a positive relationship between competition and cost efficiency in public procurement. For example, according to Bek Aagaard, K. & Gregers Linaa, J. (2024) contracting authorities obtain an average 4.6% price reduction when two bids are received instead of only one. With four bids received, the contract price is 9.7% lower compared to having received one bid 272 . It is also evident that the price is, for example, approximately 5.1% lower if the contracting authority receives four bids instead of two (9.7% - 4.6%). Moreover, based in DK public procurement data, the analysis indicates that stronger competition lowers the likelihood of an overpriced winning bid, defined as a contract price exceeding the expected value by more than 20% 273 . Finally, their estimations show that, on average, an additional bid is accompanied by a 2.5% decrease in the price of the contract 274 . Significant price reductions were in particular observed in regional government procurements, in works contracts, and in procedures awarding contracts on the basis of lowest price rather than MEAT ( Figure 98 , p. 249) 275 . The above findings are also in the same order of magnitude as in the previous evaluation 276 of the EU public procurement rules, which found that a contracting authority that publishes an invitation to tender and uses an open procedure may expect total benefits equivalent to savings of 3.8 % on the final contract value. According to the same source, overall prices for EU advertised procedures were 2.5-10% lower than contracting authorities initial estimates 277 . 

4.1.2.2Indirect cost and benefits

While direct costs and benefits can usually be identified more easily, indirect effects - both positive and negative - are significantly more challenging to measure. Even where contracting authorities and firms comply with the rules, overly complex or prescriptive requirements can create additional burdens. These may not always be reflected in direct financial terms, yet they still result in lost opportunities and inefficiencies.

The first type of indirect costs (i.e. negative effects on market functioning) identified in the evaluation is related to the increase in duration of procedures from the submission deadline to award which reflect the external efficiency and speed of the process. This indicator matters for market responsiveness and planning by suppliers (see Section 4.1.2.1.1). Additionally, as emerges in particular, from stakeholder’s feedback, other indirect costs are related to reduced competition, limited market access, reduced investment and diminished innovation. Annex VI ( Table 100 , p. 251) offers further details supported by examples, summarised as follows: 

·Administrative and legal complexity introduced by sectoral legislation on mandatory GPP lead to missed broader benefits, including a reduced uptake of sustainable practices and the loss of positive spillover effects that procurement could otherwise generate in the economy.

·Overly prescriptive or restrictive rules, such as excessive financial requirements for SMEs, can result in missed opportunities for growth and job creation especially at regional and local levels, where SMEs are often embedded in local economies.

·Informational asymmetries due to linguistic requirements such as tender documentation available only in the language of the contracting authority, can lower supplier diversity. A narrower supplier base subsequently reduces the resilience of supply chains.

·Weak incentives for pre-commercial procurement, such as the lack of adequate risk sharing mechanisms for bidders, discourage firms from investing in new solutions due to high risks and uncertain returns. This hesitancy can lead to foregone innovation, depriving both the public sector and the wider economy of potential long-term benefits.

In the short term, all the above-mentioned factors may deter firms from bidding, resulting in a narrower pool of competitors, which ultimately results in higher costs for contracting authorities.

Regarding indirect benefits, the evaluation provided evidence on the following outcomes resulting from the Directives:

·Indirect compliance benefits (i.e. spill-over effects): the Directives encouraged to - a different degree - greener, more innovative, and inclusive practices in particular by contracting authorities, setting an example for the wider market. They also improved public services through eProcurement and advanced the professionalisation of public administration.

·Wider macroeconomic benefits: the Directives promoted SME participation, fostering grassroots economic growth and offering wider societal benefits. This was achieved through the use of greener, more innovative, and inclusive products and services by public administrations.

·Other non-monetary benefits: the Directives facilitated easier policy monitoring by providing access to structured data, enabling citizens to more easily verify the efficient and effective use of public funds.

Finally, regarding indirect benefits, a survey organised among Member States concerning the costs of setting up and maintain eProcurement systems (See Section 4.1.2.1.3), reported numerous advantages from introducing eProcurement systems, with improved transparency and easier monitoring of corruption risks and bid-rigging being the most significant. This often resulted in higher participation, ultimately fostering more competitive environment. Keeping online platforms open and transparent also helped the contracting authorities gain expertise from one another. Users also appreciated the systems becoming more user-friendly and incorporating features such as alerts and improved search, and filter mechanisms, which help to streamline procurement processes. Furthermore, the usage of modern eProcurement systems significantly contributes to standardizing procurement documentation, simplifying supervision processes, reducing administrative burdens, and enhancing security. One Member State reported significant improvements in user satisfaction with an integrated platform supporting all phases of the tendering process, while another noted increased efficiency in tender publication, auditability, compliance, and accessibility for SMEs.

4.1.2.3Overall balance between cost and benefits

The evaluation has provided new insights into transactional cost with the average cost of procedure estimated at EUR 43 200 for the period 2019-2024 (an increase from EUR 34 600 before the 2014 reform), though as a share of contract value these costs declined to 0.9% (from 1.4%) 278 . In terms of savings, making public procurement processes more streamlined and competitive can generate significant benefits - for every additional bid, there is an average 2.5% reduction in the contract price. This indicates that, despite the transaction costs involved, the system’s overall efficiency is positive in terms of direct effects, as the gains in value for money significantly surpass the procedural burden. 

From a broader perspective, the evaluation suggests that while indirect costs largely take the form of missed opportunities, these appear to be, to a large extent, offset by the wider benefits generated by the Directives. These benefits, although more diffuse, are significant: enhanced transparency and accountability with benefits in terms of reduced corruption, easier policy monitoring through more structured data than before the reform, and the wider societal gains from encouraging greener, more innovative and inclusive practices. Consequently, while the rules may entail considerable costs (predominantly direct), the broader value they bring to the economy and society indicates that the system generates net benefits when assessed from a long-term and collective outlook.

4.1.3Coherence

This section aims to examine to what extent the three evaluated Directives are still coherent among themselves - both in terms of provisions as well as objectives - and, whether the Directives are still coherent with the general policy framework in which they are expected to perform.

4.1.3.1Internal coherence

The Directives aimed at achieving multiple objectives, including the increase of the efficiency of public spending, facilitating in particular the participation of SMEs and to enable procurers to make better use of public procurement in support of environmental, social and innovation policy objectives 279 .

According to ECA (2023) the inclusion of multiple objectives in the 2014 reform resulted in an unsatisfactory progress of the evolution of public procurement practices, with some objectives conflicting among themselves 280 . However, based on a study 281  carried out for the purpose of this evaluation, no significant conflict between the main objectives of the Directives was found. Instead, Caranta, R. (2025) argues that the Directives established a balanced framework without undermining efficient public purchasing, and without evidence of major inconsistencies.

Caranta, R. (2025) considered that legal uncertainty stems from the fact that the Directives do not address Institutional Public-Private Partnerships. This can be justified from the fact that the cooperation between public authorities and private entities by means of the creation of joint-ventures is excluded from the scope of Directive 2014/23/EU, in line with the principle of free administration 282  (Treaty principles remain applicable however) 283 .

Additionally, the provisions on contract execution appear insufficient to fully support the internal market and the achievement of strategic objectives and integrity aspects, as highlighted by Caranta, R. (2025). In particular, the Directives do not establish rules on the enforcement of environmental, social and labour law obligations. While this ensures that contracting authorities will be able to adapt to the national legal traditions, according to Caranta, R. (2025), the lack of a harmonised approach creates a fragmentation of the legal framework and undermines the achievement of strategic objectives.

Regarding more specifically the relationship among the three Directives and the objectives these pursue, the study made by Caranta, R., (2025) found that they largely share the same objectives, although sustainability is less prominent in Directive 2014/23/EU. Many of the provisions in the Directives are the same or with very similar wording. Compared to Directive 2014/24/EU, Caranta, R. (2025) considered that Directives 2014/23/EU and 2014/25/EU place greater emphasis on flexibility, and while some rules reflect this (e.g. on qualification systems or more flexible procedures), many others do not. Conversely, some differences in rules (e.g. on selection and exclusion regime or conflicts of interest) are not justified by the specificities of Directives 2014/23/EU and 2014/25/EU, according to Caranta, R. (2025). Additionally, the analysis done by Caranta, R. (2025) concluded that the existence of multiple legal texts and the difficulty in distinguishing their respective scope confuse stakeholders, including national courts, further contributing to the risk of inconsistent application of the rules. The latter was also mentioned in the targeted consultation with Member State’s first instance review bodies.

As for the stakeholders’ consultation, the results suggest that while a notable share of respondents (29.7%, 199 replies) perceive the three Directives as coherent, a larger proportion are either neutral (35.8%, 240 replies) or unsure (21.8%, 146 replies), indicating a widespread lack of a clear opinion. Only a minority (12.8%, 86 replies) explicitly disagreed with the statement. Among public authorities, the neutral stance prevailed (40.5%, 79 replies), while 31.8% (62 replies) agreed with the coherence of the Directives. Similarly, 32.3% of economic operators (40 replies) were neutral, followed by 30.1% (38 replies) who held no opinion on the subject ( Figure 48 and Table 52 , p.157). This distribution implies that, although overt criticism of coherence is limited, there is no strong consensus affirming it either, possibly reflecting limited awareness of the interplay between the Directives or mixed experiences with their practical application. Along the same lines, while 39.1% of the OPC respondents (262 replies) agree that the objectives of the Directives were met coherently 284 , nearly have of the respondents remain neutral 285 or uncertain - 26.9% expressed neutral views (180 replies), while 21.2% selected the “don’t know” option (142 replies) - and 12.84% explicitly disagree. The overall distribution of replies suggest that clarity about the objectives is still not universal and many may lack sufficient familiarity or practical experience to form a strong view ( Figure 49 and Table 53 , p. 158).

While ECA (2023) found the objectives in the Directives contradictory, the evaluation shows that the Directives are not incoherent, but rather that their interpretation and application poses difficulties for stakeholders -which is consistent with the findings in Section 4.1.1.1. These difficulties can be explained by the application of the Directives in combination with additional national legislation. With regards to the objectives of public procurement these have remained broadly coherent. The broadening of procurement policy objectives by additional sectoral legislation 286 did, however, increase the complexity of EU procurement rules to be applied by contracting authorities and economic operators, as also highlighted by ECA (2023) 287 and as further developed in Section 4.1.3.2 below.

4.1.3.2External coherence

The EU public procurement legislative framework, traditionally regulating procedural rules for contracts over certain value, has been expanded over the last years, to include numerous legal instruments at the EU level (directives and regulations) with substantial requirements on public procurement 288 .

These overlapping legal frameworks—ranging from energy and defence to digital and environmental regulation—have added new layers of complexity to an already intricate system, triggering its fragmentation. As a result, contracting authorities and economic operators face growing difficulties in interpreting and applying the rules consistently, which risks undermining legal clarity, compliance, and the coherence of public procurement as a policy tool 289 .

According to Janssen, W.A. (2025), the problems related to coherence between the Directives (2014/24/EU, 2014/23/EU and 2014/25/EU) and other EU legislative instruments regulating public procurement can be divided into two levels:

·The first level concerns issues such as: incoherency in use of terminology (e.g. use of distinct definitions of “life-cycle” in Regulation 2024/1781 and Directive 2014/24/EU) and scope (e.g. public procurement requirements in Directive 2023/1791 apply also to procedures below the thresholds of the Directives and to certain purchases that are excluded from them); absence of appropriate cross-references to the Directives, unclear substantive overlap without legal conflict (as between Article 18(2) Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 9 Minimum Wage Directive 2022/2041), or differences in reporting and monitoring requirements 290 . In addition, while some of these additional instruments cover Concessions, other do not, without any clear rationale.

·The second level of concerns relates to incoherence in terms of legal conflict, meaning that conflicting legal obligations between the Directives and other legislative instruments lead to violations of EU law when applied concurrently (as e.g. the inclusion of a compliance with due diligence requirements in the Corporate Sustainability Due Dilligence Directive 2024/1760 creates a legal incoherence with the “link to the subject matter” requirement under the Directives). 291

With regards to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Directives are coherent and do not represent a significant impact - neither positive nor negative.

During the OPC, stakeholders expressed concerns over the coherence of the 2014 procurement Directives with procurement rules contained in sectoral legislation that emerged over the past years, with 36.9% of respondents (248 replies) disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that these rules are coherent 292 and only 10.9% (73 replies) supporting the view of coherence between the Directives and sectoral legislation ( Figure 52 and Table 56 , p. 161). On the other hand, stakeholders did not express strong views on either the coherence between defence and security procurement legislation (Directive 2009/81/EC) and the Directives or the coherence of the Directives with the legislation on remedies, with many respondents having no opinion on these two matters.

Altaee (2025) too underlined that public procurement experts highlighted the complexity stemming from the expanding body of sectoral legislation, which introduces additional green and social requirements that public buyers must follow in addition to the 2014 procurement Directives. According to Altaee (2025), this fragmentation, with no clear mechanism for coherence or hierarchy, risks overwhelming those responsible for public procurement and diluting the impact of policies. 293

Similarly, the European Committee of the Regions in a recent report 294 underlines that the scope of EU public procurement rules extending beyond the Directives and including sector-specific (vertical) as well as horizontal regulations and directives has created a complex framework for local and regional authorities to navigate, especially in certain sectors 295 .

4.1.3.3Conclusions - coherence

During the evaluated period the Directives remained consistent between them, albeit their interpretation has suffered from some inconsistencies. While only limited issues concerning the internal coherence of the Directives were thus identified, the introduction of numerous procurement provisions in other legal acts has led to a fragmentation of the regulatory framework, causing concerns regarding legal coherence and applicability. Moreover, the scope of the procurement rules has become increasingly uncertain for users as a result.

4.2How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?

The primary objective of harmonising public procurement in the EU was to create a level playing field for businesses across the EU, ensuring fair competition, delivering best value for money, and promoting the free movement of goods and services. Given this objective, it can be said that the Directives have brought tangible benefits that would have been difficult for Member States to achieve individually: the continued harmonisation of public procurement rules at EU level has played an important role in creating a more equitable and transparent environment for both public authorities and economic operators. The Directives also provide a solid, common basis for creating strategic leverage for public procurement as a policy instrument. Given the importance of public procurement in today's economic and political, the objectives and needs addressed by the European public procurement Directives continue to justify action at EU level.

4.3Is the intervention still relevant?

This section analyses the extent to which the 2014 Directives are still relevant in 2025. This assessment takes place against the background of a changed geopolitical situation, shifting global trade patterns, a loss of economic competitiveness in the EU, the need to ensure the stability and resilience of the EU’s economic infrastructure and to promote sustainability, among other things.

4.3.1Scope

The objectives set in 2014 to improve legal certainty and clarity remain highly relevant today. As a public investment tool, public procurement offers considerable potential for contributing to a more integrated and stronger single market, but this requires a clear regulatory framework.

The objective of providing legal certainty is particularly relevant in a context where certain legal measures introduced in 2014 are still being questioned today. For example, the rules on public-public cooperation and internal public procurement appear to be among the most contested areas as regards the scope of the Directives. Only 18.5% of respondents to the OPC (125 replies) considered these rules to be still relevant and appropriate, while a much larger proportion (39.3%, 166 replies) disagreed, including half of public authorities (98 replies) and 43 out of 48 trade unions (Figure 28 and Table 32 , p. 130). This significant gap reflects ongoing concerns about the clarity, scope or practical application of these provisions, suggesting that the current legal framework may not fully reflect the operational realities or evolving needs of public authorities, in particular at local and regional level, that are engaging in such forms of public cooperation.

The proliferation in recent years of legislative acts containing public procurement provisions has led to concerns among contracting authorities and economic operators, who are finding it increasingly difficult to interpret and apply the rules correctly, confirming the continued importance of ensuring legal clarity and certainty. As already discussed in Section 4.1.3.2 this is also reflected in the results of the OPC, where only 10.9% of respondents (73 replies) considered that EU sectoral legislation was consistent with the 2014 Directives ( Figure 52 , p. 161). Such uncertainty and inconsistency can undermine the attainment of the strategic goals underlying the sectoral acts, hindering efforts to drive sustainability and innovation and to deliver public value.

4.3.2Procedural aspects

The objectives set out in 2014 to make procurement procedures simpler and more flexible appear more important than ever.

Indeed, 47.9% of OPC respondents (398 replies) believe that the Directives’ rules aimed at increasing procedural flexibility (e.g. the choice of available procedures, time limits for submitting offers, contract modifications) are no longer fit for purpose. Negative opinions in this respect are especially pronounced among public authorities (54.8%, 108 replies) and trade unions (49 out of 51 replies), while business associations and firms expressed more mixed views 296 ( Figure 16 and Table 20 , p. 116).

Feedback collected from stakeholders suggests that the procurement system has not always proved agile enough for public buyers to anticipate and respond to supply disruptions. The existent procedures have turned out to be sometimes too complex and insufficiently flexible to manage risks. Contracting authorities have not been able to respond to price shocks or strategic dependencies 297 .

The current framework does not seem adequate to deal with possible security challenges such as cybersecurity 298 , non-defence security, as well as with crisis situations, especially in case of prolonged crises. OPC respondents echoed this concern. When asked whether the Directives are fit for purpose in situations of supply-chain disruptions (e.g. during a health, energy, or security crisis) 43.9% disagreed 299 (297 replies) – the disagreement was most prevalent among firms (51.6%, 64 replies) and business associations (48.6%, 53 replies). Finally, academic institutions were even stronger in their views on the Directives no longer being fit for purpose in case of major supply shortages with 60.6% (20) negative replies ( Figure 56 and Table 60 , p. 166).

In terms of procedural set-up, the current legal framework has proven to be rigid and complex, particularly with regard to the documents required by contracting authorities. This is exacerbated by additional requirements stemming from additional sectoral legislation or national rules (see Section 4.3.4 below). Finally, the insufficient relevance of the current procedural set-up should be considered in the context of governance objectives (see Section 4.3.5 below), namely transparency, prevention of corruption and anti-competitive practices, integrity and professionalisation.

4.3.3Market access

The objectives set for 2014, as well as the relevance and adequacy of EU rules on market access, are among the most debated issues nearly ten years after the adoption of the Directives. In terms of market access objectives, the issue of cross-border procurement remains central, as public procurement is one of the driving forces behind the single market, enabling companies to participate in public contracts in other Member States.

The Directives’ rules on eProcurement are broadly seen as relevant and adequate in facilitating market access. Nearly half of OPC respondents (49.2%, 335 replies) supported this view, including two-thirds of public authorities (125 replies), more than half of firms (70 replies), and 45.9% of business associations (50 replies), while only a small minority (13.8%, 94 replies) expressed disagreement or strong disagreement ( Figure 25 and Table 29 , p. 127). This positive balance suggests that the eProcurement provisions have largely met stakeholders’ expectations and continue to serve as an effective tool for enhancing transparency, reducing administrative burdens, and improving access to procurement opportunities while fighting irregular practices ( Figure 25 , p. 126).

The Directives’ rules on market access for companies from other EU countries are generally viewed today as relevant and adequate, with 38.1% of respondents expressing agreement. While a smaller share (23.1%) disagrees, the difference indicates a moderately positive perception of the current framework ( Figure 26 , p.128). This suggests that, although the rules are seen as broadly fit for purpose to ensure fair access to the EU public procurement market, there may still be practical or structural barriers limiting the full effectiveness.

However, views on the Directives’ rules concerning market access for companies from non-EU countries differ from the above-mentioned positive perception. Only 16.1% of OPC respondents (109 replies) considered the rules on market access for companies from third countries to be still relevant and adequate, while a significantly larger share (36.3%, 246 replies) disagreed. In particular, the majority of contracting authorities disagreed with such statement (52.6%, 103 replies), while among business associations and companies the lack of relevance and adequacy of the current rules was shared by 39.6% (42 replies) and 37.3% (47 replies), respectively. 91.7% of trade unions and 45.5% (15 replies) of academic institutions indicated neutral views ( Figure 27 and Table 31 , p. 129). During consultations, contracting authorities indicated that they often face uncertainty in relation to the access to the EU public procurement markets of economic operators originating from third countries with which the EU does not have international commitments, with doubts among different stakeholders remain regarding the participation of economic operators from such third countries.

According to Altaee (2025), several Member States expressed concern on the dependence on external suppliers 300 . The same source reports that the Directives have not helped in reducing dependence on non-EU suppliers for critical materials and technology, a strategic necessity to secure economic and strategic autonomy given the current changing geopolitical landscape. Asked whether the Directives are fit for purpose to contribute to the EU’s strategic autonomy, including the security of EU supply chains, OPC respondents show a predominantly critical perception: 49.3% of respondents disagree (337 replies), compared to only 11.8% (81 replies) who agreed 301 . The disagreement was most prevalent among business associations (57.8%, 63 replies), firms (53.5%, 69 replies) and academic institutions (45.5%, 15 replies). Trade unions were even stronger in their views – 49 out of 51 believe the Directives are no longer fit for purpose to contribute to the EU’s strategic autonomy ( Figure 54 and Table 58 , p. 75). Moreover, the written contributions respondents explained that the Directives lack mechanisms to address strategic dependencies; particularly the reliance on single-country suppliers from countries outside the EU for essential goods emerges as a critical gap of the current framework in terms of market access.

4.3.4Strategic objectives

The objective set in 2014, which was to advance strategic objectives using legal tools, encouraging the consideration of environmental, innovative and social aspects in public procurement, while striving to minimise potential negative effects, remains highly relevant today given the geopolitical, competitiveness and climate challenges that the EU is facing.

The strategic objectives are generally regarded by the stakeholders as relevant and adequate, though the level of support varies across themes. The rules supporting green procurement receive a moderately positive assessment as regards their relevance and adequacy today, with 39.3% of respondents (273 replies) 302  in agreement and 32% (222 replies) 303  disagreeing ( Figure 35 and Table 39 , p. 139). Socially responsible procurement rules enjoy even stronger support, with 42.9% of respondents (296 replies) 304 finding them relevant and adequate, against 34% (235 replies) 305 holding an opposite opinion ( Figure 36 and Table 40 , p. 140). The rules designed to foster innovation (such as innovation partnerships and competitive dialogue) receive an almost evenly split assessment: 32.2% (222 replies) 306 consider them adequate, while 31.9% (220 replies) 307  disagree or strongly disagree ( Figure 37 , p. 141).

More generally, the overall framework of the Directives for supporting strategic procurement—such as through the use of quality criteria—is viewed with cautious approval. A smaller share of OPC respondents (35.1%, 242 replies) 308 agrees that these rules remain relevant and adequate, compared to 42.2% who disagree (291 replies) 309 . This narrow margin reflects a degree of ambivalence among stakeholders: while many recognise the potential of MEAT and similar tools to promote value-based and strategic outcomes, others may find their practical application complex or insufficiently impactful ( Figure 38 and Table 42 , p. 142). These results suggest that, while the strategic provisions of the Directives are broadly seen as conceptually sound, their practical effectiveness may vary depending on the stakeholder group and the specific objective pursued. 

Building on the previous sections, while the existing strategic objectives remain relevant, new priorities have emerged alongside social, environmental and innovation aspects. In the policy guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, the President of the European Commission emphasized that the revision of public procurement must allow for the introduction of a European preference approach in certain strategic sectors, alongside the current objectives. These efforts would bolster the initiatives under the Clean Industrial Deal and support the development of a strong and resilient market base, including for lead markets where concrete measures on the demand side are needed to build a business case for decarbonised products, ensuring security of supply with critical, crisis-relevant products. These new strategic objectives, driven largely by geopolitical developments such as supply chain disruption, have been repeatedly highlighted by stakeholders in various consultations and the OPC.

4.3.5Governance

The governance objectives set for 2014, namely transparency and anti-corruption, integrity and professionalisation, remain highly relevant today. On transparency (e.g. EU-wide publication via TED), the OPC respondents expressed a positive view 47.7% (325 replies) 310  believe the rules remain adequate and relevant, while only 19.9% consider them no longer fit for purpose ( Figure 17 and Table 21 , p. 117). Less favourable views were expressed regarding the current rules on monitoring (e.g. the quality of data provided in TED), with only 25.3% of respondents (173 replies) considering them still relevant and adequate, compared to 28.9% (190 replies) 311 who view them as no longer fit for purpose ( Figure 18 and Table 22 , p. 118). Finally, the Directives' rules on integrity (e.g. exclusion grounds, conflict of interest rules) are considered still relevant and adequate by 42% of respondents (289 replies), in contrast to 33.2% (224 replies) who disagree or strongly disagree with this view ( Figure 19 and  Table 23 , p. 119). 

4.3.6Conclusions - Relevance

The 2014 Directives and the objectives they aimed to achieve remain highly relevant today, and in some cases even more so than in 2014. In particular, the need to simplify public procurement is even more important today, given Europe’s competitiveness challenges. Likewise, rolling out sustainable works, products and services is even more urgent today than it was in 2014 given accelerated climate change and wider environmental challenges. In the current geopolitical context, the 2014 objective of fostering an integrated internal market has become increasingly important for securing Europe’s strategic autonomy and economic security amid growing global challenges. New needs have arisen in this regard since 2014 as a result of geopolitical developments.

5What are the conclusions and lessons learned?

5.1Overall conclusions

The 2014 Directives have been partially effective in reaching their stated objectives.

Firstly, regarding legal clarity and scope, the introduction of new concepts and the interaction between the three legal instruments have created new challenges in terms of interpretation. As for the rules on appropriate actors, the Directives have not reduced uncertainty, as the new provisions lacked legal clarity. With regards to defining the scope of the Directives, the new light regime did not lead to greater legal certainty. For utilities, the Directives brought some improvement with the clarification of the derogation system. The Directives have increased legal certainty with regards to concessions. The proliferation of procurement provisions in sectoral legislative texts has created concerns regarding legal clarity and coherence of these provisions with the 2014 Directives.

Secondly, with regard to simplification and streamlining of the procedures, the 2014 Directives have only partially been effective in this objective. Although several procedures were introduced, these have not translated into practical flexibility. The 2014 Directives mainly translated flexibility into a large number of procedures, rather than into an ability to adapt to unpredictable situations or to negotiate the best outcomes for the public contracts. However, certain sectors have leveraged the mechanisms strengthened by the Directives to aggregate demand. Even a decade on, majority of respondents to the OPC survey do not believe that the Directives have established simpler rules for EU public procurement, with only less than 1 in 5 stating otherwise. The roll-out of eProcurement has supported simplification efforts, even if some of the tools introduced, in particular the ESPD, have not achieved their intended objectives.

Thirdly, with regard to competition and market outcomes, the 2014 Directives have been partly effective in maintaining competition in EU public procurement. While the average number of bids per procedure dropped from more than 5 to above 3, contracts exceeding EUR 20 million received an average of around 9 bids, the use of open procedures increased to 82% and the supplier base remains diversified. However, the Directives did not alter the single-bid phenomenon, with the proportion of single-bidder procedures increasing by 3.8% on average, and little impact on the use of direct awards, which noted a minor decrease. SMEs have seen increased access to public procurement, in line with their overall share in the economy, as the Directives have encouraged SME participation by providing tools to facilitate the division of contracts into lots.

Fourthly, as far as direct cross-border participation is concerned it remained relatively stable in terms of market share with less than 5% of contracts awarded directly to firms established in other EU Member States or third countries. However, this relatively low figure does not capture the full complexity of the underlying value chains – the latter is better expressed by indirect cross-border procurement, which represents around 20% of total procurement, with significant variations across sectors.

Fifthly, with regard to promoting strategic public procurement (green, social, innovative), the Directives have been partially effective. The voluntary approach chosen in 2014, which was a major innovation introduced by the Directives, allowed Member States and contracting authorities to pursue strategic policy objectives through procurement procedures and to tailor the rules to their policy objectives and specific context, but led to uneven uptake across the EU. Green public procurement is implemented unevenly. The uptake of socially responsible public procurement has gained traction. The uptake of innovative public procurement is limited in practice, representing a marginal share of the total value and volume of public procurement. The adoption of sustainable and innovation procurement provisions in sectoral legislation raises stakeholder concerns about a lack of coherent rules.

Sixth, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the 2014 Directives in terms of governance. Effective public procurement governance relies on the availability of reliable and comparable data. However, data gaps and quality issues remain widespread, both at EU and national level. This undermines the transparency and integrity of the system and renders the prevention of corruption and the detection of bid-rigging practices more difficult, as well as the ability of Member States to steer public procurement in line with wide policy objectives. The integration of data above and below EU thresholds remains a challenge, with initiatives such as the PPDS still at an early stage. The ambition to foster a procurement environment of integrity and professionalisation remains unevenly realized. As the developments in the last decade have increased complexity of aligning public procurement with strategic policy objectives and external pressures such as geopolitical instability and technological challenges, professionalization has become increasingly important.

In terms of overall efficiency, the evaluation concluded that while the rules entail direct administrative costs, these are lower than before the 2014 reform (on average at 0.9% of the contract value compared to 1.4% earlier). From a broader perspective, while indirect costs largely take the form of missed opportunities, they appear to be, to a large extent, offset by the indirect benefits generated by the Directives, including enhanced transparency and accountability achieved through eProcurement tools. Overall, the evaluation concluded that the EU public procurement system generates net benefits.

While limited issues with the internal coherence of the Directives were identified, the introduction of numerous procurement provisions in other legal acts has led to a fragmentation of the regulatory framework, causing concerns regarding legal coherence and applicability.

The evaluation confirmed that the above objectives remain highly relevant, particularly given today’s competitiveness challenges. If anything, the objectives to simplify rules and reduce administrative burden as well as to pursue strategic policy objectives have become more important than they were in 2014. New rules have also arisen notably as regards EU strategic autonomy and economic security.

As discussed in Annex II, while certain limitations are acknowledged, the robustness of the findings presented in this evaluation is considered satisfactory.

In conclusion, the 2014 Directives have partially met their intended objectives.

5.2Lessons learned

The 2014 Directives established rules on how to procure goods, services and works that were designed to ensure fair competition and deliver best value for money while optimising societal outcomes and aid the fight against corruption. While these objectives have been partially achieved, the procedural rules are widely perceived as complex and insufficiently flexible to allow contracting authorities to effectively pursue their public investment goals. The inclusion of procurement provisions in sector-specific EU legislation and their interplay with the 2014 Directives has moreover resulted in concerns over regulatory coherence and consistency, further complicating public procurement.

With the 2014 reform, public procurement legislation has become a tool to pursue strategic policy objectives. While the implementation of strategic procurement across Member States is uneven, green, innovative and social procurement continue to be strategic priorities, as underlined in the Clean Industrial Deal and the Competitiveness Compass.

The procurement framework is moreover under pressure to accommodate new strategic priorities, such as economic security and strategic autonomy. Market access inequalities however persist, with non-European companies at times allowed to participate in EU tenders without European companies benefiting from reciprocal market access. Recent geopolitical developments underscore the importance of procurement legislation supporting strategic autonomy.

Transparency and high-quality data are essential for effective governance, strategic decision-making and to fight corruption. The evaluation shows significant improvements in transparency but the existence of data gaps and low data quality at both the EU and national levels makes it difficult to direct public investment in line with policy objectives and to monitor procurement activities to prevent bid-rigging.

The continuous increase in the complexity of procurement over the evaluation period reinforces the need for highly qualified staff in contracting authorities. Past investments in the professionalization and capacity building of procurement personnel have had a positive impact but have not been sufficient to maximize strategic impacts and to achieve policy objectives.

These lessons indicate that the current public procurement framework is not sufficiently agile, coherent, and strategically oriented to effectively respond to both current and emerging challenges.

Annex IProcedural Information

1.Lead DG, Decide reference and, if relevant, Work Programme reference

DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW).

Decide entry PLAN/2024/2225.

2.Derogations granted and justification

Not applicable.

3.Organisation and timing

The evaluation report for the EU public procurement directives was planned for Q3 2025 on the Commission Work Programme 2025 312 . 

A call for evidence and an open public consultation run from 13.12.2024 to 7.03.2025.

Interservice Steering Group meetings took place on 5.11.24, 18.03.2025 and 9.07.2025.

The following Commissions services participated: DG AGRI, DG BUDG, DG CNECT, DG COMP, DG DEFIS, DG DIGIT, DG EAC, DG EMPL, DG ENV, DG ESTAT, DG FISMA, DG GROW, DG HERA, DG HOME, DG INTPA, JRC, DG MOVE, DG NEAR, DG REFORM, DG REGIO, DG RTD, DG SANTE, SG, SJ, DG TAXUD, DG TRADE.

In line with better regulation principles, an Interservice Consultation ran between 12.09.2025 and 25.09.2025. Where possible, all comments from the different Commission services were taken into account.

4.Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (if relevant) 

Not relevant.

5.Evidence used together with sources and any issues regarding its quality 

The analysis presented in this evaluation report is based on sources that are listed in Annex VII – Bibliography.

Annex IIMethodology 

As with any evaluations, the overall findings may differ across countries. Such differences have been pointed out to the fullest extent possible, within the constraints of the available data. As mentioned in Section 2.2, with regard to the main data sources used in this evaluation, the following points of reference are used:

·Da Rosa et al. (2025) compare data from 2013–2015 and 2016–2023, interpreted as before and after the 2014 Directives;

·Ecorys (2025) analyses 2006–2010 and 2017–2024, interpreted as before and after the 2014 Directives; in cases where more granular information is available, the report presents data on a yearly basis;

·World Bank (2025) report covers years 2018–2023.

The presented findings are based on a methodology combining various elements, such as:

·Data analysis: 

-Data analysis of TED across all Member States and selected national data, covering above- and below- EU threshold procurement [Ecorys (2025), World Bank (2025)].

-Data analysis of TED across all Member States covering above EU threshold procurement [Da Rosa, I. et al. (2025), Ecorys (2025), World Bank (2025)].

-Data analysis of TED data merged with third parties’ private datasets containing company financial information [Ecorys (2025)].

·Surveys, consultations:

-Online TED survey among contracting authorities and economic operators, including SMEs and start-ups, concerning public procurement contracts for which notices were published on TED during 2006–2010 and 2017–2024 [Ecorys (2025)]

-Online survey among Member States representatives concerning costs of IT infrastructure (i.e. in-house research).

-Online consultation carried out within the OPC and CfE (i.e. in-house research, see Annex V).

-Targeted in-person stakeholders’ consultations (i.e. in-house research, see Annex V).

-Workshops and interviews with procurement officials, business associations, and experts [Altaee (2025), Ecorys (2025)]. 

·Econometric models to investigate:

-the effects of the transposition of the 2014 Public Procurement Directives (simple OLS regression models) [Ecorys (2025)] 313 .

-the temporary effects of contracting authorities’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic (a nearest-neighbour matching approach, which calculated the average treatment effect (ATE) of the ‘treatment’ variable on the outcome variable of interest) [Ecorys (2025)] 314 .

·Case studies of specific contexts and practices [Ecorys (2025)].

·Trend analysis comparing results with the 2011 Impact Assessment accompanying the legislative proposal [Ecorys (2025), World Bank (2025)].

·Desk research [Caranta, R. (2025), Jansens, W.A. (2025), in-house research].

Methodology for estimates on the total government expenditure on public procurement

The following section explains the methodology used in this evaluation to estimate the government expenditure on public procurement and its subcomponents. The main source of data used in the Evaluation for the above purpose was the annual government finance statistics (GFS) data collected by Eurostat on the basis of the European System of Accounts (ESA2010) transmission programme. As defined in ESA2010, paragraph 2.111: “The general government sector (S.13) consists of institutional units which are non-market producers whose output is intended for individual and collective consumption, and are financed by compulsory payments made by units belonging to other sectors, and institutional units principally engaged in the redistribution of national income and wealth”.

Government total expenditure comprises several categories, out of which the following three items can be used to estimate the government expenditure on works, goods and services:

·P.2, “intermediate consumption”: the purchase of goods and services by government 315 ;

·P.51g, “gross fixed capital formation”: consists of acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed assets during a given period plus certain additions to the value of non-produced assets realised by the productive activity of producer or institutional units. Fixed assets are tangible or intangible assets produced as outputs from processes of production that are themselves used repeatedly, or continuously, in processes of production for more than one year 316 ;

·D.632_PAY, “social transfers in kind - purchased market production, expenditure” 317 .

In plain words, the general government procurement is defined as the sum of intermediate consumption (goods and services purchased by governments for their own use, such as accounting or information technology services), gross fixed capital formation (acquisition of capital excluding sales of fixed assets, such as building new roads) and social transfers in kind via market producers (purchases by general government of goods and services produced by market producers and supplied to households).

Two ways to measure the the time-effectiveness of procurement procedures 318

There are two main ways to understand and measure the time-effectiveness of procurement procedures, and they capture different dimensions of the process:

·Time actually spent working on the procedure (person-days):

This approach measures the active effort required from staff to process a procurement file. It includes the hours or days people (either on behalf of the economic operators or contracting authorities) spend on tasks such as drafting tender documents, collecting and evaluating bids, handling clarifications, and preparing award decisions. Expressed in person-days, this is a direct measure of administrative burden, as it reflects the real resources (staff time and, indirectly, salary costs) dedicated to the procedure.

·Time elapsed between the submission deadline and the contract award (calendar days):

This approach looks at the overall duration of the procedure, measured in days from the deadline for submitting offers until the contract award. It may include periods where no one is actively working on the file (e.g., waiting for approvals, internal scheduling gaps, holidays). This measure is more indirect, as it reflects how long the process takes from an external perspective (e.g. for suppliers waiting for results), but it does not capture how intensively the contracting authority is engaged during that period.

In practice, the two indicators are complementary:

·Person-days capture the internal effort and direct costs of running a procedure.

·Calenda days reflect the external efficiency and speed of the process, which matter for market responsiveness and planning by suppliers.

A procedure can therefore be fast in terms of staff effort but still very long overall if there are many “empty days,” or conversely, it can be fast but resource-intensive if many people work on it over a short period.

Triennial reporting

This evaluation draws from the contributions foreseen under the Triennial reporting that Member States submitted 319 during the most recent reporting period covering the time between 1 January 2021 and 31 December 2023. In the context of the above obligations, the Commission received reports from 27 EU Member States, as well as one report from Norway as a member of the European Economic Area (EEA).

As a general observation, with the new reporting template developed by the European Commission, the national reports have provided more quantitative data than in the previous monitoring period. Although comparability has improved thanks to the standardisation of national reports, difficulties remain in aggregating the data, since the responses from the Member States may emphasise certain points and omit others while statistical difficulties at national level hinder exhaustive reporting.

Collection of data on the cost and duration of procedures

In 2022 and 2025, two similar surveys were run based on information on awarded contract published on TED, referred to as data covering 2019-2024. Both studies resulted in the following turnout: data on characteristics of contracting authorities and winners are available for 4,746 respondents, qualitative data on procurements for 1,480 respondents and quantitative data on costs for several hundred respondents. On costs, combined 2019-2024 data are available for 215 contracting authorities and 422 winners of public contracts.

Dedicated external studies

The following dedicated studies were commissioned to external consultant in order to support the work on the evaluation of the Directives:

·Altaee (2025). Evaluation of the EU public procurement directives – Study on relevance and EU added value, Altaee written by Samira Bousetta, July 2025 ( https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/3480868 ).

·Caranta, R. (2025). Coherence in the EU public procurement directives. A study into the internal coherence between the objectives, the principles and the provisions in the EU public procurement and concessions directives, University of Turin, 2025, ( https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/3304248 ).

·Da Rosa, I., Tátrai, T., Tresó, D. (2025). Evaluation of Transparency and Integrity, 2014 Public Procurement Directives, ( https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/9217244 ).

·Ecorys (2025), Cost-Benefit Analysis on the Quality and Efficiency of Public Procurement Procedures, Final Report, European Commission: Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Ecorys, Publication Office, 2025 (publication pending).

·Janssen, W.A. (2025), The coherence of public procurement legislation in the European Union. A Study for the EU Commission into the external coherence between the public procurement directives and other legislative instruments regulating public procurement, Utrecht University & University of Groningen ( https://data/europa.eu/doi/10.2873/7419429 ).

·World Bank (2025), European Union: Competition in Public Procurement, © World Bank (publication pending).

A complete bibliography is provided in Annex VIII.

Robustness and limitation of findings

The robustness of finding presented in this evaluation is considered satisfactory, although certain limitations are acknowledged and discussed below. In particular, the following limitations should be mentioned regarding the data quality 320 :

·Completeness of below-threshold data varies significantly across Member States. In countries where tenders are not systematically published or are only partially available, the comparability of above/below threshold analyses is weakened. Secondly, the heterogeneity of the national sources may result in imperfect de-duplication between national sources and TED despite efforts undertaken by the consultant.

·The 2023–2024 introduction of eForms caused additional challenges in terms of ensuring continuous reporting, coverage and coherence. The quality of the final dataset may be imperfect despite efforts undertaken by the consultant.

·TED faces several data quality issues, particularly information about the winning company and contract values. With regard to the latter, errors such as missing amounts, or exceptionally high or low figures suggesting data entry mistakes or incomplete reporting are frequent. Additionally, practices for estimating contract values vary across Member States, reducing comparability and affecting the reliability of aggregated analyses. To address these issues, consultants were asked to perform data cleaning and validation before use. Yet, the quality of the final dataset may be imperfect despite efforts undertaken by the consultant.

Secondly, the following limitations should be mentioned regarding the surveys 321 :

·The survey achieved a low response rate (1–2%), potentially introducing non-response bias. 

·No survey responses were collected on concessions due to the lack of available concession data.

·Responses may have been influenced by recall bias, especially for tenders from earlier years or when respondents had changed roles or organisations. To reduce this risk, the survey focused on tenders awarded between early 2022 and the end of 2024.

Thirdly, the following limitations should be mentioned regarding the methodological approach 322 :

·Causal inference: although econometric techniques were applied to control for confounding factors, the observational nature of the data limits the ability to establish causal relationships. Unobserved or omitted variables may still affect the results, requiring cautious interpretation.

·Quantification of benefits: certain benefits and costs, particularly those linked to strategic, social, or environmental objectives, could not be fully monetised or quantified.

·Comparability over time: shifts in procurement practices, changes in legal frameworks, and external shocks (e.g., COVID-19, security crisis) during the 2014–2024 period may limit comparability across years and Member States.

Annex IIIEvaluation matrix and answers to the evaluation questions

Table 1: Evaluation matrix

Annex IVOverview of benefits and costs 

Table 2: Overview of costs and benefits identified in the evaluation

Table 3: Simplification and burden reduction (savings already achieved)

Table 4: Potential simplification and burden reduction (savings)

This estimate is based on the generalisation of the conclusions of a study by Utrecht University 341 on a national public procurement data space in the Netherlands, which is based on three mechanisms: (i) increased competition through better access for buyers to market information; (ii) enhanced intergovernmental cooperation through opportunities for joint procurement; and (iii) reduced favouritism and corruption through greater transparency. This assumption is largely confirmed by the Commission's survey on eProcurement systems 342 and related costs in Member States, carried out as part of its evaluation: respondents report that eProcurement delivers multiple benefits—most notably higher participation—which typically strengthens competitive outcomes.

For the Netherlands, the study calculated potential annual savings of between €140 million and €465 million. In the context of total public procurement expenditure in the Netherlands in 2023, which amounted to €116 billion, this equates to savings of between 0.12% and 0.40%. Taking the Netherlands as a benchmark for medium size population Member States, and comparing this result with estimates for :

·Member States with a small population: Finland. A 2024 study 343 estimated that implementing advanced eProcurement measures could lead to annual savings of €100 million. Given Finland's annual public procurement expenditure of around €45 billion, this estimation is around 0.25%

·Member States with a large population: Italy. Consip (the national central purchasing body) estimates around €4.0 billion in annual savings from its eProcurement instruments in 2024 344 , benchmarked against Italy’s public procurement expenditure of roughly €251 billion (11.8% of 2023 GDP of €2.128 trillion), this corresponds to about 1.6% of total procurement

In order to obtain a single benchmark figure, we calculate a weighted average based on the purchases of these three standardised estimates. Using the median values for the Netherlands (0.26%), Finland (0.22%) and Italy (1.6%), the weighted average is approximately 1.07%. However, it is to be highlighted that this is an estimate: results will vary depending on the size of each country, its governance model and, above all, the degree of digital adoption, centralisation.

Annex VStakeholders’ consultation 

This Annex documents key consultation activities conducted in the context of the evaluation of the Directives.

Aa number of meetings with stakeholders took place between 2024 and 2025, including meetings with Member States as part of the Commission Expert group on Public Procurement (EXPP), Commission Multi-Stakeholders Expert group on e- Procurement (EXEP), Commission Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement (SEGPP), as summarised below.

Commission Expert Group on Public Procurement (EXPP)

The EXPP meet on seven occasions to discuss the evaluation of the public procurement directives: 4 July 2024, 14 November 2024, 31 January 2025, 27 March 2025, and 11 June 2025.

Commission multi-Stakeholder Group on Public Procurement (EXEP)

The EXPP meet on three occasions to discuss the evaluation of the public procurement directives among other topics: 27 & 29 November 2024, 6 February 2025, and 5 & 6 June 2025.

Commission Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement (SEGPP)

With the occasion of the evaluation of the public procurement directives, the Commission renewed the mandate of the SEGPP. This group met on three occasions to discuss the evaluation as well as future opportunities for improvement: 12 February 2025, 15 April 2025, 17 June 2025.

Survey among Member States concerning eProcurement IT Systems

As part of the evaluation, a survey among Member States was conducted in July 2025 to understand the costs associated with the setup and maintenance of the eProcurement systems. The survey aimed to determine the level of investments made by the Member States in connection with the introduction of electronic public procurement systems, covering both one-off investments related to the development and implementation of the software, and recurring investments associated with their maintenance and staffing costs.

The Commission received responses from 14 Member States (BE, HR, DK, EE, FI, FR DE, HU, LV, MT, RO, SK, SI, SE) and Norway. All EU countries reported recent substantial investments in eProcurement systems between the year 2023 and now ( Table 5 ) hence since the entry into application of eForms. Except for one Member State that outsources this service to private providers, 12 countries use state owned system or a combination of publicly and privately owned systems (e.g. eProcurement system(s) run by governmental agencies or CPBs).

Table 5: Year in which the last major investment in the eProcurement system was completed

Source: In-house survey among Member States, July 2025.

Selected quotes received from the Member States:

-“The new platform is modern, intuitive, and actively maintained and supported, which has significantly improved user satisfaction. We now have an integrated platform that is continuously evolving into an end-to-end platform, supporting our users throughout both the pre- and post-award phases of the tendering process.”

-“The increased integration between different phases, the availability of more functionalities, and greater visibility encourages users to use the platform more frequently and more effectively. As a result, both users and policymakers are starting to gain access to better-quality data.”

-“Although in 2023 users struggled to transition from previous standard notices to eForms, feedback from users about eForms and their ease of completion is now positive.”

-“The upgrade is primarily intended to make it easier for companies, especially SMEs, to find and participate in public tenders.”

-“As a bidder, users will experience improved search functionality, allowing them to search all tenders and expected procurements from Danish authorities – including EU tenders. The new user interface makes it easy and clear to search for tenders, even on mobile.”

-“Once-Only Principle: the system […] enables for the transfer of entered data through all stages of public procurement, including transferring data from the procurement plan to the preliminary consultation (if published) and to the public procurement procedure (procurement documentation).”

-“Other benefits are high user satisfaction and efficiency gains by the CAs compared to manual email competitions. Also, the usage of joint procurement has grown although we have no evidence of the effect of our systems.”

-“[…] there was a shift away from manually checking notices before publication, transitioning to automated system validations, which enables faster publication of eForms (3 working days were reduced to immediate publishing after approval of the eForm (below-threshold) or publication in the EU OJ (above-threshold)).”

-“In the long term, the aggregation of [national] data with European data (via PPDS) can attract more EU bidders and make procurements more competitive.”

-“…both at the EU and national levels, consistent benefits are anticipated: cost and time savings due to automation, increased transparency and accountability, better access for companies, and high-quality data for decision-making.”

-“The introduction of eForms is the single largest external cost driver over the past five years, but also an investment in future security, competitiveness and long-term market position.”

-“The use of e-procurement systems brings several significant advantages, both operational and strategic, that strengthen the efficiency, transparency and quality of the entire purchasing process. Digitalization means efficiency and time savings. By automating central parts such as tender management, contract follow-up and evaluation, manual work is reduced and procurement times are shortened. Digital systems also bring a higher degree of transparency and legal certainty.”

-“The obligation […] to use e-procurement systems […] has positively impacted procurement efficiency. It drove the creation of a new business sector for eProcurement system providers through a free-market approach, leading to dozens of companies offering diverse solutions to contracting authorities. This created jobs and a dynamic, competitive ecosystem benefiting both providers and buyers.”

-“Publishing calls for tender digitally, accessible via any compatible browser, increased contract visibility and bid numbers, boosting competitiveness. SMEs, in particular, gained access to opportunities they previously lacked the resources to monitor. Public buyers benefited from receiving more bids, reducing procurement costs, and identifying alternative solutions to meet their needs.”

-“Digitising procurement, using eProcurement platforms for document and information exchange, reduced costs for operators submitting applications and bids while cutting paper use, conserving natural resources, and protecting the environment.”

-“Mandatory eProcurement enabled access to extensive procurement contract data, aiding anti-corruption efforts by identifying risks, such as repeated awards to the same operators. Open data access promotes transparency, allowing citizens, journalists, and researchers to monitor public fund use and policy commitments. This data simplifies litigation by providing judges and claimants with verification means and supports public procurement monitoring, contributing to policy development and impact studies.”

-“Public procurement data, available via the national open data portal […]helps operators, especially SMEs, identify trends and monitor opportunities such as contract end dates. Contracting authorities can identify buyers with similar procurements, aiding in sourcing, requirement definition, and tender preparation.”

Strategic Procurement Dialogues

Additionally, the Strategic Procurement Dialogues were carried out in the Member States between May 2023 and November 2024. The objective of this project was to provide a dialogue between key stakeholders on the use of public procurement as a lever for innovative and sustainable public policy development. As part of this project 23 workshops have been organised. The workshops were structured to address three core areas of strategic public procurement (green procurement, social procurement, public procurement of innovation). Overall, about 700 stakeholders (public buyers at central, regional and local level, trade associations, public bodies, etc.) took part in the workshops. The project ended in January 2025 with a final conference which was designed to showcase the findings and perspectives that have emerged from the conducted workshops, with an emphasis on the developed roadmaps or action plans developed by Member States. A Community of Platform has been created on the Public Buyers Community Platform to share information and know how between participants about strategic procurement.

Targeted consultations

Commission Expert Group on Social Economy and Social Enterprise

A targeted consultation with the Commission Expert Group on Social Economy and Social Enterprise (GECES) took place on 28 April 2024, following two previous meetings where GECES experts drafted a cohesive report to contribute to the evaluation and revision of the Directives. The report highlights that while the Directives have partially succeeded in enabling procurers to use public procurement to support common societal goals, several barriers remain: fear of litigation, lack of training and advice services, and insufficient data. Additionally, although the current Directives have facilitated access to public procurement for social economy entities, some contracting authorities still lack knowledge of social provisions, and there is a need for greater legal clarity, as well as control and enforcement mechanisms. To address these issues, several suggestions were put forward, both on the legislative and non-legislative side.

On the legislative side, GECES recommends several changes to the Directives. These include establishing a minimum percentage of public procurement that shall be awarded through contracts reserved for the social economy, making the division into lots compulsory as of a certain contract value (to favour SMEs and Social Economy Entities participation), and introducing compulsory social and environmental aspects. Additionally, GECES suggests introducing production process-related criteria, such as governance and local anchorage, in the contract award criteria, and making the MEAT the standard logic in public tenders. Other recommendations include making price-revision clauses mandatory and attaching an updateable weighting system for social and environmental selection criteria to the Directive.

On the non-legislative side, GECES recommends several measures to support the effective implementation of the Directives. These include providing clarification on the meaning of "disabled and disadvantaged persons", creating a consultation and advice service on the use of SRPP, and supporting the creation of networks of "facilitators of social clauses". GECES also suggests creating a database at EU level of best practices, providing continuous training for Contracting Authorities, and annexing a model template for socially responsible public procurement to the new directive.

Rail Supply Industry Expert Group

A meeting with the Rail Supply Industry Expert Group took place on 11 December 2024. Participants represented both industry and public authorities operating in the rail sector. Participants expressed their concern about the proliferation of legal obligations affecting procurement coming from different legal acts, these are oftentimes contradictory and deter economic operators from engaging in procurement. The rail supply industry has experienced economic loses due to inflation as well as price dumping from third countries, that can undermine competition.

NGOs working on environment, human rights and social responsibility

Targeted consultation of NGOs working on environment, human rights and social responsibility took place on the 28 March 2025. Discussion was organised around a set of questions addressing environmental and social considerations in public procurement and in particular:

·barriers to supporting sustainability and social responsibility through public procurement as well as possible solutions to them,

·possible reconciliation of easier-to-apply public procurement rules for public buyers and suppliers (simplification) with strengthened environmental sustainability and social responsibility,

·possible streamlining of existing legislative framework regulating green and social aspects of public procurement.

Additional elements particularly considered in the discussion were labels and price (ensuring that the financial offer for a public contract is well balanced with strategic sustainability objectives and a high-quality delivery). Input provided by NGOs revealed that challenges to including environmental and social considerations in public procurement are of very various nature: certain very specific to green and social aspects, others of more general nature. In particular, NGOs indicated as main barriers: complex legal framework & legal uncertainty, lowest-price criteria dominance (preventing social enterprises from competing fairly), lack of a clear mandate for sustainability in procurement, limited capacity of contracting authorities, challenges related to the use of labels & due diligence, barriers to access public contracts for SMEs. In addition, NGOs proposed solutions to some of the identified problems.

Advisory group on Green Public Procurement

The meeting of the Advisory group on Green Public Procurement (GPP AG) during which the group was consulted on the evaluation of the Directives took place on the 10 July 2025. Discussion was organised around the questions specific to environmental aspects in public procurement, the same as the ones discussed during the NGO meeting but focused only on environment. The GPP AG members provided their input on identified barriers and problems on one hand, and on proposed solutions and recommendations to them on the other.

The most discussed subjects were the use of labels and their equivalence and data availability and reliability. Other subjects of discussion were: absence of a strategic approach to the GPP, limited procurers capacity, difficulties to regulate markets that are very dynamic, decrease of competition in public procurement, lack of market engagement, unclear legislation, complexity of issue of the link to the subject matter, lack of clear guidance and of carbon standards, administrative burden, failure of a one-size-fits-all method, lack of consideration of corporate sustainability responsibility.

Stakeholders active in the field of utilities and concessions

A targeted stakeholder consultation was held on 14 May 2025 with companies active in the utilities, concessions and energy sectors. The debate featured two open discussion sessions on the simplification needs of the current public procurement legal framework and the role of strategic considerations.

During discussions on the simplification of the rules, stakeholders noted that the scope of the Directives is not entirely coherent, for instance with regards to the coverage of certain economic operators, activities, or sectors. Participants highlighted that divergent implementation increases administrative burdens (e.g. ESPD). Consensus emerged on the limited opportunities for negotiation before awarding contracts and the inflexibility in their modification. Regarding the strategic role of public procurement, participants agreed on the need to revise the MEAT criteria to emphasise social and sustainability factors beyond price. However, they expressed mixed views on whether these criteria should be voluntary or mandatory. Concerns were raised about the administrative burdens and inconsistencies created by sectoral legislation.

In addition, the Commission strived to ensure that a wide range of consultations was available and, when feasible, supplemented these with bilateral meetings with a diverse range of stakeholders (Table 5 below).

Table 6: Number of evaluation-related bilateral meetings per category of stakeholder in 2023-2025

Source: In-house research.

Feedback from local and regional authorities

Representatives from national, local, and regional authorities were consulted in several ad hoc meetings upon request. In addition, feedback from local and regional authorities was gathered through the Report of the Committee of the Regions Reg Hub 345 .

The public procurement legal landscape is fragmented due to an overlap between national rules, the Directives and sector-specific procurement legislation. This overlap often results in legal uncertainty and complexity. As stated by representatives from local authorities in Spain, preparation of the tender documentation often requires more than a year time, due to the need to comply with additional national law requirements.

A similar concern was echoed by a national association for cities and towns when explaining that gold-platting is common, and that it is usually made through regular modification of national procurement rules that impede the development of a knowledge base and consistent practices.

A common agreement between local and regional authorities is that negotiations should be generally allowed in procurement in order to maximize the value for money. With regards to the use of strategic procurement, local and regional authorities often face legal constrains when trying to use public procurement to support the local or regional economic and industrial base.

Lastly, with regards to areas where the flexibility intended in the Directives did not sufficiently materialise, local and regional authorities often expressed their dissatisfaction with the regime of modification of contracts and in-house rules.

Feedback on Call for Evidence and Open Public Consultation

From 13 December 2024 until 7 March 2025, interested parties could provide feedback to the Commission’s Call for Evidence (CfE) and Open Public Consultation (OPC).

As the evaluation is a backward-looking exercise – in line with Better Regulation principles, when taking into account the feedback from the CfE and OPC, answers with forward looking content were not considered.

This synopsis report should be regarded solely as a summary of the contributions made by stakeholders concerning the evaluation of the 2014 Directives. It cannot in any circumstances be regarded as the official position of the Commission or its services. Responses to the consultation activities cannot be considered as a representative sample of the views of the EU population.

Synopsis report

1.Who responded to the Open Public Consultation?

The Open Public Consultation (OPC) received 733 replies with respondents representing diverse groups of stakeholders. The most replies we received from the public authorities (27% - 199 replies), followed by companies and businesses (20% - 150 replies) and business associations (16% - 119 replies). Other respondents included NGOs (10% - 71 replies), trade unions (8% - 55 replies), EU citizens (7% - 53 replies), academic/research institutions (5% - 34 replies) and consumer organizations (1).

Figure 2: Replies received by users type

More than a quarter of respondents were from Germany (26% - 193), followed by Belgium (14% - 102), France (10% - 75) and Spain (6% - 43). Besides the Members States, the Commission received replies from the following countries: United States (5), Norway (4), Switzerland (4), Andorra (1), Algeria (1), Ukraine (1), United Kingdom (1), Israel (1).

Out of the 199 replies from the public authorities (as the most represented type of stakeholder) 86 (43%) were from Germany, followed by 15 replies (8%) from the Dutch public authorities. Furthermore 91 (46%) replies were from local public authorities, 58 (29%) from national, 37 (19%) from regional and 13 (6%) from international public authorities.

As for the company/businesses (as the second most represented type of stakeholder), out of the 150 replies, 89 (60%) came from large businesses (250 employees or more), 24 replies (16%) from medium (50 to 249 employees), 14 (9%) from small (10 to 49 employees) and 23 (15%) from micro (1 to 9 employees) enterprises.

In terms of experience with public procurement, 82% of companies participating in OPC have bid for public contracts in the last 8 years. On the demand side, 95% of contracting authorities declared that they been carrying out public procurement procedures in the last 8 years. Overall, the prevailing experience related to above EU threshold procurement (nearly 85% of respondents), while the remaining share indicated more frequent involvement in procurement below the EU thresholds.

2.Who responded to the Call for Evidence?

The Call for Evidence (CfE) received 949 feedback instances. Again, most replies came from public authorities (21% - 196 replies), followed in this case by EU citizens (18% - 168), business associations (17% - 160), companies and businesses (16% - 156) and NGOs (13% - 120). Other respondents include academic/research institutions (3% - 29), trade unions (2% - 16), non-EU citizens (4), consumer organisations (2) and environmental organization (2).

The geographical origin of the CfE contributions was more spread, with Germany still in the lead (15% - 141), followed by Belgium (14%- 132), Sweden (9% - 85), France (9% - 83) and Poland (9% - 75). Individuals or organisations based in the following non-EU countries also submitted feedback: Norway (10), United States (7), United Kingdom (7), Switzerland (4), Ukraine (3), and Israel (2).

3.Overview of feedback received from OPC and CfE

The public consultation and call for evidence have aimed at providing the Commission with an additional understanding of public opinion regarding the Directives, the attainment of their objectives, and the relevance of their provisions. While all quantitative data is presented below, a focused analysis first introduces the main topics raised by the different stakeholders. This section is organised by themes corresponding to the objectives of the intervention and is divided into two parts: a complete overview of the quantitative results received, followed by key messages drawn from free-text contributions and attached position papers. The selected quotes from the written contributions received in the OPC and the CfE were chosen for their ability to most accurately reflect the prevailing themes and opinions emerging from the consultation. They serve to complement the numbers shown in the graphs and tables, in order to provide a clearer and more nuanced picture. It should be noted that these quotes are only examples and do not cover all the opinions shared in the consultation.

Simpler, more flexible rules, value for money, transparency, integrity

Quantitative analysis – key findings

Regarding the attainment of the Directives’ objectives, 49% of respondents believe that they did not make the public procurement system flexible enough and 54% think that the Directives did not establish simpler rules for the public procurement system.

Respondents tend to agree that the digitalisation of public procurement (eProcurement) has helped to lower the administrative burden (42% of respondents agree with this statement) and has made the procurement of works, goods and services faster (38% agree).

Companies/businesses are more positive than public authorities regarding the benefits of eProcurement. 57% of companies agree that eProcurement helped to reduce the administrative burden, compared to 40% of public authorities. On the speed of procedures, 52% of companies agree that digitalization had a positive impact, compared to 34% of public authorities. 38% of respondents believe that the Directives have helped to reduce corruption (only 15% disagree), while 62% of them agree that the Directives have increased transparency by setting the proper framework for the publication of tenders at all stages of the public procurement procedure.

With regards to the relevance of the rules set out in the Directives, most of respondents (48%) think that the rules aiming at increasing procedural flexibility (e. g. the choice of available procedures, time limits for submitting offers, contract modifications) are no longer relevant and adequate.

In contrast, the same percentage of respondents (48%) consider the Directives’ rules on transparency (e.g. EU-wide publication via TED) to be still relevant and adequate.

Feedback from written contributions

The 2014 Directives aimed to modernize EU procurement by promoting digitalization, transparency, and SME access, but challenges remain. Despite efforts to simplify procedures, administrative burdens for SMEs persist, and the anticipated increase in their participation hasn't materialized. While digitalization has facilitated processes, other complexities and burdens remain, particularly in tender documentation and procedures. The lack of high-quality data to measure directive outcomes is also a concern. Positive impacts include clarifying procurement principles and the benefits of eProcurement, though practical issues in implementation pose obstacles. Overall, procurement is often seen as legally driven rather than commercially focused, which could hinder realizing its full societal value.

Easier market access, SMEs and cross-border participation

Quantitative analysis -key findings

When asked about the attainment of the market access objectives set by the Directives, most of respondents (46%) disagree that the Directives have resulted in more competition in public procurement markets. 54 % of public authorities are of this view, but only 34% of companies/businesses and 42% of business associations.

Most respondents (53%) believe that the Directives ensure the equal treatment of bidders from other EU countries in all stages of the process and the objective evaluation of tenders. Only 12% disagree. 38% of respondents consider that the Directives have made it easier to bid on public contracts from abroad (e.g. through eProcurement). This majority opinion is not shared by public authorities - 42% disagree with it.

Regarding the relevance of the Directives’ rules, almost half of respondents (49%) consider that the rules on eProcurement are still relevant and adequate to facilitate market access.

While 38% of the respondents find the Directives’ rules on market access of companies from other EU countries still relevant and adequate, only 16% consider relevant and adequate rules on market access applicable to companies from non-EU countries.

Feedback from written contributions

According to many stakeholders the directive's goal of achieving a Single Market in procurement is still hindered by national preferences, language barriers, and inconsistent implementation across Member States, affecting fair competition. The absence of a unified European standard for sustainability criteria further complicates cross-border participation. The complex procurement law particularly challenges SMEs and start-ups due to a lack of expertise. Despite subcontracting clauses intended to aid SME access, they often lead to longer chains and pressure on subcontractor conditions. A multitude of national procurement platforms creates additional burdens, especially for SMEs lacking specialized departments. persisting market access inequalities, with non-European companies allowed to participate in EU tenders without European companies benefiting from reciprocal market access. Additionally, while the EU adheres to the Government Procurement Agreement, many partner countries maintain restrictions, limiting mutual market openness

Addressing strategic challenges

Quantitative analysis – key findings

Public authorities agree that the Directives have encouraged contracting authorities to buy works, goods and services which are environmentally friendly (56%), socially responsible (55%), and innovative (45%). However, all other respondent groups are less positive. For instance, companies/businesses disagree that the Directives have encouraged contracting authorities to buy works, goods and services which are environmentally friendly (46%), socially responsible (50%), and innovative (54%).

Opinions on the impact of the Directives’ objectives on suppliers are diverse. However, more respondents disagree than agree that the Directives encouraged companies to make greater efforts in meeting environmental standards, consider social aspects, and use innovative solutions in their economic activities. Specifically, 33 % of respondents feel that the Directives did not motivate companies to meet environmental standards, 38% believe they did not foster consideration of social aspects, and 39% think that they did not promote wider use of innovative solutions. These numbers are particularly high in responses provided by companies/businesses. 44% of them disagree that the Directives encouraged companies to make greater efforts in meeting environmental standards, 41 % disagree on social aspects, and 54% on innovative solutions. Noticeably, the number of public authorities who stated “don’t know” is higher than for other questions (40%).

Furthermore, overall, there is some agreement that the Directives’ rules that aim for environmentally friendly procurement (e.g. quality assurance standards and environmental management standards) and for socially responsible procurement (e.g. reserved contracts, requirements on accessibility for people with disabilities and design for all users) are still relevant and adequate. 39% and 43% of respondents say so, respectively. Regarding the Directives’ rules on supporting innovation, the percentage of respondents who agree that these rules are still relevant and adequate is the same as the percentage of those who disagree (32%). 35% of respondents said that they agree that the Directives’ rules on supporting all types of strategic procurement (e.g. the use of the most economically advantageous tender) are still relevant and adequate, while 42% were of the opposite view.

Feedback from written contributions

The predominant focus on the lowest price in EU procurement undermines quality and excludes social enterprises with higher costs. The MEAT principle, intended to promote value-driven procurement, lacks clear guidance. Many Member States prioritize price over quality, leaving social and environmental criteria underutilized. Contracting authorities often lack resources and expertise, leading to inconsistent implementation of sustainability criteria. Various regulations cause fragmentation, complicating strategic procurement. While some other legal acts promote inclusive procurement, such as for social enterprises, overall objectives face challenges, including market access disparities and insufficient strategic alignment across Member States.

The increasing complexity of EU procurement legislation is reducing competition by making tender preparation difficult, especially for SMEs without resources to handle bureaucracy. Strategic procurement goals, like innovation quotas, can conflict with competition objectives. Selection criteria favor large companies, contributing to market concentration and reduced bidder numbers. Fragmented regulations and lack of harmonization across levels create complex, daunting processes. Existing mechanisms to support SMEs are underutilized due to low awareness. The focus on lowest price undermines job quality and public value, while corruption concerns are more linked to direct awards than tender procedures.

Competition

Quantitative analysis – key findings

38% of the respondents consider that the level of competition in the EU public procurement market is too low, compared to 11% who think that it is too high and 33% who say that it is adequate. Based on OPC replies, no significant conclusion could be drawn on whether competition had increased, remained the same or decreased over the last 8 years: 25% of respondents think that it decreased, 21% that it remained the same, and 25% that it increased.

Regarding the frequency of awards based on price only, nearly half of the respondents (49%) consider it to be too high, followed by 35% who believe that it is adequate and only 3% who think that it is too low. For 37% of the respondents the high frequency of price only awards is a sign of bad procurement practices (among which 57% of business associations and 40% of companies/businesses). 29% believe that high quality can be assured through technical requirements (in particular, 56% of public authorities) and 27% that price only awards may be more efficient in certain circumstances (e.g. a simpler and faster way to buy homogenous goods).

The frequency of single bidding is considered too high by 29% of respondents, adequate for 25% but too low only for 6%. Interestingly, a high number of respondents (41%) do not have an opinion on this issue. An absolute majority of the respondents (58%) agree that the high frequency of single bidding is not linked to procurement practices but due to market structure or other factors unrelated to procurement, and only one quarter of respondents (25%) think that it is a sign of bad procurement practices.

The frequency of direct awards is considered adequate by 29% of respondents, too low by 23%, while only 15% respondents think that it is too high. 33% of respondents did not have an opinion on it. The high frequency of direct awards is not a sign of bad procurement practices for most respondents. Only 14% chose that response in the questionnaire, compared to 67% who answered that it is a legitimate procurement practice under certain circumstances and may facilitate the flexibility and timeliness of procedures.

Coherence

Quantitative analysis – key findings

Most respondents (39%) believe that the objectives of the three Directives are coherent with each other. However, EU legislation relating to public procurement (e.g. sectoral rules such as the Net Zero Industry Act or Clean Vehicles Directive) are not thought to be coherent with the Directives by the largest part of respondents (37% vs 11% who think that sectoral files are coherent).

Feedback from written contributions

The regulatory framework for public procurement in the EU has grown significantly more complex, particularly following the 2014 directive reform. This provided more clarity and uniformity but also created challenges and uncertainty, making it difficult for contracting authorities to stay updated. Detailed procedures stemming from various legal acts related to procurement increase the administrative burden. Further complications arise from the ongoing case law from the European Court of Justice that must be considered in procurement processes

Resilience

Quantitative analysis – key findings

Most respondents (49%) disagree that the Directives are fit for purpose to contribute to the EU’s strategic autonomy (including the security of EU supply chains). 42% think that the Directives are not fit for purpose in urgent situations. 44% consider that they are not fit for purpose in case of major supply shortages (e.g. supply-chain disruptions during a health, energy or security crisis). 38% think that the Directives do not ensure that security considerations are properly addressed by the contracting authorities.

Feedback from written contributions

The current EU public procurement framework lacks agility in addressing market failures and supply crises, as the rigid structure of directives inhibits swift responses. Although exemptions exist for extreme conditions, they are underutilized due to complexity. Concerns are raised about the dominance of non-EU providers in critical sectors, such as digital services, affecting data security and strategic autonomy. National security safeguards are deemed insufficient, with inadequate mechanisms to exclude risky operators and products. The COVID pandemic exposed the inflexibility of urgent procurement provisions, underscoring the directives' inadequacy in crises, such as migration surges or infrastructure attacks. The need for speed and agility in procurement for emergencies like policing is constrained by directives focused on competition and equal business access.

Other themes – comparison with below EU thresholds procurement

Quantitative analysis - key findings

Compared with procurement below thresholds, carrying out transactions under the Directives is rarely or never considered to be simpler (opinion expressed by 59% respondents), better value for money (opinion of 45% of respondents), faster (55% of respondents), more transparent and fairer (opinion of 36% of all respondents and 54% of public authorities), more professional opinion of 31% of all respondents(and 51% of public authorities), subject to more competition (38% of respondents), more environmentally friendly (38% of respondents), more socially responsible (42%of respondents, more supportive of innovation (43% of respondents), and better in preventing corruption (34% of respondents).

Other themes – comparison with private procurement

Quantitative analysis – key findings

Compared with private procurement, carrying out transactions under the Directives is rarely or never considered to be simpler (the view expressed by 49% of respondents), better value for money (32%), faster (49%), more professional (21%), subject to more competition (20%), more environmentally friendly (20%), more socially responsible (18%,), and more supportive of innovation (31%).

On the other hand, compared with private procurement, carrying out transactions under the Directives is considered as more transparent and fairer by 22% of all respondents and better in preventing corruption by 19%.

Distribution of replies for each OPC question

Simpler, more flexible rules, value for money, transparency, integrity

A detailed distribution of replies for each question is provided below.

Figure 3. The directives helped contracting authorities get better value for money when procuring works, goods and services

Table 7. The directives helped contracting authorities get better value for money when procuring works, goods and services, by type of respondent (first row has frequencies and second row has row percentages)

Figure 4. The directives made the scope of the applicable rules clearer

Table 8. The directives made the scope of the applicable rules clearer, by type of respondent (first row has frequencies and second row has row percentages)

Figure 5. The directives provided sufficient flexibility in the public procurement system (e.g. a broader choice of procedures and procurement techniques)

Table 9. The directives provided sufficient flexibility in the public procurement system (e.g. a broader choice of procedures and procurement techniques), by type of respondent (first row has frequencies and second row has row percentages)

Figure 6. The digitalisation of public procurement (eProcurement) helped lower the administrative burden when procuring works, goods and services

Table 10. The digitalisation of public procurement (eProcurement) helped lower the administrative burden when procuring works, goods and services, by type of respondent (first row has frequencies and second row has row percentages)

Figure 7. The digitalisation of public procurement (eProcurement) made it faster to procure works, goods and services

Table 11. The digitalisation of public procurement (eProcurement) made it faster to procure works, goods and services, by type of respondent (first row has frequencies and second row has row percentages)

Figure 8. The directives set out simpler rules for the EU public procurement system

Table 12. The directives set out simpler rules for the EU public procurement system, by type of respondent (first row has frequencies and second row has row percentages)

Figure 9. The directives helped reduce corruption and fend off political pressure in public procurement procedures

Table 13. The directives helped reduce corruption and fend off political pressure in public procurement procedures, by type of respondent (first row has frequencies and second row has row percentages)