P9_TA(2023)0435

Strategic Compass and EU space-based defence capabilities

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2023 Strategic compass and EU space-based defence capabilities (2022/2078(INI))

(C/2024/4221)

The European Parliament,

—	having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular, Article 222 thereof,

—	having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular, Article 42(7) thereof,

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 (1),

—	having regard to the joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

—	having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (2),

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (3),

—	having regard to the Council Recommendation of 14 November 2022 assessing the progress made by the participating Member States to fulfil commitments undertaken in the framework of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) (4),

—	having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward’ (JOIN(2022)0024),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 (5),

—	having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/698 of 30 April 2021 on the security of systems and services deployed, operated and used under the Union Space Programme which may affect the security of the Union, and repealing Decision 2014/496/CFSP (6),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence’ (COM(2022)0061),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU (7),

—	having regard to the Commission communication of 22 February 2021 entitled ‘Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (COM(2021)0070),

—	having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

—	having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (8),

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (9),

—	having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (10),

—	having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (11),

—	having regard to the publication of 28 June 2016 entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’,

—	having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 February 2013 entitled ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’ (JOIN(2013)0001),

—	having regard to Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014 on the European Union Satellite Centre and repealing Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre (12),

—	having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2014, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

—	having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022,

—	having regard to NATO’s overarching space policy of 17 January 2022,

—	having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s report of 13 July 2021 on reducing space threats through standards, rules and principles of responsible behaviours and to UN General Assembly Resolution 76/231 of 24 December 2021 thereon,

—	having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 77/41 of 7 December 2022 on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing,

—	having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 75/36 of 7 December 2020 on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours,

—	having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 62/217 of 22 December 2007 on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space,

—	having regard to the UN Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, adopted at the 1499th plenary meeting of 19 December 1966,

—	having regard to the UN open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, established by UN resolution 76/231,

—	having regard to its resolution of 9 May 2023 on critical technologies for security and defence: state of play and future challenges (13),

—	having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022 (14),

—	having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security, and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products (15),

—	having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (16),

—	having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (17),

—	having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on cyber defence (18),

—	having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2016 on space capabilities for European security and defence (19),

—	having regard to its resolution of 3 April 2014 on the EU comprehensive approach and its implications for the coherence of EU external action (20),

—	having regard to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963,

—	having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Technique of 10 December 1976,

—	having regard to the EU Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 9 November 2020,

—	having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

—	having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0334/2023),

A.	whereas the EU has programmes and capabilities that make it a space power;

B.	whereas the EU Space Programme and the EU secure connectivity programme (IRIS2) play an important role in the context of European security and defence, giving the EU status as a credible actor on the international stage;

C.	whereas EU space activities make an important contribution to the security of citizens in the EU and beyond; whereas no individual Member State could achieve this alone;

D.	whereas the UN has established an open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours to counter threats by states to space systems;

E.	whereas the strategic compass and the EU space strategy on security and defence recognise the importance of space as a strategic area in which increasingly assertive and potentially conflicting powers operate on civilian, military and economic-related matters;

whereas the Versailles Declaration of 10 and 11 March 2022 emphasises the need for increased investment in strategic enablers, including cybersecurity and space-based connectivity, in order to enhance EU defence capabilities and the EU’s operational capacity in the implementation of common security and defence policies, as well as other Union policies in areas such as external action, border management, protection of critical assets, crisis management, humanitarian aid or disaster relief;

whereas Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the essential need for and strategic value of geospatial imagery and secure connectivity in military targeting, manoeuvring and defence, but has also revealed challenges that need to be addressed by international governance initiatives focused on space and cyber issues, given the close links existing between the space and cyber domains;

H.	whereas space security is essential to ensure global stability and can help to mitigate the impact of conflict or to avoid conflict altogether;

I.	whereas the space capabilities of the EU and its Member States generate activities that are essential to the economy, scientific research and the functioning of our societies;

whereas space-based assets are dual-use, serving civilian purposes while being crucial to security and defence; whereas space capabilities have become indispensable not only because they make it possible to make autonomous assessments and decisions and take autonomous action but also because they are essential to EU and Member State civilian and military operations;

K.	whereas the EU is facing the risk of losing autonomous access to space for the deployment of its civil and military satellites; whereas this loss would result in security challenges as the EU would be forced to run its missions from outside EU territory and rely on non-European launchers;

whereas space activities have become more common, the risk of collisions and debris in space has grown and the number of state and private players has risen; whereas a technological and commercial space race is taking place and strategic competition between space powers has heated up, and the potential for escalation is increasing;

whereas the rapid development of ‘new space’ private space capabilities presents opportunities for innovation in cooperation with Member States but also poses challenges as commercial exploitation can have a negative impact on space security; whereas such private capabilities, for example Starlink satellite services, have been used for better or for worse in the context of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;

N.	whereas this weaponisation translates into the development of means to neutralise, or even destroy, spacecraft;

whereas threats to the space, civilian or military capabilities of the EU and its Member States, whether accidental or intentional, have grown in number and are difficult to detect and attribute to a source, and whereas unfriendly behaviour, whether rooted in ambiguity or intimidation, has intensified;

P.	whereas the deliberate creation of debris fields by malicious actors, using for instance anti-satellite missiles, can lead to collisional cascading (Kessler syndrome), preventing safe access to space;

Q.	whereas an international common vision relating to possible reaction thresholds for acts occurring in space does not exist; whereas this lack could lead to an accidental or unintentional escalation;

whereas threats of that kind also have major effects on humanitarian and crisis management operations, as space services capacities are often used to assist people affected by emergencies such as natural disasters or armed conflicts; whereas a collaborative approach to space services is needed to monitor and tackle such challenges, including the effects of climate change;

whereas European space capabilities are not sufficiently secure, with some European space industries still dependent on non-EU countries; whereas disparities exist among Member States in the extent to which their national space systems are protected and funded; whereas rapid and effective response capacity in the event of a space crisis is lacking;

whereas space is a rapidly growing economic sector; whereas according to the 2022 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence report, the space and cyberspace domains appear to be less well funded than traditional domains such as air, land and sea; whereas the aggregated annual spending of the Member States on civil space operations roughly amounts to just one sixth of the United States’ spending and is substantially lower than China’s spending; whereas this such significant disparity is making it challenging to achieve the EU’s goal of open strategic autonomy in space;

Welcomes the findings and high level of ambition in the recommendations proposed in the EU space strategy in the area of security and defence, which lives up to the high expectations of European players in the space sector; calls for the recommended actions to be taken in a swift and effective manner, in accordance to the EU’s guiding principle of open strategic autonomy;

Notes that the EU Climate Change and Defence Roadmap recognises climate change as a ‘threat multiplier that fundamentally affects our long-term security’ and sets out concrete actions to address the increasingly important climate and security nexus; stresses the importance of closely monitoring and reporting on climate change using the EU’s space capabilities owing to its crucial consequences for EU security, its effect on migration and conflicts in neighbouring regions, and its implications for food security, energy production and international trade;

Protection and resilience of space systems and services

Recognises space systems and satellites as critical infrastructure which need to be protected and strengthened; notes that the upsurge in risks from space debris, as well as threats in space and on space systems, both ground and space-based, makes it necessary to bolster the resilience of European space infrastructure, supply chain systems and services;

Welcomes the proposal set out in the strategy to draw up a classified annual space threat analysis document with a view to making the EU and its Member States collectively aware of the extent of those threats and the action to be taken to address them effectively;

Notes that 11 of the 27 Member States have already introduced national space laws; welcomes the Commission’s initiative to propose space legislation for the EU establishing a common, harmonised and coherent security, safety, and sustainability framework to bolster the resilience and strategic autonomy of EU space services and prevent excessive fragmentation of the global space market, while contributing to strengthening the competitiveness of the European space industry by stimulating the use of space services across a wide range of EU policies; points out that this coherent and harmonised EU framework is eagerly awaited by the Member States and the wider space industry, including major industrial players and SMEs; highlights the need to establish an effective regulatory framework for new space companies based in the EU, with a significant emphasis on protective measures and information security, in line with the security needs of the Union; calls for the establishment of specific measures to ensure that private space companies providing a service are considered, in times of crisis, as private entities with a public service mission in order to prevent any suspension or degradation of access to space services, in particular satellite communication; encourages the Commission to include matters of registration, liability and environmental standards in new space legislation;

Calls for the international regulatory and capacity resources for space traffic management (STM) to be boosted and for the establishment of common reaction thresholds for acts occurring in space, with the aim of better protecting the infrastructure in orbit belonging to the EU, the Member States and private companies; insists on the fact that the EU should not rely on third-party space surveillance systems; calls for the EU and its Member States, therefore, to strengthen their efforts in the field of space surveillance and the tracking of objects in an effort to reduce the risk of collision; recalls the importance of enhancing the cybersecurity of both space systems and ground-based infrastructure against cyberattacks; calls for increased international cooperation and coordination in the field of space traffic management and for a reduction in the environmental footprint of the space sector;

Stresses the need to raise awareness at EU level of the importance of both civilian and governmental users using the Galileo Public Regulated Service and new Galileo differentiators such as the High Accuracy Service, Authentication Service and Emergency Warning Service in a synergetic way with Earth observation and secure communications in order to strengthen the EU’s operational capacity to act in all phases of disaster risk management and effectively address evolving threats;

Regrets the Union’s heavy dependence on other countries for space surveillance and tracking (SST) data; urges the Commission and the Member States to increase investment in SST detection capacities to support the development of a more extensive European database, in cooperation with the EU SST consortium;

Calls for the IRIS2 secure connectivity constellation to be swiftly set up, with the participation of the space sector across Europe, including SMEs, and to be made ready for use with a view to providing constant access to secure and sovereign connectivity services that meet the EU’s and Member States’ operational needs, and for the existing components of the Union’s Space Programme to be completed in order to enhance the resilience of Member States’ critical infrastructure; considers that IRIS2 demonstrates the importance of satellite-based secure connectivity, including through the use of quantum encryption, and space-based Earth observation as critical enablers; emphasises, furthermore, the importance of IRIS2 for the effective implementation of the EU’s common security and defence policy, as it provides support to missions and operations abroad and serves as a key tool to ensure the security of sensitive digital communications;

10.

Welcomes the proposal to launch an EU Earth observation services programme for governmental use, for sensitive applications in the areas of security and defence; calls on the Commission to commission a study to analyse the feasibility of such a service and to ensure sufficient funding for this purpose;

11.

Highlights the significant contribution of Copernicus to missions related to Earth observation, including applications related to security;

12.

Calls for the secure, multi-orbital connectivity infrastructure to be developed into a genuinely global service, covering also areas that currently have poor coverage, such as the Arctic; calls for the access of public security and defence stakeholders to common satellite services in strategically significant areas to be ensured in order to support the operation of critical infrastructure, crisis management, and situational awareness;

13.

Takes the view that, in order to maintain continuity of service if an incident takes place, it is necessary to ensure that satellites are future-proof and that probable attack scenarios are anticipated during the development stage; asserts that autonomous ground systems must be maintained to prevent any long-term negative effects that may result from a diminished access to space and that protective measures must be strengthened by systematically integrating cybersecurity requirements by design through constant cooperation with the private sector and throughout the lifespan of existing components;

14.

Notes that the Union’s space capabilities allow it to protect space infrastructure, increase its resilience and improve the contributions made by European space assets to operational defence and security capabilities and to ensure that deterrence and defence efforts remain solvent in the event that attacks or denial in space impair critical infrastructure; is concerned by the real risk posed by the uncontrolled development of new space technologies; calls, to this end, for an assessment and stricter monitoring of the risks of militarisation to be carried out at European level, including in particularly sensitive matters such as access to space or operations in orbit;

15.

Stresses that capacity for autonomous access to space is an essential element of European space policy; notes with regret the EU’s current lack of autonomous access to space, which endangers missions related to security and defence; takes the view, therefore, that a special, synergy-based effort must be made to further foster the long-term production and competitiveness of European launchers; calls for the EU and its Member States to apply the principle of European preference when choosing launchers, in order to ensure the economic sustainability of the European launch sector and reduce dependence on launchers made outside the EU, as well as in the selection of space data and services by public authorities; calls on the Commission to develop a comprehensive strategy for a Union launcher policy that prioritises autonomous access to space, redundancy, reuse and scalability, covering all types of missions, orbits and types of payload, and to rely on the technical expertise of the European Space Agency;

16.

Highlights the need to support the establishment of geographically diversified spaceports and launch complexes on EU territory, furthering the EU’s strategic autonomy in the space domain; notes that the space assets of EU governments must only be launched from the territory of a non-EU country or with non-EU launch services in exceptional and justified cases; calls for the transformation of existing and future spaceports within the EU into genuine European spaceports, with dedicated EU funding for their operations and security to be allocated in the next multiannual financial framework; calls for the establishment of a common procurement platform for launch services to meet the needs of both the EU and its Member States;

17.

Highlights the need to foster the development of responsive space systems that are able to place small satellites in various types of orbit at a short notice in order to address specific operational needs and capability gaps related to shortages of or damage to existing space assets;

18.

Acknowledges that some orbits are already congested with satellites and debris that make the future development of space activities riskier and more complex, stresses in this regard the need to monitor and manage existing space debris and to find ways to reduce the amount of waste generated by future space activities;

19.

Welcomes the recent inauguration of the Esrange spaceport in Sweden, which will make the EU more resilient by offering a second launch site in the Union alongside the Guiana spaceport in France; welcomes the recent investment in the Diamant launch site at the Guiana spaceport, which is designed to enable small and medium-sized launchers to be launched, diversifying the launch capabilities in the EU;

Responses to malicious or hostile activities in space

20.

Notes that, given the intensification of threats in the space sector, the EU and its Member States must bolster their capabilities and governance to detect, categorise, attribute and address threats as quickly as possible; welcomes the conclusion set out in the space strategy that new governmental Earth observation capacities and services are needed;

21.

Stresses that the infrequent public revelations about the hostile activities of space powers aiming to target critical space infrastructure confirm both the reality of the threat of possible malicious activities and the difficulties related to determining the exact origin of these threats; recalls, in this respect, that on 15 November 2021, Russia used a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile to destroy one of its old electronic listening satellites, creating a large amount of space debris; adds that Russia eventually confirmed that it had carried out this operation as a test, without giving details of the resources used; recalls that the reality of these threats is also sufficiently supported for it to form the basis of work carried out in conjunction with the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, following Resolution 76/231 on the reduction of space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours; calls for the development of safeguards to defend against the increasing risk of the militarisation of space;

22.

Calls for great vigilance to be shown as regards the development of sensitive technologies by small private entities, which are more vulnerable to acquisitions by malicious or hostile actors and which could pose a risk of uncontrolled growth; urges the Member States and the Commission, in addition, to make sure that the eight criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (21) and the rules of the Dual-Use Regulation (22) are being respected in full regarding the export of space-related technology;

23.

Stresses that space domain awareness (SDA) is essential to detecting, tracking and attributing a threat and enabling Member States to take appropriate decisions in the event of a space attack; recalls that any response to an attack must be proportionate to its nature, taking into account both non-kinetic and kinetic actions and their reversibility; stresses that few Member States currently possess the necessary capabilities for accurate SDA and thus strongly encourages the Member States to supply the information needed to attribute hostile behaviour, for which secure, robust and reliable communication and exchange capabilities at EU level will need to be established; highlights that information exchange should also include frequent exchanges of best practices between Member States, with the participation of the EU institutions;

24.

Welcomes the proposal set out in the strategy to amend Decision (CFSP) 2021/698 with a view to attributing and addressing threats to space programme services; calls for more meaningful responses on solidarity mechanisms to be taken at EU level; calls for further work to be done to make the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) ready for use in particular in the space domain, by testing and agreeing on the modalities for identifying and attributing an attack, as well as preparing the necessary response mechanisms; welcomes the commitment to develop a dedicated toolbox, complementary to cyber diplomacy and hybrid toolboxes, that would help to address the different threats in the space domain;

25.

Stresses that exercises are essential to testing and validating the EU’s response to space threats, as well as building a greater shared awareness regarding space threats and a common strategic culture in the space domain;

26.

Recalls the close link between the space and cyber domains; highlights in this regard that EU responses and initiatives in space should be coherent, taking into consideration challenges inherent to both domains;

27.

Calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt policies on anti-satellite testing, specifically with the aim of banning destructive testing;

Competitiveness and investment

28.

Calls for the EU to adopt a genuine industrial policy and to be able to draw upon a competitive industry, including through the creation of Important Projects of Common European Interest where necessary; takes the view that EU support to enable Member States to develop their capabilities must benefit European industrial players, both long-established groups and innovative SMEs and start-ups; supports, at the same time, heavy and risk-taking investment in key space and cyber technologies, including in disruptive space technologies, with the aim of reducing strategic dependence on third countries, including through joint procurement of critical components and through securing the critical raw materials supply chains; notes the potential for the Commission’s Observatory of Critical Technologies to detect and monitor the creation of dependencies on third countries; calls on the Commission to ensure the alignment between the critical raw materials act and the necessary needs of the space domain in the field of security and defence;

29.

Highlights the underutilisation of data provided by various components of the EU Space Programme; calls for improvements to the utilisation of EU space data and services by public authorities, particularly in the field of security and defence;

30.

Stresses that, if space capabilities are to be developed, the resources allocated to space in the next multiannual financial framework must be substantially increased, including in support of EU agencies such as the EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) and the European Defence Agency to respond to the growing needs of the Union and its Member States in space capabilities and resilience, in particular concerning access to space, Earth observation, space situational awareness, secure connectivity, advanced position, navigation and timing (PNT), and their related services to users; stresses, in particular, the need to increase funding for space traffic management and space surveillance and tracking systems with a view to protecting the EU’s space infrastructure and addressing potential threats; draws attention to the need to achieve coherence in and provide visibility for all the different types of funding allocated via instruments to European space policy;

31.

Calls for coherence between existing instruments to be improved with a view to preventing unnecessary duplication of investments; considers it essential for funding to be properly channelled into those instruments, taking into account the capacities available at both EU and commercial level; supports joint coordination between the European Defence Fund, the EU Space Programme, Horizon Europe and the PESCO projects in an effort to speed up the development of relevant capabilities; stresses the importance of synergies between EU and national civilian, space and defence programmes to meet capability needs;

32.

Calls for the technical skills needed in public administration and businesses to be improved by further investing in education and training, including in the area of security and defence-related aspects of the space domain; notes the importance of increased investment in space-related education at all educational levels with a strong focus on greater gender equality in the field of space, since only 30 % of the workforce internationally is made up of women;

Governance

33.

Stresses that EU and Member State resilience and their response to potential hostile actions in space, particularly malicious acts threatening EU space assets such as the testing of anti-satellite weapons, must be underpinned by clear, flexible and responsive governance, thereby addressing shortcomings stemming from the current fragmentation of competences in the EU’s approach to space and defence and enhancing accountability for all actors involved in the different components of the EU Space Programme;

34.

Believes that governance is unique to each component of the Space Programme; stresses that those components, which have major implications for the security of the Member States, require harmonised governance that involves the Member States and makes it possible to protect information;

35.

Welcomes the governance approach of Galileo and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service, which is crucial for the good functioning of the EU Space Programme’s architecture and for the robustness of the system; recalls the importance of extending this unique chain of command and clear division of task to all components of the EU Space Programme;

36.

Stresses that changes to Copernicus services to enable it to meet defence requirements should be subject to appropriate governance closely involving SatCen; recognises the essential role of SatCen as a single collective geospatial intelligence capability that lends weight to the capacity of the EU and its Member States to take autonomous decisions and action;

37.

Stresses the importance of ensuring coherence and further developing PESCO projects in the field of governmental imagery, space-based missile early warning systems, military PNT and defence of space assets; is attentive to the timely delivery of PESCO capability projects related to space;

38.

Points out that governance must not duplicate existing means or circumvent Member States in areas such as threat attribution, which largely relies on national capabilities; stresses, in this regard, that SatCen’s experience and expertise and its trust-based relationship with Member States and industry can be usefully exploited in this area; emphasises the need to further increase SatCen’s funding to allow it to effectively execute its operations in the light of increased demand for its products in recent years;

Cooperation and partnerships

39.

Notes that the changing geopolitical landscape must spur the EU and its Member States on to reach common and coordinated positions so that they are able to set international standards; calls on the EU to assume a more active role as a facilitator in international norm-building in space; supports multilateral solutions, reached within the UN framework, in the area of space governance; calls for the EU and its Member States to be proactive in seeking multilateral agreements, including potential revisions of international treaties, in particular relating to space traffic management, and to reaffirm the applicability of international humanitarian law; stresses the need to develop, at UN level, an effective framework for the coordination of space situational awareness and to develop norms and principles for space debris removal; calls for the EU and its Member States to reaffirm commitments to transparency and confidence building measures to advance new measures for space security in the light of current threats; notes the need for an international legal framework regulating the activities of new space companies;

40.

Stresses the importance of developing cooperation with strategic partners, while ensuring the EU’s strategic autonomy and ability to address autonomously any threats to its space assets and interests in space; supports the continuation of an enhanced dialogue with the United States, while remaining vigilant to the risk that it may seek to steer or dictate outlooks, standards and rules that the Member States have not helped to shape; calls for deeper cooperation and for alliances to be established with a broader set of EU strategic partners;

41.

Notes that NATO is conducting strategic reflections on its role in the space domain; notes, however, that the EU, in its own right and through its Member States, already has more developed programmes, capacities and institutions that do not compete with NATO in this domain; calls for closer cooperation between the EU and NATO, based on shared threat analysis, to be pursued in areas of shared interest, for example through joint training and exercises, exchanges of best practice and staff-to-staff meetings, while ensuring that the roles, competences and autonomy of the two organisations are scrupulously maintained and updated through continuous dialogue and reflection; recalls that the EU and NATO already discuss space issues as part of their structured dialogue on resilience;

42.

Highlights the role of the European Space Agency (ESA) as a technical agency, contributing, among other things, to the implementation of the EU space policy; recalls that cooperation with the ESA must be conducted within a framework that safeguards the essential interests of the Union;

43.

Points out that the EUSPA, in charge of providing commercial and governmental services and ensuring the operational security of satellites systems, should continue to reinforce its role in providing for the security of the space systems in operation, and thereby contribute to the EU’s strategic autonomy;

° °

44.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

(1) OJ L 79, 17.3.2023, p. 1.

(2) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164.

(3) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80.

(4) OJ C 433, 15.11.2022, p. 6.

(5) OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 149.

(6) OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 178.

(7) OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 69.

(8) OJ L 129 I, 17.5.2019, p. 13.

(9) OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 15.

(10) OJ L 79 I, 21.3.2019, p. 1.

(11) OJ L 331, 14.12.2017, p. 57.

(12) OJ L 188, 27.6.2014, p. 73.

(13) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0131.

(14) OJ C 214, 16.6.2023, p. 26.

(15) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 54.

(16) OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 102.

(17) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 86.

(18) OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 57.

(19) OJ C 86, 6.3.2018, p. 84.

(20) OJ C 408, 30.11.2017, p. 21.

(21) Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99).

(22) Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1).