COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing specific conditions to fishing for deep-sea stocks in the North-East Atlantic and provisions for fishing in international waters of the North-East Atlantic and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002 /* SWD/2012/0202 final */
Table of Content 1. ......... Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties. 4 1.1........ Organisation and timing. 4 1.2........ Consultation and expertise. 4 1.3........ Changes to the working document following the IA Board’s opinion. 5 2........... Problem definition. 5 2.1........ Context: the specific management framework. 5 2.2........ Context: related areas of the fisheries policy. 6 2.3........ Problems. 6 2.4........ Main problems: unsustainable fishing, risk to VMEs, undesired catch,
poor scientific advice. 6 2.5........ The affected sector: metiers, catches, economic importance. 6 2.6........ Problem evolution and underlying driving forces. 6 2.7........ Grounds for EU action and scope. 6 2.7.1..... Necessity and subsidiarity. 6 2.7.2..... Scope. 6 3........... Objectives. 6 3.1........ General objective. 6 3.2........ Specific objectives. 6 4........... Policy options. 6 4.1........ Separate regulation. 6 4.2........ Option 1 – no change/indispensable update. 6 4.3........ Option 2– ban deep-sea fisheries. 6 4.4........ Option 3– ban gears that are most harmful to the deep-sea ecosystem.. 6 4.5........ Option 4 – access conditional on international management standards
for the High Sea. 6 4.6........ Option 5 – instrument for the implementation of NEAFC decisions,
extending those decisions to EU waters where possible. 6 5........... Analysis of impacts. 6 5.1........ Overall assessment of impacts. 6 5.1.1..... Economic impact and impact on fisheries management 6 5.1.2..... Social impact 6 5.1.3..... Impact on the environment 6 5.1.4..... Burden and costs for public administration. 6 5.1.5..... Transposition and compliance aspects. 6 5.1.6..... Third country impacts. 6 5.2........ Summary of impacts. 6 6........... Comparing the options. 6 6.1........ Qualitative assessment by option. 6 6.1.1..... Comparison with regard to effectiveness. 6 6.1.2..... Comparison with regard to efficiency and coherence. 6 6.2........ Ranking of options. 6 7........... Monitoring
and evaluation. 6 APPENDIX - Glossary. 6 ANNEXES. 6
1. Procedural issues and consultation of
interested parties Lead DG: DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE) Other services involved (underlined: primary involvement): SG, BUDG,
ENV, EMPL, ENTR, ECFIN, REGIO Agenda Planning reference: 2008/MARE/025 1.1. Organisation and timing This impact
assessment concerns policy options for managing deep-sea fisheries in the
North-East Atlantic, developed during revising the 2002 Council Regulation
establishing specific access requirements for deep-sea fisheries (Regulation
2347/2002[1], in the following called the "access regime"). The
spatial scope is visualised in Annex
I. The Commission
is obliged to report to the European Parliament and the Council on the access
regime and to propose necessary amendments (Article 10 of the access regime). This
revision is foreseen in DG MARE's Agenda Planning (2008/25) and in the 2010
Annual Management Plan of the Directorate-General of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries,
as one of the main policy outputs under the activity "Conservation,
management and exploitation of living aquatic Resources", with the
specific objective: "To develop a consistent policy for the conservation
and management of fish resources and the protection of biodiversity." The Commission's internal
review process started with a 2007 Communication on the management of deep-sea
fish stocks[2]. The European Parliament provided its opinion in 2008.[3] DG MARE consulted Member
States from spring 2009 to spring 2010. It then organised meetings with the
inter-service steering group in May and October 2010. DGs ENV and REGIO participated
in the meetings. 1.2. Consultation and expertise The main part of
the assessment work started in 2009 with a technical questionnaire that DG MARE
sent to the Member States which report under the access regime, receiving
contributions up to October 2009. From
December 2009 DG MARE consulted Member States concerned and the four Regional
Advisory Councils (RACs) on the future of the access regime[4]. The consultation was targeted
to these recipients in view of, on the one hand, the wide coverage of
stakeholders and interest groups in the RACs and, on the other hand, the
technical and routine character of the review process. By the time of closing
the consultation on April 9, 2010, the Commission had received detailed feedback.
In the wake of this, the service held individual meetings with stakeholders who
had asked for this. The
feedback showed general agreement on a modernisation of the access regime, and
in particular on a move towards fishery-specific management. There was wide
agreement that the reshuffle should be designed open enough so that it can take
account of evolving scientific advice, e.g. coming from the ongoing major
EU-funded project “Deepfishman”. This project should deliver by 2012 i.a.
innovative harvest control rules for deep-sea stocks in prevailing data-poor
conditions. So far, these rules are not available from the project, and the
future access regime should therefore be open to testing them once available. A
number of NGOs signed an additional contribution in which they advocated the
transposition towards deep-sea fisheries in EU waters of deep-sea management standards
adopted for the High Sea; in this contribution, they also highlighted the
discard-problem of these fisheries. The contributions, which have been entirely
taken into account during the impact assessment, are summarised in Annex II. Also in 2009, the
Commission asked its Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
(STECF) to provide scientific advice on certain aspects of the access regime.
The report, and also the stock assessment of deep-sea species, passed the
Plenary of STECF in July 2010.[5] STECF updated the list of deep-sea species which is attached to the
access regime and advised that some deep-sea species live in different depth
ranges depending on the geographical location, and that some are separated in
depth from shallower fisheries on the continental slope, while others are
overlapping with them. Discussing the exploitation of deep-sea species in
general, STECF advised that the fisheries could be developed towards
sustainable fisheries, but only at very low levels of exploitation which would
be closely monitored. It also highlighted the considerable problem of discards
in the trawl fishery. This assessment can be found in Annex III. In January 2010 the
Commission launched a data call to Member States dedicated to catch and fishing
effort data of the deep-sea metiers in the North-East Atlantic. The data was
processed by the Joint Research Centre in its capacity as secretariat and
scientific support to the STECF, and linked to economic data that concerns the
fleet segments in which those metiers operate. The resulting information allows
describing the sector most affected by the access regime and assessing the
economic importance of deep-sea fisheries for the fleets therein engaged. Spain and the UK did not provide data, so that information on their fleets could not be taken into
account. The deep-sea fisheries of Spain are important in relative terms. Finally, in November 2011
the Commission reported on the review of Regulation (EC) No 734/2008.[6] This regulation transposed the 2006 UN standards on protecting vulnerable
marine ecosystems on the bottom of the High Sea. The report states that so far
no Member State submitted an environmental impact assessment, that some
standards needed to be technically more precise, and that the UN standards were
enlarged in 2009, which is not yet reflected in the Regulation. While this
review is outside the scope of this impact assessment, there are repercussions
because one of the policy options suggests transcribing the UN standards into
EU waters. 1.3. Changes to the working
document following the IA Board’s opinion This version of the
impact assessment report takes into account the opinion given by the
Commission’s Impact Assessment Board on 25 February 2011. Main changes are: –
The scope of the assessment has been more
precisely defined; –
The description of the current regulatory framework
has been reorganised in order to better show the interrelation among the
various governance levels and topics; –
The problem definition has been restructured in
order to distinguish between basic problems of the deep-sea fisheries and
problems related to the design and implementation of the current access regime; –
The options have been enlarged by envisaging a
more ambitious measure, namely the complete ban of deep-sea fishing; in
addition, the options were revised to clarify the intervention logic and more
critically assessed concerning their utility in achieving the objectives; –
The baseline case is now further detailed in
view of the evolving concept of the new CFP (adoption of the reform proposals
due in summer 2011). Following
the second opinion of the Impact Assessment Board dated 6 May 2011, –
the policy options presented in this report are
explained in more detail, –
the analysis of the coherence of policy options
with the envisaged CFP reform is outlined more in detail, in particular
concerning individually transferable quotas, simplification and
regionalisation; in addition, the link to the reform of the Data Collection
Framework was explained, –
the link between objectives and expected
outcomes is improved by refining the qualitative assessment of options, –
The view of different stakeholder groups is
incorporated into the main text, and the executive summary contains an overview
on expected impacts of policy options. 2. Problem
definition 2.1. Context: the specific management framework The current management
framework for deep-sea fisheries has developed as stand-alone EU measures,
measures agreed in the competent regional fisheries management organisation
(NEAFC[7]) to which the EU is a Contracting Party[8], and multinational political agreements (UN) on measures for the
unregulated High Sea. The link of EU measures to international measures is
two-fold: the specific problems of deep-sea fisheries are the same wherever
these fisheries occur; and some deep-sea species are widely distributed, thus
being exploited in EU waters by EU vessels and in international waters by EU
and foreign vessels. While the EU was
innovative when starting its measures in 2002, the policy development since
2006 is more and more driven by the multinational scene: || EU measures || UN resolutions and FAO standards || NEAFC measures timeline || Since 2002 || UN since 2006; FAO standards 2008 || Since 2004, increased activity since 2009 scope || EU vessels in all or parts of the waters of the North-East Atlantic; foreign vessels in EU waters || Management for deep-sea fisheries in the High Sea || Vessels of contracting parties in the international waters of the North-East Atlantic Influence on the other measures || Improved negotiation case for general precautionary measures in the regional and multinational forum || NEAFC has started developing the management of its deep-sea fisheries according to UN/FAO standards || Need to be transposed into EU law for EU vessels fishing in NEAFC area In terms of EU measures,
there is mainly the access regime which since its inception is accompanied by
total allowable catches (TACs) for catching target deep-sea species, and additional
technical measures against the environmental damage of bottom gears (protecting
bottom habitats and sharks), namely:
Council
Regulation (EC) No 1568/2005 bans the use of trawls and gillnets in waters
deeper than 200 m around the Azores, Madeira and Canary Island.
·
Council Regulation (EC) No 41/2007 banned the use of gillnets by
Community vessels at depths greater than 600 m in ICES Divisions VIa,b, VII
b,c,j,k and Subarea XII. This ban was later extended to all western waters, and
continues by virtue of Regulation (EC) No 1288/2009 until mid 2011. ·
Council Regulation (EC) No 2270/2004 established protection areas
where the fishing for orange roughy is restricted. Since 2010, fishing for
orange roughy is no longer allowed. In addition, protection zones for blue ling
where established in the West of Scotland. ·
The first measure to protect corals and other
spots of high biodiversity (vulnerable marine ecosystems, VMEs) was the
prohibition of fishing activity that can get into contact with the bottom in
the Darwin Mounds to the North of Scotland (Regulation (EC) No 602/2004),
accompanying the designation of a Special Area of Protection under the Marine
Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC). Additional area closures
followed in the West of Scotland and later to the North of Spain (El Cachochu). The access regime itself
concerns deep-sea fisheries in the North-East Atlantic including EU waters of
the outermost regions of Azores, Madeira and Canary Islands[9]; it basically consists of: –
A centralised reporting on the activities of
fishing vessels specifically engaged in deep-sea fisheries, –
an obligatory sampling of those vessels activity
for monitoring by independent observers; –
freezing the size of the fleet that can fish
directed on deep-sea species, accompanied with a system of special fishing
permits; –
an improved surveillance of those vessels'
activity by rules on the non-functioning of the satellite tracking device
(VMS) and on obligatory landings in designated ports. The access regime does not
contain and does not provide a mechanism for adopting technical measures, for
instance closed areas or gear restrictions, neither in EU waters nor in
follow-up of resolutions in NEAFC. All technical measures so far adopted have
been ad hoc measures decided by the Council. They were renewed until mid
of 2011 in the Regulation on transitory technical measures (Regulation (EC) No
1288/2009); a further renewal is currently being discussed by the co-legislators.
New measures would have to be adopted in co-decision procedure by the European
Parliament and the Council, unless the legislators empower the Commission to
introduce them by way of delegated acts or implementing rules. In the
Regulatory Area of NEAFC, which consists of the international waters of the North-East Atlantic, the main measures adopted within NEAFC are the following:
Fishing effort directed towards deep-sea species is capped
until 2012 at 65% of the effort deployed in 2003.
All gillnets are banned from waters deeper than 200 m.
Ten areas where VMEs are present have been closed for bottom
gears.
In 2009, five very large areas of the Mid-Atlantic were closes for
bottom gears as a precautionary measure. Since 2009, NEAFC develops maps
on existing and new fishing areas in order to develop proportionate prerequisites
for undertaking fishing trips with bottom gears.
A seasonal closure for spawning aggregations of blue ling was
introduced close to the Exclusive Economic Zone of Iceland.
The multinational
political agreements, namely UN GA Resolutions 61/105[10] of 2006 and
64/72 of 2009, are not directly applicable but set out how to manage deep-sea
fisheries on the unregulated High-Sea. A direct consequence of these agreements
was Regulation (EC) 734/2008 which aims at protecting VMEs on the bottom of the
High Sea from interference by EU vessels. However, these standards should
were appropriate also be applied in the RFMO or the national context. The 2006
agreements were technically more completely described by the FAO guidelines of
2008.[11] The main elements are: ·
Conduct impact assessments (to
ensure that bottom fishing does not have an impact on VMEs) and ensure that
vessels do not engage in bottom fishing until assessments have been carried out
(UN GA 64/72 para 119 a). ·
Identify where VMEs occur or are likely to occur
(UN GA 64/72 para 119 b). ·
Establish protocols of VME encounters (UN GA
64/72 para 119 c). ·
Adopt measures to ensure long-term
sustainability of deep-sea stocks including non-target species, on the basis of
the best available scientific assessments and information and including
monitoring and control measures and ensuring fishing effort, capacity and catch
limits are commensurate with the stocks (UN GA 64/72 para 119 d). ·
Strengthen data collection (UN GA 64/72 para 119
d). 2.2. Context:
related areas of the fisheries policy The Basic Regulation in the Common Fisheries Policy[12] circumscribes the legal framework for the conservation, management
and exploitation of ‘living aquatic resources’. It obliges adopting
conservation measures in a precautionary approach and to minimise the impact of
fishing on the marine eco-system. These basic obligations are highly relevant
for managing deep-sea fisheries. It also imposes an obligation to adopt management plans as far as
necessary to maintain stocks within safe biological limits or to restore such
limits. This obligation cannot be directly used for developing a specific
management for deep-sea stocks because biological reference points are not
known for these stocks. Neither does the obligation to manage stocks in a way that allows
extracting the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) directly affect deep-sea stocks,
because the scientific knowledge is too scarce to apply this concept. A large
scientific projects ("deepfishman") is ongoing that will try to
identify management approaches for data-poor situations based on secondary
indicators, given that the primary indicator (fishing mortality (F) exercised
on the stock) is not known. Concerning the level of detail, the Basic Regulation does not
contain any provision on managing specific fisheries or stocks. The Habitats Directive[13] obliges Member States to create a network of sites to protect biodiversity,
called the network of NATURA 2000. To the extent that a protection measure
intervenes with fisheries, the EU regulates the fisheries part of the
protection measure based on the CFP. Marine offshore sites of NATURA 2000 are
still in development, and only a few have been created already. Reefs are
explicitly mentioned as possible objects of NATURA 2000 protection measures.
The reform of the Basic Regulation of the CFP foresees introducing a specific
procedure for channelling Member State requests on the CFP part of designations
under NATURA 2000. The Data Collection Framework (DCF) is based on Council Regulation
(EC) No 199/2008.[14] It establishes the principles and standards for programs of data
collection for the CFP. The deep-sea fisheries can represent a metier on which
data needs to be collected according to the DCF. However, the current
disaggregation level of the metiers in this framework is too broad as to allow
distinguishing all deep-sea fisheries in the recurrent data assemblage.
Therefore, the access regime obliges Member States to collect specific data
from vessels that are engaged in deep-sea fisheries. The Western Waters Regulation[15] establishes annual fishing
effort ceilings for demersal fisheries in large areas of the North-East
Atlantic and around the adjacent outermost regions. Until 2003, it also
covered deep-sea fisheries, but those were excluded after the adoption of the
access regulation. 2.3. Problems The four fundamental
problems of deep-sea fishing, which are also apparent in the North-East Atlantic, are: a) the high vulnerability of these stocks to fishing; many of them will
only sustain fishing pressure over a longer period that is economically not
viable; b) fishing with bottom trawls destroys or risks destroying
irreplaceable benthic habitats (vulnerable marine ecosystems) which represent
main sources of biodiversity in the deep sea. The extent of destruction that
already occurred is unknown; c) fishing with bottom trawls for deep-sea species produces medium to high
levels of undesired catch of deep-sea species; d) determining the sustainable level of fishing pressure via scientific
advice is particularly difficult. In addition to these fundamental problems, there are problems of
efficiency, coherence and effectiveness of the current access regime which
to some extent aimed at overcoming the four basic problems; namely: e) The scope of fleets concerned is too large and too inflexible (lack
of effectiveness as the regime is not targeted enough) f)
The regime does not allow the transposition of
NEAFC measures (lack of efficiency) g) After the adoption of the new control regulation[16], the regime is partly redundant and the link to the control
standards is unclear (lack of coherence); h) The separate data collection is of very limited use to scientific
advisory bodies, although constituting an administrative burden[17] (lack of effectiveness and lack of coherence with the Data
Collection Framework). Among these technical shortcomings, the Commission's review of 2007
already identified the following: scope of the fleet concerned is too large (e);
lack of guidance on control in designated ports (g) and on sampling programs (h);
lack of reporting follow-up by Member States (h). In 2010, STECF confirmed[18] that the data collection on fishing effort and catches was
inappropriate for scientific analysis, both concerning method and quality (h). Following this review report, the Commission did not take immediate
steps for improving the access regime. Concerning the control aspect, DG MARE
maintained deep-sea fisheries on its inspection programmes in Member States, in
order to emphasize the importance of effective control of these fisheries and
to help Member States in improving their control system. The control problems
have not been markedly serious and certainly not as serious as in some fisheries
of commercially high importance (cod, mackerel, bluefin tuna, hake). 2.4. Main
problems: unsustainable fishing, risk to VMEs, undesired catch, poor scientific
advice Deep-sea stocks are fish
stocks caught in waters beyond the main fishing grounds of continental shelves.
They are distributed on the continental slopes or associated with seamounts.
These species are slow-growing and long-lived, which makes them particularly
vulnerable to fishing activity. Some species like blue ling and black
scabbardfish grow faster and live shorter than others (e.g. orange roughy,
deep-sea sharks and roundnose grenadier), and are thus relatively less
vulnerable. The vulnerability to fishing also depends on whether the species
can be targeted in local aggregations, which is the case for orange roughy,
blue ling and alfonsinos. The biological state
of deep-sea stocks is unknown. Based on the information available, some of
the stocks are considered depleted (orange roughy, two species of sharks, red
seabream in the Bay of Biscay). Other stocks are considered overfished in view
of rapid declines in catches per deployed fishing effort, such as roundnose
grenadier. For the remainder, the fisheries are considered unsustainable.
Some of them have stabilised in recent years at low harvest levels, which can
be attributed to reduced fishing activity following the reduction in fishing
opportunities. Scientists in general
recommend reducing the catch levels until signs of population increase come
from the stocks. In case were exploitation levels over a series of years do not
seem to have had a detrimental effect on the stocks, scientists advise that the
fishery could be kept stable. In other cases, scientists advise that the
fishery should not expand or catches should be brought back to levels before
the expansion of fishing activity.[19] For the few stocks for
which scientists have advised a concrete precautionary catch level, the
corresponding TACs have been reduced in order to approach these levels. The
situation in 2012 will be as follows[20]: Species/area || Advised max. catch level (tonnes) || TAC 2012 (tonnes) Deep-sea sharks || Reduce to lowest level || 0 Black scabbard fish North-Western waters || 2.000 || 2.179 Black scabbard fish Iberian waters and Azores || 2.800 || 3.348 Roundnose grenadier North-Western waters || Less than 6.000 || 6.525 Orange roughy || Reduce to lowest level || 0 Red seabream Southern Spain || 500 || 780 Red seabream Azores || 1.050 || 1.136 Fishing by bottom trawls
probably represents the greatest threat to VMEs based on coral and sponge
grounds.[21] Any
long-lived
sessile organisms that stand proud of the seabed will be
highly vulnerable to destruction by towed demersal fishing gear. The vast majority of bottom trawling is currently shallower than
1500 m, while corals are known to occur as deep as 3800 m. However, the
diversity and abundance of corals and sponges peaks between depths of 800–1500
m meaning that in fact the majority of those VMEs may be at risk of impact. The
most obvious impact of trawling on reef corals is mechanical damage caused by
the gear itself. The impact of trawled gear will kill the coral polyps and
break up the reef structure. The breakdown of this structure will alter the
hydrodynamic and sedimentary processes as well as cause a loss of shelter
around the reef. Organisms dependent on these features will have a much less
suitable habitat and reef recovery may not be possible or could be seriously
impaired. The scale of effects will depend on the scale and frequency of any
trawling operations. Damage will range from a decrease in the size of the reef,
and a consequent decrease in abundance and diversity of associated fauna, to a
complete disintegration of the reef and its replacement with a low-diversity
disturbed community. It is likely that the
majority of trawling impact to VMEs happened between 1970 and 1990. After 2000,
fishing effort has largely declined in offshore and deep-water areas. Furthermore,
efforts to protect cold-water coral habitats in the past decade (Hatton bank, Rockall,
Porcupine slope and Darwin mounds) have likely further reduced the relative
proportion of coral habitats being affected by human activity. Sponge grounds
in the North-East Atlantic have received no specific protection measures and it
is likely that there is still a heavy impact of fishing on sponges in certain
areas. There is also less incentive for fishers to avoid areas where non-reefal
corals occur because there are no gear damaging consequences. While there are
many observations of corals and sponges being trawled by commercial fishing
operations, there are very few records with precise information on quantity.
While research vessel surveys do usually record accurately the quantities of
VME by-catch, there are very few occasions when more than a few kg have been
caught in the last decade. Bottom trawls are only likely to retain a small
fraction of corals and sponges due to their fragile nature. The estimated rates of
undesired catch in observed trawl fisheries are on average between 20 and 30%
in weight[22], but can go beyond 50% (main species: afterwards discarded is baird's
smoothhead).[23] Rates of undesired catch (primarily of the deep-sea species
rabbitfish) in gillnet fisheries targeting anglerfish went easily beyond 50% of
the catch; in hake gillnet fisheries, discard rates used to be highly volatile,
between 2 and 80%, on average 30%.[24] In view of this, and in view of the destructive impact of lost and
abandoned nets continuing ghost fishing in the deep sea[25] the Community has banned gillnets from depths below 600m since 2006
and restricted it below 200m (transitional measure). Consequently, today there
are no gillnet fisheries targeting deep-sea species. They are a by-catch in
anglerfish and hake fisheries above 600m. Rates of undesired catch in longline
fisheries are much lower. Discarded fish does not
survive. These fisheries with high discards tend to deplete the whole fish
community biomass. Depletion of dominant species can induce major changes to
fish communities through removing key predatory or forage fish. [26] As a general obstacle to
proper management, the poor information on deep-sea stocks does not
allow scientists to assess the stocks’ status, neither in terms of absolute
population size nor fishing
mortality. There are several reasons for this: Data series from commercial
catches are short, they often lack discard information and information
particularly valuable for assessment like fishing depth. The longevity and low
growth makes it impossible to structure the stock into age classes and to
assess the effect of fishing on the stock by changes in the length or age
structure of catches. Scientific surveys do not cover their whole distribution
and are very expensive. 2.5. The
affected sector: metiers, catches, economic
importance Mostly affected is the primary
production sector engaged in wild fisheries. Deep-sea fisheries as defined
by the access regime are currently practiced by fleets from (in the order of
effort deployed in 2008 according to MS notifications): France, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Lithuania and Denmark. Of these Member States, France accounts for 79% of the fishing effort, and the
three most active countries (France, Spain and Portugal) together for 93%. Deep-sea species are harvested by very different types of fleet:
on the one hand, capital-intensive large trawlers that are also present in
other fisheries and that have a wide range of operation (France, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark). On the other hand, coastal fleets of smaller vessels
that use handlines and longlines in deep-waters of coastal areas that have a
very short shelf area (Portugal). While these vessels might be less dynamic in
their exploitation pattern, they are more difficult to be brought under
management and control measures (lack of space for observers on board, lack of
VMS-monitoring or electronic logbook, multitude of landing places etc). A short
description of the main fisheries is given in Annex
IV: overview on deep-sea fisheries in the North-East Atlantic The overall importance
of deep-sea catches is small: The 34.434 tonnes of deep-sea species landed from
the North-East Atlantic in 2008 represent only about 1% of the overall landings
(3.563.711 tonnes) from the North-East Atlantic.[27] In the regional context, the picture might be very different. For
instance, in the Azores deep-sea species are responsible for 24% of the
landings and 51% of the value (first sale), and in Madeira for about one third.
The landings of deep-sea species have in general decreased.
Looking at the species subject to quota-management, this decrease is only
visible in the figures since 2005 (decrease of 35% from 2005 to 2009), as some
important stocks were not under quota before. Annex
V: list of deep-sea species and landings per Member State
Annex VI: Evolution of the landings of quota-species The value of landings
of deep-sea species by EU fleets is estimated for 2008 at 78,9 million EUR.[28] The main species marketed in France attained an average price on
first sale of 2,40 EUR, which is below the price of most sought-after whitefish
(cod: 2,85 EUR, hake: 3,04 EUR).[29] The highly-priced orange roughy can currently not be landed by EU
vessels as the fishing opportunities are fixed at zero. Annex
VII: List of species by landings in weight and value With regard to the relevant
fleets, there are 145 fleet segments that report catches of deep-sea
species. However, only 24 metiers target deep-sea species (2008).[30] Annex
VIII: Relation between deep-sea metier and fleet segment;
Annex IX: Landings made by deep-sea metiers For the 14 fleet segments
which have been identified as housing deep-sea metiers, the landings and revenues
attributable to deep-sea species can be compared to the overall landings
and revenues. The deep-sea related landings per fleet segment are
responsible for between 1 and 60 % of the overall landings, and for between 0,3
and 66% of the overall revenues. This shows that some segments heavily depend
on the sale of deep-sea fish. This is particularly true for the fleet segments
identified in Portugal. It is to be noted that at the level of business, the
dependence could be high also within other segments, as the fleet segments are
based on vessel characteristics, not undertakings. The 14 fleet segments
identified are hardly profitable, and their profitability is slightly
lower than the average of all fleet segments.[31] Annex
X: Deep-sea related fleet segments with their economic performance It is not possible to
identify the number of employment posts in the primary sector, the
auction places, transport, processing and markets that depend on landings of
deep-sea species. However, the Member State most active in the fishery, France, estimates that the two companies most involved in deep-sea fishing and landing the
large majority of the species count 300 fishermen; parts of the respective
vessels are engaged in other fisheries. Also, there are 200 fish mongers
specialised in deep-sea fish.[32] The biggest processing business employs more than 300 persons, and
one of their processing plants in Lorient sources to a considerable extent from
deep-sea fishing activity.[33] The four ports most related to deep-sea landings are Boulogne sur Mer, Lorient, Concarneau and Le Guilvinec. The ports of Lorient and Boulogne account 26% and 6%, respectively, of deep-sea species in their overall landings.[34] 2.6. Problem evolution and underlying driving forces Before 2002, deep-sea
fisheries had developed without accompanying management measures of the Community.
While some fisheries, in particular Portuguese ones, are long established and
relatively stable, the trawl fisheries in the North-Western waters developed
rapidly from the end of the eighties, partly in response to a starting decline
in demersal fisheries on the continental shelf. As this decline is not yet
reversed, alternative opportunities are not readily available. In addition,
some of the large trawlers also depend on access to deep-sea resources of Faroese Islands, and the corresponding annual agreements with the EU have become more and
more difficult to reach. Like is the case for all
wild fish stocks, leaving deep-sea fisheries unrestricted leads to a race by
fishing undertakings to take possession of a free resource, without having
sufficient regard to the sustainability of the exploitation level or knock-on effects
on the environment. For example, the valuable orange roughy species in
north-western waters is considered depleted after only some years of
exploitation, as well as the valuable red seabream in the Bay of Biscay. In the
case of deep-sea species, restricting the fishing activity is of particular
importance due to the fact that the recovery from depletion of slow-growing
stocks might take a very long time or might fail. After 2002, the fishing
pressure on deep-sea species has fallen considerably, as have the number of
vessels engaged in these fisheries, in particular among trawlers. This is due
to stock depletion, reduced fishing opportunities and technical restrictions
for bottom gears, in particular trawls and gillnets. Trawling in deep waters
wide off-shore is energy- and thus cost-intensive. Some trawlers were able to
reduce their current costs by landing into foreign harbours that are closer to
the fishing grounds, but the economic viability of the activity has often been
questioned, particularly in view of subsidies. There is an economic incentive
to switch to passive gear (in particular longlines), as this gear is less
fuel-intensive. Reluctance for gear-change normally is due to the expected
change in catch composition, technical problems, need for investment, and lack
of expertise and experience. The obligation of the
Member States to show a good environmental status of marine waters by 2020[35] fosters a critical assessment of deep-sea fisheries including
environmental and biodiversity aspects. This political
driver will be further strengthened by the Commission’s Post-2010 Biodiversity
Strategy. Wide-spread concerns in
the public about biodiversity and unsustainable fishing practices create demand
for products that stem from a production process not harmful to the environment
and preserve the resource base. 2.7. Grounds
for EU action and scope 2.7.1. Necessity
and subsidiarity The proposal concerns a field of exclusive Union
competence (Articles 3(1d), 38 to 44 TFEU), therefore subsidiarity does not
apply. Member States are able to
develop measures for their own fleets that lead to a more sustainable
management of deep-sea resources. However, most deep-sea fisheries are shared
between Member States (and sometimes the fleet of one Member State are mostly
present in the waters of another Member State), and this makes Member States
reluctant to submit their own fleets to constraining measures unless the same
or equivalent rules will apply to neighbouring fleets. In addition, the
scientific knowledge on deep-sea stocks can only improve when common standards
for data sourcing are followed, otherwise scientists would not be able to
compare data stemming from various Member States. 2.7.2. Scope This report develops policy
options for managing deep-sea fisheries in the North-East Atlantic which
respond to the problems listed in this section. Concerning the insufficient
scientific knowledge-base (main problem (d)), this problem concerns data
sourced from activity of commercial vessels, and data sourced from scientific
surveys and other scientific probes. Only the former aspect (data sourcing from
commercial vessels) is addressed here. On the latter aspect, the Commission has
asked the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) for
advice on improving scientific deep-sea surveys. The advice was issued in April
2011 and will feed into the review of the Data Collection Regulation scheduled
for 2012. 3. Objectives 3.1. General objective General objective of the
proposal is to ensure sustainable exploitation of deep-sea stocks according to
the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield, thereby limiting the environmental
impact as much as possible. As long as data and method have not achieved the
requisite quality level allowing a management towards MSY, the fisheries have
to be managed according to the precautionary approach. These objectives are in
line with the EU 2020 Strategy announced by the Barroso Commission in 2010,
because they would pave the way towards sustainable fishing of deep-sea species
and contribute to employment stability in coastal areas. With regard to growth,
the current level of fishing activity is considered unsustainably high, and
therefore growth could not come from quantity, but only from quality of fish. 3.2. Specific objectives Specific objectives are (linked to the specific
problems listed in the problem definition): Main objectives: a) To comply with scientific advice on precautionary catch levels; to facilitate
the future development of MSY-management for these data-poor stocks; b) To reduce the impact of bottom gears on the seafloor in order to
reduce the risk of damage to VMEs; c) To reduce the level of undesired deep-sea species in the catch; d) To ensure the collection of all data needed for improving scientific
advice. Technical objectives: e) To focus the rules on the metiers that are targeting deep-sea
species and make the metier-definition adaptable to evolving scientific advice
and fleet behaviour; f)
To provide for the transposition of NEAFC
conservation measures; g) To make the access regime coherent with the control regulation; h) To harmonise the special data collection with the general standards
and ensure follow-up. 4. Policy
options 4.1. Separate
regulation i)
Maintaining a distinct regulation for
deep-sea fisheries is justified by the fact that deep-sea fisheries have
distinct biological characteristics (slow growth, longevity, late maturity, low
natural mortality) and can be distinguished from other fisheries through the
concept of metier, although there are overlaps with demersal fisheries on the
shelf that take deep-sea species as a by-catch (fisheries on anglerfish, tusk,
ling, hake, blue whiting). The Union has strongly advocated international
standards on the management of deep-sea fisheries[36], and within the
international fora it is accepted that management of deep-sea fisheries needs
tailored measures. Maintaining a distinct regulation will also allow the Union
to pursue the sustainable management of deep-sea fisheries with Northern
countries (Norway, Russia, Iceland, Faroese) which are less committed to this
policy. During the consultation with stakeholders, no Member State has questioned the usefulness of a specific regulation, and NGOs have insisted on the
need to continue a stand-alone regulation. j)
The future basic regulation for the CFP
evolving under the reform process is not a suitable place for regulating
specifically the access to deep-sea fisheries, because the basic regulation
will not relate to specific fisheries. An integration of the access regime into the Western Waters Regulation
is not preferred for the following reasons: Due to the political nature of its
core elements[37], the Western Waters Regulation is closely related to the reform
process, unlike the access regime; its future depends on the political
decisions to be taken with the reform. Furthermore, the Western Waters
Regulation only concerns one element of management, namely effort regulation,
and is designed as a general access limitation, not as an instrument to manage
specific fisheries; it does not deal with scientific data collection. 4.2. Option 1 – no change/indispensable update The first policy option is to continue the access regime as it is
currently running. As an indispensable update, the access regime would be
aligned with new control regulation. No stakeholder has requested to continue the
access regime as it is. This baseline case would be influenced by the CFP reform. The
following new topics[38] are relevant for the future of deep-sea fisheries: Highly relevant: Discard ban: The reform proposal might contain
a discard ban directly applicable to the main deep-sea species for which catch
limits are established. This policy would be phased in stepwise, addressing
technically problematic fisheries like deep-sea fisheries at a later stage, and
foresee Commission implementation measures. Procedure for adopting fisheries measures in the pursuit of designating
areas of NATURA 2000: Member States are currently increasing efforts on
identifying marine sites suitable for protection under the Habitats Directive,
which could consist of deep-sea coral reefs. The new procedure would allow
introducing the fisheries management part (e.g. closed areas). Mandatory system of individually transferable quotas: This mechanism will induce capacity reduction as the quotas will
over time accumulate with the more efficient part of the fleet. The extent of
impact will depend on the safeguard against monopolisation and for small-scale
fleets. Indirectly or later relevant: Obligatory management according to MSY:
not yet applicable to deep-sea fisheries for lack of stock assessment. Results-based fisheries management with regionally coordinated
design of implementation measures: the results to
be achieved need to be formulated in management plans and other instruments,
and are not established by the reform-proposal itself. 4.3. Option 2– ban deep-sea
fisheries A second option would consist
of closing fisheries that are targeting deep-sea species. In the context of the
consultation on the access regime, no stakeholder has requested to ban deep-see
fishing; however, in the context of fixing TACs in 2010, NGOs had requested the
phasing out of deep-sea fisheries as they have not proved to be sustainable. 4.4. Option
3– ban gears that are most harmful to the deep-sea ecosystem A third option would ban
gears that are most harmful to the deep-sea ecosystem. Those are trawls, for
their high levels of undesired catch of deep-sea species and the risk of
damaging bottom habitats, and gillnets for their negative impact on the
ecosystem when they were used unsustainably in the deep sea before transitional
restrictions came into force. The technical solution would consist in either
banning those gears from the fleets that are allowed to target deep-sea species
(sup-option 1: fishing authorisation) or by banning those gears from
operating deeper than at a certain depths (sub-option 2: spatial).
This option would respond to the main problems on damage to VMEs and undesired
catch. In accordance with applicable rules of the European Fisheries Fund, financial
assistance could be made available for the change of gear during a transitional
phase, to be funded by the existing envelope. For other bottom gears, their
range of operation could be limited to existing fishing patterns, and only
allowed to expand after assessment of their risk to VMEs. The other problems would be tackled by adaptations to the existing
rules: The problem of
unsustainable fishing could be reduced by a rule that does not allow setting
annual fishing opportunities at a higher level than precautionary levels
advised by scientific bodies. Such a rule would not prejudice the development
of MSY-conform harvest rules in the future, as it would only relate to
management according to the precautionary principle. In accordance with
scientific recommendation, fishing opportunities could be fixed by way of
regional fishing effort maxima, provided that measures against the capture of
most vulnerable deep-sea species are in place and the vessels have to land all
of their catches. The problem of
disintegrated data collection and its dissemination shortcomings could be tackled
by defining the data collection standards for deep-sea fisheries as part of the
existing Data Collection Framework and allow the Commission to close the
fishery if data is not collected. The problem of
inefficient effort reporting would be tackled by discontinuing this reporting
tool. The analysis of effort levels for management purposes could be done by
data calls on scientific data according to the data collection regulation,
under which the link according to the previous paragraph ensures data
collection specifically on deep-sea metiers. The problem of the
current access regulation affecting too many vessels could be tackled by distinguishing
fishing authorisations for by-catch from those for targeted fisheries, whereby
the thrust of measures would only concern target fisheries. For fine-tuning,
the Commission should be empowered to amend of the list constituting deep-sea
species and the elements that help distinguishing a target fishery from a
by-catch fishery. The lack of efficiency
caused by the absence of a mechanism to transpose NEAFC technical measures
could be solved by a provision that describes the NEAFC measures in force and
empowers the Commission to amend those measures or add similar measures
following adoption in NEAFC. Alternatively to incorporating such a mechanism
into the reviewed access regime, this objective could be fulfilled by providing
such a mechanism via the technical measures regulation that is going to replace
the transitional measures, which are valid only until end of 2012. Finally, the redundant
control provisions could be abolished, and a provision added which specifies the
enhanced control standards which apply according to the control regulation
(equivalent to the control of the implementation of multi-annual plans). NGOs have since years
advocated the banning of harmful gears (trawls and gillnets), or as a minimum
approach individual prior environmental impact assessments. The stakeholders
using trawls in the deep-sea fisheries consider such a measure disproportionate
mainly for five reasons: that a gear change might be too expensive or targeting
the same species with other gear might fail; that there is no proof of
destruction of coral reefs, and that if this could happen, destruction would
have occurred in the past, in particular in the orange roughly fishery; that
the fishery does not longer expand; that the enterprises are willing to
cooperate in discard reduction measures; and that this could result in a
general political stigma against trawling which cannot be accepted, as the
fishing pattern and impact varies from fishery to fishery. 4.5. Option
4 – access conditional on international management standards
for the High Sea A fourth option would incorporate
management standards developed by UN/FAO. The main new elements would be: –
Conduct impact assessments before allowing bottom
fishing; –
Identify where VMEs occur or are likely to
occur; establish protocols of VME encounters; –
Close areas where encounters with VMEs above a
certain weight of indicator biomass has occurred.. These measures would
aim at solving the main problem of risks to VMEs. For the reduction of
undesired catch, which is a topic not addressed by those standards, option 4
would either oblige vessels to drastically reduce discards (sub-option 1:
discard reduction targets), or move towards a mandatory regime of
regional effort management where all catches have to be retained on board (sub-option
2: regional effort limits). The other problems would be tackled as
described in option 3. NGOs and the
South-Western RAC were in favour of submitting EU deep-sea fisheries to
international standards developed for the High Sea. Most Member States were in
favour of simplifying the access regime, which is not compatible with this
option. 4.6. Option
5 – instrument for the implementation of NEAFC decisions, extending those decisions
to EU waters where possible Option 5 would consist in reducing the regulatory content of the
access regime to the minimum required to fulfil the obligations resulting from
the NEAFC resolutions, and extending those measures to EU waters where
possible. This would in essence mean to limit and monitor overall fishing
effort expended in the NEAFC Regulatory Area (international waters) and EU
waters (current limit is 65% of the 2003 fishing effort), to transpose
technical measures (e.g. ban on gillnets, area closures, VME encounter
protocols), and to undertake a documentation of the fishing "footprint"
in EU waters, within the aim of limiting the need for environmental impact
assessment to areas which are not already heavily fished. No stakeholder was generally in favour of this option. However, France was in favour of freezing the "footprint" of bottom activity, and Member
States often requested not to advance with burdensome unilateral measures as
long as a level playing filed at the international stage is not ensured. NGOs criticise the performance of NEAFC protection measures in the
area of deep-sea fisheries, which they consider insufficient. However, given
that most recently NEAFC has put more emphasis on developing a deep-sea policy
in accordance with UN standards, this opinion might evolve as well. 5. Analysis
of impacts The access regime is a framework regulation for which impacts are
difficult to estimate in quantitative terms. However, where concrete elements
for a quantitative estimation are available, those are presented. 5.1. Overall assessment of impacts 5.1.1. Economic impact and impact on
fisheries management Option || impact 1 – no change || The capacity and effort limits constrain the fishery, and stability of these limits is foreseeable until 2012 (NEAFC horizon for reviewing the effort limits). In medium term perspective, the discard ban envisaged by the CFP reform will put economic pressure on fleets which will have to sort, store and land unwanted/ un-marketable fish. The introduction of ITQs will rationalise the capacity base of production and thus reduce costs. The MSY-approach will only be useable after substantial improvement in scientific knowledge on the stocks. A change in income from changing fishing opportunities cannot be predicted, because the maximum sustainable yield provided by these species is not known. In case that TACs continue to be reduced towards precautionary catch levels, the turnover will be impacted by less available quota. 2 – banning DS fisheries || Azores fishing sector would lose half of its income (and therefore employment by up to this amount), Madeira fishing sector would lose one third of income. French port Lorient would lose a quarter of its turnover. Three French fleets of 15 high-performing vessels would lose about 30% of their income and thus would have to rationalise or find alternative harvest opportunities; loss of specialised processing industry in France. 3 – banning harmful gears || Loss of turnover in France and Spain generated with species that can only be targeted with trawls (e.g. roundnose grenadier). Possibility to target other main species (black scabbard, blue ling) with longlines like practiced in Portugal and Northern countries. Investment in gear, vessel modification and know-how necessary. EFF could be used for financial assistance, depending on the national operational program. A by-catch allowance for those gears when targeting other species would cushion the negative economic effect and ensure that unavoidable by-catch in deep-sea species does not need to be discarded. No significant impact on gillnet fisheries because those are currently not targeting deep-sea. TACs would better regulate the fishing mortality, because the remaining gears would have much less discards. A change in income from varying fishing opportunities cannot be predicted, because the maximum sustainable yield provided by these species is not known. 4 – High Sea standards || High inception costs for conducting and documenting environmental impact assessments. Costs are unknown as this is a new concept only applied in the High Sea where so far no Member State has finalised an impact assessment. Costs will depend on the available knowledge on the seabed, the type and operation range of the vessel, and additional research needed. Costs might strangle small businesses in outermost regions which do not have access to finance, have low income and whose bottom gear (longlines) is less harmful; therefore an exemption might be necessary. 5 – NEAFC alignment || The effort limits agreed in NEAFC are partly restricting, and their further development after 2012 is subject to negotiation. EU-TACs will have to continue for controlling the catch of high-value species that are particularly vulnerable, but there would be no obligatory guidance on the TAC levels. 5.1.2. Social impact Option || impact 1 – no change || No impact. 2 – banning DS fisheries || Loss of employment in outermost regions (see 5.1.1) where alternative jobs are scarce. Employment figures on the fisheries sector in Madeira and Azores are unreliable, but several hundred could be affected. 3 – banning harmful gears || The loss of parts of the turnover in the French and Spanish trawl fleets might force scaling down of workforce, depending on alternative fishing opportunities that make good for it. 4 – High Sea standards || If discard reduction is pursued by regional fishing effort management, fleets that are active in a fishery will benefit from a regional "ring-fencing" of activity, deterring the development of new fisheries on deep-sea species exercised by other, e.g. more modern type of fleet. 5 – NEAFC alignment || No impact. 5.1.3. Impact on the environment Option || impact 1 – no change || Reduction in by-catches depends on the development of technical measures which so far have only rudimentary been tested in DS trawl fisheries. With the discard ban coming with the CFP reform, unwanted fish will have to be landed, which gives fishermen an incentive to use more selective techniques. Reduction of the risk of VME damage depends on the designation of marine protected areas, which is an ongoing process requiring a lot of expensive research. The CFP reform plans to foresee a special procedure for adopting fisheries closures in the context of creating marine sites of NATURA 2000 2 – banning DS fisheries || The environmental problems of VME-destruction, high discards and high vulnerability of stocks would be effectively solved in all waters of the NE Atlantic, excluding those caused by foreign vessels. 3 – banning harmful gears || Remaining gears would have much less discards; the main risk to VME damage would be eliminated. Damage risk due to bottom longlines remains, but is considered much less severe. 4 – High Sea standards || If implemented properly, VMEs would be protected from the risk of damage. Reduction in by-catches depends on the development of technical measures which so far have not been tested in DS trawl fisheries. Otherwise, following the discard ban, unwanted fish will have to be landed, which does not have a direct effect on the environment. 5 – NEAFC alignment || If implemented properly, VMEs would, after several years of footprint documentation/arbitration, be protected against damage from bottom gears. The added value is nevertheless questionable because Member State documentation of NATURA 2000 offshore areas of protection is already ongoing. Discard policy in NEAFC does so far not cover deep-sea species. 5.1.4. Burden and costs for public administration Option || impact 1 – no change || No additional costs. The recurrent expenses on monitoring the fishing effort are not effectively spent, as the information is considered being of low use by scientists. Inefficient existence of two separate systems for effort monitoring (separate reporting under access regime (Article 9) and data calls under data collection regulation). 2 – banning DS fisheries || In France and Spain, administrative control capacity that was dedicates to deep-sea fisheries would be freed for other fisheries of more economic importance. In Portuguese outermost regions, administration would supposedly have to be scaled down in view of the eroding economic activity. No more costs from separate effort and logbook follow-up (estimated being several thousand Euros per Member State ). 3 – banning harmful gears || No more costs from separate effort reporting. Financial assistance to support gear change is already programmed or could be reprogrammed within the existing financial envelope (European Fisheries Fund). 4 – High Sea standards || No more costs from separate effort reporting. The costs associated with impact assessments are expected to be passed onto the businesses (see 5.1.1). The large amount of parallel management measures requested will increase the control needs and therefore the administrative costs (no estimation possible) 5 – NEAFC alignment || One-off costs of documenting and approving the footprint of bottom activity in EU waters, estimated at least one expert man-year per Member State[39]. 5.1.5. Transposition
and compliance aspects 1 – no change || The current access regime has suffered implementation shortcomings, but those are not considered material. However, the reporting tool used for assessing compliance with global effort limits agreed in NEAFC is considered unreliable and has not been designed for this purpose, but for gathering more detailed scientific information (Article 9). 2 – banning DS fisheries || Monitoring that certain species are not caught poses recurrent control problems. For key species, the control could be facilitated by imposing zero landing/marketing obligations. 3 – banning harmful gears || The transposition and compliance depends much on the technique selected for implementing the ban. If the ban refers to the depth in which the gear is deployed, a new control mechanism (on fishing depth) would have to be employed which is not at hand today and is no part of the major control reform that still needs to be implemented in practice. If the ban refers to the catch composition, it would use the same reference as employed for defining the deep-sea fisheries today, and the obligatory reporting of catches in electronic logbooks as required from 2011 could be used as a control mechanism. 4 – High Sea standards || The transposition and compliance might be hampered by the fact that a multitude of management measures apply in parallel, while the vessels engaged in these fisheries are particularly difficult to control by the nature of their operation (see evaluation of effectiveness below) 5 – NEAFC alignment || The control regime in NEAFC area is relatively strict which helps ensure compliance. The documentation of the bottom fishing footprint will be very difficult for small vessels and inactive vessels, and poses the problem of distinguishing between bottom gear vessels and pelagic ones (which is not visible from VMS data). The transposition of the footprint concept to EU waters would be extremely difficult for the control side if it reveals a patchwork of areas which in future could be fished or only under certain conditions. Vessels that fish in the water column (not on the bottom) would have to have access to all areas, making control even more difficult. 5.1.6. Third
country impacts 1 – no change || The access regime does not apply to third country vessels. The regime and associated TAC decisions have in the past been used to advocate stricter management for deep-sea species within NEAFC. However, NEAFC has started implementing the UN standards, so the access regime has less value as an argument today. 2 – banning DS fisheries || Some stocks that are classified by ICES and NEAFC as "deep" are being fished by Norwegian vessels in EU waters, namely tusk and ling. However, those would not be classified as "deep" under the ban because they have life characteristics more similar to shallower species. No direct impact on foreign vessels in NEAFC waters, which could be achieved only via negotiation 3 – banning harmful gears || No direct impact. The ban could be used to advocate a similar measure for foreign trawlers operating in NEAFC and targeting deep-sea species (level playing field). Gillnets are already banned from deep-sea fishing in NEAFC. 4 – High Sea standards || Gradual implementation of High Sea standards already ongoing in NEAFC area. 5 – NEAFC alignment || By limiting its policy to implementing measures agreed in NEAFC, the EU would lose the negotiation power coming from unilateral measures. 5.2. Summary of impacts Option || Advantages || Drawbacks 1 – no change || + No need to change administrative practice, no adaptation costs + Continuation of established framework provides stability + Re-establish policy consistency among CFP regulations (control). || - Does not address the problems identified with the current system (cf. Commission communication of 2007) - Member States and stakeholders are in favour of a more ambitious overhaul 2 – banning DS fisheries || + Strong reaction to the lack of proof for a sustainable fishery. + The environmental (VME) and biological problem (high vulnerability of target species) would be addressed. Effective protection of benthic habitats and the ecosystem at large || - Azorean fishermen would lose halve of their income, Madeira fishermen one third, probably loss of several hundreds of employment with limited alternatives. Lorient in France would lose 25% of its turnover, loss of jobs in the French processing industry. - Could be considered disproportionate because some deep-sea fisheries exist since long ago, and some key species seem to have life characteristics which allow sustainable exploitation. - Loss of data collection from commercial fisheries, on which the scientific advice relies; lack of willingness of MS to continue scientific surveys in fisheries which they do not exploit, therefore no improvement in advice - Northern states are not directly affected in international water, the level playing field will depend on the could “take over” the negotiation pressure that will be appropriate for this aspect of negotiations 3 – banning harmful gears || + Improved protection of benthic habitats and the ecosystem at large + Strong answer to the problem of undesired catch in the deep-sea fisheries + The ban could be combined with a more lean (simpler) update of the access regulation. + The vessels concerned could be assisted in changing towards less destructive gears in order to continue fishing for some key deep-sea species. || - VMEs like cold water corals also appear in shallower water, where trawling for other species would continue. However, this aspect is outside the scope of this impact assessment. - gears would also be banned from areas of the deep sea where there are no VMEs or where they are unlikely; 4 – High Sea standards || + All technical shortcomings of the existing regime would be addressed + Response to the international standards on deep-sea fishing || - Policy reliant on multiple individual measures that are difficult to define precisely and then to implement with sufficient assurance that they will be effective. Trawling would be banned by overregulation rather than by a straightforward measure. - Option would rely on measures that would have to be taken and implemented by Member States against vested interests. - The administrative burden to manage DS fisheries would increase 5 – NEAFC alignment || + From a conceptual point of view, effective protection of VMEs || - Costly and long preparation phase with unclear quality of the resulting footprint documentation - Difficult to implement with regard to small vessels and inactive vessels - Difficult to monitor in case of patchy area limits - Questionable added value in view of ongoing documentation of NATURA 2000 offshore areas of protection - EU would lose negotiation power coming from unilateral action towards more sustainable deep-sea fishing. In view of the strong drawbacks, options 2 and 5 are discarded.
Option 1 is discarded as well because it does not respond to shortcomings
identified, nor to stakeholder expectations. 6. Comparing
the options 6.1. Qualitative
assessment by option The qualitative
assessment of outcomes is based on DG MARE's experience with the impact of the
current access regime and with the implementation of measures similar to those
proposed in the options, in particular the prohibition of certain gears in
certain fisheries and the introduction of UN standards of managing deep-sea
fisheries in the High Sea in 2008[40] and in
NEAFC in 2009. 6.1.1. Comparison
with regard to effectiveness Effectiveness: The extent to which options achieve the
objectives of the proposal Recall:
General objective: General objective of the proposal is to ensure
sustainable exploitation of deep-sea stocks according to the concept of Maximum
Sustainable Yield, thereby limiting the environmental impact as much as
possible. As long as data and method have not achieved the requisite quality
level allowing a management towards MSY, the fisheries have to be managed
according to the precautionary approach. Recall:
Specific objectives: a)
To comply with
scientific advice on precautionary catch levels; to facilitate the future
development of MSY-management for these data-poor stocks; b)
To reduce the
impact of bottom gears on the seafloor in order to reduce the risk of damage to
VMEs; c)
To reduce the level
of undesired catch; d)
To ensure the
collection of all data needed for improving scientific advice. e)
To focus the rules
on the metiers that are targeting deep-sea species and make the
metier-definition adaptable to evolving scientific advice and fleet behaviour; f)
To provide for the
transposition of NEAFC conservation measures; g)
To make the access
regime coherent with the control regulation; h)
To harmonise the
special data collection with the general standards and ensure follow-up. Recall: Sub-options
of option 3 concern the implementation of the ban. Sub-option 1 would
ban bottom trawls and gillnets by not allowing to provide them with fishing
authorisations to target deep-sea species. Sub-option 2 would not allow
them to fish below a certain depth which would have to be established according
to scientific advice. The
sub-options of option 4 deal
with the problem of undesired catch which is not directly addressed by the
international standards but needs action nevertheless. Sub-option 1 of
option 4 would reduce undesired catch by imposing reduction targets in % of
catch, and ensure scientific estimation of discards for the metiers concerned. Sub-option
2 of option 4 would move the management towards obligatory regional fishing
effort limits in which all species would have to be landed. 6.1.1.1. Summary table O = neutral impact, + = positive impact,
++= very positive impact (relative to other options), - = negative impact, -- =
very negative impact (relative to other options), n.a. = not applicable as the
option does not cover this aspect Objective option || General objective || Specific objective a) || Specific objective b) || Specific objective c) || Specific objective d) and h) || Specific objective e) || Specific objective f) || Specific objective g) 3 - Banning harmful gears || ++ || + || ++ || ++ || + || + || + || + Sub-option 1: fishing authorisation || + || n.a. || ++ || ++ || n.a. || ++ || n.a. || n.a. Sub-option 2: spatial || + || n.a. || + || + || n.a. || +/° || n.a. || n.a. 4 – High-Sea standards || + || + || + || + || + || + || + || + Sub-option 1: discard-reduction targets || + || n.a. || n.a. || + || n.a. || n.a. || n.a. || n.a. Sub-option 2: regional effort limits || + || n.a. || n.a. || ++ || n.a. || n.a. || n.a. || n.a. 6.1.1.2. Discussion For the specific objectives
a), d), e), f), g) and h), the options provide the same solution (see chapter
4.4 and 4.5) and are therefore considered equivalent. The expected outcomes
with regard to objectives can be summarised as follows: a) (- To comply with
scientific advice on precautionary catch levels; to facilitate the future
development of MSY-management for these data-poor stocks - ): By regulating in
co-decision that recurrent decisions on the allocation of fishing opportunities
cannot go beyond what is scientifically advised as a precautionary level of
catches or fishing effort, it will be ensured that the scientific advice on
precautionary management is adhered to. As the rule only applies to the
precautionary framework, it leaves open the possibility to develop harvest
rules scientifically based on MSY in the future, and following those harvest
rules in recurrent decisions on the allocation of fishing opportunities. d) + h) (- To ensure
the collection of all data needed for improving scientific advice; to harmonise
the special data collection with the general standards and ensure follow-up -):
By enlarging the general data collection requirements towards fishing depth,
VMS position and logbook entries haul by haul, the additional data considered
necessary by scientists would be collected in the deep-sea metier. By linking
this data collection to recurrent notification exercises (VMS position,
electronic logbook reports), the administrative burden for the fishing
undertakings can be kept to a minimum. By incorporating the data collection on
the deep-sea metier into the standards of the general data collection, it will
be ensured that the data collected responds to the recurrent statistical
validity requirements, can be compares across Member States and will be channelled
though the established data processing and reporting flows, rather than being
stored "on the side". The obligation to sample deep-sea metiers
according to a specific metier definition is needed because otherwise the
biological data from the commercial fishery would sometimes be submerged in larger,
more disaggregated metiers. This obligation could be transferred into a
reviewed data collection regulation (2012) in case it will be decided to
incorporate metier-specific requirements. Finally, the need to enlarge
scientific surveys in deep-sea areas, as expressed by ICES in its advice to the
Commission of April 2011, will also be analysed in the context of the DCF
review 2012, when the list of international surveys eligible for financial
contributions will be scrutinised. e) ( - to focus the
rules on the metiers that are targeting deep-sea species and make the
metier-definition adaptable to evolving scientific advice and fleet behaviour -
): By defining a metier of deep-sea fishing (10% of deep sea catches per
fishing day), the special fishing authorisations can be split into two
categories, one for vessels targeting deep sea species, one for vessels the
catches of which are limited to y-catches only. All vessels would be subject to
the limit on vessel capacity in the fishery and on landing in designated ports,
but the other obligations and rules of the access regime (eligible gears,
limitation in range, effort limitations, data collection) would only apply to
vessels targeting deep-sea species, thus repairing one of the shortcomings of
the existing regime. The Commission would be empowered to modify or detail the
list of deep-sea species and the metier-definition according to scientific
advice and regional fishing pattern, thus allowing for an evolution of the regime
according to the reality of the fisheries and the improving scientific
knowledge. f) ( - To provide for
the transposition of NEAFC conservation measures - ): The implementation of
technical conservation measures agreed in NEAFC for the international waters of
the North-East Atlantic is a technical exercise which could be ensured by referring
to the currently applicable measures in the co-decision act and empowering the
Commission to amend or supplement those measures according to evolving
decisions within NEAFC, by way of delegated acts. Alternatively to
incorporating such a mechanism into the reviewed access regime, this objective
could be fulfilled by providing such a mechanism via the technical measures
regulation that is going to replace the transitional measures, which are valid
only until end of 2012. g) ( - To make the
access regime coherent with the control regulation - ): The new control
regulation contains a number of provisions similar to the existing access
regime. Alignment can be achieved by discontinuing those provisions. For the
remainder of measures, the access regime cold ensure control standards applied
to multi-annual stock management plans by stipulating that the precautionary
measures contained in the access regime shall have the same bearing as
multi-annual stock management measures, and by limiting landing possibilities
to designated ports, with prior notice. In addition, the access regime could
strengthen the control regulation's instrument of closing a fishery when
essential provisions of the conservation measure are not complied with, by
stipulating that the data collection obligations are to be considered also as
essential conservation measures in the particular case of deep-sea species. Concerning VME
protection (objective b), the banning of bottom trawls from targeted fishing is
considered more effective than implementing the High-Sea standards related to
VME-protection (prior impact assessment, encounter protocols, search for VME sites).
Bottom trawls would no longer be present on the deep-sea grounds, irrespective
of the results of a risk assessment. Risk assessment according to the international
standards is influenced by the notion of "intensity of prior
presence", and this would give rise to qualification problems[41], in particular where vessels have old and patchy track records but
have since limited their area of operation. Concerning the reduction of undesired
catch (objective c), option 3 is also considered more effective, because rather
than trying to impose on vessels discard targets which are not known to be
reachable beforehand, the gears with the highest undesired catch would no
longer be employed. Such a strong policy is considered proportionate in this
special case because of the high vulnerability of these species, and the impact
of trawls reducing the biodiversity in those depths. Within option 4, the move
towards regional effort levels is preferred over discard reduction targets, in
view of affirmative scientific advice on the utility of effort management[42]. Within the more
effective option, the sub-option which introduces the ban via restricted
fishing authorisations is considered more effective than the sub-option which
would ban the gears from a certain depth. There are three reasons for this:
First, a spatial approach would require control of depth levels at which gears
are employed, and such a control instrument is currently not implemented.
Second, the depth limits would have to be established according to scientific
advice on local occurrence of deep-sea species, because those inhabit varying
depth ranges.[43] Third, the distribution area of deep-sea species overlap with the
distribution area of other species on the lower part of the continental shelf[44]; therefore a depth-criterion would constrain also fisheries which
are not considered for this measure. By contrast, the sub-option 'fishing
authorisation' would refer to the catch composition during the trip, and
information on the catch composition becomes in future more reliable through
the obligation to send electronic logbook information.[45] This
aspect also influences the comparison of effectiveness with regard to the
objective of focussing the access regime towards the target metier (e): If
other metiers will be affected by the new restrictions as well, the focus would
still be too large. 6.1.2. Comparison
with regard to efficiency and coherence Efficiency: The extent to which objectives can be
achieved for a given level of resources/ at least cost Coherence: The extent to which options are coherent
with the overarching objectives of EU policy, in particular the reformed CFP
and the revision of the Data Collection Framework foreseen in 2012. For
ease of simplicity, the comparison is given as a global appreciation with
regard to the policy objectives. 6.1.2.1. Summary table Assessment criterion option || Efficiency || Coherence 3 - Banning harmful gears || ++ || + Sub-option 1: fishing authorisation || + || + Sub-option 2: spatial || +/° || + 4 – High-Sea standards || +/° || Partly +, partly - Sub-option 1: discard-reduction targets || + || + Sub-option 2: regional effort limits || + || Partly +, partly - 6.1.2.2. Discussion Regarding efficiency,
option 3 gets a higher rating than option 4. This is because option 3 bans
harmful gear from these fisheries directly, whereas option 4 poses ever
increasing conditions on the use of bottom gears. Thus, option 4 makes it very
burdensome to use bottom gears, which in economic terms makes it less
attractive, while option 3 forces the operators to use less harmful gear. A
further relative disadvantage of option 4 is that it relies on implementation and
control of several additional measures in parallel, while the fisheries
administrations are facing cost-cutting exercises imposed by the need for
fiscal discipline and need thus to concentrate their control effort on economically
important fisheries. Within option 4, the sub-options concerning discard
reduction are considered equally efficient. Introducing regional effort limits
would mean upfront costs for the establishment of baseline fishing effort
levels[46], and then normal administrative supervision, while the sub-option
on discard-targets would mean increasing costs when implementation and
monitoring of discard performance starts. For the businesses, the situation is
similar. Within option 3, the
sub-option on spatial limitation is considered less efficient because it needs
an additional control effort related to fishing depth, while national
administrations are in the process of implementing the new control regulation
which in itself puts extreme strain on them. Concerning coherence,
option 3 is more appreciated than option 4. On the one side, the banning
of harmful gear is a policy already developed.[47] The discard
ban forthcoming under the CFP reform[48] is
being anticipated by following a particularly restrictive policy on this
subject in fisheries where the species caught are particularly vulnerable to
fishing. The ecosystem approach to fisheries management, a concept already
valid under the current CFP, is put into practice for fisheries that operate in
the most fragile ecosystems. The intentional limitation in regulatory detail
and deliberate restriction in imposing additional administrative requirements
on the pursuit of certain fishing operations is in line with the reform's simplification
approach. The CFP reform's move towards regional management could be
translated by giving an option for a voluntary move towards regional effort
management for those gears that are allowed to remain in the fishery. The
architecture of such an approach is a follows: The access regulation defines
the possible scope, prerequisites and scientific assessment of regional fishing
effort management plans. Once finalised, the Commission would base its
proposals for allocating maximum fishing effort levels in the concerned fishery
on the regional plan, and the Council would fix the fishing effort limits at
annual intervals accordingly. Safeguards would ensure that the management can
be rescheduled according to catch limits if the conditions for operating the
effort plans do not remain fulfilled. Finally, the option is coherent with the
development of individually transferable quotas. Those quota shares
would be established based on the catch records of the vessels concerned. The
banning of a certain gear in the deep-sea fishery would not preclude the
respective vessels from having access to the species according to their catch
records, but rather force them to use a different technique or, if this is not
feasible, to sell/lease the quota share to another stakeholder who wants to use
a gear that is still allowed. On the other side, option
4 on introducing High Sea standards is coherent with an existing policy protecting
the same type of species, although in a different economical/fleet context.[49] The negative note here comes from two considerations: 1) In EU
waters, VMEs receive protection also through the development of sites of NATURA
2000 under the Habitats Directive. The CFP reform will introduce a
procedure for putting into practice the fisheries part of these
environmental measures. This approach is based on the idea of creating a
positive list of unique communities of biodiversity which will be directly
protected, while the international concept is based on the idea of risk
mitigation and avoidance strategies. Both are not incompatible but could lead
to duplication of work. 2) The addition of new administrative requirements to
the fishery, without assurance on the result, is not coherent with the simplification-approach
intended by the CFP reform. Within the option 4,
the sub-option on discard-reduction targets is coherent with the CFP reform
focussing on result-based management and technical implementation by
Member States on a regional basis. The sub-option on imposing regional
effort limits is likewise coherent with the CFP reform, as fishing effort
management combined with a landing obligation is a tool for eliminating discards.
However, the partly negative evaluation comes from the fact that fishing effort
levels – which are gear-specific - would conserve fishing with bottom trawls,
although this gear has a harmful impact on VMEs; the Commission has a higher
interest in encouraging switching gears than in reducing discards using a gear
that is harmful to the environment. Finally, option 4 is also coherent with the
introduction of individually transferable quotas, as it does not touch
on the fishing opportunities as such. Within option 3,
banning gears by way of putting conditions to the pursuit of certain species
(sub-option 1) is coherent with regulatory practice.[50] Likewise
there are prohibitions to use a certain gear below a certain depth (sub-option
2).[51] Both options are
coherent with the forthcoming review of the Data Collection Framework.
That review concerns the harmonised method of data collection, the sampling
intensity and the nature of information to be collected, as well as the
processing and dissemination of data and the financing of scientific surveys.
Options 3 and 4 provide the same rules related to data collection, namely to
ensure that deep-sea metiers are sampled even if under general rules this
metier would be submerged in a larger one, and that additional information is
collected from the commercial fisheries which is sceintifically important for
the analysis of deep-sea fisheries. If so decided during the review of the data
collection framework, these metier-specific rules could be absorbed into the
data collection framework. Finally, the access regime would allow the
Commission closing a fishery if the data collection has not been carried out,
an instrument that would be a precautionary conservation measure in addition to
the possibility under the data collection rules to reduce the financial
contribution. 6.2. Ranking
of options Option 3 (banning
harmful gears) is overall the policy option that receives the best evaluation.
It addresses shortcomings of the existing regime by measures that are developed
for both options, 3 and 4. But the two main problems, namely protection of VMEs
and reduction of undesired catch, is addressed in a more direct way. Option 4
has merits in that it is coherent with the current policy approach towards the
management of deep-sea fisheries in the High Sea. However, its effectiveness is
doubtful. The option relies on multiple individual measures that are difficult
to define precisely and then to implement with sufficient assurance that they
will be effective. Bottom trawling would be banned by overregulation rather
than by a straightforward measure. The option would rely on measures that would
have to be taken and implemented by Member States against vested interests,
while increasing the burden of administrative follow-up within a context of
administrative structures being scaled down. Within the preferred
option, banning gears by limiting fishing authorisation for targeting deep-sea
species to less harmful gears is preferred over establishing a regulatory depth
line which cannot be trespassed by these gears. Main reason is the need for
depth control under the alternative measures and the problem that overlapping
bottom trawls and gillnet fisheries on the lower part of the continental shelf
would also be affected. 7. Monitoring and evaluation For the progress of the policy the
following indicators are proposed provisionally and will be further developed: Policy area || Possible progress indicator || Data gathering / evaluation arrangement Sustainable fixing of fishing opportunities || Number of stocks which are managed according to the precautionary advice received from ICES/STECF; Number of stocks for which exploratory MSY-rules are being tested || Commission service Discard reduction || Trends in discards of deep-sea metiers || Technical reports from STECF based on data collection under the access regime and DCF. Protection of VMEs || Accomplish phase-out of bottom trawls in deep-sea fisheries by the end of the transition period. Spatial profile of bottom trawlers concerned moves towards shallower waters || Monitoring of fishing authorisations of Member States, Member States to assess VMS-traces and catch composition protocols of vessels concerned Data gathering and channelling is adapted to scientific needs and aligned with the general data collection policy. || Reduction in fish stocks for which ICES working group on deep sea species reports unavailability of commercial fisheries' data || ICES advice APPENDIX - Glossary B Bathymetry – is the study of underwater depth. Biological
reference points – values
of fish stock population parameters (such as biomass or fishing mortality rate)
used in fisheries management, for example with respect to an acceptable level
of biological risk or a desired level of harvest yield. By-catch – the catch of non-target species and undersized individuals of the
target species. By-catches of commercial species may be kept or discarded along
with the non-commercial by-catch. C Capacity – The fishing capacity of a vessel depends on various factors. The
basic factors which are easily measurable are the vessel's power in kilowatt
and its volume in gross tonnage. CFP – the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. It provides
the framework for management of the EU fishery sector, including all marine
fisheries within 200 miles of Member States’ baselines. The latest basic
regulation on the CFP is Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 which should be replaced
by a new one in 2012. D DCF – (=Data Collection Framework) is based on
Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008.[52] It establishes the principles and standards
for programs of data collection for the CFP. The deep-sea fisheries can
represent a metier on which data needs to be collected according to the DCF. Demersal – meaning the area close to the sea bed. Demersal fish lives close
to the seabed (benthopelagic fish or groundfish) or rests on the seabed (benthic
fish). Discards – any fish, or other living matter caught when fishing, that is not
kept but is returned to the sea – alive or dead. E Effort – the total quantity of fishing gear in use over a specific period
of time. Effort can be expressed in many ways: days away from port, hours
trawling, length of driftnet, number of hooks used and so on. The basic concept
followed by the CFP is a combination of time at sea and fishing capacity
expressed in kilowatts or volume (gross tonnage) F Fishing
effort – see Effort. Forage fish - Small fish, often in shoals, prolific and serving as food for
predatory fish higher up in the food chain. H Habitats
Directive - The Habitats Directive[53] obliges Member States to create a network of sites to protect Biodiversity
called the network of NATURA 2000. To the extent that the protection concept
intervenes with fisheries, the EU has regulated the fisheries part of the
protection measures based on the CFP. Marine offshore sites of NATURA 2000 are
still in development, and only a few have been created already. Reefs are
explicitly mentioned as possible objects of NATRA 2000 protection measures
(code 1170). Harvest
control rule – stipulates how harvest is to be
controlled by management in relation to some indicator of stock status. For
example, a harvest control rule can describe the various fishing mortality
values which will be aimed at for various stock abundance values. It formalises
and summarises a management strategy. In the absence of fishing mortality and
stock size values, such rules could for example set maximum harvest levels
according to trends observed in abundance indices. I ICES – the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea founded
in 1902. It facilitates and coordinates collaboration, including fish stock
assessments, between Member States. It works via numerous working groups under
the remit of one or more standing committees. ITQ – individually
transferable quotas. A concept partly applied in European fisheries management,
but not at EU level so far, which allows undertakings to trade in their fishing
opportunities subject to certain conditions and safeguards. The main purpose of
ITQ is to rationalise the capacity base of resource exploitation by using
market-mechanism. The CFP reform process favours the mandatory introduction of
such a system in EU fisheries. J Juvenile – an immature fish, i.e. one that has not reached sexual maturity. M Metier – a combination of vessel characteristics and fishing pattern,
normally described as the fishing operations of vessels using a certain gear in
a certain area (and season) targeting (a) certain species. Monitoring – regular and systematic collection of environmental and biological
data by agreed methods and to agreed standards. Monitoring provides information
on current status, trends and compliance with declared standards and
objectives. Fishing Mortality
(F) – the death of organisms due to fishing. It is
usually expressed as an instantaneous rate: the natural logarithm of the ratio
between the number of animals surviving to the end of the year and the number
at the start of the year. MSY – maximum
sustainable yield: the largest average catch that can be taken continuously
from a stock under existing environmental conditions. (For species with
fluctuating recruitment, the maximum might be obtained by taking fewer fish in
some years than in others.) Also known as ‘maximum equilibrium catch’. The
MSY-concept is originally based on international law (Johannesburg summit on
Sustainable Development 2002) and now also enshrined in Community rules:
According to Commission Decision 2010/477/EU of 1 September 2010 on
criteria and methodological standards on good environmental status of marine
waters[54], the fishing pressure has to be held at levels equal or below Fmsy
in order to indicate a good environmental status with regard to healthy stocks
that are commercially exploited. In case where an F value cannot be estimated,
secondary indicators have to be used. The Commission plans to enshrine the
concept in the 2012 CFP reform as obligatory management basis. O Overfishing – an exploitation rate is greater than is required to meet or match
a specific management objective, e.g. maximum sustainable yield (MSY). P Passive gear
– (equivalent: static gear) gear that catches fish by attracting it or by
hampering its further move and enmeshing. Opposite: towed gear. Pelagic –
meaning the water column excluding the space close to the seabed. Pelagic fish
lives and feeds in the open water, not on or from the bottom. Precautionary approach – a decision to take avoiding action based on the possibility of
significant environmental damage, even before there is conclusive evidence that
damage will occur. This approach requires fishery managers to pay due regard to
the uncertainties of stock assessment and management. S Safe
biological limits – to keep stocks within safe
biological limits, there should be a high probability that spawning stocks are
above the threshold where recruitment is impaired and fishing mortality is
below the level which will drive the spawning stocks to the threshold. Sampling – selection of factual information to acquire
some knowledge of a statistical population. Sampling standards for collecting
data on sea fisheries are contained in the Commission Program[55] adopted under the Data
Collection Framework[56]. Spawning
aggregations – fish often groups closer together to
spawn. Spawning aggregations provide an easier target for fishing operations,
because more fish can be caught with the same effort. But the risk of depleting
the stock is also higher, and fish caught before spawning was not able to contribute
to reproduction during that season. STECF – the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries of
the EC. Unlike ICES working groups, which consider stock assessments and
management from a scientific perspective only, the STECF is expected to
consider the socio- economic implications of modifying or varying scientific,
including ICES advice. Stock - means a
marine biological resource with distinctive characteristics that occurs in a
given management area. Stock assessment
- provides a science-based quantitative evaluation of fish populations, in
order to help define management objectives and guide their implementation. It
produces biological reference points and indicators on the status of the stock
compared to those reference points. For deep-sea species, no stock assessments
are available, because of paucity or insufficient quality of data. Sustainable
fisheries – fisheries with an annual catch,
including discards, that does not exceed the surplus production of the stocks
(i.e. annual growth plus recruitment less the annual natural mortality). T TAC – total allowable catch: the quantity of fish that can be taken
from each stock each year. The figure is agreed by the Fisheries Council of
Ministers in annual meetings, for deep-sea species biannual meetings. EU Member
States are allocated a set share of the TAC as their national quota. V VME, vulnerable
marine ecosystems - Features of the deep seabed
such as seamounts, coral reefs and hydrothermal vents are known to act as
biodiversity hot spots and also to attract large numbers of fish. These
ecosystems are extremely vulnerable for a number of reasons including the low
growth rates associated with great depths as well as the fragility of the
organisms, such as corals and sponges, which provide structural support to the
habitats. Although scientific research on these organisms and ecosystems has
increased in recent years, including through projects supported by the EU such
as the Hermes, Hermione and Coralfish projects, more information is still
required on their biology, location as well as the associated fisheries. These
vulnerable ecosystems are threatened by natural causes such as climate change
and ocean acidification, as well as by a variety of anthropogenic activities,
which include deep-sea bottom fishing, deep-sea mining, bio-prospection and
deep-sea tourism. While these activities generate economic benefits, they
contribute to the destruction of these habitats which results in a continuing
loss of marine biodiversity. ANNEXES Annex I: Deep-sea grounds in the North-East Atlantic Depth
contours at 1500 m of the North-East Atlantic potentially impacted by
deep-water fisheries, with the delimitations of several regulatory areas. (By
Ricardo Medeiros, Department of Oceanography and Fisheries of the University of
the Azores).
Source: REPORT OF THE ICES-NAFO JOINT WORKING GROUP ON DEEP WATER ECOLOGY
(WGDEC) 2008, p. 16. ICES CM 2008/ACOM:45 Annex II: Contributions following the consultation Entity || Scope of review || Specific interest/ ideas || Special permits || Effort limitations and TACs || Improve knowledge || Control France (an exhaustive background document was finalised in September 2010: "Le Grenelle de la Mer", Avenir des Pêches Profondes, groupe n° 1, rapport final) || Put whole regime under review, but no abrupt changes needed || Acknowledge positive development in some important stocks; acknowledge that DS[57] regime is only part of a number of management improvements; develop VME[58]-closed areas, spatial-seasonal closures, prohibition to new fisheries unless accompanied by scientific advice; regulation on ghost-fishing is already sufficient || The 100 kg-threshold should be increased for non-SPP[59] vessels which should be allowed to land up to 400kg per trip, if avoidance measures are put in place to prevent any discards above this level || By-catch TACs[60] need to be aligned with the reality of the fisheries || Encourage science-industry partner-ships || adapt the regime to the new control regulation; request prior notification of landings of DS species until introduction of electronic logbook; foresee increased frequency of VMS[61]-transmissions in case of transfer through VME areas; problem with the identity of designated ports in the gillnet fisheries Spain || || Concentrate the special regime on targeted fisheries and let by-catch fisheries be regulated by the western waters regime alone || The threshold of 100 kg per trip or 10t per year are inappropriate in view of the variety of vessel sizes and mixed fisheries || Effort calculation does not show a clear picture, as the effort depends on the variety of species caught and rectangles of operation; no effective follow-up of commitments in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) possible; TACs are more limiting now, and effort regime is not independent measure as it also depends on real landings || || Entity || Scope of review || Specific interest/ ideas || Special permits || Effort limitations and TACs || Improve knowledge || Control Portugal || Review of the 100 miles zone around Azores needed (linked to the CFP[62] reform and western waters regime) || Ring-fencing fishing effort around Azores and Madeira || SPP system not effective as too many vessels are concerned (other MS) or too few (small vessels in Portugal); an Annex II species is primary fishing target in Azores (red seabream) || Effort ceilings should be developed by (target) fishery and take account of the stability of the artisanal fisheries; By-catch TACs (DS sharks) need to be aligned with the reality of the fisheries; difficulty to obtain caches per rectangle in Azores (76% vessels under 10m) || data-coverage should be possible within the DCF[63]; on board observers no solution for small vessels || adapt to control regulation; delete article 6 (reporting of position in case of VMS failure) United Kingdom || Put whole regime under review, but no abrupt changes until outcome of the Deepfish-man project is known || Revise the regime in a way that future develops can be influenced by the results of the Deepfishman project; stress the precautionary approach, as many DS stocks might be incapable of discovery within a decent time horizon; develop closed areas for aggregations of orange roughy and blue ling || || Zero TAC for sharks is consistent with UK policy; continue current approach and develop in addition an MSY-approach for selected fisheries for which knowledge on fishing mortality will improve || gathering of knowledge for a complete stock assessment might be too expensive in view of the value of the fisheries || Germany || Put whole regime under review in order to wok towards sustainable exploitation || Differentiate between by-catch and targeted fisheries || Do not cover by-catch fisheries (except with TAC rules), for reason of proportionality || ditto || Improved scientific coverage should be incorporated into the data collection framework || align with control regulation Entity || Scope of review || Specific interest/ ideas || Special permits || Effort limitations and TACs || Improve knowledge || Control Netherlands || || || || System of effort calculation totally inappropriate for NL, where the fleet that on some days has some DS by-catch are large pelagic trawlers that are away for 4 weeks sometimes || || RAC[64] North-Western waters || Put whole regime under review, but act very carefully in order not to punish vessels that have made efforts already || Define the fisheries more clearly; delete species from the list that are caught in more shallow waters; open to inclusion of other species that share the common criteria; advocate spatial-seasonal closures || Bring reward/-punishment mechanism into the issuance of permits (award, renewal, withdrawal) || Effort ceilings should be developed by (target) fishery, and adjustments should be possible in view of improved stock status || COM to put more money to science-industry partnerships || RAC South-Western waters || Put whole regime under review || Acknowledge the variety of biological characteristics; acknowledge that the measures adopted since 2002 have brought positive development; improve transparency in data provision to NEAFC; New fisheries should be prohibited unless accompanied by impact assessment; further develop closed areas for protection of VMEs || Limits need to be developed by group of species/fisheries. If the annual criterion of 10t should stay, at least the trip-based threshold of 100kg should be defined by fishery || ditto; By-catch TACs need to be aligned with the reality of the fisheries || Reference data should be the haul and not the landings per trip; training needed in order that fishermen can distinguish species || NGO Alliance[65] || Put whole regime under review || Apply UNGA standards for deep-sea fishing on the High Sea also to EU waters, in particular prior impact assessment on bottom habitat. Count all catches against the quota || || Precautionary principle calls for lower TACs. Move towards effort management presupposes better effort data || Full observer coverage; standardise monitoring protocols; revoke permit in case of data shortcomings || Annex III: Scientific advice from the
Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) A) 2010 report of the
SGMOS-09-05 Working Group "Fishing Effort Regime" Part 3: Deep Sea and Western Waters page
117: Discussion
on the vulnerability and exploitation of deep sea species There are no extant scientific reasons for not
exploiting deep-water fish and shellfish species in the NE Atlantic. Even
fisheries for the most vulnerable species, such as orange roughy, are likely to
be sustainable if catches [exploitation rate] are maintained at sufficiently
low levels. For example, stock reduction analyses of orange roughy in VI
indicate that MSY may be around 150-250 t whereas in the early years of this
fishery annual catches amounted to several thousand tonnes. The key issue as to
whether deep-water species can be exploited sustainably is the extent, efficacy
and compliance of management and monitoring. It is evident that management
frameworks and approaches in place in recent years have not been effective in
achieving sustainability. Management by TACs and quotas is unlikely to be an
effective management tool because the relationship between F and catches is
unknown in most fisheries. Furthermore, many fisheries are of a mixed species
nature and management by TACs and quotas, particularly where these are
restrictive for some species, is likely to lead to high-grading and higher
levels of discarding. In contrast, effort management, particularly at the
fisheries rather than at the stock level, is more likely to be effective as
there is an underlying relationship between F and effort. Difficulty of
bycatch Effective monitoring is
essential and this should include multinational coordinated fisheries
independent surveys to generate reliable abundance indices for use in
assessments. Without such data the scientific justification for exploiting
these stocks would be seriously compromised. Effective observer schemes are
also essential and it may be necessary to have 100% coverage in international
waters (as in the NAFO Regulatory Area) and particularly in some fisheries e.g.
orange roughy. A general concern is the
high level of discarding on deep-water trawl fisheries. Most of these fish die
and as a consequence long-term exploitation could have a significant impact on
the general deep-water fish assemblage and ecosystem as a whole. This needs to
be monitored on an ongoing basis and provides another justification for the
development of extensive fisheries-independent surveys. Most deep-water
fisheries in the NE Atlantic are currently being ratcheted down to a low level
in line with ICES advice, and these should only be allowed to expand when
information becomes available as to the level of fishing that is sustainable,
and for some stocks, where there is reliable evidence of stock recovery. While
current deep-water fisheries may be of minor economic significance, they have
in the past generated substantial landings and have been of high socio-economic
importance to many countries. If the stocks are exploited sustainably economic
returns are likely to be lower but nevertheless important to some regional
communities. B) Review of scientific
advice for 2011, Consolidated Advice on Stocks of Interest to the European
Community, Edited by John Casey, Willy Vanhee & Hendrik Doerner, 2010, page
236: STECF notes that
appropriate sustainable exploitation rates for most deepwater species have not
been determined and the risks associated with current fishing effort are not
quantified. Given the biology of many of these species, very low exploitation
rates or zero fishing are likely to be advised in most cases. STECF once again
reiterates its comment that management measures based on effort/fleet regulation
are a more appropriate long-term approach for management of these fisheries and
consequently fisheries based advice, in addition to that currently given, has
value. (…) STECF further notes that
several of these deep-water fisheries take place in international waters
outside national or EU jurisdiction. Hitherto this has rendered it difficult to
enforce management measures for these fisheries. Annex IV: Overview deep-sea fisheries in the North-East Atlantic Source: STECF stock assessment part 2, July 2010[66] In ICES Division IVa there is a by-catch of Greater silver smelt (Argentina silus) in the industrial trawl fishery. A longline fishery
targets tusk (Brosme brosme) and ling with forkbeard (Phycis
blennoides) and grenadier as a by-catch. Some deepwater species are landed
as a by-catch in the trawl fisheries targeting anglerfish and Greenland
halibut. In ICES Division IIIa there is a targeted trawl fishery for
roundnose grenadier (Coryphaenoides rupestris) and greater silver smelt.
Several deep-water species are also taken as a by-catch in, for instance, the
trawl fisheries for northern shrimp. In ICES Sub-area V there are trawl fisheries targeting blue ling,
redfish species, argentine and orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus),
which have as by-catch a great number of other deep-water species. There are
also traditional longline fisheries for ling and tusk, and trawl and gill net
fisheries for Greenland halibut and anglerfish. In ICES Sub-areas VI and VII there are directed fisheries for blue
ling, roundnose grenadier, orange roughy, black scabbardfish and deep-water
sharks. In Sub-area VIII there is a longline fishery, which mainly targets
greater forkbeard, and trawl fisheries for hake, megrim, anglerfish and Nephrops
which have a by-catch of deep-water species. In ICES Sub-area IX some deep-water species are a by-catch of the
trawl fisheries for crustaceans. Typical species are bluemouth (Helicolenus
dactylopterus), greater forkbeard, conger eel (Conger conger),
blackmouth dogfish (Galeus melastomus), kitefin shark (Dalatias licha),
gulper shark (Centrophorus granulosus) and leafscale gulper shark (Centrophorus
squamosus). There is a directed longline fishery for black scabbard fish (Aphanopus
carbo) with a by-catch of the Portuguese dogfish (Centroscymnus
coelolepis) and leafscale gulper shark (Centrophorus squamosus).
There is also a longline (Voracera) fishery for Pagellus bogaraveo. In ICES Sub-area X the main fisheries are by handline and longline
near the Azores, and the main species landed are red (blackspot) seabream (Pagellus
bogaraveo), wreckfish (Polyprion americanus), conger eel, bluemouth,
golden eye perch (Beryx splendens) and alfonsino (Beryx decadactylus).
At present the catches of kitefin shark are made by the longline and handline
deepwater vessels and can be considered as accidental. There are no vessels at
present catching this species using gillnets. Outside the Azorean EEZ there are trawl fisheries for golden eye
perch, orange roughy, cardinal fish (Epigonus telescopus), black
scabbard fish, and wreckfish. In ICES Sub-area XII there are trawl fisheries on the mid-Atlantic
Ridge for orange roughy, roundnose grenadier, and black scabbard fish. There is
a multispecies trawl and longline fishery on Hatton Bank, and some of this
occurs in this sub-area, some in Sub-area VI. There is considerable fishing on
the slopes of the Hatton Bank, and effort may be increasing. Smoothheads (Alepocephalus
species) were previously usually discarded but now feature to a greater
extent in the landings statistics. In ICES Sub-area XIV there are trawl and longline fisheries for Greenland halibut (Rheinhardtius hippoglossoides) and redfish that have by-catches
of roundnose grenadier, roughhead grenadier (Macrourus berglax) and
tusk. Technical Annex V: list
of deep-sea species; landings per MS in 2008 The
access regime contains two lists of deep-sea species. Landings in species of
the Annex I-list trigger the allocation of the vessel’s trip to deep-sea
activity, while on both Annex I and II-species, special data collection has to
apply. List of deep-sea species (Annex I to the access regime) Scientific name || FAO code || Common name Aphanopus carbo || BSF || Black scabbardfish Apristurus spp. || CSA, CSF, CSG, CSJ, CSN, CSU, CSV, CSW, CSX, CSZ || Iceland catshark Argentina silus || ARU || Greater silver smelt Beryx spp. || BXD, BYS || Alfonsinos Centrophorus granulosus || GUP || Gulper shark Centrophorus squamosus || GUQ || Leafscale gulper shark Centroscyllium fabricii || CFB || Black dogfish Centroscymnus coelolepis || CYO || Portuguese dogfish Coryphaenoides rupestris || RNG || Roundnose grenadier Dalatias licha || SCK || Kitefin shark Deania calcea || DCA || Birdbeak dogfish Etmopterus princeps || ETR || Greater lanternshark Etmopterus spinax || ETX || Velvet belly Galeus melastomus || SHO || Blackmouth dogfish Galeus murinus || GAM || Mouse catshark Hoplostethus atlanticus || ORY || Orange roughy Molva dypterygia || BLI || Blue ling Phycis blennoides || GFB || Forkbeards Centroscymnus crepidater || CYP || Longnose velvet dogfish Scymnodon ringens || SYR || Knifetooth dogfish Hexanchus griseus || SBL || Six-gilled shark Chlamydoselachus anguineus || HXC || Frilled shark Oxynotus paradoxus || OXN || Sailfin roughshark (Sharpback shark) Somniosus microcephalus || GSK || Greenland shark Additional list of deep-sea species (Annex II to the
access regime) Scientific name || FAO code || Common name Pagellus bogaraveo || SBR || Red (blackspot) seabream Chimaera monstrosa || CMO || Rabbit fish (Rattail) Macrourus berglax || RHG || Roughhead grenadier (Rough rattail) Mora moro || RIB || Common mora Antimora rostrata || ANT || Blue antimora (Blue hake) Epigonus telescopus || EPI || Black (Deep-water) cardinal fish Helicolenus dactylopterus || BRF || Bluemouth (Blue mouth redfish) Conger conger || COE || Conger eel Lepidopus caudatus || SFS || Silver scabbard fish (Cutlass fish) Alepocephalus bairdii || ALC || Baird's smoothhead Lycodes esmarkii || ELZ || Eelpout Raja hyperborea || RJG || Arctic skate Sebastes viviparus || SFV || Small redfish (Norway haddock) Hoplostethus mediterraneus || HPR || Silver roughy (Pink) Trachyscorpia cristulata || TJX || Spiny (Deep-sea) scorpionfish Raja nidarosiensIs || JAD || Norwegian skate Chaecon (Geryon) affinis || KEF || Deep-water red crab Raja fyllae || RJY || Round skate Hydrolagus mirabilis || CYH || Large-eyed rabbit fish (Ratfish) Rhinochimaera atlantica || RCT || Straightnose rabbitfish Alepocephalus rostratus || PHO || Risso's smoothhead Polyprion americanus || WRF || Wreckfish Member State landings
of Annex I+II deep-sea species in 2008 as reported in the economic data call
2010: Member state || Weight (Ton) || France || 12.988 Spain || 10.302* Portugal || 8.910 Germany || 281 Lithuania || 148 Estonia || 132 Ireland || 115 Belgium || 64 Netherlands || 37 Sweden || 0,02
Total 34.432 * Data
from 2007 Annex
VI: Evolution of the landings of quota-species (t) Name || FAO code || 2003 || 2004 || 2005 || 2006 || 2007 || 2008 || 2009 Black scabbardfish* || BSF* || 5.527,8 || 5.982,1 || 9.563,2 || 7.892,3 || 9.263,2 || 9.715,8 || 8.645,5 Greater silver smelt || ARU || 2.513,7 || 5.790,9 || 3.428,4 || 1.286,6 || 4.042,7 || 3.026,4 || 1.826,7 Roundnose grenadier** || RNG** || 4.604 || 4.445,1 || 9.049,1 || 10.262,7 || 7.811,6 || 5.336,7 || 4.543 Orange roughy || ORY || 590,8 || 529,2 || 387,3 || 585,4 || 372,1 || 104,3 || 37,0 Blue ling || BLI || 3.431 || 3.585,7 || 3.093,6 || 2.877,5 || 2.396 || 1.865,8 || 2.182,9 Deep Sea Sharks*** || DWS*** || || || 3.457,5 || 2.863,4 || 1.745,3 || 1.341,6 || 792,6 Alfonsinos nei*** || ALF*** || || || 302,4 || 323,7 || 321,8 || 305,8 || 298,2 Blackspot(=red) seabream || SBR || 1.427,0 || 1.506,5 || 1.772,4 || 1.376,1 || 1.618,5 || 1.553,4 || 1.411,9 Greater forkbeard*** || GFB*** || || || 1.854,8 || 1.776,9 || 1.874,8 || 1.882,3 || 1.607 Total
18.094,3 15.857,4 32.908,7
29.244,6 29.446 25.132,1
21.344,8 * Catches for Madeira are only accounted for since 2005. ** Catches in ICES
areas VIII, IX, X, XII and XIV are only accounted for since 2005. ***TACs only exist
since 2005. Source: Member states’ catches according to
FIDS system. Annex VII:
List of species by landings a) List of regulated deep-sea
species (Annex I and II to Regulation 2347/2002) by landing’s weight realised
in 2008. Landings concerning Spain are taken from 2007. Name || FAO code || Weight (Ton) || Annex Black scabbardfish || BSF || 7.686 || 1 Conger eel || COE || 7.453 || 2 Baird's smoothhead || ALC || 5.888 || 2 Black (Deep-water) cardinal fish || EPI || 4.151 || 2 Blue ling || BLI || 2.143 || 1 Roundnose grenadier || RNG || 1.911 || 1 Forkbeards || GFB || 969 || 1 Roughhead grenadier (Rough rattail) || RHG || 514 || 2 Portuguese dogfish || CYO || 494 || 1 Leafscale gulper shark || GUQ || 492 || 2 Wreckfish || WRF || 460 || 2 Bluemouth (Blue mouth redfish) || BRF || 429 || 2 Red (blackspot) seabream || SBR || 398 || 2 Deep-water red crab || KEF || 379 || 2 Kitefin shark || SCK || 271 || 1 Common mora || RIB || 139 || 2 Orange roughy || ORY || 131 || 1 Knifetooth dogfish || SYR || 116 || 1 Gulper shark || GUP || 95 || 1 Black dogfish || CFB || 76 || 1 Other species || || 240 || 1&2 Total weight (Ton) || || 34.706 || 1&2 Source:
Member states’ notifications to the deep sea and economic data call 2010. Due
to the autonomous methods applied in responding to (economic) data calls,
landings figures from this source are not necessarily identical to landings
notified to the Commission’s system for following up the fishing quota
consumption. b) List of regulated deep-sea species by
landings during 2008 in order of value. Spain is not included. (Spain is responsible for roughly 30% of the landings in weight.) Name || FAO code || Value (EUR) || Annex Black scabbardfish || BSF || 24.689.079 || 2 Conger eel || COE || 11.567.070 || 1 Wreckfish || WRF || 6.699.253 || 1 Blue ling || BLI || 5.130.028 || 2 Roundnose grenadier || RNG || 3.511.307 || 2 Red (blackspot) seabream || SBR || 3.242.361 || 1 Forkbeards || GFB || 1.460.557 || 2 Bluemouth (Blue mouth redfish) || BRF || 1.369.542 || 1 Deep-water red crab || KEF || 1.354.676 || 1 Orange roughy || ORY || 830.987 || 2 Portuguese dogfish || CYO || 827.808 || 2 Leafscale gulper shark || GUQ || 799.281 || 2 Other species || || 2.250.112 || 1&2 Total value (EUR) || || 63.732.061 || Member states’ notifications to the deep
sea and economic data call 2010.
Annex VIII: Relation between deep-sea metier and fleet segment Fleet
correspondence between the métier-level data (Deep-Sea Data Call) and the fleet
segment level data Metier-level || Fleet segment level || Fishing Days (Deep-Sea Data Call) || (AER Data Call) || Country || Gear || V. Length || Country || Gear || V. Length || DEU || OTB || VL40XX || DEU || DTS || VL40XX || 673 EST || OTB || VL40XX || EST || DTS || VL40XX || 1.352 FRA || GEN || Unknown || || || || 61 FRA || GEN || VL2440 || FRA || DFN || VL2440 || 90 FRA || GNS || VL2440 || 496 FRA || GNS || Unknown || || || || 207 FRA || GNS || VL40XX || FRA || DFN || VL40XX || 70 FRA || LLD || Unknown || || || || 3 FRA || LLS || Unknown || || || || 303 FRA || LLS || VL2440 || FRA || HOK || VL2440 || 163 FRA || OTB || VL1824 || FRA || DTS || VL1824 || 2.938 FRA || OTT || VL1824 || 18 FRA || OTB || VL2440 || FRA || DTS || VL2440 || 1.129 FRA || OTT || VL2440 || 1.019 FRA || OTB || VL40XX || FRA || DTS || VL40XX || 3.073 FRA || OTT || Unknown || || || || 1.100 FRA || OTB || Unknown || || || || 331 IRL || OTB || VL40XX || IRL || DTS || VL40XX || 13 LITH || OTB || VL40XX || LTU || DTS || VL40XX || 239 POL || OTB || VL40XX || POL || DTS || VL40XX || 51 POR || LLS || VL1012 || PRT || HOK || VL0012 || 44 POR || LLS || VL1218 || PRT || HOK || VL1224 || 863 POR || LLS || VL1824 || 2.025 POR || LLS || VL2440 || PRT || HOK || VL24XX || 526 || || || || || Total: || 16.786 The métier with
the length reported as "Unknown" for France are vessels without Deep
water species licenses that nevertheless landed some deep water species in
2008. Terms used: AER=
Annual Economic Report; VL= vessel length, 2440 = from 24 to 40 metres, DEU =
DE, EST = EE, FRA = FR, IRL = IE, LITH = LT, POL = PL, POR = PT, OTB = bottom
otter trawl, GEN = gillnets and entangling nets, GNS = set gillnets, LLD =
drifting longlines, LLS = set longlines, OTT = multi-rig otter trawl. Source:
JRC synthesis report on the Data Call on the Collection of Transversal
Variables for Analysis of the Access-Regime to Deep-Sea Fisheries, April 2010;
Member states’ notifications to the deep sea and economic data call 2010. Technical Annex IX:
Landings made by deep-sea metiers Landings of species made by metiers targeting deep-sea
species in the year 2008 in
order of value. Spanish metiers are not included. Name || FAO code || Value (EUR) || Northern prawn || PRA || 24.187.163 || Greenland halibut || GHL || 17.072.811 || Black scabbardfish || BSF || 16.391.765 || Blue ling || BLI || 5.451.524 || Atlantic cod || COD || 4.766.113 || Roundnose grenadier || RNG || 3.828.724 || Atlantic redfishes nei || RED || 1.557.121 || Greater forkbeard || GFB || 1.057.484 || Orange roughy || ORY || 832.579 || Portuguese dogfish || CYO || 706.869 || Leafscale gulper shark || GUQ || 369.963 || Raja rays nei || SKA || 293.987 || Lowfin gulper shark || CPL || 241.122 || Long rough dab || PLA || 217.071 || Black dogfish || CFB || 184.835 || Knifetooth dogfish || SYR || 122.637 || Wreckfish || WRF || 117.562 || Red (blackspot) seabream || SBR || 107.054 || Roughhead grenadier (Rough rattail) || RHG || 102.749 || Source:
Member states’ notifications to the deep-sea and economic data call 2010. Technical
Annex X: Deep-sea related fleet segments with their economic performance a) Landings of regulated species by fleet segment
which could be identified as being relevant for deep-sea metiers || || || || Annex I species || || || || Annex II species || || || || Total Annex I & II species || || || || Fleet segment || || Weight Landings kg || || Value Landings Euros || || Weight Landings kg || || Value Landings Euros || || Weight Landings kg || || Value Landings Euros || country || gear || length || year || North Atlantic || All || North Atlantic || All || North Atlantic || All || North Atlantic || All || North Atlantic || All || North Atlantic || All DEU || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || *) || || || || || || || || || || || EST || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 131.880 || 131.880 || 59.602 || 59.602 || || || || || 131.880 || 131.880 || 59.602 || 59.602 FRA || DFN || VL2440 || 2008 || 24.682 || 24.682 || 60.700 || 60.700 || 80.378 || 80.378 || 143.262 || 143.262 || 105.060 || 105.060 || 203.962 || 203.962 FRA || DFN || VL40XX || 2008 || || || || || 5.864 || 5.864 || 11.132 || 11.132 || 5.864 || 5.864 || 11.132 || 11.132 FRA || DTS || VL1824 || 2008 || 693.546 || 703.555 || 968.536 || 985.417 || 266.588 || 266.591 || 863.037 || 863.056 || 960.134 || 970.146 || 1.831.574 || 1.848.474 FRA || DTS || VL2440 || 2008 || 462.340 || 465.662 || 602.366 || 607.458 || 1.447.028 || 1.447.049 || 3.365.525 || 3.365.610 || 1.909.368 || 1.912.711 || 3.967.891 || 3.973.067 FRA || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 88.593 || 88.593 || 93.312 || 93.312 || 5.093.858 || 5.093.858 || 13.276.721 || 13.276.721 || 5.182.451 || 5.182.451 || 13.370.033 || 13.370.033 FRA || HOK || VL2440 || 2008 || 306.974 || 306.974 || 590.977 || 590.977 || 4.974 || 4.974 || 8.772 || 8.772 || 311.948 || 311.948 || 599.748 || 599.748 IRL || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 7.623 || 7.623 || 6.674 || 6.674 || 6.023 || 6.023 || 7.040 || 7.040 || 13.645 || 13.645 || 13.714 || 13.714 LTU || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 114.820 || 114.820 || 37.520 || 37.520 || 33.080 || 33.080 || 9.695 || 9.695 || 147.900 || 147.900 || 47.215 || 47.215 POL || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || || || || || || || || || || || || PRT || HOK || VL0012 || 2008 || 125.046 || 125.046 || 542.846 || 542.846 || 59.379 || 59.379 || 158.511 || 158.511 || 184.425 || 184.425 || 701.357 || 701.357 PRT || HOK || VL1224 || 2008 || 289.264 || 433.114 || 2.423.614 || 3.444.422 || 2.875.342 || 3.422.430 || 9.030.786 || 10.257.810 || 3.164.605 || 3.855.544 || 11.454.400 || 13.702.233 PRT || HOK || VL24XX || 2008 || 380.618 || 397.315 || 3.689.268 || 3.851.241 || 286.454 || 358.855 || 1.265.445 || 1.387.656 || 667.072 || 756.170 || 4.954.713 || 5.238.898 Grand Total || || || 2.625.385 || 2.799.264 || 9.075.416 || 10.280.170 || 10.158.966 || 10.778.481 || 28.139.925 || 29.489.265 || 12.784.352 || 13.577.744 || 37.215.342 || 39.769.436 *) data not contained for business secrecy
reason, number of vessels too small DTS=demersal trawls and seines; DFN=Source drift
and fixed nets; HOK: gears using hooks Source: Member states’
notifications to the deep-sea and economic data call 2010. b) Deep-sea landings by relevant fleet segment in
comparison with overall landings || Fleet segment || || total Weight Landings, kg || || Deep sea landings || total Value Landings, EUR || || Deep sea value country || gear || length || year || North Sea & Eastern Artic || North Atlantic || all || as % of total landings || North Sea & Eastern Artic || North Atlantic || all || as % of total value DEU || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || *) || || || || || || || EST || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 0 || 13.313.977 || 13.313.977 || 1,0 || 0 || 23.735.345 || 23.735.345 || 0,3 FRA || DFN || VL2440 || 2008 || 0 || 6.034.382 || 6.034.382 || 1,7 || 0 || 25.871.040 || 25.871.040 || 0,8 FRA || DFN || VL40XX || 2008 || 0 || 441.861 || 441.861 || 1,3 || 0 || 2.287.079 || 2.287.079 || 0,5 FRA || DTS || VL1824 || 2008 || 0 || 48.577.719 || 48.967.602 || 2,0 || 0 || 144.755.822 || 146.027.941 || 1,3 FRA || DTS || VL2440 || 2008 || 0 || 35.618.733 || 37.705.265 || 5,1 || 0 || 82.202.684 || 86.631.588 || 4,6 FRA || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 0 || 31.195.634 || 31.195.634 || 16,6 || 0 || 51.065.671 || 51.065.671 || 26,2 FRA || HOK || VL2440 || 2008 || 0 || 2.920.655 || 2.920.655 || 10,7 || 0 || 11.139.769 || 11.139.769 || 5,4 IRL || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 0 || 342.638 || 342.638 || 4,0 || 0 || 654.766 || 654.766 || 2,1 LTU || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 764.566 || 1.044.766 || 1.809.332 || 8,2 || 384.461 || 1.094.596 || 1.853.379 || 2,5 POL || DTS || VL40XX || 2008 || 5.424.840 || 0 || 5.424.840 || 0,0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || PRT || HOK || VL0012 || 2008 || 0 || 1.131.226 || 1.131.226 || 16,3 || 0 || 4.120.852 || 4.120.852 || 17,0 PRT || HOK || VL1224 || 2008 || 1.078.494 || 4.387.326 || 6.423.579 || 60,0 || 0 || 14.948.769 || 20.611.737 || 66,5 PRT || HOK || VL24XX || 2008 || 2.080.802 || 1.944.212 || 11.593.048 || 6,5 || 0 || 5.734.230 || 28.123.115 || 18,6 Grand Total || || || 9.348.702 || 146.953.128 || 167.304.038 || 8,1 || 384.461 || 367.610.624 || 402.122.283 || 9,9 *) data not contained for
business secrecy reason, number of vessels too small Source: Member states’
notifications to the deep-sea and economic data call 2010. [1] Council
Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002 of December 2002 establishing specific access
requirements and associated conditions applicable to fishing for deep-sea
stocks, OJ L 351 dated 28.12.2002. [2] COM(2007)30 final. [3] P6_TA(2008)0196. [4] On the function
of RACs, see Council decision of 19 July 2004 establishing Regional Advisory
Councils under the Common Fisheries Policy; OJ L 256 of 3.8.2004. Concerned are
the RACs concerning North-Western waters, South-Western waters, North Sea and long distance fleet. Not concerned are the RACs for the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. [5] Website: https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. Go to Final
Reports/ Evaluation of Effort Regimes and then chose "09-09_SG-MOS 09-05 -
Deep Sea & Western waters". [6] Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No734/2008 on the
protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas from the adverse
impacts of bottom fishing gears. COM(2010)651. [7] North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. [8] The others are Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and
Greenland), Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation. [9] It applies first to ICS areas. These areas coincide with the NEAFC
Convention area, i.e. the North-East Atlantic. In concerns then EU waters of
CECAF areas. These areas defined in the Committee for the Eastern Central
Atlantic Fisheries concern waters around the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands. [10] A/RES/61/105 - Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, and related instruments. Adopted in December 2006. [11] FAO International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-sea
Fisheries in the High Seas. [12] Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and
sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries
Policy. [13] Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of
natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. [14] Regulation
concerning the establishment of a Community framework for the collection,
management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific
advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy; OJ L 60, 5.3.2008, p. 1 [15] Regulation
(EC) No 1954/2003. [16] Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009. [17] The associated costs are not significant in absolute terms (EUR 5k
to 10k per MS estimated using the standard cost model), but still relevant in
view of the limited economic value of the fisheries. [18] 2009 report on the evaluation of effort regimes, SG-MOS 09-05 - Deep Sea &
Western waters, p. 19; cited before. [19] See STECF, Review of scientific advice for 2011, Consolidated
Advice on Stocks of Interest to the European Community, 2010, page 236 et seqq. [20] See Council Regulation No 1225(2010), and STECF Consolidated advice
cited before. The TAC areas are not always identical to the areas of scientific
advice. [21] The following is summarised from ICES, Report of the ICES/NAFO
Joint Working Group on Deep-water Ecology (WGDEC), Copenhagen 2010. ICES CM
2010/ACOM:26, ICES, WGDEEP report 2010, CM 2010/ACOM:17, p. 71 seq., and from
STECF, Report of the subgroup Fisheries and
Environment, Deep-sea Fisheries, SEC(2002)133. [22] ICES advice 2010 Book 9, chapter 9.4.15.2 Advice on roundnose
grenadier. [23] ICES, Report of the Working Group on the Biology and Assessment of
Deep-sea Fisheries Resources (WGDEEP), 2010, CM 2010/ACOM:17. [24] STECF, Deep-sea gillnet fisheries, November 2006. [25] See Hareide (et al), A preliminary Investigation on Shelf Edge and
Deep water Fixed Net Fisheries to the West and North of Great Britain, Ireland,
around Rockall and Hatton Bank, 2005; Brown (et al), Ghost fishing by lost
fishing gear, 2005 (study contract DG FISH/2004/20). [26] See for example ICES, WGDEEP report 2010, CM 2010/ACOM:17, p. 71. [27] Data on deep-sea catches from Joint Research Centre, Data Call on
the Collection of Transversal Variables for Analysis of the Access-Regime to
Deep-Sea Fisheries, report April 2010. Catches made by Spain are taken from 2007 (10.302t). Data on EU27 landings from the North-East Atlantic are taken
from EUROSTAT. [28] Source: JRC report on data call, as before. [29] Source: Le Grenelle de la Mer, Avenir des Pêches Profondes, groupe
n° 1, rapport final septembre 2010 (pas encore publié). [30] To be noted that this data is incomplete as Spain and United Kingdom did not provide data at the metier-level. Also, this being the first
statistical exercise of its kind, the results obtained have to be treated with
caution [31] Source: JRC report on data call, as before. Annual return on
investment per related fleet segment between
-0,05 and 0,39%, on average -0,03%. Average of all fleet segments:
0,27%, ranging from -0,63 to 6,57% [32]
Source: Le Grenelle de la Mer, Avenir des Pêches Profondes, groupe n° 1,
rapport final septembre 2010 (pas encore publié). [33] .Source:
Monographie des pêches maritimes et des cultures marines du Morbihan, Direction
Départementale des Territoires et de la Mer, Lorient 2008. [34]
Source: Le Grenelle de la Mer, Avenir des Pêches Profondes, groupe n° 1,
rapport final septembre 2010 (pas encore publié). [35] See Marine Strategy Framework Directive, Directive 2008/56/EC, OJ L
164, 25.6.2008, p. 19. [36] 1995 UN Fish stocks agreement and 2008 International Guidelines for
the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries in the High Seas of the Food and
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations; the principles and management
descriptions laid down therein were confirmed recently by the UN General
Assembly (Resolution 64/72 of December 2009). [37] See the Commission's review report of November 2011, adopted as
document COM(2010)661. [38] The topics reflect current status of discussion and do not pre-empt
the Commission's deliberations. [39] Based on the experience within NEAFC area for which this process is
ongoing since 2009. [40] [40]
See Communication COM(2010) 651. [41] See Communication COM(2010) 651, p. 6. [42] See Annex III and already STECF, Report of
the subgroup Fisheries and Environment, Deep-sea Fisheries, SEC(2002)133.p.
8, 71 et seqq. [43] See chapter 1.2 with reference to the SGMOS 0905 report on the
evaluation of effort
regimes in the Deep Sea & Western waters, 2010. [44] See SGMOS report before. [45] See Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1224/2008. [46] For comparison, the establishment of reliable baseline effort
levels under the Atlantic cod plan has taken three years of administrative and
scientific assessment. For deep-sea fisheries, the period would be shorter as
the fisheries are much smaller and more concentrated. [47] See chapter 2.1. [48] Which is expected to apply during the first years to key quota
species, not to all species caught. [49] Only large capital-intensive vessels are able to undertake long journeys
on the High Sea, while in costal waters of the deep like in Portugal, a large amount of artisanal vessels prosecutes the fishery. [50] E.g. in the annual fishing opportunities regulations, or in
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2009 on transitional technical measures, or in Council
Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 concerning the Mediterranean Sea. [51] See chapter 2.1; also Regulation (EC) No 1228/2009 on transitional
technical measures, and Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 concerning the Mediterranean Sea. [52] Regulation concerning the
establishment of a Community framework for the collection, management and use
of data in the fisheries sector and support for
scientific advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy; OJ L 60, 5.3.2008, p.
1 [53] Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of
natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. [54] OJ L 232, 2.9.2010, p. 14. [55] Commission Decision 2010/93/EU of 18 December 2009 adopting a
multiannual Community programme for the collection, management and use of data
in the fisheries sector for the period 2011-2013 (notified under document
C(2009) 10121), OJ L 41, 16.2.2010, p. 8 [56] Regulation (EC) No 199/2008. [57] Deep Sea. [58] Vulnerable Marine Ecosystem. [59] Special Fishing Permit. [60] Total Allowable Catches. [61] Vessel Monitoring System. [62] Common Fisheries Policy. [63] Data Collection Framework. [64] Regional Advisory Council, established through Council Decision of
19 July 2004 establishing Regional Advisory Councils under the Common Fisheries
Policy (2004/585/EC). [65] PEW, Greenpeace, Seas at Risk, deepsea conservation coalition [66] To be found on the website: https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
The fisheries are partly no longer active.