(1)

On 31 July 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/512/CFSP (1).

(2)

The Union remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

(3)

In its conclusions of 19 December 2024, the European Council reiterated its resolute condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed the Union’s unwavering commitment to providing continued political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people.

(4)

As long as the illegal actions by the Russian Federation continue to violate fundamental rules of international law, including, in particular, the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, or of international humanitarian law, it is appropriate to maintain in force all the measures imposed by the Union and to take additional measures, if necessary.

(5)

In view of the continued and escalating aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular the recent brutal military campaign deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, including energy, water and health facilities, which has caused severe suffering to the civilian population and seeks to undermine Ukraine’s resilience, the Council considers it necessary to adopt further restrictive measures.

(6)

In particular, 60 entities should be added to the list of legal persons, entities or bodies set out in Annex IV to Decision 2014/512/CFSP, namely the list of persons, entities and bodies supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex in its war of aggression against Ukraine, on whom and on which tighter export restrictions are imposed regarding dual-use goods and technology, as well as goods and technology which might contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia’s defence and security sector. Those entities include certain entities in third countries other than Russia that indirectly contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement thereby enabling the circumvention of export restrictions, including those on computer numerical controlled (CNC) machine tools, microelectronics, components for unmanned aerial vehicles, microelectronic products, maritime equipment, and components for other vehicles and machinery.

(7)

It is appropriate to expand the list of items which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector by listing items which have been used by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine and items which contribute to the development or production of its military systems, including laboratory glassware, certain high performance lubricants and their additives, and energetic materials.

(8)

Additionally, it is appropriate to introduce further restrictions on imports of goods which generate significant revenues for Russia, thereby enabling the continuation of its war of aggression against Ukraine, including on certain raw materials, metals, certain minerals, on scrap of steel and other metals, on chemicals, on articles of vulcanised rubber and on tanned furskins.

(9)

In order to minimise the risk of circumvention of restrictive measures, it is appropriate to further extend the list of goods and technology subject to the prohibition on transit via the territory of Russia.

(10)

It is also appropriate to impose further restrictions on exports of goods which might contribute to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities, such as chemicals, rubber and articles of vulcanised rubber, articles of steel, tools for metal production and industrial tractors.

(11)

It is justified to expand the existing broadcasting prohibition to also restrict broadcasting and the facilitation of broadcasting in the Union of content of entities which mirror the content of other entities that are already subject to the prohibition, in order to tackle attempts to circumvent the restrictive measure. Consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property as recognised in Articles 11, 16 and 17 thereof, this measure does not prevent those media outlets which are subject to the broadcasting prohibition and their staff from carrying out other activities in the Union than broadcasting, such as research and interviews. In particular, this measure does not modify the obligation to respect the rights, freedoms and principles referred to in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, including in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in Member States’ constitutions, within their respective fields of application.

(12)

It is appropriate to introduce a prohibition on providing liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal services to Russian entities or to entities owned or controlled by Russian nationals or operators. The relevant contracts for the LNG terminal services concerned should terminate automatically on 1 January 2027.

(13)

It is appropriate to amend the price cap for Russian crude oil and petroleum products. The Council should be informed as soon as possible of any agreement of the Price Cap Coalition and of G7 Discussions, and the Council should decide, based on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on the application of the oil price cap, with the result that a full ban on maritime services related to Russian crude oil and petroleum products would enter into force.

(14)

It is appropriate to amend the obligation to provide traceability evidence by requiring importers of polished diamonds, including diamonds polished in third countries, to provide a due-diligence statement confirming that the diamonds were not mined, processed or produced in Russia.

(15)

The Government of the Russian Federation has imposed illegitimate so-called ‘temporary management’ on property located on the territory of the Russian Federation, that belongs to foreign persons associated with so-called ‘unfriendly foreign states’, i.e. states which have introduced restrictive measures against Russia. That so-called ‘temporary management’ is tantamount to expropriation. By those means, the Government of the Russian Federation removes from the Russian market the Union competitors of Russian companies, giving the latter an economic advantage over those Union and other foreign competitors, thus strengthening the Russian economy’s resilience to restrictive measures that affect it. In some cases, the so-called ‘temporary management’ is even granted to Russian competitors of Union entities themselves, giving them a direct economic advantage over those Union competitors. To strengthen the framework of restrictive measures by the Union, it is justified to enable the Council to draw up a list of Russian companies, which are subject to a transaction ban, that benefit from such illegitimate so-called ‘temporary management’ in particular by ‘temporarily’ taking over the management in Russia of the property and entities owned or controlled by entities established in the Union, or by operating in the same market sector as those Union owned or controlled entities. Provision should be made for exceptions in certain cases.

(16)

The Union has taken decisive measures to identify entities that facilitate a continued financial lifeline for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, whether by connecting to the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (‘SPFS’) of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation or by enabling the circumvention of Union restrictive measures, and to prohibit any transaction between those entities and Union operators. Out of the identified entities, five have taken measures to close loopholes and terminate the relevant illicit activities. It is therefore justified to remove the listings for those five entities from the relevant annex to Decision 2014/512/CFSP. In addition, there is evidence that other such entities in third countries continue to enable Russia to carry out illicit activities. Four financial entities were identified. Transactions between them and persons located in the Union should be prohibited, by listing the four financial entities in the relevant annexes to Decision 2014/512/CFSP.

(17)

The Central Bank of the Russian Federation is launching the digital rouble, which is expected to become a common method of payment in the coming years among Russian companies, individuals, and credit and financial institutions, as well as between them and operators in third countries. Although it is still in a preparatory stage, the digital rouble project is intended, inter alia, to provide a payment system which shields Russian persons from the effect of restrictive measures laid down in, for example, Decisions 2014/512/CFSP and 2014/145/CFSP (2), and in Council Regulations (EU) No 833/2014 (3) and (EU) No 269/2014 (4). It is therefore appropriate to prohibit engaging, directly or indirectly, in any transaction involving central bank digital currencies such as the digital rouble or providing support to the development of such projects. A limited period of time to enable the orderly termination of existing relevant contracts should also be provided for.

(18)

It is appropriate to expand the list of crypto-assets the use of which is prohibited in transactions, as those crypto assets pose a risk of circumventing the prohibitions laid down, inter alia, in Decisions 2014/512/CFSP and 2014/145/CFSP, and in Regulations (EU) No 833/2014 and (EU) No 269/2014. A limited period of time to enable the orderly termination of existing relevant contracts should also be provided for.

(19)

In February 2025, the Russian crypto-exchange Garantex was listed in the relevant Annexes to Decision 2014/145/CFSP and to Regulation (EU) 269/2014 for providing access for other listed entities to the global financial system. Evidence from civil society investigations shows that those activities of Garantex have been transferred to other entities established in Russia, in order to bypass Union restrictive measures. Any further listing of individual crypto-asset service providers or of decentralised platforms allowing the exchange or transfer of crypto assets is therefore likely to result in the setting-up of new ones to circumvent those listings. In order to ensure that Union restrictive measures achieve their intended effects, it is appropriate to prohibit engaging with any crypto-asset service provider that is established in Russia, and making use of any platform that is established in Russia, which facilitates the transfer and exchange of crypto-assets.

(20)

It is appropriate to add 20 credit or financial institutions to the list of legal persons, entities or bodies subject to a transaction ban. The transaction ban applies to certain Russian credit or financial institutions or other entities, including those subscribing to financial messaging services, or to Russian subsidiaries of third-country credit or financial institutions, which are relevant for the Russian financial and banking system, and are either large or important regional banks, which consequently facilitate regional and federal finances and business, or banks which facilitate cross-border payments, thereby bolstering the Russian economy and its industry, or banks which undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine by operating in the occupied territories of Ukraine, or by providing financial services over the occupied territories of Ukraine, or banks which offer financial services to military personnel in the Russian armed forces, or banks which are already the subject of restrictive measures imposed by the Union or by partner countries. In addition, it is necessary to amend an exemption that is required for the reception of payments due and the fulfilment of prior obligations by the legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Annex VIII to Decision 2014/512/CFSP, and to add an exemption for the payment of reasonable professional fees or the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, as well as an exemption related to the needs of state-funded intermediate organisations for the foreign cultural policy of the Member States in Russia.

(21)

It is justified to impose additional restrictions on the provision to the Government of Russia and to legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia of services that contribute to enhancing Russia’s technological capabilities, in particular the provision of managed security services.

(22)

It is appropriate to introduce an exemption from the requirement for prior authorisation for services provided to the Government of Russia which are not already subject to the restrictive measures set out in Decision 2014/512/CFSP or Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, where those services are strictly necessary for the functioning of a consular or diplomatic representation of Russia located in a Member State.

(23)

It is necessary to broaden the existing prohibition on the acceptance of financing, donations or any other economic benefits or support from Russia, whether directly or indirectly, by extending it to public and private research institutions, universities, higher education establishments, research and technology organisations, non-governmental organisations, public bodies and agencies, to undertakings and other entities in the industrial and commercial sectors, including micro, small, medium-sized and large enterprises, that carry out research and innovation action, as well as to natural persons associated with such legal persons, entities or bodies. Accepting Russian public funding can result in providing direct or indirect support to Russian natural or legal persons, entities or bodies due to the related transfer of knowledge, access to infrastructure, training and other activities carried out in the context of research and innovation. Furthermore, existing programmes might envisage research stays in Russia. Those activities can be used for influence campaigns and the promotion of disinformation aimed at undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and for promoting pro-Russian propaganda aimed at justifying and supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. It is thus appropriate that funding from Russia and its proxies to actors in the Union carrying out research and innovation action be prohibited.

(24)

It is appropriate to clarify that reporting obligations concerning information which would facilitate the implementation of Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 should encompass the duty to report about persons that engage in attempts at circumvention schemes, or on transactions deemed suspicious.

(25)

The Union has imposed significant restrictive measures in the maritime sector vis-à-vis Russia, in particular regarding the fleet of tanker vessels, known as the ‘shadow fleet’, engaged in irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). In order to ensure that vessels sold by Union operators do not join or support the shadow fleet, the conditions applying to sales of tanker vessels to operators in third countries should be tightened by providing for specific due diligence and a mandatory clause in tanker vessel sales agreements in accordance with which the vessels cannot be sold on or transferred to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, or for use in Russia. Such due diligence should be proportionate, and include a screening of all parties to the transaction. In the specific context of tanker vessel sales, where a Union seller has carried out appropriate due diligence and obtained the required contractual commitments, the Union seller should not be held liable for a subsequent breach of those commitments by the buyer, provided the Union seller acted in good faith and did not possess information suggesting an intent to circumvent the measures. The liability for such a breach should rest with the third-country party that fails to respect the contractual prohibition.

(26)

Noting that many vessels listed by the Council as belonging to the shadow fleet have reached an age at which they ought to be recycled, and in order to encourage their recycling rather than continued operations, and to enable Union operators to be involved in recycling-related activities, a new derogation from the Union restrictive measures should facilitate the recycling of such vessels.

(27)

It is justified to introduce restrictions on ice-breaker vessels operating in Russia, because those vessels are instrumental in supporting oil and gas exports from northernmost Russia. In addition, a restriction on providing services to Russian flagged, owned or managed LNG tankers should be introduced.

(28)

At present, claims against Union companies complying with restrictive measures can be brought by legal persons, entities or bodies other than Russian legal persons, entities or bodies, by persons other than those listed in Decision 2014/512/CFSP and in Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, or by persons other than those acting on their behalf or at their direction, for instance when Union operators discontinue their supply to natural and legal persons in third countries other than Russia of products the export of which to Russia is prohibited. Therefore, it is appropriate to strengthen the Union’s framework of restrictive measures by extending the scope of the prohibition on the satisfaction of such claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by Union restrictive measures. The scope of the prohibition on the satisfaction of such claims should therefore also be extended to cover claims brought by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies established in third countries other than Russia and partner countries listed in the relevant annex to Decision 2014/512/CFSP, where those natural or legal persons, entities or bodies are selling, supplying, transferring or exporting goods, technology or services the sale, supply, transfer or export of which is prohibited under Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, whether or not the goods, technology or services originate in the Union.

(29)

Russia has adopted legislation, in particular the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 122 of 15 February 2024, and the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1767 of 18 October 2021 as amended by Government Resolution No. 380 of 27 March 2024, which allows the Russian Government to decide, at the request of a Russian legal entity of which the Russian State, a Russian legal entity, or a Russian citizen owns, directly or indirectly, more than 75 % of the share capital, on the use of an invention, a utility model or an industrial design without the consent of the right holder, for which only a symbolic compensation is required to be paid into a special rouble bank account. The legislation targets, in particular, right holders owned or controlled by natural persons in, and by legal persons incorporated under the laws of, countries that impose restrictive measures on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, including persons and companies in Member States. The legislation effectively deprives Union right holders of legitimate protection for their intellectual property rights and trade secrets in Russia, thereby giving an economic advantage to Russian-owned companies, and ultimately bolsters Russian industry. Moreover, the legislation directly contributes to increasing the resilience of Russia’s economy and its war effort, particularly when the inventions, utility models or industrial designs in question are used in the area of defence or for dual-use goods. It is therefore appropriate to enable the Council to impose a transaction ban on entities incorporated under Russian law that use without their consent the intellectual property rights of subsidiaries incorporated in Russia of Union companies. In order to facilitate identifying the entities using the intellectual property rights and trade secrets of Union right holders without their consent in that way, it is necessary for the affected Union right holders to inform the respective Member State of such use.

(30)

It is necessary to amend the prior notification mechanism for Russian diplomats and consular officers, as well as for members of the administrative and technical staff or of the service staff of diplomatic missions or consular posts of Russia, and for their family members, when travelling to a Member State other than that of their accreditation or residence.

(31)

Preventing and countering the circumvention of the Union’s restrictive measures in and by third countries remains a priority. Significant efforts have been undertaken to prevent the re-export to Russia of Union-origin dual-use goods and technology, including the Common High Priority (CHP) items listed in Annexes VII and XL to Regulation (EU) 833/2014, to Russia. The Commission monitors trade flows of those items, and the International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions engages with third countries where suspicious trade flows have been identified.

(32)

It is justified to add two combined nomenclature (CN) codes and the Kyrgyz Republic to the list of goods and technology and countries set out in Annex XIV to Decision 2014/512/CFSP. Based on available trade data for the first ten months of 2025, imports of CHP items from the Union to the Kyrgyz Republic were almost 800 % higher than before Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. For the same period, exports of CHP items from the Kyrgyz Republic to Russia were 1 200 % higher than before Russia’s war of aggression. The listings concern machining centres for working metal (CN code 8457 10 ) and machines for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of voice, images or other data, including switching and routing apparatus (CN code 8517 62 ). Those CN codes are listed under the relevant annexes to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, as the goods are capable of being used to contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of Russia’s defence and security sector. Machining centres are widely used in defence manufacturing, as they can produce high-precision metal components essential for military production. Machines for the transmission of voice and data are used, inter alia, for field communication networks and for drone telemetry. The high level of imports of such items into the Kyrgyz Republic from the Union compared with pre-war figures demonstrates a continuing and particularly high risk of circumvention, through their subsequent sale, supply, transfer or export from the Kyrgyz Republic to Russia.

(33)

The International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions has actively engaged with the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Union has also engaged in technical discussions with the Kyrgyz authorities. Despite multiple requests and despite various exchanges, the Kyrgyz Republic has neither adopted nor enforced measures sufficient to ensure that Union-origin CHP items are not re-exported to Russia, thus increasing significantly the risk that its jurisdiction is used to circumvent the Union’s restrictive measures. Therefore, the Kyrgyz Republic should be identified as a jurisdiction where the risk of circumvention is systematic and persistent, with authorities failing to prevent the sale, supply, transfer, or export to Russia of goods and technology as listed in Annex XIV to Decision 2014/512/CFSP, exported from the Union.

(34)

It is appropriate to extend the list of partner countries for importation of petroleum products.

(35)

It is also appropriate to add two ports and locks in Russia, and one port and lock in a third country other than Russia to the relevant Annex to Decision 2014/512/CFSP, that are used for the circumvention of the oil price cap by vessels practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices. This concerns the Karimun Oil Terminal in Indonesia.

(36)

Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures.

(37)

Decision 2014/512/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)

Article 1ae is amended as follows:

(2)

Article 1af is amended as follows:

(3)

the following articles are inserted:

(4)

Article 1ba is replaced by the following:

(5)

the following article is inserted:

(6)

Article 1e is amended as follows:

(7)

Article 1k is amended as follows:

(8)

the following article is inserted:

(9)

in Article 1p(2), the following points are added:

(*1)  Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 (OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj).’;"

(10)

Article 2 is amended as follows:

(11)

Article 3 is amended as follows:

(12)

in Article 3a(4), point (h) is replaced by the following:

;

(13)

Article 4 is amended as follows:

(14)

in Article 4g, the following paragraph is inserted:

(15)

in Article 4ha(5a), point (b) is replaced by the following:

;

(16)

Article 4k is amended as follows:

(17)

Article 4m is amended as follows:

(18)

Article 4o is amended as follows:

(19)

Article 4p is amended as follows:

(20)

in Article 4pa, the introductory wording of paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

(21)

Article 4u is amended as follows:

(22)

Article 4v is replaced by the following:

(23)

the following Article is inserted:

(24)

Article 4x is amended as follows:

(25)

the following article is inserted:

(26)

Article 5d is amended as follows:

(27)

in Article 7(1), the following point is added:

;

(28)

Article 8c is replaced by the following:

(29)

the Annexes to Decision 2014/512/CFSP are amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.