Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2021/C 79/01)

Last publication

OJ C 72, 1.3.2021

Past publications

OJ C 62, 22.2.2021

OJ C 53, 15.2.2021

OJ C 44, 8.2.2021

OJ C 35, 1.2.2021

OJ C 28, 25.1.2021

OJ C 19, 18.1.2021

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 21 January 2021 — Federal Republic of Germany v Esso Raffinage, European Chemicals Agency, French Republic, Kingdom of the Netherlands

(Case C-471/18 P) (1)

(Appeal - Registration, evaluation and authorisation of chemicals - Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (REACH) - Articles 5 and 6 - General obligation to register substances - Articles 41 and 42 - Evaluation of registration dossiers and compliance check of information submitted by registrants - Declaration of non-compliance - Actionable measure - Interest in bringing proceedings - Locus standi - Respective competences of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and national authorities - Obligation on ECHA to check the compliance of additional information submitted by registrants at its request - ECHA’s power to take an appropriate decision - Article 1 - Objective of protecting human health and the environment - Articles 13 and 25 - Use of animal testing - Promotion of alternative methods)

(2021/C 79/02)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented initially by T. Henze and D. Klebs, and subsequently by D. Klebs and J. Möller, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Esso Raffinage (represented initially by H. Estreicher, Rechtsanwalt, and N. Navin-Jones, Solicitor, subsequently by H. Estreicher, Rechtsanwalt, A. Kołtunowska, adwokat, K. Merten-Lentz, avocate, and N. Navin-Jones, Solicitor, and finally by H. Estreicher, Rechtsanwalt, A. Kołtunowska, adwokat, and K. Merten-Lentz, avocate), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) (represented by: W. Broere, C. Jacquet and M. Heikkilä, acting as Agents), French Republic (represented initially by D. Colas, J. Traband and A.-L. Desjonquères, and subsequently by E. Leclerc, J. Traband, W. Zemamta and A.-L. Desjonquères, acting as Agents), Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented by: K. Bulterman and L. Noort, acting as Agents)

Interveners in support of Esso Raffinage: European Coalition to End Animal Experiments (represented by: T. David, Solicitor), Higher Olefins and Poly Alpha Olefins REACH Consortium, Higher Olefins & Poly Alpha Olefins vzw (represented initially by E. Vermulst, advocaat, and subsequently by P. Kugel, advocaat)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Esso Raffinage and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA);

3.	Orders the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Coalition to End Animal Experiments, Higher Olefins and Poly Alpha Olefins REACH Consortium and Higher Olefins & Poly Alpha Olefins vzw to bear their own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 399, 5.11.2018.

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 January 2021 — Päivi Leino-Sandberg v European Parliament

(Case C-761/18 P) (1)

(Appeal - Access to documents of the EU institutions - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Article 10 - Refusal to grant access - Action before the General Court of the European Union against a decision by the European Parliament refusing to grant access to a document - Disclosure of the annotated document by a third party after the action was lodged - Order that there was no need to adjudicate pronounced by the General Court on the ground that was no longer any interest in bringing proceedings - Error of law)

(2021/C 79/03)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Päivi Leino-Sandberg (represented by: O.W. Brouwer and B.A. Verheijen, advocaten, and by S. Schubert, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament (represented by: C. Burgos, I. Anagnostopoulou and L. Vétillard, acting as Agents)

Interveners in support of the applicant: Republic of Finland (represented by: M. Pere, acting as Agent), Kingdom of Sweden (represented: initially by A. Falk, C. Meyer-Seitz, H. Shev, J. Lundberg and H. Eklinder, and subsequently by C. Meyer-Seitz, H. Shev and H. Eklinder, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Sets aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 20 September 2018, Leino-Sandberg v Parliament (T-421/17, not published, EU:T:2018:628);

2.	Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union;

3.	Reserves the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 82, 4.3.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 20 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) London, United Kingdom) — Secretary of State for the Home Department v OA

(Case C-255/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2004/83/EC - Minimum standards for granting refugee status or subsidiary protection status - Refugee status - Article 2(c) - Cessation of refugee status - Article 11 - Change in circumstances - Article 11(1)(e) - Possibility of availing oneself of the protection of the country of origin - Criteria for assessment - Article 7(2) - Financial and social support - Irrelevant)

(2021/C 79/04)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) London

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Secretary of State for the Home Department

Defendant: OA

Interested party: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 11(1)(e) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, must be interpreted as meaning that the requirements to be met by the ‘protection’ to which that provision refers in respect of the cessation of refugee status must be the same as those which arise, in relation to the granting of that status, from Article 2(c) of that directive, read together with Article 7(1) and (2) thereof;

2.

Article 11(1)(e) of Directive 2004/83, read together with Article 7(2) of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that any social and financial support provided by private actors, such as the family or the clan of a third country national concerned, falls short of what is required under those provisions to constitute protection and is, therefore, of no relevance either to the assessment of the effectiveness or availability of the protection provided by the State within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) of that directive, or to the determination, under Article 11(1)(e) of that directive, read together with Article 2(c) thereof, of whether there continues to be a well-founded fear of persecution.

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(1)  OJ C 206, 17.6.2019.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 20 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht des Saarlandes — Germany) — QM v Finanzamt Saarbrücken

(Case C-288/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 2(1)(c) - Supplies of services for consideration - Article 26(1) - Transactions treated as supplies of services for consideration - Article 56(2) - Determination of the point of reference for tax purposes - Hiring of means of transport - Making cars available to employees)

(2021/C 79/05)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht des Saarlandes

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: QM

Defendant: Finanzamt Saarbrücken

Operative part of the judgment

On a proper construction of the first subparagraph of Article 56(2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008, the act of making a vehicle forming part of the assets of the business of a taxable person available to one of that taxable person’s employees does not fall within the scope of that provision if that transaction does not constitute a supply of services for consideration within the meaning of Article 2(1)(c) of that directive. By contrast, the first subparagraph of Article 56(2) of Directive 2006/112 does apply to such a transaction if it involves a supply of services for consideration within the meaning of Article 2(1)(c) of that directive and if that employee has a permanent right to use that vehicle for private purposes and to exclude other persons from using it, in exchange for rent and for an agreed period of more than 30 days.

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(1)  OJ C 206, 17.6.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 20 January 2021 — European Commission v Printeos SA

(Case C-301/19 P) (1)

(Appeal - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Decision finding infringement of Article 101 TFEU - Fines - Annulment - Repayment of the principal amount of the fine - Article 266 TFEU - Default interest - Distinction between default interest and compensatory interest - Calculation of interest - Article 90(4)(a), second sentence, of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012)

(2021/C 79/06)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: F. Dintilhac, P. Rossi and F. Jimeno Fernández, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Printeos SA (represented by: H. Brokelmann and P. Martínez-Lage Sobredo, abogados)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Sets aside point 2 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 12 February 2019, Printeos v Commission (T-201/17, EU:T:2019:81);

3.	Orders the European Commission to pay Printeos SA interest at the rate set by the European Central Bank for its principal refinancing operations, plus 3,5 percentage points, on the amount of EUR 184 592,95 for the period from 31 March 2017 until the date of payment in full;

4.	Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and pay those of Printeos SA relating both to the proceedings at first instance in Case T-201/17 and the proceedings before the Court of Justice.

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(1)  OJ C 238, 15.7.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 21 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie — Romania) — Consiliul Concurenţei v Whiteland Import Export SRL

(Case C-308/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Competition - Penalties imposed by the national competition authority - Limitation period - Actions interrupting the limitation period - National legislation precluding, after the initiation of an investigation, the possibility that subsequent action for the purpose of proceedings or investigation may interrupt the new limitation period - Principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law - Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 - Article 25(3) - Scope - Article 4(3) TEU - Article 101 TFEU - Principle of effectiveness)

(2021/C 79/07)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Consiliul Concurenţei

Defendant: Whiteland Import Export SRL

Operative part of the judgment

1.

EU law must be interpreted as meaning that national courts are not required to apply Article 25(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] to the time-barring of a national competition authority’s powers to impose penalties for infringements of EU competition law;

2.

Article 4(3) TEU and Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, according to which the decision to initiate an investigation, adopted by the national competition authority, concerning an infringement of EU competition law rules, is the final action of that authority which may have the effect of interrupting the limitation period relating to its power to impose penalties and excludes any subsequent action, for the purpose of proceedings or investigation, from interrupting that period, where it becomes apparent, having regard to all elements of the limitation rules at issue, that such an exclusion presents a systemic risk that acts constituting such infringements may go unpunished, which it is for the referring court to verify.

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(1)  OJ C 263, 5.8.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 14 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State — Belgium) — RTS infra BVBA, Aannemingsbedrijf Norré-Behaegel BVBA v Vlaams Gewest

(Case C-387/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Public procurement contracts - Directive 2014/24/EU - Article 57(6) - Optional grounds for exclusion - Measures taken by the economic operator to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of an optional ground for exclusion - Obligation of the economic operator to provide evidence of such measures on its own initiative - Direct effect)

(2021/C 79/08)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: RTS infra BVBA, Aannemingsbedrijf Norré-Behaegel BVBA

Defendant: Vlaams Gewest

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2170 of 24 November 2015, must be interpreted as precluding a practice whereby an economic operator is required, at the time of submission of their requests to participate or of their tenders, to provide voluntarily evidence of the corrective measures taken to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence, in respect of that operator, of an optional ground for exclusion referred to in Article 57(4) of that directive, as amended by Delegated Regulation 2015/2170, where such an obligation does not arise either from the applicable national rules or from the tender specifications. By contrast, Article 57(6) of that directive, as amended by Delegated Regulation 2015/2170, does not preclude such an obligation where it is laid down in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner in the applicable national rules and is brought to the attention of the economic operator concerned by means of the tender specifications.

2.	Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24, as amended by Delegated Regulation 2015/2170, must be interpreted as having direct effect.

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(1)  OJ C 270, 12.8.2019.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Apelativen sad — Plovdiv — Bulgaria) — Criminal proceedings against OM

(Case C-393/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Right to property - Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights - Right to an effective remedy - Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA - Confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property - Directive 2014/42/EU - Freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union - National legislation providing for the confiscation, for the benefit of the State, of property used to commit the offence of smuggling - Property belonging to a third party acting in good faith)

(2021/C 79/09)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Apelativen sad — Plovdiv

Party in the main criminal proceedings

OM

Interveners in the main criminal proceedings: Okrazhna prokuratura — Haskovo, Apelativna prokuratura — Plovdiv

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 2(1) of Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property, read in the light of Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding a national law which permits the confiscation of an instrumentality used to commit an aggravated smuggling offence where that property belongs to a third party acting in good faith;

2.

Article 4 of Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding a national law which permits the confiscation, in the context of criminal proceedings, of property belonging to a person other than the person who committed the criminal offence, without the former being afforded an effective remedy.

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(1)  OJ C 295, 2.9.2019.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 20 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus — Estonia) — Maksu- ja Tolliamet v Heavyinstall OÜ

(Case C-420/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2010/24/EU - Article 16 - Recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures - Mutual assistance - Request for precautionary measures - Judicial decision of the applicant Member State for the purpose of implementing precautionary measures - Jurisdiction of the court of the requested Member State to assess and reassess the justification of those measures - Principles of mutual trust and of mutual recognition)

(2021/C 79/10)

Language of the case: Estonian

Referring court

Riigikohus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Maksu- ja Tolliamet

Defendant: Heavyinstall OÜ

Operative part of the judgment

Article 16 of Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the requested Member State, ruling on a request for precautionary measures, are bound by the assessment of the factual and legal compliance with the conditions laid down for the application of those measures made by the authorities of the applicant Member State, in particular where that assessment is contained in the document referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 16(1) of that directive, attached to that request.

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(1)  OJ C 263, 5.8.2019.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch — Netherlands) — TQ v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

(Case C-441/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Area of freedom, security and justice - Directive 2008/115/EC - Common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals - Article 5(a), Article 6(1) and (4), Article 8(1) and Article 10 - Return decision issued against an unaccompanied minor - Best interests of the child - Obligation for the Member State concerned to be satisfied, before the adoption of a return decision, that that minor will be returned to a member of his or her family, a nominated guardian or adequate reception facilities in the State of return - Distinction on the basis solely of the criterion of the age of the minor in order to grant a right of residence - Return decision not followed by removal measures)

(2021/C 79/11)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: TQ

Respondent: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, read in conjunction with Article 5(a) of that directive and Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that, before issuing a return decision against an unaccompanied minor, the Member State concerned must carry out a general and in-depth assessment of the situation of that minor, taking due account of the best interests of the child. In this context, that Member State must ensure that adequate reception facilities are available for the unaccompanied minor in question in the State of return.

2.

Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 5(a) of that directive and in the light of Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may not distinguish between unaccompanied minors solely on the basis of the criterion of their age for the purpose of ascertaining whether there are adequate reception facilities in the State of return;

3.

Article 8(1) of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as precluding a Member State, after it has adopted a return decision in respect of an unaccompanied minor and has been satisfied, in accordance with Article 10(2) of that directive, that that minor will be returned to a member of his or her family, a nominated guardian or adequate reception facilities in the State of return, from refraining from subsequently removing that minor until he or she reaches the age of 18 years.

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(1)  OJ C 270, 12.8.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 14 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus — Finland) — Proceedings initiated by Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto

(Case C-450/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Competition - Article 101 TFEU - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Manipulation of the bidding procedure - Determination of the duration of the infringement period - Inclusion of the period during which the cartel members implemented the anticompetitive agreement - Economic effects of anticompetitive behaviour - Cessation of the infringement on the definitive award of the contract)

(2021/C 79/12)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto

Intervening parties: Eltel Group Oy, Eltel Networks Oy

Operative part of the judgment

Article 101(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that, where an undertaking which has allegedly participated in a single and continuous infringement of that provision, the most recent constituent element of which consists in the concerted submission with its competitors of a tender for the award of a public works contract, has won the contract and concluded with the contracting authority a works contract determining the essential characteristics of that contract and, in particular, the overall price to be paid for those works, the performance and payment of the price for which are staggered over time, the infringement period corresponds to the period up to the date of signature of the contract concluded between the undertaking and the contracting authority on the basis of the concerted bid submitted by that undertaking. It is for the national court to ascertain the date on which the essential characteristics of the relevant contract and, in particular, the total price to be paid for the work, have been definitively determined.

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(1)  OJ C 280, 19.8.2019.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 20 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen — Sweden) — Lexel AB v Skatteverket

(Case C-484/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 49 TFEU - Freedom of establishment - Corporation tax - Taxation of associated companies - National tax legislation prohibiting a company which is established in one Member State from deducting interest paid to a company established in another Member State, belonging to the same group of companies, in the case where a substantial tax benefit is gained)

(2021/C 79/13)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Lexel AB

Defendant: Skatteverket

Operative part of the judgment

Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that a company established in one Member State is not permitted to deduct interest payments made to a company belonging to the same group, established in another Member State, on the ground that the principal reason for the debt linking them appears to be the obtaining of a substantial tax benefit, whereas such a tax benefit would not have been deemed to exist if both companies had been established in the first Member State, as in that situation they would have been covered by the provisions on intra-group financial transfers.

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(1)  OJ C 295, 2.9.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 21 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie — Romania) — UCMR — ADA Asociaţia pentru Drepturi de Autor a Compozitorilor v Asociația Culturală ‘Suflet de Român’, represented by its liquidator, Pro Management Insolv IPURL

(Case C-501/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 2(1)(c), Article 24(1) and Article 25(a) - Taxable transactions - Fees for the public performance of musical works - Article 28 - Collective copyright management organisation - Collection of those fees in its own name and on behalf of copyright holders from end users)

(2021/C 79/14)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UCMR — ADA Asociaţia pentru Drepturi de Autor a Compozitorilor

Defendant: Asociația Culturală ‘Suflet de Român’, represented by its liquidator, Pro Management Insolv IPURL

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 2(1)(c) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2010/88/EU of 7 December 2010, must be interpreted as meaning that a holder of copyright in musical works supplies services for consideration to the end user, a performance organiser, where the latter is authorised, by a non-exclusive licence, to perform those works for a public audience in return for the payment of remuneration collected by an appointed collective management organisation which acts in its own name but on behalf of that copyright holder;

2.

Article 28 of Directive 2006/112/EC, as amended by Directive 2010/88, must be interpreted as meaning that a collective management organisation which collects, in its own name but on behalf of holders of copyright in musical works, royalties due to them in consideration for the authorisation for the public performance of their protected works, acts as a ‘taxable person’ within the meaning of that provision and is therefore deemed to have received the services in question from those rights holders before providing them to the end user itself. In such a case, that organisation is required to issue invoices in its own name to the end user containing the royalties collected from the latter, including value added tax (VAT). The copyright holders are, in turn, required to issue to the collective management organisation invoices including VAT for the services supplied in respect of the royalties received.

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(1)  OJ C 372, 4.11.2019.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 20 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht — Germany) — Land Baden-Württemberg v D.R.

(Case C-619/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Aarhus Convention - Directive 2003/4/EC - Public access to environmental information - ‘Stuttgart 21’ infrastructure project - Refusal of a request for environmental information - Article 4(1) - Grounds for refusal - Term ‘internal communications’ - Scope - Limitation in time of the protection of such communications)

(2021/C 79/15)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Land Baden-Württemberg

Respondent: D.R.

Other parties: Deutsche Bahn AG, Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 4(1)(e) of Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘internal communications’ covers all information which circulates within a public authority and which, on the date of the request for access, has not left that authority’s internal sphere — as the case may be, after being received by that authority, provided that it was not or should not have been made available to the public before it was so received.

2.

Article 4(1)(e) of Directive 2003/4 must be interpreted as meaning that the applicability of the exception to the right of access to environmental information provided for by it in respect of internal communications of a public authority is not limited in time. However, that exception can apply only for the period during which protection of the information sought is justified.

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(1)  OJ C 406, 2.12.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 20 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia — Romania) — Administraţia Judeţeană a Finanţelor Publice Sibiu, Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Brașov (DGRFP) v LN

(Case C-655/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 2 - Article 9 - Concepts of ‘economic activity’ and ‘taxable person’ - Transactions which seek to obtain income from goods on a continuing basis - Acquisition by a creditor of immovable property in the context of an enforcement procedure carried out for the purpose of the recovery of loans secured by mortgage guarantees and the sale of those buildings - Simple exercise of right of ownership by its holder)

(2021/C 79/16)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Administraţia Judeţeană a Finanţelor Publice Sibiu, Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Brașov (DGRFP)

Defendant: LN

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(1)(a) and Article 9(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that a transaction by which a person acquires immovable property in the context of an enforcement procedure undertaken for the purpose of recovery of a loan which had previously been granted and, consequently, sells that property does not constitute, in itself, an economic activity, where that transaction falls within the scope of a simple exercise of the right of ownership and of the sound management of private assets, such that that person cannot, in the context of that transaction, be considered a taxable person.

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(1)  OJ C 19, 20.1.2020.

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 14 January 2021 — European Commission v Italian Republic

(Case C-744/19) (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 2013/59/Euratom - Basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation - Article 106 - Failure to transpose within the prescribed period)

(2021/C 79/17)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: R. Tricot and G. Gattinara, Agents)

Defendant: Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieri, Agent, and C. Colelli, avvocato dello Stato)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom, and by failing to communicate to the European Commission the text of the provisions of national law adopted, where necessary, in the field governed by Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 106(1) and (3) of that directive;

2.	Orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 399, 25.11.2019.

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 21 January 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña — Spain) — Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS) v BT

(Case C-843/19) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security - Directive 79/7/EEC - Article 4(1) - Voluntary early retirement - Early retirement pension - Eligibility - Requirement for the pension amount to be received to be at least as much as the legal minimum amount - Proportion of workers of each sex excluded from the benefit of early retirement - Justification of a potential particular disadvantage to female workers - Social policy objectives of the Member State concerned)

(2021/C 79/18)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS)

Defendant: BT

Operative part of the judgment

Article 4(1) of Council Directive 79/7 of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude national legislation which, in the event of voluntary early retirement of a worker enrolled in the general social security scheme, makes that worker’s right to an early retirement pension contingent on the condition that the amount of that pension must be at least as much as the minimum pension to which that worker would be entitled at the age of 65, even if that law puts at a particular disadvantage female workers compared with male workers, which is for the referring court to verify, in so far as that consequence is justified by legitimate social policy objectives which are unrelated to any discrimination based on sex.

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(1)  OJ C 54, 17.2.2020.

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 3 December 2020 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Liège — Belgium) — Agence fédérale pour l’Accueil des demandeurs d’asile (Fedasil) v Mr M. (C-67/20), Ms C. (C-68/20), Ms C. (C-69/20)

(Joined Cases C-67/20 to C-69/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - No need to adjudicate)

(2021/C 79/19)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour du travail de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Agence fédérale pour l’Accueil des demandeurs d’asile (Fedasil)

Defendants: Mr M. (C-67/20), Ms C. (C-68/20), Ms C. (C-69/20)

Operative part of the order

There is no need to adjudicate on the requests for a preliminary ruling made by the cour du travail de Liège (Belgium) by decisions of 10 February 2020.

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(1)  OJ C 161, 11.5.2020.

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 3 December 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia — Romania) — Siebenburgisches Nugat SRL v Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Braşov, Agenţia Naţională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcţia Generală a Vămilor — Direcţia Regională Vamală Braşov — Biroul Vamal de Interior Sibiu

(Case C-99/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Customs union - Common customs tariff - Combined nomenclature - Tariff headings - Subheading 8302 41 30 - Metal rail components for hanging curtains)

(2021/C 79/20)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Siebenburgisches Nugat SRL

Defendants: Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Braşov, Agenţia Naţională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcţia Generală a Vămilor — Direcţia Regională Vamală Braşov — Biroul Vamal de Interior Sibiu

Intervener: Hans Draser Internationales Marketing

Operative part of the order

The combined nomenclature, as set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, in the version resulting from Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1754 of 6 October 2015, must be interpreted as meaning that rail components for hanging curtains, in the form of finished tubes (painted, nickel-plated, chromed), come under tariff subheading 8302 41 90, unless those finished tubes consist in rods, tubes or bars merely cut to the desired length, which it is for the referring court to verify for the purposes of the tariff classification of the goods.

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(1)  OJ C 279, 24.8.2020.

Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 10 December 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Ufficio del Giudice di Pace di Lanciano — Italy) — XX v OO

(Case C-220/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - State of national health emergency - Continuity of judicial activity - Postponement of hearings - Lack of sufficient details concerning the factual and regulatory context of the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need for an answer to the reference for a preliminary ruling - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2021/C 79/21)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Ufficio del Giudice di Pace di Lanciano — Italy

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: XX

Defendant: OO

Interveners: WW, XC, VS

Operative part of the order

The request for a preliminary ruling brought by the Giudice di pace di Lanciano (Justice of the Peace of Lanciano, Italy) by decision of 18 May 2020 is manifestly inadmissible.

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(1)  OJ C 279, 24.8.2020.

Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 26 November 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Colt Technology Services SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Telecom Italia SpA, Voidafone Italia SpA, Ministero della Giustizia, Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze v Ministero della Giustizia, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze, Wind Tre SpA, Procura generale della Repubblica presso la Corte d’appello di Reggio Calabria, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Cagliari, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Roma, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Locri

(Case C-318/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality - National legislation on pricing of interception activities ordered by judicial authorities - Failure to take into account the principle of full reimbursement of the costs of telecommunications operators - Article 53(2) and Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Lack of sufficient details concerning the factual and regulatory framework of the main proceedings and the reasons justifying the need to reply to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2021/C 79/22)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Colt Technology Services SpA, Wind Tre SpA, Telecom Italia SpA, Ministero della Giustizia, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Vodafone Italia SpA

Intervening parties: Procura generale della Repubblica presso la Corte d’appello di Reggio Calabria, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Cagliari, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Roma

Defendants: Ministero della Giustizia, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Roma, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Cagliari, Procura generale della Repubblica presso la Corte d’appello di Reggio Calabria, Wind Tre SpA, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Locri

Operative part of the order

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy), by decision of 13 February 2020, is manifestly inadmissible.

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(1)  OJ C 348, 10.10.2020.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Oberösterreich (Austria) lodged on 1 July 2020 — A, M v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Kirchdorf

(Case C-293/20)

(2021/C 79/23)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesverwaltungsgericht Oberösterreich

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: A, M

Defendant authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Kirchdorf

Other party to the proceedings: Finanzamt Kirchdorf — Perg — Steyr

By order of 20 January 2021, the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) ruled that the request for a preliminary ruling lodged by the Landesverwaltungsgericht Oberösterreich (Regional Administrative Court, Upper Austria, Austria), by decision of 29 June 2020, is manifestly inadmissible.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social n.o 26 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 19 November 2020 — KM v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS)

(Case C-625/20)

(2021/C 79/24)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social n.o 26 de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: KM

Defendant: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS)

Questions referred

1.

Is the Spanish rule on compatibility of benefits established in Article 163(1) of the [Ley General de la Seguridad Social] (General Law on Social Security), as interpreted by case-law, which prevents two permanent disability benefits awarded under the same Social Security scheme being deemed compatible, while benefits awarded under different schemes are deemed compatible, even if, in both cases, entitlement has been earned by virtue of separate contributions, contrary to the European rules established in Article 4 of Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, (1) and Article 5 of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), (2) given that the Spanish legislation may give rise to indirect discrimination on grounds of sex or gender, having regard to gender distribution in the different Spanish Social Security schemes?

2.	If the reply to the first question is in the negative, could the Spanish legislation be contrary to the aforesaid European legislation if the two benefits relate to different injuries or illnesses?

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(1)  OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24.

(2)  OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Giustizia Amministrativa per la Regione Siciliana (Italy) lodged on 27 November 2020 — Caruter s.r.l. v S.R.R. Messina Provincia S.c.P.A., Comune di Basicò, Comune di Falcone, Comune di Fondachelli Fantina, Comune di Gioiosa Marea, Comune di Librizzi, Comune di Mazzarrà Sant’Andrea, Comune di Montagnareale, Comune di Oliveri, Comune di Piraino, Comune di San Piero Patti, Regione Siciliana — Urega — Ufficio regionale espletamento gare d’appalti lavori pubblici Messina, Regione Siciliana — Assessorato regionale delle infrastrutture e della mobilità

(Case C-642/20)

(2021/C 79/25)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Giustizia Amministrativa per la Regione Siciliana

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Caruter s.r.l.

Defendants: S.R.R. Messina Provincia S.c.P.A., Comune di Basicò, Comune di Falcone, Comune di Fondachelli Fantina, Comune di Gioiosa Marea, Comune di Librizzi, Comune di Mazzarrà Sant’Andrea, Comune di Montagnareale, Comune di Oliveri, Comune di Piraino, Comune di San Piero Patti, Regione Siciliana — Urega — Ufficio regionale espletamento gare d’appalti lavori pubblici Messina, Regione Siciliana — Assessorato regionale delle infrastrutture e della mobilità

Question referred

Does Article 63 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, (1) concerning reliance on the capacities of other entities, in conjunction with the principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services enshrined in Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), preclude the application of the Italian national rules relating to ‘criteria for selection and the supplementing or amending of tendering documentation’ laid down in the penultimate sentence of Article 83(8) of the Public Procurement Code established by Legislative Decree No 50 of 18 April 2016, according to which where recourse is had to reliance on the capacities of other entities (referred to in Article 89 of the Public Procurement Code established by Legislative Decree No 50 of 18 April 2016), the agent must in any event fulfil the majority of the requirements and provide the majority of the services?

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(1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Apelativen sad — Sofia (Bulgaria) lodged on 15 November 2020 — Criminal proceedings against VD

(Case C-654/20)

(2021/C 79/26)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Apelativen sad — Sofia

Party to the main proceedings

VD

Questions referred

1.

Does the principle of legality of criminal offences and penalties allow national legislation which provides for both administrative and criminal liability for the same act, namely driving a motor vehicle while subject to a coercive administrative measure in the form of a driving licence suspension, in the absence of any criteria allowing for an objective distinction to be made between the two types of liability?

2.	Should the Court of Justice of the European Union answer the first question in the negative, what powers does the national court have to ensure the effective application of the principles of EU law?

3.

Is a penalty involving deprivation of liberty of up to three years and the imposition of a fine of 200 to 1 000 Bulgarian leva (BGN) proportionate for the purpose of Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as regards the criminal offence of driving a motor vehicle while subject to a coercive administrative measure in the form of a driving licence suspension?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 9 December 2020 — Criminal proceedings against M.M.

(Case C-671/20)

(2021/C 79/27)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie

Party to the main proceedings

M.M.

Questions referred

1.

Must EU law — in particular Article 2 TEU and the value of the rule of law expressed therein, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the principles of primacy, sincere cooperation and legal certainty — be interpreted as precluding the application of a Member State’s legislation, such as Article 41b(1) and (3) of the Ustawa z dnia 27 lipca 2001 r. — Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (Law of 27 July 2001 on the System of Ordinary Courts, ‘the LSOC’), in such a manner that the president of a court may, independently and without judicial review, decide to change the composition of a court as a result of an authorisation granted by a body such as the Izba Dyscyplinarna [Sądu Najwyższego] (Disciplinary Chamber [of the Supreme Court, Poland]) for the criminal prosecution or detention of a judge included in the original panel (Regional Court Judge I. T.), which involves the mandatory suspension of that judge from his or her duties and entails, in particular, prohibiting that judge from sitting on panels in the cases assigned to him or her, including the cases assigned to him or her before the authorisation was granted?

2.

Must EU law — in particular the provisions cited in question 1 — be interpreted as precluding: (a) legislation of a Member State such as Article 42a(1) and (2) and Article 107(1)(3) of the LSOC, which prohibits a national court from reviewing, in the course of that court’s review of its compliance with the requirements of being a tribunal previously established by law, the binding effect and legal circumstances of the authorisation granted by the Disciplinary Chamber referred to in question 1, which are a direct cause of the change in the composition of the court, while at the same time stipulating that an attempt to conduct such a review will give rise to disciplinary proceedings being instituted against the judge conducting it? (b) the case-law of a national body, such as the Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional Court[, Poland]), according to which acts by national bodies such as the Prezydent Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (President of the Republic of Poland) and the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council for the Judiciary[, Poland]) related to the appointment of members of a body such as the Disciplinary Chamber are not subject to judicial review, including review from the point of view of EU law irrespective of the seriousness and extent of the infringements, and the appointment of a person to a judicial post is final and conclusive?

3.

Must EU law — in particular the provisions cited in question 1 — be interpreted as precluding the authorisation referred to in question 1 from having binding effect, in particular as regards the suspension of a judge from his or her duties, due to the fact that it was granted by a body such as the Disciplinary Chamber, and therefore: (a) all State bodies (including the referring court as well as the bodies which have powers to designate and modify the composition of national courts, in particular a court president) must disregard that authorisation and allow the judge of a national court covered by that authorisation to sit on the adjudicating panel of that court; (b) a court whose composition does not include the judge originally appointed to it — solely because he or she is covered by that authorisation — is not a tribunal previously established by law and therefore cannot, as a ‘tribunal’, rule on questions concerning the application or interpretation of EU law?

4.

From the point of view of the answers to the above questions, is it relevant that the Disciplinary Chamber and the Trybunał Konstytucyjny do not guarantee effective judicial protection due to their lack of independence and the established infringements of the rules concerning the appointment of their members?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 15 December 2020 — Unilever Italia Mkt. Operations Srl v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato

(Case C-680/20)

(2021/C 79/28)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Unilever Italia Mkt. Operations Srl

Respondent: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato

Questions referred

1.

In cases other than those involving corporate control, what are the relevant criteria for establishing whether contractual coordination among formally autonomous and independent economic operators results in the creation of a single economic entity for the purposes of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU? Specifically, can the existence of a certain level of interference in the commercial decisions of another undertaking, which is typical of cooperative commercial relationships between producers and distribution intermediaries, be deemed sufficient reason to classify those undertakings as part of the same economic unit? Is it necessary for a ‘hierarchical’ link to exist between the two undertakings, identified by the existence of a contract under which several autonomous undertakings ‘submit’ to management and coordination by one of their number, thus making it necessary for the Authority to prove that there is a systemic and consistent range of guidelines likely to influence the undertaking’s management decisions, namely strategic and operational decisions of a financial, industrial and commercial nature?

2.

In assessing whether there has been abuse of a dominant position implemented by means of exclusivity clauses, must Article 102 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the competition authority has an obligation to verify whether such clauses have the effect of excluding equally efficient competitors from the market, and to examine specifically the economic analyses produced by the party concerning the actual ability of the alleged conduct to exclude equally efficient competitors from the market? In the case of exclusionary exclusivity clauses or conduct characterised by a large number of abusive practices (loyalty-inducing rebates and exclusivity clauses), does the Authority have a legal obligation to base its allegation of a competition offence on the equally efficient competitor criterion?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 22 December 2020 — SIA DOBELES HES v Sabiedrisko pakalpojumu regulēšanas komisija, Ekonomikas ministrija, Finanšu ministrija

(Case C-702/20)

(2021/C 79/29)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Augstākā tiesa (Senāts)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant at first instance and cross-appellant: SIA DOBELES HES

Defendant at first instance and appellant: Sabiedrisko pakalpojumu regulēšanas komisija

Other parties to the proceedings: Ekonomikas ministrija, Finanšu ministrija

Questions referred

1.

Must the obligation imposed on the public operator to purchase electricity at a price higher than the market price from producers who use renewable energy sources to generate electricity, relying on the obligation imposed on the end consumer to pay in proportion to use, be deemed to constitute intervention by the State or through State resources for the purposes of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

2.

Is the concept of ‘liberalisation of the market in electricity’ to be interpreted as meaning that liberalisation must be deemed to have already occurred where certain aspects of free trade exist, such as, for example, contracts concluded by a public operator with suppliers from other Member States? Can liberalisation of the market in electricity be deemed to begin when the law grants some electricity users (for example, electricity users connected to the transport network or non-domestic electricity users connected to the distribution network) the right to change electricity distributor? What effect do developments in the regulation of the electricity market in Latvia have on the assessment of aid granted to electricity producers in the light of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (for the purposes of the answer to question 1), in particular, the situation prior to 2007?

3.

If the answers to questions 1 and 2 make clear that the aid granted to electricity producers does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, do the fact that the applicant now operates in a liberalised electricity market and the fact that the payment of compensation would now afford it an advantage over other operators present on the market concerned mean that compensation for the loss must be treated as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

4.

If the answers to questions 1 and 2 make clear that the aid granted to electricity producers is State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, must it be considered, in the context of the supervision of State aid provided for in that provision, that the applicant’s claim for compensation for the loss sustained due to failure to respect fully the statutory right to receive a higher payment for electricity generated constitutes a request for new State aid or a request for payment of the portion of State aid not previously received?

5.

If question 4 is answered to the effect that the claim for compensation must be assessed, in the context of past circumstances, as a request for payment of the portion of State aid not previously received, does if follow from Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that, at the present time, in order to adjudicate on the payment of that State aid, it is necessary to examine the current market situation and to take account of the legislation in force (including the limitations currently in existence to prevent overcompensation)?

6.	Is it significant, for the purposes of the interpretation of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, that wind power plants, unlike hydroelectric power plants, have benefitted in the past from the full amount of aid?

7.	Is it significant, for the purposes of the interpretation of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, that only some of the hydroelectric power plants which have not received the full amount of aid should now receive compensation?

8.

Must Article 3(2) and Article 7(1) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid (1) be interpreted as meaning that, since the amount of the aid at issue in the present case does not exceed the threshold for de minimis aid, that aid should be considered to fulfil the criteria laid down for de minimis aid? Must Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1407/2013 be interpreted as meaning that, in the present case, in view of the conditions for preventing overcompensation set out in Commission Decision SA.43140, the treatment of the payment of damages as de minimis aid is liable to create unacceptable cumulation?

9.

If the view is taken in the present case that State aid was granted/paid, must Article 1(b) and (c) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2) be interpreted as meaning that circumstances like those of the present case amount to new State aid and not existing State aid?

10.

If question 9 is answered in the affirmative, in order to assess whether the applicant’s situation matches that of aid which is deemed to be existing aid, as referred to in Article 1(b)(iv) of Regulation 2015/1589, must account be taken solely of the date on which the aid was effectively paid as the starting point of the limitation period for the purposes of Article 17(2) of Regulation 2015/1589?

11.

If it is considered that State aid has been granted/paid, must Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 2(1) and (3) of Regulation 2015/1589 be interpreted as meaning that a procedure to notify State aid like that at issue in the present case is deemed to be appropriate where the national court upholds the claim for compensation for the loss sustained on condition that a decision has been received from the Commission which approves the aid and directs the Ministry of the Economy to forward to the Commission, within two months of delivery of the judgment, the relevant declaration of aid for the business activity?

12.

Is it significant, for the purpose of interpreting Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, that compensation for the loss sustained is claimed from a public sector body (Public Services Regulatory Commission) which, historically, has not had to bear such costs, and also that that body’s budget is made up of State charges paid by public service providers belonging to regulated sectors which must be ringfenced for regulatory activity?

13.

Is a compensation scheme like that at issue in the present case compatible with the principles contained in EU law and applicable to regulated sectors, in particular Article 12 and recital 30 of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive), (3) as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC (4) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009?

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(1)  OJ 2013 L 352, p. 1.

(2)  OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9.

(3)  OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21, Special edition in Latvian: Chapter 13 Volume 029 P. 337.

(4)  Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2009 L 337, p. 37).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 30 December 2020 — Comune di Lerici v Provincia di La Spezia

(Case C-719/20)

(2021/C 79/30)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Comune di Lerici

Respondents: Provincia di La Spezia

Questions referred

Does Article 12 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) of 26 February 2014 preclude national legislation which imposes a concentration of companies providing local public services of economic interest, as a result of which the economic operator succeeding the initial concession holder following transparent corporate transactions, including mergers and acquisitions, continues to operate the services until the agreed date, if:

(a)	the initial concession holder is a company awarded the contract in-house on the basis of similar control where several other public authorities are shareholders in that company;

(b)	the new economic operator has been selected by means of a public call for tenders;

(c)	as a result of the concentration, the requirements for similar control where several other public authorities are shareholders in that company no longer apply in relation to some of the local authorities which originally awarded the service in question.

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(1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 28 December 2020 — Paget Approbois SAS v Depeyre entreprises SARL, Alpha Insurance A/S and Alpha Insurance A/S v Paget Approbois SAS, Depeyre entreprises SARL

(Case C-724/20)

(2021/C 79/31)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Paget Approbois SAS, Alpha Insurance A/S

Defendants: Depeyre entreprises SARL, Alpha Insurance A/S, Paget Approbois SAS

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 292 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (1) be interpreted as meaning that the pending lawsuit brought before the court of a Member State by the creditor of an insurance compensation claim to obtain the settlement of that claim by an insurance undertaking subject to winding-up proceedings pending in another Member State, concerns, within the meaning of that directive, an asset or a right of which the insurance undertaking has been divested?

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, is the law of the Member State in which the proceedings are pending intended to govern all the effects of the winding-up proceedings on the pending lawsuit? In particular, should it be applied in so far as it: — provides that the opening of such proceedings results in the suspension of the pending lawsuit; — subjects the resumption of the proceedings to the claim for insurance compensation being lodged against the estate of the insurance undertaking by the creditor and to the bodies responsible for the winding-up proceedings being summoned; — and precludes an order to pay the insurance compensation, since such an order can no longer be the subject of a judgment except relating to the determination and fixing the amount of the compensation?

---

(1)  OJ 2009 L 335, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 29 December 2020 — CT, Ferme de la Sarte SPRL v Région wallonne

(Case C-726/20)

(2021/C 79/32)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: CT, Ferme de la Sarte SPRL

Defendant: Région wallonne

Question referred

Is Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 (1) to be interpreted as excluding from its scope the production of turf or of green roofs?

---

(1)  OJ 2013 L 347, p. 487.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 4 January 2021 — Fédération des entreprises de la beauté v Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé

(Case C-4/21)

(2021/C 79/33)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Fédération des entreprises de la beauté

Defendant: Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé

Questions referred

1.

Must the letter of 27 November 2019 from the Head of the ‘Consumer, Environmental and Health Technologies’ Unit of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs be regarded as a measure which is preparatory to the decision by which the Commission determines whether a provisional measure of a Member State is justified or not on the basis of Article 27(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic products, (1) in view of the wording of that letter and the absence of any evidence showing that authority has been delegated to the member of staff who signed it to take a decision on behalf of the Commission, or must it be regarded as such a decision, expressing the final position of the Commission?

2.

Should the letter of 27 November 2019 have to be regarded as a measure which is preparatory to the decision by which the Commission determines whether a provisional measure of a Member State is justified or not on the basis of Article 27(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009, when a national court is asked to rule on the legality of a provisional measure taken by a national authority on the basis of Article 27(1) of that regulation, may that court, pending the Commission’s reaching its decision, rule on that provisional measure’s compliance with that article and, if so, to what extent and on which points, or must that court, for as long as the Commission has not declared it to be unjustified, treat the provisional measure as compliant with that article?

3.	If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, must Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 be interpreted as allowing provisional measures to be taken which apply to a category of products containing the same substance?

4.

Should the letter of 27 November 2019 have to be regarded as a decision expressing the final position of the Commission on the provisional measure at issue, may the validity of that decision be contested before the national court, even though it has not been the subject of an action for annulment on the basis of Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in view of the fact that the wording of that letter suggested that it was merely a preparatory measure and that the Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé, to which that letter was addressed, replied to it, expressing its disagreement and indicating that it was maintaining its provisional measure until the Commission gave its final decision, and the Commission itself did not reply to that letter?

5.

If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, was the letter of 27 November 2019 signed by a member of staff to whom authority had been delegated to take the decision on behalf of the Commission and is it valid inasmuch as it is based on the assertion that the safeguard clause mechanism laid down in Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 ‘covers individual measures concerning cosmetic products made available on the market and not general measures which apply to a category of products containing a certain substance’, in view of the interpretation which must be given to the provisions of that article, combined with those of Article 31 of that regulation?

6.

If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, or if the letter of 27 November 2019 may no longer be contested as part of the present dispute, must the provisional measure taken on the basis of Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 be regarded as contrary to that regulation from the outset or only as from the notification of that letter to the Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé, or even as from a reasonable period of time after that notification, intended to allow it to be repealed, in the light, also, of the uncertainty as to the significance of that letter and of the fact that the Commission did not reply to the Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé, which indicated that it would ‘maintain, as a precautionary measure, its decision of 13 March 2019, pending the decision of the Commission taken in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009’?

---

(1)  OJ 2009 L 342, p. 59.

Order of the President of the Court of Justice of 4 December 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo No 17 de Barcelona — Spain) — UD v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona

(Case C-746/19) (1)

(2021/C 79/34)

Language of the case: Spanish

The President of the Court of Justice has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 19, 20.1.2020.

Order of the President of the Court of Justice of 21 December 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Oost-Vlaanderen Afdeling Gent — Belgium) — Openbaar Ministerie v EA

(Case C-246/20) (1)

(2021/C 79/35)

Language of the case: Dutch

The President of the Court of Justice has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 297, 7.9.2020.

Order of the President of the Court of Justice of 14 December 2020 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — BC v Deutsche Lufthansa AG

(Case C-467/20) (1)

(2021/C 79/36)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Court of Justice has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 433, 14.12.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 20 January 2021 — Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO — M. J. Dairies (BBQLOUMI)

(Case T-328/17 RENV) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark BBQLOUMI - Earlier EU collective word mark HALLOUMI - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2021/C 79/37)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi (Nicosia, Cyprus) (represented by: S. Malynicz QC, V. Marsland, Solicitor, and S. Barran, Barrister)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: M.J. Dairies EOOD (Sofia, Bulgaria) (represented by: D. Dimitrova, avocate)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 March 2017 (Case R 497/2016-4), relating to opposition proceedings between the Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi and M. J. Dairies.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi to pay the costs relating to the proceedings instituted before the General Court and to the proceedings on the appeal before the Court of Justice.

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(1)  OJ C 239, 24.7.2017.

Judgment of the General Court of 20 January 2021 — Jareš Procházková and Jareš v EUIPO — Elton Hodinářská (MANUFACTURE PRIM 1949)

(Case T-656/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark MANUFACTURE PRIM 1949 - Absence of a prior right acquired pursuant to national law - Article 52(2)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 40/04 (now Article 60(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2021/C 79/38)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Applicants: Hana Jareš Procházková (Prague, Czech Republic), Antonín Jareš (Prague) (represented by: M. Kyjovský, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Elton Hodinářská a.s. (Nové Město nad Metují, Czech Republic) (represented by: T. Matoušek, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 September 2018 (Case R 1159/2017-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between, on the one hand, Mrs Jareš Procházková and Mr Jareš and, on the other hand, Elton Hodinářská.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Mrs Hana Jareš Procházková and Mr Antonín Jareš to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO);

3.	Orders Elton Hodinářská a.s. to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 4, 7.1.2019.

Order of the General Court of 19 January 2021 — Umweltinstitut München v Commission

(Case T-712/18) (1)

(Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Documents relating to a meeting of the Joint Management Committee for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures established by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, on the one hand, and the European Union and its Member States, on the other hand (CETA) - Refusal of partial access - Disclosure of the requested document after the appeal has been lodged - No longer any legal interest in bringing proceedings - No need to adjudicate)

(2021/C 79/39)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Umweltinstitut München-Verein zur Erforschung und Verminderung der Umweltbelastung eV (Munich, Germany) (represented by: M. John, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: C. Ehrbar, F. Erlbacher and C. Vollrath, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Commission Decision C(2018) 6539 final of 2 October 2018 refusing access to certain documents relating to the meeting of the Joint Management Committee for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures established by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, on the one hand, and the European Union and its Member States, on the other hand, (CETA) signed in Brussels on 30 October 2016, held on 26 and 27 March 2018 in Ottawa (Canada).

Operative part of the order

1.	There is no longer any need to rule on the action.

2.	Each party shall bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 44, 4.2.2019.

Order of the General Court of 18 January 2021 — Datenlotsen Informationssysteme v Commission

(Case T-34/20) (1)

(Action for annulment - State aid - Software solutions for universities - Tax advantages and public funding - Formal investigation procedure - Decision classifying the implemented measures as existing aid - Lack of individual concern - No regulatory act - Inadmissibility)

(2021/C 79/40)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Datenlotsen Informationssysteme GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: T. Lübbig, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Blanck and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2020/391 of 20 September 2019 on the measure SA.34402 — 2015/C (ex 2015/NN) implemented by Germany for Hochschul-Informations-System GmbH (OJ 2020 L 74, p. 22).

Operative part of the order

1.	The action is dismissed.

2.	The application by the Federal Republic of Germany for leave to intervene in support of the European Commission has become devoid of purpose.

3.	Datenlotsen Informationssysteme GmbH is ordered to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 77, 9.3.2020.

Action brought on 11 December 2020 — OP v Commission

(Case T-736/20)

(2021/C 79/41)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: OP (represented by: S. Pappas, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

annul i) the decision of the Selection Board of 5 February 2020, by which the applicant was not placed on the reserve list of Open Competition EPSO/AST/147/19 and ii) the decision of the Appointing Authority of 3 September 2020, by which the complaint of the applicant against the decision of the Selection Board of 5 February 2020 was rejected, to the extent it contains additional reasoning;

—	order the defendant to bear its costs as well as the applicant’s costs for the current proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment, transparency, objectivity and of Article 1d(5) of the Staff Regulations.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to good administration.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging insufficient and inadequate reasoning.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations.

Action brought on 16 December 2020 — Advansa Manufacturing and Others v Commission

(Case T-741/20)

(2021/C 79/42)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Advansa Manufacturing GmbH (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) and 14 other applicants (represented by: D. Haverbeke, L. Ruessmann, and P. Sellar, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

—	Annul Annex I to the Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021, (1) to the extent that it wrongfully excludes the man-made fibres manufacturing sector;

—	Order pursuant to Article 264 TFEU that the effects of Annex I to the contested act be continued until such time as the defendant takes the measures necessary to comply with the Court's decision pursuant to Article 266 TFEU;

—	Order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on seven pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that Annex I to the contested act is vitiated by a lack of competence. — In accordance with Articles 5(1) and 5(2) TEU, the EU shall act only within the limits of the competence conferred upon it by the Member States. Competences not conferred upon the EU by the Treaties remain with the Member States; — It is not the defendant but the Member States that are competent, under Article 10a(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended, (2) to adopt the contested act.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that Annex I to the contested act is vitiated by an infringement of an essential procedural requirement. — The statement of reasons of the contested act required by Article 296 TFEU fails to disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasoning followed by the defendant in calculating the indirect emission intensity figure for the applicants’ sector, which is the determinative factor of inclusion or exclusion of a sector from Annex I to the contested act; — As a consequence of this failure to state reasons, the applicants are unable to defend their rights and the Court is unable to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that Annex I to the contested act infringes the principle of subsidiarity. — According to Article 5(3) TFEU, the European Union only acts, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at EU level; — While the national measures based on Article 10a(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC are subject to State aid control, the defendant breached the principle of subsidiarity by determining an ex ante list limiting the sectors and subsectors that can be eligible for indirect emission costs compensation, since (a) Member States are best placed to assess the genuine risk of carbon leakage for each industrial sector due to significant indirect costs actually incurred; and (b) the defendant adopted Annex I without providing a sufficient explanation of the necessity to do so.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that Annex I to the contested act infringes the principle of transparency. — The process leading to the adoption of the contested act lacked transparency in key respects, in particular: (a) the defendant failed to disclose the data used to calculate the indirect emission intensity figure of the applicants’ sector in either the contested act or the accompanying impact assessment; (b) the defendant failed to provide explanations substantiating its assessment on which subsectors have the highest potential for electrification; — Throughout the contested act’s adoption process, the defendant refused to communicate to the concerned parties how their indirect emission intensity figure would be calculated and how the electrification criterion would be applied, thus preventing them from entering into any substantive discussion with the defendant during the consultation periods; — The defendant therefore failed to comply with its obligations under Article 15 TFEU and Article 11 TEU to ensure the transparency of the process leading to the adoption of Annex I to the contested act.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that Annex I to the contested act is vitiated by manifest errors of assessment. — In the context of its discretion when carrying out complex economic and social assessments, the defendant must be able to show that it evaluated all the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation which the contested act was intended to govern. The defendant committed several manifest errors of assessment when excluding the applicants’ sector from the list of eligible sectors contained in Annex I to the contested act, notably by (a) failing to substantiate and justify the introduction of two additional eligibility thresholds; (b) failing to take into account the relevant and complete electricity consumption data of the applicants’ sector, which led to the underestimation of the sector's indirect emission intensity and to the sector's exclusion from Annex I; (c) disregarding the evidence produced by the applicants without stating reasons; and (d) with regard to the qualitative assessment, incorrectly assessing the sector’s fuel/electricity substitutability and failing to substantiate why the sector's subsectors were not included in Annex I based on this criterion.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that Annex I to the contested act is vitiated by a misapplication of the correct assessment criterion. — Article 10(a)(6) of Directive 2003/87/EC requires that sectors be considered against a criterion involving the assessment of ‘genuine risk’ of carbon leakage; — The defendant applied a different test, that of ‘significant risk’. By doing so, it applied the wrong lawful test.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that the contested act infringes the proportionality principle. — The defendant infringes the proportionality principle as it: (a) fails to seek to achieve the legitimate objective which is to incentivise a cost-effective decarbonisation of the economy by allowing energy-intensive sectors to invest in energy efficiency instead of shifting their production to third countries; (b) places an excessive burden on the excluded sectors while less burdensome solutions (such as setting maximum aid levels or conditionality mechanisms) would meet the objectives of the contested act at least in the same way; and (c) revealed the core details of its assessment of the eligible sectors only four days prior to publication of the contested act on 25 September 2020, which itself is only a little over three months prior to the expiry of the currently applicable Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the ETS . By doing so, the defendant infringes Article 5(4) TEU.

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(1)  OJ 2020 C 317, p. 5.

(2)  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32), as amended.

Action brought on 14 January 2021 — PJ v EIT

(Case T-12/21)

(2021/C 79/43)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: PJ (represented by: N. de Montigny, lawyer)

Defendant: European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the decision of 17 December 2020 by which the executive director denies the applicant the benefit of the exceptions to the prohibition on teleworking outside the country of employment and dismisses her request to telework from her place of origin submitted on 15 December 2020;

—	order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement, first, of Article 5.1.b. of the Guidelines applicable to the Commission and transposed to EIT and, second, of the applicant’s acquired rights. Next, the applicant invokes breach of the authority’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials. The applicant also alleges arbitrary interpretation of the ‘travel restrictions’ concept, lack of predictability and legal certainty, infringement of the national interpretations of those same sanitary measures introduced in each Member State. Finally, the applicant invokes infringement of the right to private and family life, failure to take into account her situation beyond the actual and justified interest of the service and disproportionate harm to her interests.

2.

Second plea in law relating to a plea of illegality regarding the rules in force if they are to be considered as prohibiting the applicant from teleworking from her place of origin in her situation based on infringement of the principles of equal treatment, right to private and family life, wellbeing at work, the principle of legal certainty and predictability. The applicant also invokes force majeure and infringement of Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in that the restriction on her rights is unlawful and disproportionate.

Action brought on 16 January 2021 — Be Smart v Commission

(Case T-18/21)

(2021/C 79/44)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Be Smart Srl (Rome, Italy) (represented by: F. Satta, G. Roberti, A. Romano and I. Perego, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

—

declare that the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 12(1) and Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) No 2015/1589, by failing to take a decision under Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 2015/1589, in particular to initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU, in connection with the complaint lodged by the applicant on 15 October 2014 (SA.39639);

—	order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The present action is based on Article 265 TFEU and seeks to obtain a declaration that the Commission unlawfully failed to take a position on the complaint lodged by Be Smart S.r.l. on 15 October 2014, registered under number SA.39639, concerning two unlawful State aid measures in favour of the Consorzio Interuniversitario Cineca.

In support of its action, the applicant claims that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligation to act, which arises under the provisions regarding unlawful State aid, by failing to take action after receiving the invitation to act and not adopting a position on the complaint lodged on 15 October 2014. It also failed to observe the fundamental principle of good administration laid down in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Action brought on 19 January 2021 — About You v EUIPO — Safe-1 Immobilieninvest (Y/O/U)

(Case T-23/21)

(2021/C 79/45)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: About You GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: W. Mosing, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Safe-1 Immobilieninvest GmbH (Mauer, Austria)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark Y/O/U — European Union trade mark No 10 226 884

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 November 2020 in Case R 527/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	hold an oral hearing;

—	annul the contested decision with the consequence that EUIPO shall revoke the EUTM entirely;

—	order EUIPO and, in case it intervenes in writing, the other party to the proceedings before EUIPO, to bear its/their own costs and to compensate the costs incurred by the applicant in the proceeding before the General Court and in the appellate proceeding before EUIPO.

Pleas in law

—	Infringement of the procedural requirements of evidence in terms of legal certainty and the principle of legitimate expectations;

—

Infringement of Article 58 in conjunction with Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Article 95 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council in conjunction with Articles 10, 19 and 27 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625.

Action brought on 20 January 2021 — Beveland v EUIPO — Super B (BUCANERO)

(Case T-29/21)

(2021/C 79/46)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Beveland, SA (Sant Joan les Fonts, Spain) (represented by: J. Carbonell Callicó, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Super B, SL (Talavera de la Reina, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Word mark BUCANERO — European Union trade mark No 390 641

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 November 2020 in Case R 1046/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the contested decision, expressly declaring the EU trademark BUCANERO (word mark) to be revoked for all the goods registered in Classes 32 and 33;

—	order EUIPO and the proprietor of the trade mark at issue, SUPER B, S.L., to pay all the costs of the proceedings before the General Court, including the costs relating to the revocation proceedings before EUIPO.

Plea in law

Infringement of Articles 18 and 58 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Action brought on 22 January 2021 — Ryanair v Commission

(Case T-34/21)

(2021/C 79/47)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ryanair DAC (Swords, Ireland) (represented by: E. Vahida, F.-C. Laprévote, V. Blanc, S. Rating and I. Metaxas-Maranghidis, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the European Commission’s decision (EU) of 25 June 2020 on State Aid SA.57153 (2020/N) — Germany — COVID-19 — Aid to Lufthansa; and

—	order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the European Commission misapplied its communication Temporary framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak (1) (the ‘Temporary Framework’) and misused its powers by finding that Deutsche Lufthansa AG is eligible to the aid, failing to assess whether there were other more appropriate and less distortive measures available, finding that the amount of recapitalisation was proportionate, failing to apply proper conditions regarding the exit of the State, mandating insufficient slot divestitures, and failing to impose an effective ban on aggressive expansion by the beneficiary.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the European Commission misapplied Article 107(3)(b) TFEU by finding that the aid addresses a serious disturbance in the German economy, by violating its obligation to weigh the beneficial effects of the aid against its adverse effects on trading conditions and the maintenance of undistorted competition (i.e., the ‘balancing test’), and by requiring the late submission of a restructuring plan.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging that the European Commission violated the general principles of non-discrimination, free provision of services and free establishment.

4.	Forth plea in law, alleging that the European Commission failed to initiate a formal investigation procedure despite serious difficulties and violated the applicant’s procedural rights.

5.	Fifth plea in law, alleging that the European Commission violated its duty to state reasons.

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(1)  Temporary framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 91I/1 of 20 March 2020, as amended.

Order of the General Court of 13 January 2021 — Chiquita Brands v EUIPO — Fyffes International (HOYA)

(Case T-189/20) (1)

(2021/C 79/48)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Third Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 191, 8.6.2020.

Order of the General Court of 15 January 2021 — Aldi Stores v EUIPO — Dualit (Shape of a toaster)

(Case T-199/20) (1)

(2021/C 79/49)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Fifth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 201, 15.6.2020.

Order of the General Court of 20 January 2021 — JD v EIB

(Case T-608/20) (1)

(2021/C 79/50)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Fourth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 433, 14.12.2020.